

[श्री श्रीकान्त वर्मा]

अब तक कोई आपत्ति नहीं की है, यह नहीं कहा है कि जुबिन मेहता को भारत आने की अनुमति नहीं देनी चाहिए जैसे कि इजरायल ने अभी तक नहीं कहा है कि किसी अरब संगीतकार को या लेखक को भारत आने की अनुमति नहीं दी जानी चाहिये। मैं आपके माध्यम से विदेश मंत्री जी से जो यहां बैठे हैं, अनुरोध करूंगा कि वे इस निर्णय पर पुनर्विचार करें और उनके आरकेस्ट्रा को और उन्हें भारत आने की अनुमति प्रदान करें।

विदेश मंत्री (श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी) : सभापति महोदय, श्री जुबिन मेहता एक विश्व विख्यात वायलिन वादक हैं। सारे संसार में उनकी प्रतिष्ठा है और हमें उनकी कला के लिये अभिमान है। वे भारत से संबंधित हैं और भारत की ओर से उन्हें उनकी कला के लिये अलंकृत भी किया जा चुका है। माननीय सदस्य ने यह भ्रम पैदा करने की कोशिश की है कि मानो भारत सरकार श्री जुबिन मेहता को हिन्दुस्तान में आने देना नहीं चाहती। यह बात गलत है। जुबिन मेहता भारत आना चाहें तो उनका स्वागत है लेकिन वह एक ऐसा आरकेस्ट्रा अपने साथ लेकर आना चाहते हैं जो अमरीका का आरकेस्ट्रा नहीं है जहां श्री जुबिन मेहता रहते हैं। वह इजरायल का एक आरकेस्ट्रा लेकर यहां आना चाहते हैं और इजरायल के आरकेस्ट्रा को इजाजत देने में हमारे सामने कुछ समस्याएँ हैं। लेकिन यदि कांग्रेस पार्टी सर्वसम्मति से सुझाव दे कि इजरायल के आरकेस्ट्रा को यहां आने दिया जाय तो भारत सरकार इस सवाल पर पुनर्विचार करने के लिये तैयार है।

श्री श्रीकान्त वर्मा : सभापति महोदय, मैंने कांग्रेस पार्टी के मेम्बर की

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please do not take down.

(Shri Shrikant Verma continued to speak)

श्रीमती सरोज खापड़ें (महाराष्ट्र) :

श्रीमन्

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is not a subject to be discussed. Next item. Mr. Kalyan Roy.

DISCUSSION UNDER RULE 176

Government Statement on Agreement between India and Bangladesh on sharing of the Ganga Waters at Farakka

SHRI KALYAN ROY (West Bengal): Sir, the Farakka Agreement involves 160 million people of the Indo-Gangetic plains and, more than that, it involves not only India and Bangladesh but also Nepal and Bhutan and ultimately involves the life of our 600 million people and effects the economic survival of about 10 eastern and north-eastern States. It is a question of life and death for the people of West Bengal. Sir, what is the origin?

[Mr. Deputy Chairman in the Chair]

Precisely at 5 p.m. of April 2, 1962, the fate of Calcutta port was affected when a violent earthquake struck Bengal, Burmah and Arakan. The major portion of the Ganga waters which had so far been flowing through Bhagirathi-Hooghly, started going into another channel. Between 1853 and 1947, as many as 13 committees and experts were consulted by the Government on the measures for improving the navigability of Hooghly. In desperation, a proposal was drawn up in 1946 to construct a 26-mile channel from Calcutta to Diamond Harbour bypassing the main river. However, Sir, all these plans were ultimately given up because of technical difficulties. The importance of a barrage over the Ganga for preservation of the Calcutta port was one

of the major considerations before the Boundary Commission set up to delimit the frontiers in 1947. Sir Cyril Radcliffe awarded Murshidabad to West Bengal so that the barrage and the connecting canal could be built within Indian territory. Sir, not only this, all the scientific experts like Sir Arthur Cotton, Vernon, Stevenson and Sir William Willocks agreed that dredging and excavation of a new shipping canal was technically impossible and that Farakka was the only alternative. Sir, the construction of the Farakka Barrage was completed at a cost of about Rs. 156 crores to save the Calcutta Port, and the minimum requirement estimated by all concerned—I have told already—is 40,000 cusecs during the lean months. Farakka can give the Calcutta Port 47,000 cusecs of water to save it from silting. This would not have affected Bangladesh at all. Regarding the charge of salinity of Bangladesh, this too does not seem to be based on facts for the World Bank team reported that 100 thousand cusecs can probably be withdrawn from the major rivers causing excessive salinity intrusion into the lower Magna outlet. Surely, taking 40,000 cusecs cannot be expected to add to the salinity of Bangladesh rivers. Sir, after 40,000 cause were made available, what was the result? In 1976, 40,000 cusecs owed to the feeder canal in Bhagirathi. In 1977 flow was kept below 30,000 cusecs. The Port authorities claim that even one year of headwater eliminated any need of dredging of the river for 30 miles down the port. The channel itself was more stabilised. A 26-foot draft was achieved for practically the whole of the year. In fact, this was precisely the goal for constructing the Rs 156-crores barrage at Farakka and later also the Halia Port. Now all this has gone.

Sir, I would not speak from a narrow 19th century nationalistic point of view, nor would I take a chauvinistic stand, but the issue is extremely explosive. We are faced

ambiguity any euphemism or any equivocal stand on such an issue which is going to affect the lives of millions of people, will be improper. When the present Government refuses to recognise facts, one has to say harsh facts. The House will bear with me because seldom has our nation seen such a gross betrayal, such a dishonesty and such a down-right bankruptcy that one shudders to think, What will happen in future.

It is no wonder that this ugly, foul, filthy document was signed when the rest of the country slept. That is the right time for such things. Sir, I am quoting from the All India Radio broadcast of September 30, 1977 by Shri A. N. Dar of Indian Express, on how it was signed:

"I have seen many international agreements being signed in the teak-pannelled cabinet room of the Prime Minister's office housed in the massive sandstone building of the Central Secretariat. But the signing ceremony I watched in the early hours of this morning at which representatives of India and Bangladesh were present certainly called for serving of sweets which of course were distributed soon after midnight. While the rest of the country slept, the Cabinet room was alive with a new sense of achievement."

And what achievement, Sir? Even Mr. Dar stated this on the All India Radio:

"Unfortunately, the details of the agreement have not yet been disclosed. But judging from press reports, it is clear that India has scaled down its demand considerably... India has made a sacrifice."

Sir, it is not that people of Calcutta but the people of the whole Eastern India were murdered on that day. It is for the first time that it gave a weapon to the United States, and a new colonialist power to interfere in our affairs. And, who was the first

[Shri Kalyan Roy]

to welcome the agreement? He was Mr. Carter, President of the United States, the country which sent the Seventh Fleet to prevent the birth of Bangladesh as a free sovereign country. It is a total sell out, an outright surrender to the military dictatorship, a dictatorship which is oozing blood and dirt from every pore. And, Sir, this is a new Munich on the sub-continent. The statement which Mr. Desai read out with great courage but with no conviction on the 14th November, 1977, is full of pious sentiments, noble ideas, beautiful, sweet phrases and lofty goals. But didn't Neville Chamberlain, returning to the United Kingdom after signing the Munich Agreement and delivering Czechoslovakia to Hitler, also declare with great aplomb "Peace with honour"? And a few years afterwards it was found that there was neither peace nor honour. The Farakka Agreement today has brought us neither peace nor honour.

Sir, Mr. Desai and Mr. Vajpayee had only a few sentences on the question of survival of Calcutta and Haldia ports, and some platitudes. On page 6, they stated:

"No one in India can minimise the importance of this Port for the city of Calcutta and for the economy of the entire eastern region on which depends a vast segment of our population."

Then again on page 7, Mr. Desai stated:

"...would enable us to arrest..."

Please listen—"arrest".

"further deterioration..."

No improvement.

"in the Port of Calcutta and with the help of such other measures as dredging, river training, prevention of soil erosion, etc. to bring about improvement in the Port."

Are we children? Don't we know what was happening to Calcutta all these years? Draught in the Port of Calcutta is rapidly declining and the annual traffic handled over the last decade has shrunk from about 15 million tonnes to 7.5 million tonnes. The harbour is unable to accommodate oil tankers, container vessels and the larger ocean-going vessels. Timely and effective dredging operations might have helped in the past, as was pointed out by a Study Team of the International Association of Ports and Harbours. But now the silting in the sluggish Hooghly has progressed too far for dredging alone to keep the port open. Only regular flushing of the river can do that.

Sir, what then was the imperative to sign the agreement in the middle of the night in such an atmosphere of secrecy? Mr. Desai has made that also very clear on pages 3 and 4. He has stated:

"...the political imperative of improving relations with our closest neighbour, which is an acid test of the effectiveness and credibility of our entire foreign policy and for that matter, of the principles which India has always advocated should guide relations among nations."

Again on page 8, Mr. Desai has stated:

"This Government has recognised that for the sake of our own development and the effectiveness of our foreign policy, the crucial test is whether or not we could make this sub-continent free of friction, allowing us to concentrate our resources on our primary task of development and the welfare of our people."

So, Sir, you can see that it is not the Calcutta Port or any democratic principles which were involved in the signing of this agreement but a total change in the foreign policy vis-a-vis the military junta, set up and sustained by the Pentagon and the CIA,

which was the driving force behind this agreement. Farakka is an excuse, a tool which has been used cynically to appease the military regime which is unrepresentative, unelected, undemocratic and illegal and whose entire history from its birth till today is one of continued bloody repression of its people, on the one hand, and of coming closer to countries which are against development of the third world, on the other. Sir, Mr. Desai's Government has been so carried away by such deep love and respect and affection that it has forgotten that democracy lies deeply buried under the Padma and the Meghna and that no political party exists there today. Recently the Bangladesh Communist Party and all other parties were banned. And the respected leader, Mr. Soni Majumdar, has been arrested recently. Who cares?

On page 9, Mr. Desai has stated:

"The Farakka problem has been a national issue in Bangladesh transcending political parties and regimes. All the political parties and groups in Bangladesh have been united in demanding much larger shares and a speedy settlement of the dispute."

May I ask Mr. Desai. Whom were you addressing? Were you addressing a non-existent Parliament in Bangladesh? Or, were you addressing the Parliament in India? There are no political parties existing in Bangladesh. They have been suffocated, strangled and killed inside and outside. This is the military regime you are dealing with.

Sir, all the noble sentiments expressed by Mr. Desai have gone waste. The entire Farakka Barrage has been a waste. And the opposite is going to happen. As the Calcutta Port stands today, strangled to death, serious socio-economic problems will arise with the gradual collapse of trade and commerce and attrition bet-

ween various States within our country will grow over the sharing of the remaining water. This may lead to serious internal crisis. This in turn is bound to affect the Indo-Bangladesh relations. Then, what was the third purpose of the agreement? It has boosted the prestige of the military regime which, totally discredited at home and abroad, was searching desperately for a way-out to gain credibility and some success in its foreign policy.

The Prime Minister has talked of shared sacrifices. India has shared sacrifices. But what about the other side? We are not going to get ever 30,000 cusecs in the worst period of the year. And the danger is... (*interruptions*) The same thing happened in the House of Commons. When Winston Churchill was talking of the Munich Agreement, the Tory Party was laughing, and the next day war was declared. Not only that. What sinister thing is this? Tomorrow the question may be asked: If India can sacrifice its major port, if India can sacrifice its water, then, why not land in the north? That may also be one of the ways of surely improving relations with our nearest neighbour. Even the manner in which the whole negotiation was carried out, was detestable and smacks of arrogance. No consultation was done with the State Government at all; not even with the port authorities. In the *Statesman* of 24th April 1977 Mr. Siddhartha Ray criticised the whole thing. Mr. Bhola Sen, ex-Minister, said, the agreement was a disaster. What has the present Chief Minister to say about it? I am reading from the *Economic & Political Weekly* of September 7, 1977. Mr. Jyoti Basu said, "I know nothing more than what has appeared in the newspapers. They have not taken us into confidence. Matters do not look bright for Calcutta." A united delegation consisting of the Janata Party, the CPI(M), the CPI and others came and pleaded with the Prime Minister; yet the agreement was signed. The whole country has rejected the agreement...

THE PRIME MINISTER (SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI): The whole country has not rejected it. It is a black lie.

SHRI KALYAN ROY: Sir, I do not want to say anything on that. But when one feels doubt and suspicion about one's motives, one is inclined to use words which the Prime Minister is using. (*Interruption*) I cannot lower myself to the level of the Prime Minister.

Sir, I was pointing out the position of Calcutta. In reply to a question of mine on 12th March 1976 Mr. Trivedi, who was the Minister in charge, replied, "The volume of traffic passing through Calcutta Port showed a downward trend." And then he continued, "The main reason for less traffic in iron ore was the inability of Calcutta Port to handle deep-draughted bulk carriers." I asked him: What is the solution? In the same reply he said, "Farakka Barrage Project is also expected to improve navigability of the river." This is the reply. Now, all that has gone down. Mr. K. L. Rao, Ex-Minister of Irrigation, assured in the Lok Sabha in May 1972 that 40,000 cusecs of water would be made available. May I then ask what led to this volte-face? Mr. Jagat Mehta, who was in the United Nations, was shouting so much, and correctly, for this 40,000 cusecs of water. I am not reading the whole speech. I am reading only a portion of it, a few portions. He said in the United Nations, "Mr. Chairman, whatever criterion we apply, withdrawal of 40,000 cusecs of water by India at Farakka is well within the entitlement of its equitable share of Ganga waters." What happened? That is the biggest question. That is the biggest secret which Shri Desai is not inclined to disclose. What is the result of this? What have we seen? On the 1st October 1977 the Statesman has written that the time taken for the movement of ships has already mounted. And this is what Anand Bazar has written on the 23rd November 1977. It is doubtful whether Calcutta port will at all survive.

Then it has written—I do not know how far it is correct—that as a protest against this unholy agreement, Shri S. K. Bhattacharya, an expert and senior engineer of Calcutta Port Trust has tendered his resignation. This is the result of the agreement.

Finally, I say the present agreement is neither in the interest of India, nor in the interest of Bangladesh. It is in the interest of the imperialists and their collaborators. Before I conclude, I may say that the *fait accompli* has already been made. May I request the new Government to seriously pursue the Ganga-Brahmaputra Link Canal Scheme and try to review the agreement and really help financially and technically in the creation of irrigation facilities of Bangladesh? The great question remains and it is being talked about everywhere. Is what has been submitted on the floor of the House as agreement all that is there? Or, are there some secret clauses or letters which have passed between Shri Desai and Mr. Zia-ur-Rahman? (*Interruptions*). You can give a reply. I do not know what kind of people you are.

Finally, before I sit, let me say what I feel. When Shri Vajpayee was reading the statement on the agreement with great gusto I could see that in the depth of his dusty soul there was nothing but abject surrender. However bombastic words Shri Desai or Shri Vajpayee used, it is a total, unmitigated defeat. West Bengal and the entire eastern India now recede into darkness under the leadership of Shri Desai.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA (Karnataka): Mr. Deputy Chairman, the agreement which was signed recently between India and Bangladesh on the question of sharing of the Farakka waters has dismayed the people not only of Bengal, but throughout the country.

I would like to begin by pointing out that the river Ganga is basically

an Indian river. Ninety-nine per cent of the catchment area of this river lies in India and 94.5 per cent of the ultimate irrigation potential of this river is in India and 94 per cent of the population in the river belt also lies in India. Of the total length of the main channel of the Ganga, 1,925 kms. are in India and only 141 kms. are in Bangladesh. These are some of the basic facts which I would like to place on record.

The need for this Farakka barrage was accepted over 100 years ago and the British consultants had prepared the early plans. Ever since partition, Pakistan—and now Bangladesh—was kept very much in the picture and all relevant information was given to them whenever it was demanded. So, there was nothing so secret that we have done in putting up the barrage. Its cost was 1,515 million rupees. And also, Sir, I would like to point out that it took nine years—these figures are available in the records given to us by the Ministry itself in the past—to complete it and four years to complete the feeder canal. The project was commissioned with the representatives of Bangladesh present, in 1975. The importance of the Farakka Barrage, not only to the North-Eastern region, but also to the upper regions of UP and Bihar, is an accepted fact. The entire economy of the North-Eastern region is very much dependent on this river, particularly on the Calcutta port, and the port is also used by Nepal and Bhutan. It was because there was a controversy about the minimum water that would be required to flush the Hooghly and keep the Calcutta port going that various studies were carried out at different times and I would like to quote Mr K. L. Rao's statement of 1972 made in the Lok Sabha when, I think, the present External Affairs Minister was also present. In that statement he had said that there had been differences of opinion about the minimum waters that would be needed and added:

"Keeping all these in mind, we have decided on the following for-

mula:..."—I would like to quote, from the records, Sir—

"For five years after the water is let down into the feeder canal, the feeder canal will carry the full discharge of 40,000 cusecs throughout the year including lean months."

I go further:

"After this period the entire position will be reviewed in the light of the recommendations and observations of the afore-said study teams."

In conclusion, Sir, he said:

"It may be stated that the Government of India fully recognises the importance of maintaining the navigability of the Hooghly for the preservation of the Calcutta port as one of the topmost Indian ports and will take all necessary steps to ensure the same. It is to be noted that the interests of the upstream irrigation projects will be fully safeguarded."

Sir, this was the statement made by the then Minister in 1972. In the light of this, I would like to ask: What have got in this present agreement? I would just like to put the point very briefly. Our share of the water under this agreement is 32.7 per cent as against Bangladesh's 67.3 per cent during the leanest season of the year. Secondly, summer or the lean season which was always understood to start, according to all of us, from March and go up to May new starts—we are given to understand and we do not know when the calendar was changed—from January, instead of from March... (Interruptions)... I got it from your statement; I had it from the statement, from the chart, that it starts from January to March. This chart is part of your agreement. Thirdly, instead of the 40,000 cusecs that we have always been demanding, now it is just half. I think the same bureaucrats who were briefing when I was at the United Nations last year

[Shrimati Margaret Alva]

have briefed them now also; and the same bureaucrats had said that, that was the minimum we had to fight for, otherwise we would be finished and that Calcutta port was gone for ever. I believe the same set of people have advised the Government to take this stand as if we are all fools this year and as if we never needed 40,000 cusecs, but only 20,000 cusecs, I do not know whose credibility one is supposed to challenge. Anyway, Sir, by this agreement on share goes down to 20,500 cusecs during the leanest period. We have further agreed to a ten-day period and this period, this ten-day-period chart, has been marked out and worked out and accepted and, according to this, from the 11th of April to the 10th of May, which is a whole month, the minimum flow is accepted at 20,000 to 21,500 cusecs. And, then, Sir, we have gone further in our generosity and we have agreed to guarantee a minimum of 80 per cent flow of the agreed amount of water to Bangladesh irrespective of what comes from up-stream. You either get what has been agreed to or, even if you do not get it, you guarantee 80 per cent flow to them. 80 per cent has been guaranteed to them saying, "You can have this whether we have our share or not". Then again, Sir, in exchange for all these, what do we get? Have we received even a firm commitment about the co-operation in the long-term project which ultimately would be the only solution as far as the problem of the river water is concerned? There is again the vague clause saying that we will sit and discuss and that we will find a solution and will see how it is to be implemented and so on. They started off actually by asking for, in 1962, 2,500 cusecs of water. It went up and up and up and today we are told that they need 55,000 cusecs of water. Do you expect that Government now to stand by these provisions in the Agreement where we believe that we have done them a great favour? This was said by Mr. Kalyan Roy also. I am not challenging this.

I wish to quote from an article by Shri G. K. Reddy recently that there were some letters exchanged between the two Governments which formed part of the Agreement which we have signed. I do not challenge you on that. I do not believe this. But if there are any letters, about which only the Foreign Secretary knows perhaps, we would like to know, and we would like to be taken into confidence, whether there were any such letters and what they contained. Then, we understand—and I only quote from articles, I have no other information—that in these letters the possibility of getting the co-operation of a third country upstream for working out the final solution, has been mentioned, in which case the problem is going to get even more complicated at a later stage. Is this time?

Of course, there is the saving clause—clause 15—which provides that the Agreement may be extended for a further specified period with mutual consent. What does it mean? Do you think that at the end of five years we are going to be able to reverse the trend and to get a better deal? Or is it that Mr. Vajpayee thinks that there will be some other Government which will have to bear the consequences of this Agreement and he will not be there to be held responsible and face the brunt of the whole thing? Whatever it may be, I understand that even that clause was added at the last minute because of pressure from certain sources—may be in the Cabinet—and that is why in order to compromise, this clause was added at the eleventh hour, and...

AN HON. MEMBER: It was there from the very beginning.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: This is what we have got from the Agreement, as far as the Agreement is concerned.

I would just like here to pick up a few points from the statement which the hon. Foreign Minister so beauti-

fully presented to Parliament last week... (*Interruption*)... He always does it beautifully of course. Whether he convinces us or not is another thing. The first thing on the basis of which he justifies it is good neighbourliness and equal sharing of sacrifices. I would like to know who has done more for Bangladesh than the previous Government? Who had done more to get Bangladesh whatever they needed at the time of crisis than the previous Government? Do you mean to say that you have today more interest and more affection than the previous Government had for Bangladesh? Is it that you are trying to tell us and the country that you are doing more for Bangladesh than we were capable of doing? But let me tell you, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, that it was the interest of the nation that was more important than friendship with anybody. We could not sell out that interest—the basic interests not only of the north-eastern region but of the entire country. That is why we had to stand firm and say: thus far and no more. You say that this is for maintaining the economy of the region and the economy of the country? What have you compromised for? With whom? What have you got in return for that? And with what regime have you compromised, and for what purpose?

We are told that the entire Agreement is for five years. It goes on for five years and this will be reviewed after three years. You have no guarantee at all of anything. Anything can be changed at the end of five years and you can also back out after five years. But enough damage would be done to Calcutta port by that time. Are you going to back out after five years, after you have destroyed the Calcutta port and the north-eastern region?

Then we are told in the statement and even outside that the state was not clean, that the previous Government had left something which they could not clean out. You say you

have cleaned out so many things left by the previous Government. Why have you not been able to clean this out? Anyway, this is a political question.

I would like to draw your attention again to the statement made by Dr. K. L. Rao in Parliament which was the statement by the previous Government. In 1974, the Joint Statement by the two Prime Ministers said very clearly that the two Prime Ministers noted that the Barrage would be commissioned by the end of 1974. There is a categorical statement made by the two Prime Ministers that it would be commissioned in 1974.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM): It was conditional.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: No, it was not conditional. But later they said that they would negotiate and work it out. They did not say that they would commission it on a solution being reached. It has not been said anywhere in the document. That the commissioning was dependent on any conditions has not been said. I am also a lawyer. I have also studied the documents. I am also capable of some interpretation though I may not be as experienced as you are.

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: Will you read the whole of the agreement?

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: Which Agreement, the present Agreement or the previous one?

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: 1974 Prime Ministers' Agreement.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: I have read the statement that was given to us for our use last year at the United Nations. If something has been hidden, it is not my fault. You produce it or lay it on the Table of the House. I am quoting from the documents which have been given to

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us. Please get the other things out. We will quote them next time. The copy which was given to us was signed by Mr. C. C. Patel on behalf of India in which the schedule was drawn up for that year. Here is the Agreement or rather the understanding which has been signed on the 18th of April, 1975. It was signed by Mr. C. C. Patel for us. It has stated very clearly that while discussions regarding allocation of fair flow of waters of Ganga during the lean months are under way in keeping with the Prime Ministers' Declaration of 1974, it is essential to run the feeder canal and for that year we agreed to that figure since the negotiations were still on. The statement is here. It was a purely temporary commitment by the lean season of that particular year of 1975. Then the negotiations did not work out and we were not able to come to an agreement after the death of Mr. Majibur Rahman. I must point out that we then went back to draw the water which we needed, in 1976 summer and we took the water that we thought was necessary. If there had been a commitment, there would not have been any reason why the Government would have gone and drawn the full flow that was needed to keep the Farakka Project going. If we had made a commitment, we would have stuck to 16000. The fact that we had not made a commitment is obvious from our drawing full flow in 1976. So, let us not be told that we had already made a commitment. It was then that it was pointed out by our then Prime Minister:

"This is purely a technical problem which needs a technical and not a political solution."

Unfortunately, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I must say with great grief that the experts have been ignored in this Agreement. The entire negotiations have been led by a bureaucrat of the Foreign Office who is not an expert in irrigation matters and

whose political sense we have very often questioned. I do not see why these negotiations should not have been held at the expert level because in the past the entire negotiations were left to the Ministry of Irrigation and Power and the statements were always made by that Ministry. Mr. C. C. Patel has signed all the previous documents. Here, suddenly we have a change-over and that is why we have landed up in the mess that we are in. Then, there is this other great argument which the Foreign Minister gave in a statement to this House about the lower riparian states. I think this is a very dangerous statement to make because we have 40 other rivers, I think, which we share between the two countries. I feel that if we accept the stand of Bangladesh that the lower riparian states have the right to veto or even to control the use of water by the upper riparian states, it is going to land us in serious problem even in the future. This is a stand which the international forum have not accepted as yet and I do not see why we should rush to accept this principle because it certainly is not going to suit us. Also, I would like to point out that as far as we are concerned, in order to save Calcutta Port we have no other source for flushing it except this river whereas as far as the irrigation potential of Bangladesh is concerned, in fact they have more water than they need and which can be utilised to much better advantage.

Sir, I would like to point out that last year, we had made every effort to see that this issue was not internationalised. The emphasis was that this was a problem between two friendly neighbouring States and that we would find a solution. In fact, even when the inscription on the UN Agenda came before the General Assembly, we had bitterly opposed it and finally, of course, we had to submit, but even after that the idea was to keep the negotiations between the two countries and not to allow any international agency to come in. But

what has happened since then? I must say that the signing ceremony which was on the Delhi TV was shocking. You have an open shamiana where the two signing parties are there and the entire diplomatic corps is invited to witness the ceremony. Has this happened with regard to any other agreement between two countries anywhere at any time between India and any other country? Is this a normal signing protocol that you have allowed the entire diplomatic community in Bangladesh to be a witness? And what is the significance? The significance is that you have made it out to be a great international agreement and an achievement. Could it not have been signed in a closed room like you have done all these years? What was so international about this agreement that the entire diplomatic corps had to be summoned to witness it? I would like to ask whether it is a fact, and this is again from reports, that a reception was given at the United Nations after the signing of the Agreement by the Bangladesh Permanent Representative which was also attended by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and our own Permanent Representative and that statements were made by the Secretary-General of the UN as well as by our Permanent Representative lauding the efforts and the role of the United Nations in bringing about this Agreement. I would like to know whether it is a fact and if it is a fact, what the Government thinks about this new stand, that the United Nations had taken, a leading role, in bringing about this agreement? And finally, as far as this is concerned, what shocked us most was the hurry with which President Carter sent his congratulations to us on this great achievement. People who had opposed the birth of Bangladesh, who had threatened to invade this area with the Seventh Fleet, today suddenly have become great champions of Bangladesh and wanting friendship between India and Bangladesh, and they are quite pleased with us.

There is one more question which I would like to raise, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir. I believe or I understand at least that certain reports have been submitted after a detailed research by the Poona Hydraulic Research Laboratory about the actual flow of water into the barrage that would be necessary to save the Calcutta Port or to keep the barrage going. I would like to know what the figure is that is given by the Poona Hydraulic Research Laboratory and whether our Foreign Minister and this great negotiator are quite satisfied that this minimum flow which was said to be absolutely necessary for saving the Calcutta Port has been guaranteed. And then, I do not know whether it is directly connected, I understand that a meeting between the BSF and the BD Chiefs took place in Delhi shortly before the signing this Agreement. Was there any connection between the two, and if so, what was the common link between this meeting and the signing of the Agreement? Finally, Sir, I ask: What is the future after this Agreement? Has the problem been solved? Are you satisfied that this question has once for all been laid to rest? Or, have you created new problems for yourself and for the future Governments of this country? I would like to say that this Agreement marks a disaster to us, as far as I am concerned and as far as many, many millions in this country are concerned. And let me tell you that in spite of all these concessions, in spite of all your statements, you have not been able to get in return a definite commitment regarding any long-term project. Have they made any commitment regarding our proposals for the connecting canals which we had proposed in the past? I have the details with me but I do not want to go into them because I am running out of time. I would like to ask you whether it is a fact that because of this Agreement, disputes as far as water is concerned between West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are going to be aggravated. You

[Shrimati Margaret Alva]

think you can keep Bangladesh happy. You will create problems between our States, between West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh and Bihar as far as water is concerned because you have guaranteed something there and you will have to see that the other States also pay the price for it. And then I ask again what I asked before, what happens at the end of five years? You again open the hornet's nest, you again start the negotiations, you again go back to whatever Government may be there and say, now what do we do and what do you do then? You start again from the same point at which you had started now and the wrong step taken now is going to land you in even more serious trouble at the end of these five years. Thank you.

SHRI DINESH SINGH (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I watched with very great interest Mr. Kalyan Roy present a very emotional case. He has used very strong language, which is, perhaps, customary for his Party and for him. I would beg of the House to consider this Agreement in cooler terms because what we are really considering is an Agreement with Bangladesh over a very difficult issue and the injection of emotions and strong language is not going to lead us to any solution. I would also say that the charge, that he made, of interference from outside and the Government, more or less buckling down to what may have been said from outside is a totally false allegation. There could be no question of this Government yielding to foreign pressure and especially on this issue. This is an issue with a historical perspective. This is an issue which goes back to the previous Government, about which the hon. Member, Shrimati Margaret Alva, mentioned, and, therefore, there is no question of this Government having ignored the interests of the country or having

acted under foreign pressure. It would be much better if we could detach ourselves from these statements and allegations and go into the substance of the Agreement. What did Mr. Kalyan Roy say? He said that we have ignored the interests of the Calcutta Port and thereby ignored the interests of Bengal and the hinterland that links it with the Bay of Bengal. Is this allegation true? What is it that we have always been saying? Mr. Kalyan Roy again read out something which Mr. Mehta had said in the United Nations, as if it was some kind of a discovery that he had made. The same figure was given by the Prime Minister in this House. We have never denied it. It is our plea that we need roughly 40 thousand cusecs for the well-functioning of the Calcutta Port. It is mentioned here on page 3 of the Statement. Now, that is our position. But is there enough water in the river all the time for us to get these 40 thousand cusecs and if there is not enough water, what do we do?

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA
What do you do?

SHRI DINESH SINGH: We have known it and you have also known it all along and as I go on you will probably realise how you have made an error which we have tried to correct.

Now, as I was saying, Mr. Deputy Chairman, we have said that our requirements are roughly 40 thousand cusecs and according to the Agreement anything between 35 to 40 thousand cusecs will be available to us for over 8 months in a year. It is, therefore, an Agreement which gives us what we have been wanting for most of the period and it will enable us to keep the Calcutta port flushed. Now, what happens in the lean period, that is the question that comes up and the impression has been given, again by Shrimati Margaret Alva, that there was the previous Government negotiating for a long time, not yielding basic positions and it was

perhaps on the point of grabbing these 40 thousand cusecs, which this Government has lost. What was the Agreement of 1975? The previous Government and Mrs. Alva's own contribution to it in the United Nations brought about an Agreement of 1975 where we had agreed to take only 11 to 16,000 cusecs in the lean period...

AN HON. MEMBER: For how long?

SHRI DINESH SINGH: If you had read the statement by the Prime Minister, on page 4 you would have seen:

"The Barrage was commissioned in April 1975 after an agreement with the then Government of President Mujib for withdrawals by India in the range of 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs for the period 21st April to 31st May."

SHRI KALYAN ROY: Ganga River is becoming so lean after the Agreement that it will be invisible.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: If it becomes invisible after it joins the sea, there is no harm.

PROF. S. NURUL HASAN (Uttar Pradesh): With your permission, I would like to hon. Member to clarify. The hon. Member said that 1975 Agreement was for 1975 only. Is that correct or not correct?

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (West Bengal): What was the withdrawal in 1976?

SHRI DINESH SINGH: The previous Government made an Agreement for one year, limiting our utilisation to 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs. We have made an Agreement for 5 years raising this from 11,000 to 22,500...

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: Next year we took the full quantity.
1234 RS —5.

PROF. S. NURUL HASAN: Let the facts be clear. What was the position in 1976? There seems to be a difference of opinion. What was the position in 1976? Let us be clear about facts.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: Mr. Deputy Chairman, the hon. Member has asked me about what happened in 1976. He was then a member of the Government. Perhaps, he could enlighten me. . .

AN HON. MEMBER: He was not kept informed.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: I would merely say that the previous Government by an Agreement made in 1975 limited our use to 11,000 cusecs and the Agreement made by us this year has raised it to 22,500 cusecs. Now, it is nobody's contention that this is possibly the most ideal solution . . .

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: What did you draw in 1976 summer?

SHRI DINESH SINGH: I have replied that the hon. Member was a member of the Government and, perhaps, could enlighten me. How do we know?

PROF. S. NURUL HASAN: Source of it is the same as was a few minutes ago for the hon. Member.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: My source is the statement made by the Prime Minister. Unlike Members on the other side, I have no other source available to me.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: I saw you getting papers from the Official Gallery. I thought you had other source also.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: I am glad, the hon. lady Member keeps a track of my movements.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: I cannot help it.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: The paper I hold is the same. Now, as I was saying, Sir, the Prime Minister has made it quite clear that this Agreement is, in fact, sharing of difficulties which both the Governments faced, and, therefore, a settlement has really to be made in the reality of the situation. It is our hope that it would be possible to augment the waters of Ganga in that area by the connecting canals to which a reference 1.00 P.M. was made by the hon. lady Members. There is surplus water is in the Brahmaputra. It may be possible to bring that water to this area and we may be able to make a better utilisation of the Ganga waters. But the question is, as things stand today, could there have been a better agreement? It is my contention, Sir, that looking at the reality and as things are today, this is perhaps the best agreement that we could make. But as time passes, and as the situation changes or as the situation improves, we would be able to take benefits from it and in doing so, we would not only be able to keep the Calcutta Port going as it is, but perhaps we may also be able to improve upon it. After all, when we say that during the lean period the full water will not be available, it does not mean that there are no alternative ways of keeping the Calcutta Port free of silt. There are other measures, whether it is a question of dredging it or a question of ensuring that there is not so much erosion upstream, these are all measures which we shall have to look into. But in this agreement alone, I would say that we have neither sacrificed the interest of the Calcutta Port nor the interest of the people of West Bengal or the interests of the States through which the Ganga flows. In fact, it would give us five years time to go into this matter carefully and to find out what other steps could be taken to improve the Calcutta Port and to improve the irrigation facilities in the Ganga basin.

The real point that we have to bear in mind is that Bangladesh and India are very close neighbours. Mrs. Margaret Alva referred to the sacrifices we made for the liberation of Bangladesh. Now, these sacrifices are not a question of one-time effort or an one-period effort. When two neighbours wish to live peacefully and harmoniously and co-operate with one another, certainly, sacrifices have to be made by both the countries on a continuing basis. The fact that we have once made the sacrifice and because of that we can always claim a special position in Bangladesh does not reflect the reality of the situation. A close association and co-operation would mean a constant demand for sacrifices when there are shortages. Also, it could mean sharing of the benefits and we shall have to balance between the two. This beginning which has been made, the agreement which has been brought about, the agreement which had been attempted for so many years, I think, is a remarkable achievement of this Government that within this short period of time they have been in office, they have been able to bring about this settlement and I think...

SHRI KALI MUKHERJEE (West Bengal): Raja Saheb, you are badly briefed.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: The point is that you are not convinced yourself. Don't try to convince us. It is obvious you are not convinced.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: The charge of bad briefing is there only if you depend entirely on the brief. If you apply your mind to it, you cannot be badly briefed. All that I am trying to say is this. I would request you also to apply your mind. Perhaps, you have been wrongly briefed. The pile of papers which Mrs. Margaret Alva was carrying was perhaps the result of some briefing. I would now request her to apply her mind over the brief that she has

collected. She will then come to the conclusion that an agreement which was badly begun by the previous Government had been well-concluded by this Government. I would also like to take this opportunity, since I am speaking for the first time, to convey my congratulations to Babu Jagivan Ram for his efforts in the negotiations and the Foreign Minister whose final responsibility it was to sign the agreement.

SHRI KALYAN ROY: He is nodding his head that he has nothing to do with the agreement. He has made his position very clear. that he has nothing to do with the agreement.

SHRI DINESH SINGH: Mr. Deputy Chairman, it is not new for Mr. Kalyan Roy to put words into other's mouth, but I do not think the External Affairs Minister could possibly have said that he has nothing to do with it. Therefore, I would appeal to the House.

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय (उत्तर प्रदेश) : आपको फारेन मिनिस्ट्री नहीं मिलने वाली है।

श्री दिनेश सिंह : मालवीय जी, खाली फारेन मिनिस्ट्री की निगाह से तो आप देखते हैं। आप जरा देश की निगाह से देखिए तो इस मसाले की तस्वीर बदल जायेगी।

(Interruptions)

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : देशभक्ति की शिक्षा आपसे ही लेनी है।

SHRI DINESH SINGH: Sir, I would beg of the House to look at this Agreement in its depth, in the achievement that has been made, in the possibility of further improvement that has been left open and a deep opportunity of co-operation which has been included in the Agreement. If it is possible for us to go into an agreement with Bangladesh on the kind of the agreement that we made over the Indus Waters, I think it will

be a great achievement and it will bring great benefit to India. We would then be able to make use of the Ganga water far beyond 40,000 cusecs which was our demand, because then there will be plenty of water in that area. So, Sir, I would conclude by saying that when the House considers this matter, away from the emotion that has been introduced by some Members, coolly and calmly, I am sure it will come to the conclusion that no better agreement could have been made and this Agreement will be as important as our contribution in the Bangladesh struggle for independence.

Thank you.

श्री उपसभापति : अब सदन की कार्यवाही 2-15 तक के लिये स्थगित की जाती है।

The House then adjourned for lunch at seven minutes past one of the clock.

The House reassembled after lunch at seventeen minutes past two of the clock.

Mr. Deputy Chairman in the Chair.

SHRI ANANDA PATHAK (West Bengal): Sir, according to the statement of the Prime Minister made the other day on the floor of this House, the agreement between the Government of India and the Bangladesh Government was signed for bettering the relations between the two countries. That was the main theme of the whole statement. But I find that it has aroused serious misgivings among the people of West Bengal and other States and they have vigorously protested against this agreement. Even the State leadership of the Janata Party in West Bengal has also raised its voice against this agreement. It is very unfortunate that before signing this agreement, Government of India did not consult the Government of West Bengal although the West

[Shri Ananda Pathak]

Bengal Government is directly connected with the problems of Farakka as well as the Ganga waters. Therefore, what their view is, what they want and what are their problems—all that should have been taken into account before signing that agreement. That is our view.

According to the agreement, we find that India will get 20,800 cusecs of water during the leanest period from April 21 to 30 and progressively more water will be withdrawn from the Ganga in the preceding and succeeding weeks. That is the provision of that agreement. But time and again the experts have made it clear that on account of this, the very flow of 40,000 cusecs of water through Farakka barrage as well the Hooghly river will be jeopardised. Although the present Agreement provides for more water than the Agreement which was signed between the Indira Government and the Mujibur Rahman Government at that time, we find that only 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs of water could be drawn from the Ganga which was totally negligible. When they signed the agreement there were vigorous protests from all sides and from all shades of opinion because unless the full amount of water is given the whole of the Calcutta Port would be silted. That was the protest raised from all corners. Even now, though the Agreement is now for 20,000 cusecs of water, it will be quite insufficient to meet the needs of West Bengal. That is why we find so much protest from all sides.

Sir, it is true that sometimes in the interest of maintaining better relations we have to adopt the policy of give and take with our neighbours but ignoring the needs of our country to satisfy the needs of the neighbour is also not proper. So while this Agreement has already been signed without consulting West Bengal we demand a review of the Agreement within one year of its signing. Let us calculate the effect and the impact

of the Agreement and then see what can be done and what should be done.

Sir, the Agreement is for five years and provides for a review only after three years. This is a provision which I will not support. The Chief Minister of West Bengal also requested the Government of India and the hon'ble Prime Minister that the Agreement should be reviewed after one year after watching its effect on the Calcutta Port. But his request has been totally ignored. I maintain that it is an injustice to the Government of West Bengal, to the people of West Bengal and we cannot support the stand taken by the Government of India. The Government of West Bengal and all the people there have vigorously protested against this Agreement and I fully share their view. Although I fully share the view, as I said in the beginning, in the interest of better relations with a neighbouring country sometime we have to adopt the policy of give and take. Sir, I repeat that not only Calcutta but the whole eastern region has been ignored. Therefore, the Agreement should be reviewed at the earliest opportunity, as early as possible within one year. The Agreement should be revised to help the people of West Bengal in getting more water. That is all I have to say. Thank you.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI (Punjab): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, in fact, when I was told that the Janata Government fielded its prime spokesman on foreign affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, to speak before me, I was having second thoughts whether I should even stand up and speak. But it was quite apparent from the few minutes that Mr. Dinesh Singh spoke that his heart was not in what he really said. Since there were no other speakers from the Government side on the list which was sent to us today, it was probably felt necessary that somebody must get up and defend the so-called historic Farakka Agreement. But probably there were no volun-

teers to speak because it is quite possible that most Members of Parliament, the most prominent public opinion-makers in the country, irrespective of party and political affiliations, have felt that this Agreement has been nothing short of a sell-out. And it is true today, in today's political context, specially when great delight is taken by the Members of the ruling party to single out Members of the Congress and say they did not speak up during the last 18 months and what happened to their conscience and what happened to their voice. Probably the Members of the Janata Party have equal qualms of conscience and do not want to be branded three or five years later that they stood up to defend a statement which cannot be defended at all.

Nevertheless, one of the points Mr. Dinesh Singh made was that in the circumstances this was the best agreement which could be arrived at. Even if it means repeating some of the points made out by the earlier speakers, I would like to understand what were the circumstances, what were the two conflicting and opposite cases presented by the Government of India and the Government of Bangladesh. As the hon. Prime Minister in his statement said, Bangladesh, in order to protect its interests and avoid adverse effects on the country's ecology and economy, wanted the entire flow of 55,000 cusecs during the leanest period of the dry season and that the flow should be maintained uninterrupted. Fair enough. You cannot blame another Government for making a demand which seems high, given the circumstances and the quantum of water available. But what was the case of India? How do the two cases compare with each other? When you put forward a case, one takes it for granted that the case is substantiated by facts and by genuine requirements. As I, a lay person, understand this, in Bangladesh the Ganges water feeds the Padma river which in its turn feeds the two tributaries, Gorai and Madhumati, which in their turn feed about three

districts with a population of about three crores. On the other hand, there is India's case which affects millions and millions of land acreage, the catchment land being much, 94 per cent more of what Bangladesh's land is, with 14 to 16 crores of people, all living in the eastern belt of India—Bengal, Bihar, Eastern U.P. and other north-eastern States. The Calcutta port is totally dependent on the waters which it would receive. Fifty per cent of India's trade passes through the Calcutta port. Not only the Calcutta port, there is the Haldia port which is also dependent on this and which is equipped to have heavy traffic of 20 million tonnes a year. That port is built to receive ships of 80,000 tonnes which require a draught of 42 feet. The Haldia port took approximately Rs. 150 crores to construct and, as has been stated, the Farakka barrage took Rs. 156 crores to construct.

These are the two cases. How do we synchronise the interest? How do we balance the interests to arrive at an agreement which might be internationally applauded, which might show a great inborn and inherent desire to sacrifice even when we see the sufferings. I quite agree with Hon. Prime Minister that the fundamental principle of the success of a national foreign policy depends on good neighbourly relations. But it is a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of any country in the world that it is always based on the national interests, and I would ask the Hon. Prime Minister and the Hon. Foreign Affairs Minister whether they are genuinely convinced that they have served the larger national interests of India when they sold out our share of water to Bangladesh?

There was another point which was made by the Prime Minister. He said that we were trying to win over a friendly Government. As has been asked earlier, what is the concept of a friendly Government? Is friendship not based on certain principles and certain values, values which the

[Shrimati Ambika Soni]

Janata Government today proclaims louder than anybody else? Are you trying to buy friendship with the military junta? Are you trying to buy friendship of those people who do not know how to honour their own freedom fighters? Are you trying to buy friendship of those people who have shed their freedom fighters blood in order to occupy the positions of power at the instance of other foreign powers? If that is the interest, if that is the objective and the goal, I wonder how far you would be successful. This question could have been answered at later date, but unfortunately this question has been answered right now for the Janata Government. The attitude of the Bangladesh Government till recently has been anything but friendly. How has the agreement on Farakka mellowed their feeling to India? I would definitely like to ask. The statement goes on to say further that since there is no international law which puts down the rights of the riparian States and it is still to be codified, the universally accepted principle is that the riparian States should sit together and discuss their problems. I agree that that would be the best possible solution in the national interests and, in this case, with a neighbouring country to sit down and discuss mutually the problems. But, there is an agreement which has been recognised in Helsinki also, which has been utilised not once but many times over all over the world. The Supreme Court of the United States, when deciding riparian problems referred to it. The Harmon theory which was propounded to settle the problems of riogrande affecting the United States of America and Mexico, was never accepted. It has been extinct. We should no longer cling to it. You have the instance of the Canadian Government. The Swiss tribunal has referred to the international precedents or rules which talk of equitable distribution of water. What is equitable distribution of water? As I understand from whatever little documents have been available to all of us, equitable distribu-

tion has to be based on not only the catchment land which is a very important factor but also on the population affected, on her trade which is affected, on irrigation of land, and of food supply to millions of people in our country who are affected, that is all to be taken into consideration when you are making an equitable distribution of water.

The Government goes on to say that they are not working on a clean slate. I do not understand what they mean by a clean slate. It might not have been a clean slate if they had been handed down an agreement which bound them. As I understand the agreement of 1974 the two Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh, was written only for the leanest period for approximately 4 months. If there had been anything which had bound India for generations to come, it would have been a longer contract. It was only to uphold the principle which the Prime Minister has spoken of today, of helping a neighbouring country in need, of helping a friendly Government in need, that the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, looking to the problems which were facing Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the architect of Bangladesh, agreed to this sharing of water for 3½ months or 4 months, which may have been seen as a disadvantage to India. But it was operating for these four months. There was no other agreement to bind any government, any successive Government, for years and years to come.

Sir, I am hearing a new theory now because I have heard during the last few months that the Government is morally obliged to undo which the Congress has done, whether it is good or not good.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: Who says so? Who has made such a statement?

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: Well, Sir, even if no such statement has been made, it would be politically unwise to make such a statement. The people of this country would not

accept it. The Harijans of this country find that the land given to them is being taken back. It is seen in the very steps which have been taken by the Government. But I would not like to digress. If the moral compunction on the Janata Government was there that there was already a commitment...

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: There is no such commitment.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: May I go on? I am not such an experienced speaker and I just lose track of my points. So, as was pointed out by the Foreign Minister on various occasions, Bangladesh tried to internationalise this problem. They took it to the Islamic Conference, to the Non-aligned Bureau and to the United Nations. Well, we do not want to internationalise this problem. Normally one would not like to internationalise any problem. It is connected with your own national interest. We should have the capacity to sort it out. Since we did not have a clean slate, since there were certain things with which the Government did not agree and which the Government wanted to undo, wasn't there this way out that you could have referred it to the International Court? Precedents have been established. Don't you think that the merit of the case which was put forward by India, putting forward all its requirements, would have received a just consideration? Even this would not be a very unusual affair. As Mr. Dinesh Singh mentioned, the Indus Water dispute was referred off and on to the International Court. Waving aside compulsory jurisdiction or whatever there is, this could have been done if we felt bound by any treaty or any contract or agreement which was not to our liking. There is no justification for entering into a further agreement. Then you say "We have done better than what the Congress Government did; they settled for 11 to 16; we settled for 20 to 26." But the requirement is

40,000 cusecs, and anything below 40,000 cusecs is a sell-out. There is no justification if you say "The other Government did this much good and we have done a little bit more." That good is not enough. And that is what we are interested in finding out.

Again, Sir, the Joint Rivers Commission which was constituted in 1972, which has again been brought into prominence, has been given a life period of three years to suggest how the waters of the Ganga could be augmented. What has the Commission been doing from 1972 till now is a big question-mark. What will it do in the next three years? And then the Government will consider the recommendations given by the Joint Rivers Commission with a view to implementing them so that the flow in the river could be augmented. Sir, we may not be experts in irrigation, we may not be experts in dealing with foreign affairs, but even a lay person like myself can question it. To increase the flow, surely the Janata Government is not thinking of melting the snows on the Himalayas. There are only three ways of increasing the flow into the Farakka, and to my mind, they are: first, the Government should have mentioned or the two signatory Governments should have mentioned that all programmes of deforestation will be forbidden and that afforestation will take place on a large scale, because without afforestation you cannot attract clouds, you cannot have rain and you cannot increase the flow in your river. Secondly, there should have been a provision already—it is not necessary to come to know of it three years from now—that there should be no more constructions on this river. There should be no more constructions because the two constructions on the two tributaries—the Kosi and the Ghandak—already take 10,000 cusecs of water each and any further construction on this river will lessen the flow of water.

[Shrimati Ambika Soni]

The third thing I feel is that it would have been advisable if the Government had also been able to write down that more reservoirs would be built so as to store water during the period when there is abundance of water, and even during the lean months we would have ample supply of water from the reservoirs. Do you have to wait for three years to hear of these suggestions? I would, therefore, like you to note that if this sort of a thing had also been included, then this agreement would not have looked as superficial as it did now. There is another thing that Mr. Dinesh Singh said in the morning, that we Congress Members have no right to stand up and speak on this issue because the earlier commitment was made by the Congress Government. In all humility I would say that Babu Jagjivan Ram was negotiating at that time also on behalf of the Congress Government and in his sagacity he refused to succumb to any pressure which would involve sacrificing the interests of India. We upheld the interests of India and thereby we could not have a long-term agreement or any agreement to that effect. Today Babuji has again negotiated the same agreement on behalf of the Janata Government, but this time pressure does seem to have been put on him because even though he might have been the main negotiator or one of the main negotiators of this problem, he was not there when the agreement was signed. Could we infer from this that even though he was negotiating on behalf of the Janata Government he realised that this agreement was not in the interests of India. I would also want to say that there is another mistake another shortcoming...

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही (उत्तर प्रदेश): इन सारी चीजों की जानकारी क्या श्रीमती सोनी को स्वप्न में हुई थी।

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI:..... and that is, looking through the documents backwards I felt that even when

the two Prime Ministers, our ex-Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and their late Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, signed an agreement in April 1974, it was done for the four lean months and the rest of the year was taken as an oral agreement mutually settled. I should be the last person to put forward any suggestion that international agreements should not be oral. I find that the same thing has happened today. We talk of the period January to May and during the rest the maximum flow will come in. Is there a written agreement for the rest of the year? Because there is no written agreement there is no legal sanctity to an oral agreement. The present Government should know that after the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, within a few days, the new Government, which came into power refused to honour any settlement and said, the Farakka Barrage should be stopped forthwith because there was no agreement to determine inflow of water into the Farakka for the remaining eight months. I would like to know from the honourable Foreign Minister or the honourable Prime Minister if this agreement is only restricted to the lean months or it covers supply of water for the whole year. Sir, I would not like to make a very lengthy speech; I would not like to say more than what I have already said because I would be repeating unnecessarily a lot of points. Earlier, before coming into the House, I had the opportunity to overhear the honourable Prime Minister saying that there is no point in shooting when the guns do not hurt. Our objective is not to shoot anybody down...

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: I never used those words.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: What I meant was it was said in such strong words. The strong words used reflected this impression. I could not agree with the Prime Minister more strongly words probably boomerang. But the Government must at this moment understand and realise that this is not

an issue to be dealt with coldly; this is not an issue to be dealt with sitting back in a relaxed manner and having a point here and there. The problem has assumed such importance that it affects the destiny of not just 14 or 16 crores of people around there, it affects the destiny of 62 crores of people. Just because it is located in Bihar or Bengal you cannot say that only the destiny of the people of Bihar and Bengal is affected. If something happens in Haryana or Punjab, you cannot say that it affects only the people of Haryana and Punjab, and that the people of **Kashmir are not affected**. If something happens in Andhra Pradesh or Tamil Nadu, you cannot say that it affects only the people living there and not those living in other parts of India. Whatever happens in one part of the country affects the entire population of India. So, it is not a matter which can be considered so lightly.

I could understand when the hon. Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister earlier said that Farakka is a very important and delicate issue and therefore the details on which they were negotiating were not forthcoming because if the details were divulged that would put an end to the negotiation. I wish the details had been divulged and the negotiations had been put an end to because then we would not have to face such a shameful document. The Foreign Minister said we should rise above political and partisan considerations and we should not be small and petty in dealing with this vital issue. I would have agreed with that, if they had shown the courtesy of inviting the Leader of the Opposition and discussed this agreement with them before it had become effective. You cannot expect us to defend something to which we are not only not the signatories, but which we totally condemn. I agree with many people who were saying that it is now a *fait accompli* and what are we going to achieve by this long debate? Maybe we may not achieve anything; maybe the agreement cannot be reserved.

But we do want to say that this Farakka agreement is a black mark on India's foreign policy.

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI (Gujarat): Mr. Deputy Chairman, rise to welcome the agreement which has been arrived at between the Governments of India and Bangladesh. Being essentially a technocrat, I may not be able to work myself up to the passionate emotions in which several of the opposition speakers have expressed themselves including the lady members. I would, however, like to refer to the concluding statement made by the Prime Minister. I am sorry that a lot of partisan emotion has been injected into this debate. The Prime Minister's last sentence was:

"May I seek the indulgence of the House to treat this Agreement in the same spirit sinking inter-party differences and in the wider perspective of the overall objective of our foreign policy and specifically the well-being of the two countries?"

Sir, having ignored this appeal of the Prime Minister, I am afraid several of the speakers have fallen into the error of completely ignoring the entire tenor of the statement of the Prime Minister. There are two or three major principles which have been enunciated in the Prime Minister's statement, namely, (a) that it was incumbent on us to arrive at a bilateral agreement with Bangladesh; and (b) it should be irrespective of our individual views on the political complexion of the Government in neighbouring State. We are not concerned with that. Two of the primary tenets of our foreign policy to which the previous Government was wedded and to which this Government is also wedded are, (a) that settlement with neighbours will be by bilateral negotiations; and (b) it will be based on non-interference in the internal affairs of the other countries and in not judging the issue of settlement between two countries on the basis of the political complexion of the Government in the other country.

[Shri H. M. Trivedi]

Sir, I am sorry that in a public debate of this kind responsible Members of this House have indulged in casting aspersion on the political complexion of the Government in a neighbouring country. I hope at least subsequent speakers will refrain from doing so.

Before I proceed to the merits of the issue, I would like to clarify two or three factual points so that the debate may proceed along the proper lines. Firstly, what in fact was the agreement of 1974? In their joint declaration of May 1974, the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh noted—noted—that the Farakka Barrage would be commissioned by the end of 1974, but at the same time they agreed—agreed—that a mutually acceptable allocation of the water available during periods of minimum flow in the Ganga should be arrived at before commissioning the Barrage.

This is the prime fact which we must not forget. In other words; a settlement on the flow of the Ganga waters during the lean season had to be agreed upon with Bangladesh before commissioning the barrage. The second thing which I would like to clarify is the question raised by my honourable colleague, Prof. Nurul Hasan. He asked: "What was the agreement for the lean season of 1975-76? Sir, the fact is that there was no agreement for the dry season of 1975-76; there was no inter-governmental agreement. When no agreement was reached for the dry season of 1975-76 and when India started drawing flows to the feeder canal capacity. Bangladesh made a number of moves to internationalise the Farakka issue. Now, Sir, my honourable colleague, Shrimati Soni, has traversed a rather delicate ground in international law and she has gone even to the extent of suggesting that it might even be possible to go to the International Court of Justice, etc. I am afraid, Sir, the foreign policy of this country has not

been conducted in the past on the basis of going to the International Court of Justice. But it has always been based on peaceful and amicable settlement of whatever issue arises between two countries on a bilateral basis. But, Sir, I will come to the merits even in terms of international law a little later.

When this happened, Sir, it was raised in the United Nations and I suppose, my honourable friend, Mrs. Alva, probably attended the session there in which this country powerfully pleaded and I think she herself must have pleaded with equal passion—that it was an issue which must be settled bilaterally between India and Bangladesh. This was the stand we took internationally and it became incumbent upon us to settle the issue bilaterally.

Thirdly, Sir, as a matter of fact, a reference was made to an answer which I had the privilege of giving in this House to Mr. Kalyan Roy, namely, that the trade of Calcutta was diminishing and that the Farakka Barrage scheme would ensure better navigability in the Hooghly river. Both these statements still remain true and it is true that the trade of Calcutta has been diminishing. But, Sir, to the technical aspect of the question of why it has been diminishing, I will come a little later. Let me first clarify the position in international law also.

Mrs. Soni referred the precedent of an agreement between the United States and Mexico. Let me state categorically, without any fear of contradiction, that there is no precedent available in international law similar to, or on all fours with the dispute, in relation to the circumstances, between India and Bangladesh.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: But I would like to tell that on the matter of the Indus Water Treaty we had gone to the International Court of Justice though it was not binding on

the Indian Government to accept the decision of the Court. But the matter had been referred to the Court.

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI: Let me state quite categorically that there is no precedent in international law with categorically recognises the rights of an upper-riparian State, the superior rights of an upper-riparian State over a lower-riparian state. This is the position in law. It does not recognise categorically the special or superior rights of an upper-riparian State . . . (Interruptions) . . . If you will please bear with me, it has to be considered, taking into account the unique feature of an international river as to how equitable sharing has to be determined. This is the principle in international law. Now, opinions may differ on whether this is an equitable distribution or not. You may hold one view and I may hold another. But the principle in international law is that it does not recognise categorically the superior rights of the upper-riparian States and, therefore, let us not confuse the issue by talking of going to the International Court of Justice and so on. But I would stress that far from going to the International Court of Justice, we have maintained as one of the prime principles of our foreign policy that we must settle our disputes with our neighbours on a bilateral basis and this is the crux of the problem.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: Sir, I would not like to interrupt Mr. Trivedi. He is much more knowledgeable, because I am not a student of international law or any other law. But I said that since there is no international law and the Prime Minister's statement does refer to international law which is not there, there are certain precedents which have been recognised even in Helsinki and only to these international precedents I was referring, which deal with

equitable distribution of water. I never referred to any law.

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI: Thus we are on the same ground, namely equitable distribution, in which case you are welcome to maintain your opinion and I am welcome to maintain my opinion. But let it be quite clear that in terms of arguing our case on the basis of international law, the position in international law is not clear at all in terms of recognising the superior rights of an upper-riparian State. I would repeat that.

Sir, I will now really come to the merits of the Farakka issue as such. In the heat of the debate several Members seem to have lost sight of the major tenor of the Prime Minister's statement and the major issues raised in answer in the Prime Minister's statement.

Firstly, Sir, questions were raised as to what we have gained by this settlement. Here I would like to refer to what the Prime Minister stated:

"The demand for consumptive and non-consumptive use, particularly for irrigation of the Ganga waters, has increased and is likely to continue to increase even more rapidly in future. Therefore, for a rational arrangement for increasing the availability of water through some long term scheme is imperative."

Sir, apprehensions were expressed that this settlement may lead to any inter-State disputes because the upstream States may be affected as regards the availability of water. Sir, it is argued as if the entire economic future of the eastern region and even of upstream States hinged on this settlement, settlement of river disputes and equitable distribution between the neighbouring States, of available water at the feeder canal. Now, Sir, this is a misconception. It appears to have been misunderstood that by way of natural

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flow, sufficient water is just not available in the Ganga to be able to take care of all the needs. Let us recognize that this is the prime parameter of the problem. Sufficient water is just not available to meet the requirements, both consumptive and non-consumptive requirements, in the Ganga to take care of three things: firstly, increasing needs of the upstream States; secondly, the necessity for flow of water in the Hooghly to keep the Calcutta port clear; and thirdly, the rights such as they may be of the lower riparian State in order to take care of its needs. Therefore, Sir, in view of this, the major point which was made by the Prime Minister in his statement, and the more important part of the statement, is that an agreement has been arrived at on the long-term solution of the problem and an agreement has now been arrived at which says that within a period of three years the two countries will arrive at an understanding on the type of scheme which they will execute—mark the words—‘which they will execute’—as speedily as possible thereafter. The economic interests of this country, including the interests of the port of Calcutta, really are related with augmenting the flow of the Ganga. And the augmenting of the flow of the Ganga can only occur on the basis of an agreed scheme between the two countries and on its execution. Instead of seeking international interference, instead of talking about going to the International Court of Justice, I would suggest to the hon. Members, Sir, that time would be when we may require international assistance, not interference, to be able to execute the project which would increase the flow of the Ganga for meeting the purposes of both countries. That is the major question, Sir.

Sir, an apprehension was expressed with regard to disputes between States. I am sorry, and I must confess to myself indeed, and I think all hon. Members must confess to themselves, that the harm which we have inflicted upon

ourselves by our failure to settle the river disputes between States in our own country—this harm has been, and is likely to be, much greater than the residual handicaps of the port of Calcutta even after the flow of water at the level at which it has been agreed to in this Agreement. I am sorry to say that that is the situation.

3. P.M. Now, Sir, I will come to the other merits of the Agreement and try to clarify some of the technical aspects of the problem. There are three major misconceptions which are harboured by hon. Members. Firstly, it would seem as if the hon. Members imagine that the regime of the Hoogly river has been deteriorating only in the immediate past. This is not the case. The regime of the Hoogly river has been deteriorating for over a period of 45 to 50 years. Let us not forget that the Farakka barrage scheme was not conceived by us. The Farakka barrage was conceived by the British. We agreed that the Farakka barrage scheme was necessary for the preservation of the Port of Calcutta. Nobody can deny that. Having served more than 30 years of my life in shipping, I yield to no one in this House about my concern for Calcutta and for the other major ports of India. I am, therefore, as acutely concerned with what happens to Calcutta after this Agreement and what was happening to Calcutta before this Agreement as anyone else. But let us get away from the misconception that there was a deterioration in the regime of the river Hoogly only in the last four or five years. The point I wish to make is that we have been geared for the last 20 years to combat that deterioration. We have been combating that deterioration in the river Hoogly for the last 20 years by measures of dredging and river training, etc. This is something which may have to be continued even after the Agreement. But the fact is that we have been combating that deterioration.

Now, I will come to the other part about declining trade at Calcutta. Sir, about 6 or 7 years back when the trade

at Calcutta was somewhere near 16 or 17 million tonnes, is consisted mainly more than two-thirds of bulk cargoes of iron ore, salt, coal, food-grains, fertilisers etc. The deteriorating regime of the river was not the only cause of decline in trade. Why was there a decline in trade? The trade declined because in the carriage of bulk cargoes the type of ships that came into play in world's trade required a larger draft and deeper workers. In other words, coincidentally as it happened, with the deteriorating regime of the river, we also had a phenomenon of larger ships with larger drafts wanting to use Calcutta Port. The answer which we have sought to the deteriorating regime in the Hoogly is not one. We have sought two answers. Farakka has been built at an expense of 156 crores of rupees. But let the hon. Members not forget that we have also executed one of the largest sport complexes in Haldia at a cost of over 125 crores of rupees. Haldia is the real answer to this decline in trade to a large extent. I won't say that the use of Calcutta Port is going to be discontinued. I am not, for a moment, suggesting that the measures for the continued use of Calcutta by ships which are likely to make use of Calcutta for general cargoes which are carried in ships of that burden and that dead weight will not be necessary. Let me not be misunderstood. All I am trying to say is that we have had two answers, Farakka Barrage and Haldia. Now, my hon. friend, Mrs. Soni, referred to 20 tonnes from Haldia. Haldia was commissioned only last February. Hardly a few ships have called there. I do not know how she got the figure of 20 million tonnes for Haldia. She also referred to the effect of this Agreement at the new port. Sir, let me make it quite clear that no reliable technical studies are available as yet about the effect of the flow of Farakka on the regime of the river as far down as Haldia. Insofar as Haldia is concerned, all our planning has been based on maintenance dredging for the purpose of maintaining the ap-

proach channel to Haldia. In other words, Sir, if, in fact, this Agreement achieve what it is intended to achieve, namely, arrest the further deterioration of the regimes of the river—and Mr. Kalyan Roy quoted the experience which we had in two dry seasons, when in one dry season we let go some water low and in the other dry season something like 35,000 cusecs flowing—and if there was some improvement in the regimes of the river in the salinity of the water at Calcutta, there is every reason to believe that with the flow of water which has now been agreed upon in this agreement at least, the deterioration will be arrested and that there may even be a certain improvement in the regime of the river. This, as I said already, fits into both the long-term and the short-term aspects of the problem. We have got an agreement and this will be reviewed and the long-term solution will be arrived at. In the short term, the agreement envisages a review at the end of three years, and the flow of water which is likely to be available at Farakka will, as I said earlier and we have every reason to hope, arrest the further deterioration and, perhaps, also lead to a more moderate and, perhaps a more gradual improvement. The second misconception is that the flow of waters from Farakka are likely to lead to an instantaneous improvement in the conditions for the port of Calcutta. Sir, it is also not true. Even with 40,000 cusecs flowing from Farakka, in the lean season the regime of the river was likely to improve only over a period of seven to ten years. It is not impossible and let us hope that if, in fact, at the end of three years, an agreement is reached on a scheme to augment the waters of the Ganga and if, in fact, that scheme is implemented within a period of five to eight years, thereafter, it is not impossible that this period may well coincide with the anticipated improvement, bringing improvement of the regime of the river in so far as Calcutta is concerned even with the flow of 40,000

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cusecs. The third point, as I said earlier, I have dealt with and that is as far as the approach channel to Haldia is concerned. As I said earlier, being a technocrat, I cannot bring myself to talk passionately on the political aspects of the problem but I am sorry that several expressions have been uttered with regard to the political complexion of the Government in a neighbouring State. Any intransigence on our part in settling an issue of this character, a delicate international issue of a technical nature, is likely to lead to further intransigence. I am sorry to advise my hon. friend—I am not a lover of the regime which has come in Bangladesh but I must confess, that if in a public debate of this character on Farakka, we are going to indulge in expressions of that character, we are not assisting the democratic forces in Bangladesh, and in fact we are assisting further intransigence. Sir, the political issue seems to have been discussed as if this is not a technical issue. This is an issue relating merely to the sharing of waters between two neighbouring States of a river.

SHRI KALYAN ROY: Technical imperative has been stated again and again.

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI: My friend, Mr. Kalyan Roy, spoke as if we were arguing about a disputed territory, as if we were trying to recover territory lost in a war or in a confrontation. Sir, we are not dealing here with a problem of that character. We are not dealing here with a problem in which any neighbouring State is trying to alter the geo-political balance in the sub-continent which has come to be established after the establishment of Bangladesh. We are not dealing with a situation of that character. We are not dealing with a situation in which any neighbouring situation in which any neighbouring State is interfering with the exercise of any sovereign rights within my

own territory. I would like to point out that when Bangladesh maintained that the lower riparian State must continue to receive the natural flow of the Ganga, when they claimed a veto over the rights of the upper riparian States, we have rejected it. As a matter of fact, the reasons for the protracted negotiations have been the sorting out of the issues involved, and to get a long-term agreement to be able to augment the flow of water in the Ganga which would really be the permanent solution. Sir, as I said, we are not dealing here with any disputed territory or recovery of any disputed territory or any State indulging in any overt action, direct or indirect, which would alter the geo-political balance on the sub-continent. We are also not dealing with an issue

SHRI KALYAN ROY: You have stated in the House that Farakka is the answer to the Calcutta Port. Now you are arguing against it. That was your reply in this House.

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI: I have already clarified. You were not here when I was referring to that particular Question. I would like you to read the record. I would, therefore, Sir, conclude by saying that in the national and international context in which this issue had to be discussed—in the context of the preceding agreements such as they were—I am not blaming this Government or that Government—, an understanding, call it an agreement, call it a declaration, regarding the settlement of the flow of water in the lean months, will, in fact, be arrived at with Bangladesh before commissioning the barrage—bearing in mind the fact that this issue was going to be internationalised after failure to arrive at the agreement—it was already internationalised, as I said...

SHRI KALYAN ROY: It was not

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI: As a matter of fact, Mr. Kalyan Roy, you should remember that it was by international consensus that this issue was remitted

to us at our own instance, on the basis of our own plea, on the basis of our own...

SHRI KALYAN ROY: International capitalists and monopolists and imperialists will always try to do this; in the third world developing countries they will always try to intervene in various ways. Are you going to surrender to them?

SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI: Mr. Kalyan Roy, have you forgotten your experience of 20 years with regard to the Kashmir dispute, when you failed to find the friends that you were looking for. If the international community was, in fact, intent upon interfering in the manner in which you suggest, I tell you that they would have taken notice of what Bangladesh had then said. Instead, I think it is a happy outcome, even at the international forum, that they heeded our plea and that they recognised the fact that this was an issue to be settled in consonance with the principles which we ourselves have maintained, entirely for bilateral settlement. Therefore, Sir, having clarified the technical aspects, having clarified the fact that there is no reason to fear that the regime of the river will deteriorate further—in fact it is likely to lead to a gradual improvement—, having regard to the fact that Haldia is really the major answer as far as the trade is concerned and having stressed the fact that we have arrived at a satisfactory bilateral agreement, I would suggest, Sir, that this House welcomes this Agreement.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I am intervening in this debate particularly because I have been referred to several times by some of the speakers who spoke on this subject with great passion. I can understand the passion, I can understand the vehemence; but will vehemence and passion solve any problem? That is all that I want to ask. And, may I say, that it does not

help us in this House, which is the House of Elders, as it is called, to behave as if we are children. I can understand children tearing up things, messing up things, destroying things, but will elders be able to do that? Of course, I know that they are not all elders in this House. But when they have come, they have become elders, they should not forget that. This is the House of Elders; that description is not justified otherwise. Therefore, we ought to consider things more calmly and with greater dignity.

When it was said by my hon. friend opposite that we are determined and that is our policy to see that we undo everything that was done by the previous Government, I cannot understand how such a fantastic statement should be made by a person who claims to be very reasonable. Now, claims and professions are quite different from action. We are not wedded to removing everything that was done by the previous Government. I have said it publicly that we are also bound by the commitments of the past Government in foreign relations. We are not disturbing them; nor can I say at any time that whatever the previous Government had done was wrong. How can it be said? I would only say whatever wrong was done was wrong. And I would not claim even on behalf of this Government that whatever we have done has always been right and we would not do something which may not be wrong. I am not going to claim that. But to attack us on this issue in this manner is not fair. That is all that I want to plead. Nor is it fair to say that we are selling out the country. There would not be a worse charge than that against anybody. I do not want to imitate other's language nor do I want to use invectives in reply, because that does not help the solution of any problem. But I would certainly want to point out that invectives do not add any strength to an argument. On the contrary; they only show that there is bankruptcy of logic in the argument. That

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is all that it means. Otherwise, why should any one use invectives at all? And how have we sold out anything? I would be the last person in the world who would want to sell out anything. I would prefer death hundred times before I do that. And I maintain it. Let them point out any instance where it has been so done by me in any transaction, private or public. But those who are used to this kind of thing, will imagine others also are doing the same thing. What else would they do? Now, when it is said that we sold out the country, I am bound to say that...

SHRI SHYAM LAL YADAV (Uttar Pradesh): It is unfair.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: Where were you sleeping all the time when they said this? What is the use of protesting? I would also like to tease them. I cannot allow these things to pass on. This is my business as the Leader to show them where they are wrong. Let them also feel what it means, when it is said that we sold out something. When 11,000 to 16,000 was agreed to what would it be called? Why was it forgotten by them and how does it lie in their mouth to say that this is a sell-out? I cannot understand. I would not object to that; I would not quarrel; let them say that. But to make a charge of selling out this country is something for which I have certainly got to tell them let them improve themselves before they are entitled to say that. That is all that I would say. It is not right. And in this House where will dignity be if you are going to say these kinds of things? We should talk with some dignity. This is not the way to discuss such an important problem which concerns two countries. It cannot be forgotten that international relations are very important for any country. We are not living by the law of the jungle now. We are supposed to live in a civilised world. Should we behave as uncivilised?

This is what has happened. My hon. friend over there goes on repeating *ad nauseam* that there is a military junta there in the neighbouring country. Does he do good to anybody? Is it right to criticise a neighbouring country in this manner? How is it his concern or my concern to castigate any Government in a neighbouring country? Is it right? We may like or we may not like it. That is a different thing. It is a personal opinion. But we have no business to say this. Then, we will have to go round everywhere condemning everybody except ourselves, that we are angels and others are not. This is not right. This is not how our policy is framed. We believe in a non-aligned policy; that is, common to everybody

AN HON. MEMBER: Genuine.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: Genuine. Because you are not genuine. That is why I say that. I am prepared to prove it in a dialogue, if you want it, where it was not genuine. That is why I have called it genuine. I do not apologise for what I have said. I have said everything deliberately. It is proved by what I have done now, how it can be genuine. Therefore, what is the use of saying this kind of thing? Now, take this agreement. Now, what have we done to justify all this passion being raised for several hours? This question had been pending for a long time. I yield to none in saying that Calcutta Port must be preserved and must be strengthened by whatever legitimate means, that we can adopt. We should do it. I can also understand the opinion in West Bengal being one and that in Bangladesh being the other. They also say that this is not right. For emotional people, when reason disappears this is not understandable. Now, it is said that I have not taken the people into confidence. I did keep the Chief Minister of West Bengal informed about it. Not that I went on his advice. I would be very unfair to him to say that. But he was informed about what we were doing.

But my hon. friend says that we should take the opposition into confidence while negotiating such things. I do not know. Is it in consonance with any commonsense while running a Government? Is any Government run like this in the world? Can any relations with any country be carried on in this manner? Then, there will be no negotiations and there will be no settlements if this is to be done. When hon. friends opposite talk in this manner, it will be an impossible task. Let them be reasonable. Let them consider. These are not national questions. These are international questions. But then, there must be an agreement to the mutual advantage of both our countries. I am trying to do it to the best of my capacity.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: There would be an assurance that these things would not be taken advantage of. The opposition would not behave irresponsibly. I am sure of that, Sir.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: We want the opposition to be strong. But the way to be strong is not to become irresponsible. That is what I would say.

(Interruptions)

SHRIMATI PRATIBHA SINGH (Bihar): We would like to know why the opposition leaders were not consulted.

(Interruptions)

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: I cannot take the opposition leaders into confidence in everything. Sometimes, I cannot take even my colleagues into confidence when I act. I have to do that also. I have to tell them afterwards and explain to them if necessary. No Government can be run in the manner in which my hon. friend wants it to be run.

श्रीमती विद्यावती चतुर्वेदी (मध्य प्रदेश)

मेम्बर पार्लियामेंट को इस तरह से क्रिटिसाइज करेग तो यह कोई गम्भीरता की या बड़ी अच्छी बात नहीं है

1234 RS-6.

(Interruptions). हम वच्चे नहीं है जो यहां आकर बैठ गये हों। हमारी भी डिग्नटी है, हम लोग भी समझते है, हमारी भी भावनाएं है ।

श्री मोरारजी आर० देसाई : मैं नहीं कहता कि आप नहीं समझती हैं, लेकिन गलत समझती है इतना ही कहता हूँ ।

श्रीमती विद्यावती चतुर्वेदी : हो सकता है कि आप गलत समझते हो। यह मेरी या आपकी कोई ठेकेदारी नहीं है कि जो आप समझते हों वह सही हो और जो दूसरा कोई समझता हो वह गलत हो ।

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: When it is said that we are not understanding, we are not doing it rightly and we are doing it dishonestly, when all these epithets have been given to me, could not even this much be accepted? What can I do to that? But this is not going to prevent me from saying what I have to say. Let it be understood because we have got to do it properly. Take the case of Bangladesh. Take the case of our neighbours. We are a big country in this area, much bigger than most of them. Whose duty is to make friendship? It is our duty to do so, but of course in a reasonable manner, not in a manner which hurts this country. But if something is to be given by somebody it is the elder brother who has to give and not the younger brother. That has been the tradition and culture of this country. But we have not given away anything in this matter. I repeat that. That also must be remembered. But if help is necessary. We are helping many of them. What is the meaning of "You ask Bangladesh to be generous" Are we to take Shylock's pound of flesh? When Farakka Barrage was taken up for construction there was no agreement between Pakistan and India. There were only talks. But they were objecting to its commissioning. It could not have been commissioned unless

[Shri Morarji R. Desai]

there was an agreement between the two Prime Ministers. That is what was quoted and that is what was said that we should come to an agreement about drawing of waters in lean months. And it was only due to the fact that the Prime Ministers came to an agreement, that the Farakka Barrage was commissioned. Now it is suggested that it was only for four months. Would not Bangladesh then say that we were only deceiving them and taking their agreement under a false pretence? Would they not say that? How can you do that?

Therefore, when you agreed to 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs did you not make some commitment about this matter? What would be the proportion of drawing waters between the two countries? This is what you did and this is where we were hard put to it, and yet we were able to persuade the Bangladesh Government. It is better to see the advantage of both the countries and not only of Bangladesh. We had also to see both the things. It was because this country unilaterally began to withdraw waters that they went to the International Court. It was not for nothing that they went to the International Court. What else were they to do? If it had been a more powerful country it would have attacked us. That is all that they would have done.

AN HON. MEMBER: U.N. is not the International Court.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: International agency. They all became courts because that is how they work generally.

SHRI N. G. RANGA (Andhra Pradesh): You are answering one speech and castigating everybody.

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: Castigating whom? I am not castigating anybody. If we are going to be castigated by abuses, I am returning it in a civilized manner. I am not doing in an uncivilized manner.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA:
Do you mean to say that we are uncivilized?

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: I am certainly doing it, not that I am not doing it. I won't deny what I am doing. I do not want to tread on anybody's toes. But certainly they must understand it, before they do it again, that they will get it. This is not right. We are not going to accept anything and everything like that quietly. Therefore, in this matter of Bangladesh when we came to this conclusion, we were able to persuade them to come to this agreement which is double of what was agreed to in 1975—perhaps a little less than double. And that is also only for six weeks or two months. After that there is no difficulty. And more than that what we have achieved is a long-term arrangement. When there was going to be no talk about it. They were not willing to do so before. And it is only a long-term arrangement which is going to solve the problem, as even my hon. friends said. So there is an agreement on that and we are very keen on doing it because there are so many other problems connected with it. They have agreed to come to a conclusion or to complete the discussions within three years. That is why 'three years' have been put down. And when we consider, there are several schemes which can be taken up and we have to do this in co-operation with them. Unless they agree, unless we agree with them, they cannot be taken up and if they are taken up there can be a permanent solution of this problem, which will always guarantee Calcutta Port and also others upstream, as much water as they want.

This is what we want to achieve. It is to our mutual advantage. But when my friends say that we have sold out and say that this agreement is wrong, what did the Amrita Bazar Patrika have to say when the 1975 Agreement was made from 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs? They said: "Though

the accord reached between India and Bangladesh on sharing Ganga waters on the Farakka project constitutes only a short-term agreement, it is a giant step towards a final solution". They did not condemn it; they did not say water which would be available was less. On the contrary, they approved of it. "Because of the complexities the issue has acquired, a long-term settlement would of necessity be a time-consuming process". We have brought down the time-consuming process to three years. And they have agreed. They were not willing to talk about it before. That is why that is the greatest advantage in this agreement. And, after all, 40,000 cusecs is the maximum which can be drawn. If you draw more than that, West Bengal will be flooded. You cannot draw more. That also is forgotten. And if 40,000 cusecs is the maximum, can it be said that it should be all the year round? How can it be said? But most of the year round, barring these two months, there is going to be no difficulty in flushing.

SHRI KALYAN ROY: We are talking about the lean months

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: Yes, in the lean months, 20,000 is a much better proposition than 11,000. Is that denied? And we are also wedded to taking all other steps, like dredging and such other steps, to see that Calcutta port does not suffer. On that score, we are committed to it. There is no question about it. But we want to find out a permanent solution, to which Bangladesh has agreed, to discuss and come to a conclusion. That is the advantage which is forgotten. Thank you, Sir.

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA: Sir, since the Prime Minister feels that some of us younger people are not able to maintain the decorum of the House, I think it is better that some of us withdraw.

(At this stage, some hon. Members left the House)

SHRI NAGESHWAR PRASAD SHAHI: No, no, you have many children. Who says you are younger?

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : मान्यवर, यह फरक्का का मामला काफी गम्भीर है और वह इस बात से भी पता चलता है कि हमारे प्रधान मंत्री जी ने इतना समय इस सदन को दिया और करीब आधे घंटे उन्होंने भाषण दिया । मगर अगर देखा जाये तो आधे घंटे में केवल सात, आठ मिनट उन्होंने फरक्का की बात नहीं होगी और बाकी बात जिस तरह से एक स्कूल का टीचर लड़कों को शिक्षा देता है और बच्चों को पढ़ाता है उसी किस्म से हमको यहां पढ़ाया गया और उसी तरह से उन्होंने अपनी बात कही ।

[The Vice-Chairman (Shri Shyam Lal Yadav in the Chair].

ज्यादा अच्छा होता कि इसके लिये प्रधान मंत्री जी अलग कोई ब्लास लगा लिये होते और वहां हम लोग चले आते और हम लोगों को आप पढ़ा देते ।

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: You come. shall take it.

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : आप कहेंगे तो ऐसा हो जायेगा, मगर हाउस के अन्दर इस तरीके से हाउस के सदस्यों को ऐसा कहना मेरे ख्याल से अगर वह ठंडे मन में सोचेंगे तो उनको लगेगा कि शायद उन्होंने ठीक नहीं किया ।

जहां तक गंगा जी का सवाल है, गंगा जी का नाम हमारे इतिहास से जुड़ा हुआ है । हमारी संस्कृति में गंगा जी का नाम जुड़ा हुआ है । हम तो इलाहाबाद के रहने वाले हैं हम जद नहाते हैं तो कहते हैं :

"गा जेते तुम तारे तेते न नभ में तारे हैं ।"

[श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय]

वह हमारे देश की एक नदी है करीब दो हजार मील की लम्बाई में। केवल सौ मील से कुछ कम वह नदी बंगला देश में जाती है

श्रीमती विद्यावती चतुर्वेदी : मालवीय जी, यहां भावना की बात की कोई कद्र नहीं है। भावनाओं में मत बहिये।

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : दूसरी बात मैं यह भी कहूंगा कि वह भी डेढ़ दो सौ साल की बात है। 1776 में बंगाल में बड़ा भयंकर अकाल पड़ा था। उसमें बहुत से लोग मर गये थे और उनसे पहले मेरा अनुमान है अगर मैं गलत नहीं कहता तो 1767 या 1765 में एक बड़ा भयंकर भूकम्प आया था और उस वक्त एक सौ मील से कुछ कम गंगा नदी बंगला देश के इलाके में चली गई वरना पहले वह पूर्णतः भारत में थी। ये बातें हम ध्यान में रखें तो जादा अच्छा होगा।

हम लोगों ने इस मसले पर विचार किया। हमारे राष्ट्र ने हमारी भूतपूर्व सरकार ने जिसके हमारे माननीय प्रधान मंत्री जी बड़े सम्मानित सदस्य रहे इस समस्या पर काफी वर्षों विचार किया और हमने 156 करोड़ रुपये फरक्का का प्रोजेक्ट बनाने में व्यय किये और अब जाकर के 1975 में हमने उसको कमीशन किया। हमारे फरक्का को बनाने में कुछ उद्देश्य सामने थे। इसमें जो ऊपर के प्रदेश है बिहार है, उत्तर प्रदेश है इनकी भी समस्या ध्यान में रखी गई थी। कलकत्ता के पोर्ट की बात पश्चिमी बंगाल प्रांत की बात तो थी ही पर उसके साथ ही यह भी अनुमान था कि फरक्का बैराज के बनने के बाद ये जो उत्तर प्रदेश और बिहार की गरीबी का सवाल है उसको भी कुछ लाभ होगा। हमको अनुमान था कि यह चीज सुचारु रूप से चलेगी। मगर हमने हल्दिया पोर्ट भी बनवाया करोड़ों रुपया खर्च करके हल्दिया पोर्ट जो दुनिया

का बहुत अच्छा मैकेनाइज्ड पोर्ट माना जाता है।

श्री कल्याण राय : अभी बंद होने वाला है।

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : अभी तो बंद नहीं हुआ। तो हमारे कलकत्ता पोर्ट से बंगाल की इकानामी बिहार और उत्तर प्रदेश की इकानामी भी बहुत कुछ इस बात पर निर्भर करती है कि हमारे यहां जो सामान पदा होता है उसका निर्यात हो। अब अगर कलकत्ता पोर्ट ही मुश्किल में पड़ जाएगा तो फिर इस सारे प्रश्न की इकानामी अपसैट होगी। यह एक मामूली सी बात है इस पर ज्यादा हम कहना नहीं चाहते।

अब हुआ क्या है बहस इस बात पर हुई कि जो लीन मंथम कहे जाते हैं गर्मी का महीना जब आता है जब गंगा में पानी कम होता है उस समय हम गंगा से हम कितना पानी बंगला देश को दें और कितना पानी लें। हमको यह नहीं भूलना चाहिए कलकत्ता बंदरगाह आज बड़ी मुसीबत में पड़ा हुआ है। नदी में सिल्टेशन बहुत बढ़ गया है और नदी के सिल्टेशन को समाप्त करने के लिए हमने वहां कुछ ड्रेजर्स लगवाये ड्रेजर्स लगवाने की योजना है मगर अनुभव यह बताता है वैज्ञानिकों का यह मत है कि ड्रेजिंग से पूरा मामला साफ नहीं हो सकता जो बड़े जहाज को वहां आ सके। बड़े जहाज भारत में भी बनाये जायेंगे बनाये जा रहे हैं विदेशों में भी बन रहे हैं फिर वह टुंगली नदी में नहीं आयेंगे।

एक और समस्या थी। कलकत्ता विराट नगरी है लेकिन पीने के पानी का प्रवध वहां करना पड़ता है और चूंकि इसकी समस्या वहां खड़ी हो रही थी 1974 में एक योजना बनाई गयी थी उलूबलिया में एक बड़ी भारी स्कीम बंगलादेश सरकार की थी कि वहां

पीने के पानी का प्रबन्ध किया जाए। मगर उसको पूरा नहीं किया जा सका। कलकत्ता में पीने के पानी की समस्या पूर्ववत् बनी हुई है। यह अंदाज हुआ कि उससे जो पानी मिलेगा उसमें जो नमक का प्रभाव ज्यादा है उसमें मशीनें उल्टवलिया की खराब हो जायेंगी। जो नदी का पानी है उसमें नमक बहुत है इसलिए मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि यह केवल मात्र व्यापार की समस्या नहीं है, केवल मात्र अर्थ नीति की समस्या नहीं है बल्कि यह समस्या कलकत्ता के नागरिकों की सामान्य जीविका से भी जुड़ी हुई है। हमारे प्रधान मंत्री जी ने श्रीर उधर की तरफ के अन्य वक्ताओं ने यह साबित करने की कोशिश की कि वे इस समस्या के बारे में काफी जानकारी रखते हैं लेकिन उनके भाषणों से यह साबित हो गया कि जनता पार्टी के कुछ वक्ताओं का ज्ञान इस समस्या के बारे में कितना कम है। जनता पार्टी की तरफ से जो लोग बोले हैं उनमें श्री दिनेश सिंह और श्री त्रिवेदी पहले हमारी ही पार्टी कांग्रेस में थे। मैं समझता हूँ कि इस बारे में जनता पार्टी के अन्य लोग भी बोलेंगे। इन लोगों ने जितनी बातें कही उनसे यह समस्या हल होने वाली नहीं है।

मान्यवर, मेरी समझ में यह बात नहीं आती कि शर्तनामों में जो बातें रखी गई हैं उनसे यह पता नहीं चलता कि अगर कोई मतभेद होगा या आपस में कोई झगड़ा होगा तो उसको कैसे हल किया जाएगा। मैं नहीं जानता कि इस बारे में सरकार की तरफ से क्या निर्णय हुआ है और वे इस बारे में

क्या सोचते हैं लेकिन मैं यह अवश्य जानना चाहूँगा कि अगर कोई इस प्रकार की समस्या पैदा होगी तो सरकार उसको किस प्रकार से हल करेगी इस पर आज स्पष्ट प्रकाश डाला जाना चाहिए। क्या आप ऐसी समस्याओं को इंटरनेशनल ट्राइब्यूनल में ले जाना चाहते हैं? इस संबंध में आपके पास क्या योजना है यह बात साफ की जानी चाहिए। मैं इस बात से सहमत हूँ कि हमें कोई ऐसी बात नहीं कहनी चाहिए जिससे हमारे पड़ोसी राज्यों के साथ हमारे सम्बंधों में किमी प्रकार की कोई बद्मजगी पैदा हो। मगर हम इस बात को कैसे भूल सकते हैं कि बंगलादेश में आज जो सरकार है वह अत्याचारी सरकार है। यह वह सरकार है जिसने बंगलादेश के राष्ट्रपिता को मरवा डाला। वहां की वर्तमान सरकार ने ताजुद्दीन और कमरुज्जमा को जेल में मार डाला। यह वह सरकार है जिसके अन्तर्गत अगर आप कलकत्ता के अखबार को पढ़ें तो आपको पता चलेगा कि ढाका में रोज जलूस निकलते हैं जिनमें हिन्दुस्तान का विरोध किया जाता है। ये लोग इंडियन मिशन पर जाते हैं और भारत के वहां पर जो दूसरे दफ्तर है, जैसे इंडियन एयर लाइन्स का दफ्तर है, वहां पर जाते हैं और भारत के विरोध में नारे लगाते हैं। वहां पर यह स्थिति है कि भारत विरोध को प्रोत्साहन दिया जा रहा है। इन बातों की तरफ से भले ही हम अपनी आंखें मूंद ले, लेकिन इनको भुलाया नहीं जा सकता है। इस दृष्टि से कि कहीं हमारे विदेशी मित्र नाराज न हों, जायें, हम इन बातों की तरफ ध्यान न दें,

[श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय]

यह उचित नहीं है। यह एक प्रकार से एपीजमेंट की पालिसी है। आप जानते हैं कि एपीजमेंट की पालिसी बड़ी खतरनाक होती है। हिटलर का एपीजमेंट किया गया तो उसके बाद कितना बड़ा महायुद्ध हुआ, यह किसी से छिपा हुआ नहीं है। बंगलादेश के शासकों ने फरक्का के सवाल को लेकर भारत के खिलाफ काफी संवर्ष भी किया है। युनाइटेड नेशन्स में जो बातें आईं वे तो आईं ही, लेकिन इस बीच में जो दो तीन सम्मेलन हुए, जिनमें मुझे भी शामिल होने का मौका मिला, उनमें भी बंगलादेश ने इस सवाल को उठाया। गत वर्ष अक्तूबर में मडागास्कर के तानासरीब नगर में एक इंटरनेशनल सम्मेलन हुआ था। कुछ नव स्वतंत्र विकासशील देशों की समस्याओं पर विचार करना था और इस बात पर विचार करना था कि इन देशों की तरक्की किस प्रकार से हो। वहां पर बंगलादेश के तीन प्रतिनिधि आए हुए थे। वहां पर उन्होंने जमीन-आसमान का फुलावा उठाया कि किसी तरह से फरक्का बैराज के संबंध में भारत के खिलाफ प्रचार किया जायें। उस सम्मेलन में विश्व के 70 के लगभग देशों के प्रतिनिधि आए हुए थे। बंगलादेश के प्रतिनिधियों ने इस संबंध में पच्चे बांटे और क्वेश्चन किया। बाद में वे प्रस्ताव भी लाये, लेकिन वह प्रस्ताव नामंजूर कर दिया गया। लेकिन बंगलादेश के प्रतिनिधियों ने इस सवाल को उठाने में और भारत को बदनाम करने में कोई कमी नहीं की। इसी प्रकार से जो दूसरे सरकारी या अर्ध-सरकारी अंतर्राष्ट्रीय सम्मेलन हुए उनमें भी वर्तमान बंगलादेश की सरकार ने फरक्का बांध को लेकर भारत के खिलाफ प्रचार करने का प्रयत्न किया।

मान्यवर, अगर हमारे प्रधान मंत्री नाराज न हों तो मैं दो तीन बातें इस संबंध में कहना चाहता हूं। आजकल एक फुस-फुस

चल रही है, एक प्रकार की फुसफुसाहट चल रही है।

विदेश मंत्री (श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी) : क्या आप अफवाहों पर विश्वास करते हैं ?

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : एक प्रकार की फुसफुसाहट चल रही है। हो सकता है, ये बातें सही न हों, मगर ये बातें कही जाती हैं। इसलिये कि आपके ज्ञान में आ जाये, इसलिये कह रहा हूं। सके लिये शर्त लगाई गई थी संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका की ओर से। हमारे प्रधानमंत्री जी कहते हैं कि हम किसी के दबाव में नहीं आते। लेकिन मैं जानता हूं कि एक प्रेसर होता है सरकार और सरकार के बीच नेगोसियेशन होता है, एक तौर तरीका होता है। तो उनकी तरफ से जब तारापुर के लिये एनरिचड यूरेनियम की बात हुई, तो यह भी कहा गया कि फरक्का के मामले में आप किस तरह से सेटिलमेंट करें। मैं समझता हूं कि हमारे मोरारजी देसाई शर्त को मानेंगे नहीं।

दूसरी बात यह भी कही जाती है कि इस समझौते में जो कुछ हुआ है, उसमें कुछ सीक्रेट क्लॉज हैं। मगर मैं समझता हूं कि शायद ऐसा नहीं होगा। इस बारे में अगर कुछ स्पष्ट वक्तव्य सरकार के प्रवक्ताओं द्वारा हो सके तो उचित होगा।

SHRI MORARJI R. DESAI: There is no secret clause whatsoever. I have said it so many times.

श्री हर्षदेव मालवीय : अंत में यह बात कहीं गई कि अपने मित्रों से, निकट के जो हमारे पड़ोसी हैं, उनसे हमें अच्छे सम्बन्ध रखने चाहिए। मैं मानता हूं कि यह होना चाहिए। मगर किससे अच्छे सम्बन्ध रखने एक डिक्टेटोरियल रिजिम है, जहां पर

हत्यायें हो रही है। आप या आपके प्रवक्ता कुछ भी कहें कि जो बांग्ला देशी यहां पर थे, उनको वापस नहीं भेजा। मगर हम इसको नहीं मानते। मैं आपका आदर करता हूं। आप जो चाहें कहें, मगर हम उन लोगों के बारे में जानते हैं। इसी सदन के एक सदस्य है। करोमगंज के रहने वाले हैं। वे अपने घर पर से बांग्ला देश वालों से बात कर सकते हैं। उनका कहना है कि कम से कम उनकी नालेज में दो ऐसे व्यक्ति हैं जो मारे गए। इसी प्रकार से यहां कुछ नामों की सूची है। प्रो० शांतिमय रे और श्री शचिन्द्रलाल सिंह, मेम्बर पार्लियामेंट, जो कि भारत-बांग्लादेश मंत्री समिति के सदस्य हैं, उनके तार की एक प्रति मेरे पास है। उन्होंने तार विदेश मंत्री, प्रधान मंत्री, रक्षा-मंत्री और श्री चन्द्र-शेखर जो को भेजा था। इसको सुन लीजिए :

"M.A. Zaili and 34 other Bangladeshi politicians handed over to Bangladesh Govt. in May in good faith—lodged in Dacca Central Jail—taken to Kurmitola Cantonment on 22-10-77 for execution. Prisoners appeal to Zia on the strength of solemn assurance to Prime Minister Morarji Desai was no avail."

माने कि किसी प्रकार का उन्होंने असोरेन्स दिया था प्रधान मंत्री को, मगर इसके बावजूद :

"Appeal for mercy—no avail. Jail's last message to all comrades and well-wishers—We are moving forward to our cherished goal. Comrades, carry forward the battle till last drop of your blood. Good by. This is from inside Dacca Central Jail source."

दूसरी बात जैसा कि मैंने पहले भी सदन में कहा था कि यहां पर एक जगह 164 आदमी थे। मेमालय-बांग्लादेश सरहद पर कुछ गुरिल्ला थे। इन मुजीब के आदमियों को वहां से खदेड़ा गया और बांग्लादेश की बांग्ला राइफल ने उनको मार डाला। जहां इस तरह के अत्याचार हों रहे हों, तो

ऐसे देश से कैसे हम समझौता कर सकते हैं। वहां पर चीनी लोग बंटे हुए हैं जिनकी भावनायें हमारे देश के प्रति बहुत अच्छी नहीं कही जा सकती। वहां पर चीनी लोग गुरिल्ला युद्ध की ट्रेनिंग दे रहे हैं। वहां पर अंसारों की आर्मी खड़ी की जा रही है, वहां पर भारत विरोधी भावना फैलाई जा रही है और वहां पर अमरीकी सरकार और सी०आई०ए० का काफी जोरों से काम हो रहा है।

(Time bell rings)

श्रीमन्, अभी समाप्त करता हूं। वहां पर इन सब तत्वों की तरफ से जोरदारी हो रही है। एक नीति पश्चिमी साम्राज्यवाद और संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका की बिल्कुल स्पष्ट है और वह यह है कि इस स्टेबिलिटी नहीं होनी चाहिए। वह इस देश में देश को डीस्टेबिलाइज्ड करना चाहते हैं। वह इस देश में एक सुव्यवस्थित शासन व्यवस्था नहीं चाहता। हर प्रकार से, येन केन प्रकारेण, अन्दर से, बाहर से, किसी न किसी प्रकार से यहां अव्यवस्था बनाए रखना चाहते हैं और इसके लिए जिया की सरकार का इस्तेमाल किया जा रहा है। इन सब बातों को देखते हुए, मैं समझता हूं कि इस प्रकार से जो फरक्का एग्रीमेंट हो रहा है, वह देश के लिए, देश के राजनैतिक हितों के लिए, देश के आर्थिक हितों के लिए यह भी बिल्कुल लाभकारी नहीं है। यह देश के लिए खतरनाक है। हम लोगों को अपनी सही बात पर खड़ा होना चाहिए, अपना पक्ष साफ-साफ रखना चाहिए, उनके सामने दबना नहीं चाहिए। धन्यवाद।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN: (SHRI SHYAM LAL YADAV): Shri Kureel. Not here. Shrimati Lakshmi Kumari Chundawat. Not here. Shri Irengbam Tompok Singh.

SHRI IRENGBAM TOMPOK SINGH (Manipur): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I wish the Prime Minister

[Shri Irengbam Tompok Singh]

will be present while I am speaking because I will express the feelings of Indians on the other side of Bangladesh near the Burma border. Today since the morning I was listening very carefully to the debate. It was very enlightening and educative to me, hearing the speeches from both sides of the House. One point I would like to raise. The very survival of the port of Calcutta is in danger. Whether it is the port for shipping, Calcutta city is becoming a national problem. How to maintain the port for many years to come and how to maintain the city also is a matter of great concern for all of us who reside beyond Bengal. I do share some of the feelings expressed by the previous speakers from the Congress side, but nevertheless I would like to point out some more important facts which affect us on the other side of Bangladesh. North Bengal or Siliguri is the connecting line between this part of the country and the other part across Bangladesh, consisting of Assam and six or seven small States. We have had the bitterest experience before the birth of Bangladesh. It had become a sanctuary for the insurgent people either of the Mizos or of the Nagas and others. Some extremists were always taking shelter there. Now that is not there since the birth of Bangladesh. So we welcome the birth of Bangladesh. But at the same time our hon. Prime Minister has said that we should look upon them as our younger brother and that we should regard ourselves as the elder brother. This has been the attitude of our Indian leaders. Now if we look back at the history of partition which took place in 1947, we were all born and brought up there for from mainland of India but we were very very eager to merge with the Indian Union. But it was very very difficult to see Indian leaders there except some of the erstwhile leaders like Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. In this connection I will not generate any sort of heat nor any sentiment. But I would like to remind you that sentiment can

meet bullets but not reason. This should not be forgotten by both sides of the House. At the same time, the Farakka issue should not be discussed in a partisan manner. In this country there is continuity of leadership. Some of us sitting here were very critical of the hon. Prime Minister, Babuji and other leaders when they were in the undivided Congress. Once when there was a flood in Bihar, I still remember very vividly, Babuji did not pay a visit to the interior parts. Some of the leaders cannot even think of going into the interior parts of the country. For the last 20 years some of them have not gone to the interior parts of any State. Now, if you look at the areas along the Himalayas, right from Ladakh of Jammu and Kashmir to Nagaland and Mizoram, you will find that the same conditions are prevailing. We are the fortunate or unfortunate people because we used to travel all the time via Farakka Barrage seeing the progress of the project finished, seeing the river, guessing how long it is going to take to complete. It is of a very great concern to us. We used to realise the seriousness of it whenever we had to fly across Bangladesh. When there was trouble in Bangladesh we were not in a position to fly across Bangladesh. Normally the moment we are airborne from Calcutta, most of the time we are flying across Bangladesh watching the whole greenery of Bangladesh till we land at Gauhati. When there is trouble between our two countries, then we have to fly to Bagdogra and again come down to some other place. So it is of great concern to us. Any sort of agreement between India and Bangladesh is of great concern to us—whether there will be any friction between these two countries. It affects the eastern part of the country the most; not so much the other parts of the country because geographically the remaining part of India is intact. Therefore, whether it is Bihar or Bengal or U.P., the people most affected are those in the north-

eastern zone. Anything happening between India and Bangladesh directly affects the economic and political life of our people in those areas. I need not have to say more on this aspect. Our fear is that there are extremist elements who are ready to exploit the situation because we do not know people of what sentiment will be dominating our part of the country though there are nationalist elements dominating at the moment. I have also read this Farakka agreement very carefully. I have read the statement made before the House by the honourable Prime Minister. We are always thinking of the importance of Calcutta. At the same time ours is a very great country, whereas Bangladesh is a smaller country. No doubt Bangladesh is a sovereign State. We should not allow any sort of psychological fear or psychosis either in Bangladesh or in Nepal or in Burma because these countries may consider that India may be aggressive. It is not correct at all. However, I would not like to repeat the points raised by some of my colleagues. I would like to remind Babuji and the Prime Minister and some of my former colleagues who have now come to power that they should not forget the theory propounded by one of their great gurus, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia; that is, why we should not think in terms of a confederation of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan or leaving aside Pakistan, why not India and Bangladesh in the present context. In this connection I would like to remind the House that a person in Delhi by getting into a train at Delhi can go to Pakistan or some other place without much difficulty, whereas for us to travel from Delhi to our place it takes four days; we take the longest route *via* Farakka or *via* Barauni. So we are hoping for a time when these two countries should come nearer and nearer. Whatever happens to Bengal, we are concerned with it. Those of us who are in Bengal have their kith and kin in Bangladesh or *vice versa*. In my father's and my uncle's time—not to speak of the present generation—we had our kith and kin here as

well as there. Dacca and Comilla are very close from our side. It is nearer for us as we come out of Manipur or any other part of the north-eastern zone to travel *via* Bangladesh. Keeping the national interests in view—at the same time it is my firm belief—we have never doubted the very *bona fides* of our national leaders, whether they belonged to this party or that party. It is, therefore, their duty and it is their obligation, it is their primary duty in their life to serve the interests of their motherland. No one is above the country; no party is above the country. That should be our motto. And that should be the motto in the case of the Janata leadership. Keeping in view the importance of Calcutta and the importance of this river, this obstinate river, we must have a long-term strategy. In India we have three types of rivers. One is rain-fed; the second is snow-fed. This type of rivers are flowing in the northern part of the country. From the Himalayas all these rivers are 4 p.m. flowing down to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. In the southern parts and in the Deccan side there are only rain-fed rivers. It is easier to tame rain-fed rivers whereas it is very difficult to tame tributary-fed and snow-fed rivers.

We are all talking of the quantum of water. On the other side of West Bengal, the Brahmaputra river is there. How to tame that river is also a problem. It is said that water, water everywhere, but there is no water either for irrigation or for drinking purposes. There are some tributaries also. There are so many tributaries and it is very difficult to control them and the result is that they create havoc either in Uttar Pradesh or Bihar. My point is that while discussing Farraka Agreement, without losing our ground and without sacrificing water which is required for our own consumption either for irrigation or for drinking purposes, we should have a long-term plan on how to utilise our vast water resources beyond West Bengal and on the other

[Shri Irengam Tompok Singh]

side of Assam. If we are able to utilise the water resources available in the river Brahmaputra through a long-term plan in this country, then there will be no problem on account of shortage of water. Solving the river problems and flood control problems is interlinked with other problems. I would like to remind the House that since the time of partition we have been having many problems. Take, for example, our decision to hand over Berubari. It was becoming a great concern for us and sometimes in negotiations we become very generous and charitable. If we show the same generosity on the Kashmir side also we may lose. Some portion will go out of our hands. In the case of Tibet also it is the same case. If we trace history, in our negotiations with neighbouring countries, we have lost and sometimes our Indian leaders are not very careful about this. Leaders from our side also were not careful. Some people in some parts of our country do not consider as Indians. I am not speaking of myself, but others. This is very wrong. One reason is that the Central leaders and other leaders do not visit the north-eastern region. Our Foreign Minister is a true nationalist. The State External Affairs Minister is a friend of ours. As regards the hon. Prime Minister, by the grace of God he is safe and is with us. A time will come when they should visit other neglected parts of the country. For instance, Babuji never goes there. It is not enough to sit all the time in palatial buildings in Delhi or elsewhere. Farakka is not a party issue. It is the concern of all our countrymen from Kashmir to Kanyakumari and from Nagaland and Mizoram to Gujarat. Our hon. Prime Minister is from Gujarat. But he should not neglect this very important north-eastern region. It is very sensitive and should not, therefore, be neglected. Economically, regional disparity has crept in there. This area includes the whole of Bengal, Orissa, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and As-

sam. Therefore, Farakka is not a question of sentimental issue. It is a vital issue; it is a national issue and under no circumstances this country should lose even a pint of water. Thank you.

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, इस राष्ट्रीय मामले को दलगत आधार पर देखा गया और दलगत पैमाने से नापा गया यह एक बड़ी ही दुर्भाग्यपूर्ण बात है। उधर के माननीय सदस्यों ने बड़े जोरों से इस बात की दलील दी कि 'दिस इज ए सेल आउट'। ऐसा लगता है कि वह सचमुच कब सेल आउट हुआ इस को वह भूल रहे हैं। मेरे दोस्त ने अभी बताया, उस तरफ के दोस्त ने बताया कि सेल आउट तो 1950 में हुआ था जिस समय तिब्बत को चीन को सौंप दिया गया था। वह सही मायने में सेल आउट था और श्रीमती सोनी और श्रीमती अल्वा इसे स्वीकार करेंगी।

[THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI) in the Chair].

प्रो० एस० नूरुल हसन : विदेश मंत्री जी भी स्वीकार करेंगे ?

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : विदेश मंत्री जी इस को पहले स्वीकार कर चुके हैं। मंत्री बनने के पहले स्वीकार कर चुके हैं, बाद में वह क्या कहेंगे मुझे नहीं मालूम। मंत्री बनने के पहले उन्होंने कहा था कि सेल आउट हुआ तो 1950 में हुआ जब तिब्बत चीन को सौंप दिया गया था। अगर यह सेल आउट न हुआ होता तो 1962 में जो अपमान इस देश को सहना पड़ा वह हरगिज न सहना पड़ता। चीन की सेनायें हिन्दुस्तान की ओर न बढ़ती और न तो हमारा नेफा का हिस्सा जाता और न लद्दाख का ही हिस्सा जाता। 20 हजार वर्ग मील भूमि जो हमारी चली गयी उस 1962 के समय में वह उस सेल आउट की वजह से चली गयी, उसे यह हमारे दोस्त भूल गये। उसके संग्राम में हमारी इस संसद ने सर्वसम्मति से एक प्रस्ताव पास किया था कि जब तक

हम अपनी भूमि वापस नहीं लेंगे तब तक हम चैन नहीं लेंगे। संसद् अपना प्रस्ताव भूल गयी। पं० जवाहर लाल नेहरू ने यह प्रस्ताव मूव किया था और संसद् ने उसे पास किया था कि हम अपनी खोयी हुई भूमि को वापस लेंगे और जब तक वापस नहीं लेंगे तब तक चैन नहीं लेंगे। यह संसद् का प्रस्ताव था। मगर आज क्या हो रहा है। आज यह कहा जा रहा है कि उसे भूल जाइये।

डा० चन्द्रमणि लाल चौधरी (बिहार) : वाइंट ऑफ आर्डर। मैं अपने लायक दोस्त से यह पूछना चाहता हूँ कि जो प्रस्ताव पं० जवाहर लाल नेहरू ने इस संसद् में पास कराया था उस के प्रमाण में उन की स्पीच की कोई कापी आप के पास है। आज सारे हिन्दुस्तान की आंखें खनरे में हैं। आज हिन्दुस्तान का पानी खत्म हो रहा है और पानी खत्म होने के मायने आबरू खत्म होना है। जब पानी नहीं है तो किस काम की है जिन्दगानी। आप कौम के साथ खिलवाड़ करना चाहते हैं।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): There is no point of order.

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : यह संसद् के रेकार्ड में है। वह प्रस्ताव इस संसद् ने ही पास किया था।

डा० चन्द्रमणि लाल चौधरी : आप उसे निकलवाइये।

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : वह पहला सेल आउट हुआ था जब पं० जवाहर लाल नेहरू ने तिब्बत की तश्तरी में रख कर चीन को दे दिया था, प्रेजेंट कर दिया था, और जिस समय चीन हिन्दुस्तान पर हमले की तैयारी कर रहा था तो उस समय हिन्दुस्तान में हिन्दी चीनी भाई भाई के नारे लगाये जा रहे थे। वह सेल आउट था और उस समय हमारे एक दोस्त ने कहा था कि

“हिमालय के उस पार हो क्या रहा है कि ज्वालामुखी परवरिश पा रहा है।” यह उस ने 1950 में कहा था जिस समय तिब्बत पर कब्जा किया था चीन ने और वह ज्वालामुखी 1962 में हमारे सामने आ गया।

श्री सरदार अमजद अली (पश्चिमी बंगाल) : उस के बाद गंगा का क्या हुआ ?

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : उस के बाद देखिये कि क्या सेल आउट हुआ। जिस समय बरेल्वारी सौंप दिया गया पाकिस्तान को, पूर्वी पाकिस्तान को, उस को यह लोग सेल आउट नहीं मानते। तीसरा सेल आउट तब हुआ जब हमारी सेनाओं ने जो हिस्सा पाकिस्तान का जीता था, हजारों जवानों का खून बहा कर काश्मीर के उस हिस्से को पाकिस्तान को सौंप दिया गया। उसको ये सेल-आउट नहीं कहते, नहीं मानते।

प्रो० एस० नूरुल हसन : विदेश मंत्री जी मान लें, हम भी मान लेंगे।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : तब ये विरोधी दल में थे, इसलिए।

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : श्रीमान्, मैं यह कह रहा था कि जिस समय सेल आउट हो रहा था, उस समय इनकी जुवान बंद थी। आज ये सेल-आउट की बात करते हैं।

श्रीमती मार्ग्रेट आल्वा : तब आप सब लोग थे बड़े नेता, हम नहीं थे।

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : इस सुलह-नामे की शर्तों से साफ जाहिर है कि श्रीमती इंदिरा गांधी ने शेख मुजीबुर्रहमान के साथ जो तय किया था उससे आगे तय हुआ है। उससे पीछे नहीं हुआ है। जो शर्तें श्रीमती इंदिरा गांधी ने तय की थीं, उनसे उदार शर्तों पर इस बार सुलहनामा हुआ है।

[श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही]

श्रीमन्, बंगला देश के निर्माण का श्रेय किसको है ? हिन्दुस्तान को है । हम बड़े गर्व के साथ कहते हैं कि बंगला देश का निर्माण हमने किया और हमारी सेना वहाँ पर लिबरेशन आर्मी बनकर गई थी ।

SHRI SARDAR AMJAD ALI: Sir, on a point of order....

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : श्रीमन्, जब मैं बोलता हूँ तो ये खड़े हो जाते हैं ।

SHRI SARDAR AMJAD ALI: May I make my submission ? Sir,....

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : मैं निवेदन कर रहा था कि हमारे देश की सरकार के नेताओं ने बार-बार यह कहा है कि हमारी सेना वहाँ लिबरेशन होकर गई थी ।

(Interruptions)

SHRI SARDAR AMJAD ALI: Sir, this issue which we are discussing has got some international importance. The hon. Member is making mention of the creation of Bangladesh as by Hindustan or India. This will have serious and terrible repercussions anywhere. So....

SHRI NAGESHWAR PRASAD SHAHI: It is not a point of order.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): You carry on.... (Interruptions). It is not a point of order, I know.

SHRI SARDAR AMJAD ALI: The Foreign Minister is also here.... (Interruption) . . . Am I allowed to have my say?..... (Interruptions).. Am I allowed to make my submission here or not?. This is Parliamentary procedure (Interruptions)

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): You have made your point.

SHRI SARDAR AMJAD ALI: You have not allowed me to finish. I was

not interfering. I was.... (Interruptions). This is very peculiar. Kindly listen to me. I was not opposing him. I was not saying anything against him. I was....

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : श्रीमन्, मैं बोल रहा हूँ और ये डिस्टर्ब कर रहे हैं । . .

SHRI SARDAR AMJAD ALI: The hon. Member says that Bangladesh is the creation of India. This is going to have serious repercussions in the international world. The Foreign Minister being present here, I will request him to take note of it and to clarify the position.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): Mr. Shahi.

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : श्रीमन्, मैं तो यह कह रहा था कि अगर यह सुलहनामा न होता तो उसके बाद क्या होता । या तो बंगला देश अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संस्था में जाता, या लड़ाई होती । दो ही चारा था । लड़ाई होने के बाद क्या अंजाम होता ? जो सेना वहाँ पर मुक्ति सेना होकर गई थी वह वहाँ पर हमलावर होकर जाती ।

उप-सभाध्यक्ष (श्री एच० एम० त्रिवेदी)
आप कंकलूड कीजिए ।

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : श्रीमन्, मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि इससे अच्छा कोई साल्यूशन नहीं हो सकता था । यूनाइटेड नेशन्स में काश्मीर के सवाल को ले जाकर जिस प्रकार की परेशानी भारत के लिए पैदा हुई उसी प्रकार की परेशानी फिर पेश करना या फरक्का के सवाल को भी वहाँ उठाना, मैं समझता हूँ कि इससे बड़ी दुर्भाग्यपूर्ण बात कोई दूसरी नहीं हो सकती है । मैं स्पष्ट कहना चाहता हूँ कि जिन शर्तों पर सुलहनामा हुआ, उन से बेहतर शर्तों पर दूसरा सुलहनामा नहीं हो सकता था ।

मैं एक दो बातें और कहना चाहता हूँ। श्री मालवीय ने बड़े जोरदार शब्दों में कहा कि वहाँ की सरकार बड़ी जुल्मी सरकार है और फौजी सरकार है और वहाँ पर बड़े जुल्म हो रहे हैं। लेकिन मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि इस बारे में कोई विरोध नहीं है। लेकिन मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि क्या दो देशों के बीच में इस आधार पर सुलहनामा होगा कि वहाँ पर कैसी सरकार है ?

SHRI KALYAN ROY: Why do not you have relations with South Africa and Rhodesia?

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : रोडेशिया और दक्षिण अफ्रीका की दूसरी बात है। वहाँ का मसला दूसरा है। क्या आप यह चाहेंगे कि जिस प्रकार से दूसरे देशों के लोग कहते हैं कि जो कम्युनिस्ट कन्ट्रीज हैं उनके साथ कोई समझौता नहीं करना चाहिए, इसलिए हमको भी उनके साथ समझौता नहीं करना चाहिए ? हमने कभी यह नहीं सोचा कि किसी दूसरे देश में किस प्रकार की सरकार है। हमने हमेशा यह सोचा कि हिन्दुस्तान के फायदों के लिए और हमारे राष्ट्रीय हितों के फायदे के लिए क्या किया जा सकता है। इसी आधार पर हमारी दोस्ती हुई है और यह दोस्ती आज भी कायम है। बहुत से लोगों को इस बात का संदेह था कि हिन्दुस्तान की नई सरकार रूस के साथ दोस्ती कायम रखेगी या नहीं। मगर वर्तमान सरकार ने यह साबित कर दिया कि उसके सामने दूसरे ऐसे कोई मापदण्ड नहीं हैं, सिवाय राष्ट्रीय हितों के, जिनके आधार पर उसकी राष्ट्रीय नीतियां तय होती हैं।

श्रीमती सोनी ने यह बात भी उठाई कि आप अपोजिशन से सलाह क्यों नहीं करते हैं। मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि जब शिमला समझौता हुआ था या रूस के साथ जब संधि की गई थी, क्या उस वक्त विरोधी दलों को कंसल्ट किया गया था।

श्रीमती अम्बिका सोनी : क्या इसका मतलब यह है कि अगर कांग्रेस सरकार ने कोई गलती की है तो आप भी गलती करते जायें।

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : श्री मालवीय ने फुसफुसाहट की बात कही है और युरेनियम के इशू को भी इसमें शामिल किया है। मैं समझता हूँ कि यह सरकार अफवाहों पर विश्वास नहीं करती है। लेकिन मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि चौधरी चरण सिंह ने जब यह कहा कि यह अफवाह है कि श्रीमती इंदिरा गांधी के पास दो हजार करोड़ रुपये हैं तो क्या आप इसको सही मानते हैं ? मैं कहता हूँ कि आप सुनी सुनाई बातों पर क्यों विश्वास करते हैं।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): I am sorry I cannot allow you to continue any more.

श्री नागेश्वर प्रसाद शाही : इसलिए मैं सिर्फ इतना ही निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि कि इस समस्या को राष्ट्रीय दृष्टि से देखा जाना चाहिए।

SHRI SANKAR GHOSE (West Bengal): Sir, this Farakka question is not a political or a partisan question. It is a national question. Therefore, when the Prime Minister intervened in this debate, we had hoped that he would clarify many issues and throw light on many obscure aspects. But the Prime Minister devoted his time more to castigating the Members of this House than to clarifying issues. The Prime Minister has been very generous to the opposition by saying that he will not discuss with the opposition. He has been still more generous to his colleagues by saying that in respect of some matters he will not even discuss with his colleagues. And he has been even more fair to this House in not taking the House into confidence with regard to the basic facts on which the House can take a decision.

As I said, the Farakka question is not a political issue. So far as Bangladesh is concerned, we want peaceful and friendly relations with Bangladesh and we are prepared to make sacrifices to have friendly relations with Bangladesh. India is even pre-

[Shri Sankar Ghose]

pared to make sacrifices to have friendly relations with Bangladesh.

But we want to know what the facts are on the basis of which these concessions have been made. Sir, it has been stated that under this Agreement except during the lean months, we will get 35 to 40 thousand cusecs. This is what the House is told when everybody knows that a dispute regarding Farakka is a dispute regarding the lean season only. There is no dispute about the flow of water during the monsoon or during the period when it is not a lean season. That has been stated repeatedly by the Government of India, by the External Affairs Ministry. I may, Sir, read from an extract here. The hon. External Affairs Minister is here. He has said that he will continue the old foreign policy. The document is here but the date is not given. I hope he is also continuing with to affirm the facts stated in this document. It is said:

"The discussion on Farakka between India and Pakistan in the beginning and later between India and Bangladesh has throughout been confined to sharing the Ganga waters in the lean season, of a couple of months or so, for the obvious reason that in the rest of the year, water flows are plentiful. . . And if anything is surplus the main problems is of flood control. Allocation in times of surplus is not only unnecessary but impracticable since neither country has the capacity to control the flood adequately."

Therefore, Sir, if we are told that under this Agreement you are getting during a period which is not a lean period about 25 to 40 thousand cusecs, that is of no consequence because that is not a matter in dispute so far as Farakka is concerned. The real question is with regard to the lean season and what we are getting then. On that there are two questions: One is what are the principles which you apply; secondly, what are the facts on which

you apply the principles. Sir, though the international law on the right of the riparian States is not codified, it is well-settled. It is settled under the Helsinki rules of 1966. It is settled under that that the riparian States have the right to an equitable and reasonable use of water; it is settled that the right of the downstream States is not a right to the "natural volume" of water, the right is to the "natural use" of water. The right is to the natural use of water, not to the natural volume of water, not to what Bangladesh was getting but to what it was using.

Therefore, if we are to discuss this question of natural use, should we not know what Bangladesh requires, should we not know what India requires? And should we not then make an assessment of how much we have to give, how much they have to get? Has the House been told about that? The Prime Minister says that he will not take the Opposition into confidence not even his colleagues in some matters. And he has not taken the House into confidence in this matter.

Is it not true . . . (*Interruptions*) Is it not true that in 1961 Pakistan said that they require 2,500 cusecs of water? Will the External Affairs Minister clarify that? Is it not a fact that the World Bank said later that Bangladesh requires 5,000 cusecs of water. Sir, is it not a fact that so far as this claim is concerned, as it has been stated in the document of this Ministry, "Bangladesh is served by alternative river systems and has actually the problem of surplus water most of which flows unused down to the sea." The problem is of surplus water most of which flows unused down to the sea. Sir, if you tell us that this is India's requirement, this is the requirement of Bangladesh...

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: Calcutta port water goes to the sea. Why are you raising that point?

SHRI SANKAR GHOSE: Sir, I am raising this question because it is not

a matter only about the Calcutta port, it is not a matter only of the eastern region but it is a matter regarding the interests of the whole of India. Sir, if there is a discussion, there has to be a discussion on facts. If you say that it is a foreign affairs matter we shall not discuss it, it is that it is a foreign affairs matter stand that. But if you say that there has to be a discussion, then there has to be a discussion on two questions on the basis of facts. Firstly, what is Bangladesh's need, we must be told. The Minister of External Affairs must tell us what the assessment of the Government of India regarding the need of Bangladesh is. Then we must be told what his assessment regarding the needs of India is. Then, if there is not sufficient water, we can understand what to concede. Then the House can take a decision. But if the facts are not disclosed—including the fact that the External Affairs Ministry's documents say that Bangladesh does not need that much of water—and if it is merely said that it is purely a political settlement of a technical problem then it is not fair to the country.

Sir, 90 per cent of river Ganga passes through India and India has 1925 kilometres through which the Ganga passes.

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: He has given those figures. Why are you repeating them?

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE: He was not here then.

SHRI SANKAR GHOSE: Sir, if 90 per cent of the river Ganga passes through India, are you entitled to 33 per cent of that water only? I am asking that question. I am only saying if there has to be a discussion, let us have the facts.

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: Is it international law? You have quoted that.

SHRI SANKAR GHOSE: As regards international law, if I may read the Helsinki Rules, they state that "each basin State is entitled

as of right within its territory to reasonable and equitable use of the water." What is the reasonable share? Ninety per cent of the river passes through India. Am I entitled to just 33 per cent of the waters?

(Interruptions)

Sir, I would not like to be interrupted. I have the highest respect for Babuji and great regard for Babuji but I have to present my point of view.

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: You can state your point of view.

SHRI SANKAR GHOSE: So far as Babuji is concerned, he has tried his best to solve the issue. I have nothing against him. But so far as this House is concerned, the House has to take a decision on the facts. Should we not be told what the facts are? Then is it the position, is the Government saying that they are not writing on a clean slate and that there were certain commitments? Sir, what are the commitments?

Now, Sir, there are two Agreements. One of 1974 and the other of 1975. What do these Agreements say? Now, so far as the 11,000 and 16,000 cusecs Agreement is concerned, there are many points. That Agreement is in respect of a period of one month and ten days, from 21st April to 31st May, not even for the whole lean season. The other point is that it was in respect of one year only. And then that Agreement said—and this is important—that after this discharge it shall be ascertained what the result is, that there should be a study, that there should be a joint survey and on that basis a decision will be taken. What happened after this? What was the flow in the dry season of 1976? The flow was 35,000 to 36,000 cusecs. What was the flow in the dry season of 1977? The flow was 30,000 cusecs; 5,000 cusecs less. We have the figures and we have the experts and they have said that this reduction by 5,000 has caused a lot of damage to the

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navigable channels, particularly to Mayapur. We have the figures.

Therefore, Sir, if we are told that from 11,000 cusecs it has gone up to 20,000 cusecs, that is not the position. We have to compare 36,000 cusecs of 1976 or 30,000 cusecs of 1977 with this 20,000 cusecs.

I am not saying that we should not be generous so far as Bangladesh is concerned. I agree with the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the External Affairs Minister that there are certain political compulsions. I realise that in relation to Bangladesh, India which is a big country can be generous. But we can be generous on the basis of certain facts. It may be that Bangladesh may need 5,000 or 10,000 cusecs. We need 40,000 cusecs. If their need is more we come to a particular decision. But, should not the House be told what the need of Bangladesh is? Can this House come to a decision without that knowledge? Have we made this analysis when we are giving 67 per cent of water to Bangladesh and retaining 33 per cent for ourselves? We are eligible to 33 per cent only. Unless we know what Bangladesh needs, is it a fair proposition to the House?

So far as the previous Agreement is concerned, there was another clause in 1974 and 1975 Agreement and that was that the quantity of water that we shall get, was not dependant exclusively on the water that was available in the Ganga. The quantity of water that we were to get was dependant on the entire water in the region, including the Brahmaputra. And so far as the Brahmaputra is concerned, at no point of time the flow of water is less than 1,30,000 cusecs. In April, the flow of water in Brahmaputra is 2 lakhs cusecs. In May, the flow in Brahmaputra is 5 lakhs cusecs. It is known, it is a fact, it is recognised and accepted by the Government of India and by all international experts that if we pool these waters,

then so far as Bangladesh is concerned, there is no shortage.

Therefore, if we are saying that we are writing on a clean slate, we must not forget two things. This 11,000 and 16,000 Agreement was based on the basis that there would be further analysis and a joint survey on the results of the flow. And if the results are disclosed, then it will be clear that we need 40,000 cusecs. So far as the Brahmaputra and Ganga are concerned, if the thing is taken in the totality, on the basis of international principles and on the basis of Helsinki rules 1966, we also need that quantity of 40,000 cusecs. But on this question, which is a sensitive question and a delicate question where we want to see that there is friendly resolution of the conflict with Bangladesh, we have left out the technicians throughout, the technicians who could give us the report.

Apart from that, we should know what is the need of India. This we can do in two ways: By a joint survey or our own survey in respect of the flow of 36,000 cusecs or 30,000 cusecs or 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs, or we can go by the reports of the experts. Now, what is the position? Dr. Walter Hansen, the expert whom the Government invited, said in 1967 that we need 40,000. Dr. J. J. Boughers, an international expert who came to India, said that we need 40,600. He said this in December, 1968. In March, 1960, River Research Institute said that we need 40,000. Again, in November, 1971, Dr. Walter Hansen again came here and he said that we need 40,000 cusecs. In August, 1972, Dr. K. L. Rao on the floor of the Lok Sabha said that we need 40,000 cusecs for five years and then for another two years there will be variable flow and after seven years, it will be examined afresh. Therefore, Sir, if we proceed on the opinion of the experts, 40,000 cusecs of water is clearly needed. If we proceed on the basis of experiments conducted after the 1974-

75 Agreement, 40,000 cusecs is again clearly needed. We are willing to make a sacrifice; but when we do so, we must know what Bangladesh needs. Should not the Government of India tell us what its need is? If they say that it is a secret matter or a confidential matter, that is different but if it is not a secret matter, then I say...

(Time bell rings)

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): Please conclude.

SHRI SANKAR GHOSE: Therefore, I say that so far as this matter is concerned, I have got two suggestions to make. One is that you are now going to review this Agreement after three years. It is a matter of very great importance and it should be reviewed much earlier than three years. Number two point is, so far as the link between the Ganga and the Brahmaputra as a long-term solution is concerned, there is only a pious wish that is mentioned in the Agreement. It should be expedited. Future of the Calcutta Port is involved and of the whole of India is involved.

Raja Dinesh Singh said that we should approach the matter coolly. We cannot approach the matter coolly if it means death of the Calcutta Port, the stultification of the eastern region. We can consider it coolly if their appeal is that you consider the facts. I request you to consider the facts, the requirements of Bangladesh and the requirements of India in the light of Helsinki rules. In my opinion, we are making too much concessions. We have made concessions and economically we have lost. Our loss is real, genuine and tangible. Bangladesh's gain is not economic. It is not real. It is psychological. It is a loss for us, it is a defeat so far as diplomacy is concerned. The stakes are very high. Though we want to maintain very friendly relations with Bangladesh, this is a matter which has affected and grievously hurt the interests of the Calcutta Port, Eastern India and India.

श्री जगजीवन राम : वाइस चैयरमैन साहब, फरक्का के संबंध में सदन में काफी बहस हुई है और इस तरफ से और उस तरफ से सदस्यों ने जो कुछ कहा है, शायद एक दूसरे का बहुत अंश में जवाब दिया जा चुका है। मैं बहुत लम्बा भाषण देना नहीं चाहूंगा। एक बात आरम्भ में ही स्पष्ट कर देना चाहूंगा कि जो समझौता हुआ है वह बिलकुल जाहिर है, प्रगट है, सम्पूर्ण है; उसमें कोई छिपा हुआ क्लज (अनुच्छेद) नहीं है। इसको कह देना मैं उचित समझता था क्योंकि कई सदस्यों के दिमाग में शायद ऐसा संदेह है कि जो समझौता सामने है वह सम्पूर्ण नहीं है, उसका छिपा हुआ कोई क्लज (अनुच्छेद) है कोई सीक्रेट क्लज है। फरक्का जिस लिए बनाया गया था वह तो सदस्यों को मालूम है। इसमें भी संदेह नहीं कि गंगा भारत की नदी है लेकिन जब हम भारत की नदी कहते हैं तो इस चीज को हम को नहीं भूलना चाहिए कि बंगलादेश भी किसी समय भारत का हिस्सा था इसलिए बंगलादेश का भी हक है गंगा नदी को अपनी नदी कहने का। तो इस चीज को हम भुला नहीं सकते, और फरक्का का जब ख्याल हुआ तो उस वक्त न पाकिस्तान भारत से भिन्न था, न बंगलादेश भारत से भिन्न था। फरक्का का विचार उस वक्त हुआ जब कि एक देश का पानी एक ही देश में व्यवहार में लाया जाता था। इस चीज को क्यों हम भूल जाते हैं कि पानी की कीमत बढ़ती जा रही है और एक ही देश में पानी की समस्या को लेकर ऐसे झंझट खड़े हो रहे हैं कि हम उसे सुलझाने में समर्थ नहीं हैं। कर्णाटक में कावेरी को लेकर तमिलनाडु के साथ क्या हो रहा है? वहां कोई विदेशी राज्य नहीं है; एक ही राज्य है। नर्मदा की समस्या पर, मध्य प्रदेश और गुजरात के बीच, अभी तक हम नहीं सुलझा सके। वहां भी गुजरात में लोअर रेपेरियन का सवाल है। फर्क यही है कि उसका कोई दूसरा देश नहीं बन पाया है, बंगलादेश का दूसरा देश बन गया। इसलिए आज हमें समझना होगा कि लोअर

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रेपरियन का क्या अधिकार है ? मैंने इसलिए कहा कि पानी के महत्व को आज हम समझने लगे हैं और एक ही देश में पानी की समस्या को लेकर झंझट खड़ा हो रहा है। अगर गंगा में इतना पानी रहता कि उस से भारत का भी काम चल जाता और बंगलादेश का भी काम चल जाता, तो कोई समस्या खड़ी नहीं होती। लेकिन गर्मी के दिनों में गंगा में इतना पानी नहीं रहता है कि दोनों का काम चल जाए। अब काम चलने की बात होती है, तो कुछ लोगों के दिमाग में केवल यही बात क्यों आती है कि सिंचाई के लिए कितना आवश्यक है। लेकिन पानी का इस्तेमाल सिंचाई के लिए सीमित नहीं है, सिंचाई के अतिरिक्त भी उसका उपयोग है। मैं कानूनी मसले में नहीं जाना चाहता—वह तो अपने मित्त श्री शंकर घोष जैसे कानूनदां के लिए छोड़ देता हूँ—लेकिन साधारण बुद्धि यह कहती है कि अगर कोई देश किसी नदी के पानी का इस्तेमाल करने का आदी बन चुका है, तो क्या किसी भी कारण से ऐसा कहा जा सकता है कि हम वहां पर पानी का वैसा इस्तेमाल करने नहीं देंगे ? मौलिक प्रश्न यहीं पर खड़ा होता रहा है। मैं इस प्रश्न पर नहीं जाना चाहता कि पोर्ट को साफ करने को पानी का इस्तेमाल किस श्रेणी में आता है, देश के नमकीन होने की समस्या को सुलझाने के लिए पानी का इस्तेमाल किस श्रेणी में आता है ? लेकिन ये दोनों महत्व के प्रश्न हो जाते हैं। जब श्री शंकर घोष ने पूछा कि बंगलादेश को कितने पानी की आवश्यकता है, तो इस चीज को क्यों भूल जाने है कि पानी का इस्तेमाल पीने के लिए भी है, उद्योग के लिए भी है, नौका चलाने के लिए भी है और समुद्र से बढ़ने हुए सैलिनिटी (खारेपन) को रोकने के लिए भी है, और इसके अतिरिक्त सिंचाई के लिए भी है; और सब को मिला-जुला कर देखें तो किसी देश के प्राकृतिक सौंदर्य को अक्षुण्ण रखने के लिए भी पानी की आवश्यकता

है, जिसे अंगरेजी में ईकोलोजी कहते हैं। जब बंगलादेश गंगा के पानी की मांग करता है तो वह संपूर्ण रूप से उसके इस्तेमाल को सामने रखता है। 1974 में दोनों देशों के प्रधान मंत्रियों में एक बात तय हुई। बात यह तय हुई कि जब फरक्का पूर्ण हो जाय तो उस को इस्तेमाल में लाया जाय उसे कमीशन किया जाय, लेकिन उस के साथ-साथ यह भी शर्त लगा दी गयी कि कमीशन करने के पहले दोनों देशों में पानी के विभाजन के मसले को सुलझा लेना होगा। इस का अर्थ यह हुआ कि जब तक पानी के बंटवारे के मसले को सुलझा न लिया जाय तब तक हम फरक्का को इस्तेमाल में नहीं ला सकते थे। तो उस के लिये उत्सुकता किस की थी ? हमारा डेढ़ सौ करोड़ रुपया उस में लग चुका था। इसलिये हम को अधिक उत्सुकता थी कि हम फरक्का का इस्तेमाल जल्दी आरम्भ कर सकें। बंगलादेश को इस के लिये अधिक उत्सुकता नहीं थी इसलिये कि फरक्का बन जाने के बाद भी गंगा का पानी जितना था वह उनको मिलता जा रहा था। 1975 के पहले जो गरमी के दिन थे जब कम से कम पानी फरक्का में आता है 55 हजार क्यूजेक्स वह संपूर्ण जल बंगलादेश को जाता था, कलकत्ता को या भारत को नहीं, इसलिये हम को ज्यादा से ज्यादा उत्सुकता थी कि इसका (फरक्का का) इस्तेमाल जल्दी से जल्दी हो और कुछ पानी हम नहर के द्वारा कलकत्ता को दे सकें। इसलिये 1975 में हम ने प्रत्यन किया मैं गया था वहां। वहां से वहां के मंत्री यहां आये थे। फिर हम गये और हमारा प्रयत्न हुआ कि फरक्का को कमीशन करने के पहले उस के पानी का बंटवारा होना अनिवार्य है तो पानी के बंटवारे पर पहले समझौता कर लें और फिर फरक्का को कमीशन करें और मैं दोहराना नहीं चाहता, 11 हजार से लेकर 16 हजार क्यूसेक तक 21 अप्रैल से 31 मई तक भारत द्वारा पानी लेने का समझौता हुआ। मैं जानता हूँ कि इतना पानी लेने के लिये भी मुझ को क्या प्रयत्न

करना पड़ा था। और मैं कोई गुप्त बात प्रकट नहीं कर रहा हूँ लेकिन एक दिन हम को शेख मुजीबुररहमान साहब से यह कहना पड़ा था कि मेरा वापस जाना सिर्फ भारत के एक मंत्री का वापस जाना नहीं होगा, जगजीवन राम का वापस जाना होगा और तब यह समझौता हुआ। लेकिन आप कहते हैं कि वह समझौता सिर्फ चार महीने के लिये था। तो वह चार महीने के लिये इसलिये था कि चार महीने में हम इतना पानी ले सकेंगे। यह समझौता तो नहीं था कि चार महीने के बाद जितना पानी हमारे मन में होगा लेते रहेंगे। अकल की बात यह है कि चार महीने तक लेंगे और उस के बाद समझौता जब तक न हो, फरक्का को बन्द कर देंगे। समझौता तो यह कहता है कि चार महीने के लिये समझौता हुआ था। आगे के लिये हम फिर समझौता करेंगे। तो आगे का समझौता जब तक नहीं हो जाता तब तक हम को पानी नहीं लेना चाहिए था। लेकिन दुर्भाग्य की बात यह रही कि 1976 में बंगला देश में जो भीषण राजनैतिक दुर्घटनायें हुईं उन के कारण कोई नया समझौता उस समय नहीं किया जा सका हमने वहाँ के सिचाई और बाढ़ के मंत्री से मिलने के लिये, तारीख निश्चित कर दी थी लेकिन उस बीच में जो वहाँ दुर्घटना हुई उस में वह भी मारे गये और कितने ही लोग मारे गये और जो नयी सरकार बनी उस को वहाँ अपने को स्थापित करने में समय लग गया। वह उस समय समझौते की बात नहीं सोच सकते थे। लेकिन चूँकि फरक्का खुला हुआ था इसलिये हम पानी लेते रहे। यह जरूर है कि हम 40 हजार क्यूसेक कहते हैं, लेकिन नहर की क्षमता नहीं थी इसलिये 35, 36 या 37 हजार तक हम लेते रहे, लेकिन गरमी के दिनों में देखा कि अगर हम इतना पानी ले लेंगे तो बंगला देश को कम मिलेगा और उनकी हालत बिगड़ सकती है तो इसलिये हमने स्वयं अपनी तरफ से उन्हें कुछ ज्यादा पानी दिया था। इसका दुनिया के लोगों पर अच्छा असर

पड़ा था। इसके बाद जब वहाँ की सरकार सम्मल पायी तो उन्होंने हम को लिखा कि आप जो एक तरफा पानी फरक्का से ले रहे हैं यह मुनासब नहीं है। समझौते के लिए बात करनी चाहिए थी और वह बात करने के लिये आये। बातचीत हुई लेकिन बातचीत में कोई निश्चय नहीं हो सका। लेकिन यह मैं फिर दोहराऊँगा कि जो कुछ विचार हुआ वह कोई नये सिरे से नहीं शुरू हुआ था। एक समझौते की बात चलती है तो कुछ इस तरह से कहा जाता है, कुछ उस तरह से कहा जाता है। हर मीटिंग में जब शुरू करते हैं तो पहली मीटिंग में जितनी बात हो चुकी है उससे आगे चलते हैं। फिर 1976 में ऐडमिरल खान जब यहाँ आये तो उनसे बातें हुईं, उनमें जो हमारी तरफ से आफर थे और उनकी तरफ से जो आफर थे वह दोनों को मालूम थे। उसके बाद समझौता नहीं हुआ। वह यहाँ से चले गये। यहाँ से जा करके उन्होंने दुनिया में सब जगह प्रचार शुरू किया। इस्लामी देशों में, नान-अलाइड राष्ट्रों में, जहाँ-जहाँ वह समझते थे कि अपनी बात को समझा सकते हैं उन्होंने कहा और हमारे दोनों देशों के बीच में जो फरक्का को लेकर मतभेद था वह मतभेद दुनिया के मैदान में फैलाया जाने लगा। यह हम नहीं कह सकते कि सभी पक्ष के लोग हमारे साथ हो जाते। दुनिया में जो हालात हैं वह आप जानते हैं, मैं इसको विस्तार में नहीं कहना चाहता। आखीर में यह मसला संयुक्त राष्ट्र के सामने पेश हुआ। यह जनता पार्टी की सरकार बनने के पहले की बात है। वहाँ पर हम लोगों ने प्रयत्न किया कि हमारी विदेश नीति का एक मौलिक आधार यह रहा है कि सिर्फ अपने लिए ही नहीं, हम दुनिया में यह प्रचार करते रहे हैं कि दो देशों में कोई मतभेद हो जाए तो आपस में समझौता कर लेना चाहिए। बाइ-लेटरल नेगोशियेशंस से अपने मसले को सुलझा लेना चाहिए। तो हमारे सामने यह सवाल रहा कि जब हम दुनिया में उपदेश देते रहते हैं तो एक मसला हमारे सामने एक पड़ोसी देश के साथ है तो क्या हम दुनिया में एक उदाहरण पेश

[श्री जगजीवन राम]

कर सकते हैं कि हम मिलकर इस मामले को निपटा सकते हैं। हमारे जो प्रतिनिधि वहां गये थे उन्होंने प्रयत्न किया, संयुक्त राष्ट्र में, यू० एन० ओ० में कि किसी तरह से फिर यह मसला दोनों देशों में बातचीत के जरिये सुलझा लें। हमें कामयाबी मिली। नान-अलाइंड देशों के लोगों ने प्रयत्न किया, लेकिन साथ ही साथ यूनाइटेड नेशंस ने यह तय कर दिया कि शीघ्र ही मंत्री स्तर पर दोनों देशों के बीच ढाका में बात होगी। हम गये, बात हुई। लेकिन आपस में फैसला नहीं हुआ। हमेशा ख्याल रखिये कि हम कनीन स्लेट पर आरम्भ नहीं कर सकते, हर समझौते में जब हम मिलते हैं तो कुछ न कुछ बात होती है। उसके बाद एडमिरल खान हिन्दुस्तान में आये, यहां बात होती रही। उन आंकड़ों को मैं यहां नहीं कह सकता, इसलिए कि उन आंकड़ों को गुप्त समझा जाता है और उनको गुप्त रखना मुनासिब बात है क्योंकि दोनों देशों के सम्बन्धों का प्रश्न है। इसलिए हमने तय किया था कि जो दोनों देशों ने आंकड़े दिए हैं, जब तक संधि नहीं हो जाती है तब तक उन आंकड़ों को हम प्रकाशित नहीं करेंगे। प्रधान मंत्री को सब बातों के बारे में मालूम था। उस समय भी समझौता नहीं हुआ और यह निश्चय हुआ कि फरक्का के ऊपर फिर अप्रैल महीने में वार्ता होगी। इस बीच में भारत में सरकार बदल गई। नई सरकार को समझौते के लिए जो शुरू करना पड़ा तो वह फिर वहीं से शुरू करना पड़ा जहां पुरानी सरकार के वक्त हमने छोड़ा था, नये सिरे से नहीं करना पड़ा। अब यह देखना पड़ा कि जब नदी में गर्मी में सबसे कम पानी—जो आज तक के रेकार्ड से मालूम है, 55 हजार क्यूसेक होता है यह मोटी सी बात है कि अगर 55 हजार में से 40 हजार हम ले लेंगे तो बाकी सिर्फ 15 हजार बंगला देश के लिए जाता है। सिर्फ 15 हजार छोड़ने के बाद गंगा की धारा इतनी नीचे चली जाएगी कि

बंगला देश के लोग कहेंगे कि भारत ने हमको मुक्त किया, हमको स्वाधीन बनाया और अब पानी के बिना हमको मारना चाहता है। यह सोचने की बात हो जाती है। इसलिए कहीं न कहीं हमको आकर फैसला करना था। दोनों देशों को त्याग करना था, कुछ हमको आगे बढ़ना था, कुछ उनको आगे बढ़ना था। उनका बराबर कहता था कि हमारी जरूरत 44 हजार क्यूसेक की है क्योंकि 1975 में जो व्यवस्था हुई थी उसमें उनको 44 हजार मिला था। वह 44 हजार को पकड़ कर बैठे हुए थे कि 44 हजार हमको दे दो और उसमें फालतू जितना हो उसको कलकत्ता को दे दो। और हमारा कहना था कि हमें 40 हजार क्यूसेक पानी चाहिए। अब दोनों तरफ के सवाल हमारे सामने थे। मुझे यह बात कहने में कोई संकोच नहीं है कि जब बड़ा देश कुछ देता है तो उसको उदारता कहा जाता है और यह कहा जाता है कि यह जेनरस कन्ट्री (उदार देश) है। लेकिन जब कोई छोटा देश कुछ देता है तो कहते हैं कि उसने आत्म-समर्पण कर दिया। छोटा जब देता है तो उसको सरेण्डर कहा जाता है और बड़ा कुछ देता है तो उसको जेनरस कहा जाता है। हम यह मानते हैं कि हमने जो दिया है इसमें कुछ जेनरोसिटी का हिस्सा है। मैं पूछना चाहता हूं कि कलकत्ता के प्रश्न पर बंगाल के लोग ही यह क्यों समझते हैं कि कलकत्ता के संबंध में उनका ही उत्तर-दायित्व है? मैं जानता हूं कि जब वे बोलते हैं तो भावनाओं में बहुत आ जाते हैं। लेकिन मैं यह भी समझता हूं कि जब वे साधारण रूप से भी बोलते हैं तो ऐसा मालूम पड़ता है कि गुस्से में बोल रहे हैं। आप लोग यह क्यों समझ लेते हैं कि कलकत्ता पोर्ट केवलमात्र बंगाल का ही है। समझौते के लिए बातचीत करते समय मेरी मजबूरी यह रही कि उधर से भी मेरे सामने बंगाली थे और इधर से भी बंगाल थे। दोनों बड़े भावुक थे। दो भावुकों के बीच मैं पड़ गया। मेरे सामने कितनी मुश्किलें आई होंगी, यह आप खुद समझ

सकते हैं। श्री कल्याण राय इस बात को समझ सकते हैं कि जब दोनों पक्ष में बंगाली हों तो कितनी मुसीबत रही होगी। लेकिन मैं यह भी जानता हूँ कि बंगाली बड़ी तीखी बुद्धि का होता है। मतलब की बात तो जल्दी समझ जाता है। आपको यह मानना चाहिए कि यहाँ पर दोनों तरफ के सवाल जुड़े हुए थे। मैंने कलकत्ते के हितों को हमेशा अपनी नजरों में रखा है। कलकत्ता पोर्ट का सवाल और कलकत्ता में पीने के पानी का सवाल, ये दोनों हमारी नजरों में थे। सन 1975 में 11 हजार क्यूसेक पानी कलकत्ता को मिल गया तो यह कहा गया कि इस वर्ष हमको मीठा पानी पीने को मिल गया। मैं इसको दोहराना नहीं चाहता कि सन् 1975 में 11 हजार से 16 हजार क्यूसेक तक पानी कलकत्ता को देने की बात हुई तो बंगाल के अन्दर एक आनन्द और उल्लास की लहर दौड़ पड़ी। मैंने यह भी देखा कि अखबारों के सम्पादकीय लेखों में इस बात का स्वागत किया गया।

SHRIMATI MARGARET ALVA:
You are quoting from press clippings of a time when there was press censorship.

श्री जगजीवन राम : आपको इससे सरोकार नहीं है। आपको इससे पानी मिलने वाला नहीं है। आपको तो कावेरी नदी से पानी मिलेगा। मैं समझता हूँ कि इसीलिए डा० के० एल० राव यह सोचते थे कि गंगा नदी को दक्षिण में ले जाया जाए।

मैं यह कह रहा था कि उस वक्त उसका स्वागत हुआ था। लेकिन मैंने यह जरूर सोचा था कि जितना हम अभी कर सकते हैं उतना कर दिया जाये। यह कहा गया कि गर्मियों के दिनों में कलकत्ता को 40 हजार क्यूसेक पानी मिल सकता है। लेकिन सवाल

यह था कि इतना पानी कहां से मिल जाये। अगर 40 हजार मिल जाय तो झंझट की कोई बात नहीं रहेगी। इस साल हमको काफी पानी मिल गया। बंगला देश से समझौता हो चुका था। लेकिन बंगला देश ने कोई तकाजा नहीं किया। इसका एक कारण यह भी था कि इस वर्ष गंगा में पानी ज्यादा रहा। मांगने की आवश्यकता ही नहीं पड़ी। अगर पानी 55 हजार से भी ज्यादा रहता है तो हमारे सामने कोई बड़ी समस्या ही नहीं रहती है। किसी-किसी साल इस प्रकार की स्थिति आ जाती है। लेकिन गंगा एक विचित्र नदी है। 31 मई को पानी कम रहता है, लेकिन 1 जून को 1 लाख 10 हजार क्यूसेक पानी हो जाता है। जून में कोई परेशानी नहीं होती क्योंकि अगर हम 40 हजार क्यूसेक ले ले तो उनको 70 हजार से भी ज्यादा पानी चला जाता है। इसलिए हमने इसको हिस्सो में रखना संभव बना दिया है। 10 दिन के पीरियड के टुकड़े बना दिये गये हैं। यह सोचा गया कि 10 दिन में कितना पानी रहेगा और कितना फरक्का से कलकत्ता के लिए दिया जाएगा और कितना बंगला देश को दिया जाएगा। यह संभव है कि दो-तीन पीरियड में ऐसा हो जायें कि कलकत्ता के लिए कम पानी मिले तो इसका अनिष्टकारी असर कलकत्ता पोर्ट पर पड़ सकता है। उस वक्त के लिये यह कहा जा सकता है कि हम अपने प्रयासों से जो इसका अनिष्टकारी प्रभाव पड़ने वाला है, वह न पड़ने दें। इसके लिये गवर्नमेंट आफ इंडिया और वेस्ट बंगाल गवर्नमेंट सभी को मिलकर प्रयत्न करना पड़ेगा। बालू हटाकर अर्थात् ड्रेजिंग करके कलकत्ता पोर्ट को खराब होने से बचाया जा सकता है। यह तो कोई भी नहीं चाहेगा कि कलकत्ता पोर्ट खराब हो। बिहार, उत्तर प्रदेश और कई अन्य प्रान्तों की आर्थिक व्यवस्था उसके ऊपर बहुत निर्भर करती है और उनकी समृद्धि भी उसी के ऊपर निर्भर करती है।

[श्री जगजीवन राम]

दूसरी बात यह भी समझ ली जाय कि बांगला देश हमारा पड़ोसी देश है। भौगोलिक स्थिति को हम बदल नहीं सकेंगे। बांगला देश हमारा पड़ोसी रहेगा और पड़ोसी से मित्रता रहने से आदमी सुख की नींद सो सकता है। पड़ोसी देश में कैसा शासन चल रहा है, अगर हम यह देखने लगेंगे तो दुनिया के तमाम देशों को इसी दृष्टि से देखना पड़ेगा। लेकिन हमारे माप-दंड यही रहते हैं कि जिन देशों के साथ हमारे सम्बन्ध हैं, जिन देशों के साथ हमारा कूटनैतिक संबंध है, उस देश के आन्तरिक प्रबन्ध के मामले में हमको कोई नुक्ताचीनी नहीं करनी चाहिए। यह बराबर हमारी विदेश नीति का एक लक्ष्य रहा है। हम सभी देशों के साथ मित्रता चाहते हैं। लेकिन किसी भी देश के आन्तरिक मामलों के सम्बन्ध में कोई आलोचना नहीं करना चाहते हैं। जिस तरह से हम यह पसन्द नहीं करते कि हमारे देश के आन्तरिक मामले में कोई आलोचना करे, उसी तरह से दूसरे देश भी नहीं चाहते हैं कि हम उनके आन्तरिक मामलों की कोई आलोचना करें। इसलिये खास करके सदन में और भी नहीं करनी चाहिए, भ्रसक संभव हो तो बाहर भी नहीं करनी चाहिए। सदन में बिल्कुल नहीं करनी चाहिए किसी देश के आन्तरिक प्रबन्ध के मामले में कोई आलोचना। बांगला देश हमारा पड़ोसी राष्ट्र रहेगा। उनके साथ हमारा संबंध मैत्रीपूर्ण रहे, यह हमारा प्रयास होना चाहिए। हमारे पूर्वी और उत्तरी क्षेत्र का बहुत कुछ आर्थिक सम्बन्ध बांगला देश के साथ प्राकृतिक तरीके से था, वह एक अप्राकृतिक विभाजन हो जाने से छिन्न-भिन्न हो गया है। लेकिन अगर हमारा और उनका रिश्ता अच्छा हो जाय और जिसकी हम कोशिश कर रहे हैं तो हमारे लिये और उनके लिये, दोनों पड़ोसी देशों की समृद्धि के लिये अच्छा होगा। हर एक दृष्टिकोण से हमें यह देखना होगा। मैं नहीं कहता कि यह सब दृष्टिकोण

हमारे सामने नहीं था। जब मैं फरक्का के बारे में समझौता कर रहा था तो मेरे सामने भारत और बांगला देश की मित्रता होने से क्या लाभ हो सकते हैं, यह दृष्टिकोण मेरे सामने था। दोनों सरकारों कांग्रेस और जनता पार्टी के काल में जब मैं समझौता कर रहा था, तो यही दृष्टिकोण हमारा था और दोनों प्रधान मंत्रियों का भी दृष्टिकोण यही था। और इसलिये मैं नहीं मानता कि इस समझौते के द्वारा भारत के किसी हित का अनिष्ट हुआ है। बांगला देश में भी इस समझौते की ऐसी ही कड़ी आलोचना हो रही है, जैसे कि इस सदन में हो रही है। तो दोनों ही पक्ष इससे पूर्णतया सतुष्ट नहीं हैं और इसलिये यह मानना पड़ेगा कि हमने कोई ऐसा काम नहीं किया है जो मुनासिब नहीं था। तो मैं मानता हूँ कि फरक्का का जो समझौता हुआ है, वह मुनासिब समझौता है और दोनों देशों के हितों को दृष्टि में रखकर हुआ है। किसी भी समझौते पर पहुंचने के लिये दोनों देशों को कुछ न कुछ त्याग करना पड़ा है और मैं समझता हूँ कि ऐसी स्थिति में सदन को इसे स्वीकार करना पड़ेगा।

5.00 P.M.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: Sir, I have one question to ask. A question put forward by all the Members of the Congress Party in this afternoon's debate was that there are hundreds of precedents on the basis of equitable distribution of water. We quite accept the stand that Bangladesh wanted 55,000 cusecs of water and we wanted our own. Now, they wanted 55,000 cusecs of water and we wanted a certain amount. So we arrived at a compromise. What is not important is how much they wanted. We could have asked for 90,000 cusecs or 70,000 cusecs also. What is important is what is their actual requirement. On the basis of their actual requirement and on the basis of the actual requirement of India, a compromise should take place, not otherwise. In Bangladesh all media, all press and every platform has been utilised to inform

the people of Bangladesh that the Ganga waters are theirs, and any compromise, any giving away will be against their national prestige. That is why there is criticism. They are not satisfied. They may ask for 55,000 cusecs. Compromise cannot take place on that. We asked for 40,000 cusecs. We asked for the actual requirement, and they asked for something beyond their requirement. How can a compromise take place on that?

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: There will be an equitable distribution between the two countries on the basis of the requirements of the two countries.

SHRIMATI AMBIKA SONI: Why does not the Foreign Minister reply?

MESSAGE FROM THE LOK SABHA

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Bill, 1977

SECRETARY-GENERAL: Sir, I beg to report to the House the following message received from the Lok Sabha

signed by the Secretary of the Lok Sabha:

"In accordance with the provisions of Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, I am directed to enclose herewith the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Bill, 1977 as passed by Lok Sabha at its sitting held on the 28th November, 1977.

The Speaker has certified that this Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of article 110 of the Constitution of India."

Sir, I lay the Bill on the Table.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. M. TRIVEDI): The House stands adjourned till 11.00 A.M. tomorrow.

The House then adjourned at two minutes past five of the clock till eleven of the clock on Tuesday, the 29th November, 1977.