SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL (Gujarat): Madam, may I intervene just for a minute? I would request the Food Minister to be so kind as to agree to reply tomorrow so that more Members can get an opportunity to speak, There a^e more Members to speak. May I also request that the hon. Minister for External Affairs who is going to make a statement that we may have it tomorrow because Members would like to hear the Budget.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The only point is that tomorrow is a non-official day. But if hon. Members on both sides agree, and if the Food Minister also is agreeable to reply tomorrow and if the clarifications on the statement to be made by the Minister of External Affairs are also to be taken up tomorrow, if the House so desires . . .

SHRI MULKA GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore): The clarification may be had tomorrow. The statement may be made today.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Anyway, I have now been given the business of the House for tomorrow. Tomorrow there is one Resolution of Shri Banka Behary Das. He is not here in the House now. I do not know what his opinion is.

SHRI LOKANATH MISRA (Orissa): We can take this thing for one hour or so, after which the Resolution may be taken up.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Tomorrow there is also a Calling Attention Notice, there is the question Hour and then the two things that I have mentioned. If the Minister is agreeable, I think . . .

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM: I am entirely in the . . .

SHRI V. M. CHORDIA: The statement should at least be laid.

SHRI LOKANATH MlSRA: The leader of the PSP is here.

SHRI MULKA GOVINDA REDDYv Mr. Banka Behary Das will move his Resolution tomorrow after this food debate is over.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: And also the clarification.

SHRI MULKA GOVINDA REDDY: It will be carried on to the next day.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: What does the Food Minister say?

SHRI JAGJIVAN RAM; Tomorrow is non-official day. And if the hon. Members are so good enough, to give that time, I wiH certainly like more Members to take part in this. After the Question Hour and after the Calling Attention Notice, I will reply.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I wish all our deliberations are mutually agreed to like this every day.

SHRI M P. BHARGAVA (Uttar Pradesh): If the hon. Minister is agreeable and if the Opposition is agreeable, the Congress Party w:Ji have no objection

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Of course.

STATEMENT RE. DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST ASIA

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Surendra Pal Singh, you can make your statement now.

May I also take it to be the sense of the House that clarifications on the statement would be asked tomorrow and he may just lay the statement on the Table of the House?

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Yes.

SHRI MULKA GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore): Is it a big statement?

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: No.

SHRI MULKA GOVINDA REDDY: Then let him read it.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: All right. You may read it. Mr. Banka Behary Das has come. Mr. Banka Behary Das, in your absence your leader has said that you would not mind the clarifications to be asked tomorrow. Your Resolution will come a little later. The Minister.

THE DEPUTY MINISTER IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI SURENDRA PAL SINGH): Madam, on behalf of Mr. Chagl$_a$ I am reading out the statement. The creation of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the Arab countries. From time to time, the tension has erupted into incidents of varying degrees of seriousness. After the aggression on the U.A.R. in 1956, a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was set up to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. The UNEF had contingents supplied by Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Israel has all along refused to let the UNEF be stationed on or enter the Israeli side of the border. UNEF, therefore, operated only from the UA.R. side with the consent of the U.A.R. Government.

In recent weeks serious tension has developed between Syria and Israel. The Israeli prime Minister, Fo-eign Minister and Chief of Army Staff were quoted as saying that they would teach Syria a severe lesson and even mach up to Damascus. At the same time, there were reports of Israeli troop concentrations near the Syrian border. The Syrians, apprehending an imminent attack from Israel, held urgent consultations with the United Arab Republic under the U.A.R.-Syrian Mutual Defence Agreement signed in November. 1966.

On May 18, a letter was received by U Thant from the U.A.R. Foreign Minister asking for the removal of UNEF entirely from U.AR, territory^ and the Gaza strip. After again hav-' ing consultations with the U.N. Advisory Committee on UNEF, the Secretary-General decided to terminate UNEF's presence as requested by the U.A.R,

The Government of India have always supported the UNEF's activities and believe that its presence on the Israeli-U.A.R. border has helped in maintaining peace in the area. We would, however, like to state clearly that we appreciate the reasons which have impelled the U.A.R. to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF When the UNEF was stationed in the U.A.R., it was with the consent of the UA.R. Government and the UNEF could not continue to remain in U.A.R. territory without that Government's continuing consent. India could not be a party to any procedure which would make UNEF into an occupation force; nor could the Government of India agree to UNEF's continued presence in UA.R. in absence of latter's consent and in any case Indian troops could not remain part of UNEF without U.AR.'s approval. This is also in keeping with customary international law, the U.N. General Assembly resolution on the subject and the understanding reached between the late Mr. Dag Hammar-skjold, then U.N. Secretary-General and the U.A.R. Government.

On the question of UNEF's removal, I would like to refer to the reasons given by U Thant, United Nations Secretary-General, in his report dated May 18, 1967, to the U.N. General Assembly. U Thant has said:-

> "(a) The United Nations Emergency Force was introduced into the territory of the United Arab Republic on the basis of an agreement reached in Cairo between the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of Egypt and it, therefore, has seemed fully clear to me that since United Arab Republic consent was withdrawn, it was incumbent on the Secretary General to give orders for the with-drawal Of the force. The consent of the host country is a basic principle which has applied to all United Nations peace-keeping operations.

Cb) In practical fact, UNEF cannot remain Or function without the continuing consent and cooperation ' of the host country.

(c) I have also "been influenced by Jny deep concern Io avoid any action which would either compromise or endanger the contingents which make up the force. The United Nations Emergency Force is, after all, a peace-keeping and not an enforcement operation.

(d) In the face of the request for the withdrawal of the force, there seemed to me to be no alternative course ot action which could be taken by the Secretary General without putting i_n question the sovereign authority of the Government of the United Arab Republic within its own territory."

The Government Of India fully endorses the position taken by the U.N. Secretary General.

I may here refer to the incident on May 18, 1967, regarding the plane carrying General Inderjit Rikhye, Commander of the UNEF. General Rikhye was flying inside the Gaza strip when two Israeli aircraft buzzed his plane, fired warning shots and tried to force the aircraft to enter Israeli territory over the Mediterranean. General Rikhye refused to be intimidated and proceeded to his destination. We consider this incident a highly provocative one. It is, however, understood that the Israeli authorities have conveyed their apologies in this connection to the U.N. authorities. The coolness and courage of this officer who belongs to our Armed Forces deserves commendation.

On May 18, 1967, the Prime Minister received a verbal message from President Nasser communicated through our Ambassador in Cairo. The message referred to the various statements recently made by the Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the Chief of Army Staff, indicating that preparations were fceing made for an attack on Syria. The message indicated that the Israeli intention was to change the Governmenrln Syria through pressure and even by invasion. In the circumstances, the UAR wanted to declare openly that it would come to Syria's help if the latter was attacked by Israel. The UAR had consequently taken necessary measures to deter the Israelis from any aggressive designs against Syria.

The message added that UAR was not interested in increasing tensions in the area, but considering their past experience, especially during the Suez crisis, they felt it necessary to take precautions against any possible Israeli attack on an Arab country.

A reply was sent to President Nasser's message through our Ambassador in Cairo on May 19, 1967. The reply expressed the deep concern of the Government of India at the dangerous situation which had developed and our anxiety at the nature of statements recently made by the Israeli leaders. The~ reply added that we shared with the UAR adherence to the principle that no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another country. We said that we fully appreciated the reasons why the UAR has had to institute precautionary measure. We expressed the hope that peace would be maintained and we noted with gratification that it was not the mtentiori~of the UAR to increase tension in the area but that the measures taken were in the interest of preparedness and precaution against a possible attack On an Arab country. This message reiterated the respect and regard which we have for President Nasser personally and for our friendship for the U.A.R.

On May 21, 1967, the U.N. Secretary-General flew to Cairo for discussions with the U.A.R. leaders.

News has been received of the UAR. decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to other shipping carrying strategic goods for Israel. So far as the Government of India are concerned, we have taken the position as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea and that the entry to the Gulf lies within the territorial waters of UAR **and** Saudi Arabia. **We adhere to** this view.

[Shri Surendra Pal Singh,]

I would like to impress on the House the gravity of the hour and the need to be exceedingly cautious in expressings views in a fast developing situation. The interests of West Asian countries, the interests of India and the interests of the world as a whole make it imperative that there should be peace and stability in this entire area of West Asia. U. Thant is on a delicate mission. He has the fullest support of the Government of India in his efforts to maintain peace.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL (Punjab): May I, Madam . . .

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: We are leaving the clarifications for tomorrow.

MOTION *RE* FOOD SITUATION— *contd.*

SHRI BALACHANDRA MENON (Kerala): Madam, I would like to speak on two points, one on the general issues regarding food and another, on the special problems of Kerala. We have heard speeches here. Our friends have been saying that we do not have sufficient fertili-much as we want because our agriculture is primitive, we do not have sufficient and proper good seeds, and that we do not have sufficient fertilizers. Is that the fact. Or is that the only fact? That is what I should like to ask. Every country which has today made any advance on the agricultural front has been able to do so only when it has ended landlordism.. Even today, after 20 years of Congress rule we have not been able to do it and that is the greatest shame for us. It is not because the Indian agriculturist does not know how to produce food; he has been doing it for the last 6,000 years; from the Harappa period onwards. And we have got about 1,000 varieties of paddy. Out of the 1,400 varieties that the world has, India produces 1,000 varieties So we need not be ashamed. Today, some hybrid seeds are not yet produced here. We can produce those too. We have got sufficient talent for that. We od not require Taiwan to tell us; we do not require Japan to tell us; we need not even require America to tell us how we should do this. What we require is that our agriculturist should be in a position to make use of the^e hybrid seeds. Are we economically strong to have all these improved seeds and fertilizers? I will give you certain figures because I am an agriculturist. I am a trade unionist also. I know the problem of the worker who demands that the prices should not increase. I know the problem of the peasant who telle us that today what he gets is uneconomic and therefore the price should increase. Both I know and, therefore I venture to place the problem before you. Most of our peasants are poor peasants and even the middle peasant is today not in a position to make use of those costly fertilizers For example, take a 10-acre land. If he is a peasant and if there is a landlord and when he has to pay to the landlord something about 40 to 50 per cent of the produce, will he be in a position to purchase fertilizers? This is what I should like to know. I will give you certain figures. On a 10-acre land, at 7 quintal per acre—I am not speaking about hybrid seeds—if has gets 7 quintals per sere and if he has got double crop he will get about Rs 8400 at the price that he is being offered today. Out of that the expenses for seed wiH work out to Rs. 560; cultivating expenses will work out to Rs. 2,800; the cost of fertilizers will work out to Rs. 1,000—it is now Rs. 480 per ton and he will require at least two tons. So it comes to Rs. 4,360. He pays Rs. 4,200 to the landlord. So totally he pays Rs. 8,560 and what he gets is Rs. 8,400. He is a debtor. This is what happens. Tto you really understand that the orob-lem today in such cases of middle peasants and poor peasants ic that they are not in a posi+ion to clear off their doM»' T»«««» v>uge indebtedness