

SHRI KADAMBUR M.R. JANARTHANAN!: I request the hon. Member, Mr. Fernandes, to support the Bill. We have not come here to scrap the Exim Bank but we have come for amendments to raise the level of exports and imports of the country. Therefore, I request the hon. Member to support the Bill. He is the only man who wanted to scrap it. I request him to support the Bill. Thank you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI T.N. CHATURVEDI): The question is:

"That the Bill further to amend the Export-Import Bank of India Act, 1981, as passed by Lok Sabha, be taken into consideration."

The motion was adopted.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI T.N. CHATURVEDI): We shall now take up clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill.

Clause 2 was added to the Bill.

Clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the Title were added to the Bill.

SHRI KADAMBUR-M. R. JANARTHANAM: I move that the Bill be passed.

The question was put and the motion was adopted.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI T.N. CHATURVEDI): Thank you. Now, the House is adjourned for lunch till two o'clock.

The House then adjourned for lunch at twenty-seven minutes past one of the clock.

The House reassembled after lunch at two minutes past two of the clock, Mr. Chairman *in the Chair*.

SUPPLEMENTARY DEMANDS FOR GRANTS (RAILWAYS), 1998-99

THE MINISTER OF RAILWAYS (SHRI NITISH KUMAR): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table a statement (in English and Hindi) showing the Supplementary Demands for Grants (Railways) for the year 1998-99.

STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER AND DISCUSSION

Bilateral Talks with United States

THE PRIME MINISTER (SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE): Mr. Chairman, Sir, since the May 11 and 13 tests, the Government has, from time to time, taken the House into confidence and sought views of the Hon'ble Members. This was done through statements and discussions in the House on 27—29 May, 8 June and on 3-4 August. Nevertheless, I wish to reemphasise some salients of our policy.

I take this opportunity to reiterate that India's commitment to global nuclear disarmament remains undiluted. As Hon'ble Members are no doubt aware, India has consistently maintained that a nuclear-weapon-free world would enhance not only our security but the security of all nations. That is why numerous initiatives in this direction were taken during the last fifty years; such steps as would encourage decisive and irreversible measures for the attainment of this objective. Regrettably, the international community, particularly countries that have based their security on nuclear weapons or a nuclear umbrella, have been reluctant to embrace this objective. Keeping open our nuclear option, therefore, became a national security imperative three decades ago, an imperative equally valid for India in the post-Cold War period. The option that was exercised in May '98 was thus a continuation of a decision taken nearly 25 years earlier; during which period India had demonstrated an exemplary nuclear restraint, given the exceptional security related complexities of our region. I wish to place on record that successive governments continued to safeguard this option, demonstrate our capability and take such steps as were necessary to ensure the viability of the option through weaponisation.

Just as our conventional defense capability has been deployed in order to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India against any- use or

threat of use of force, the adoption of our nuclear deterrent posture has also followed the same logic. We have announced our intention to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent, but one that is credible. Mindful of our global and enhanced responsibility to address concerns of the international community, and in order to re-assure all countries about the defensive nature of our nuclear capability, we have engaged in bilateral discussions with key interlocutors. In international forums, like the United Nations, India is the only country possessing nuclear weapons to raise a call for negotiating a gradual and progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons, within a time-bound framework.

We also have an established tradition of consultation with friendly countries on all important international issues. Successive governments have pursued an open, positive and constructive approach in our foreign relations. This is in keeping with our national ethos. It is within this framework that India had been engaged, even before May 1998, in a wide-ranging and broad-based dialogue with the United States. This included discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation and on larger strategic issues.

Following the May 11 and 13 nuclear tests, apprehensions were expressed in some quarters. It was therefore, decided to have more focussed and intensive discussions. Accordingly, Shri Jaswant Singh, the then Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission was designated as our Representative, to carry forward this dialogue. Similarly, President Clinton designated Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, as the US interlocutor.

This dialogue has been conducted on the basis of a set of comprehensive proposals, put forward by India, to the international community, soon after the May tests. As the House would recollect, these proposals comprise: a voluntary moratorium on underground nuclear test explosions; our willingness to move towards a de-jure formalisation of this commitment, a decision to join negotiations

on a treaty for a ban on future production of fissile material for weapons purposes; and, our determination to make more stringent the existing system of export controls over sensitive materials and technology.

Since the 11 June 1998 Washington meet, six rounds of discussions between Shri Jaswant Singh and Mr. Talbott, have been held. Both teams have worked purposefully to narrow gaps of preception and to establish common ground. These exchanges have been marked by a sense of responsibility, candour and a sincere attempt to understand each other's concerns and points of view. The Government is entirely mindful that the issues involved touch upon matters of vital interest to both countries. In these talks, we have firmly put across our security concerns and the imperative of maintaining a minimum, credible, nuclear deterrent. I wish to inform the House that the talks are premised on this basis. Also there now exists some understanding of our security concerns and requirements.

The talks have focussed on issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation. It is agreed that regional issues shall be kept distinctly apart. As Hon'ble Members are well aware, India's concerns in these matters go beyond the South Asian region, and involve a wider perspective.

After six rounds, talks have narrowed and are now focussed on the following four issues:—

CTBT

Indian remains committed to converting our voluntary moratorium into a de-jure obligation. In response to the desire of the international community, as expressed to us in our bilateral and multilateral interactions, that the Treaty should come into effect in September 1999, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September, I reiterated broadly what I had said in Parliament, I quote India is now engaged in discussions with our key interlocutors on a range of issues,

including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999. We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions".

That remains our position. For the successful conclusion of talks, creation of positive environment by our interlocutors is a necessary ingredient.

The House will be reassured that in the assessment of our scientists, this stand does not come the way of our taking such steps as may be found necessary in future to safeguard our national security. It also does not constrain us from continuing with our R&D programmes, nor does it jeopardise in any manner the safety and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent in the years to come.

FMCT:

We have expressed our willingness to join the FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. It is our understanding, as that of many other countries, who have confirmed this to us, that the objective of these negotiations is to arrive at a nondiscriminatory treaty, that will end the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes, in accordance with the 1993 consensus resolution of the UN General Assembly. We are willing to work for the early conclusion of such a treaty.

It was suggested to us that we might examine announcing a moratorium on fissile material production. We have conveyed that it is not possible to take such steps at this stage. We will, of course, pay serious attention any negotiated multilateral initiatives in the course of the FMCT negotiations.

Export Controls:

Discussions in this area have registered progress. An expert level meeting of officials from both sides was held in New Delhi on 9-10 November. In light of our

additional capabilities, as a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons, and as earlier announced, we are taking steps to make more stringent our laws in this regard. We have also conveyed that India should be provided better access to dual-use and high technologies in view of India's impeccable record of effective control over sensitive technologies. The expert-level meeting was categorised as helpful by both, India and the US, to the prospects of continuing cooperation in this area.

Defence Posture:

As Hon'ble Members are, no doubt, aware, matters relating to defence postures are sovereign functions, not subject for negotiations. In fact, our talks are based on the fundamental premise that India will define its own requirements, for its nuclear deterrent, on its own assessment of the security environment. The US and other interlocutors, are interested in understanding our positions and our policies better.

We have formally announced a policy of No-First-Use and non-use against non-nuclear weapons states. As Hon'ble Members are aware, a policy of no-first-use with a minimum nuclear deterrent, implies deployment of assets in a manner that ensures survivability and capacity of an adequate response. We are also not going to enter into an arms race with any country. Ours' will be a minimum credible deterrent, which will safeguard India's security, —the security of one-sixth of humanity, now and into the future. The National Security Council, with the assistance of its subsidiary bodies, the establishment of which has been announced, will make important contributions to elaborating these concepts.

We have expressed our reservations about provisions of certain export control regimes that ostensibly seek to promote non-proliferation objectives, but are discriminatory in application. India's missile development programme is an

indigenous programme, that was launched almost 15 years ago. This programme is regularly reviewed, taking

into account our security environment, particularly missile acquisitions and deployments in our region. We have announced that a new version of the Agni, with an extended range is under development. Flight-testing of such an enhanced range Agni will be conducted fully in accordance with established international practice. While our decision is to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum but credible, I would like to re-affirm to this House that the Government will not accept any restraints on the development of India's R&D capabilities. Such activity is an integral of any country's defense preparedness and essential for coping with new threat perceptions that may emerge in the years ahead. This Government remains unequivocally opposed to any suggestions that seek to place India at a technological disadvantage through intrusive or sovereignty violative measures.

At the same time, we will continue to take initiatives in the international forums towards fulfilling the objective of complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. At this year's UN General Assembly, we had taken the initiative for, what could be an important first step, through a resolution of 'Reducing Nuclear Danger'. This initiative was intended to urge countries to move back from the nuclear hair-trigger response postures of the Cold War. If such initiatives are multilaterally accepted by other nuclear weapon states, they will, of course, be accordingly reflected in our own positions, too.

In the course of these discussions with the United States and other countries, I have kept in touch with leaders of various political parties. We have issued statements from time to time on pronouncements and declarations by various countries. This corpus of statements in Parliament and through Official Spokesman conveys our position

and is well known to Hon'ble members. These issues have also been discussed, at considerable length, in meetings of the Standing Committee and the Consultative Committee of Parliament. The viewpoints expressed by Hon'ble members in these discussions, have provided us valuable guidance in conducting discussions with the United States and other countries.

The dialogue with the United States will be continued at the next meeting scheduled to be held in the second half of January, in New Delhi.

While there is no time-frame for the conclusion of these talks, it is the intention of both countries, that a stable understanding should be reached on the remaining issues at an early date. This would provide a further momentum to bilateral relations, which is desired by both countries.

In addition to the talks between Shri Jaswant Singh and Mr. Strobe Talbott, we have had detailed exchanges with France and Russia. Discussions have also taken place with UK and China at the level of Shri Jaswant Singh and at official level with Germany and Japan as well as with other non-nuclear weapon states. I have been in regular correspondence with President Clinton. Our correspondence has touched not only upon issues under discussion between our Representatives but also on larger aspects of Indo-US relations. It is my view that the future of Indo-US relations is much larger than the four issues under consideration. President Clinton has also expressed to me, his desire for a broad-based relationship with India that befits the two largest democracies of the world. I have fully reciprocated these sentiments. Indeed, our ongoing dialogue with the United States is geared towards that end. I am confident this House will want to wish it all success.

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (West Bengal): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I thank the Prime Minister for making the Statement. We are grateful to you for allowing this House to have a full-fledged discussion

on the Statement of the Prime Minister on bilateral talks with the U.S.A. Sir, as the Prime Minister has pointed out, on several occasions, after Pokhran-II explosions on 11th and 13th of May, the House had the opportunity of discussing these issues.

We also had the opportunity of having interaction with the Prime Minister and our Chief Negotiator, now the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh. In the context of that, I would like to place certain issues before the House and for the consideration of the Prime Minister. He has very correctly pointed out—and I have no doubt the whole House will agree with him—that our basic objective for the last 50 years has been to achieve nuclear disarmament, as we had considered nuclear disarmament is the only guarantee to ensure peace and security to the world. From day one we have postulated that nuclear weapons are not weapons to win battles, but are weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, we have not been able to convince, particularly the nuclear weapon States, who consider that to have nuclear arsenals is their monopoly and they wanted to have an exclusive club of five and nobody else should be allowed to enter it. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has now become the Treaty, and signed by a large number of countries, is highly discriminatory, naturally India could not sign it and we opted out of it. When the CTBT negotiations began, we, with all earnestness, participated in the negotiations with the hope and objective that ultimately through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty some time—frame would be available by which the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would resume nuclear disarmament process seriously. But, CTBT failed to come up to our expectations. The House was informed of this and the then Government decided not to sign the CTBT.

But, the situation has changed after May 11 and 13, when we had five tests at Pokhran and on May 25, when Pakistan

conducted six tests. Now, the situation is that in this sub-continent we are having two nuclear-weapon States. Whether it is recognised or not recognised, but this is the ground reality. Therefore, the situation, which prevailed even after 1974, that situation has changed after May 11 and 13 and May 25, when in the subcontinent we are having two nuclear-weapon States. In that context, the sanctions were imposed. There is no denial of the fact that the international community starting from G-8 countries to a large number of non-aligned countries reacted very sharply and several resolutions, including the one at the UN Security Council, were passed. Thereafter the Government decided, and rightly so, to have negotiations with the interlocutory countries. We have been informed of this in this Statement after six rounds of talks that the representatives of the Government of India and the United States had. What we find from the Statement of the Prime Minister is that presently the discussions involved are in four critical areas — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Missile Control Treaty, Deployment and also to have some determination of export control. These are the four major issues on which we are sharing our views. Of course, there has not been any definite conclusion and negotiations are going on. Neither would I — nor I would like anyone in this House to — queer the pitch of negotiations by making certain observations which may affect this very delicate international dialogue. At the same time, I would like to refer to the observations made by the Prime Minister in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. He has very clearly articulated his views. He has quoted what he has said in Parliament. I would also like to quote it because it has some relevance to the time frame of negotiations : "India is now engaged in discussions with our key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September, 1999. We expect that

other countries, etc.,..." Now the time frame is September, 1999. If three or four countries, India, Pakistan and Israel which are important, do not sign by September, 1999, then, all the original signatory-countries conventions will have to be conveyed and what the international community would like to decide on it, they will decide. Therefore, if not directly, but indirectly these negotiations have to be completed before a time frame because we have said, "We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September, 1999." I do not know whether we will bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion or not. But there are two obligations. One basic obligation is that if we do not want to stand in the way of the implementation of the CTBT beyond 1999, then, we must have a successful conclusions of these negotiations. The successful negotiations between India and USA depend on four crucial issues. For the time being, I am keeping the CTBT issue aside.

Now I will come to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty on which serious negotiations are expected to begin at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. As I understand from the statement and the interaction which we had, the Government of India has taken a position and that position has to be reiterated that the effect of the FMCT cannot be retrospective, but it must be prospective. We would like to engage ourselves in the negotiations meaningfully with a constructive approach, not to stand in the way so that the FMCT does materialise. But any conditionality which is insisted upon should not be accepted. That is the crux of the present negotiations. What I understand is the United States of America is interested in having some sort of an obligation imposed on India, not to produce fissile materials even before the negotiations begin at Geneva. So far as the statement of the Prime Minister is concerned; and so far as the stated position of the Government of India is con-

cerned and so far as the negotiations by the Government of India are concerned, they have stated that this is not acceptable. What I would like to say is that this should not be accepted because this is the crux of the issue. We would like to engage ourselves in the negotiations. We will be prepared to accept all the obligations after the successful conclusion of the negotiations and thereafter to carry on the obligation in actual implementation. But any moratorium either voluntarily or to have the successful conclusion of the negotiations we should not accept any obligations which will put us in a very awkward situation.

The second question, of course, would come—and the Prime Minister has elaborated it in his statement—about the security perceptions. We understand, and as it has been openly pointed out by the representative of the United States Government, not once but on a number of occasions, they would not like to have deployment of the nuclear weapons and they would like to have a cap on our nuclear weapons. So far as we are concerned, definitely, we have declared, these are the two very important basic points which have been announced—no first use; and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. But at the same time, as the Prime Minister has repeated and representatives of the Government have pointed out umpteen number of times, our objective of the tests is not merely to have some academic satisfaction, to prove our technological strength, but to have a credible minimum deterrent. If we want to have a credible minimum deterrent—I am not a scientist; we have the privilege of Mr. Raja Ramanna's presence in this House though I do not find him right now—it has to be decisively determined by the scientific establishments of the Government, the scientific community of the country, that whatever we have achieved through the tests would enable us to have a minimum credible deterrent which the Government considers as absolutely necessary for our security concern. Therefore, this is one

crucial area over which we shall have to have a hard bargain. Up to now, what is achieved? of course, in a complicated negotiation like this, time is needed and there can be no two opinions that we should not lose patience and we should carry on our talk. But what we gather from the statement of the Prime Minister is that up to now, we have shared our perceptions with each other on these four crucial issues.

On other peripheral issues, yes, we have been able to achieve some success. Bilateral issues have been brought, not directly but indirectly, because the basic question which they are trying to point out is that you have some sort of non-proliferation in the framework of the region. The position which we assumed before May 11 and 13 was that the nuclear problem was not confined to any region and merely having regional non-proliferation was not going to help to ensure international peace and security. It is not a conventional war using conventional weapons. It is a war for much destruction, if it happens at all through these nuclear weapons. Therefore, this regional concept is very meagre. But still, it has emerged because in this Sub-Continent, two countries are nuclear powers. Therefore, in this connection, though the statement is confined to the development of talks between India and the USA, the talk between Pakistan and India has a relevance. It has a relevance because both of them.....

I think the Leader of the House wants to say something. Mr. Leader of the House, would you like to say something?

THE LEADER OF THE HOUSE (SHRI SIKANDER BAKHT): I am sorry. I was communicating to somebody sitting behind you.

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE: I am sorry, because you raised your hand, I thought you wanted to say something.

What I am saying is, before the 11th and 13th May or the 25th May, the Indo-Pakistan talk had a dimension which

had changed substantially after the 11th, 13th and 25th May because both of them are nuclear-weapon states. Therefore, at least, while replying to the queries and suggestions which we will be making in the course of discussion, we would like to know from the Prime Minister as to what our position is. What talks are going on? Recently, I found that some observations have been made by the Pakistan Foreign Secretary in regard to the limited agreement in relation to the nuclear non-proliferation. What has been the response of the Government in that direction?

The third relevant issue in this connection is, how are we going to formulate our views in regard to the Export Control Regimes? I entirely agree with the Prime Minister and the Government that this is a continuing policy, though we are not a signatory to the international agreement and treaty. But we are imposing ourselves very strict controls. But in the statement the Prime Minister has mentioned that they will have a fresh look at this matter. I would like to quote one sentence from the statement. It says:

"We are taking steps to make our law more stringent in this regard."

The whole sentence is:

"In the light of our additional capabilities as a responsible State, possessing nuclear weapons, and as earlier announced, we are taking steps to make our law more stringent in this regard."

What type of export control regimes we are going to have and v/hat improvement we would like to make in our law, could be explained. Of course, if it is an item of negotiation between the two countries, I would not like the Government to disclose their cards. But if it is not so, if we want to impose some obligations voluntarily on ourselves, I would like to know as to what the thinking of the Government in this regard is.

Now, coming to the question of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Yes, today is 15th of December. Therefore, we have time up to September itself. But even by that time, we shall have to formulate our views. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, Sir, I would like to draw the attention of the Prime Minister to a letter which we have sent. He was good enough to invite the representatives of our party. The Leader of the Opposition, Shri Manmohan Singh, and myself had the privilege of having interaction with him, and thereafter, we had formulated our views and conveyed the same to the Prime Minister before he left for U.S.A. to participate in the United Nations General Assembly discussion. What had we suggested? I would like to read out some of those observations.

"The country will not be benefited by premature declaration by the Prime Minister at the United Nations General Assembly of its intention to comply with the CTBT obligations and not standing in the way of the implementation of the CTBT after September 1999. The declaration of the intention of the Government on CTBT should be first announced in the Indian Parliament before it is articulated in the international fora, as both the Houses of Indian Parliament expressed its opinion in 1996 before the CTBT was opened for signatures. The Congress party feels that the Government should try to evolve a national consensus on this issue even after Pokhran-II test, and as there is time till September 1999, the Government should not announce its 'decision or intention before the process of evolving the consensus is complete. The Government should clearly spell out the advantages and disadvantages to the nation before announcing its decision or intention."

Naturally, we have suggested, as international developments are taking place very fast, the Government should take full advantage of the time available to it

before coming to any definitive conclusion. "We should watch how and in what manner USA's Senate ratifies the Treaty. The process of dialogue with important countries, including P-5 countries, should continue." And most of these have already responded to the Prime Minister. It is also given in his statement. But what is needed now? Seven, eight, nine months are still left, before we take a final decision. This is an area where it may not be possible to indicate our position on 15th of December, but, surely, in the next six, seven months, we shall have to say what our position would be in regard to the CTBT, if the present negotiations are not successfully concluded. And these negotiations cannot be successfully concluded unless there is a convergence of views. Their concept of deployment and our concept of deployment differ. It is not a question of the dictionary meaning or the grammatical derivative meaning of the word 'deployment'. It is a question of perceptions. Our perceptions and their perceptions differ. Surely, if we want to achieve the primary objective, for which all these steps and other things took place, of creating a credible nuclear deterrent, certain follow-up actions are absolutely called for not only in the area of research and development, but also in certain other areas which are too known to the Government, and it need not be spelt out in details. Therefore, that is to be decided upon. It is also to be decided upon whether there will any obligation on the production of fissile material, even before the negotiations start. We assume that the next round of negotiations are going to take place sometime in mid January. In January, in Geneva itself, in all probability, the CoD is going to meet, and the FMCT is going to be negotiated there, we will definitely like to engage ourselves seriously because it is one of our basic objectives.

The Third area on which I would like to have the reaction and response of the Government is the time-frame. The Prime Minister has mentioned this in

several parts of his statement. He has also mentioned it on earlier occasions whether we can bring in some sort of a time-frame. Here also, he has used the particular phrase 'a certain time-frame', 'nuclear disarmament with certain timeframe'. In 1988, India offered a timeframe, a ten-year time-frame, with a definite ten-point action plan. And that has not been taken up. He has now suggested, in his statement that they would like to have a time-frame for nuclear disarmament. I would like to know from the hon. Prime Minister, and also from the Government, as to what has been the response and in what form it may come. We have placed our viewpoints. There is no doubt that we have placed our viewpoint. The statement contains what our stated position is, but the statement does not contain what the re-ponse of USA has been, uptill now. As it is articulated, from time to time, in the press, what we used to hear from the authoritative representatives of the United States of America is that they are just sticking to their position. If we stick to our position, and if there is no convergence of views, how could we have a successful cpnclusion of the negotiations with our key interlocutors? It is also stated in the Statement: "We have suggested that we will not accept any restraints on the development of India's R&D capabilities. Such activity is an integral of any country's defence preparedness and is essential for coping with new threat perceptions that may emerge in the years ahead." Very well. Go and take it. That is the country's stated position; everybody will agree with you. But are they going to share this perception? This is" not the moot question. The moot question is to what extent we have been able to carry con'*iction with them. We have been able to veer them around us because here we are talking with them, though they do not represent all the 45 countries. But being the single superpower today, they have assumed to themselves some sort of an international peace keeping role. Therefore, when they talk of their concern, their concern is not

identical with our concern. Our concern is our own security. Our concern is nuclear disarmament. Our concern is keeping the world free from nuclear weapons. Their concern is not only to retain but also to hold their own monopoly over the nuclear arsenal. Mr. Chairman, it is known to the Government, to every one of us, that the conditionality, which has been suggested in the paper forwarded to the Senate for ratification of the treaty, is—they have that manifest clause—their supreme national interest. If the supreme national interest of the United States demands, even after signing the CTBT and ratified by the Senate of the United States, putting the ball rolling into operation, if the supreme national interest of the United States demands that there should be a test, they will be entitled to have that test. That is the conditionality which they are attaching to the signing of the CTBT. Therefore, their concern and our concern cannot coverge. They want to retain their superpower capacity. Therefore, in whichever area it is, it is their responsibility. That is the whole rationale of the concept of deterrent. We did not agree to have that deterrent concept. But we find that when four or five countries, the five nuclear weapon States, considered themselves that they should possess nuclear weapons, which would act as a deterrent and prevent proliferation of neclear technology and manufacturing of nuclear weapons, it ultimately failed. In this context, the Government will have to think and consider seriously what would be the scenario before September 1999. As I have mentioned, as per article 14, it requires the signature of 40 countries. All the countries' signature will be available. When the Treaty was completed in 1996 there were three nuclear threshold States, India, Pakistan and Israel. From the indications, which are available from the newspapers, we find that Pakistan is going to sign it. It is that either they have signed it or they are going to sign it. Therefore, we will remain alone. The boy stands on the burning deck—Casablanca. Therefore, this time—it may not be

necessarily on 15th December, but surely in the next four or five months—we must evolve a consensus on what should be our approach and what view we should take, if these negotiations do not conclude with success. A successful conclusion of the negotiations does not depend merely on us. I feel, Mr. Chairman, Sir, the Government of India, by declaring a voluntary moratorium, by opening

negotiations, by clearly spelling out the viewpoints of the Government, has taken certain steps. But, unfortunately, it is not being properly responded to, how we can have a proper understanding. This is the crux of the whole issue. I would not like to sound pessimistic. But, at the same time, in these international negotiations we must keep this in view. We may like it or we may not like it. We may admit it or we may not admit it. A large number of countries might not have criticised us openly.

They might not have spoken to us vociferously as some of the G-15 and P-5 countries have done. When we refused to sign CTBT and NPT, even then we did not have many friends among Non-aligned countries, and in the sub-continent. Let us be frank and can do enough. Can this problem between India and Pakistan be seriously construed today as merely a matter of concern between India and Pakistan? Of course, all the problems should be resolved bilaterally. But the country belongs to SAARC. They are also concerned. They felt it. They expressed their concern by saying that you resolve your issues bilaterally and begin a dialogue and come to a successful conclusion. To my mind, successful conclusion of talks between India and Pakistan is equally important, if it is not more important than the successful conclusion of talks between India and USA because both of them are nuclear States today. It is an area of concern not only for these two countries but also for other countries belonging to this region.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, before I conclude, I would like to request the Government to carry on the dialogue process. We

must engage ourselves in serious negotiations. There are certain basic issues on which compromise is not possible. I am sure, the Prime Minister and the Government would not compromise on those issues.

Lastly, I would like to know from the hon. Prime Minister—I had raised this question earlier also—his own hard assessment, not only as the Prime Minister of the country but also as the former Foreign Minister of the country, of the trend of negotiations which are going on. If he can share his own assessment with the House, we will be too glad. With these words, I conclude.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am of course delighted to read the Prime Minister's statement. If you permit me to say, I am even more delighted to hear Shri Pranab Mukherjee's speech just now. It shows the great advance that the country has made, that this House has made and, if I may say so, the Government has made since May. Immediately after the nuclear tests, you will recall, Sir, there was a lot of acrimony. When I and my colleagues, the new Members, came here in July, there was a debate on nuclear explosions. There was a lot of acrimony—then also I had an opportunity to speak immediately after Shri Pranab Mukherjee—that acrimony has now gone completely. It is a great tribute to Shri Pranab Mukherjee, to Dr. Manmohan Singh, to all my colleagues and to the Government that everything that the Prime Minister has said, has been endorsed by Shri Pranab Mukherjee and, I am sure, everything that he—Shri Mukherjee—has said with an exemplary sense of responsibility, would be endorsed by Members from this side.

Therefore I will merely elaborate some, of the things that he has said.

There are two or three grounds on which he has expressed his apprehension. Fortunately, they are not warranted. But before I come to them, the main point that I want to emphasise is that it was

very heartening to note that, while many of us have been anxious that the leaders of two principal parties and other parties should be meeting on such issues, Shri Pranab Mukherjee has informed us that on this vital question, consultations have been going on.

So much so that, in fact, he was able to read in the Prime Minister's statement in the United Nations, their own suggestion about how it should be worded. It is very heartening that briefings by scientists and others have been going on, and consultation have been going on across the political spectrum on a national issue. If only that culture could be extended to other issues, many of the things that we see in the House would not take place.

Sir, I would mention two points, and then I will just elaborate some of the suggestions which Shri Pranab Mukherjee has made for consideration of Government. Sir, one point is, yes, there is, in the Treaty, a ratification procedure. As you know, 44 countries are supposed to sign, to ratify, and to deposit those ratified documents with the Secretary-General of the U.N.O. As yet, only 10 have done so. In the case of United States also, only the President has signed, but the Senate, the Republican leadership in the Senate is not letting it go ahead. That is why in accordance with Shri Pranab Mukherjee's suggestions and also in the Prime Minister's wisdom, this statement in the United Nations was very carefully worded. It does not say, "we will sign by....", or "We will ratify by...." or "Having ratified, we will deposit the document by September, 1999." It only says, "Because of us, the coming into force shall not be delayed." Therefore, if it so happens that, for instance, China which has signed, but which has not yet ratified; or Pakistan which may sign, but which may hold up ratification for domestic political reasons till the last minute; or in the case of the U.S. itself, the President signs, but the Senate does not allow it to go through, then the CTBT will not come into force. So, we will be as much at liberty as anybody else, but

the onus for blocking the treaty will not come on us. That is why the statement has worded as it has. Second, Shri Mukherjee said that actually the United States is reserving the right to itself, that, in their supreme national interest, if they need to conduct tests again, they will do so. I am sure that Shri Mukherjee, knows this, but I would just mention for the rest of us that facility is available to every country which signs the Treaty; of course, that country takes the consequences for withdrawing from the Treaty. Article 9 of that Treaty says: "The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised its supreme interests." So, what they are claiming will be available to us as much as to anybody else. For that, we do not require negotiations with the United States, we certainly do not require their endorsement or approval.

The second point that he has raised of some anxiety is whether they agree with us on R&D or not. Shri Mukherjee is completely right, and the Prime Minister himself has said exactly the same thing, that these are the things that we will determine in accordance with our perception of our own defence interests. Sir, on the question of deployment or R&D, whether they agree with our assessment or not, that not come in the way of our signing or not signing the CTBT. Supposing they say, "No, you cannot do this type of research", we can say, "We will continue to do it," and still sign the CTBT. How does it come in the way? In considering these things.

Sir, there is a very important point to remember. As the hon. Member has rightly said, things have suddenly changed. Till the tests were carried out, in fact, the test themselves showed that the scientists had devised theoretical capabilities of carrying out tests. But no country can be fully confident that its R&D, the academic R&D, is actually

going to work in the battlefield. Therefore, to have signed this Treaty before May would have been suicidal and, that is why, for good reason, Shri Deve Gowda, who was the Prime Minister at that time, did not sign it. Vital developments had actually taken place in 1995, which reinforced this point.

3.00 P.M.

There were three vital developments and then in June, 1996 it was decided that we will actually withdraw from the CTBT discussions.

The first one was that the discriminatory regime of non-proliferation treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995. Within weeks of its extension, two countries, China and France immediately conducted the tests as if to rub in the point that, yes, it is an iniquitous treaty and we will do what we like. For that reason, when you were in Government, you know and I brought this to the attention of the House in the earlier debate also, in October, November, 1995 India decided to go in for tests. It is a matter of record, the Americans have stated that they got to know of this decision and brought pressure to bear. For good or bad reasons, the Indian Government buckled under. That was the position. So we had decided that tests are necessary before signing the treaty. We could not do so for reasons of pressure. In mid 1996, when the negotiations were concluded we had to say either 'yes' or 'no'. At that time, we had not conducted the tests, so we had to say 'no'.

There would have been a clean getting away for us. There was Article 14 about how the treaty shall come into force. About 320 monitoring stations were going to be set up in countries to ensure compliance. We were also to house some of those monitoring stations. The position was that when those countries which are housing these international monitoring stations have signed, the treaty shall come into force. We said, 'we will not sign'. Two days later, we said, 'we will not house these monitoring stations.' The treaty

would have still gone ahead without us. The same monitoring stations which were to be located in India could have been located in, say, Nepal. But two countries, specially China and Britain, said, 'no, no, India must be roped in'. Within 2-3 weeks, Article 14 was changed and a new version of Article was brought in which said, "Unless these 44 countries which have been designated by the International Atomic Agency as having reactors for R&D or for power, sign, this treaty will not come into force." This meant that if India does not sign, all the onus will be on India.

And that will not be the end of the matter, because in this case Sir, before we are swept off by brave words, we should remember one thing. In the case of the atomic tests, we violated no covenant that we had signed. We went back on no assurance. But in this Treaty, Article 14 provides, if you don't sign, if one of the 44 does not sign, the treaty does not come into force. But the position is, there shall then be a Review Conference. Only the countries which have signed, will be called to Conference let us say the other 43; they shall determine, the Article provides, what steps to take to ensure speedy implementation of CTBT. That means you will then be facing not just one United States acting on its own, you will not just be facing one Japan saying that we will not give aid just now, you will be facing a concerted view taken by those 43 countries and the others. That is the position. So, on the point of its coming into force, the Statement is very carefully worded. If it does not come into force, well and good, we are as free as everybody. The onus does not come on us. If it comes into force, then we have the same facilities under this treaty as others have. I will elaborate that point because of the apprehension Mr. Mukherjee expressed regarding R&D. Sir, the position is that this treaty bans all explosions. The position before May was that we had not conducted the tests, and we needed those tests for the weapons in

our assessment. If we had signed the treaty then we would have forever foregone the option we had kept open for 25 years—an option have strongly argued in favour since the explosion was conducted by Mrs. Gandhi. But things are now opposite. All the P-5 countries, specially the United States, Russia and China, have, said that explosions are banned, but sub-critical tests are not banned under this treaty. They have said, "No, we can conduct such test, we can { continue to do computer simulations to improve the lethality of our weapons." This is why we were arguing in Geneva that this is a treaty that is allowing vertical proliferation. They can go on improving the weapons we can neither have nor improve. There are five or six categories of tests of some particular types of containers and so on, — I am not a scientist, I can only read out the words to you -- which they are saying are allowed. All the three countries, namely, the United States, China and Russia have carried out such tests. Having signed the CTBT, just three days ago, Russia carried out a sub-critical test in the Arctic. They announced that they have done it. That was our objection then but that is our advantage today. Shri Jaswant Singh once explained it to me with a graphic analogy. "Look at it as a crowded railway compartment", he said. "When you are trying to come into it, your perspective is, one, When you are in it, you want the rules that will keep you in and keep the others out." That is exactly what is happening. We can continue to improve weapons - exactly as the others can. Shri Mukherjee is completely right when he said that we should never accept any restraint on the research and development. Instead we should keep quoting back to these big countries their own interpretations of the CTBT. Those interpretations now work to our advantage to the extent that the treaty is discriminatory, it discriminates in our favour.

Sir, the third point that he raised is about export control. I think, Sir, on that

there is absolutely no disagreement. Nobody has argued that we should be in the business of atomic weapons technology. Shri Krishan Kant was one of the great advocates of weaponisation and tests in 1970s. Since that time, every Indian who has thought on that matter has spoken with great responsibility that we are not for exporting this type of technology. So, if the Americans want to give suggestions on how to better safeguard our stockpiles etc. So that there is no pilferage for instance of fissile material, what is the problem? If they have some better experience in that regard, their sharing it with us cannot constitute any problem for us at all.

Sir, therefore, I think on all these matters we have really come a far long distance. On coming into force — just last year in 1997, China did exactly what Shri Mukherjee says. He rightly read out -- he had urged the Prime Minister to do and the Prime Minister has done. China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in January, 1997. They did not deposit till the United States deposited it, and then they deposited it. So, we should remember that kind of a thing and use it to our own advantage.

Sir, I would like to urge a few suggestions in addition to the points made by Shri Mukherjee. I would like the Government to consider, one, persist with this vague formulation about signing, ratifying etc. Second, press ahead on the research and development on the permissible category of tests, and even more important, on the newer type of weapons which are coming into being. Nuclear weapons are essential, but, in a sense they are gross weapons. Today with electronic warfare, with weapons with electronic devices which will disrupt the guidance systems' of the missiles of adversaries, with integrated information and power networks of the developed economies which make them even more vulnerable - even to small computer hackers - there is an entirely new category of weapons. These are in a sense non-lethal weapons, but which are

even more effective and can be better directed and focused than nuclear weapons. We should direct R and D to develop them. In this, I entirely endorse what Dr. Mukherjee was saying that actually the test is what our scientists tell us and the problem in these matters is the Government and the Government scientists have naturally to speak in elliptical terms and most of us are not conversant in reading between the lines of what they are saying. Kindly see the statement which was made. When the Prime Minister says or Dr. Abul Kalam says that we are a Nuclear Weapon State, it is dismissed at that time as a jingoist bombast. But it was actually a very important announcement. The announcement was that we have those weapons, not just that we have made some explosions but we are a Nuclear Weapon State. When he says, "We will go in only for first strike capability," it is interpreted by everybody who knows the subject. It means, not only have they weapons, they have them dispresed well enough they have them secured will enough that even if the likely adversary were to launch a first strike, they would have enough to inflict an unacceptable degree of terror. Just see what Dr. Abul Kalam and Dr. Chidambaram said immediately after the test: "One of the laboratories of the DRDO," I am just reading the press statement they issued at that time, "had the task of weaponising the proven design. This activity involved design, testing and production of advanced detonators, ruggedised high volt trigger systems, interface enginnering, systems engineering," that means development of new metals, "and systems integration to military specifications. Three other laboratories have made contributions in aerodynamics, arming, fusing, safety interlocks, flight control, etc. We have also conducted a series of trials and achieved the necessary operational clearance." Then they said, "Tests conducted during May 11-13, 1998 have provided critical data for the validation of our capability in the design of nuclear

weapons of different yields for different applications and different delivery systems." With each pair of words they are making very important announcements. "These tests have significantly enhanced our capability in computer simulation of new designs." They are pointing to precisely what Americans say is allowed under CTBT, "and have taken us to the stage of sub-critical experiments in the future". That means, they are telling us as clearly as they can, "We have the capability to do what CTBT allows us to do." so, we should realy on them and leave the last word to them. And we should ensure that what they are saying, as it cannot be said in detail, should be made available to the principal leaders of the House.

Sir, the other point really is about the conditions which the US Senate has been given. It is not only about withdrawal. As I just mentioned, that facility is available to everybody. Sir, as a part of a compromise ~ it is a very important lead for us and for the Government to consider - President Clinton has written to Congress saying, "In the ratification of this treaty, you please include conditions you think are.necessary." One of the conditions that he has given his assurance on is that every year on the anniversary of the treaty, the US President shall certify to the US Congress that no new development has taken place in the preceding year which necessitates that the U.S. withdraw and resort to tests. You can get a copy of the letter on Internet now. That letter lists, "I have consulted V, 'y', 'z' heads of such and such agencies, the Secretary of Defence -several persons who are in a position to know and who monitor defence developments and developments in the technology of others. After consulting ' them, I am certifying to you that there is no need to withdraw just now." It is valid and every year you have to do it. So, I would urge the Prime Minister to consider whether in our ratification -- in our case it is not the Senate or any other legislative body; it is the Cabinet which

ratifies the Cabinet should not incorporate conditions which are similar, let us say, to those which are adopted by P-5 countries in their own legislatures or in their own procedure. I will stress two points more. This goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, we should really pursue through to her means. One of our objections at that time to the CTBT, even when Mr. Vajpayee was the leader of the delegation to Geneva, at the time of withdrawal was that there is no link of the CTBT with the elimination of nuclear weapons. They are not bound by any time - frame. Sir, we have to pursue it by other means. You cannot make the CTBT now the sole vehicle for this. We must have the confidence in a process which is afoot after the end of the cold war. With the end of the cold war, and not because of the CTBT etc. Russia and the United States have actually eliminated 14,000 nuclear warheads. Elimination on such a scale was inconceivable even a few years ago. So, we should see similarly that the CTBT is not discriminatory in the sense in which the NPT was discriminatory. We should assist such trends and pursue that aim by other means and not make any contingent of signing or not signing in this eight months' period to which Dr. Mukherjee has made a reference because, remember, Sir, when we withdrew, the document of the CTBT could not then be sent to the UN General Assembly, as what is called consensus document. What happened was that Belgium immediately adopted it, presented it to the Conference. From there, Australia took it to the United Nations. We voted against it. To what effect? We were among the co-sponsors of the resolution under which the CTBT negotiations had started in 1993. In 1996 we voted against the CTBT as it had been finalised. Against our protests, 158 countries voted for the resolution. Three countries voted against it—India, Bhutan and Libya. Nothing has happened till now to change that situation. So, instead of taking brave position, merely of brave words, I would hope that all sides of the House will see the reality

of this matter and see to it that now we are in that railway compartment from which we were outside and, therefore, move ahead with greater confidence. Our scientists have repeatedly said it. Even in September, Dr. Abdul Kalam said, "Do not worry about the CTBT. It allows us that we need to do." So, think of the conditions by which you can put it to advantage.

One final words, Sir, and I say this with great anguish, as a new Member of this House. The condition of Pakistan holds a warning to our security. Every third week second week their tail is twisted and they have to give in. As you know, Nawaz Sharif went and met Mr. Clinton just now. He came out very bravely and said, "There shall be a link between Kashmir and the CTBT." A junior officer, Mr. Inderfurth, the Under Secretary of State, comes out and formally says, "He is saying this for domestic consumption. There is no use..."

Mr. Nawaz Sharif has made such a strong statement saying, "No, no. Clinton must mediate." Clinton said, "No. Only if both the countries request me." Why is it that they are reduced to this conditions? Because, they cannot pay even their debt. Their economy has gone completely into a tail-spin. That is the immediate danger. If you want to ward off the pressure that Mr. Mukherjee was apprehending, then really, we must pay a greater attention to the way we are pushing the economy to the brink. Sir, just last Friday, if I may quote with his permission, this House was shocked and the person for whom I have had the greatest respect for twenty years for his integrity as a symbol of confidence, Dr. Manmohan Singh was the only person who mentioned the news item of that day. he asked me. "Do you know that today the richest State in India has been declared bankrupt?" I do not think even today—five or six days have passed—we would be able to name that State. Most of us would not be able to name it. Sir, the Government of Punjab's cheques

have been dishonoured. If we go into a tail - spin, nobody will come to our assistance this time. Sir, Dr. Alagh has been warning, Dr. Manmohan Singh has been warning and Mr. Yashwant Sinha has been warning. As a new Member to this House, I request and implore all sides of the House, to ward off pressure and danger. Don't let the economy slip out of hand. If it happens, it will be the real threat to the country and not your signing or not signing the CTBT. Thank you.

SHRI NILOPTAL BASU (West Bengal): Mr. Chairman, Sir, at the very outset, I have to concede that I do not want to sound acrimonious but the kind of creativity that has been exercised by Shri Shourie, perhaps, will not be at my command to interpret the kind of things that are happening in the country. Now, to start with, India has played a significant role, over the years, in terms of articulation of our concern in the global fora and in the regional fora, based on the kind of consensus that existed in the country across the political spectrum. Notwithstanding the brief reference that Shri Pranab Mukherjee was making, I do not think, the kind of initiatives that should have been forthcoming from the Government in terms of building a consensus in taking air these positions in the international fora as well as in the process of bilateral negotiations, were really on display. We would, very frankly, like to share with the House that mere reporting of what is happening elsewhere, cannot constitute the basis of consensus. During the earlier discussions also we had tried to be constructive and pointed out, at least, two or three areas of very critical importance to the country's strategic needs which need further elaboration and on the basis of that, a consensus could have evolved. Everybody agrees that a piece of legislation, the Atomic Energy Act of 1961, that we have in this country, controls the entire premise of nuclear science, Nuclear research and development, does not take into account what our legal provisions will be in a situation

where our nuclear establishments are riot only for peaceful means. So, we have exhausted the possibility of that legislation. Now, we do not know the mind of the Government whether the executive decisions, whether the pronouncements of the Prime Minister, or, whether the *ad hoc* decisions will guide the activities in the sphere of atomic energy and research. Or, whether there will be an enactment by Parliament, which is the sovereign body in this country to guide all our activities. Now, that was one area where there could be some exchange, some interface, across the political spectrum.

Secondly, it may be in the National Agenda for Governance—forget about us; we are the barriers in this political mainstream—but the National Agenda for Governance itself says that a precondition for approaching these problems has to be a strategic review to take into consideration the security considerations of the country. Just a couple of weeks back, in response to my Unstarred question in this House, the Defence Minister told me that there had been no strategic review. In fact we raise this at the time of Pokhran itself that all these things cannot be done on an *ad hoc* basis. It has to be build into a long-term perspective and then only we can really take a strong position, then only we can take a meaningful position because, in the kind of democratic polity that we have in India, we have to build on our strength. In spite of the multiplicity of views, unless the nation comes together on certain set of ideas, it is very difficult to break the ice in this negotiation. Therefore, we have not seen the strategic review. Now, I come to the formation of the National Security Council. Mr. Chairman, Sir, I would like to ask the Prime Minister whether he thinks it fit that on such an important issue, we will come to know about what kind of a National Security Council will preside over the security considerations, the security decision making process, through an executive order. There will be no legislation, there will be

no elaboration of how to go about it, and a discussion will not take place across the floor in Parliament. We are sorry if we are acrimonious. But- we think this is too serious an issue to be left alone to the Prime Minister, or to the Cabinet, to take executive decisions.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am not going into the technical details of the moot issue which has been raised today because Shri Pranab Mukherjee has sufficiently dealt with it in his intervention. Factual things and many other things are there. Now, I put the question before the country. This is a Statement on the progress in negotiations. We are getting very mixed signals from the Government. That is also another problem that we are having. The other day our Defence Minister informed that there has not been an inch of progress. Maybe, because I am younger than my more accomplished colleague, I am a little bit crude in saying so. But actually, from the statement, which reveals very little, we do not know what is the response from the American side because there was a categorical assurance in the House earlier also. In terms of the reply given to a question on 4th June, the Government stated, "After the nuclear test on 11th and 13th May, 1998 at Pokhran, the Government has signalled a willingness to consider adhering to some of the undertakings of the CTBT, but not in a political vacuum and depending on reciprocal basis." I underline the two words—reciprocal basis. So, in the entire negotiation process, what has been the reciprocal basis, is, of vital importance.

Mr. Shourie has been warning us, sufficiently and adequately, about the pitfalls of not signing the Treaty. Sometimes I feel as if we have already decided to put our signature of approval on the Treaty. But my point is that we have to know as to what are the reciprocal points. The perceptible thing that we are actually getting from the American Government is the inclusion of a number of organisations in-the so-called entities' list. Now, apart from a mild

rejoinder from the Government, is it to be construed as a response to whatever is happening in the negotiating process? How do you assess that? How do you look at these things? There are two or three key questions. What are the advantages? Mr. Shourie was very eloquent. But all that comes into force only if India is accorded a nuclear status. But if India is not accorded a nuclear status, how much do we gain out of it? We have seen in countries what kind of inspection regime comes into force as part of this Treaty, and what can the programmes for peaceful research and development in the area of nuclear science *do to* the programmes of certain Governments; we have seen that. Therefore, it is very vital for us to know what will happen. We will definitely, in an articulation of our intent which is thoroughly different from that of America or for that matter other P-S countries, have stricter legislations on export controls. But what will happen to certain programmes and certain technologies which we need for the development of our peaceful programme? But, these may come under that dubious clause of dual-use technology. What happens to that? I would like to know whether we can assess that? What are the safeguards which we can build into these negotiations? As a result of this, while we adhere to certain noble intentions in our laws, will there be any reciprocity on the part of the developed countries. That is also very important for us. This is a very problematic area for us, because, basically, we do not believe that no nuclear deterrence can actually be a foolproof deterrence. It has been decided by the nuclear community, and even those countries which have nuclear power know, that a nuclear bomb can never be used. Forget about the first use, no country thinks in terms of actually using a nuclear bomb. In the world today, nobody thinks that a nuclear bomb can be used. Therefore, the very concept of deterrence is very difficult for us to fathom. But, at the same time, there is this whole notion of nuclear deterrence.

I am not a student of nuclear science. In the context of the kind of changes that are taking place in the field of science and technology, how do you define a credible nuclear deterrence? Is it an inelastic concept? How does it change over time? How does it change in the light of the kind of technological developments that take place? I would like to know whether it is a static concept. Then, how much of resources will have to go into expanding that idea of credible deterrence in the light of nuclear technological developments that are taking place all over? For us, it has to be as much an economic decision. How much can we mobilise on this? Our point is that nobody talks about those issues. One of the moral grounds on which India stood during the entire process of negotiations of CTBT was that CTBT is a discriminatory treaty. What do you say? Is it that by joining the CTBT, the Treaty becomes non-discriminative overnight. Mr. Pranab Mukherjee made a very important distinction that the fundamental difference between the American approach on all these negotiations and our approach is that they want to perpetuate the kind of nuclear monopoly that they have today. Our approach is to bring an end to this nuclear monopoly and go towards the process of nuclear disarmament. In that, what do we say to all these developing nations, which had been rallying behind the Indian position all these years? How do we address ourselves to that question? How do we re-state our position? Mr. Shourie was suggesting some other means. We would like to know from the Government as to what are those some other means. How do we become part of the discriminatory regime, and yet go on talking about nuclear discrimination and nuclear monopoly status of certain other countries? How do we do that? Let us know. It is on examination and information on the basis of such issues that a real, meaningful consensus can evolve in the country today. Howsoever difficult these questions may be, we cannot just push them below the carpet.

These are very, very important. We, particularly from the left, know how hard the American negotiators are. I remember, When Shri Pranab Mukherjee was the Commerce Minister, we had some discussions on the entire GATT treaty negotiations. The Americans at that point of time, only for evolving their approach on the agriculture trade had prepared 7,000 documents with the help, mostly, of non-officials. That was the level of their preparation. At every point of time, with every little change in the nuances, they knew how to respond and what would be their alternative position. They used all the instrumentalities available to them. Shri Shourie has rightly indicated about the economic situation prevailing in the country. We would like to know the kind of pressures—as we hear, or, are being reported everyday in the press—on the question of denationalisation, on the question of opening up certain economic sectors of the country, which will indirectly strengthen the American position. I would like to know whether there is any bearing on them, whether these issues are coming up, or whether they can continue to lecture us on how we will run our economy. These are the key issues on which the people of this country are exercised, these are some of the issues on which this House is exercised.

Mr. Prime Minister, we have a great regard for you, but without being transparent how can you deal with all these issues? I think the initiative that the Government intends to take, about some kind of an across the board exchange and interface, will not serve the kind of purpose that it has to serve, at this critical juncture of the nation.

Finally, let us be very clear. The question of signing or not signing will come up only when there is a convergence of ideas certain vital areas that have been pointed out, and which will have a bearing on our decision-making, in terms of our security and other requirements. Unless there is

convergence of ideas, I think, we cannot have a situation where you can expect a consensus. I am very sorry that a convoluted logic is being given. Because majority of the nations did not support us earlier on the question of CTBT, that should be a logic to give our acceptance to the treaty. The same kind of logic came in different manner. When we conducted nuclear tests, most of the countries did not support us. We differ with the perception of the Government, because this is our sovereign right, but, we question the political wisdom of the Government in exercising that sovereign right. So, I think, that is a very, very wrong way of looking at things. How much support we will get? On the basis of that, we will determine our position. This is a sovereign country. This is a sovereign Parliament. It is only the dictation and information of our security needs, of our national interest, that should inform our decisions and nothing else.

Finally, what we would like to state on behalf of our party, as a whole, is that the kind of effort that has been taken by the Government so far in evolving a consensus has been inadequate both in terms of quantity as well as quality. If the Government really wants to evolve a meaningful consensus so that our position in the negotiating process bilaterally and multilaterally is strengthened, our cooperation will be there.

SHRIMATI KAMLA SINHA (Bihar): Mr. Chairman, Sir, today the Prime Minister in his statement has elaborated India's position vis-a-vis the CTBT, the FMCT and what has been going on in our defence postures, R&D efforts, etc., etc. Thereafter, the hon. Member, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, who was also the then Foreign Minister and Commerce Minister, has made a very elaborate speech. Our eminent journalist colleague, Shri Arun Shourie, also dealt with the case very efficiently. Thereafter, my younger brother, Mr. Nilotpal Basu, presented his views. I would just like to mention a few points, without going into

the details of the issues that were mentioned earlier. India, since her Independence had enunciated the policy of *Vasudheiva kutumbakam* under our first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. This policy of *Vasudheiva kutumbakam* friendship with each nation in the family of nations has been the basic idea of our foreign policy. We tried to be friendly with the global family. Our faith in non-violence has been the moot point of our domestic policy as well as our foreign policy. India started its nuclear policy some 25 years ago. We were one of the threshold countries. Along with Pakistan and Israel, India had the nuclear capability. The whole world knew it. Suddenly, this year, soon after coming to power, the present Government, in its wisdom, decided to explode nuclear bombs. For about a week or ten days, we were at the top of the world. We lived under an euphoria. Thereafter, a situation dawned when economic sanctions were imposed against us. What has happened to us? Immediately, the Prime Minister started Negotiations with the United States of America. At that time, unfortunately, we did not have a full-fledged External Affairs Minister. But Now, our Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Sinha(Interruptions)... I am sorry. He is Mr. Jaswant Singh. But, 'Singhs' are 'Sinhas' also in my part of the country. He has been negotiating. His interlocutor has been the American Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe Talbott. He had quite a few rounds of talks. Now, the Prime Minister's statement today is rather confusing. He is neither coming out in a straightforward way as to what we are going to do, what our position is, in terms of the CTBT and FMCT; nor is he very straightforward in saying whether we will be following our policy of non-nuclearisation. Now, let us see the way he has framed his words. I quote:

"India is now engaged in discussion with our key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to

a successful conclusion, so that the, entry into force of the CTBT is not' delayed beyond Septemeber 1999. We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions." Last year, when Mr. Gujral was he Foreign Affairs Minister and thereafter, when he was the Prime Minister, he followed the policy, and the whole House endorsed the nuclear policy, the policy on CTBT, that we followed. Our policy has been that so long as any country in the world has the nuclear arsenal the nuclear power, we do not endorse this CTBT because there will be the possibility of a nuclear warfare in the world by the powers who are nuclear riowers. They also must destroy the nuclear capability. Then only India will sign this Treaty. That stand, I think, should continue because we have become a nuclear power now. But the nuclear family is not accepting us as a nuclear power. We no' accept their position and we also concede to their demand that September, 1999 is the cut-off period. By this time the CTBT should be signed. What happens thereafter? They are not going to destroy their nuclearweapons, the nuclear weapons that they have. But we will be forced to dismantle everything. So, it will be a difficult position for us.

[THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI) IN THE CHAIR]

Sir, I would like to guote Mr. Talbott. In his press statement, he appreciated India's security perceptions very graciously. Soon after the Pokhran blast, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, very vociferously, said that we did it because of our security perceptions from the north and also from oar next-door neighbour Pakistan. Now, every country is free to prepare the defence of its own. The security perception of any country should be respected by other countries. The border is very sacred to all the countries of the world. They should be prepared to protect their own borders.

We also have a right to protect our own borders. But have we been protecting our own borders?

I don't want to go into the details. But what has happened? Soon after the nuclear blast at Pokhran, economic sanctions were imposed on us. After the economic sanctions were imposed on us, we have been saying that we did it because of our security perceptions. Now, I would like to quote a few lines from Mr. Talbott's statement. I quote:

"There is also an economic dimension of security. Before India and Pakistan committed themselves irrevocably to replicating the U.S. and Soviet nuclear competition, they should consider the price tag."

This is, I feel, a kind of warning. What is the price tag?

"A recent study estimates that maintaining the American nuclear capability cost the United States just under 5.5 trillion dollars. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, comparable expenses contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet system and state. The massive spending required to develop nuclear weapons is only a fraction of what is required for safety managing even a modest capability. The tense military situation generated by a nuclearised subcontinent would drive up overall military budgets." Sir, it is true that the economic sanctions have hit us very hard. Our economy is not in a very good shape. I am glad to say that Mr. Arun Shourie has endorsed it. Now, is there any kind of underhand economic pressure or anything else? Mr. Prime Minister, I would like you to clarify that point. I would like to know whether we are bound to sign the CTBT before the cut-off date. You have yourself stated that the signing of the CTBT could not be delayed beyond September 1999. Is this the time-frame within which we will have to function? I would like the Prime Minister to explain that fact. Now, the FMCT is another item. India did not have a very rigid stand on the FMCT. We have been

participating in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva and we had expressed our views that we could examine and announce a moratorium in respect of production of fissile material. In respect of the NPT, of course, we had our clear position. We won't use it for aggression. But we have a right to protect our borders. So, we will be protecting our borders. These are the few things which I wanted to submit.

Then, I come to the Defence Posture. Mr. Prime Minister, you have said something about it. I would like to quote a few lines from your statement. "In fact, our talks are based on the fundamental premise that India will define its own requirements, for its nuclear deterrent, on its own assessment of the security environment." What does it mean? What do you mean by "for its own nuclear deterrent"? Are we going to use nuclear power to defend our borders? You should take the House into confidence and the country into confidence before taking a decision in this respect. If that is so, if it is very necessary, well, I am sure, the country will support you. But, as of today, I don't think it is necessary. The nuclear weapons are not the weapons for safety or security of any nation. They are the weapons of destruction for the human society, the human civilisation. I am glad that on many occasions, you have announced a policy of No-First-Use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. That is a very good thing. But what will be our status when the CTBT is signed? Are we to preserve our nuclear knowledge only through R&D? What do you mean by 'India's R&D capabilities' and 'there should not be any restraints on the development of India's capabilities'? Please explain these things and take the House into confidence. Do you mean to say that R&D on further nuclear warheads will be going on, and, at the same time, we will be saying, "No, no; we don't want this and we will be toeing the line that is bestowed by the United States of America, by the five big powers?" I think India is not a third

grade power. India has the capacity of being a global power. India being the largest democracy in the world, should be a member of the Security Council. When the United Front Government was in power, from that time, we had been following it, and I am sure, it could have been achieved, but for the changes in the political scenario. Of course, now I don't

know where we are(Interruptions)...

You should also take the House into confidence in telling us where we stand in this matter now and whether we are nearer to becoming a member of the Security Council or whether that prospect has gone for ever.

श्री ईश दत्त यादव (उत्तर प्रदेश) : माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, आज प्रधान मंत्री जी ने संयुक्त राज्य अमरीका के साथ द्विपक्षीय वार्ता के संबंध में इस सदन में बयान दिया है। इसके पहले भी समय-समय पर प्रधान मंत्री जी पोकरण परीक्षण के बाद जो परिस्थितियाँ उत्पन्न हुई, उनके बारे में सदन को अवगत कराते रहे हैं, इसलिए मैं प्रधान मंत्री जी के प्रति अपना आभार प्रकट करता हूँ। माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, पोकरण परीक्षण के बाद इस देश की विदेश नीति जो पहले से निरंतर थी, स्थाई नीति थी, स्वर्गीय पंडित जवाहरलाल नेहरू के समय से लेकर पोकरण परीक्षण के समय तक की विदेश नीति को धक्का लगा। हमारी जो उपलब्धियाँ हुई वैज्ञानिकों और राष्ट्र की उपलब्धि हुई इससे अमरीका और दूसरे देश अप्रसन्न हुए और उन्होंने अपनी अप्रसन्नता कई तरीकों से प्रकट की। लेकिन यह बहुत बड़ी उपलब्धि है इस राष्ट्र की नाभिकीय शक्तियों के रूप में हम एक बहुत शक्तिशाली राष्ट्र के रूप में हम एक बहुत शक्तिशाली राष्ट्र के रूप में उभरे। यह उपलब्धि हमारे देश के वैज्ञानिकों की है। डा. ए.पी. जे. अब्दुल कलाम जिन पर इस देश को गर्व है, जो जनक हो सकते हैं नाभिकीय शक्तियों की खोज करने के लिए

4.00 P.M

यह उनकी उपलब्धि है। राष्ट्र की उपलब्धि है। लेकिन माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, प्रधान मंत्री जी ने का मैं व्यक्तिगत रूप से बहुत प्रशंसक हूँ। लम्बे समय से इनके काम को इनकी बातों को सुनता और देखता चला आ रहा हूँ। लेकिन मेरी राय में दो गलतियाँ हुई। प्रधान मंत्री जी ने की हो चाहे न की हो, इनकी सरकार ने जरूर की जिनका हमारी विदेश नीति पर और देश की स्थिति पर अच्छा प्रभाव नहीं हुआ। जब पोकरण परीक्षण हुए

तो सरकार की ओर से यह प्रगट किया गया, इस तरह से जश्न मनाया गया जैसे पोखरण इनकी उपलब्धि हो। आज प्रधान मंत्री जी ने अपने बयान में कहा कि निरंतर जो भी सरकारें रही हैं सबका प्रयास रहा। हमारे वैज्ञानिकों का प्रयास रहा। लेकिन आपने ऐसा प्रदर्शन किया जैसे भारतीय जनता पार्टी की सरकार की यह उपलब्धि हो। इसी लिए पूरा राष्ट्र आपके साथ खड़ा नहीं हो सका। आपको समर्थन नहीं मिल सका। वैज्ञानिकों को समर्थन मिला। देश को एक सम्पन्न और शक्तिशाली राष्ट्र के रूप में समर्थन मिला। लेकिन आपने यह गलती की और चाहा कि देश के सामने जो अनेक समस्याएँ हैं जिनको आप सुलझा नहीं पा रहे हैं उनको राष्ट्र के लोग भूल जाएँ तथा आपकी उपलब्धि मान लें। दूसरी कमी मेरी राय में माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी यह है कि प्रधान मंत्री जी ने और सरकार ने इसको गंभीरता से लिया नहीं। आज भी लगता है कि इसको बहुत गंभीरता से नहीं ले रहे हैं। जब अमेरिका तथा कुछ देशों ने अपनी अप्रसन्नता जाहिर की, अपना असहयोग जाहिर किया, आर्थिक प्रतिबंध लगाने की बात की, सिक्थोरटियों को रोक दिया तब भी सरकार इस पर बहुत गंभीर नहीं हुई। गंभीर इसलिए नहीं हुई कि जो हमारे आज विदेश मंत्री हैं—मैं उनका भी हृदय से बहुत सम्मान करता हूँ बहुत विद्वान आदमी हैं और देश के अच्छे राजनीतिज्ञ लोगों में से हैं—उनको, श्री जसवंत सिंह जी को अमेरिका से वार्ता करने के लिए प्रधान मंत्री जी ने अधिकृत कर दिया। किस हैसियत से अधिकृत किया? आप प्रधान मंत्री हैं और विदेश मंत्री भी उस समय में हैं, आपकी एक कैबिनेट भी है, मंत्रिमंडल भी है लेकिन श्री जसवंत सिंह को आपने अधिकृत किया कि अमेरिका से वार्ता करे और अमेरिका ने एक छोटी हैसियत के आदमी, टालबोट को अधिकृत कर दिया। कोई अधिकार नहीं जसवंत सिंह जी का। हम नहीं जानते हैं आपकी व्यवस्था क्या थी। आज क्या समर्थ हो गए हैं? आप उस समय विदेश मंत्री बनाकर भेज देते। आप कैबिनेट के किसी पावरफुल मिनिस्टर को भेजते क्योंकि आज भौतिक युग में माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी पद की ही महानता, पद की ही प्रतिष्ठा हो रही है। आप उनको भेज देते। प्रधान मंत्री जी ने अपने वक्तव्य में कहा कि श्री जसवंत सिंह जी की ओर टालबोट की छः चक्र वार्ता हुई। लेकिन परिणाम क्या निकला? खोदा पहाड़, निकली चुहिया। यह प्रधान मंत्री जी का वक्तव्य है:-

“वार्शिंगटन की 11 जून, 1998 की बैठक के बाद श्री जसवंत सिंह और श्री टालबोट के बीच छह दौर की बातचीत हो चुकी है” इनके बयान को ही उद्धृत कर रहा हूँ। “जसवंत सिंह और टालबोट के

बीच छह दौर की बातचीत हो चुकी है। दोनों पक्षों ने विचारों की भिन्नता को कम करने तथा साझा आधार तैयार करने के लिए उपयोगी बातचीत की”।

उपयोगी बातचीत हुई छह चक्रों में। आज भी जो अमेरिका की मानसिकता है उसको समाप्त करने के लिए या अपने पक्ष में वातावरण तैयार करने के लिए हम सफल नहीं हो सके हैं। प्रधान मंत्री जी आज के वक्तव्य में कह रहे हैं कि छह दौर की बातचीत के बाद अब बातचीत निम्नलिखित चार मसलों तक ही सीमित रह गई है। व्यापक परीक्षण संधि, दूसरा है विखण्डनीय सामग्री नियंत्रण संधि, रक्षा संबंधी, ये तीन-चार मुद्दों तक लगता है कि प्रधान मंत्री जी ने कहा है कि जब इन्हीं पर हमको अपनी वार्ता को सीमित करना है और सितम्बर, 1999 तक वार्ता के माध्यम से हमें सी.टी.बी.टी. पर हस्ताक्षर करने के लिए परिस्थितियों को अनुकूल करना है। प्रधान मंत्री जी का कुल इतना ही वक्तव्य है।

माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, मैं फिर से दोहरा रहा हूँ कि सरकार आज भी देश के समक्ष चुनौती है, परिस्थितियाँ हैं, इसको गंभीरता से नहीं ले रही है, क्योंकि यह जो परिस्थितियाँ हैं इनका संबंध देश के गौरव और देश के सम्मान से है, देश की सुरक्षा से, देश की अखंडता और राष्ट्रीयता से है और आज दुनिया में एक शक्तिशाली राष्ट्र के रूप में भारत का सम्मान रहे। प्रधान मंत्री जी ने ठीक कहा है कि हम इन परमाणु शस्त्रों से मानव विनाश की बात नहीं करते, मैं इनकी सराहना करता हूँ। इन्होंने कहा है कि हमारा शुरु से प्रयास रहा है कि ये हमारे जो परमाणु शस्त्र हैं, इनका विनाश के लिए प्रयोग न किया जाए, मैं इनकी सराहना करता हूँ। मान्यवर, इन परिस्थितियों का निर्माण करने के लिए सरकार को अभी बहुत मेहनत करनी होगी। इसके लिए सरकार को कसरत करनी पड़ेगी। आज जो अमेरिका जैसे देश, जिनका दमाग सही नहीं है और जिनके विचार भी भारत के प्रति अच्छे दिमाग सही नहीं हैं और जिनके विचारों को भी ठीक करना पड़ेगा। उनसे संबंध भी सुधारने पड़ेगे। आज जो कल्पना है कि शस्त्रों की होड़ को समाप्त किया जाए और विनाशकारी शस्त्रों की होड़ को समाप्त करके पूरी दुनिया में एक शांति का और प्रेम का वातावरण पैदा किया जाए, यह काम होना अनिवार्य है, लेकिन कठिन है। सरकार को इस संबंध में बहुत प्रयास करना पड़ेगा। मान्यवर आप इशारा कर रहे हैं।....(व्यवधान)...

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री सनातन विसि) : आपका टाइम हो गया।

श्री ईश दत्त यादव : बोलने वाला टाइम(व्यवधान)...

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री सनातन बिसि) : आपका पूरा टाइम हो गया, आप कन्कलूड कीजिए।

श्री ईश दत्त यादव : आपका आदेश है(व्यवधान).. ठीक हैं, आपका आदेश है तो मैं अपनी बात समाप्त करते हुए आपके माध्यम से प्रधान मंत्री जी से यह कहना चाहूंगा कि परमाणु परीक्षणों के संबंध में संधि के बारे में, शस्त्रों के विनाश के बारे में गंभीरता से विचार करें और कोई भी संधि हो, कोई भी वार्ता हो, अमेरिका से या चाहे किसी भी देश से, वह सम्मानजनक वार्ता होनी चाहिए और देश के गौरव के प्रतिकूल नहीं होनी चाहिए और जो हल निकले आपकी वार्ता का, सरकार की वार्ता का, उस वार्ता से देश का सम्मान बढ़ना चाहिए, गौरव बढ़ना चाहिए। देश की एकता और अखंडता पर कोई खतरा नहीं आना चाहिए और हमेशा हमारा देश, सामरिक दृष्टि से, आणाविक दृष्टि से और नाभिकीय शस्त्रों की दृष्टि से, एक सशक्त राष्ट्र के रूप में दुनिया के सामने रहे, इसका प्रावधान मंत्री जी को प्रयास करना चाहिए और सरकार को प्रयास करना चाहिए।

इन्हीं शब्दों के साथ, मान्यवर, मैं आपका आभार प्रकट कर रहा हूँ। आपने समय दिया, बहुत-बहुत धन्यवाद।

DR. M. N. DAS (Orissa): Sir, I am thankful to you for the privilege given to me to speak a few words on the statement of the hon. Prime Minister, in his presence, for whom I have the deepest regards. Hon. Shri Pranab Mukherjee, .. while raising certain grave doubts on the statement of the Prime Minister, referred to such issues like the U.S.'s bitter attitude towards India after the Pokharan blasts, and also doubts about what will be India's attitude when the terminal date of September, 1999, approaches for signing the CTBT. Shri Mukherjee also expressed concern regarding our security perception. On the one hand, we say, "no first-use of nuclear power", but, at the same time, we say, "we have to go in for enhancing nuclear deterrent power." Shri Mukherjee also raised the issue of Indo-Pak relations and the American policy towards Pakistan. Sir, my humble submission is limited only to one thing. What

we call bilateral negotiations or talks or discussions are mere momentary offshoots of 'bilateral relations', and what we call 'bilateral relations' take a long time to evolve. Such relations are not suddenly developed, under any particular dispensation, during the time of any particular Prime Minister or a particular President, but it takes a long time to take shape. In that connection, I would like to draw the attention of the hon. Prime Minister and the hon. new Foreign Minister to one gross reality in respect of Indo-U.S. relations over the years. It is very surprising that both the countries are democratic countries—India claiming to be the largest democracy on earth and America claiming to be the most successful democracy on earth. But, somehow, over the last 50 years, we have seen strained relation between these two countries. There might have been times of good relation but on the whole, I should say, the relations have never been very cordial. Even when we look back to the days of our national freedom struggle, we find to our great surprise that when India was fighting against the British, there was no word of official sympathy from successive American Governments. In the first decade of this century, when the Swadeshi movement was going on in India, the then American President, Theodore Roosevelt, requested the Indian Viceroy to send a copy of the *Vande Mataram* literature, but the Viceroy did not comply with that request. Even as late as in the time of Franklin Delano roosevelt, when the Second World War was going on, in the thick of the war, when roosevelt wanted to prevail upon churchill to negotiate with Gandhi, to negotiate with the Congress, to come to a compromise, since Japan had already invaded South-East Asia, churchil did not pay any heed to that request. Sir, I may quote the exact words of Winston churchill, now preserved in the Jefferson Section of the Congress library. What did Churchill say? He said, "Mr. Roosevelt, in the thick of the war, if you raise the word india', I shall not be on talking terms with you." At that time, as we

know, Britain was under terrible attacks from the Nazi airforce. It had already become economically bankrupt, and it was struggling, bleeding and depending on America for food, for everything; even it was suffering the stigma of being described as the 49th State of the United States of America. That was Great Britain at that time. Still, Churchill could warn Roosevelt to keep quiet. This small information might not suffice to depict U.S. attitude towards India. Soon after independence, which country appeared in the role of a villain to cause harm to India? Immediately after India's independence and formation of Pakistan, Sir, it was one British ex-Governor of United Punjab who spoke to Jinnah, "did you hear what Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel said yesterday?" He had said "A, friendly Pakistan would be amalgamated and an inimical Pakistan will be eliminated." It was, of course, a casual statement of Sardar Patel but that Governor pointed out to Mr. Jinnah, "You have created Pakistan, but do you know your country cannot produce even a safety pin. You have nothing. You have no industry." A puzzled and shocked Jinnah looked at the Governor and asked "What do you suggest?" And what was the suggestion? "Look at Uncle Sam. All military assistance, artillery, cannons, aeroplanes, tanks, everything would be supplied by USA to you. Don't worry, don't fear about India." Since then, somehow America adopted a pro-Pakistan policy. This is a matter of history. One information, Mr. Prime Minister, Sir. You might be visiting USA to meet the President. Jaswantji had gone there several times. When Jawaharlal Nehru went to America after independence, what was the comment? "Jawaharlal Nehru received the warmest welcome, but the coldest farewell." Why warmest welcome? When Harry S. Truman received him, he hoped that India would follow the dictates of USA. But when Nehru remained adamant and there was no question of giving up our independent line of approach towards international politics, America did not give him a farewell worthy of

India's Prime Minister. From that time onwards, you find how Pakistan was militarily strengthened only to fight against India. Sir, it is a known fact that one American, Adlai—Stevenson visiting Kashmir and staying in Srinagar for one day could infuse the idea into the ears of the great nationalist leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, "why not convert Kashmir into the Switzerland of Asia?" America was ready to give all help if Kashmir become independent. Let us think of what role did Richard Nixon play during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Had not Shrimati Indira Gandhi been intelligent enough to sign a Defence Treaty with the Soviet Union, America could have invaded India to help Pakistan to fight over Kashmir or over Bangladesh. All this background we should not forget. Sir, now I come to the talk of 'bilateral discussions'. During the coming talks, kindly remind the Americans, the American leaders, the U.S. President or Mr. Talbott about the new policy of CIA to re-orient their entire system in India, to enter into every branch of Indian administration, to gather secret information of India's armaments, India's preparations, India's military equipment etc. etc.

I think the Intelligence Department of India must have informed the hon. Prime Minister and the hon. Foreign Minister about the latest CIA tactics to penetrate into every institution of India, to harm India only. When we talk of CIA activities and when we talk of the so-called proxy war, we should know as to who is behind this proxy war. What is the meaning of proxy war? A proxy war is many times more dangerous than an open war. Open wars are fought in open battlefields between opposite forces, armed soldiers and they kill each other, but when we talk of a proxy war, the armed forces of the opposite country come in disguise, massacre innocent men, women and children and disappear. They are doing it only to demoralise the country and to penetrate into different regions from Kashmir to the North-East to cause des-tabilisation.

Sir, when we talk of negotiations, the Americans should be told frankly and freely that they should adopt a freindly policy, change their negative approach and attitude towards India and stop encouraging what the Pakistanis are doing in India. Let us tell the Americans the kind of a proxy war that is being fought for clandestine destruction of our lives? Let us talk boldly and frankly to the other party. Whenever there is a question of bilateral talks, I wish, Vajpayeeji, you will hold your head high like Jawaharlal Nehru, not bow down before the only super power which is trying to dominate the entire world simply because it pros-sesses the heaviest atomic arsenal.

Sir, we are talking of nuclear power. My esteemed friend, Arun Shourieji, justified our explosions and other things. Arc we aware of one thing that by this year, 1998, the five known nuclear powers have already accumulated 20000 atomic or hydrogen bombs in their arsenals? What is the destructive capability of those 20000 bombs? Those 20000 bombs can destroy the earth 49 times over. But the scientists have raised a question. Once you destroy the earth, what is the necessity of destruction for the remaining 48 times? So, we have come to a stage where we are living in this 20th century, with the gravest danger, in the shape of this nuclear arsenal. It may destroy humanity at any time. Mr. Prime Minister, when you think of bilateral talks, think of certain ultimate positive results. Our discussions are going on diplomatically with sweet—quoted words; they don't serve in avoiding the real danger or threat to our country. Any negotiation must come out with substantive results. Otherwise, talks will be going on idenfinitely at the Secretary-level. How many times have they come out with smiling face? What are the words? Vague, ambiguous, unintelligible and meaningless. That should not be the approach. In our Foreign Policy, we have to be bold enough to uphold our honour and our national interest in mind. We should not bow down before anybody. We must remain straight as a nation.

And, the Government of the largest democracy, let it be of any party, it must hold its head high. Thank you, Sir.

SHRI J. CHITHARANJAN (Kerala): Sir, at the outset, I would like to express my thanks to the hon. Prime Minister for having made a statement about the talks, ' or, negotiations, that were going on for the last five months. Even though the talks were going on for the last five months, we were completely ignorant of what was going on in the discussions, what were the issues that were discussed and what was the Government of India's stand with -regard to various aspects. It would have been better if the Prime Minister had taken the Parliament, at least, into confidence in this matter. The American representative, Mr. Talbott, gave an interview to the Press about a month ago wherein he had made certain statements about the negotiations. Regarding the issues that were being raised, he made a certain categorical statement that there was no question of allowing or approving of India and Pakistan as nuclear States and that they would not be approved as nuclear States. In the same way, he said that these countries would not be allowed to weaponise. I do not want to give the details of those things. Even then, our Government kept silent. Now the Prime Minister has come forward with the statement. The Prime Minister says that the discussion is now centering around four issues. On all other issues, differences have been routed out and the other issues are either not pressed, or, given up. We do not know what are the issues that were given up, or, are not being pressed. Anyhow, regarding the four issues, it seems that the Prime Minister takes a very optimistic view, that a settlement can be reached. Even with regard to the CTBT, he thinks of finding a settlement before September, 1999. In fact, the present Foreign Minister also made a statement that India will sign the CTBT. That also has given rise to apprehensions. Regarding the CTBT, the Government of India held objected to

it earlier because of the fact that it was a flawed treaty, because it was a discriminatory treaty, not that we are not being allowed to make a reference and all that, but because it is a flawed treaty and it is a discriminatory treaty. That is why we had opposed it. This treaty could not be seen in isolation. Sir, after the Second World War, certain nuclear powers emerged and a global system emerged wherein these nuclear powers were at a high pedestal. They were enjoining a certain monopoly in that. Now the situation has changed. In the changed situation, the US is trying to enforce upon the unipolar world wherein their domination prevails. This non-proliferation treaty and the philosophy itself is based on the attempt of the US to enforce upon the world, a unipolar world, an unequal world, wherein the Americans and certain other countries may have the monopoly of atomic weapons. In the economic field also, they can dictate terms. They want to impose on us such a unipolar world. We have to see that in this context. I do not think by these negotiations, the US will change its basic approach with regard to these matters in the near future. We are seeing what the US is doing in various parts of the world. They are behaving just like a policeman and they are sidelining even the UN. They are preparing themselves to attack certain countries. They are attacking certain countries in the world. These things have been taking place. Therefore, it is very difficult for us to think or it will not be a real thing to think that the USA will take a reasonable attitude with regard to this. One cannot think that the USA will normally agree to giving up its monopoly in the nuclear field. Of course, negotiations are required and they have to try whether a settlement can be reached with regard to the issues where we have got differences. We can have negotiations. But, at the same time, what I would suggest is that we should not surrender our position. We should not surrender our basic position and we should be very conscious about it. I do not think that the Government will immediately surrender

the issue. I am just cautioning that you should be careful in dealing with America. Sir, after the Pokhran tests, several Ministers had been making very abnormal statements. Now it is a welcome thing that the Government of India has come to a position that we will not be the first country to attack any other country. We will not attach those countries which are not having nuclear power. At least, that is a very good thing. It is also good that we stand for entering into a treaty for real nuclear disarmament. They are all welcome features. But, at the same time, the Government of India is still lingering on, those who are in power are still holding the view, that the Pokhran test has enabled us to strengthen the security of our country. I do not agree with that. In fact, the Pokhran test has isolated us from the international community. It is giving a feeling to so many countries which are friendly to us that we are resorting to a reckless policy. But, that is not, in any way, good. In the same way, the weaponisation is being proceeded with. That will not be in the interest of the nation. All of us know that our country is in a very bad economic situation. Everyday it is becoming worse. There is no light seen. There is no expectation that we can come out of it in the near future. If you resort to this weaponisation, then where is the end? There are countries which are sitting on the stockpiles of atomic weapons—hydrogen bomb and 7,000 to 10,000 atomic bombs. They have developed new technologies and new weapons which are more destructive. Are you entering into a competition with those countries? If you begin to compete in this field, then our country will be in peril. It will be very devastating to our country. Therefore, that idea has to be given up. Sir, with regard to other issues, I do not want to go in much details. Of course, the Prime Minister has said that with regard to our national security and on other issues, a national consensus will be evolved. But, unfortunately, I have to say, of course, the Prime Minister might have held discussion with some parties at sometime,

but I am of the opinion that the present Government is not taking effective measures to bring about a consensus on various issues. Therefore, that aspect has also to be rectified. Finally, I would like to know from the Prime Minister whether he is confident that a settlement can be reached and the differences can be narrowed down. I would also like to know whether there is any settlement in the offing and what exactly the views of the Prime Minister are on this issue. I would request the Prime Minister to respond to the points which I have raised.

SHRI S. VIDUTHALAI VIRUMBI (Tamil Nadu): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, today we are discussing about an important issue that rocked not only the whole nation but the whole international community. The statement was submitted in the name of bilateral talks with the U.S. Most of the policies, as far as external affairs is concerned, never used to cross with each other. Generally, the Government, cutting across party lines, used to have consensus in this area. Sure, you may be on the other side. But when you go abroad, you are representing the whole nation. Therefore, this particular statement gets a greater importance than a *suo motu* statement. The purpose of the statement has been enumerated in the statement itself. It has said about the bilateral talks with the U.S. It has clearly mentioned the reasons behind the bilateral talks. It is to narrow the gaps of perception and to establish a common ground. For this purpose, the talks had been going on. Sir, we are very eager to find out the truth behind these talks. But, in the statement, we are unable to find out except what we came to know through press media that nearly six times the bilateral talks have taken place. In the statement, it has mentioned about the CTBT, voluntary and *de jure* announcement. In the statement, the Government of India has been mentioned about our scientists and assessment about the R & D programmes. In the statement that has been made by the hon. Prime Minister, it

has been mentioned about the production control of the FMCT, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the 1993 consensus resolution passed in the United Nations General Assembly. Sir, the only information that we got from the statement is, on the other side, they have requested to announce India's unilateral moratorium on the FMCT. In the statement, it has been mentioned about the No-First-Use and non-use against non-nuclear weapons States. In the statement, it has been mentioned about the job of our National Security Council. Sir, in the statement, information has been given regarding the flight-testing of our Angi Missile. The statement has mentioned about the CTBT, R&D programme, FMCT, No-First-Use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon States, National Security Council and flight-testing of missile. What we expected from the statement is not there in the statement at all. Therefore, how can we agree, first of all, that it is a statement? We cannot say that it is a statement. This statement says that Shri Jaswant Singh and Mr. Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State of the U.S., discussed with a sense of responsibility, candour and a sincere attempt to understand each other's concerns. They had discussed with sincerity, they discussed with candour, they discussed with responsibility but what was the talk, what was the information provided and what was the interaction that took place between them, ' has not been revealed to this august House. Why has it not been revealed? They tried best to hide the information than to reveal it. Then, they have mentioned in the statement that apprehensions were expressed in some quarters. What are those apprehensions? They have to find out that. The Government merely says "apprehensions". But the Government has failed to inform us what those apprehensions are. Sir, we know that as far as China is concerned, it has said that it has some deep sense of hurt. China has said this because of our assertion of China's

threat. Regarding that statment issued by Beijing, we should have got a reply in the statement. Have you got it? No, no reply has been received through the statement. Why do they feel hurt? What was the statement that made them feel that they have been hurt? It has been neither mentioned nor replied to. Sir, in the same way, sanctions by the US were released totally in a biased manner in favour of Pakistan. Why has the suspension of sanctions been revoked in favour of Pakistan? This is discriminatory. This statement has not mentioned any reason for that. In the same way—as is desired—this Government has not taken this House into confidence. You could have mentioned in your statement at least the perception, the thrust of the argument and the reply given to them. And what are the points on which we have agreed? What are the issues on which we could not reach any understanding? This information has not been provided in the Statement. (*Interruptions*)

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI): Please conclude.

SHRI S. VIDHUTHALAI VIRUMBI: I will take only two minutes more. You have had detailed exchanges. In the statement you have mentioned that Shri Jaswant Singh had detailed exchanges with France, detailed exchanges with Russia, detailed exchanges with United Kingdom and detailed exchanges with China. What exchanges have taken places? You have hidden it. You have not released anything to this august House about that. Then, what is the purpose of submitting this statement to the House? Why have you hidden the facts? You talks about transparency in every field. Why have you failed to take this House into confidence? At the official level they had a talk with Japan, they had a talk with Germany. When it is mentioned in this statement (*Interruptions*).

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: Sir, there should be a Minister or a Cabinet Minister in the House while a debate is going on. I think, this is a very important debate and (*Interruptions*).

SHRI M. VENKAIAH NAIDU: Sir, he was very much here. He has just gone for a(*Interruptions*).

SHRI S. VIDUTHALAI VIRUMBI: It is not a problem. (*Interruptions*).

SHRI NOLOTPAL BASU: It may not be your problem but I was referring to the tradition and the covention that we have created. (*Interruptions*).

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI): Mr. Virumbi, please conclude now.

SHRI S. VADUTHALAI VIRUMBI: Yes, Sir, I am going to conclude now. I am rounding up. At the official level, the Government of India had talks with Gemrany as well as Japan. It clearly shows that this Government has taken the bureaucrats into confidence, it has not taken this august House into confidence. What a pitiable situation! They have actually taken the officials into confidence,- they do not want to take the hon. Members into confidence. You have tried your best to hide the maximum possible. It is not good for the nation, wjiat happened between Mr. Talbott and Mr. Jaswant Singh, has not been revealed to this House. At the same time...(interruptions)

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI): You have already said this, (*interruptions*)

SHRI S. VIDUTHALAI VIRUMBI: Sir, I have never asked for more time. I will conclude in one minute. At the same time, they wanted to bring the Patents Bill. When you do not want to reveal what was the interaction between you and the USA official and when you want to introduce the Tatents Bill, what we feel is that it is one of the pressures exerted by the United States. You have succumbed to the pressure exerted by the USA. We have this genuine fear. We

have already experienced that the Security Council has got an overwhelming power over the General Assembly. Once any matter ceases in the Security Council, it cannot be dealt with even by the General Assembly. As far as the nuclear status is concerned, the same thing is going to happen. We should not wait for this. What I have to say on this is that, please try to reveal what was the interaction with the United States. And what are the conclusions arrived at? What are the areas in which you still have differences? You please take this House into confidence. Unless and until this kind of transparency takes place, you cannot have good relations either with the Opposition, or, internationally. With these words, I conclude.

SHRI R. MARGABANDU (Tamil Nadu): Sir, I really thank the Prime Minister for having come forward with this Statement giving the real facts. I do not understand how the Statement is suspected and how the Statement is not transparent. It has been made very clear, more so, in these words, "In international for a like the United Nations, India is the only country, possessing nuclear weapons, to raise a call for negotiating a cordial and progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework." So, our goal is to see that there is elimination of nuclear weapons in the entire globe. As a matter of fact, recently, when I had been to the United Nations and I happened to visit the Security Council, I was able to see that some countries which were not known to the entire world were also members of the Security Council. But, I do not know why India has not been made a Member of the Security Council. Sir, all the other countries in the world refused our admission as a Member of the Security Council. But it did not happen after this Pokhran Test. Even before that, our country was not made a Member of the Security Council. We have to analyse the reasons for this and see that India is placed in the Security Council so that we also have the power

to control other countries. I don't know if I am correct or not, but, recently, there was a statement from a Pakistani official that half-an-hour is sufficient to destroy entire India. This is the position. This also has to be taken care of in order to defend our country. So, I feel that this Statement is in all transparency. It has given the real position before this House. So, I welcome it.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI): Shri Satish Pradhan.

श्री नीलोत्पल बसु : एकदम फायर कर दीजिए।

SHRI SATISHCHANDRA SITARAM PRADHAN (Maharashtra): You try yourself with the fire, I will....(Inferno-tions)

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI): Shri Satish Pradhan.

श्री सतीश प्रधान : उनको वाटर में तैरना सीखने दो।(व्यवधान)...

SHRI T.N. CHATURVEDI: He has already burnt his fingers.

श्री सतीश प्रधान : आदरणीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, मैं आपका बहुत आभारी हूँ जो आपने मुझे यहां पर अपनी पार्टी की ओर से अपने विचार रखने का मौका दिया। सबसे पहले मैं आदरणीय प्रधानमंत्री जी और जसवंत सिंह जी को खास करके धन्यवाद देना चाहता हूँ जो इस विषय पर चर्चा करने के लिए उन्होंने स्टेटमेंट दिया। सदन में इस पर चर्चा करने के लिए उन्होंने स्टेटमेंट दिया। सदन में इस पर चर्चा में सब सदस्यों ने अपने अपने विचार रखे। मैं इतना ही कहना चाहता हूँ कि खास करके अमेरिका और जिन देशों के पास न्यूक्लियर वेपन्स है, ये सभी देश हम पर दबाव डाल रहे हैं कि किसी भी हालत में सी.टी.बी.टी. पर हम सिग्नेचर करें। मैं 1992 से इस सदन का सदस्य हूँ और देखता हूँ कि आए दिन, तब से लेकर आज तक सी.टी.बी.टी. का मामला हमारा पीछा नहीं छोड़ रहा है। कभी न कभी यहां सी.टी.बी.टी. पर बहस चल जाता है। मेरी प्रधानमंत्री जी से प्रार्थना होगी कि जितनी जल्दी हो कसे वे इस मामले को खत्म करें जिससे कि हम दूसरे विषयों पर चर्चा करना शुरू करें। अगर ऐसा हो तो अच्छा रहेगा।

हमारे ऊपर सब लोग दबाव डाल रहे हैं कि हम सिग्नेचर करें। अगर ऐसा नहीं करेंगे तो हम से चीजें नहीं खरीदेंगे और हमारी चीजों को बेचने के लिए नहीं

भेजने देंगे, ऐसा उनकी तरफ से कहा जाता है। मेरा इस विषय पर अपना कुछ अलग विचार है लेकिन यहां पर मैं बताना चाहता हूं कि जहां तक इस चीज का ताल्लुक है कि हमारे पास वे चीजे सेल करने के लिए नहीं भेजेंगे तो मैं कहना चाहता हूं कि ऐसा कभी नहीं होगा। कोई भी व्यापारी जब व्यापार की बात करता है तो उसको अपना माल बेचने के लिए कस्टमर चाहिए।

जहां कस्टमर्स की ज्यादा आबादी है उससे बड़ा मार्केट उनके लिए नहीं हो सकता। भारत की आजादी के मामले में दुनिया का नंबर दो देश है। इस कारण यहां पर उनके लिए बहुत बड़ा मार्केट है। अगर किसी को बिजनेस करना है तो यहां उसको आना पड़ेगा और वह आएगा ही। वह अपने घर में बैठकर बिजनेस नहीं कर सकता। यह बिजनेस का सिद्धांत है। वह हमारे पास बेचने के लिए नहीं आएगा, देने के लिए नहीं आएगा, ऐसा कुछ नहीं होगा। यदि उसको हम को देना होगा तो उसको हमारे से लेना भी पड़ेगा। इसके लिए उन पर दबाव डाला जा सकता है। उनको अपने मार्केट में आने के लिए मना किया जा सकता है। यह हमारे हाथ में है। तालियां एक हाथ से बर्जेगी नहीं। तालियां दोनों हाथ मिलाकर ही बजाई जा सकती हैं तो इस बात को ध्यान में लाने की आवश्यकता है। इस बारे में हमारे सामने “इनरान” का मामला है। हमारे ऊपर बैन लगाए गए, इस तरह की बातें कहीं गईं। लेकिन बैन लगाने के बाद भी इनरान ने कहा कि नहीं, हमारा करोबाद चालू रहेगा। हम अपने शैड्यूल के मुताबिक काम पूरा करेंगे, शैड्यूल के मुताबिक ही बिजली देंगे, इसमें कोई कमी नहीं होगी। जिसको बिजनेस करना है, वह बिजनेस करने के ढंग से ही बिजनेस करेगा। वह किसी के दबाव में नहीं आने वाला है। इसलिए इसको देखने की आवश्यकता है।

एक बात यह है कि सितम्बर 99 से सी.टी.बी.टी. पर जो सिग्रेचर करेगा, जो यह ट्रीटी है, वह इनफोर्स में आ जाएगा। अगर कोई देश हमारे ऊपर दबाव डालने की कोशिश करता है तो मैं प्रधानमंत्री जी से प्रार्थना करूंगा कि आप किसी भी दबाव में न आये। आपने देश को मजबूत किया है, आपने जो वेपन्स का परीक्षण किया है, वह बहुत अच्छे ढंग से किया है और बड़े अच्छे ढंग से विदेशों में और यू.एन.ओ. में जाकर देश की प्रतिमा को अच्छा किया है। आप इसी ढंग से आगे बढ़िए, हम आपके साथ हैं और इसके लिए हम आपको पूरा सहयोग देंगे, आपके साथ रहेंगे। धन्यवाद।

SHRI YOGINDER K. ALAGH (Gujarat):
Sir, I will make very brief points.

We are very grateful to the Prime Minister for the Statgement. Compared to the kind of clarifications on the security doctrine of the Government, which we had in the debate in June, there is one advance in the present statement. As the hon. Member, Shri Shourie and others have pointed out, the whole question related to access to technology. In the section, Export Control, there are statements on technology controls and that discussions have been helpful and the Government is expecting an improved situation in the future. I thought that I would also comment on the whole question of the CTBT, particularly, in view of the hon. Member, Shri Shourie's clarifications and also in view of the printed article by Mr. Talbott in *The Times of India*. As I re-read the statement of the Government, I do not think it is necessary to refer to it. Unless our Government given greater clues, I do not think it is proper to discuss details based on the statements made by other countries. As Mr. Mukherjee pointed out, in terms of details, the Government has been fairly cautious.

So far as the question of access to technology is concerned, I agree with Mr. Shourie that this is a very important question for India. There have been some very serious developments since last May. I only wanted to submit, through you, for the consideration of the House that linking up the whole question of technology controls only to the nuclear test issue is, in my mind, a somewhat narrow way of looking at the question. I think the hon. Member, Mr. Shourie, is quite right in saying that as far-as the security issues are concerned, the wider issue of access to technologies, particularly, computer and other control technologies is an extremely important issue. He is also quite right in saying that these issues should be left to the Scientists. We are really looking forward to Dr. Ramanna's statement in this regard.

I think Dr. Abdul Kalam has been making fairly detailed kinds of statments on this issue. I would refer, particularly,

to his 1991 lecture where he has pointed out that the question of access to technology should not be thought of purely in terms of nuclear technology. Even in May, I think, it has been pointed out very correctly that the technology of the large nuclear bomb is, in fact, a very simple technology. I think the hon. Member, Mr. Shourie is quite right in saying that it was in the low intensity thermonuclear test where there was interesting technological issues. But if we are thinking purely on defence aspects, then, the whole issue of rocketry cannot be ignored. That comes completely under a different clause of negotiations, namely the MTCR*. So these one-to-one link that we are making of the Pokhran test with access to the technology question, in my submission, is a somewhat limited perspective.

One needs to look at these issues in a slightly wider perspective: The kind of point which some of our defence and other scientists have been making both within the establishment and outside that take something like "the whole experience that India has with the supercomputer. It clearly shows that the question of access to technology is a wider issue. It may be recalled that the then Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was able to get from the then President, Mr. Reagan, the Cray computer. The United States had imposed restrictions including stationing in Delhi a team of experts from the U.S. to monitor the use of the computer. India decided to go in for its own technology. Some defence scientists and others have pointed out that by 1993 we were able to show that we could produce computer parallel processing equipment which was exported to countries like Singapore and Germany. Then, the United States withdrew its restrictions. In fact, it may be recalled that in 1994 the Cray Computer Company became bankrupt. The special funds that the U. S. had for trying to shore up such companies were not used because of the argument that

countries like India were able to have access to this technology.

5. P.M.

So, it is extremely important that — as the hon. Member Mr. Shourie says — we discuss this issue, this whole question of technology restrictions, within the context in which different experts, including defence experts, have been raising it. I think it is fair to say that. For example, the United States has again imposed restrictions on the export of supercomputers to India. It is like closing the gate when the horse has bolted. We are now in the 'terra flop' range. We have said that we are going to have port-based developments which compete with the best in the world. Having relaxed the restrictions, if they impose them again, it is purely a formal kind of thing. It has no substantial issue. But India does have to take a stand, and that is where I see a lot of significance in the paragraph of the Prime Minister's statement which says that we will be accessing these technologies at the frontier which are not only important for our defence, but are very important for civilian developments, particularly, in the energy and food security sectors, because nuclear and biotechnology applications have other implications also.

It is in this context that I thought some discussion on the sanctions issue might also have been useful. When the sanctions issue was raised in June, we were told that it was not important. This is on the record of the House.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI SANATAN BISI): Mr. Alagh, just a minute. It is 5 o'clock now. I have to take the sense of the House. Hon. Members, only a few Members are left and the Prime Minister is there to reply. Shall we continue? Okay. We will continue. Yes, Mr. Alagh.

SHRI YOGINDER K. ALAGH: At that time, we were told that sanctions were not important. Some of us argued

that was not quite fair. Since then, for example, on the floor of the House, we have been given lists of projects in core sectors that have been delayed. If one takes the power sector and some other sectors, it is quite obvious that investments in the range of 8—10 billion dollars which are at the core of the Annual Plan have been delayed because of the sanctions. Of course, it is absolutely right to say that direct aid by the United States is not important at all. In fact, I have said in May that the aid that the U.S. gives us is less than the budget of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. But the plan of the country, the Annual Plan and the Mid-term Plan and Ninth Plan, which we hope will come, depend basically on projects which involve restructuring and bank guarantees. And as for the depth of the financial system, a large number of them are involved either with the U.S. or with the Japanese banks because the other countries do not have the kind of depth with which these investments have to be taken on. And, there, the delay that the international financial institutions have done has definitely delayed large transmission projects which were scheduled to start this year and where approval has been delayed. That is where I thought the statement by the United States, which, I hope, emerged from the discussions which the hon. Shri Jaswantji had with them, where they have said that the restrictions by the banking system, sanctions on India, have been withdrawn, is a significant statement. I am not sure whether I would request the Prime Minister to get into this, the Prime Minister of India is a very important person. But, at some appropriate level, it would be prudent, if there is recognition of the fact that this is something which is a step in the right direction. We expect concrete steps of this kind also in the whole question of technology access. The language used in the draft document is in the correct direction. There is no doubt in my mind that the Plan has been delayed. I am not blaming anybody. With changes in the coalition regime, this has

become, in a sense, inevitable. But it does create an element of uncertainty. To the extent the uncertainty gets removed, I think, at the level of the management of the economy, at a fairly serious and responsible plane, these points should be made. This is important because one has no data on what the requirements of Defence and development are going to be. There are some speculative reports in various newspapers and none of us want any strategic details. For example, we were spending about 14 per cent of the Central Budget on Defence in 1989-90. That meant a share of GDP which was a little more than three per cent. Even if we have to get back to that and even if we have to take into account whatever one can see in terms of the projects that have been listed on the floor on the House in terms of the kind of delays that have taken place, we are speaking about mobilising $2^{1/2}$ per cent to 3 per cent of GDP. Now, these are the kinds of figures which somebody, with some planning experience, will generate. Mr. Jaswant Singh would know better about the exact figures. May be, it is 3.8 per cent; may be, it is 2.5 per cent. Now, when one starts discussing these types of issues, I think, the point that the hon. Member, Shri Arun Shourie, has made, is extremely important. If one goes through the statement of the Prime Minister as a statement in terms of moving towards a security and development doctrine, then think, we have to recognise that the country is in a fairly serious situation and it needs a very major mobilisation effort. If $2^{1/2}$ per cent to 3 per cent of GDP is required, it is all right. If it is not required, we should be informed about that. I am not talking of numbers. I am talking about the direction of an effort. My numbers may be off by 0.3 per cent or 1 per cent, and if there is somebody in the Planning Commission who can give more precise numbers, I would be happy at that. I am a believer in the planning process. But if this is the nature of the magnitude of the sacrifice that we have to make—again, I don't want to make this a political issue—after all, I was a Minister

in a Coalition government, and now, we have another Coalition government, I realise the nature of these difficulties. But the country has to be taken into confidence, and I would fully endorse what the hon. Memtapr, Shri Arun Shourie, has said that the sacrifices that have to be made in terms of the economic and defence channels, have to be spelt out, and this House has to face them in a serious manner. Thank you.

[Mr. Chairman in the Chair]

KUMARI NIRMALA DESHPANDE (Nominated): Mr. Chairman, Sir, through you, I would just like to express my gratitude to the Prime Minister for sharing information with the House. But I would like to be enlightened on the following points. Firstly, India is not just a nation. India has a message and a mission also, so, the line that is being pursued, how will that affect India's mission to establish a nuclear-free and non-violent world? The line that is being pursued, how will that affect India's role as a voice of those who are not in a position to express themselves as a voice of the third-world? I would like to know whether along with this line, efforts are on to arrive at a consensus on this issue amongst the SAARC countries, and especially, our neighbour, Pakistan. Thank you.

SHRI BHUVNESH CHATURVEDI (Rajasthan): Mr. Chairman, Sir, we are happy about the statement of the Prime Minister. But we could have been happier if the statement had been comprehensive, including all aspects of foreign policy, because Indo-US relations cannot be treated, justifiably, in isolation. Indo-US relations affect all aspects of our foreign policy. Sir, this is almost the end of the debate and enough wisdom has been inflicted on us. therefore, I would try to be as short as possible. Sir, Indo-US relations have a long history. All the Prime Ministers of India, after having been elected as Prime Minister, had first visited the USA before going to any

other country. That is our priority. From the time of Pandit Nehru to this date, our Prime Ministers have visited first the USA before going to any other country. But, unfortunately, the response is not that good. We do remember USA's contribution towards the achievement of India's independence, and that Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Pandit was sent by Gandhiji to the USA almost on the eve of independence to thank the American people and the American Government. But, somehow, it has now been realised that we are not very convenient to the USA in their strategy towards this region and, therefore, they are not responding to all our genuine desires, to all our genuine efforts and to all our genuine policies. So far, the talks between Mr. Strobe Talbott and Mr. Jaswant Singh were shrouded in mystery. We are happy that, at least, some words have now come about it from the Prime Minister. There had been so many talks, so many articles in newspapers, and many sponsored news-items also appeared in the press. They were all creating misunderstandings. But, somehow, at least, some part of it is now shared with us. My submission is that it is all good to talk about the Indo-US relations, but they should not be allowed to set up an agenda for Indo-Pak talks. They are trying to become a third party into it. We have resisted it. We have never allowed it to be internationalised. But, at the same time, they quietly tried to be a passive third party. So, it should not be allowed, and their suggestions on these issues should be cold-shouldered. The Pakistani people are now craving for friendship with India and the Indian people are also craving for friendship with Pakistan. Let the political leadership of both the countries try earnestly for it. I had a chance of meeting the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in New York. As I reported to the Prime Minister, my meeting with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was extremely good. Though it was a chance meeting, it was a very informal meeting; it was quite a long meeting, and he expressed his views very unreservedly on these issues, which I

reported to the Prime Minister. I expect that some positive steps will be taken, and on the Indo-Pak relationship, without allowing anybody else to set an agenda for Indo-Pak talks.

Sir, in the same way, I feel that your own over-enthusiastic Ministers, sometimes, spoiled our relations with other countries, whether it was Pakistan or China. China felt very bad when it was leaked out that a letter was written by the Prime Minister to President Clinton saying that in our threat perception, China is the reason for our nuclear explosion. We do not know whether it is correct or not. We wish it is not correct. But if it is correct, it is a very tragic thing. The people tried their best to forget the past and they also tried their best to have good relations with China. We should not allow ourselves to be used by China and the USA to settle scores between them. We should not allow ourselves to be used by them to satisfy or isolate Pakistan. We should never allow ourselves to be used by any world power, whoever it may be.

A message was sent by the Chinese Foreign Minister to Mr. Jaswant Singh on assuming the charge. It is very good. The message is all right. But it doesn't produce enough results. We will have to respond to it. I will suggest that Mr. Jaswant Singh should be sent there, if they extend an invitation to us. A real breakthrough is needed because enough confusion is created in Indo-China relationship. It is a vital subject for us. We must do something very positive about it. We must not ignore it. We must do our best. We have been able to build the Indo-China relationship on a very sound footing in the last three decades. As I understand it, they are confused. Therefore, some positive response is needed from the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister towards that end. In the same way, we have had many discussions with Mr. Nawaz Sharif, his colleagues and many other people like the Senate Chairman, Mr. Zaki and others. They are very

positive. I will suggest that a Parliamentary delegation should be sent to Pakistan or a Parliamentary delegation should be invited from Pakistan to create a real climate of friendship. That is our test. The test of our foreign policy is also related to our relations with our neighbours. The test of our foreign policy is not only related to Indo-US relationship or Indo-Janpan relationship but also related to our relations with our neighbours. Though Chanakya said that we should not be very fair in our relations with our neighbours, we cannot afford to ignore our relationship with our neighbours. Therefore, my submission is that we should in all seriousness make friendly gestures and attempts towards that end. I am told that six or seven rounds of official level talks have already been there. Now, another round of talks is likely to be held in January. But I have learnt that they are not conveying the date because they want to be convinced themselves whether India will be represented in the talks at the political level. They want to be sure about this. This is why they have not given a date. Please see to it that it is done. I was told that Mr. Jaswant Singh had done a commendable job in his meetings with Mr. Talbott in the US. Many people had told me there. But what is puzzling me is that now Mr. Jaswant Singh is a Minister with a Cabinet rank. Will it be proper in protocol to ask our Foreign Minister to talk to a for junior level Minister in the US? That is my objection. There is a protocol reason. I don't know if the Prime Minister can send his MoS who is not less charming, not less persuasive, no less an expert in talking. So, it should be tried. It is not a flattery. I am really serious about it. We should not do that where our Cabinet Minister is talking to a junior level Minister. Otherwise, you should not have made him a Minister. He could be a very good special envoy. Since you have made him a Minister we are very happy about it but sense of respect, that sense of protocol must be needed. An MoS can be tried. (*Interruptions*)... You can give the Cabinet rank to any-

body, there are so many MPs who are having a Cabinet rank. I don't want to name them. But it doesn't mean that.

He is the Foreign Minister. That is my objection. Therefore, it should be considered.

I read in some newspapers; I don't know whether it is correct or incorrect — when the Prime Minister wanted to talk to the Russian President, he did not come on the line. I hope it is incorrect. If it is correct, there must be some serious misunderstanding. Our Ambassador is a very able man there. Something serious should be done in this regard. When I read it yesterday, I felt very bad about it.

Then, they are also unhappy about one more thing. We were to purchase polio vaccine from Russia. But we did not purchase polio vaccine as we put order to them. That is why they are unhappy. If it is so, something should be done about it because these things do matter a lot for Russia and other neighbours.

I would like to mention one or two more points. Our relations with Sri Lanka and Burma are on a very strong footing. They should not feel ignored. Some people, especially one or two Cabinet Ministers, sometimes, have said many things overenthusiastically. Kindly ask them to restrain themselves, Mr. Prime Minister, you are the master. I will not say, "Throw them out". If it is done, they will throw the Government out. Therefore, I don't want to take that risk. Please don't do it. Kindly advise them to restrain themselves. They are talking too much. These things, sometimes, harm our relationship with other countries. We make these relations bit-by-bit. By one statement, they can demolish the whole edifice which we have been able to create after the efforts of many years.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, we feel very happy and proud about the nuclear explosions, although these explosions were done without any proper planning. Since it is a national honour, we all accept it.

At the same time, I would like to say that CTBT is a very dangerous trap. We

cannot avoid it, and, at the same time, we cannot accept it. There is a need for statesmanship. They are trying to put us in a corner' and we are trying to escape from them. The whole nation will be with you, provided you understand the nation's psyche. You should go to the people directly and share these things with them. They will accept your version. At the same time, don't adopt a very secretive approach. At least, something from what Shri Jaswant Singh has done in seven rounds of talks, should be disclosed to the people. We trust you. We are with you. But you should also share these things with us. That is why we are apprehensive about it. We are very much worried about it. We are very much afraid of it. Why are these things being done so secretly? Mr. Prime Minister, you are a transparent person. You believe in transparency. We don't say 'give us all the details; but tell us something which is worth sharing with us'. That is all I have to say. Thank you.

SHRI T. N. CHATURVEDI (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, Sir, the statement that has been made by the hon. Prime Minister is characterised by candour; it is full of significance for the future and for the ongoing negotiations and, I think, at the same time, it is characterised by a remarkable restraint. I do not propose to go towards the horizon of the foreign policy as such. I want to confine myself to the statement. But before I do so, I would like to mention that the extremely, exceedingly, constructive, thoughtful response that was made by the senior colleague, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, was also equally remarkable. I have no doubt that when these two statements are read by the people and are read by Statesmen and Governments abroad, they will know that there might be exigencies at the moment, there might seemingly be some fragmented politics, but so far as the national interest is concerned, India speaks with one voice. That is the signal, I have no doubt, that will go from this House today. I have a genuine feeling that had this statement and Shri Mukherjee's response been

made much before, there would have been time for the hon. Members to ponder over it. From the statement of the hon. Prime Minister and the way Shri Pranab. Mukherjee responded, I think, many of the misgivings and many of the doubts that were raised have automatically vanished by themselves. Sometimes, one felt, while listening to some of the colleagues, that, probably, we were still in the midst of May and June and not taking into account the changes that have taken place after that. Sir, I would just draw your attention to three important parameters, the three fundamentals, that the Prime Minister's statement contains and I think, these three fundamentals are the basis of our foreign policy, and that they also constitute the mandate which Shri Jaswant Singh had while negotiating with his counterpart. I do not want to go into the question as to who should be sent. It is for the Prime Minister to decide. But the continuity of the talk, the kind of mutuality in the understanding that had been established, cannot be snapped only on the basis of protocol. I am aware, as also mentioned by Dr. Alagh, that many a time, it is the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs who has interacted with the Ministers outside and sometimes vice versa. Shri Ish Dutt Yadav is not here. But I would just like to mention to you that in India, so far as our tradition is concerned, it is always

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ajrar *ft 5*5 *n*ft vsft 11 I think that Mr. Jaswant Singh is not going as an individual. He is going as a representative and he has been interacting as a representative. But, Sir, I draw your attention to the three fundamentals, as I said. The first one is that when he said in para 2, "India has consistently maintained that the nuclear weapon-free world would enhance not only our security but also security of all nations." And I would like to assure Kumari Nirmala Deshpande that this is the mission, this is the message, the message of India, which echoes in this statement.

Hew also the Prime Minister added, it is

unfortunate that those who only wanted to legitimize their monopoly of power or those who were just fond of nuclear umbrella, did not appreciate our security concerns. Now, this is one of the concerns which still bothers us but this has been well taken note of in the Statement itself. The Prime Minister has also given the credit to all he has not tried to monopolise the credit that this Government has done it. He has said that things have been built on what was done earlier and that is why this is a matter of pride for the nation. All that he said was, there is always a detrmation period when the option cannot be left indefinitely and that option has to be exercised and the judgment in exercising that option naturally will have to be with that of the Government of the day. It was also mentioned that the NAG, National Agenda for Governance talked of the strategic review. But then the strategic review was not made. There are moments, there are times and if the Government comes into power and if the Government has at its disposal the information, then I think certainly only some kind of a procedural formality or some kind of protocol need not necessarily be observed. The second fundamental point which he mentioned is, we have announced our intention to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent, but one that is credible. Not credible minimum but more emphasis in the sentence, 'with a minimum nuclear deterrent but one that is credible'. That means it will not be determined by others as to what is or what should be our standards of judgment for assessing whether the nuclear deterrent is credible, whether it is convincing or not. It is not their yardstick that will operate. But it is the yardstick which the people of this country have come to possess or believe in. A reference was also made by Miss Deshpande that in international fora, in the UN, India has always echoed a kind of message for progressive elimination of nuclear weapons. The third thing which I would draw your attention to in this connection is India has all along been

interacting with other powers, with other countries. So, it is not a question of isolation at a particular point of time. But the isolation is not a physical process. Isolation is something intellectual and it is from that intellectual isolation that India through its interaction all along, in all adverse circumstances even misunderstandings at times deliberately created after Pokhran, awoke through that intellectual isolation and that is why we find today, that even the question of sanctions or even the penumbra or even the spectrum of sanctions itself has been gradually shrinking. Sir, the other thing which I think is also equally important is the dialogue that has been conducted on the basis of a set of comprehensive proposals, what has been mentioned earlier in his Statement or even in some of his replies or even the Statement in June. Thereafter we have to see what our proposals were or what the framework was within which Shri Jaswant Singh was to conduct negotiations and discussions. A voluntary moratorium of underground nuclear test explosions is *suo motu*, unilateral. Our assurance of peace, in keeping with our traditions and in keeping with the past history, our willingness to move towards *de-jure* formalisation, to this commitment, we say that it is not just by verbalisation or by word of mouth but, if necessary, a legal form, or a legal garb can also be given. And then, the statement further says, "A decision to join negotiations on a treaty for a ban on future productions." Shri Shourie used the words, 'future productions'. This is not with retrospective effect. The statement goes on saying, "Future production of fissile material for weapons purposes; and, our determination to make more stringent the existing system of export controls over sensitive materials and technology." India has never been found wanting in this regard. There has not been any proliferation or a leakage of any of this sensitive material, so far as India is concerned. But still, in order to assure the world, even the doubting Thomases, the Prime Minister's statement again emphasised this particular point.

Sir, six round of talks have been held. Some Members said that not much has been revealed as to what transpired between Shri Jaswant Singh and Mr. Talbott. A reference is also made, not only to his article in the Times of India, but even to some of his interviews, even to his speech in the Asia Society—it was for the other side, for the interlocutors, to say as to what they want. So far as Mr. Jaswant Singh's mandate is concerned, his mandate is reinforced by what the Prime Minister said, and it is based, as far as the discussion in this House is /concerned, on an almost unanimous view, with some jarring exceptions here and there, as to what the House and the country feels. That is why, there was nothing for Mr. Jaswant Singh to conceal and not to reveal, or that every time, one should go to the people, because our stand was clear-cut. Our stand was unequivocal, and that was understood by our interlocutors.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, I would also like to mention that after six rounds, talks have narrowed down. Some of the hon. Members have missed the implications and the nuances of those words have been completely ignored. The statement says that after six rounds, talks have narrowed down. That means, there is an area of convergence; there is an area of agreement. It may be interlinked with some other more important points. I won't call them peripheral. They may be equally important from different angles. The statement further says that the talks are now focussed on the following four issues. One of them is the CTBT. It was good to find Shri Pranab Mukherjee referring to the letter written by his party to the Prime Minister. I think, very constructive suggestions were contained in that letter.

Sir, I can't help repeating what the Prime Minister said before the United Nations General Assembly. "India is now engaged in discussions with our key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT." The CTBT is in the bonnet of the United States or the other powers who are represented in the United

Nations—the world forum. They are worried and they are under the impression that it is only India which is proving to be the road-block, it is only India which is the bad guy. It is not just a question of surrender because something has been made out as if it is just a way of surrender, or, under pressure, and so on and so forth. The Prime Minister's statement to the United Nations further says, "We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion."—that is our willingness; that is our good faith, and that is our good intention—"so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September, 1999." This was something which was bothering them. This was something with which they were concerned. So, India cannot be blamed for this. The other meaningful sentence, pregnant with meaning, in that statement is, "We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions." When the Prime Minister used in his statement a word 'prepared,' that means there is some reciprocity expected. India is also expecting something. Unless these things are done, it will be difficult for us. Then, he goes on to say further, "For the successful conclusion of the talks, creation of a positive environment by our interlocutors is a necessary ingredient. This is a caution for us and this is a warning to others. This is a message that we wanted to give." I am mentioning this. Mr. Alagh has spoken on it at great length and Mr. Arun Shourie, about the assessment of our scientists. This stand does not come in the way of our taking such a step as may be found necessary in future to safeguard our national interest. I need not go into the question of explosions and about simulated tests because they were very well pointed out by Shri Arun Shourie and by my friend Dr. Alagh. But, what is important? To this, emphasis was given by Dr. Alagh that it does not constrain us from continuing with our R&D programmes nor does it jeopardise in any manner the safety and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrence in the years to come so

that our minimum credible deterrence will not be dented by any kind of pressure from outside. This is what is contained in this. Dr. Kalam's name was mentioned that he, along with Dr. Rajan, wrote a book, *India: 2020*. There he mentioned about dual-use technology. It is said that every country will invariably give non-strategic technologies or which are obsolete. Then, he lists about ten technologies for which we have to prepare ourselves. A very striking and shining example is given as to how India could make up in that case. A case was given by Dr. Alagh himself with regard to computers. Even for space programmes, India was denied the dual-use technology for certain reasons. It was possible for the ingenuity of our scientists to make it up.

Sir, the second issue is the fissile material cut-off treaty. I do not want to go into the details of this. If one percolates down to every word, then one can see what the negotiations are. The objective of the negotiations is to arrive at a non-discriminatory treaty that will end future production of fissile material for weapons purpose, in accordance with 1993 resolution of the UN General Assembly. We are willing. Again, the Prime Minister signifies this country's intention, this country's stand and the willingness to enter into negotiations for concluding such a treaty. The onus is not only on India, the onus is on other countries also. The onus is on a particular country which came to be a super power. All of us are aware in this House of the ups and downs in the relationship with the U.S. but, I can assure my friend, Dr. M.N. Das that, when India speaks in a united voice when the honour and dignity of the country is concerned, I have no doubt that they will also realise that India is not a banana country and that India will stand as one person to face whatever may be the adverse circumstances that confront us.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, one point I want to stress and that is about a statement given by Mr. Arun Shourie and which has been misconstrued. When he talked of

economic situation, there was a kind of caution which he gave about the economic strength of a nation State because we are a federal State, a state of co-operative federalism. This should receive our attention. I think, this point was again dilated upon by Dr. Alagh. This is not to give an impression that Mr. Shourie conceded that India was caught up in such a state of dismal economic plight that nothing will help. This was the kind of impression which the former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Smt. Kamla Sinha gave.

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी (बिहार) : सर, ये क्लेरिफिकेशन हैं या प्रधान मंत्री जी की तरफ से एक्सप्लेनेशन हैं? आप तो एक-एक लाइन बता रहे हैं। इसमें आप समय बरबाद क्यों कर रहे हैं?
....(व्यवधान)....

† شری جلال الدین انصاری: سر- یہ کلیری فیکیشن ہے یا پردھان منتری جی کی طرف سے ایکسپلینیشن ہے۔ آپ تو ایک ایرلائن بنا رہے ہیں اسمیں آپ وقت کیوں برباد کر رہے ہیں...
... ہیں

श्री टी.एन. चतुर्वेदी : मैं तो अपनी प्रतिक्रिया बता रहा हूँ।(व्यवधान)....

अंसारी साहब, मैंने कभी आपको नहीं कहा कि आप टाइम बर्बाद करते हैं।(व्यवधान)....

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी : अगर प्रधान मंत्री जी को खुश करना चाहते हैं तो दूसरी बात है।(व्यवधान)....

† شری جلال الدین انصاری: اگر پردھان منتری جی کو خوش کرنا چاہتے ہیں تو دوسری بات ہے
... "مداخلت" ...

†[]Transliteration in Arabic Script

श्री टी.एन. चतुर्वेदी : मेरा अपना इन्टरप्रेशन हैं। आपके कुछ इन्टरप्रेशन दिया था और चितरंजन साहब ने कुछ इन्टरप्रेशन दिया था और चितरंजन साहब ने कुछ....(व्यवधान).... दिया था। हमारे मित्र नीलोत्पल बसु ने कुछ इन्टरप्रेशन दिया था। अगर मैं अपना इन्टरप्रेशन देता हूँ तो मैं समझता हूँ कि आपको इसमें इतनी तकलीफ नहीं होनी चाहिए। न तो यह सीपीआई का मामला है और न केवल बिहार का मामला है।

Sir, I do not want to take much time of the House because this only needlessly upsets them. But, I will make one or two references to some of the comments made earlier by Mr. Nilotpal Basu. He said that there has not been enough effort for Consensus building. If consensus building only means concurring to his viewpoint and if concurrence to his point of view is not evolved in the process, then the consensus building has no meaning for him. If this is the case, then I think even God cannot help him. Of course, he does not believe in God. He stated that the entire thrust of this statement is that there should be disarmament of all kinds, time-bound, and so on. My friend Mr. Ansari will again say that I am using the same Phrases. But, somehow, Mr. Nilotpal Basu felt that there should be a new legislation because the Atomic Energy Commission Act does not permit that. He infers as Mr. Ansari's leader, Mr. Chitharanjan does, as if we are entering into an arms race. This is what the Prime Minister himself has warned of. That is why I said that if he had pondered over the implications of this statement, then, I think, his reaction would have been much more constructive and much more rational. Sir, I do not want to take much time of the House. Sir, I would only like to say that the comments made by Shri Pranab Mukherjee certainly deserve the consideration of the Government. The second point he made was, yes, we are doing our best; we are striving and we are hopeful. He himself said that he is not a pessimist. But, at the same time, we have to prepare ourselves for all exigencies. God forbid such a situation does not arise. I do not see any such situation once we are able to come to a meeting of minds on

many other issues and attention is focus-sed on the real issues. There can be a give-and-take. This give-and-take should not be in the sense of national pride or national interests. In diplomacy or politics, whether within the country or outside the country, I think, there is always an interchange and there is a meeting of minds, giving some essentials and at the same time gaining some more essentials. I think that process will continue. I do not envisage that a situation will arise when we will not be able to come to an agreement. All I would like to mention is that a consensus should emerge which takes into account our national interest as well as the Indian tradition of peace as well as long-term interests of both defence and development.

SHRI JOHN F. FERNANDES (Goa): Sir, the hon. Prime Minister has made a lengthy statement. It is a nine-page statement. He has said so many things but revealed nothing. I think, he is keeping up with the agreement that Mr. Jaswant Singh had with Mr. Talbott, that they will keep on talking and reveal nothing to anybody. So, I do not blame the hon. Prime Minister for not revealing anything to this Parliament. But, the hon. Prime Minister did say that he had consultations with the Opposition Parties. He had consultations with a segment of the parliament i.e., the Consultative Committee and the Standing Committee. I would also like to know from the hon. Prime Minister — we have five ex-Prime Ministers in this country: they are also in the know-how of the decision, particularly, the nuclear option that the country was about to have — whether they have also been taken into confidence when he had discussions with the Opposition. Sir, Members after Members have said that the relations between India and the U.S. are bitter after Pokhran-II. I do not think, at any point of time, the relations between India and the U.S. were sweeter; even during those days when we had imported sugar under PL-480, because discriminatory regime is still on with full

force on the globe. We have seen the middle-age doctrine of unequal laws which were followed by the mighty powers. I think that is still in vogue on this globe. In view of that, I do not know why they have to give so much importance to the so-called super power. The statement also said, "Prime Minister's statement in Parliament on 'bilateral talks with United States.'" We also had talks with other nuclear countries. We had a talk with the P-5 nations. I think, that should have been the wording of the statement. I do not know why we should give that much importance to that country, a country which had been inimical to this country throughout. Mr. Arun Shourie has mentioned, at the outset, when we went in for Pokhran-II, there was a hue and cry. I do not think that any party opposed to it. Even my party has not opposed it. The hon. Prime Minister has rightly said that this nuclear option was initiated 25 years ago. We had demonstrated it on 18th May, 1974. Nobody objected to it. It is the pride of the nation. Our question was, why, when the time-bomb was ticking in Chennai, that time was selected. That was the question we were asking because we still have time till September, 1999 and by that time, the doors of the CTBT would close on us. That was the question. Nobody objected to that. Even our colleagues in the Left did not say anything. Our question was, why then? Why, when this Government was ridden with contradictions, did that go off? I was mentioning about the doctrine of unequal laws. We have seen it in our neighbourhood when Talibans were born in Afghanistan, Sudan was born. And India was told that you cannot do it, though there is a proxy-war against India by our neighbour, we were told that the U.S. can do but you cannot do it and you should not do it. This is the regime with whom we are having bilateral talks and I compliment the hon. Prime Minister that the bilateral talks which he had were with an interlocutor, a low officer. He did not use the Foreign Affairs Minister of this country. I think, that is the message we have sent. The first talk took

place on 11th June, 1998 and afterwards, there were six more rounds of talks with Mr. Talbott and this Parliament was not taken into confidence. The hon. Prime Minister said in the first para of the statement that he had taken Parliament into confidence on 27-29 May, 8 June, and on 3-4 August, 1998. But, we never gave any importance to that talk. I do not think that it was proper for the Parliament to give importance to one country, one country which had been inimical and which and been opposing this country. They had signed the NPT in 1940. That country was the first country to use nuclear power. Sir, clause 5 of the NPT says that they will go in for disarmament. You have piled up 2000 nuclear warheads. Now you are talking about the CTBT. Now you say that there should not be CTBT but you can manufacture warheads and store them in your armaments. You ask others not to do it. I do not think we should waste our time. We can have a talk just for the sake of talking only. It was said that we also follow pre-emptive diplomacy. But it would have been appropriate for this Government to have talks with our neighbour also. The Defence Minister gave an impression prior to the Pokhran test too that our number one enemy is China. Of course, subsequently, he denied it. We also know that there is one more nuclear power, the seventh nuclear power, that is, Pakistan. Why has there been no talks with Pakistan? I know that the Government is dealing with it at the SAARC level. But we also have to take that country into confidence because we are not inimical to each other. In 1974, when we had a nuclear explosion, the then Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, said on the floor of the Lok Sabha that we were prepared to share our nuclear technology with Pakistan. I think, an impression has been created in the West that we are inimical and we will finish each other. I do not think anybody who fought a nuclear war has been a winner, either you say first use, or, second use. I do not think anybody makes nuclear weapons to use against

each other. On the contrary, we were in a hurry to reduce ourselves par with our neighbouring country. In conventional arms we had an upper hand on our neighbour. But now, after going in for a nuclear explosion, we have brought ourselves on par with our neighbour. That is the mistake that we have made. There are not only seven countries which have the nuclear technology and armament. I think there should be about 50 or 60 countries, but they have not demonstrated it. We should have waited for an appropriate time to demonstrate it. That was not an appropriate time. That was our objection. We did not object to the tests because that was the pride of the nation and that pride does not belong to any political party. It belongs — as rightly mentioned by the hon. Prime Minister — to the scientists and technicians of this country.

Then, I come to the nuclear club. Now, five countries have taken themselves to be the members of the nuclear club. Despite our talks with Mr. Talbott, we are told — Mr. Jaswant Singh said — "No, you cannot be a nuclear State." Who are they to dictate terms to us? Has the Government taken any initiative to see to it? There was a talk in New York. I think, a statement was made by some Minister that a nuclear club will be formed and India will take the initiative. I do not know whether the Government will stand by that statement or not.

Sir, the Government has said that it will go in for further talks. We have condemned the Jaswant Singh Talbott talks. Then, we will also have a conference on disarmament, like we had the CTBT talks in Geneva, which was failure, again, they are going to have a fissile Material Control Treaty. We know that the American Senate Committee knew that the fissile material from China was pilfered to Pakistan. And I think the Senate Committee has reprimanded that Government. Now, we are going to get involved in these talks again. Do you think something will come out of these

talks? Is it not discriminatory? Again you speak of the non-proliferation of fissile material. I think we are just wasting our time in having these talks.

Further, Sir, the CTBT will come into force in September, 1999. The CTBT will come into force in September, 1999. The CTBT cannot be amended. They say that it is discriminatory and we will not be a party to it. But, at the same time, they are having talks. Why are they having talks when that treaty cannot be amended? And the moment you violate the treaty, you are out of it. I do not think that India, in its present position, can be a part of the CTBT, which is discriminatory and which cannot be amended. If at all, it comes into force, I think, we have to be out of it..

I disagree with certain Members who made allegations that the economic position of this country went bad because of the sanctions imposed by the USA. As rightly mentioned by Shrimati Kamla Sinha, India is not a banana republic. Our economy did not go down because of any economic sanctions. Our export has come down, as I said in the morning, by 5.80 per cent. But this is because of our wrong economic policies. I do not think we should give all the credit to the Western powers for the ailment that we have.

6.00 P.M.

Again, Sir, the Prime Minister mentioned about the National Security Council. It is a good thing which the Government has done because that is in the National Agenda for Governance. I hope it will not be an ad hoc committee again. It is controlled by the P.M.O. At the same time, the Foreign Affairs Ministry was controlled by an officer from the P.M.O. We were embarrassed when we went to the NAM summit in South Africa. I would like to know whether this body, will be a statutory body. The National Security Council is a major Body. You cannot change the officers, like the Governors and Ambassadors, when the Government changes. Why

don't you make it a statutory body? Why don't you make that a permanent office, irrespective of any Government? Because, whichever Government may come and go, our foreign policy does not change. I would request the hon. Prime Minister to see that this body, that is, the National Security Council, does a good thing. After all, India is going to be nuclear country. We do not know where the red button will lie; whether it will be with the political leadership, or with the army leadership. I think the most appropriate thing for the Government to do is to have a statutory body. Come before the Parliament, take the powers and have an appropriate and full-fledged National Security Council. It is there in other countries; whichever country is holding the nuclear button. With these few submissions, Mr. Chairman, Sir, I request the hon. Prime Minister to take the other countries also into confidence. Take Pakistan into confidence. Let us give them that importance; they are our neighbours. Let us not give an impression to America that they are our enemies and that is why we will not talk to them. Let us give them the importance which is due to a nuclear power. With these few words, I conclude. I feel that these talks will continue and, at the same time, nothing concrete will come out.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Dr. Raja Ramanna.

श्री के.आर. मलकानी : कब तक हाउस चलेगा?

श्री सभापति : जब तक आप तय करेंगे Now, four hours are over, would you like to continue today? (*interruptions*)

श्रीमती कमला सिन्हा : कल चलाइए! (*interruptions*)

MR. CHAIRMAN: But you decide, (*interruptions*) Yes, he will speak.

DR. RAJA RAMANNA (Nominated): I will be very brief. I will take only five minutes; you can have the stop-watch on. All that I have to say is that the NPT has gone into history. The CTBT is about to go back into history because, I do not think one can implement that Treaty at all. From the technical side. You know

that our tests were not detected until we mentioned about it. And its yields were not properly mentioned by others until we showed them that 137 countries have given the correct yields only when all were put together; and not singly.

Now, in the Prime Minister's Statement, a mention was made of FMCT. Propaganda has gone round even on scientific circles that fast reactors which require fissile material, are not required because the fast reactors will not work economically. It is nonsense. It is a pure propaganda that they want to take the plutonium and bury it, or, do something in the name of protigeration. The scientific inputs clearly say that fast reactors will not work and that the fast-breed reactor which uses uranium more efficiently will not work. We must be careful when we conduct these treaties in the future.

Sir, many people have asked me, 'why you have done these tests; does it mean that no more Tests are needed? People foreget that these tests were done as a deterrent. There is a limit to the amount that you can destroy. Of course, one can go on testing and making bigger and bigger hydrogen bombs. But I disagree with Mr. Alagh that a hydrogen bomb is more easier to make than a sub-critical one. I do not believe, that is a correct statement. But it does not matter, nor is it necessary that we have to prepare a critical one ...(*interruptions*)

ONE HON. MEMBER: Mr Alagh disagrees with you.

DR. RAJA RAMANNA: I also disagree with him. (*interruptions*). It does not matter. If I have said it, I will take it back. Let us not waste time. I have promised to finish within five minutes. But be that as it may; there is a limit to *I'M* amount of destruction you can do to the world. What we have is sufficient to keep our security under control, with what we have done. I think the Prime Minister is quite correct in calling for a moratorium; and this should be enough to look after ourselves.

In principle one can go on. The Americans conducted thousands of tests because they started with a lower technology. We started with a higher technology. So, we were able to complete it. I may tell you that our scientists are respected outside. The Prime Minister also knows about it. The American Academy of Scientists requested our Director of NIAS to go there and have a discussion with them. They were willing to pay for them, but we said we will pay for ourselves. Now, they are coming in a bigger group to India to discuss more at the scientific level. They are little confused and things have to be explained to them. Earlier, their own scientists had said that there was no hydrogen bomb. The yield was low and all that. But, now they know that their own scientists had said the wrong thing. That is a separate matter. We should not press too much on these matters. We have done enough to say that we have done a number of testings already. Of course, I was amazed at that time, when the scientific journals were writing against us with results of one or two bits of information that they had received. Actually you get the correct information only when information is available from all the 137 stations together. So, it was a difficult thing to determine yields. When people sign treaties, especially from the technical side, they do not realise the difficulties of getting a full control on these matters. I am just bringing this to the attention of the Prime Minister, because he is to deal with these matters in future also.

A mention was made about the neighbouring countries. I happen to have many friends amongst the scientists in the neighbouring countries. They had welcomed it with great happiness, not at the External Affairs level, but as ordinary people, because they knew that we were capable of and we had exercised our option at a time suitable to us. Even in America, there are a lot of people, who understand us correctly in many ways and are not carried away by the State Department decisions.

I will end up by saying that we should not run down our country ourselves on the FMCT and all that. Ten years ago our data showed how badly our power reactors were working. But, to use that data is wrong. Many people seem to take into account during those days when we had difficulties, because we were not industrially developed, we lacked high efficiency and even support. But, now, in the last two or three years I am amazed at the high capacity factors our reactors are working with.

Sir, a note hat come to me. I would just read what this note ii about. It concerns the technological difficulty of making large bombs. I will not discuss these things here, but will discuss the matter among ourselves. Thank you for listening to me.

MR. CHAIRMAN: There are some more Members for seeking clarifications. Should we continue today or tomorrow?
SHRIMATI KAMLA SINHA: Sir, let us take it up tomorrow.

सदन के नेता (श्री सिकन्दर बख्त) : सर, मेरी तजवीज यह होगी कि जो साहिबान को बोलना हैं, इब्राहीम साहब को और अंसारी साहब को, वह बोल लें और जवाब कल हो जाए।

†نیٹا سدن "شری سکندر بخت": سر، میری تجویز یہ ہوگی کہ جن صاحبان کو بولنا ہے۔ ابراہیم صاحب کو اور انصاری صاحب کو وہ بول لیں اور جواب کل ہو جائیگا۔

श्री सभापति : जवाब कल कितने बजे करेंगे?(व्यवधान).... जवाब कल होगा, बोलने वाला आज खत्म हो जाएगा।(व्यवधान).... जवाब कल 12.00 बजे करेंगे?

श्री सिकन्दर बख्त : जी हां, कल 12.00 बजे हो जाए।

†श्री सकندر بخت: جی ہاں کل ۱۲ بجے ہو جائیگا۔

श्री सभापति : फिर दूसरा प्रोग्राम चेंज करेंगे?

श्री सिकन्दर बख्त : जी हां।(व्यवधान).... जब फिर डिबेट नहीं होगी।(व्यवधान)....

†श्री सकندر بخت: جی ہا ... "مداخلت" ... اب پھر ڈیبٹ نہیں ہوگی ... "مداخلت" ...

श्री सभापति : 12.00 बजे तो कल अटेंशन हैं।(व्यवधान)....

श्री सिकन्दर बख्त : नहीं, पहले बारह बजे जो तय किया हुआ हैं उसे देख ले आप।(व्यवधान)....

†श्री सकندر بخت: نہیں پہلے ۱۲ بجے جو طے کیا ہوا ہے اسے دیکھ لیں آپ ... "مداخلت" ...

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE: The Prime Minister can always get preference. The calling Attention can be deferred to accommodate the time of the Prime Minister. If he has got time at 12 noon, the Prime Minister can reply. Calling Attention can be taken up latter on.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH: Mr. Chairman, Sir, my request is that I too have to intervene. A number of hon. Members have quite rightly referred to me directly by my functional name. Therefore, there is a need for me to elaborate, not necessarily at great length, but with a sufficient clarity on the issues the hon. Members have raised Thereafter the Prime Minister will respond to the entire debate, Therefore, if we could do that with my intervention and the Prime Minister's reply tomorrow at 12 O'clock, we can finish in time to be in the Lok Sabha for discussion there.

†[]Transliteration in Arabic Script

MR. CHAIRMAN: That is all right. Tomorrow, you will speak. Then, the Prime Minister will speak. There are still three or four Members to seek clarifications. One is Mr. Jalaludin Ansari. Please seek only clarifications.

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी : सभापति महोदय, माननीय प्रधान मंत्री जी ने सदन के समक्ष जो स्टेटमेंट दिया है, वह खुशी की बात है। उन्होंने यह भी कहा है कि हम समय-समय पर सदन को स्थिति से अवगत कराते रहते हैं। उन्हें सदन को अवगत कराना भी चाहिए, लेकिन विगत 11 जून, 1998 से वाशिंगटन में श्री जसवंत सिंह जी की मि. तालबोट से 6 राउंड की बातचीत हुई, कोई एक-दो बाद नहीं और अखबारों में तरह-तरह की बातें प्रकाशित हुई जिन को लेकर अलग-अलग अनुमान लगाए जा रहे हैं। तो जब बाहर बातें चलती हों तो वे सदन के अंदर क्यों नहीं आनी चाहिए?

श्री संघ प्रिय गौतम : अनर्गल बात कह रहे हैं।

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी : गौतम जी, मैं अनर्गल बात नहीं कहता, मैं तो अखबारों में बातें छपी हैं, उन का जिक्र कर रहा हूँ।

[उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री टी.एन.चतुर्वेदी) पीठासीन हुए।]

उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, मैं यह नहीं कहता कि उन 6 राउंड्स की बातचीत की सब बातें बता दीजिए। उन में बहुत सारी बातें सीक्रेट हुआ करती हैं....

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री टी.एन.चतुर्वेदी) : अंसारी साहब, आप इधर देखिए गौतम साहब की तरफ मत देखिए और जल्दी से क्लैरिफिकेशंस पूछ लीजिए।

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी : उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, उन 6 राउंड्स की बातचीत का क्या निष्कर्ष निकला, उस बारे में उस स्टेटमेंट में कुछ जिक्र होना चाहिए। मेरी समझ से यह स्पष्ट नहीं है क्योंकि हमारे देश की सर्वसाधारण जनता भी जाने कि क्या बातें निष्कर्ष के रूप में निकली जो कि हमारे देश के हित में हैं। उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, इस बात का कम-से-कम इस स्टेटमेंट में जिक्र नहीं है और मैं प्रधान मंत्री जी से चाहूंगा कि उन 6 राउंड्स की बातचीत का हमारे देश के हित में क्या निष्कर्ष निकला उस के बारे में सदन को बताने की कृपा करें।

दूसरी बात मुझे यह कहनी है कि राष्ट्रीय आंदोलन से लेकर अभी तक कि हमारे देश की वैदेशिक नीति यह रही है कि ...

रेल मंत्री (श्री नीतिश कुमार) : आप स्वदेशी पर अच्छा बोलते हैं, विदेशी के चक्कर में कहां पड़ गए।

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी : शांति और पूर्ण निरस्त्रीकरण हमारा कमिटमेंट है, हमारी प्रतिबद्धता है। महोदय, लगता है कि हमारी सरकार कहती तो है कि हम प्रतिबद्ध है, लेकिन मुझे आशंका है कि वह कुछ पीछे हटने की बात कर रहे हैं और अमेरिका को सब से अधिक तरजीह दे रहे हैं। अमेरिका तो अब दुनिया का पुलिस सुपरिटेण्डेंट और मालिक बन गया है। वह विभिन्न तरह से ट्रीटेज के जरिए, इकॉनोमिक सेंक्शंस के जरिए अपने प्रभुत्व को साइंस एंड टेक्नोलॉजी और आर्थिक क्षेत्र में भी बनाए रखना चाहता है। तो इतनी जो वार्ताएं हुई और उन्होंने जो इकॉनोमिक सेंक्शंस लगाए थे, उन के संबंध में इस में जिक्र नहीं है कि वह सेंक्शंस हैं या पूर्णतया खतम हो गया सेंक्सन? मैं उसके असर की बात नहीं करता और इसलिए नहीं करता क्योंकि भारत एक महान देश है और रहेगा। अमरीका जैसा बड़ा देश और यह एक छोटा सा क्यूबा, जो हर मामले में कमजोर, 90 मील की दूरी पर अमरीका की नाक के नीचे, तमाम इकोनोमिक ब्लॉकेड और दूसरे ब्लॉकेड के बावजूद जब क्यूबा अमरीका के सामने दुनिया से मदद लेकर खड़ा रह सकता है तो अमरीका भारत का बालबाका भी नहीं कर सकता है। मैं भारत के सदन से भारत की जनता की तरफ से यह कहना चाहता हूँ।

श्री संघ प्रिय गौतम : आपने बहुत अच्छी बात कही है।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री टी.एन. चतुर्वेदी) : अंसारी जी, धन्यवाद। आपका टाइम खतम हो गया। आपके लीडर ने ही टाइम ले लिया था।

श्री जलालुद्दीन अंसारी : सर, एक मिनट। इसलिए मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि अमरीका की दादागिरी के सामने बहुत कुछ घुटने टेकने की बात नहीं है। कायदे के साथ उनके साथ वार्ता हो। इसमें कोई दो राय नहीं है, चाहे वह विश्व का मामला हो या देश का मामला हो, कायदे का साथ वार्ता हो।

उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, मेरा अंतिम सुझाव यह है कि भारत के जो पड़ोसी देश हैं उनके साथ संबंध सुधारने के लिए भारत की तरफ से पहल मजबूती के साथ होनी चाहिए। जैसे महाकाली समझौते के बाद आपको मालूम है कि नेपाल में जो उस समय सरकारी पार्टी थी वह उस समझौते के बाद टूट गई। इस बारे में प्रधानमंत्री जी हमसे ज्यादा जानते थे पहले भी और अभी भी। तो वह चाहे नेपाल हो, पाकिस्तान हो, बांगला देश हो, श्रीलंका

ہو، اور یہاں تک چین کا بھی ڈر دیکھا جاتا ہے، چین سے بھی، جو ہمارے پڑوسی ملک ہے، ان سے اچھا رشتہ بنانے کے لیے ہم کو مذبذبتی کے ساتھ پہل کرنی چاہیے تاکہ وہ مذبذبت ہو ہمارے ساتھ سہی سبب بنانے کے لیے۔

اوپر مذکورہ منہج، انہی شہدوں کے ساتھ میں اپنی بات سمارت کرتا ہوں۔ دہنواؤں۔

† شری جلال الدین انصاری "ہمار": سہا پتی مہودے۔ مانہ پردہان منتری جی نے سدن کے سامنے جو اسٹیٹمنٹ دیا ہے۔ وہ خوشی کی بات ہے۔ انہوں نے یہ بھی کہا کہ ہم سے سے پر سدن کو حالات سے باخبر کرتے رہیں گے۔ انہیں سدن کو باخبر کرنا بھی چاہیے۔ لیکن گوشت ۱۱ جون ۱۹۹۸ سے واشنگٹن میں شری جسونت سنگھ جی کی مسٹر تالیوٹ سے تین روڈ کی بات چیت ہوئی۔ کوئی ایک دوبار نہیں اور اخباروں میں طرح طرح کی باتیں شائع ہوئیں جنکو لیکر الگ الگ اندازے لگائے جا رہے ہیں۔ تو جب باہر باتیں چلتی ہوں تو وہ سدن کے اندر کیوں نہیں آتی چاہئیں۔

شری سنگھ پرہ گوتم: ان آرگل بات کہہ رہے ہیں۔

شری جلال الدین انصاری: گوتم جی۔ میں ان آرگل بات نہیں کرتا۔ میں تو اخباروں میں باتیں چھپی ہیں انکا ذکر کر رہا ہوں۔

† [Transliteration in Arabic Script]

اپ سہا ادھیکش شری ترلوکی ناتھ چترویدی پیٹھا سین ہوئے۔

اپ سہا ادھیکش جی۔ میں یہ نہیں کہتا کہ ان چہ روڈس کی بات چیت کی سب باتیں بتا دیجئے۔ ان میں بہت ساری باتیں سیکریٹ ہوا کرتی ہیں۔

اپ سہا ادھیکش "شری ترلوکی ناتھ چترویدی": انصاری صاحب۔ آپ ادھر دیکھئے۔ گوتم صاحب کی طرف مت دیکھئے۔ اور جلدی سے کلیری فیکیشن پوچھ لیجئے۔

شری جلال الدین انصاری : اپ سہا ادھیکش مہودے جی۔ ان چہ روڈس کا کیا نتیجہ نکالا اس بارے میں اس اسٹیٹمنٹ میں کچھ ذکر ہونا چاہیے۔ میری سمجھ سے یہ واضح نہیں ہے کیونکہ ہمارے دیش کی سروسادھارن جنتا بھی جانے کہ کیا باتیں نتیجہ کے روپ میں نکلیں۔ جو کہ ہمارے دیش کے مفاد میں ہیں۔ اپ سہا ادھیکش جی اس بات کا کم سے کم اس اسٹیٹمنٹ میں ذکر نہیں ہے اور میں پردہان منتری جی سے چاہونگا کہ ان چہ روڈ کی بات چیت کا ہمارے ملک کے مفاد میں کیا نتیجہ نکلا اسکے بارے میں سدن کو بتانے کی کراپا کریں۔

دوسری بات مجھے یہ کہنی ہے کہ راسٹرہ آندولن سے لیکر ابھی تک کی ہمارے دیش کی ودیشک نییتی یہ رہی ہے کہ....

ریل منتری "شری نیتیش کمار": آپ

سودیشی پراچھا بولتے ہیں۔ ودیشی کے چکر میں کہاں پڑ گئے۔

شری جلال الدین انصاری: شانتی اور

"پورن نرسٹی کرن" ہمارا کمٹمنٹ ہے۔ ہماری پرتی بدتا ہے مہودے۔ لگتا ہے کہ ہماری سرکار کہتی تو ہے کہ ہم پرتی بدھ ہیں۔ لیکن یہ آشنکا ہے کہ وہ کچھ پیچھے ہٹنے کی بات کر رہے ہیں اور امریکہ کو سب سے زیادہ ترجیح دے رہے ہیں۔ امریکہ تو اب دنیا کا پولیس سپر فنڈنٹ اور مالک بن گیا ہے۔ وہ مختلف طرح کی ٹروٹنر کے ذریعہ۔ اکنامیک سینکشنس کے ذریعہ اپنے پرہتو کو سائنس اینڈ ٹیکنالوجی اور آرٹھک اکشیر میں بھی بنائے رکھنا چاہتا ہے۔ تو اتنی جو وارداتیں ہوئیں اور انہوں نے جو اکنامیک سینکشنس لگائے تھے۔ انکے سمبندھ میں اسمیں ذکر نہیں ہے کہ وہ سینکشنس ہیں یا پورے طور پر ختم ہو گیا سینکشنس۔ میں اس کے اثر کی بات نہیں کرتا اور یہ اسلئے نہیں کرتا کیونکہ بھارت ایک مہان دیش ہے اور رہے گا۔ امریکہ جیسا بڑا دیش

اور یہ ایک چھوٹا سا کیوبا۔ جو ہر معاملہ میں کمزور ہے۔ نوے میل کی دوری پر امریکہ کی ناک کے نیچے تمام اکنومی بلاکیڈ اور دوسری پابندیوں کے باوجود جب کیوبا امریکہ کے سامنے دنیا سے مدد لیکر کھڑا رہ سکتا ہے تو امریکہ بھارت کا بال بانکا بھی نہیں کر سکتا ہے۔ میں بھارت کے سدن سے بھارت کی جنتا کی طرف سے یہ کہنا چاہتا ہوں۔

شری سنگھ پریہ گوتم: آپ نے بہت اچھی بات کہی ہے۔

اپ سبھا ادھیش: انصاری جی دھنیواد آپکا وقت ختم ہو گیا آپ کے لیڈرنے ہی وقت لے لیا تھا۔

شری جلال الدین انصاری: اس لئے میں کہنا چاہتا ہوں کہ امریکہ کی دادا گیری کے سامنے بہت کچھ گھنٹے ٹیکے کی بات نہیں ہے۔ قاعدے کے ساتھ انکے ساتھ بات چیت ہو سب کے ساتھ بات چیت ہو۔ اس میں کوئی دورائے نہیں ہے چاہے وہ دنیا کا معاملہ ہو یا ملک کا معاملہ ہو۔ قاعدہ کے ساتھ بات ہو۔

میرا آخری سجھاؤ یہ ہے کہ بھارت کے جو پڑوسی ملک ہیں ان کے ساتھ تعلقات بہتر کرنے کے لئے بھارت کی طرف سے پہل مضبوطی کے ساتھ ہونی چاہئے۔

جیسے مہاکالی سمجھوتا کے بعد آپکو معلوم ہے کہ نیپال میں جو اس وقت سرکاری پارٹی تھی وہ اس سمجھوتے کے بعد ٹوٹ گئی۔ اس بارے میں پردھان منتری جی سے زیادہ جانتے تھے پہلے بھی اور ابھی بھی۔ تو وہ چاہے نیپال ہو۔ پاکستان ہو بنگلہ دیش ہو سری لنکا ہو۔ اور یہاں تک چین کا بھی ڈر بہت دکھا یا جاتا ہے۔ چین سے بھی جو ہمارے پڑوسی دیش ہیں ان سے اچھا رشتہ بنانے کے لئے ہم کو مضبوطی کے ساتھ پہل کرنی چاہئے۔ تاکہ وہ مجبور ہوں ہمارے ساتھ صحیح تعلقات بنانے کے لئے۔

اپ سبھا ادھیشکش مہودے۔ انہی لفظوں کے ساتھ میں اپنی بات ختم کرتا ہوں۔ شکریہ۔
"ختم شد"

श्री सी.एम. इब्राहिम (कर्णाटक) : उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, मैं आपका आभारी हूँ। मैं ज्यादा लंबा बोलना नहीं चाहता, लेकिन दो-तीन बातें कहना चाहूंगा चूंकि प्रधानमंत्री जी यहां मौजूद हैं। पहली यह कि भारत की विदेश नीति पिछले पचास सालों से जो चलती आ रही है, अभी अभी मैंने इस स्टेटमेंट से पढ़ा कि we had consultation with all political parties, यह एक कन्सलटेशन के बजाय हो, that firm commitment of all political parties. यानि विदेश नीति किसी एक पार्टी की नहीं, गवर्नमेंट की नहीं बल्कि पूरे भारत की एक बनकर अगर देश से बाहर जाएगी तो सामने बात करने वाला देश भी जो है वह बात करते वक्त सोचकर बात करेगा। यह बदकिस्मती है कि पिछले पांच-छह सालों में देश को जिस तरह की शक्ति मिलनी चाहिए थी विदेशी में, वह अक्सर नहीं मिली। इसके कई कारण हैं, मैं उनके बारे में विस्तार से

नहीं कहना चाहता। जो पिछला हो चुका है उसको तो हम सुधार नहीं सकते, लेकिन आगे आने वाले भविष्य के लिए हम पिछली हुई गलतियों को देखकर सुधारने की कोशिश कर सकते हैं। तो क्या प्रधानमंत्री जी पूरी पोलिटिकल पार्टीज को लेकर फर्म कमिटमेंट की बात करेंगे? क्योंकि विदेश में जाने के बाद अगर हमारे किसी एक मंत्री की बेइज्जती होती है तो यह किसी एक पार्टी की या एक सरकार की नहीं बल्कि सारे देश की बेइज्जती हम मानकर चलते हैं। यह एक ऑल पार्टीज के लीडर के डिसक्शन में फर्म ओपीनियन हो कि हमारी विदेश नीति यह होनी चाहिए।

उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, यह भी जानना होगा कि हमारे दिल से दोस्त कौन हैं और जुबां से दोस्त कौन हैं। दुनिया में आज हमको पता नहीं चल रहा है कि हमारा दोस्त कौन हैं और हमारा दुश्मन कौन हैं। जो भी आता है, उससे यही बात होती है कि हमारा देश, तुम्हारा देश, सैकड़ों सालों का इतिहास है, फलां फलां हैं और तीन दिन घूमे फिर और फिर वापस चले गए। कोई नतीजा जो है निकल कर नहीं आ रहा है। जब हम वहां पर जाते हैं तो सबसे पहले यही पूछते हैं कि आप कितने दिन रहेंगे? यह आखिर ऐसा हो क्यों रहा है? क्योंकि एक फर्म कमिटमेंट नहीं है। यह सिर्फ एक पार्टी बीजेपी की जिम्मेदारी नहीं बल्कि चाहे वह कांग्रेस हो, लेफ्ट हो, जनता दल हो, जो भी पार्टी हो, हरेक की यह जिम्मेदारी है कि हम अपने देश का मस्तक कभी भी विदेश में झुकने न दें। नम्बर तीन, जहां तक बाहर के देशों में हमारे एम्बेसेडर्स का सवाल है, मैं 24 साल तक मंत्री रहा हूँ और मैंने बाहर के एम्बेसेडर्स को भी देखा है, उनके जैसा कोड आफ कंडक्ट और मेथड आफ वार्किंग हमारे एम्बेसेडर्स में विदेश में नहीं है। हमारे एम्बेसेडर्स का काम इतना है विदेश में कि जब मंत्री जाता है तो उसका सूट-केस ले जाकर कमरे में रखें और जब वह वापस आए तो उसको चढ़ाने के लिए आएँ, 15 अगस्त और 26 जनवरी को दो बार झंडा फहराएं और जो लोग वीजा के लिए आए हैं उनके लिए स्टेम्प देते रहें। मैं आपको एक छोटा सा उदाहरण देना चाहता हूँ कि अमरीका के व्यापार के संबंध में अमरीका का एम्बेसेडर मेरे से चार बार आकर मिला, सिर्फ एक मामूली सी चीज बेचने के लिए। क्या हम ऐसा एक भी उदाहरण दिखा सकते हैं कि कोई भारत का एम्बेसेडर या पूंजीपति यदि विदेश में गया हो तो वह उसको ले जाकर वहां की सरकार के बात करने गया हो? यह पिछले 50 साल में कभी नहीं हुआ, मैं यह नहीं कह रहा हूँ कि यह आज की बात है या कल की बात है। तो एम्बेसेडर्स को एक

ऐसी ट्रेनिंग होनी चाहिए कि वे पूरे देश का प्रतिनिधित्व करें। पोखरन विस्फोट होने के बाद वे वहां की लोकल इंडियन कम्युनिटी को इकट्ठा कर सकते थे, वहां का जनमत बना सकते थे, लेकिन लोकल इंडियन्स को पता ही नहीं चलता कि हमारा एम्बेसेडर कौन हैं क्योंकि वे मिल ही नहीं पाते। तो मैं चाहता हूँ कि विदेश मंत्रालय इस बारे में फौरन एक ट्रेनिंग दे अपने एम्बेसेडर्स को बुलाकर के कि उनका काम क्या है, उन्हें किन-किन विषयों में काम करना चाहिए और किस तरह से वे काम कर सकते हैं।

इसके साथ ही साथ प्रधान मंत्री जी से मेरा अनुरोध है कि जैसे न्युक्लियर टैस्ट हुआ, पाकिस्तान ने बड़ी क्षमता के साथ पूरे देशों में प्रचार भी किया, चंदा भी इकट्ठा किया। यदि हम आल पार्टीज इसमें इन्वॉल्व करके, सिर्फ सरकार के प्रतिनिधि के बजाय, यदि आल पार्टीज डेलिगेशन पूरे देशों में जाकर यह कहता कि भारत का स्टैंड यह है, भारत की नीति यह है तो मैं समझता हूँ कि जितना हमको धक्का पहुंचा है, नहीं पहुंच सकता था। लेकिन जो हुआ, वह हुआ, प्रधान मंत्री जी, हम आपको बस इतनी ऐश्वोरेंस देना चाहते हैं कि लोग चाहे किसी पार्टी के रहे, किसी सरकार के रहे, सरकार आएगी, सरकारें जाएंगी, लेकिन देश के गौरव, सभ्यता और संस्कृति को हम कभी झुकने नहीं देंगे। सौ साल की गीदड़ कि जिंदगी से एक दिन की शेर की जिंदगी बेहतर है, यही भारत अपनी क्षमता दिखाता रहा है। हमको किसी मुल्क के दबाव में दबने की जरूरत नहीं है। भारत की सौ करोड़ जनता भूखी मर जाएगी, लेकिन अपमान सहने के लिए हम तैयार नहीं हैं।

लास्ट में मैं इतना ही कहना चाहता हूँ जसवंत सिंह जी से कि आज आप भारत के विदेश मंत्री हैं, आप जिस भी देश में जाएं, जब तक आपकी बराबरी वाला आपसे नहीं मिले आप न मिलें, आप वापिस आइए। इससे बेइजती नहीं होगी बल्कि सारी दुनिया में एक मैसेज जाएगा कि भारत देश गरीब होते हुए भी अपने आत्माभिमान, स्वाभिमान, को छोड़कर नहीं जीता है।

इतना कहते हुए मैं अपनी बात को समाप्त करता हूँ।
धन्यवाद

SHRI SANATAN BISI (Orissa): Thank you, Mr. Vice-Chairman. Soon after the last nuclear test, the hon. Prime Minister had written a letter to the President of U.S.A., Shri Bill Clinton, and it was published in almost all the newspapers. There was some discussion

in the other House also, and accordingly, I had written a letter to the hon. Prime Minister. But till now, I have not received a reply from him. I would like to know as to what reply has been received by the hon. Prime Minister from Shri Bill Clinton. Thank you.

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH (Assam): Sir, I would like to seek some clarifications from the hon. Prime Minister. In this statement, the hon. Prime Minister has stated a number of times about the need-for India to have a credible minimum deterrent. Sir, I would like to request him to throw some light for operationalising this concept of a credible minimum deterrent. I noticed that the Prime Minister has talked about elements which go to make this credible minimum deterrent. No-First-Use and the non-use against non-nuclear weapon States is also stated. A minimum deterrent implies the deployment of assets in a manner that ensures survivability and capacity for an adequate response. He has also added that we are not going to enter into an arms race with any country. I believe, these are the elements which go into the making of the Indian conception of a credible minimum deterrent. But these are merely words. I would request the hon. Prime Minister to spell out in somewhat greater detail what the concept of 'a minimum, credible, nuclear deterrent' is. I think the country ought to be taken into confidence and, at some stage, a white paper ought to be prepared spelling out these issues.

Sir, in paragraph 7 of the statement, the Prime Minister has stated: "There now exists some understanding of our security concerns and requirements." I draw his attention to the use of the word 'some'. That obviously creates an impression that there is still some gap between us and our interlocutors, in their understanding and our understanding of our security concerns and requirements. If this is the case, I would like the Prime Minister to throw a little more light on this issue.

Sir, in paragraph 8, the Prime Minister has stated: "It is agreed that regional issues shall be kept distinctly apart. As Hon'ble Members are well aware, India's concerns in these matters go beyond the South-Asian region, and involve a wider perspective." I do agree with him, but, from time to time, the American spokesman have been making statements which create an impression that Indo-Pakistan issues are also part of this dialogue. I draw the Prime Minister's attention to the statement of Mr. Strobe Talbott, and I also saw a statement made by Mr. Inderfurth, which had been reported in newspapers yesterday, which again stated that a credible Indo-Pakistan dialogue is part of the whole gamut of these issues. I would like the Prime Minister to throw some light on these issues.

Finally, Sir, in paragraph 11, the Prime Minister has stated: "For the successful conclusion of the talks, creation of a

positive environment by our interlocutors is a necessary ingredient." We have said that on a number of occasions. I would like the Prime Minister to spell out, in some detail, the critical elements that he has in mind, about sanctions, the dual-use technology, etc., and the other elements which will go to make the positive environment to which the Prime Minister has referred in his statement. Thank you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI T.N. CHATURVEDI): Hon. Members, I adjourn the House. The House stands adjourned till 11 A.M. tomorrow.

The House then adjourned at twenty eight-minutes past six of the clock till eleven of the clock on Wednesday, the 16th December, 1998.