

get possession of his own house. This is a lacuna, and it should be corrected.

4.00 P.M.

As regards the amendments in section 6 to the effect that instead of 7-1/2 per cent the rent should be calculated at 10 per cent of the actual cost of construction, it is perfectly all right and perfectly in order.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Please conclude now.

SHRI P. N. SUKUL: Similarly also for constructions made after the enactment of this Bill, the definition of standard rent that it should be calculated on the basis of 10 per cent of the actual cost of construction and the market price of the land is also perfectly in order. But here we must also take into account the fact that the market price of the land will go on increasing day after day. The cost of construction will not increase, but the market price of the land will increase, and that will necessitate a further upward revision of the rent.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Please conclude now.

SHRI P. N. SUKUL: Sir, as regards section 6A proposed to be inserted in the Act to the effect that the rent can be increased by 10 per cent every three years, I think, it is also very logical because generally our banks allow 10 per cent interest for three-year fixed deposits. So, to me it seems quite all right.

In the proposed section 14C, Sir, there is a very good provision that any employee who is going to retire, before one year of his retirement he can apply to the Controller to revert the possession of the house. But, Sir, here it has been provided in the Bill that an employee of the Central Government or the Delhi Administration can apply to the Controller, not other employees. In Delhi there are thousands of State Government employees who are on deputation. They have houses, Madam. If they stay here for 10 years, 20 years of course, they can construct houses. They can take the house-building advance and can construct houses.

Here State Government employees or employees of public institutions should also be included. Why not MLAs and MPs? Suppose, there is an MP here for 20 years and he constructs a house or takes a flat, you will not allow him to take recovery of his flat or his house. MPs are also paid people, and you give them pension when they retire. So, I think, even MPs, those who are able to construct their own houses or flats, should also be allowed the benefit of the application of this Act in respect of their premises.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Now conclude please. Over now? The last point.

SHRI P. N. SUKUL: Sir, regarding the possession of a residence, as I said earlier, after the enactment of this Bill if in certain cases it cannot be made applicable for ten years, for ten years the Act will remain infructuous for those houses, for those landlords. So, this Bill must apply to all houses that are covered under it, and it should not be made applicable after ten years of construction, as I said, future constructions.

With these words, Sir, I support the Bill.

#### SHORT DURATION DISCUSSION ON THE SITUATION IN SRI LANKA

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY (Tamil Nadu): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I would seek your kind permission to initiate the debate from the front bench.

Sir, the situation in Sri Lanka is very grave. Blood-and-tears soaked tragic history of Tamils in Sri Lanka continues without an end in sight. Death is parading in the streets of the North and the East of the island, concealed in the mask of peace. Valiant youths of Tamil race are striving and struggling in the middle of conflagration, continuing to fight for the cause of their race, standing at the precipice of imminent death. Our own soldiers are getting killed, and our own kith and kin are being liquidated.

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brothers killing brothers, brothers fighting brothers. They are confronting the onslaught and pressure of an army and weaponry which is a hundred times greater than their numerical strength and weapons. But we should not forget the big lesson of history that the thirst of a race for its liberation or spiritual aspirations of a people cannot be contained or crushed by the use of weapons. In this fateful hour of weeping and weeping, sorrow and suffering, struggle and sacrifice, pain and pathos, the song of the school children even in the Tamil areas in this :

"This moment we go together into death and disappearance, but with courage and confidence, joy and ecstasy. Now, we die for our race, for our motherland, alive or dead in our journey, we shall destroy, create and preserve. In this cycle, there is no cause for sorrow, but great dedication."

Talks were held between the top brass of the RAW of the Cabinet Secretariat, including Mr. Verma and Mr. Chandran of India and the LTTE in Madras. These negotiations were carried on since the beginning of February this year till the third week of July. Many rounds of talks were held. A final political settlement was round the corner, which would have been the only silver lining in the otherwise dark horizon. I understand from reliable sources that the LTTE submitted a set of proposals which were not agreed to by the Government of India and by the RAW. The LTTE were asked to modify that set of proposals. They agreed and they submitted a second set of proposals for bringing an immediate cease-fire to enable the Government of India to initiate a process of reconciliation refuting the charges of intransigence and obduracy adopted by the LTTE.

I would like to draw the attention of this House to the set of proposals which were to be agreed between the Government of India and the LTTE. Even on 9th March, 1988, Mr. Prabhakaran.

(The Vice-Chairman (Shri B. Satyanarayan Reddy) in the Chair)

the supreme of the LTTE, who has become a living legend among the Tamil masses, who is standing on the precipice of death even today, sent a letter to the hon. Prime Minister expressing his willingness for unconditional talks and appealing for an immediate cessation of hostilities. On behalf of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, he stated that the present confrontation between the LTTE and India is a forced one and there is an immediate need to put an end to this conflict and alleviate the sufferings of the Tamils.

In their proposals, I understand they declared an assurance that they will continue to stand by the pledge to co-operate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, but insisting that this implementation should have the desired effect of safeguarding the interests and aspirations of their people. They were willing to hand over 700 usable small arms at pre-designated places to the authorities concerned. As a first step. They will hand over 300 arms on a date mutually agreed to facilitate declaration of cease-fire which will end all armed hostilities between the IPKF and the LTTE. But following the first hand-over, the remaining 400 arms will be handed over in due course. They demanded a time-frame for five months which was not agreed to by the Indian side. I understand the RAW people insisted for a time-frame of five weeks. They demanded the time-frame of five months because of the realities of the ground situation. A large number of their commanders, cadres, those who were in charge of weapons, were killed during IPKF operations. Therefore, they needed time to locate the missing arms and to work out an inventory of weapons. Therefore, they asked five month's time-frame. But, anyhow, when they were persuaded to accept the time-frame of five weeks, they also agreed for this. I understand the LTTE expressed their willingness to join the electoral processes and contest in the envisaged provincial elections provided for. They expressed their willingness to let all the groups who were involved in the ethnic conflict to contest the

representatives. They demanded that the Government of India should take up with the Government of Sri Lanka improvements in the devolution package and ensure their implementation as the 13th amendment to the Constitution is very unsatisfactory. Why the talks failed? This is the crucial question. When the Government of India also agreed to their demand for rehabilitating the Tamils in the North-East as well as LTTE, their hospitals, schools, factories, LTTE stressed that they should be in charge of the Committee for the rehabilitation work. Then, the Government of India insisted that there should be representatives from the Government of India side. Ultimately the LTTE agreed for inclusion of the representatives of the Government of India. Suddenly, the Government of India imposed a new condition saying that representatives from the Government of Sri Lanka side also should be included in the Committee. For this the LTTE objected. This is the major point where the talks failed. Why did they object to the inclusion of the representatives from the Sri Lankan side? Because it will be suicidal for them. They are not objecting to include representatives from India. You can increase your number. In the process you could have told them that you want to increase the number of representatives from the Indian side. But, Sir, inclusion of the representatives from the Sri Lankan side, as far as the rehabilitation of the LTTE also is concerned, that will be suicidal for them. They will be bringing danger into their own arena. That will enable the Sri Lankan Government, their intelligence agencies to know every minute detail, every address, everything which was not available to them for all these years. This is the point where the talks failed. I have got great respect for our hon. Minister. Is it not a fact that Lt. Col. Jekny, an emissary of the LTTE, was sent by the Indian Government, in our own IPKF helicopter to meet Mr. Prabhakaran? When he came back, when he was unarmed, he was shot dead. Even then, the LTTE are prepared to continue the talks. But the Government of India did not agree even for a formal cease-fire for announcing a formal cease-fire at that stage. It is a painful paradox that LTTE

is pressurised to lay down their arms without agreeing to any conditions, without giving any guarantee about the devolution package or the interim administration. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan Government is not pressurised which has not honoured any of its commitments. Is it not an assault on the Accord when Jayewardene declared that he will campaign against the merger of the North and East? Is it not an assault on the Accord when the Land Minister of Sri Lankan Government, Mr. Gami-ni Dissanayake has stated that Israeli forces will stay on in Sri Lanka and they will get logistic military support from other countries also? Is it not an assault on the Accord by the Sri Lankan Government that colonisation was geared up by the State-aided machineries in the North and the East to change the demographic and ethnic structure? Is it not an assault on the Accord when they offer a price of one million rupees on the head of Mr. Prabhakaran? Is it not an assault on the Accord when the seventeen LTTE men were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy quite contrary to the Provisions of the Agreement? The Agreement says that the Sri Lankan army personnel should be confined to their barracks as on 25th May, 1987. Sir, because of the colonisation, the population of Sinhalese in the eastern province which was 9 per cent in 1957 rose to 24 per cent in 1987 whereas the Tamil population was reduced by 20 per cent. Against this colonisation, Sir, to remove the police installations in Tamil areas, the propaganda secretary of the LTTE started his fast unto death and he died on 26th September, 1987. Then, Sir, in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the LTTE was not a signatory. Many people are confused about the latter Agreement in which they were a signatory. This is the Agreement between Mr. Ditt and Mr. Prabhakaran in which the First Secretary of India, Mr. Puri and the deputy leader of the LTTE Mr. Mahatva did not their signatures on 28th September 1987. This is a copy of that text of the Agreement between the LTTE and the Government of India. Sir, I quote the agreement.

"It was agreed that the establishment of interim administration would facilitate

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tate the fulfilment of the five demands put forward by the LTTE in its resolution conveyed on 13th September 1987 to the High Commissioner."

Sir, I quote again clause 8.

"Mr. Prabhakaran said that the LTTE would surrender the remaining arms, that is other than the personal arms meant for the security of their leaders once conditions of security for their leaders and cadres are created."

Sir, here is a reference about the five demands. The main demand is about the colonisation. Sir, the interim administration is not any new privilege but an agreed proposal according to clause 2.15 in the Accord which was included even in the Bangalore December proposal. Only after constituting the interim administration, elections to the Provincial Councils could be held. Sir, I could narrate the repeated betrayals and deliberate frauds committed by the Sri Lankan Government against Tamils and against the spirit of the Accord. Sir, betrayal and fraud number one committed by Sri Lankan Government is the 13th amendment. This 13th amendment has created the post of a Governor for the north and eastern provinces. Sir, this is contrary to the proposals suggested by India. India suggested that Governor only is a ceremonial head. But, Sir, what happened? In India, discretionary powers of Governor are specified in our Constitution but here Sir, the discretionary powers are not specified. They are unlimited. Discretionary powers are the discretion of the President of Sri Lanka. This is the major threat. Therefore, they are opposed to this 13th amendment. The Governor's post will be a Trojan horse. Sir, again betrayal and fraud number two committed by the Sri Lankan Government is the formation of Provincial Councils; Our hon. Prime Minister assured that these Provincial Councils will enjoy autonomous powers but the vital subjects like land, agriculture, employment and fisheries are not brought under the purview of the Provincial Councils. By a mere proclamation of the President or with a simple

majority in the Parliament, the Councils could be dissolved any time. Betrayal number three committed by Sri Lankan Government is about the language issue. No guarantee to the use of Tamil language has been made in the Constitution. When you insist on surrender of arms, for what reasons they should surrender? Of course, I do not expect them to continue the fight, but, Sir, when they are compelled to surrender the arms, what guarantee they have got about their security? Is it for this they have made enormous sacrifices all these years to get them drowned into the deluge of despair and destruction to get them plunged into endless misery and eternal darkness? Did they lay down their lives for this? Did they suffer persecution, plunder, rape and killings by the Sinhalese racists all these years to witness a heroic struggle accept subjugation and slavery? Should they surrender their arms for subjugation and slavery? Should they surrender their arms for subjugation? Sir, the House will be shocked to know about the Sri Lankan Government gazetting an Indemnity Bill with retrospective effect for the period from July 1977 to December 1987 making State Officers not responsible for detentions, preventions and prosecutions under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. All the guilty who are responsible for the holocaust and carnage in the year 1983 including the Velikkadai prison massacre, will be justified by this Indemnity Bill. Sir, the Bill ordered to be published by the National Security Minister, Mr. Lalit Athulathmudali, has also laid down that under the proposed Act any action or legal proceedings which have been instituted in any court or tribunal

before and after it became effective will be dismissed or declared null and void. Sir, because of this, the LTTE were forced to give a statement which has irritated our Government. They made the state-

"It must be remembered that the enormous sacrifices made by the Tamil people and the martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth was not to effect a temporary merger and elections for a powerless provincial council. What

is described as the North and East is the motherland of the Tamils and that is indivisible.

India is trying to teach democracy to the Tamil people that has suffered forty years of suppression to the extent of genocide by spending millions of rupees to bomb and burn Tamil areas. India seems to be also exploring the possibility if it could have elections with the help of quislings. India mistakenly believes that if they could hold a show of elections and have a puppet administration in the Tamil homeland, which has been made a big garrison of the Indian army, they could convince the world that democracy has revived in Tamil Eelam."

Sir, today, in Vavuniya jungles, our troops have encircled the LTTE. Even today, according to press reports. The press reports indicate the LTTE is on the verge of a collapse. Sir, what the IPKF today is undergoing is Operation Checkmate—Stage III. Our IPKF Commanders have disclosed the fact that their targets are there. What do they mean? The targets are Prabhakaran and his deputy, Mathiah, and the key figures of the LTTE. They could be eliminated. They could be liquidated. Strafing is going on. Bombardment is going on. Our helicopter gunships are pouring bombs. You could destroy them. You could destroy their bunkers. You could destroy their trenches. You could destroy their hide-outs. You could capture their rations and medicines. But, for what gain? They are not your enemies. You are destroying the only shield of protection the Tamils have developed over all these decades. You are destroying the only bargaining point you have had with the Sri Lankan Government, that is Tamil militancy. Sir, I appeal to this Government from the core of my heart: Stop this war. They are not your enemies. Sir, our hon. Minister is a very balanced man. I am so happy he has come here. But, Sir, I would appeal to him: Don't believe this canard being spread by the Sri Lankan Government and the Sri Lankan press that the LTTE is planning to bombard Indian cities. I cannot imagine this. Even yesterday I met some people who are really

connected with this. Till this date, they have not indulged in any of the violent activities on our side. I swear on my conscience. This is a crucial hour. Even this minute they have been encircled. They could be wiped out. They could be killed. Chemical bombs and napalm bombs are being used. But there is no circumstance that warrants such an offensive to be carried out with International Red Cross, Human Rights Group and independent observers excluded from the area of conflict. Is it not a contravention of the Geneva Convention? Does it not contravene all laws governing armed conflicts in your pursuit of a particular militant group? It is worthwhile remembering that these boys and girls whom you are now in the process of liquidating, are the sons and daughters of the people of the north and east. Do you think that the citizens of the North and East will ever expect India kill their sons and daughters to bring peace? About two hundred people have been detained under NSA in Tamil Nadu. When they were arrested under the Passport Act on 11th August, the Advocate moved the City Civil Court for getting bail for them, but the City Public Prosecutor demanded adjournment and it was adjourned for the next day. Again the next day the Public Prosecutor demanded adjournment and it was adjourned for 16th August. It is a very serious matter. On 16th August within the precincts of the court one top commander of IPKF, Col. P. S. Hudo, with two other subordinate officials of IPKF in uniform came to the court. And the Public Prosecutor again demanded adjournment. How did the IPKF commanders come to the court? It is very dangerous; it is unimaginable. On 18th August orders were served under NSA and seventy in Madras and seventy-two in Madurai including eight girls have been detained under NSA. I have gone through the grounds of detention which show as if they had planned to sabotage and destroy the railway bridges. Most of them are immobilised. They were mortally wounded in the war with the Sri Lankan army and they were getting treatment. Some of them have undergone plastic surgery. They could not move out of their beds. It is these people against whom NSA has been used. You will shudder to

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see their photographs. They cannot move out of their beds. And you have framed charges against them as if they have tried or planned to destroy bridges and railway lines in India. I do not want to quote the Amnesty International report which may irritate my esteemed colleagues from the other side. That is not my intention today. I do not want to irritate anybody here. But our own honourable Minister in his reply on 28th July 1988 regarding this Amnesty International report himself admitted—though he denied the report; he rejected the report—when he said:

“Every specific complaint received from any source about the behaviour of IPKF troops has been investigated. Wherever such charges have been proved, quick and salutary action has been taken against the guilty.”

This statement of his admits that there have been violations, atrocities, attacks, brutal attacks, against innocent people, against innocent women. Whoever is concerned about human rights will shudder to read this report of Amnesty International of August 1988. Many of those who were taken for interrogation were shot dead in cold blood; many girls were raped. But I do not blame the entire IPKF. One General Pande of IPKF said—it appeared in the press—that ninety per cent of the Tamil population support the LTTE and in every house there is one member of LTTE. Sir, they are our natural allies. When China invaded, it is the Tamils who offered to join the Indian army. They are our own kith and kin and they are not our enemies. Therefore, I would like to make an appeal to this Government. Even at this moment you stop the war. You stop the war, you declare an informal cease-fire though not a formal cease-fire. Those people can be brought to the negotiating table. They were prepared for the talks. The talks were going on and the negotiations were going on. But our honourable Minister, I know, is not happy and he cannot be happy.

I do not want to put the blame on those persons who are not responsible for breaking the talks.

Sir, this is the land of Mahatma Gandhi. The world witnessed the assassination, the murder, of Mahatma Gandhi at the hands of Nathuram Vinayak Godse, and the world should not witness the murder of human rights at the hands of this Government in Sri Lanka.

Therefore, Sir, before I conclude. I would request the Government of India again to stop this war, this mad war, which is due to the ego of one particular individual, which is due to the intransigent ego of the Government headed by one particular individual. Sir, what sin have they committed against the Government of India? Is it a sin to take up arms in their own soil? Is it a sin to enter into a struggle to enable themselves to liberate their race from the shackles of slavery? Is it a sin? What moral right have we got to dictate terms like this when we are championing the cause of the Palestinians, when we are championing the case of the African National Congress and when we are condemning the West bank colonization? What moral right have we got? We are committing blunder after blunder, grave blunder after grave blunder, on the Sri Lankan question. Therefore, before any eventuality, any unimaginable eventuality, takes place, I would like to say one thing here. Anything can happen. You can liquidate Pirabhakaran or somebody else. But if they are liquidated, with all sincerity I would say here—I want to register my point of view herenow—that the process of liquidating the spirit of unity and integrity will start not only in Sri Lanka, but also in India. Sir, if they liquidate the greatest emancipator of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, if they eliminate him, then hundreds of Pirabhakaran will be born, thousands and thousands of new Tigers will be born and the flame of liberation will be lit in every home, in

every house, in every hut, in every hamlet, of the Tamils and the flame of liberation will be lit in the heart of every Tamil and the sin of the Government of India will never be forgiven, not only by the Tamils, but also by all those people who are concerned about the human rights.

With these words, Sir, I conclude.

SHRIMATI RENUKA CHOWDHURY (Andhra Pradesh): Sir, I just want to ask one question. Is there nobody on the Treasury Benches who is interested enough to speak on the subject? That is number one.

Secondly, if they do not want to speak because they are ignorant, don't they even want to hear and learn about this? This is all that I am asking. I am just asking you only. There is nobody there.

श्री राम चन्द्र विकल (उत्तर प्रदेश):  
हम सब लोग हैं। क्या बात है?  
(व्यवधान)

श्रीमती रेणुका चौधरी: ऐसी क्या बात है, क्या हुआ, कौन लोग हैं, क्या लोग हैं, हद होती है एक चीज की।

SHRI SUKOMAL SEN (West Bengal): There are no Members on the Treasury Benches, Sir.

SHRIMATI RENUKA CHOWDHURY: For the past twenty minutes, there are only two Ministers and two Members. I just want to draw your attention to this only. We do not just want to do the exercise of mechanically sitting in the Rajya Sabha. (Interruptions). We do not want simply the mathematical exercise of numbers.

श्री मुख्तियार सिंह मलिक (हरियाणा):  
बुला लेंगे बाहर से (व्यवधान)

श्रीमती रेणुका चौधरी: आप मुझ से मत कहिए। जो कहना हो चेयर से कह दीजिए।

But I want this to be on record.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY (Uttar Pradesh): Sir, my speech, coming after Mr. Gopalsamy's, will sound unusually mild, I think. I would like to begin by saying, going by what Renukaji just said, that the Doordarshan and the official media play up this great achievement called the 'Accord'. But I find not only no Congress(I) member here, but there is not one member from Tamil Nadu in the Congress(I) present in the House today. Not one, single MP elected from Tamil Nadu on Congress(I) ticket is present today.

AN HON. MEMBER: Not even Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: He is not present either. This itself shows the feeling that the Congress Party and even its Tamil members have for the sentiments of the people of Tamil Nadu.

SHRI S. S. AHLUWALIA (Bihar): He is elected from U.P., and he speaks for Tamil Nadu. (Interruptions).

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: During the emergency I was a Sardar. So, I know how he feels. (Interruptions)

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed on the 29th of July and it is not more than a year later that we are today discussing the situation in Sri Lanka. Obviously, the first thing to do is to assess what are the gains and losses out of that Accord and also to come to a judgment as to which have been more—losses or gains—and also what we should be doing now when we are in this new situation. So the Accord meant despatch of about 70,000 and more troops and it includes the CRPF and other paramilitary forces; I would say probably 100,000 troops in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lanka army itself is 12,000 or 13,000. So, in fact, their presence is overwhelming presence in the island of Sri Lanka.

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Now, it is not that I was opposed to the army going there. In fact, I was very much for the army going there, from the very beginning. The present Minister of Foreign Affairs was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1983-84 period when in the Lok Sabha it used to be my demand. I remember once Mrs. Indira Gandhi saying that mine was a lone voice in Parliament. I said that circumstances would come when they will have to send out Indian troops. Now these troops have gone. I was demanding that these troops should go to Colombo, and not to Jaffna. So the direction is a bit wrong; it does not matter. The troops have gone there. And there is certainly one achievement which no one can deny. Now, I am a critic of the Government policy, but I cannot deny the fact that the presence of Indian troops in Sri Lanka has brought to an end the genocide launched by the Sri Lankan army all these years, from 1983 onwards. So there is no doubt about that. Hence there is no one today in India, to my knowledge, and not even the DMK President, Mr. Karunanidhi, from his public statements, who favours the immediate pull-out of the troops because of the situation that has been there and that we would have there in case such a troop pull-out was indeed ordered.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY:** We only requested that the Indian troops should be pulled back to the October 9th position in Sri Lanka. That is our stand.

**SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY:** The disengagement, ceasefire, etc. are different aspects, Sir. But there is no one who favours calling back the Indian army; there is no one in India in any spectrum of political field. There may be a fringe group, I do not know. But the general consensus is that the Indian army's presence in Sri Lanka is necessary.

Now, one need not be carried away with some of the reports that we have got about what the Indian Army has done in the field of human rights. I will certainly say that it was highly improper and irresponsible for Mr. Chidambaram to say that we do not care for Amnesty International. The Amnesty International is a respected organisation. They base their information on non-official sources and sometimes on official sources. But their basic motivation is good and whatever they say we must read and seriously consider. Indeed, I have been very much concerned about the human rights and I did look at the Amnesty Report which the Amnesty International was kind enough to send to me. I would say that the human rights excesses committed by the IPKF were there, but they bunched around the period October 1987 to January 1988. After that period, the excesses are rare and occasional. I would say that it goes to the credit of the IPKF that whenever such excesses were brought to their notice, they have taken action. I say this not to say that the human rights excesses cannot take place. Any Army which goes there can do this. But it goes to the credit of the Indian Army that the excesses or the kind of violations that have taken place since January 1988, considering the international experience of other armies, are in fact quite minor. I have said this to a number of Tamil organisations all over the world. Whenever they complain to me about excesses, I tell them to please give me the cases so that I may take them up with the authorities. I am a member of the Consultative Committee of the Defence Ministry and the Minister has assured me that they would examine any such case if it is brought to their notice. I would also urge that at some stage the Indian Parliament should send a parliamentary delegation to Sri Lanka including the Jaffna and North-East parts, allow the people there to meet the Indian parliamentarians and to tell



them what the situation is and how they feel about it. I think the time is quite ripe to urge upon the Indian Government that it is one of the things which will go in its interest and in the interest of the image of the IPKF.

Sir, the fact is that still there are cases of violations of human rights on both sides. I am very sorry to say that despite our tremendous presence in Sri Lanka, we are unable to protect certain people who would decide to take a courageous stand. There is the case of Mr. Kandaswamy who headed the Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Army and distinguished himself in the Tamil Information Centre in London for many years. He was a highly respected individual. He has been missing since June 19. The Indian Government and the IPKF are in no position to find him out. I would like a statement from the Government as to what has happened to Mr. Kandaswamy. I went to the Fourth Tamil Eelam Conference in New York and that is the question that many people asked me. What has happened to Mr. Kandaswamy? I know that he has done a lot of good work in terms of publicising all that the Sri Lankan Army was doing earlier. Now he is missing. I would like to know what has happened to him. According to the Indian Express Report, he was kidnapped by an organisation called EROS. I would like to know where Mr. Kandaswamy is. The Government should take it up as a top priority item. All that has been achieved is the stopping of genocide in Sri Lanka. But at what cost? That is the key question. That is what disturbs me. The genocide in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army against the Tamils has come to an end, thanks to the presence of IPKF. But at what cost? What have you lost in the process? That is what I want to say. I want to say that objective realities of the situation are much worse today than before the Accord was signed. First of all, we are now ending up by fighting Mr.

Jayewardene's war. Recently, Mr. Jayewardene gave increase in pay to his Army. He said that it was possible for him to give them increases in pay because he did not have to incur expenditure on fighting the Tamils. The Indian Army was bearing the entire expenses and all the money that was earlier being spent on it by Sri Lanka is now being spent by the Indian Army. Therefore, he was able to give the increase. I think it is an indiscreet thing to say. It is also true that the singular fact that arises out of the Accord is that today we are fighting Jayewardene's war. We condemned Jayewardene earlier for pursuing the military solution. Today we are pursuing the same thing. In fact we should be attempting some kind of a concrete political solution. I am not the one to say that you should negotiate only with the LTTE. I must say, I am happy to say that when the National Front met recently, we recognised the LTTE as a major organisation. But we would like the Government of India, whenever it decides to negotiate and seek a political solution, to negotiate with all of them. We do not recognise any one group as the sole representative of the Tamil people. So, first of all, the cost, in terms of casualty, has now crossed 600, even by official accounts, 600 people have died. It is painful. Many of the people affected met me sometimes. I remember one case of an MLA of our own party from Bharatpur, Mr. Nathi Singh. He has one daughter. His daughter got married recently. And his son-in-law went for the IPKF work. He was parachuted into the University campus, and he was butchered by the LTTE. And he does not look into all these aspects. It is a very poignant situation. In fact, the Army themselves feel very unhappy. And unjustified criticism of the Army, in fact, hurts a lot of people. And I would urge restraint in this as far as possible. The second thing is that you are fighting the LTTE. You are fighting the Tamil militants as represented by the LTTE. But have the

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Sinhalese come over to your side? The Sinhalese have become more hardened. In fact, extremism and terrorism in the Sinhala area is growing. And they are telling you to get out. The Sinhalese are also telling you to get out. So, who are you fighting for? You have gone there and you are fighting the LTTE. LTTF says, you get out. And the other side, the Sinhalese, whose war you are fighting and for whom 600 people have died, are also saying, you get out. So, the situation has got more polarised, not less. And how the LTTE came to this dominant position, I do not want to go into. Mr. Gopalsamy's Party used to support an organisation called TELO. In fact, its leader Sabaratnam was a gem. And in cold blood he was murdered by the LTTE. (Interruption). You had your say. In cold blood, he was murdered by the LTTE. That is how they became a dominant organisation. That happens. Now you are finishing the LTTE. So, who is going to defend the Tamils in case you decide to pull out tomorrow? That is why you cannot pull out. We are not for the Army staying because we are imperialists or we are hegemonistic and we wanted them to stay. We say that if you pull out today, the Tamils will be defenceless because the Sinhala mind has not changed. The Sinhalese are as against the Tamils or, in fact, more against the Tamils than ever before. Therefore, today, the cost of the treaty, the cost of the accord is that, one, you are losing your own men fighting the Jayewardene war and paying for it too. Jayewardene is not paying you for it. You are paying it. The Indian tax-payer is paying it. And the second thing is that the Sinhala attitude is becoming more and more arrogant and extremist. They are also not appreciating your presence. They are telling you to get out, the people for whom, whose war you are fighting. And having gone there, you cannot pull out. And if you pull out, Tamils will be massacred. And if

you stay there, your staying is now dependent on Mr. Jayewardene continuing. If tomorrow Mr. Jayewardene is assassinated or he loses in an election and somebody else comes to power or there is a military coup, and then they say, you get out, what will you say? Military there is today dominated by the JVP—the Janata Vimukti Peramuna. It has got no connection with the Janata Party. You please be clear on that. JVP has infiltrated the Army. Tomorrow if there is a coup and then they say, you get out, what will you say? Will you be able to save your face in the UN and say, we will not get out? Therefore, the situation today is much worse than before the accord was signed. And that is why the Accord is a total failure. I do not say the going of the IPKF has not achieved something. It has. I said that. It has put an end to the Sinhalese Army's genocide. But you have not solved the problem. So, how do you solve the problem? What is the way out? And, Sir, with that, I will conclude. What is the way out? I have not taken much time. I have still got some more time considering that the Janata Party is the largest party. Therefore, you should be generous in giving me more time.

AN. HON. MEMBER: You should have the largest heart also. (Interruptions). ..

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: Since the CPM have also given their time to me, I would like to conclude by asking, what is the way out? You have gone rushing into an accord. For whom? Who did you sign the accord with? You signed with the Sri Lankan Government. That Government which was under seige, because you were financing and you were arming the militants. And now you are in a situation where you are helping the Sri Lankan Army, fighting the very group of people whom you financed and you helped in the beginning, gave arms, having worsened the situation, you are in a position where

you cannot get out and you cannot even stay there permanently. The question is what is the wa out? That is the question. It is a Catch 22 situation. (*Interruptions*). Sir, glasnost is affecting CPM also. I am glad that glasnost is reaching you. So, the core of the problem is that the sinhala population, which is 75 per cent of the population, has been consistently refusing to share power with the remaining Tamil population, which is about 24 per cent. There is a small group called Burgers whom I leave out. But 24 per cent of the population that include plantation Tamils, that includes Muslim Tamils and Hindu Tamils, all Tamil speaking people put together are 24 per cent of the population and the Sinhalese are consistently refusing to share power with the Tamils. And, why? On a racist theory, on the racial superiority theory that Sri Lanka belongs to Sinhala people. This is the core of the problem. That has to be altered. Now, even in India we are under this illusion. I would like to backtrack a little here and say that we are under an illusion because we think that the Tamils went there from here and now they are demanding a separate country there. That is not so. The Tamils of North and East have been there from time immemorial. It is the Sinhalese who went from Bihar and Orissa. Some 700 or 800 years back there was a king called Vijay Sinha, who led them, and that is how the word Sinhala came. This is not my history. Even the Pakistanis who tried to take unholy interest in Sri Lanka, their publication put out by the Institute of Regional Studies, India-Sri Lanka Relations, Retrospect Problems and Perspective, I will read out what it says. In that it says at page 20 that the two main ethnic communities of the island, the Sinhala and the Tamils originally migrated from India as the two major religions of the people. In other words, the fight in Sri Lanka is between two groups of Indians.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: This is distortion of history, total distortion of history.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: Well, I know that the DMK has its own version of history. But I am quoting here an authoritative text of history. The Tamils were...

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: That is a text from Islamabad. You said that they were living there from time immemorial. Then you are quoting that these two groups (*Interruptions*).

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: I said even they accept.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY): Please address the Chair.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: Sir, he is bubbling with enthusiasm. He has already had his say.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Just now you stated that one group played the game of double agent. Do not fall in that trap.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: Who is an agent, who is not an agent, everybody is confused. But we in Parliament should not be LTTE agents.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: There is nothing wrong in advocating the cause of LTTE, instead of playing the role of a double agent like you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY): Do not enter into a controversy, Mr. Gopalsamy.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: So, what I am saying is this, that the North and East Tamilians of Sri Lanka have been there from time immemorial. The Sinhala majority has no right to say that they are aliens. If there are aliens at all, it is the Sinhala people because they are much more recent migrants as they came only 500 or 700 years ago. Hence, we cannot accept this argument that is being propounded time and again. Time and again the argument is being propounded that Sinhala people somehow have the racial superiority or inherent superiority in that island. So, the main problem

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has been that the Tamils came to the conclusion of wanting Eelam only after they tried everything else. They wanted in 1948 a federal constitution. We do not know how Sri Lanka became independent country because by the Act of Parliament which made India independent, all kings from whom the British took power, were made independent kings; some of them chose to merge, and so on. But in Sri Lanka, they did not restore power to Tamil kings and from that time onwards, Sri Lankan Tamils have been fighting for a share in power. So I cannot give you the extent of discrimination that took place during these last 40 years which is the core of the problem. Unless you understand that, it is not possible to appreciate what is to be done. Take Ceylon Administrative Service. I have the statistics of 1978 and I am quoting this from a publication, Minorities Rights Group Report No. 25-Ceylon Administrative Service. According to this report, the share of Tamils in Ceylon Administrative Service is only 5 per cent; their share in population is 24 per cent but share in administrative service is only 5 per cent; in clerical services, postal, railways, it is only 5 per cent; in professions, engineers, doctors, lecturers, it is only 10 per cent; in armed forces it is only one per cent or even less—I am talking of 1978—and in the public sector employment, their share is 5 per cent; in the police force, it is 2 per cent. So, in other words, here is a huge population which has been systematically denaied for the last 40 years, a share in power and today you are asking them to live with a group of people who are in overwhelming majority and who have been their butchers.

What is the answer to that? The answer is that either the Sri Lankan people adopt a federal constitution in which the rights of the States are clearly defined, or they have a parting of ways. Let there be Eelam. Who are you to stop Eelam? The Prime Minister, in his speech in Madras after signing the accord said the States so formed after the accord will have the same rights as Indian States. But it is not so. In fact, they are nowhere near that. Even India has not truly a

federal Constitution. Here, there are two separate nations. Therefore, a federal constitution is the very minimum because under the present constitution, your accord is against the basic structure of Sri Lankan Constitution and Sri Lankan Supreme Court can throw it away; a referendum can undo it. Therefore, what you should be working for is change in the entire Constitution. The present Constitution is a theocratic unitary constitution. What they should have is a secular federal constitution. That is the very minimum and the accord should have been a stepping stone for that. After the accord, there has been no initiative from the Government at all. And that is the core of the problem. I would say that the Government, if it wants to get a way out, has to build the political process. If they want to go ahead with elections, they will go ahead and whosoever wants to participate, will participate. We in the National Front have been calling for a ceasefire and negotiations with all the groups. That has to be done. Here, even the LTTE can contribute. They cannot fight the Indian army. No liberation movement in the world 5.00 P.M. has succeeded which could not secure its supply routes.

The Vietcong in Vietnam had its supply routes through China. If you see the history, you will find that the liberation movements which have succeeded were those which had secure supply lines. The LTTE's success was because the supply line from Tamil Nadu was secure. Today, they are fighting the very country or the forces of the very country from whom they had secure supply routes. They do not have any chance against the Indian Army.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: For ten months they have withstood.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY): Mr. Swamy please conclude.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: They do not have any chance. If the LTTE is genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement, there is a way. The people of India are sympathetic to the people of Sri Lanka, particularly the Tamils. If the LTTE takes to Gandhian

methods, lay down all arms and rely on the people of India...

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Lay down before whom?

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: I am not the Minister.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: To lay down before the butchers. *(Interruptions)* Is this Gandhism? You are propounding a new concept.

SHRI RAM AWADHESH SINGH (Bihar): American way.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: Suddenly, Mr. Ram Awadhesh Singh has woken up to what is American way. I hope he knows where it is. Therefore, Sir, I would appeal to the LTTE. The people of India would rise in its defence. But it should realise that it has no chance, it does not have any chance, against the Indian Army. After all, the Indian Army had been given a job and it will go after it.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: All the Tamils are with the LTTE. Mr. Subramanian Swamy, you should know this. You are using this occasion to denigrate the LTTE.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY): Mr. Gopalsamy, you had your views. Let him continue.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: I appeal to the LTTE. It should adopt Gandhian methods. The people of India would stand by it, would put pressure on the Indian Government and thereby bring about a negotiated settlement. Ultimately, there has to be a negotiated settlement with some group on the island. It has to be a political settlement. If all of them undertake this method, all of us would rise as one person to support them. But it cannot be that we in this country would denigrate our own Army, that we would try to run down our own Army and bring down their morale. Certainly... *(Interruptions)* no nationalist would like the Indian Army to come out from there as a defeated Army because it has impact for us on all fronts. Therefore, I would say that those of us who would like a negotiated settlement would like to see that Gandhian methods are adopted. *(Interruptions)* By this alone, it is possible

to have a ceasefire and democratic elections. Thank you.

*(Interruptions)*

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA (Andhra Pradesh): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, India is now stuck up in Sri Lanka due to the greatest misadventure of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The Sri Lankan policy of the Government is a monumental failure. Just like the other accords which Mr. Rajiv Gandhi signed with aplomb at various stages, this accord also is in the doldrums. This also indicates, the stalemate in Sri Lanka indicates, the paralysis which is gripping this Government and its decision-making process. They do not know how to come out of the mess which they themselves have created.

Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 29, 1987, was itself a superficial approach to a complex, historical, problem. Repeatedly we questioned in this House and even till today this Government has not been able to satisfy this House or the country why India became a party to this accord instead of being a guarantor or a witness. An accord which should have been signed between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil groups has been signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of this country with the President of Sri Lanka and as a result of this the country has been committed to an enormous task there, a policeman's job in Sri Lanka, which was never envisaged. Today we are stuck up there because of this and at what cost? It is not only at the cost of our prestige but huge financial expenditure over the troops and other people sent there. We have some limited objectives in Sri Lanka. No doubt. Government justifies it by telling that the country's geo-political interests demanded our intervention there. Otherwise, some of the super powers would have come and meddled there. The security concern was shown. Then, the Indian Ocean being continued as a zone of peace, free from interference of extra-territorial powers was also cited as one of the reasons. To that extent our interest in Sri Lankan affairs was justified, but what I am questioning is that this Government had no business to commit this country

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to such a misadventure, to such an accord which has completely bogged down our Indian army there. This accord has gone beyond the purpose for which it was meant. It interfered with the Tamils' issue. It has committed the Government of India to a heavy responsibility and day-to-day administration and policing and at such a huge cost. What is the need for all this? The Indian army which has been sent there to protect Tamils in Sri Lanka has ended up in killing them. That is exactly what has happened there. What is happening there. That shows the success of the Sri Lankan policy of this Government which they claim.

And what was the purpose? When we demanded in this Parliament, before the Sri Lankan accord, that India should intervene militarily, meaning against the Sri Lankan Government if necessary, Government always came forward to say, "No, no, this is an internal affair of Sri Lanka, we cannot go beyond a point, we are not even mediators, we are only using our good offices nothing else". And the same Government today went beyond that brief and committed this country to such misadventure.

And what has happened to the implementation of this accord also? It is faulty from the very beginning. If you take from the Sri Lankan side, almost all the conditions of the accord have been violated by them. While commenting on the referendum in the North and East, the President of Sri Lanka himself is on record to say that "we know the result of the referendum, it will never be in favour of the merger, it will go against that, we are not agreeing to the merger". This is what he said even before the referendum is held. This itself shows the attitude of the Sri Lankan Government there. Then the Sri Lankan Government failed to release the Tamil political prisoners as agreed upon. It has failed to withdraw the emergency rule in the Northern and Eastern provinces. It has failed to disband the Sinhalese homeguards in the Eastern province. This was also part of the agreement. He promised

to confine his armed forces to barracks, but that condition has also been violated and the most dangerous part is that it has intensified the Sinhalese colonisation of Eastern province, particularly Mullaitheeru and Trincomalee districts. Then it has violated the accord by opening Sinhalese police stations in the North and the East. It arrested the LTTE regional commanders and attempted to take them to Colombo for interrogation and execution. Even today the Sinhalese Government is refusing to commit itself to a merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces. These are the violations of the Accord committed by the Sri Lankan Government.

Then India also has not lived up to its commitments. There was a commitment to set up an interim government which has not been achieved. It has failed to set up a Tamil police system also. Then it allowed the LTTE leader, Thuduppan to die from fasting. Then it allowed LTTE Regional Commanders and cadres in the custody of the IPKF to die. It has virtually declared—why say virtually, it has declared—a war against the LTTE and it is responsible for the death of hundreds of civilians and destruction of civilian property.

This is not the task which we had envisaged for the Indian Army there. This itself shows the failure of the Sri Lankan policy of this Government. And this war on LTTE declared by India and the IPKF is the biggest diplomatic victory for Mr. Jayewardene who really wanted this kind of a situation. He tried all sources, all foreign sources. He tried to involve the Americans, he tried to involve the Israelis, he tried all sources. But when he failed, he thought of this very pliable Prime Minister here who wanted to escape from the scandals rocking this country at that time, against him, and who wanted a diversion. He forced this Prime Minister to enter into this incredible Accord there. And from 10th October, the offensive against the LTTE and hundreds of boys who had withstood the onslaught of the Sri Lankan Army for years, for decades, started. And they have been annihilated. That is the achievement of this Government.

**ठाकुर जगतपाल सिंह (मध्य प्रदेश):**  
यह बात बिल्कुल गलत है। छोटे खतरे को  
एवाइड करने के लिए बड़े खतरे....

**उपस राधयक्ष (श्री बी० सत्यनारायण  
रेड्डी):** आप अपना नाम दें दें। आपकी  
मोका दिया जाएगा बोलने का।

**SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA:**

All the boys who have been valiantly standing against the Sri Lankan Army's atrocities have been finished—most of them. The second level leadership has been finished. Today they are keeping the Tamilians there virtually without any defence. Tomorrow if the Indian Army withdraws, the Tamilians will have to live at the mercy of Sri Lankan forces and the other militant groups there. And what is the reason they are giving? Because the LTTE has not agreed to the Accord and unless they agree unconditionally, they will not stop army action. When did they agree to it? It is not a new phenomenon. Even at the time of signing the Accord, Mr. Prabhakaran is on record to say that he opposed this Accord; he did not agree to this. He was locked up in a hotel room, held incommunicado, was not allowed to meet people and express his views. And it was made out that the LTTE and other groups had agreed to it. It is a false claim of the Government. The Government has misled the Parliament and the country also as regards the agreement of the Tamil groups to this Accord. And now they want to finish whatever is remaining of the LTTE. It is not a question of my holding any brief for the LTTE. They also committed certain atrocities against the other Tamil groups, the militant groups, which should have been avoided and which we condemn. But that is the only leading force there today which stands for the Tamil rights. That group is being slowly decimated. And this Government is bent upon finishing Mr. Prabhakaran within a short time. That is their main aim and they are trying to achieve that. The whole Tamilian population is terrorised in Sri Lanka. They are the population which welcomed the Indian Army, as people coming from the same ethnic group, thinking that they were saviours of the people there.

And the same people today hate the Indian Army. The Sinhalese already hate them. And the Tamils also now hate them. I do not know for whose benefit the Indian Army is staying there. Friends have suddenly become foes there. My Friend, Mr. Subramanian Swamy has pleaded that they should adopt the Gandhian methods. But they are fighting with their backs to the wall. Their offer for cease-fire has not been accepted. As far back as on February 27, 1988 they gave an offer for unconditional cease-fire for unconditional talks, but this Government has not agreed. Phabhakaran wrote on March 9 to the Prime Minister, offering to discuss the matter unconditionally, but this was not accepted. They say, "No, you must agree to the Accord; lay down the arms, disarm yourself; then only we will talk to you." This is the type of approach that this Government is adopting everywhere, not only in Sri Lanka. They adopted it in Punjab. Every one of the terrorists they want to finish, to the last, and then only a political solution will be thought of. If they want to adopt this kind of strong-arm methods everywhere they cannot achieve the purpose. Now this Government has to do certain introspection and see how to get out of this situation. The only way out is to declare a cease-fire and call the Tamil groups there for negotiations and discussions. That has to be done and no pre-conditions need be put because they also want peace there and, ultimately, if the Accord is beneficial to the Tamils, they will accept it. But you should not put a condition there. So, it is necessary that a cease-fire should be declared immediately and, also, whoever is in custody should be released.

Then, an interim Government, as promised, must be established there. Merger should take place, as agreed upon, of the northern and eastern provinces, and elections should be held as quickly as possible.

Finally, before I close, I would like to remind this Government: For years you have been advising the Sri Lankan Government that a military option should not be exercised and they should only

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try for a peaceful settlement. That was the advice you were giving but it is exactly quite opposite that you are doing today by insisting on continuing the hostilities there—by not agreeing to a cease-fire and not calling the LTTE for talks. Therefore, I plead that even now it is your duty to declare a cease-fire and try for a negotiated settlement. Thank you.

SHRI E. BALANANDAN (Kerala):

Sir, today we are discussing a very-serious issue over which there is a real difference of opinion among the Members of Parliament. To start with if we go back to the history of the Sri Lankan issue, the Tamil ethnic group in Sri Lanka was demanding a separate State for themselves for their development for long and the Sri Lankan Government was using the military and police against it and they were killing them. Thousands of them have been killed by the Sri Lankan police and military. The strength of the Sri Lankan army has been increased to 50,000. The expenditure of the Sri Lankan Government on military, previously, was Rs. 3.6 billion. But it has risen to Rs. 6 billion. That was the situation when the whole thing developed into such that the demand of the Tamil people led to the suppression of the Tamil people and the Sri Lankan Government was utilizing the forces of Israel as well as British mercenaries against the Tamil people. And the Ceylonese Government were being helped by Pakistan through supply of arms, etc. Therefore, there was the danger of third forces coming into Sri Lanka and their penetration being established there on the ground of this ethnic conflagration. This was the situation which developed there. Therefore, from our side we entered into an Accord on the ground that we do not want any imperialist agency in the neighbouring small State of Sri Lanka. That will come to create destabilisation in this area. The conditions agreed to, according to us, were also bad.

To go back to see the conditions, the first condition was that the multi-lingual multi-ethnic character of the Sri Lankan State has been agreed to. That is one of the basic conditions for which the Tamil population was fighting.

The northern and the eastern provinces are the historic habitation of the Tamil-speaking people, it was agreed.

And pledge to nurture the cultural, linguistic identities of each ethnic group within the framework of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. This is the basic point on which some difference is there. An independent Tamil State is wanted by a section of the Tamil agitators. In this agreement it was said that within the framework of the Sri Lankan Constitution, unity of Sri Lanka, this ethnic problem could be solved by a federal structure giving freedom to the Tamil people as envisaged in this agreement.

Joining of the northern and eastern provinces in a single administrative unit has not been done.

A referendum would be held within a year on the question of regional governments, in the east whether they want an administrative unit with North.

Elections would be held for the provincial council by December, 1987, so on and so forth.

To fulfil these conditions, if Sri Lanka requests, our army should go and supervise it. This was in sum the condition.

Now one year and one month have exactly passed today. So we have to look back and assess and estimate the result, whether we were gaining, whether we were losing and whether anything is to be re-thought, re-assessed, whether a new strategy is to be taken etc. etc., with an unbiased look.

Therefore, if we go through, we will find that the Sri Lankan Government on its part did not implement the accord in its true spirit. We find that the Prime Minister of the country was not agreeing with the accord. We also find that the Internal Minister—there is a Minister for Internal Affairs also—was not in full agreement with the accord. This way and that way the Sri Lankan Government was dragging its feet to fully implement the accord within the shortest possible time, on thing.

Another thing also simultaneously happened. There are several Tamil organisations not only the LTTE. Many organisa-



tions of the Tamil people having influence on a sizeable population, were supporting the accord. But the LTTE, having fire power in its hands, wanted to be the sole agent, sole representative of the Tamil people. That was the main hurdle to come to an understanding. It refused to lay down arms as agreed to in the accord.

Therefore, what is the total situation today? Our army our jawans, our officers are fulfilling a very difficult job. In the foreign terrain they have to go and operate against an alien section of people who are having arms. They are fighting our armed forces on which we have to express concern. Our valient fighters our armymen, many of them have lost their lives. But, however the point we have to discuss today is whether there is a possibility of implementing the full accord or not. What stands in the way? By doing through the records I found that there was a near chance of an agreement and the Government of Sri Lanka had agreed to a single unit of Eastern and Northern areas and they also agreed to have elections on the basis of 1982 rolls which was a disputed point. It is stated in the newspapers that the agreement was on the cards within a few days. I don't know what has happened to that. How has that situation changed?

Another report had appeared in the papers that the RAW has negotiated and had almost reached an agreement. I want to know from the hon. Minister whether RAW has been entrusted with the job of negotiating on this question or it is being negotiated at the Foreign Minister's or the Prime Minister's level.

I would also like to know what was the condition agreed to? According to the reports in the Times of India, our Defence Minister went to Sri Lanka and talked to the Sri Lankan authorities and others and agreed to concessions four times that of the concessions agreed to by the RAW. What were they? What are the concessions actually have been agreed to be given by the Defence Minister of this Country? I want to know that. What were the conditions agreed to between RAW and others? These conditions we must know so that we can take a proper view of the situation.

In the Lok Sabha last month it was stated that our expenditure on our military operations there till last month amounted to Rs. 97 crores. Some other figure might be for this month. Month after month a huge amount is being spent by us. It has also been reported that the Government of India have assured them to give Rs. 150 crores in order to meet the expenditure on resettlement of displaced persons. We do not know the details. Therefore, what is the thinking of the Government of India after having been there for one year and one month on the question of solving this problem? We do not think that we can solve this question by military means alone. I do not say that the military should be withdrawn now. It is for the safety of the Tamils, the Indian Army should be there. Don't think the majority of the Sinhalese are against them. No. The recent elections in Sri Lanka proved this. The JVP and some other parties were against the elections. They declared boycotting of the elections. Even then more than 60 per cent of the people voted in this election. The Left Four-party Alliance in Sri Lanka is supporting the Accord. Therefore, sane opinion in the land of Sri Lanka is not against the Accord at all. Don't take it that every Sinhalese is against the Tamils. That is not a fact. The fact is that the sane opinion is developing in Sri Lanka. We have to develop that opinion. We have to help every small and single political step to strengthen this together with the military operations. We have to move politically also to solve this problem. Therefore, I am asking the Minister to explain to us, what is the latest appraisal of the Government of India, of our efforts to implement the Accord which was signed? Is there any possibility in the near future to come to an arrangement so that our IPKF is withdrawn? If not, what is the way out? The Minister should tell the Parliament about the latest situation and the Government's thinking on this matter. It should be spelt out properly. The Government of India was not against the Tamil people, 1,40,000 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka were here. We were feeding them. We were helping them. We were helping them in so many ways which I don't want to explain. The ethnic problem of a minority can be solved only through com-

[Shri E. Balanandan]

plete democratic way. Some hon. Member pointed out about the Constitutional amendment brought forward in Sri Lankan Parliament. It is not sufficient. It does not give the real autonomy. Therefore, that needs change. How far and how effective we can negotiate and pressurise the Sri Lankan Government is another question. But while going through the framework of the Accord, we must still pressurise the Sri Lankan Government to have a little broader approach towards the ethnic people so that they are given more freedom. Sri Lankan people should be one and that attitude should come from the Sri Lankan Government. Therefore, I request the Minister to see that proper pressure is brought on the Sri Lankan Government to implement the Accord, to establish the democratic process by giving more freedom to Sri Lankan Tamil minorities within the Constitutional framework. Then alone the question of ethnic conflict can be solved. The Minister should also tell the Parliament, what is the latest situation and how the Government is going to approach the problem.

कृषि मंत्री (श्री भजन लाल) : उप-सभाध्यक्ष महोदय, एक अर्ज मैंने आपसे करनी थी कि फूड के ऊपर मुझे एक स्टेटमेंट देना है। अगर आपकी इजाजत हो तो दे दूँ.... (व्यवधान)

श्री सुब्रह्मण्यम् स्वामी : उसमें क्वेश्चन पूछने हैं। बहुत समय लगेगा।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री बी. सत्यनारायण रेड्डी) : उपमें मेम्बरों क्लैरीफिकेशंस पूछेंगे इस पर समय लगेगा फिर यह बीच में रुक जायेगा.... (व्यवधान)

श्री सुब्रह्मण्यम् स्वामी : हम आपके क्लैरीफिकेशंस नहीं हैं।

श्री भजन लाल : उसका जवाब साथ ही मैं आज ही दे देता। मैंने क्या कहा है बी. आप लोगों ने यहाँ क्या कहा है। (व्यवधान)

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री बी. सत्यनारायण रेड्डी) : आप बयान देंगे तो उस पर मेम्बरों क्लैरीफिकेशन भी पूछेंगे.... (व्यवधान)

श्री भजन लाल : मुश्किल यह हो जायेगी कि लोक सभा में स्टेटमेंट हो गया

है इसलिए यहाँ अगर नहीं होगा तो रखना अच्छा नहीं होगा। फिर कल मैं बाहर... (व्यवधान) जा रहा हूँ। इसलिए फिर इसको पहली तारीख को रखना पड़ेगा... (व्यवधान) यह आज के बिजनेस में है। लिखकर भेजा हुआ है।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री बी. सत्यनारायण रेड्डी) : सिर्फ तीन लोग इस में बोलने वाले हैं।

(व्यवधान)

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Rajasthan): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, what we are engaged in this evening, to my mind, is not a discussion on the conduct of the Sri Lankan Government or how it conducts itself so far as its domestic affairs are concerned. To my mind, it is also not a discussion on the conduct or misconduct of the LTTE. Sir, as I said, for the benefit of the Minister, I will wait until the Minister satisfies himself with all the interruptions that he wishes to make. Then, I can proceed. It is a very serious matter. I have started by saying that it is not my intent to discuss the conduct of the Sri Lankan Government and how it conducts itself in administering its own affairs or indeed, even the conduct or the misconduct of the LTTE. I am principally and primarily concerned with the conduct of the Government of India and its Sri Lankan policy. I would like to remind you, Sir, that when this Accord was signed, hon. the Prime Minister, as he is given to doing, categorised it as the Accord of the Century and when I remind you of it, it is not to derive any empty satisfaction from that reminder because the taste of that reminder is like the taste of ashes in my mouth. So, we can examine the success or the failure of any policy, not against the statement of claims and the objectives made by any Government, but only and always only against the criteria of the attainment of those aims. Now, 13 months after the launching of this misadventure, we need to remind ourselves as to what were the stated aims of the Government of India in its Sri Lankan policy. Indeed, the hon. Minister for Defence, in a recent press interview, has been good enough to reiterate them; and the three stated aims of the Sri Lankan policy were, end of violence in Sri Lanka; secondly, protection

of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka; thirdly, safeguarding of India's security needs in the region and all this, in an overall framework of Sri Lankan unity. This is how the Government of India explained its aims in Sri Lanka and explained its Sri Lankan policy. Now, Sir, 13 months later, when we examine as to how many of these aims have been achieved, whether they have been achieved at all, or not achieved, no matter how we look at it, demonstrably, there have been failures on all these three fronts. I am not going to engage myself in an examination whether Sri Lanka will remain united or not. But there is not an end of violence. Violence continues. I would agree with the previous speaker that possibly, the extent of what was called genocide of Tamils has been lessened. Yet, it is a very saddening fact for me to underline that the direction of violence has changed and that the perpetrator of current violence ought to be the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I do not think our presence is subserving Tamil interests in Sri Lanka which is the second stated aim. The third, about subserving Indian's security need I will come to a little later. Sir, it will suffice to say that by the involvement of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, not only are India's security interests not being subserved, in fact, they are being harmed. This is so primarily because to my mind, there was not at the beginning and there is still not today a recognisable or intelligible political purpose behind the involvement of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and there is no attainable military aim. This, in turn, exemplifies the failure of the Government's Sri Lankan policy, both on the diplomatic and on the military fronts. Why has it failed on the diplomatic front?

Firstly, the conceptualising of policy and the conduct of our diplomacy must have ensured the avoiding of significant military presence and action abroad. In fact, rather than Indian diplomacy ensuring this, it has obtained the involvement of IPKF in what appears to be a morass. Secondly, Sir, it is a diplomatic failure because of the origins which persuaded the hon. Prime Minister to say that it was the 'Accord of the Century', which exemplifies a search for the false heroic, a misconceived and

insufficiently understood concept of the regional role. That is why we have ended up with diplomatic failure. Thirdly, it appears that none of the lessons of current history, whether of Vietnam or of Afghanistan or of Kampuchea or of Angola or of Namibia or of Lebanon, have been understood or studied by the Government of India. If, simply put that lesson were to be stated, it is that you might prevail militarily, but only at terrible costs. But you cannot prevail even militarily over national, religious, regional forces which is what we have ended up precisely doing in Sri Lanka. It is a measure of our failure of diplomacy, that our yesterday's allies have become today's adversaries. It is a measure of our failure on the diplomatic front that the Sri Lankans do not longer like us to be in Sri Lanka. The Tamil who interests we are supposed to be subserving by being there, do no longer trust us. The IPKF which is but an instrument of State policy does not know till today who its real enemy is. As an ex-soldier. I can tell you now damaging it is for a soldier not to know what it is and whom it is that he is required to combat. This brings me to the failure on the military front.

Why have we failed on the military front? Firstly, because no country has ever benefited from a long war which is what we are ending up by doing in Sri Lanka. Military leadership, whether political or of any other kind, is not the art of getting soldiers killed. It is the challenge of preserving every single soldier's life. Secondly, Sir, we have failed militarily because you cannot send an army to war on slogans of peace; which is what we have done in Sri Lanka. You call it the IPKF, and you ask it to engage in war, and this has caused a psychological fracture in the minds of those whom you are asking to lay down their lives. Thirdly, a nation should go cautiously into a long-term confrontation if you do not like the word 'war'. It has to mobilise all its resources for a battle materially and psychologically. No effort of this kind on a foreign soil, whether you like the word 'war' or do not like the word 'war', is possible without a psychological preparation. The IPKF is in difficulties today. The nation is divided as it is

[Shri Jaswant Singh]

today on the IPKF's role in Sri Lanka. The nation is unsure of the Government's Sri Lankan policy which, in turn, has led and contributed to our military failure, because insufficient thought and insufficient preparation went into the IPKF's involvement in Sri Lanka. Which is why I call them military failures. IPKF is being asked to engage in Sri Lanka—as a friend serving in IPKF told me recently—what is called the fourth state of insurgency. Fourth state of insurgency is that people have already formed a state within a state. Whether you like LTTE or you do not like LTTE, whether LTTE deceived us or did not deceive us or they went back or did not go back on their words, is not the significant point. The significant point is that today LTTE deservedly or undeservedly is in the fourth state of insurgency. It was their writ, according to my understanding, despite the IPKF's presence, it is their writ, which largely runs in Jaffna. It might interest a lot of my friends here, for twenty years we contended with insurgency in Mizoram, at the end of these twenty years we signed an accord, at the time of signing the accord—I could be faulted of the exactness of the figure—roughly 250 Mizo terrorists surfaced with roughly 341 arms. Government does not share its intelligence with us. What little information I have on the subject is that there are today 2500 trained cadres of LTTE. There is a mistaken impression for some friends to state that the supply routes of LTTE have dried up. No, they have not dried up. If they had dried up, LTTE could not have held up the IPKF as it has done today. I say this as one who has had the honour of having worn uniform; I say it in pain, less in anger. Both on the diplomatic and on the military fronts, I would like to share with the honourable Minister for External Affairs, a very eminent Indian, a man of reflection and thought, please recognise that foreign policy failures have far more profound effect on the future of a nation than the failures on the front of domestic policy. What you do on the front of foreign policy lives with the nation for many decades until rectified and the two principal examples, which time will not permit me

to elaborate are, of course, J&K 48 and the bleak plateau of the Aksai Chin, in the decade of the 50s. Aksai Chin demonstrated the second principle which I would like to share with the honourable Minister, that you cannot confront raw military force with moral force alone, which is what we attempted to do in the early stages of our China policy. And the reverse of it is what we are now trying to do in Sri Lanka. And that is, that a variation of the same theme would suggest, that just as you cannot confront raw military power merely with moral power, when that raw military power is combined with moral force, you cannot confront it with military force alone. IPKF is today engaged in an operation on foreign soil, with insufficient local intelligence, with insufficient local support, with a morale which I cannot say is of the highest order. Hence all actions of IPKF are reactive and, to my mind, I find it, the implication of it, as insulting that on 29th July 1988 IPKF was advised to bunker down, not to stir out on the roads, so that no incident could take place, so that on the anniversary of the signing of the accord, LTTE might not score a point by blowing up a mine or firing a sniper shot at a passing vehicle. It is a reflection both on the diplomatic and military front, this conduct of IPKF, which after all is a symbol of the Government of India's Sri Lanka policy. I am one of the later speakers and time would not permit me to elaborate. I believe that Sri Lanka and the Government of India's Sri Lanka policy have their own implications and I would entreat this Government not to treat it lightly. You can score a debating point with me. You have access to information and you can refute whatever I say here. What you say will get reported in the papers and what I say will not be reported in the papers which is not a matter of great concern to me. But believe me—Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, through you I would entreat the honourable Minister of External Affairs—believe me, what you do in Sri Lanka today, and what you have already done for the past 13 months, is going to be counted as one of those foreign policy decisions the consequences of which this nation will have to live with for many decades to come.

I would conclude by asking the honourable Minister to provide three or four elementary clarifications.

Have you even today got a time-frame? I cannot use here the word "solution" because in complex situations like this there is no solution. Let me, therefore, put it simply: Have you even today got a time-frame for creating such conditions that the IPKF can come back home? You sent the IPKF to Sri Lanka and you have to create conditions which permit the IPKF to come back with its honour intact. The Indian army cannot be permitted to lose, even to appear to lose, because it is not the Indian army's loss, it is the Indian nation's loss. It is this Government which involved the IPKF in Sri Lanka and it is this Government's bounden duty to create conditions for an honourable withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka? Have you got a time-frame for it or is it going to be indefinite?

Secondly, what indeed is your diplomatic purpose of continuing this engagement of the IPKF in Sri Lanka? What is the diplomatic aim even now? Please explain this to us. Or, what is left of it?

Thirdly, what is your primary aim or what is the basic task that you have given to the IPKF? What is the task which the IPKF must achieve? Is it the destruction of the LTTE and if it is not the destruction of the LTTE, then what is that specific task that the IPKF has?

Sir, I will not go into the various aspects of the accord or what has not happened under the accord or what the Sri Lankan Government has not done about the accord. My simple clarifications with regard to the accord are about the question of crown lands and about devolution of financial powers. Perhaps the Government will explain this.

Sir you have been very tolerant and very patient with me. But it is just one more sentence that I would like to share with you. In this entire administration of the Government of India's Sri Lanka policy, the primary and, ironically enough, an ancient lesson that we have to learn in India is about the true na-

ture of India's power and about the limitations on the application of that power, because, in the absence of that understanding, a grievous wrong will be perpetrated by this Government on the future generations of India. Do not take our observations lightly or merely as an adversarial role of a political opponent or dub them as motivated. Please heed them. We too speak for the nation; we are also concerned about its welfare. Thank you, Sir.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY): Now, Dr. Ratnakar Pandey,

डा० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय (उत्तर प्रदेश)  
माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, श्रीलंका की स्थिति के संबंध में इस विशेष चर्चा में भाग लेने का अपने जो मुझे अवसर दिया है इनके लिए मैं आपका कृतज्ञ हूँ। लंका की चर्चा या तो रामायण के युग में हुई थी या राजीव गांधी के युग में हो रही है। इसके पहले लंका को इतना महत्व नहीं दिया गया। रावण के स्वरूप वाले जो लोग हैं वे स्वयं अपना परिचय रावण शब्द उच्चारित कर के दे रहे हैं। मैं उस चर्चा में न पड़कर के अपने सैनिकों का, जो श्रीलंका में वीरता के साथ हमारे देश ने जो शान्ति सेना के माध्यम से समझौता किया है और जिस कार्य को वह अंजाम दे रहे हैं, अपने प्राणों की आहुति दे रहे हैं और आतंकवाद जो लंका में मचा रखा है लोगों ने, उनके गलत इरादों को नाकाम कर रहे हैं, उसके लिए इस सदन के माध्यम से मैं उन्हें श्रद्धांजलि अर्पित करता हूँ और जो हमारे वीर सैनिक हताहत हुए हैं या किसी प्रकार अपने प्राणों की आहुति दिए हैं, उन्होंने भारत का नाम रोशन किया है, भारत की महिमा को उजगर किया है।

माननीय उपसभाध्यक्ष जी, आतंकवाद चाहे पंजाब में हो, चाहे श्रीलंका में हो चाहे कहीं भी हो यह निन्दा की बात है जबर्दस्ती अपनी आकांक्षाओं की पूर्ति के लिए "जाफ़ा", जहाँ तमिल आबादी के लोग अधिक रहते हैं, वे चाहते हैं कि

[डा० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय]

लंका को अलग कर दिया जाए और यह अलगावादी नीति, जो भारत की विदेश नीति रही है उस में बर्दाश्त के बाहर रही है। भारत अपनी विदेश नीति पर कायम है। नेहरू जी ने जो पंचशील सत्य, अहिंसा, नानइंटरफियरेंस की नीतियां बनाई थीं, उस पर हम कायम हैं। लेकिन, अपने अपने देश की यह परम्परा रही है कि जब कोई याचक बनकर के सहायता के लिए आता है अन्याय, अत्याचार, दुराचार और शोषण के खिलाफ उसकी मदद करना भारत की विदेश नीति का और भारत की जो आध्यात्मिक शक्ति है उसका मूल सिद्धांत रहा है। हमारे शान्ति सैनिकों ने जो काम किया है श्रीलंका में वह बहुत ही प्रशंसनीय है। हमारे सैनिक प्राणों की आहुति दे देते हैं लेकिन उफ़ नहीं करते हैं। जिस काम पर उन्हें भेजा गया, उस काम को वे अंजाम दे रहे हैं।

मान्यवर, अभी हमारे माननीय मित्र कह रहे थे कि यह विदेश नीति की असफलता है और अपने देश में सम्मान के साथ हमारी सेना नहीं लौट रही है और भावी पीढ़ी तक इस घटना से प्रभावित होगी। वे अपने देश के सामने अजब प्रश्न-चिन्ह तक लगा रहे थे। एक नौ-जवान प्रधान मंत्री इस देश के हैं जो अभी अधिक दिन नहीं हुए जब श्रीलंका में गए थे और लौट रहे थे तो सैल्यूट देते समय वहां के सैनिकों ने उनके ऊपर जो आक्रमण किया, वह विदेशी ताकतों के इशारे पर की गई साजिश थी, जिस में प्रधान मंत्री श्री राजीव गांधी के प्राणों के भूखे हुए लोगों की साजिश को ईश्वर ने असफल कर दिया। श्री राजीव गांधी केवल व्यक्ति नहीं है, वे पूरे भारत का प्रतिनिधित्व करते हैं और उनका प्रतिनिधित्व करते हैं जो इस दुनिया में दबाए जा रहे हैं, जो पिछड़े हुए हैं, जो पावर्टी लाईन के नीचे रहते हैं, जो पूँजीवादियों के शोषण का शिकार हो रहे हैं, उनके प्रतिनिधि के रूप में जब उन्होंने श्रीलंका का दौरा किया था तो जानलेवा जो आक्रमण हुआ उनके ऊपर यह इस बात का प्रतीक है कि

जो ऐसी ताकतें है चाहे वह लिट्टे ही, या अर्थ संगठन हो बार-बार समझौता किया संगठन ने और उन्होंने हथियार समर्पित करने का, प्रभाकरन् जी ने वचन दिया 6.00. जो समझौते होते हैं वे किसी P.M. सिद्धांत पर होते हैं और आतंकवाद कोई सिद्धांत नहीं है लेकिन अवसरवादिता अपार्चुनिस्ट सिद्धांत को लेकर जो निहत्थे, निर्दोष और शान्त स्वभाव के लोग हैं उन पर कोई भी आक्रमण करता है चाहे वह सिंहली हो, चाहे तमिलवासी हो, उसमें भेद करना मानवता के नाम पर मैं कलंक समझता हूँ। मानवता और मानवता में अंतर नहीं होता है हमारे जो शान्ति सैनिक वहां वीरतापूर्ण कार्य कर रहे हैं, उसके लिए हम उन्हें बधाई देते हैं। हमने जो समझौता किया है उस पर हम कायम हैं। उससे एक कदम भी हम पीछे नहीं हटेंगे। आज तमिलनाडु में चुनाव का समय ज्यों ज्यों नजदीक आता जा रहा है, हमारे राजनीतिक दलों के लोग चुनावों में ऐसी सनसनीखोज बातें फैलाना चाहते हैं जिससे उन्हें राजनीतिक फायदा हो, लेकिन उनको कोई राजनीतिक फायदा होने वाला नहीं है। तमिलनाडु में कुछ राजनीतिक दल यह प्रचार कर रहे हैं कि तमिलनाडु में हिन्दी को राजीव गांधी की सरकार थोपना चाहती है। मैं पूछता हूँ कि दक्षिण भारत हिन्दी प्रचार सभा का पिछले वर्ष का रेकार्ड मंगाकर देख लीजिए वहां 1 लाख 80 हजार लोगों ने हिन्दी की परीक्षाएँ पास की हैं। तमिलनाडु में विरोधी दलों का शासन है। जब संविधान में हिन्दी और भारतीय भाषाओं पर बात आई तो तमिलनाडु के मित्र संविधान का तमिल भाषा में अनुवाद कर के अभी तक नहीं भेज सके।

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Unnecessarily he is dragging a matter which is irrelevant to this subject. Shall I ask Mr. Pandey whether he knows what Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru advised people like him about these arguments?

DR. RATNAKAR PANDEY: I am coming to the point.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: You don't know anything.

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री बी० सत्यानारायण रेड्डी) : विषय पर आइए ।

डॉ० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : हमने जो श्री-लंका से समझौता किया है उस में जाफना में जो तमिल भाषा-भाषी रहते हैं, उनके बारे में हमने कोई जो भी समझौता किया है ...

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Sinhalese never lived in Jaffna. He does not know even the alphabets of the Sri Lankan problem. He is exhibiting his ignorance.

डॉ० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : इसलिए मैं बताना चाहता हूँ कि जो इस तरह के झूठे और बनावटी आरोप लगाए जाते हैं, वे सही नहीं हैं। हमने जो समझौता किया है...

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : किसे समझौता किया है ?

डॉ० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : हमने कहा है कि श्रीलंका की भाषा तमिल को बनाया जाए, यह समझौता हुआ है और रूढ़ि आरोप लगाया जाता है कि हम हिन्दी को थोपना चाहते हैं तमिलनाडु में इस तरह के क्षणिक स्वार्थ और दयनीय इरादों से कोई भी दल सफलता प्राप्त नहीं कर सकता । हिसा में हमारा विश्वास नहीं है। हिसा चाहे कोई हमारे देश में करे या दूसरे देश में करे, यह उचित नहीं है।

[The Vice-Chairman, (Shri Jagesh Desai) in the Chair.]

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Mr. Pandey is not aware of what Mr. Moopanar stated about it. He does not know what he is talking here.

डॉ० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : हमने इस देश को स्वतंत्र किया है और आज भी अहिंसा हमारा परम धर्म है, लेकिन यदि कोई देश हमसे, हमारे पड़ोसी देश को कूचक का अड्डा बनाता है, विदेशी ताकतों की वहाँ संरचना करता है और मूल लोगों को उखाड़कर किसी और को काबिज करने का प्रयत्न करता है जो वहाँ भारत मूक

दर्शक बनकर नहीं रहता और उसके होते हुए जो श्रीलंका से हमने समझौता किया है, उसमें हमें हर कदम पर सफलता मिली है और उस सफलता पर इस देश ने गर्व का अनुभव किया है। यह दूसरी बात है कि जो विरोधी दल के मित्त हर चीज में राजनीति देखते हैं और यहाँ भी राजनीति देखते हैं जो श्रीलंका में आतंकवाद है और उसने सारे लंका के जन-जीवन को तहस नहस कर के रख दिया है और बार-बार इस समझौते...

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Subhas Chandra Bose was branded as a terrorist by the British. (Interruptions)

डॉ० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : कोई भी आतंकवादी हों चाहे प्रभाकरन हो और चाहे पंजाब में मारे जाने वाला आतंकवादी हो अगर आतंकवादी को जड़ से निकालना है तो राजीव गांधी के नेतृत्व में भारत ही उसको निकाल सकता है। आतंकवादी को केवल इस धरती से नहीं बल्कि विश्व से मिटाकर छोड़ा जायगा।

जहाँ तक श्रीलंका की बात है भारत का इसमें कोई भी स्वार्थ नहीं है।

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: You have become mainacs in the hands of Jayewardene.

डॉ० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : श्रीलंका के राजनीतिक फायदे के लिए यह कोई समझौता नहीं किया गया है बल्कि इतिहास इस बात का गवाह है कि जब-जब कोई याचक बन कर शरणार्थी बनकर भारत की शरण में आता है तो भारत ने सम्मान उसके सम्मान की उसके शान की, उसकी धरती की रक्षा की। जब राम ने रावण को मारा और अगर राम चाहते तो शान से वहाँ राज कर सकते थे लेकिन उन्होंने विभीषण को राज अर्पित किया। हमने अपनी सीमा विस्तार के लिए कोई शांति संगठन को नहीं भेजा है और न इस स्वार्थ से कोई समझौता किया है बल्कि जो श्रीलंका में अशांति व्याप्त थी और कुछ ऐसे तत्व जो हमारे देश के मूल सिद्धांतों के विपरीत विदेशी साजिशों का अड्डा बना रहे हैं

[डा० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय]

श्री लंका को, उसको तहस-नहस करने के लिए, उसको छिन्न-भिन्न करने के लिए हमने यह समझौता किया है। यह पूरी तरह से सफल समझौता है।

भाषा के नाम पर, धर्म के नाम पर, जाति के नाम पर, सम्प्रदाय के नाम पर, रंगभेद के नाम पर जो लोग मानवता में विभेद करना चाहते हैं वे लोग प्रभाकरन और लिट्टे संगठन के समर्थक हो सकते हैं लेकिन यह देश हमेशा से अहिंसा में विश्वास करता रहा है। यह देश हमेशा अपनी नीतियों पर चलता रहा है। सूरज का लाख सितारे मिल कर भी मुकाबला नहीं कर सकते। राजीव ने जो समझौता किया है सूरज की रोशनी में चमकता हुआ समझौता है जो सारी दुनिया को समान दृष्टि से देखता है। श्रीलंका की जो स्थिति है उसमें हम विश्वास करते हैं कि हमारे बीच ऐतिहासिक शांति स्थापित करेंगे और जो अतंकवादी तत्व वहाँ शांति को भंग करना चाहते हैं चाहे प्रभाकरन हो या उनके समर्थक हों या उनके लिट्टे जैसे संगठन हो वे हमेशा के लिए अपने इरादों में सफल नहीं होंगे।

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: You are branded as butchers. You are justifying that butchery.

डा० रत्नाकर पाण्डेय : इन शब्दों के साथ भारत-श्रीलंका समझौते के प्रत्येक कार्य में भारत को सफलता मिली है, देश का मुख उज्ज्वल हुआ है सारी दुनिया के सामने। राजीव गांधी की चारो नीति प्रतिष्ठापूर्ण कार्य के रूप में प्रतिष्ठित हुई है। इन शब्दों के साथ श्रीलंका और भारत का जो समझौता हुआ है और जो लंका की स्थिति है उससे हम विश्वास करते हैं कि आने वाले दिनों में सदैव के लिए श्रीलंका में पूर्ण शांति की स्थापना करेंगे। धन्यवाद। (व्यवधान)

श्री शशीम हाशमी (बिहार) : समाध्यक्ष महोदय, अभी आने काबिल दोस्त की तकरीर मैं सुन रहा था। उनकी तकरीर सुनने के बाद गालिब का एक शेर मुझे याद आया :

नुत्क है सर बगरेबा कि इसे क्या कहिये  
खामा अनुगुशत बदन दो है इसके क्या कहिये,

मेरी बुद्धि और मेरी भाषा ने शर्म के कपड़े के अंदर मुंह छिपा लिया है इसके बाद मैं क्या बोलू। मेरी कलम को आश्चर्य से दों ने दबा ली है इस पर मैं क्या लिखू।

उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, दुनिया की तारीख इस बात से भी हुई है कि जब भी किसी नस्ल के ऊपर जुल्म होता है अत्याचार होता है कम संख्या के बनियाद पर तो उसको अमान्य किया जात है तो उस नस्ल की बड़ी संख्या जो मूल देश में रहती है हमेशा अपनी छोटी-सी सांस्कृतिक भाषाई और धार्मिक टुकड़ों के लिए किसी न किसी प्रकार अपनी महानुभूति को व्यक्त करती है, कभी रूबानो और कभी व्य वहरिक रूप से। इसलिए इस बात में कोई संदेह नहीं है कि ऐतिहासिक परिभाषा के आधार पर कि तमिल भारतीय नस्ल के है उनकी भाषा भारतीय है, उनका धर्म भारतीय हैं, उनकी संस्कृति और सम्पदा और परम्परा भारतीय है, इसलिए इतिहास के इस परिभाषा पर वे हमारे अंग हैं, यह निर्विवाद बात है। इस पर कोई प्रान चिह्न नहीं उठाया जा सकता है। ऐसी हालत में जब कोई जानबूझ कर अपने ऊपर अत्याचार करता है। किन्हीं कारणों से जिनमें एक परम्परा है और जैव यूरोप के सम्म्य कहे जाने वाले देशों के अन्दर चलता है कि जहां पर कोई बहुपंथा में होत है वहां अलासंख्यों पर अत्याचार करने की मनोवृत्ति है वही मनोवृत्ति सिहलियों की तमिलों के साथ है . . . . . (व्यवधान) मैं अर्ज कर रहा था कि सिहलियों ने तमिलों को अपने ही देश में निहाल तो तमिलनाडु के अन्दर 176 स्क्वायरी केम्पों में 25 हजार से भी अधिक तादाद में रहे। दक्षिण हिन्दुस्तान के मुखतलिफ शहरों के अन्दर एक लाख से भी ज्यादा तादाद में यह लोग रह रहे। यूरोप के अन्दर जिसमें तीन हजार के अन्दाज में ब्रिटेन में रहे, 20 हजार के अन्दाज में वेस्ट जर्मनी और फ्रांस में रहे और 20 हजार के अन्दाज में केनाडा और यूरोप के दूसरे मुल्कों में ये तमिल लोग अपना घर छोड़कर गये। मैं यह अर्ज करना चाहता हूं कि गांवों के अन्दर



बाढ़ भी आती है तो आदमी अपने घर की ओर जाता है। जानवर और पशु भी अपने खूंट की तरफ जाते हैं। लेकिन तमिल लोग जाफना से निकलकर दुनिया के दूसरे मुल्कों में नहीं जा सकते थे क्योंकि 35 हजार के करीब भारतीय समाचारों के आधार पर, उनके महान ध्वस्त कर दिये गये और 25 प्रतिशत से ज्यादा उनके जवाहरात और कीमती सामान लूट लिया गया, यह परिस्थिति थी जिसके अंदर वे मजबूर हो गये अपने घरों को छोड़ने के लिए। अपनी आत्म रक्षा के लिए उन्हें अपने घर छोड़ने पड़े। यह कहा जाता है कि वहां पर 24 प्रतिशत तमिल हैं और 75 प्रतिशत सिन्ही हैं। आप जानते हैं कि इजराइल जो मुट्ठी भर आबादी का मुल्क है, चारों तरफ अरबों से घिरा हुआ है। लेकिन अफ्रीका की पैट्रोलियम उनकी मिली हुई है और वेस्ट टेक्न लोरी से उसको सशस्त्र कर दिया गया है और इसलिए मुट्ठी भर इजरायलियों को करोड़ों अरब कुछ नहीं कर पा रहे हैं। यह एक ऐतिहासिक तर्क है, एक सच्चाई है, अरब उसका कुछ बिगाड़ नहीं सकते हैं। इसी तरह से 24 परसेंट लोगों को अगर मजबूर और शक्तिशाली बनाया जाना तो वे भी अपनी इज्जत और अपनी जिन्दगी को अच्छी प्रकार से गुजारने की स्थिति में हो सकते थे। लेकिन—

बागवाने आग दी जब आशयानों ने,

जिन पर तकिश था वही पत्ते हवा देने लगे।

जब उनकी जुर्म की चक्की चली तो हिन्दुस्तानी फौज वहां गई उनको बचाने के लिए। वहां के बच्चों में खुशियों और उल्लाम की लहर दौड़ गई। सैकड़ों हजारों माल की हमारी जो संस्कृति है, उन्होंने समझा कि जिनकी वे संतान हैं, वे उनकी रक्षा के लिए भारतीय सेना वहां गई है। लेकिन अफसोस है कि आज भी सिन्ही उन पर हमला कर रहे हैं और भारतीय सेना भी वहां पर है। तब उन्हें अहसास हुआ कि यू आर बूट। तुम भी बूट हो। भारतीय सेना की प्रतिष्ठा का प्रश्न है। आप जानते हैं कि भारतीय सेना की प्रतिष्ठा की वजह सारी दुनिया में गुंजनी है।

हम प्रतिष्ठा से खेल नहीं सकते। इसलिए जैसा कि जसवंत सिंह जी ने कहा इसके लिये कोई ऐसा समाधान निकालना पड़ेगा जिससे राष्ट्रीय गौरव भी बचा रहे और हमारी प्रतिष्ठा भी बची रहे और तमिल भी वहां सुरक्षित रहे सकें। अब यह जो अकाई है, आप इसके अंदर कोई भी एक धारा बता दें जिसके अन्तर्गत तमिलों की परमानेंट सुरक्षा का इंतजाम किया गया हो। एक भी ऐसी धारा नहीं है। पार्लियामेंट में मामूली से दो गुटों के बजूद से वह सारा हवा में उड़ जायेगा। इसलिये इसके लिये कोई परमानेंट सौल्यूशन निकालना होगा ताकि तमिलों की समस्या हल हो सके। एक नेशनल फ्रेमवर्क के अंदर इसका हल निकालना होगा। जो उनकी समस्याएं हैं उनके हल के लिये उन्हें शासन करने, शिक्षा प्राप्त करने, फाइनेंस संबंधी आदती उनको मिलनी चाहिये और इन चीजों के अंदर वहां की गवर्नमेंट का कम से कम इंटर-फेयर होना चाहिए। इस तरह की तमाम बातें होनी चाहिए। यह भी देखा गया है कि कभी-कभी राष्ट्रीय प्रतिष्ठा एक व्यक्ति की प्रतिष्ठा का प्रश्न बन जाता है। लेकिन हमें इसमें कोई राष्ट्रीय प्रतिष्ठा का सवाल न बनाकर इसको हल करने की कोशिश करनी चाहिये और इसके लिये मैं सरकार से आग्रह करूंगा कि कुछ एम०पीज० की एक उच्च-स्तरीय और शक्तिशाली समिति बने और वह इसकी समीक्षा करके कोई रास्ता निकले। उस वार्ता के अंदर तमिलों का रिप्रेजेंटेटिव भी होना चाहिये। दुनिया में हिन्दुस्तान इस बात की वकालत करता है और जब फिलिस्तीनियों का मसला आता है तो वह मांग करता है कि पी०एल०ओ० को उसके अंदर शामिल किया जाये तो इसके लिये क्यों नहीं होना चाहिए। किसी भी अंतर्राष्ट्रीय समस्या के समाधान के दो आधार कैसे हो सकते हैं, दो दृष्टिकोण कैसे हो सकते हैं? इसलिये तमिलों को भी इसमें शामिल करना होगा, उनकी बातों को सुनना होगा। उसमें श्रीलंका की सरकार भी हो

[श्री शमीम हाशमी]

और यह समिति उसमें जाकर इसको हल करने की कोशिश करे और इस प्रकार इस समस्या का समाधान निकाला जाय ताकि हमारी सेना वहां से इज्जत और प्रतिष्ठा और राष्ट्रीय गौरव को बढ़ाते हुए भारत में वापस आ सके। सेना का वहां से अब जल्दी आना चाहिये। क्योंकि जब किसी देश की सेना किसी दूसरे देश में फंसी जाती है और वह वही रहती है तो इससे उस देश की जनता भड़क उठती है और उस शक्तिशाली सेना को भी कठिनाइयों का सामना करना पड़ता है। वहां की अपोजीशन पार्टियां जो हैं वे राजनैतिक स्तर पर सबसे बड़ा मुद्दा भारत की सेना की वहां पर मौजूदगी को बनाये हुए हैं। इन तमाम बातों को देखते हुए राष्ट्रीय हित में बहुत सोच-समझ कर और इसको किसी प्रतिष्ठा का विषय न बनाकर कोई इस तरह का हल निकाला जाना चाहिए। जिससे हमारी भी इज्जत बनी रहे, श्रीलंका में शांति स्थापित हो और वहां पर जो तमिल लोग हैं उनकी सुरक्षा के पूरे उपाय हों।

इतनी बातों के साथ उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, मैं अपनी बात समाप्त करता हूँ।

SHRI ANAND SHARMA (Himachal Pradesh): Mr. Vice-Chairman, the matter which this House is discussing today is of great importance and a matter of concern for this entire country and the people of the entire region. There cannot be any doubt about that. There is also no dispute that because of what has been happening for the last few years in Sri Lanka, the manner in which the people of Tamil origin were brutalised, the manner in which they were subjected to racial discrimination, the manner in which they were victims of a genocide, they needed help. There is no dispute that people in this country were anguished and angered. It is not only a question of historical links or the cultural links which this country, the Government of India, and the people of India have, ir-

respective of the region they belong to and irrespective of the language which they speak, and it would be very unfair if we try to describe these links as links between the people of Tamil origin in India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The entire Indian people, our Government and our people, stood as one in condemning the atrocities on the Tamils in Sri Lanka. When they needed help, the Government of India came forward, extended help and took up the issue repeatedly with the Government of Sri Lanka to ensure a peaceful, negotiated, settlement of the conflict.

Now, when we talk here in terms of a settlement of the dispute, we have to be very clear about the approach and the principles involved. The Government of India have always said that the rights of the Tamil minority have to be accepted and respected, that the Tamil culture has to be preserved and promoted, that the atrocities on the Tamil must end and there should be a negotiated settlement, a settlement within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. We never believe in, we never encourage, the division of a sovereign nation, the division of a friendly non-aligned country.

Sir, prior to the Accord, tension was increasing in the entire region. Forces hostile to the democratic forces in this region, forces which I can also term as alien forces with respect to India, were trying desperately to gain a foothold in this region, particularly, in Sri Lanka to set up military bases using the Tamil-Sinhala conflict as an excuse. It was in this background that the Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, signed this historic accord with the President of Sri Lanka, Shri Jayewardene.

SHRI RAM AWADHESH SINGH: Historic, black, accord.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: I am using the word 'historic' because it was for the first time that heads of two Governments had shown to the world that two sovereign nations can come together to solve disputes, that one country can help another in resolving conflicts for its stability and progress. This accord was acclaimed not only by the people like us from the treasury benches. This accord also received

the support of the people all over the world. This accord was also hailed by many world leaders, be it the United States of America or the Soviet Union.

**SHRI RAM ADADHESH SINGH:**  
First by America. z

Sir, I will term it as act of great statesmanship by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka. It was an act of great statesmanship and courage displayed by them. Sir today, there are some friends who have some reservations...

(व्यवधान) अरे कभी चुप रहने की भी आदत सीखिए । (व्यवधान)

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : इतनी गलत बात बोल रहे हो (व्यवधान) ।

उपसमाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेश देसाई) :  
राम अवधेश जी आप हाजिर नहीं रहते तो हाऊस शान्ति से चलता है ।

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : मैं जाऊँ ?  
बोलिये तो मैं चला जाऊँ ? ।

एक माननीय सदस्य : आप जा सकते हैं ।

**SHRI ANAND SHARMA :** Sir, as I was saying, it was an act of great statesmanship. Today, there are friends who have reservations. They may have genuine reservations. There are some others who are criticising the very basis of the accord. Those who opposed the accord right from the beginning have ignored the preceding and subsequent developments. There are also friends who, influenced purely by political motivations, go in for criticism of the accord, of the Government, of the Prime Minister and of the IPKF. I strongly condemn this sort of motivated criticism. It is a deliberate attempt to denigrate this great effort and also to malign the Indian Army. I find it very surprising, Sir, when people, in one breath, talk in terms of the honour of the Indian Army—nobody is more concerned with the honour of the Indian Army than the Prime Minister and the Government of India; the honour of the Indian Army

is not your sole property; the entire nation is concerned; the Indian Army has not behaved or acted in a manner which has brought bad name to the country—in the same breath, there are friends who also accuse falsely the Indian Army of committing atrocities. They have used not only uncharitable or abusive language but have, in fact, become allies of those forces which are out to malign this country, this Government and its armed forces.

Sir, a reference has been made about Tamil culture and Tamil language. I know the reasons for which some friends look up towards the press gallery and talk more about Tamil language. I do not blame them because they stand for an ideology which is nothing but parochialism. Whenever elections are approaching they would like to raise the issue of language because that is their only ideology, that is the only political instrument which some friends have time and again deliberately raked up, let me be very clear. As far as this accord is concerned or the Prime Minister is concerned, I would not like to go back towards the internal thing but this accord provides a guarantee for the preservation of Tamil culture, Tamil language and I must congratulate the Prime Minister for having this incorporated. Today when we talk in terms of achievements, can you forget that Tamil language is one of the official languages of Sri Lanka today, it has been accepted as such? (*Interruptions*). There has been an amendment in their Constitution subsequent to the accord and that amendment to the Constitution is not a small event. I know, friends on the other side can always pack up something even after this amendment to point out some flaws. I am not here to suggest that there are no pitfalls. I am not here to suggest that there are no obstacles ahead, but we must be objective in our criticism. Even if we have to oppose we have to be objective. I was happy to hear from one of the friends at least on one aspect of this accord and subsequent developments... (*Interruptions*). Mr. Subramanian Swamy was more objective.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY :** You must be happy.

**SHRI ANAND SHARMA :** When we talk of this accord, the achievements and the future hurdles, we must not forget that it was not our own decision to go to Sri Lanka. Those who say or ask this question as to why we have gone there, they are conveniently forgetting the developments in Sri Lanka, the fact that it was both the Government of Sri Lanka and the people of Jaffna who had repeatedly urged the Government of India. It was only when both the Government and the Tamils there had urged the Government of India, the Prime Minister of India responded.

**AN HON. MEMBER :** This House also.

**SHRI ANAND SHARMA :** That is correct. Sir, it was on that invitation, on that appeal that the IPKF went there. And IPKF went there for what? It went there to stop the genocide. It went there in the wake of an assault which had led to widespread protest even in this country. Sir, IPKF, I may say, has succeeded in stopping that genocide. This was one genocide, the genocide of the Sinhalese versus the Tamils and there was another aspect. There was violence, Tamil versus Tamils violence, very unfortunate. We expected that all those who had welcomed the accord, giving commitment of this Government and this country, all those Tamil groups would abide by the accord, they would support the accord as they had promised to do and they would surrender the weapons. It is here where the dispute started because the LTTE went back over the conditions of the accord, as they had promised to do and they would surrender the weapons. It is here where the dispute started because the LTTE went back over the conditions of the accord, the assurances and the promises. It was the LTTE which could be held responsible.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY :** They were not at all party to the Accord. Now you are doing the dirty job of Mr. Jayewardene there.

**SHRI ANAND SHARMA :** I understand the emotions of my friend, Mr. Gopalsamy. LTTE had given assurances. Even

after the Indian Army had gone to Sri Lanka, the LTTE leadership had met the leaders of the IPKF and settled the time frame for surrendering the weapons. Sir, I appeal to Mr. Gopalsamy not to be subjective while discussing the LTTE part of the Sri Lankan problem, because LTTE not only refused to surrender the weapons but it also started attacking the IPKF. It was not the IPKF who started it first.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY :** They did it in self-defence. What is wrong in it?

**SHRI ANAND SHARMA :** No, no. IPKF had a duty under the Accord. It was the duty of the IPKF to disarm all the militant groups. To accomplish that role if the IPKF tries to disarm the LTTE or any other Tamil militant group, it is only fulfilling its duty. But that does not justify violent attacks on the IPKF. Sir, it is not a question of IPKF versus the LTTE.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY :** Will you yield for a moment? Mr. Sharma requested the Members not to be too subjective even if it is the case of LTTE. I would like to clarify one point. Seventeen LTTE men were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy against the spirit of the Accord. When the Indian Government and the IPKF failed to protect them or rescue them they had to end their lives, which triggered off the whole conflagration. Then you started attacking the LTTE. I must say they had to retaliate naturally.

**THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGDEESH DESAI) :** Mr. Sharma, now please don't yield. Otherwise there will be no end to it.

**SHRI ANAND SHARMA :** I will not, Sir. The truth remains that IPKF was only trying to discharge its responsibility which was given to it under the Accord. Sir, when we talk of protecting the Tamils, can we ignore the fact that because of the situation resulting from the efforts of the IPKF and the post-Accord developments, after a long gap people in Jaffna peninsula are once again in a position to lead a normal life? The refugees have

been returning from India only because there has been an improvement. Children are going to schools. Markets are open. It is quite surprising that some friends who criticise every thing ignore even these developments.

Sir, I still say that the IPKF has protected the Tamils in Sri Lanka. It cannot be accused of committing any violence against the Tamils. The skirmishes between the LTTE and the IPKF cannot be termed as a war between the Tamils and the Indian Army. LTTE is not and cannot be the sole discretion of the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY : Then what about the decimation of innocent Tamils? The same genocide you are doing now.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA : There have been other Tamil groups who have been fighting for the cause of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Those groups had also been making sacrifices. They were a part of the struggles. But it was the LTTE....

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY : Some quisling groups you have found.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI) : You spoke for thirty-four minutes, Mr. Gopalsamy.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA : Sir, it was the LTTE which wanted everything for itself, which wanted the Tamils of Sri Lanka to be its private property. They tried and started eliminating all the other Tamil groups, whether it was the EPRLF or TELO or the other groups... (*Interruptions*)... There was shedding of the blood of these Tamils freedom fighters by the LTTE. They killed them by hundreds; they killed their leaders. Why? Because of the personal ambition of Mr. Prabhakaran and the lust for power—to control everything resulting from the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord by one group. That is the root-cause of the strife there, the continuing bloodshed in Sri Lanka. The LTTE cannot escape responsibility when we talk in terms of history.

Many friends have referred to history—that when history will be written, this will

be criticized or condemned and this will be an unfortunate chapter. But history will also record the support of the Indian Government to the Tamil cause, history will also record the courageous act of statementship of the Prime Minister of India, and history will also record how the LTTE tried, through a Fascist approach, to weaken the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka by decimating, by killing, all the others who also stood for the same language, for the same culture and for the same people.

Sir, Mr. Jaswant Singh said...

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY : Rajiv Gandhi has become a neo-Fascist.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA : Well, I don't have to give a reply to him, in any case.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI) : Don't reply to any comments. The Minister is there and he will reply.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA : There is one thing which he said and I object to it. That is why I am referring to it. He said that the Indian army has been completely cornered there and which, according to him, is very humiliating. The Indian army is not fighting a war there. Why are they making it look like that? Why are you falling in the trap of those forces which are out to malign you? The Indian army has acted with the utmost restraint. The Generals who have been there have repeatedly said that they have been fighting with one arm right behind their back. They have not used their full powers. Mr. Jaswant Singh had served the Indian army and he knows the might of the Indian army. The very fact that this army is not eliminating those who are still refusing to fall in line, proves the point that the army there has a specific role and the Indian army has not indulged in any uncalled-for violence or assault even against such elements.

Sir, I have listed the various achievements which have been there. Of course, have are anxious that the Accord is finally and fully implemented and our soldiers come back. But we must not doubt the

[Shri Anand Sharma]

sincerety of Mr. Jayewardene also. Immediately after the signing of the Accord, there was an attempt on the life of our Prime Minister—which was referred to by Mr. Pandey—and later there has been a serious attempt on the life of President Jayewardene. So many leaders of his party and Ministers have been killed but he has not gone back on the Accord.

Sir, last year, in this month, we were discussing the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord when we were all concerned about the attitude of the Government—besides President Jayewardene, what about the Prime Minister, what about the other Ministers? But President Jayewardene has ultimately prevailed. There is greater acceptance even within his own party and Government, and there are honest efforts towards implementing the same. Elections to seven of the Provincial Councils have already been over. Of course the most crucial one there is the Northern Council, and for that, once the violence stops, once the LTTE agrees and surrenders the arms, I am sure elections will take place there also.

But one greatest achievement we must not forget. When we talk of the presence of the alien forces, we know what the situation is in the Indian Ocean today, how many new nuclear bases have come up during the last to decades. The Gulf crisis provided a convenient excuse to various forces to set their naval fleets in the Indian Ocean.

Sir, but for the Indian army, you imagine the scenario when we know that the Israelis were there, MI-5 was there, there were so many others there. Some Pakistani pilots were reaching there. There were forces which were trying their best, trying desperately to establish some base there, to get a foothold there. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord has prevented that. One shudders to think what could have been the consequence of that situation, had that accord not been signed, what threat it would have posed for the unity and security of India.

Therefore, I say, we must be objected in our approach, we must be patient, and we must give all support to the Government, to the Prime Minister so that this accord is successful, is implemented to the satisfaction of all the people of Sri Lanka, both the Tamils and the Singhlese, and we hail the commendable role of the Indian army in Sri Lanka.

Thank you, Sir.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Mr. Matto. Five minutes.

SHRI GHULAM RASOOL MATTO (Jammu and Kashmir): Mr. Vice-Chairman, while speaking on the subject, I would like to say that I support the Government policy not because I am an ally of the Congress but because I honestly feel that the situation is such that one has to support the Government in the national interest.

I recollect, last year when this accord was signed, the Prime Minister called a meeting of the Opposition parties, which I had the occasion to attend. I can say now that all the parties hailed this accord at that particular point of time. I do not want to say whether some of them resiled from that stand later on. The reasons given by the Prime Minister have been clearly adumbrated by my friend, Mr. Jaswant Singh. The three reasons that were given by the Prime Minister were:

Number one, we want this accord to save the Tamils from the genocide that the Sinhalese are perpetrating on them.

Number 2, we want that within the sovereignty and integrity of Ceylon, Sinhalese and Tamils should live together.

Number three and the most important was the geo-political atmosphere prevailing in that country at that time.

Not as an ally of the Congress, but I honestly feel that the situation still remains the same. The three fundamental reasons given then are there, and the policy followed by our Government at

the present moment is the appropriate policy. There is no other way than following this policy. I do not understand why there should be any opposition done to such a policy.

Of course, we tend to see it from this angle, Mr. Vice-Chairman, that when we have entered into an Accord, whether after a particular point of time, we have achieved success or not in that particular Accord. In my humble view that is not the barometer by which that Accord is to be viewed. The Accord is to be viewed on the basis whether the basic points that weighed with us in entering into that agreement at that particular moment still hold good or not. There have been difficulties in the meantime. Certain difficulties do come. Certain difficulties might further come in future. But my honest opinion is that the policy is correct, and it has to be followed with the patience we have been following it. I will not impute motives. I will not charge the LTTE or others for having failed this Accord or for trying to fail it. This is not the time for that. My personal opinion is—I have said so on many occasions in this House and I honestly feel that this has been the policy of the Government of India also—that the Tamils of Sri Lanka are the blood of our blood and flesh of our flesh. If there has been a deviation on somebody's part, that they have gone astray and they have not done such things, that we have not been able to fulfil the Accord, then what is the way out? The way out for us is to give a message to them, to the Tamils, who tend to be against us at this particular point of time for whatever reasons, that we are with them, we are fighting their battle, don't misunderstand us. In this situation I just put it to the hon. Minister, whether it is possible for us at this particular point of time, even now, to have a direct dialogue with Mr. Prabhakaran, because Mr. Prabhakaran has become the symbol of the LTTE at the present moment. Instead of dealing through the RAW or with those people, why should not we directly talk? Let an invitation go to him that he is not in danger of anything. We mean no harm

to him, much less to the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. They are our own brothers. We are fighting their cause. But now that Mr. Prabhakaran has become a symbol of the LTTE, let us convince him to come over here for a dialogue and talk with us. For the sake of argument, if he is not prepared to come to us, let us ask him to meet even in a third country he thinks fit and we will go and talk to him there. But we must have a dialogue with him. It is not merely for one purpose. The main purpose, of course, is that we want to dispel any misgivings in his mind. Unfortunately, those misgivings have been created. Those misgivings are there in the minds of the Tamil people there and those misgivings have got to be erased and avoided. So, I suggest, to find out if there is a possibility of a dialogue with Mr. Prabhakaran directly at the highest level so that we bring home the point in the minds of the Tamils in Sri Lanka that we are their friends and are with them.

In the meantime I hear with dismay certain newspaper reports that the LTTE is trying to have some sort of terrorism in India and all that. Although the Government of India has replied to that effectively, yet I do not think it is in the interest of the Tamils in Sri Lanka also to give such threats to the people of India. We can fight terrorism and we have fought terrorism and have been fighting terrorism. Terrorism will neither help them, nor us. But we want a solution. We want the LTTE should cooperate with us. We want there should be an understanding between us and the LTTE. We want also the hon. Minister to convey to the Sri Lankan Government that while on the one hand we do fight those who want that this Accord should fail, we should also give them a message that once this internal problem is solved, it has to be settled within the framework of the Accord. I say this because who is going to gain after the internecine fight between us and the Tamil people in Sri Lanka? It is only the Sinhalese Government that will be benefited by this. We have to convey this message to them that Tamils are our brothers, but we

[Shri Ghulam Rasool Matto]

have to settle this issue within the framework of this Accord. Of course, here I want to say one thing and that is the last point. I say I am opposed to any sort of Eelam. I want that the solution of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka should be within the framework of the Accord because Sri Lanka is a very small island and two separate Governments there will definitely not be in the interest of India, because if one small country which is less than a district of India adopts one foreign policy, the other is bound to follow another policy. It will be a permanent difficulty for us. We want to avoid this. I would request my DMK friends and others that they should advise Tamil friends that the solution of their problem does not lie in ELAM or a separate State for Tamils but within the framework of Sri Lankan Constitution, a fool-proof guarantee to settle the ethnic conflict. Thank you.

**SARDAR JAGJIT SINGH AURORA** (Punjab): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, let us accept that apart from human reasons, our involvement in Sri Lanka has been for our geo-political interests and these political interests have to be safeguarded. On the other hand, after 13 months of fighting, today we have got to try and assess the situation, how far we have succeeded in both these interests for which we decided to send the Indian Peace Keeping Force. If we have failed or not succeeded to the extent we should have, what are the reasons for it? Even at the time of signing the Accord, the motive and the concept was good but we had not taken sufficient care of the nitty-gritty to find out where it could go wrong. I think, at that time, we under-estimated the mistrust that the Tamils generally of Sri Lanka and the LTTE which was the dominant group had about the Sri Lankan Government, including their President, Shri Jayewardene. There is no doubt, in my mind, that what has transpired afterwards is total mistrust of the LTTE in the good intention or the honourable intentions of the Sri Lankan Government. That is the basic reason. Now, having failed in that for not having correctly appreciat-

ed the situation, we must now realise what has transpired so far. There is no doubt that not being mentally ready and not having our troops geared up for fighting a guerilla war, when it was forced on us, we were caught flat-footed. It took us some time and we had to react to the situation and fly in a number of troops, first to control the situation before we could get an upper hand. In the last few months we can say that we have achieved an upper hand, but can we say with any degree of certainty that we can see the end of the present operations? Now, while we are talking about it, it is necessary that we should realise what guerilla warfare is. There is no doubt that the regular forces are not normally trained or committed for guerilla types of operation. But the circumstances do demand them and if they demand them, then, the regular forces have to change their tactics. They should relearn the tactics. They have to modify their organisations to be able to carry out this task.

The first thing that I would like to mention is that having been involved in these operations a long period if you want to use these forces again for a regular type of operation, you will need considerable time to give them a chance, to retrain them for a regular type of operation. That is one aspect that you have to bear in mind that the troops now deployed in Sri Lanka, if you need them in a hurry and if you try to put them straightway in battle as you did for the guerilla warfare, they will not be able to give a good account of themselves in the initial stages.

One thing which is most important for guerilla warfare is intelligence. It is even more important than it is for regular type of warfare because you are fighting an enemy whom you do not see most of the time and all your meetings are fleeting. They are seen only for a few moments. As a result, it is really a soul killing job for regular troops to be involved in this. That is one aspect. The other aspect is, while the IPKF is fighting in Sri Lanka, we have to realise for what or for whom are we fighting. Are we fighting for Mother India or are we fighting for the convenience of Jayewardene or the present Sri Lankan



Government. If we are fighting for Mother India, who is going to be our friend in Sri Lanka where we have definite geo-political interest? Is it going to be Tamils of Sri Lanka or is it going to be the Sinhalese of Sri Lanka because these people, who have been fighting there have received no assistance, no thanks even from the Sri Lankan Government or the Sinhalese people. They are now fighting the same people whom they were sent, to help to enable them to get their rightful political rights from the Sri Lankan Government. So, there is a confusion in the minds of our troops and it would be wrong to totally ignore this aspect. We have to take note of this aspect that in any prolonged fighting that goes on outside India. It is for the first time after independence that we have sent troops outside India and there, they are fighting a guerilla warfare which now does not seem likely to end in the near future and the toll we are giving both in the form of casualties as well as I should say, psychologically. What are we fighting for? It is extremely important for us to think about it realistically.

Another thing I would like to mention here is that this idea that there has to be an unconditional surrender by the LTTE and they have to give up their arms before we talk to them at all. I feel for this concept of unconditional surrender, the world had to pay a very heavy price during the Second World War. Therefore, are we right in wanting and insisting on that there must be an unconditional surrender and all the arms must be given. If the arms are given, are we in a position to make certain that when we come out and we must come out sooner or later, sooner the better, the Sri Lankan Tamils will be able to look after themselves against a hostile population and an unsympathetic Government? If this is not going to happen eventually, are we going to have a real, friendly Sri Lanka, next door to us. After we have done the dirty work, we may find that they have decided to go and join somebody else and we would have ended up achieving nothing? Therefore, I feel now that we

have to think and we have to adopt a flexible attitude. The Lankan Tamilians are our real friends. We still have to find a political solution to the problem and for that I feel that it would be only right for us to be able to persuade, and, to an extent, if necessary, force the Sri Lankan Government to adopt a more sympathetic attitude and give certain assurances. Those assurances should be such that they will give confidence to the Lankan Tamilians that they can rely upon them. The present attitude of the Sri Lankan Government is that they are not going to have the northern and eastern territories as one whole unit where the Sri Lankan Tamilians will have special rights. If they are not given that confidence, you will find the Tamilians will not give up this fight. Admittedly, you may be able, in due course, to overcome the resistance with the forces that we have. But, to what end? I think the eventual solution may be worse than where we are now. So, there is a need for the Government to think about this problem and I feel personally that we have to adopt a more flexible attitude towards this problem and make the Sri Lankan Government not only give verbal promises but in actual fact make them commit that this territory will not be divided.

Secondly, there should be para-military forces with sufficient number of armed Tamilians to be able to look after this territory in case the local population turns hostile and even part of the Sri Lankan forces may turn hostile. Without these assurances, I feel, this problem will carry on and eventually, we will be doing ourselves and our army a great deal of harm.

THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I am grateful to the hon. Members who have participated in this debate and I am gratified to note that all relevant aspects of the question have come into the discussion. Arguments and counter-arguments also have come and in a way, except for a few clarifications, my task has been rendered considerably easier.

[Shri P. V. Narsimha Rao]

Sir, I am not new to this issue. From 1981 onwards we have been seized of this matter. In 1983 we had occasion to go into this question in great detail in this very House. And I remember Mr. Gopalsamy, full of emotion, emotion greater than the one which we saw in him today, making speeches, impassioned speeches, asking the Government of India to do something, to send its troops. Sir, I visited Colombo when the whole town was burning. Smoke was curling up towards the sky. In dozens of places we were not able to negotiate the main roads. We had to take to lanes and by-lanes in order to reach our destination within the town. This was the condition, the kind of killing that was taking place. Actually people were being stopped on the road and asked, "Are you a Tamil?" It was that kind of a thing. The sheer indistinguishability of a Tamil and a Sinhala came so graphically to view that those who wanted to attack the Tamils had to ask the person who was going to be attacked whether he was a Tamil. This was the situation. When I compare that situation to today, I have to honestly admit—apart from party positions, apart from our predilections—that there is no comparison between that and today's position. I must say that we have come a long way, Sri Lanka has come a long way, our Tamil brothers have come a long way, and because of this accord, something which was not conceivable in 1986, until 1986, maybe, until the accord it self was signed, maybe, a few days before the accord it was not conceivable but it became possible only on the signing of the accord. This accord also has a history behind it. We had been trying to convince President Jayawardene, in spite of the fact that Mr. Gopalsamy was telling us that this was not going to happen—he was giving a final total negative prognosis that we would ever be able to convince President Jayawardene; naturally his mistrust of President Jayawardene was total—today the same President Jayawardene has entered into an accord which has been considered to be reasonable from all points of view. Its precursors we also remember. Annexure C of 84, and before that how we

were trying to keep Sri Lanka as one single nation, one single country, without allowing it to be partitioned. This was the main basis on which all the negotiations were carried out. And finally this Accord has achieved an acceptability which none of its predecessors did. I am not saying that everyone in Sri Lanka accepted the accord. The JVP did not and the said so the very beginning. I have no quarrel with them. Those who did not accept the accord ab initio, I have no quarrel with them because I have nothing to discuss with them; we have no meeting ground. That was not the case with the LTTE. And I am very clear in my mind as events developed, I was not in this Ministry but I was a close witness to what was happening and I can say in all conscience that the LTTE did accept the accord. How did the events develop? This is nothing new that I am revealing to the House today. I would like to place a few facts which have been brought out from time to time:

"Prabhakaran and his aides were consulted in Jaffna by officials of the Indian High Commission in Colombo even during the negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government. Prabhakaran raised one or two specific points, especially that he wanted the Sri Lankan army to withdraw to positions it held on May 25, 1987, and these were incorporated into the final agreement. He expressed a desire to come to Delhi. He was brought to Delhi in an Indian Air Force plane. Although he had expressed some reservations about the agreement initially on seeing the draft, after our explanations he accepted the agreement."

If we had simply said he just accepted it, maybe, there could be a doubt whether he accepted it or not. He comes here, he raises doubts, those doubts are met, and discussions take place with the Prime Minister of India. Now how can anyone say that they did not accept the accord? In fact, that is the point, that is the mystery, which Mr. Gopalsamy and, maybe, those of his thinking have to unravel. In fact, in this meeting with the Prime Minister on 28.7.87, he raised some specific problems, as I said, of a personal and organizational nature which

would flow from the accord, from the implementation of the agreement, and this laying down of arms. These were certain problems which he raised. I do not want to go into the details; it is not proper. But I would only say that those doubts and those points were fully met and not only met, but they were implemented also, to start with.

**SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY:** You have given Rs. 50 lakhs also;

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY:** Why was he kept incommunicado?

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** It does not matter. Why was he not allowed to meet Mr. Gopalsamy? If that is the question, I have no answer.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY:** Not Gopalsamy, but anybody else for that matter.

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** Maybe anybody; it does not matter. A person has been brought here for a particular purpose. The two leaders meet and they convince each other. He accepts and in the wake of the acceptance, certain things are done by the Government of India actually and also certain things were done by the other side. This was also agreed to.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : अकाई के समय प्रभावकरण को क्यों नहीं बुलाया गया?

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** If any further proof is required that Mr. Pirabhakaran has accepted the terms of the agreement, this was clear from the fact that the LTTE did start surrendering arms on August 6, 1987, as provided under the agreement. It is a different matter that the LTTE went back on it. Now, there are many reasons and I would not like to go into the reasons why the LTTE went back. I can understand them. It may be a psychological reason for one...

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : एक मिनट आप सुनो

श्री पी० वी० नरसिंह राव नाद में आप कहिये, मैं जवाब दूंगा आपको

It may be that they found it difficult to switch over to a different system, a system of democracy in which they found themselves not very much aware of the ins and outs; maybe they found themselves out of depth, and that can be one reason. Whatever be the reason, the fact is that the LTTE went back, has gone back, on the accord, having accepted it. It is inconceivable, and no one can say, that the Prime Minister of India would have flown to Colombo all the way and would have signed the accord if the accord had not been accepted by all the groups of the Tamil people there. This is just not possible, not conceivable.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY:** Mr. Minister will you yield just for a minute?

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** Yes.

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY:** On August 4, when he made a speech in Siddhulmalai before a mammoth gathering, he categorically stated that the accord had been thrust on them by a superpower against whom they could not take up arms. He said that they had been compelled, because it was very clear.

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** This is something which I do not accept. I know it for a fact that this was accepted. Otherwise, there would have been no accord. Today, some honourable Members asked me what the latest position is. I will come to the other matters a little while later. Now, what is the latest position? Some well-meaning Members—I respect them; I respect their views—said: "Why don't you talk to them?" Now, I would like to know how I could talk to Mr. Pirabhakaran if he is not accepting the accord. What locus standi have I got to talk to him and what locus standi has he got to talk to me? We have come together on the basis of an accord and that accord is inviolate as far as I am concerned. And, if I have to talk to him, I can talk to him only within the four corners of the accord. Let him raise objections. He has raised objections in the past and we have met those objections. We are also not fully satisfied with the

[Shri P. V. Narsimha Rao]

devolution package that has been announced already. We are requesting President Jayewardene, we are urging upon him, to improve the package. He has agreed to do so after the Councils come into being. In fact, I am glad to say that this pressure to improve the package of powers given to the Councils is already coming from the Sinhalese side, where the Councils have come into being. So there is absolutely no difficulty, there should be no difficulty, on an agreed basis, to go on improving the content. We are not taking anything for granted. We have told him, persuaded him, and he has agreed. And this also, I think, is well known. But what do I talk about? Is the accord, from my point of view, negotiable? If I talk to him without referring to the accord, and if he wants me to change the accord, is it possible for me? This is the logic of saying that unless he agrees to the accord, there can be no talks. There have been talks in regard to certain matters at some level. And these talks were also on the basis of the acceptance of the accord, and not otherwise. Those talks failed for various reasons. But one reason which has been quoted by Mr. Gopalsamy which I would like to correct for the record, is the presence of the Sri Lankan Government representatives on the committees of rehabilitation. Sir, in the first instance, the rehabilitation is not for party cadres or for a list given by so and so. It is for all those who suffered as a result of these happenings in the past. And naturally, how could I think of any committee doing any work without the full participation of the Government of Sri Lanka. And there need be no objection from any quarter, because this is an open committee, this is an open procedure. There is nothing under-hand about it. I do not see what objection there could be. And if on this we are faulted, I do not see how that faulting is justified.

Sir, I have been asked about the time-frame before which the Indian army, the IPKF, would be called back to India. Now, this is the basic question which

arises from the basic fact that the IPKF has gone there for a mission. That mission is a very well defined mission. They know what to do. They did not go there to wage a war. A kind of fight was imposed on them. They went there for a political solution. And if in pursuance of the political solution the IPKF has gone there, the political solution has to be completed first. We cannot think of calling them back before the political solution is complete. We expect that conditions will be made congenial. To-day there is a little change from what it was two or three months back. Maybe, after some time it will be more congenial. I have no reason to doubt that the Tamil population of Sri Lanka wanted to take part in the elections as much as their counterparts, from the other side, did. Didn't 62 per cent voting take place? It was in spite of threats from the other side. The voting was very scanty in one small area where perhaps the threats were so complete and so bewildering. But in all the other areas, it was 60 to 62 per cent. I have no doubt that if they are allowed to vote according to their own free will, the Tamil areas will vote 80 to 85 per cent. The question is that we have to create the conditions. Those conditions have to be created to the satisfaction of both the sides. We are in the process of creating those conditions. Mr. Gopalsamy asks whether we are going to decimate the LTTE. Now the basic point is that I am not decimating anybody. I have not gone there to decimate anybody. But someone after having changed his mind, starts fighting with me. They start attacking the Indian Army. In that case, the Indian Army has to do something to defend themselves and to see that one very important aspect of the Accord, viz. of recovering arms and of disarming any group that may be having arms is completed. They have to complete it. We had thought that it would be completed voluntarily. It started on the 6th of August. It came to a grinding halt immediately. In fact, it continued in the other direction of attacking the IPKF itself. Now the IPKF is duty-bound, under

the Accord, to see that these groups, whichever groups there may be, are completely disarmed. It is not only the LTTE. If there are other groups tomorrow going ahead with arms, then those groups will have to be disarmed. There is nothing special with one group. It so happens today that apart from the LTTE, all the others have laid down their arms. If not, they would also have been treated the same way and they would also have to be disarmed, as is being done with the LTTE. We would like that this operation is completed expeditiously in a manner which does not leave any hardship to the people of the area. That is why maybe it is taking a little more time. But the care that is being taken in carrying out this operation is well worth the trouble and in spite of the impatience shown by the hon. members, I feel that this circumspetion, this pace at which this is being done, is justified under the circumstances.

Mr. Jaswant Singh asked as to what was the diplomatic aim. The diplomatic aim is to see that India and Sri Lanka help each other in maintaining their unity and non-aligned status and that it does not lead to a situation where third powers come in and start meddling here. Now, you must describe the Accord as we describe it. It is not a question of description. It is a question of substance. What is the substance of the Accord? How do you differ from the substance of the Accord? The Accord itself has been hailed by every section of this House and by every section of the people in India, as Mr. Matto pointed out.

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA:  
All sections did not hail it.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO: But they agreed.

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA:  
Most of the opposition parties expressed their reservations.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO: I don't remember. I don't remember still one party in this country saying that the Accord is bad.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: I went on record.

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA:  
All the opposition parties expressed their reservations.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:  
Not when the Accord was entered into. Some question was raised about the devolution of crown land and the devolution of financial powers. This is a part of the Accord; this is one of the points of detail. What we are really talking about now is the Accord itself. And the details, I would like to submit, could be considered while implementing the Accord. So, today, President Jayewardene is committed to hold elections. He is committed to the language question, to make Tamil the official language. The Amendment has also come. Under that Amendment, a law has to be passed. I do not see how any one can escape the responsibility of passing the law after the constitution has been amended accordingly. So, I do not see any difficulty in completing the implementation of the Accord but for the fact that the main essence of the Accord, i.e. the devolution of powers on the people by the elections to the Councils has hampered, that has been delayed. And it is rather ironical that while under the Accord itself, the whole concept of devolution to the Councils was meant for the benefit of the Tamil people. In actual fact, they are getting the benefits on the other side, and the Tamils are still deprived of the benefits. This is the irony to which our friends of the LTTE have led us. I would like to tell Mr. Gopalsamy and other friends that I am a serious-minded person myself. We have seen the history of this. We have gone through every detail. We have discussed. What I would say today is that I have no basis for discussion except on the basis of the Accord. Once they agree to the Accord

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which they did, then whatever other matters could be raised, they are matters of detail which could be gone into. We are still trying to persuade President Jayewardene to do many more things, and we feel that once this is amicably settled and the process begins—we know how it started in India. We did not start with Purna Swaraj. We did not start with all the powers that we got later. We started with whatever powers they were prepared to give. We have to take that line. That is the political line, that is the political solution we have been talking about, and that political solution will lead to a united Sri Lanka with full safeguards and rights to the Tamil people, equal rights with the others. But the fact remains that one is a minority, the other is a majority. We cannot ignore the fact. But the minority itself will be given the rights under the Constitution and under the law, the rights which they have to get in order to lead a life of equality with the others. This is how we envision the future of Sri Lanka. Mr. Subramanian Swamy said . . .

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA: The use of the word Purna Swaraj will land you into trouble.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO: It is not like that. What we said is, we demanded . . . (Interruption) Let it also be on record that I have given an illustration. I have given this only to show that the devolution of powers today could become better tomorrow. The Accord itself is against the separation of the Tamil areas, against the concept of separation. So, the question of misinterpreting my statement does not arise. And Mr. Upendra will kindly note that . . .

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA: I helped you to clarify.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO: I am clarifying it. I just said this to give an example that nothing is done

overnight. The process has to continue. The process has to go on improving on what has been done. And within the framework of a united Sri Lanka we could go on improving the rights to be given to the Tamils. Now this is the point. Sir, I have given all the details.

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: One point I had asked and you were saying . . .

SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY (Andhra Pradesh): You were saying about Shri Subramanian Swamy . .

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: I said, on the human rights question we have a responsibility to satisfy as many people as possible and I suggested to you that a Parliamentary delegation should go there, talk to the people in Jaffna. It does not interfere because Jaffna is now in peace and in Trincomalee, where there is peace, there is no fighting, we go there, talk to the people, and we should be able to satisfy ourselves.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : मान्यवर, मंत्री जी ने जो जवाब दिया है उसके बारे में दो-तीन शंकाएँ पैदा होती हैं। एक तो यह है कि कोई भी समझौता होता है और जिस कारण से वहाँ झगड़ा हुआ है वह तमिल लोगों के हित के बारे में जो उत्तरी-पूर्वी राज्य थे वहाँ उनकी बहुसंख्या थी और झगड़ा यही था कि राजसत्ता में उनको पूरी हिस्सेदारी नहीं मिल रही थी। सिंहल सरकार के जरिए, तो यही झगड़े की मूल कारण था।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): You ask your question in one minute. I cannot give you more time. You cannot make a speech. You have only to ask the question. Only one minute I can give you. I cannot give you time like that. No speech.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : मान्यवर, जब वहाँ की जो मुख्य पार्टी थी विवाद

की उस विवाद की पार्टी को क्या समझाते पर हस्ताक्षर करने के पहले समझौते के उपबंधों से अवगत कराया गया ? दूसरे, अवगत कराने का उसको दिल्ली में रखा गया और समझौता हुआ श्रीलंका में, तो इससे साफ पता चलता है कि जो समझौते के उपबंध थे, जो शर्तें थी उससे प्रभाकरण को अवगत नहीं कराया गया और उस पर उसका सेंटिफिकेशन नहीं था । इसलिए ज्यों ही समझौता हुआ तो उसने कहा कि अब मुझे इंडिया से भी और लंका से भी दोनों से लड़ना पड़ेगा । तो मान्यवर, मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि क्या भारत सरकार ने समझौता करने के पहले प्रभाकरण को विश्वास में लेते हुए, उसको पार्टी बनाना चाहिये था, पंचायत तो हम करने वाले थे, लेकिन पंचायत करने के बजाय हम पार्टी ही बन गए ? बजाय इसके कि मध्यस्थ बनकर हम समझौता कराते, वह तो हमने किया नहीं और हम लोग पार्टी बन गए, पंचायती नहीं रहे ?

**SHRI V. GOPALSAMY:** Sir, I would like to know from the hon. Minister what is his reaction to the specific suggestion for a cease-fire and resumption of talks with the LTTE.

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** Sir, taking Mr. Gopalsamy's query first, I have answered it quite directly that if there have to be negotiations or talks, they can be only on the basis of acceptance of the accord and one of the most important aspects of the accord is laying down of arms. Everything emanates from there, everything stems from there. So, I would only be doing an exercise in futility, if I agree to talk just for the sake of talks. I mean this is the truth, that without the accord being accepted, we have no *locus standi* no common ground to talk. Many other friends came to me and gave the same argument as Mr. Gopalsamy. He spoke with emotion. He is a man of emotion. It is good because emotion is a motive force in many human actions.

But, of course, emotion devoid of certain logic also sometimes leads us to wrong channels. I would like to say that when I have no common ground to talk, his duty would be—and I would be appealing to him—to help us through his own influence if he has any, to convince the LTTE to please accept the accord first, and on the basis of the acceptance of the accord, as a natural corollary, lay down arms. Even the number of arms to be laid down was considered at some stage. Meanwhile a number of arms have been recovered in point of fact; but I am not going into those things. In fact, I must say, that no one wanted to go into the exact number of arms meticulously. We know that this should not be done when we are thinking of larger things. Now, if this is satisfied, any other matter—yes—we could certainly think about. But today, as the Prime Minister has said very clearly, the accord remaining unaccepted on one side and accepted on the other side, there can be no common ground; there can be no basis for any talks. And what do I do? Do I go back to Jayewardene and say that the accord is to be amended? Is it possible for me to do that at this stage? This is just not possible. Our main basis for being there is the accord. So, the importance of the accord cannot be detracted from under any circumstances.

**SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA:** If they have apprehensions about the accord, why don't you clear them? Why do you make it a condition?

**THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI):** He has made the position of the Government clear.

**SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO:** If they are objecting to it or if there is non-acceptance of the accord, this is not possible. This has been done. Everything has been explained. They had accepted it and after having accepted it, for what reasons they are objecting to it, I don't know. I have

[Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao]

gone over that ground already. . .  
(Interruptions).

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: They are willing to co-operate in the implementation of the accord.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO: This is a point of fact on which Mr. Gopalsamy's information seems to be wrong. I am standing by the information, by the knowledge, which I have. So, I don't think we can really double-check on that because this is the information, this is the hard fact, on the basis of which everything happened.

One point which I would like to clarify is about amendment to the Constitution which, according to some Members, can be taken away by a simple majority in Parliament. Now the correct position is that the Constitution can be amended by simple majority plus concurrence of all the Provincial Councils. If one objects, then special majority in Parliament which is two-thirds of the total membership of the House, not just those present and voting. Now, under any Constitutional dispensation, what more safeguards could be thought of, I am not able to understand. If one is against the very idea of keeping Sri Lanka as one country, that is a different matter. But taking unity as the framework, if any one could improve on these safeguards, I would like to know if it is possible. We have gone into all those aspects. Our own security concerns have been very clearly described by several Members. I do not have to go into that. But the point is that we have not yet started acting on it. It will be possible only when other parts of the accord are implemented and I am sure the moment they are implemented and the democratic process starts, we will be able to address ourselves to those concerns also. I do not see any difficulty on that score. We have to go on making our efforts. This is where we are. That is why,

if you ask how long is it going to take or how long it will take to hold elections, these are questions which it is not possible to answer in a cut and dried manner. The commitment is there. Our pressure is there. Our persuasion is there. But conditions have to be made congenial. They became a little congenial before. But they must become congenial enough to have fair and free elections which are credible and not otherwise. These are some of the parameters subject to which the thinking is going on.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : मेरे प्रश्न का जवाब नहीं आया ।

श्री पी० वी० नरसिंह राव : जी हाँ, मैंने आपको बताया कि सभी चीजें उनको सुझायी गयी हैं । उन्हें अंधेरे में नहीं रखा गया है ।

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : आप तो पंचायत करने गए थे, पार्टी कैसे बन गए ?

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेश देसाई) : उनको जो कहना था, वह उन्होंने कह दिया ।

SHRI SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY: I had talked about the necessity of convincing as many people as possible on the human rights question.

SHRI P. V. NARASIMHA RAO: I have noted this suggestion. At the moment, I would only request Mr. Subramanian Swamy to bear with us. We are addressing first things first. Thank you very much.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : महोदय, मेरे प्रश्न का जवाब नहीं आया ।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेश देसाई) : श्री भजन लाल वक्तव्य देंगे ।

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : महोदय, यह अन्याय मत कीजिए । जवाब दिलवाएं । मेरा स्पेसिफिक प्रश्न है कि किन परिस्थितियों में... (व्यवधान)...



THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Whatever he wanted to say, he has already said.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : आप मेरे अधिकारों की रक्षा कीजिए । किन परिस्थितियों में भारत सरकार... (व्यवधान)...

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेश देसाई) : आप बैठ जाइए ।

### STATEMENT BY MINISTER

#### Flood Situation in Assam and West Bengal

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Now, Mr. Bhajan Lal to make his statement.

SHRI PARVATHANENI UPENDRA (Andhra Pradesh): We can take it up tomorrow.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): He has already made the statement in the Lok Sabha.

श्री ईश दत्त यादव (उत्तर प्रदेश) : महोदय मेरा एक व्यवस्था का प्रश्न है । यह कृषि मंत्रीजी के वक्तव्य से संबंधित है ।

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह (बिहार) : सुन लीजिए । हो सकता है उसी के बारे में हो ।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेश देसाई) : कैसे हो सकता है ? मैं भी थोड़ा जानता हूँ ।

There cannot be any point of order. Now, the Minister to make the statement.

[The Vice-Chairman (Shri H. Hanumanthappa) in the Chair.]

THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE (SHRI BHAJAN LAL): Sir, Assam has experienced successive waves of floods during the months of

May, June and July. The latest wave of floods has started since 20th August, 1988. The rainfall in the catchment areas of Brahmaputra has been very heavy from 22nd August onwards. During the five days from 22nd to 26th August, 1988, Pasighat recorded 1168 MMs, Teju recorded 625 MMs and Dola recorded 312 MMs. Consequently, the river Brahmaputra received very huge inflows and has been rising very rapidly. On 26th August, 1988 at 6-00 P.M. the river touched a level of 106.31 Metres at Dibrugarh as against the highest flood level of 105.97 Metres recorded during last year. This was 2.11 Metres above the danger level of 104.20 Metres. However, with the decrease in rainfall in the catchment area, inflow is getting reduced and the water level has started receding. The level recorded at Dibrugarh today morning was 105.72 Metres.

The entire mass of water is flowing from Upper Assam to the Western parts of the State causing damages all along the river course. Parts of Guwahati town on the western side have also been inundated. The places further downstream Guwahati along the river course, will also experience the effects of these floods as the water flows further down.

Serious damage was apprehended in Dibrugarh on account of rising flood waters since the town is situated nearly half a metre below the danger level (104.20 metre) of the river at this point. The vast sheet of water was held back by a system of dykes and embankments. Arrangements for evacuation of people in the low lying areas were made by the State Government and round the clock vigil over the flooded banks has been mounted. The Army is also assisting the civic authorities in maintaining the dyke and other rescue and relief operations. Wherever seepage of water was noticed the bunds have been strengthened by sandbags and spurs. People have also been evacuated from low lying areas and transported to relief camps.