

incurring losses and which are earning profits or are at the margin;

(c) what is the percentage of wage bill and overhead costs against the annual turnover of HMT during the above years;

(d) how much money is owed by HMT

to other parties and how much is due to the HMT during the same period; and

(e) what steps, if any, have been taken to pull up the Company from its downward journey?

(Rs. in crores)

	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	1994-95 (Provisional)
(a) Profit before Tax.	38.15	(-) 12.53	(-) 120.24	(-) 78.81
(b) It would not be in the Commercial interest of HMT to disclose the profit/loss of any particular unit.				
(c) Percentage of wage bill & overhead costs to sales.	32	39	48	41
(d) Amount owed by HMT (Current liabilities).	247.21	260.37	252.11	262.29
Amount due to HMT (Sundry debtors, loans & advances).	314.53	334.37	222.21	205.67

(e) The steps taken by HMT to improve its performance include marketing and production strategies to increase sales, thrust on high value added items, reduction of inventories and sundry debtors, reduction of cost of production, overheads and surplus manpower, productivity improvement, and focus on customer satisfaction.

Health Complications due to Radioactive Leakage

*67. SHRI CHATURANAN
MISHRA:
SHRI N. GIRI PRASAD:

Will the PRIME MINISTER be pleased to state:

(a) whether it is a fact that the villagers around the Tarapur Nuclear Power Plant are likely to face health complications because of the recent leakage of radioactive water containing isotopes such as cesium-157;

(b) if so, whether any study has been induced into the matter; and

(c) if so, the details thereof?

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS AND FERTILIZERS, MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND MINISTER OF STATE IN THE DEPTT. OF ELECTRONICS AND OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (SHRI EDUARDO FALEIRO) ON BEHALF OF THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (SHRI BHUVNESH CHATURVEDI):
(a) to (c) The villagers around the Tarapur Atomic Power Station complex will not face any health complications because of the minor leak from the Waste Immobilisation Plant. Investigations by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board revealed that the incident was of a minor nature and that it occurred within the premises of the

Waste Immobilisation Plant which is within the exclusion zone of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. There is no human habitation within this zone.

Enquiry of Charar Incident

*68. SHRI PARMOD MAHAJAN:
SHRI VIREN J. SHAH:

Will the PRIME MINISTER be pleased to state:

(a) whether Government have so far made any enquiry about the burning and destruction of the shrine and the town at Charar-e-Sharief in May, 1995;

(b) if so, the details thereof;

(c) the number and nationality of militants who were in the town and in the shrine and since when they were there;

(d) what steps Government had taken for saving the shrine and arresting the militants and the circumstances of their escape;

(e) the action taken against persons found responsible for their escape; and

(f) the total amount sanctioned and the expenditure so far incurred on the reconstruction of shrine and the burnt houses at Charar-e-Sharief?

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE (SHRI BHUVNESH CHATURVEDI):

(a) and (b) No independent inquiry has been held into the incident.

(c) As per available information, the presence of militants in Charar-e-Sharief was first noticed towards the beginning of January, 1995. Their number in the shrine was placed between 20 and 40 and the estimates of the total number in the town varied between 40 and 350. Although there was confirmed information that one Major Mast Gul, an Afghan mercenary was leading the cohort of terrorists holed up in the town, there was no firm estimates of how many of them were foreign mercenaries.

(d) Since the shrine was a fragile wooden structure, the security forces

could not storm the place to evict mercenaries and militants. Further, mercenaries had mined the area all around the shrine and the adjoining mosque and also planted explosives extensively. The security forces, therefore, occupied the high features of the surrounding hills at a distance of 1-2 Kilometres and kept a watch over the town to prevent further infiltration of militants into the town. Any engagement with the militants so holed up was avoided to prevent loss of innocent lives of civilians in cross fire. Instead offers of safe passage across the Line of Control were repeatedly made by the State Government to the militants which were rejected. When despite all these precautions the militants set the town and shrine on fire on the day of Id, the security forces entered the town to round up the militants. In the process 9 militants were killed and one foreign mercenary by the name Abu Jindal was apprehended.

(e) There is report of 29 militants having been killed including 5 foreigners in the exchange of fire that took place after the militants set the town and the shrine on fire and the security forces closed up in the town. In the fierce fighting and the chaos that ensued, many of the militants managed to escape. No action has been taken for this against any persons.

(f) Reconstruction of the Charar-e-Sharief shrine by the Government is not envisaged as there has been no demand for this from the people. The burnt houses are being reconstructed by the owners themselves. For this, they have been paid ex-gratia relief of Rs. 1 lac in each case from the Prime Minister's Relief Fund in addition to the relief to which the fire victims are entitled from the State Government @50% of the loss subject to a ceiling of Rs. 1 lac in each case. As per information supplied by the State Government sanction has been issued in favour of fire victims for a total amount of Rs. 14.50 crores out of which