

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.] that the matter should be discussed here in a proper way so that we can make suggestions for other steps to be taken to deal with the situation. This will not satisfy us nor anybody in West Bengal.

SHRI P. GOVINDA MENON: There has been no request from the Government of West Bengal.

SHRI D. L. SEN GUPTA: Since this is a very serious matter, I would request you to see that the Food Minister comes here, even at 1 P.M. and answers the question whether the one lakh tonnes of rice demanded by the Government of West Bengal to be sent there immediately has or has not been sent.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The statement has been made and the matter can be discussed at some later date.

SHRI D. L. SEN GUPTA: What the people are interested in is whether rice is coming to them or not.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: The Government should go; that is the only way.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Further discussion on the Tashkent agreement. Dr. Tara Chand.

#### **MOTION RE. THE TASHKENT DECLARATION—*contd.***

DR. TARA CHAND (Nominated): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I hope this august House will agree with me that the leaders of the three delegations which met at Tashkent ought to be thanked by us. The whole country has been placed under great obligation by their deliberations at Tashkent which led to the formulation of the Declaration. Some people have suggested that this Declaration is useless, it has produced no effect and it can produce no effect. I am amazed at that statement because if you look back to what was happening in this country up to the end of December 1965 and compare it with what has happened since the Declaration was made, you will see the

great difference which the declaration has created in the atmosphere of the two countries. Up to the end of 1965 there were, in spite of the cease fire and the cease fire line, every day numerous violations of the cease fire agreement. In fact these violations increased to thousands and both sides were almost daily reporting to the U.N. Council that cease fire violations were taking place. We were all on tenter-hooks and nobody knew when the violations of the cease fire may restart the war which had been ended on the 23rd September. If the war had restarted, in fact if the war had continued even for two months more, I am completely certain that it would have ruined both the countries. It would have ruined our finances and it would have exhausted the weaponry which we and the Pakistanis possessed and the result would have been that we would have been in the most helpless condition. And some of our neighbours would have taken advantage of that condition to wreck their will upon this country, and everybody knows the neighbour from whom we were afraid of such a thing happening. We would have thrown open a defenceless India to the machinations of China. I think, therefore, it is completely wrong to say that this Declaration has not created a very advantageous position both for India and Pakistan. We are in the midst of a severe famine. Our finances would have been ruined and the friends from whom we expect support and help during the famine conditions would have been antagonised. I therefore, hold that we should be grateful to the three great leaders of the three delegations and their supporters for the Declaration.

My next point is that We should consider this matter in this way. The Tashkent Declaration is not merely an agreement; it is not merely a treaty. It is a more solemn form of agreement or treaty "between India and Pakistan. It is more solemn and it is supported by one of the biggest countries in the world, namely, Russia. Then it is a

declaration to the whole world that we have agreed upon certain principles on which we are going to act after the Declaration has been accepted. Therefore we should look upon this Declaration as not merely a bipartite sort of agreement which can be easily denied by any party that wants to do it but it is a declaration to the whole world and in fact in some way or other it brings in all the world support.

My next point is this. It is said that this Declaration has certain unconstitutional provisions within it; for instance, that India is unconstitutionally giving up Kargil, Haji Pir Pass and Tithwal to the Pakistanis. May I ask my friends to consider this matter from this point of view? In 1949 when we entered into the cease fire agreement what we did was, we said that we would draw a line from north to south about 500 miles long and we said and promised that without surrendering our sovereignty over the areas to the west of this line which belonged to the old State of Jammu and Kashmir, we would not assert our sovereignty by forceful means. If later on any settlement is made between India and Pakistan then we shall see what is to be done, whether this part belonged to us or belonged to Pakistan or whatever may be the result. Therefore we did not surrender our sovereignty; our sovereignty was in abeyance after 1949. When on 5th August 1965 and later some intruders came over the line into our part of Jammu and Kashmir it became necessary that the nefarious business should be stopped. It was in my opinion the duty of the Pakistanis to stop any infiltration from their side to our side but they did not do that, and therefore it was necessary for us to do that. This was said and done not after the Declaration but long before the Declaration that we shall go back to the cease fire line, that is, to the position we had taken up in 1949. We had *not* abandoned or surrendered our sovereignty over this territory but we said that our

sovereignty will remain in abeyance till by peaceful methods the problem is solved. Therefore there is no cession of any part of Jammu and Kashmir to anybody by this Declaration or by what went before this Declaration. Even before the Declaration we had said that we shall go back to the position as it existed before the 5th August. Here is a statement which Sardar Swaran Singh has made. The Indian Foreign Minister met U Thant on 1st October and conveyed to him the Indian position in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. These were the terms:

(1) India would observe cease-fire unconditionally but not unilaterally. India could not separate the operation in Jammu and Kashmir from other areas. India would hit back if Pakistan violated the cease fire.

(2) India would agree to withdraw as demanded by the Security Council provided Pakistan also earnestly did so and that too only if Pakistan withdrawal covered the infiltrators.

So I say that by the 1st October it had been decided by the Government of India that they would withdraw their forces from these three places which had been occupied by them. Therefore it is not this Declaration which is responsible for the restoration of these three places west of the cease fire line. I think therefore it is a complete misreading of this Declaration to say that the Government of India is guilty of doing something which is unconstitutional and which they had not stated before going to Tashkent. On the 1st October Sardar Swaran Singh had mentioned the terms on which we were prepared to withdraw our forces from the western part of Jammu and Kashmir to the previous positions.

Now, some people have raised the point that it has not ended the war between India and Pakistan. I am afraid they have not read the very first article of the Declaration. The first article of the Declaration says:

[Dr. Tara Chand]

"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means."

I do not know whether anything clearer could be stated by either our delegation or the Pakistani delegation. We renounce resort to violence, force and war in settling disputes between us. Even assuming that the position in Kashmir is a dispute, conceding for a moment that it is a dispute—although I do not believe that it is a dispute—that dispute also has to be resolved as stated here, that is, by not having recourse to force but by settling it through peaceful means. Therefore! although it is not stated that we renounce war for ever for the purpose of settling our disputes, for all practical purposes this Declaration makes it clear that force and violence will not be used even in the matter of the settlement of the problem of Kashmir.

[THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN *in the Chair*]

Now, therefore, I think we have achieved a great result by signing this Declaration. We should remember that before this Declaration was signed, the leaders of Pakistan were making all kinds of statements from which anybody could infer that they intended to carry on the war. Mr. Bhutto said that they would carry on the war for a thousand years and even till the last moment the President of Pakistan said that they could enter into a cease-fire agreement only if such and such things happened, which meant that because those things would never happen they would never cease fighting. The Declaration pledges Pakistan and India to the use of peaceful methods in the settlement of disputes, for the time

, being at any rate. So long as the Declaration stands, there is no question of force or war being resorted to.

Then, does this Declaration imply a repudiation of the statements made by the Prime Minister of India, the late Lal Bahadur Shastri? I strongly hold that it does not. It does not mean the repudiation of any of the pledges or statements which the Prime Minister, the late Lal Bahadur Shastri, made either in this House or outside this House. All that was said in this House on the 10th December or earlier was that we would accept a simple cease-fire immediately, but so far as other matters in the Resolution of the UNO of the 6th September were concerned, we had to discuss these matters. He did not say that he repudiated those matters, because on the 6th September the UN Security Council had already stated that both parties should withdraw their forces to the positions before the 5th of August. Therefore, he did not say that we were not going to do it. He only said that we were going to do it, provided the other party also did likewise which was quite a sensible and reasonable proposal to make. It is not a repudiation. It does not mean that we are not prepared to come back, behind the 5th of August line. Therefore, I feel that we owe it to ourselves and to the late Prime Minister to let the whole world know that no statement of the Prime Minister has been repudiated by signing this Declaration.

Now, what has this Declaration really done? To my mind, it has done two things. The first thing that it has done is to try and restore mutual confidence between India and Pakistan. We already see the signs of this confidence returning. We already see that in many ways the situation as it existed before the war is being restored. Aeroplanes are flying. People are going and people are coming. The number of troops is being reduced from the front confronting the Pakistani people on the cease-fire line in

Jammu and Kashmir. Even apart from that I think a more important matter is that this Declaration has won for India the appreciation of the entire world, which is an extremely important matter. Those who, during the course of the war, were breathing fire and sword, those who were saying that they would give no help to India and so on and so forth have all now fled. We are finding much response for meeting the famine conditions in India. Almost every country in the world is making efforts. We find that the USA, which appeared, at one stage, to be extremely annoyed with India, is now coming forward with the kind of help that they had been giving before this war and similar things are happening all over the rest of the world. Therefore, this Declaration has restored India's position in the world and it has brought about a complete change of feeling towards India from even those who were extremely critical of our position. I think, therefore, the Declaration has achieved very considerable results in the matter of restoring confidence between India and Pakistan and in the matter of restoring amicable relations between India and the rest of the world.

It is true that the Declaration has not settled in detail many difficult problems which we face. One of them is the Kashmir problem. That is true. It may be that at any time the Kashmir problem may again create a condition of strain between the two countries, but I hope that the spirit which has been released by this Declaration, the pledge which we have taken—and not only we—the pledge which Pakistanis have taken and the pledge which has been supported by such a great State as the U.S.S.R., these are going to help us in the solution of the most complicated problems that exist between India and Pakistan.

I think the third and the most important result of the Tashkent Declaration is that it opens the way for the establishment of permanent peace between India and Pakistan.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA (Bihar): Madam, the Tashkent agreement is a trail-blazing endeavour. It is an attempt to set right the relationship between two fraternal people and two fraternal States. For hatred, we substitute love and for war, peace. Nature and God in their wisdom bound this great sub-continent on the north, north-west and north-east with the impassable barrier of the Himalayas and surrounded the other three sides by the vast seas and ocean. Nature and God meant that the destiny of this great sub-continent shall

be one. Our destiny has been one. Though this country has

been in its long course of history sometimes divided between two States, sometimes between more than two, our destiny has been one. The race, language and the culture of the people of Pakistan and India are one. There is no reason then why we should not try to live in peace. Unfortunately because of the way in which the partition of the country came about, the sad incidents that followed that partition created a complex of hatred and fear in both the great countries. It is time now that we set our relationship right.

Let us take the lesson of history. I have already said that the history of the sub-continent has been one though the sub-continent has been divided often times in history into numerous States. But there is one lesson that history impresses on all of us that when the States of this great sub-continent stood united, India prospered, India was victorious; but when disunity prevailed, the whole sub-continent was subjugated and trampled under foot by foreigners. That history casts on us an obligation that we make an endeavour to live in peace, amity and goodwill. Unless we learn the lessons of history, like the Bourbons of France we shall face extinction. Madam, it took England and France, France and Germany, and England and the U.S.A. several centuries of bitterness to rea-

[Shri B. K. P. Sinha] Use that their destiny was one, and it is now that they have realised their one common destiny and they are acting on that basis. Mature as we are—we may be illiterate—but our people with a history of ten thousand years behind them are a mature people, and they have realised in good time that their destiny is one, and therefore they are making an endeavour, a fresh endeavour to live in peace and goodwill.

Madam, the previous speaker has already pointed out the achievements of the agreement, its special features. I would briefly refer to some of them. Both countries by this agreement agree to abjure the use of force in the settlement of their problems. Both countries undertake not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other, and pursuant to these two it has been proposed that meetings shall be held at various levels, Ministerial level and official level, and that joint Indo-Pakistan bodies would be formed to normalise and develop friendly relationship between the two great countries. The most important feature in my opinion is that while we agree to withdraw from Tithwal, Haji Pir and Kargil, Pakistan agrees to withdraw from the Chhamb-Jaurian sector. Let us not forget that it is not a small concession. Chhamb-Jaurian sector is the very jugular vein of the Kashmir Valley, the apple of discord. Whoever controls Chhamb-Jaurian will control the beautiful Valley of Kashmir, and Pakistan has agreed to restore possession of this strategic area to this great country.

Madam, voices are raised that Haji Pir and Tithwal are strategic points and to abandon them puts our strategy at a disadvantage. No doubt these points are of strategic importance, but no State boundary today is based solely on strategic considerations, and less so are cease-fire lines which are in the nature of temporary adjustments to maintain peace between two countries. The only sanction behind boundaries, whether they are perma-

nent boundaries or cease-fire lines, is the strength of a country. So long as we are strong, no nation, whatever the character of our boundary, whether it is a cease-fire line or permanent boundary, can dare violate that line. If we are weak, whatever the strategic advantage that we possess, history has taught us that we shall be trampled down. We have exhibited our strength last year in the unfortunate fight between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, it seems, never took us seriously when we proclaimed, when our leaders proclaimed, that an attack on Kashmir shall be treated as an attack on any other part of India and there shall be counterattacks, counter-measures in any appropriate sector of the long boundary between India and Pakistan. Now that Pakistan has experienced the strength of our arms, now that Pakistan has realised that India is in a mood of seriousness and that what the Indian leaders say they mean to implement, I am sure in future they shall never try to traverse the ceasefire line, never try to penetrate it. Moreover, a new factor has entered in this agreement. This agreement has been in a sense underwritten by a great power, a neighbouring power, the U.S.S.R., and in virtue of that underwriting by that great power it is too much to say that Pakistan may behave as it has behaved in the past. As I have already said, we get back in the bargain our jugular vein, the Chhamb-Jaurian area. Maybe, Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil may provide opportunities for pinpricks, but for these areas we exchange a strategic area, that is, Chhamb-Jaurian; that is, we save our lifeline though we give up a few outposts which may provide opportunities for infiltration of which there is no chance henceforth.

It has been said again that Government made some commitments both to Parliament and to the people. Here is what our late Prime Minister Shas-tri said in his letter to Mr. U Thant: "Government will not agree to any disposition which will leave the door

open for further infiltration or prevent Government from dealing with infiltrations that have taken place". Now there is nothing in the agreement which prevents us from dealing with the infiltrators in the way that we choose. It was in pursuance of first part, that is, 'he will not agree to any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltration, that the Prime Minister said that normally he would not like to part with Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil. But when that settlement was made, there was a different situation. A different situation prevails today, for both the countries have agreed to abjure the use of force. Both have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other. The plighted word, the pledged word of the leader of Pakistan is there to this effect, and it is expected that honourable as they are, they will keep their word. Therefore, the general commitment that Shastriji made in the light of this new development is carried out. Even sending infiltrators—it has been accepted—is use of force; it is interference in the internal affairs of India. When Pakistan commits that she will neither use force nor interfere in the internal affairs of India, Pakistan commits that henceforth she will not violate the cease-fire line.

Moreover, as I have already said, this agreement has been underwritten by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by setting its seal of approval, even the United States of America has indirectly underwritten this agreement. In virtue of this commitment, this fresh commitment, of these two great powers, it is too much to say that Pakistan will ever dare to send infiltrators through these three strategic areas. We are operating in a new context. The assurances that were made by the late Prime Minister have not been violated. Government assured the people of India that they would not allow the continuance or creation of circumstances which might facilitate infiltration in future. In the light of the above considerations, even infiltration in the

future has been made impossible. To withdraw them from Haji Pir, etc. would not be violative of security *vis-a-vis* infiltrators and therefore, It is not violative of the commitments of the Government. Rather to stick to the letter in the new circumstances, in the new situation, would be violative of the spirit of these commitments. An obsessive fidelity to superficial consistency would be a mere exhibition of assinine complex for, as Emerson remarked, "Consistency is the virtue of an ass", more so in the conduct of foreign relations, because as the situation changes, commitments change, and a commitment which may be valid, which may be in force, in a particular set of circumstances becomes obsolete in a new set of circumstances. Therefore, in the light of the new situation that I have enumerated, the spirit of the commitments has been carried out; the letter would be but violative of the spirit of those commitments. "Consistency", another big man has remarked, "is the bugbear of little minds," and Shastriji, that small dimunitive, meek, soft-spoken man, was not a little mind; he carried the substance of his commitments though, in the process, to some little minds—there is no dearth of little minds in this country—it may appear that he violated the letter of his commitments. Therefore, neither on strategic grounds nor on the ground of the past commitments of the Government, can there be any valid objection to this agreement.

Lastly, I would refer briefly to the constitutional objection raised by my friend. Now, the cease-fire line or the withdrawal to the cease-fire line does not mean that we give up our sovereignty over the whole of Kashmir. It has been rightly pointed out by the previous speaker that a certain position was established in 1949. We are retreating to that position, we are re-establishing that position. If during the last 18 or 19 years the Constitution was not violated by our acceptance of that line, I do not see how the Constitution is being violated now. The Berubari judgment is flung at

[Shri B. K. P. Sinha] our face. But then, Berubari was in permanent, peaceful possession of this country, and it was sought to be transferred permanently to the possession of Pakistan. In this case, when we withdraw 'to the' cease-fire line, we do not commit that we give up our claims to the areas beyond the cease-fire line; we retain our notional sovereignty. It is mere transfer of possession, it is not transfer of ownership.

A petition was brought forward in the Punjab High Court exactly on the same grounds which have been alleged by the hon. Members of the Opposition in opposition to this agreement and that petition was dismissed in limine, at the preliminary hearing itself. It was considered to be so devoid of any substance that it was considered to be a waste of time of the court to hear the petition. And in the Supreme Court, the gentlemen of the Opposition who inspired that petition acted on the principle that discretion was the better part of valour, and they withdrew the petition. You are a discreet man, I know.

PROF. M. B. LAL (Uttar Pradesh): Wait and see.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: If you look at the articles of the Constitution, it becomes very clear that the Constitution has not been violated because article 1(3) says:

"The territory of India shall comprise—

(a) the territories of the States;"

The territories of the States are defined in the First Schedule. Jammu and Kashmir is item 14 in the First Schedule. It is defined in these words:

1, "...The territory which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution was comprised in the Indian State, of Jammu and Kash-

Now, when did this relevant article commence? That is made clear by article 394 of the Constitution which says—that 16 articles—articles 1 to 4 are not one of them—came into force in November, 1949 and that the rest of the Constitution came into force on the 26th day of January, 1950, which is referred to in the Constitution as the date of commencement of our Constitution. A year before that at least, the cease-fire line had been established.

PROF. M. B. LAL: A dangerous interpretation.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: It is not a dangerous interpretation. I am making it quite clear. A year before, the cease-fire line had been established. Therefore, when the Schedule speaks of areas comprising the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it contemplates areas under the notional sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, because if it is given a factual interpretation, then the whole thing becomes anomalous. Therefore, what the Constitution contemplates is that we retain our sovereignty over the whole area of Jammu and Kashmir within the cease-fire line and also notionally beyond the cease-fire line. And now when we agree to withdraw, we retain that notional sovereignty; we do not give up that notional sovereignty. In these circumstances, the constitutional objection of the Members of the Opposition falls through.

Madam, this agreement initiates a new chapter in our relationship. We are surrounded by powerful enemies and unless we learn to live in peace with Pakistan, it may be difficult for us to meet the greater challenge from another State from beyond our northern borders.

This agreement has excellent features and therefore, I support it.

श्री जगत नारायण (पंजाब) : मैडम  
डिप्टी चैयरमैन, मैंने सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह

की स्पीच को बड़े गौर से सुना और जिन भाइयों ने ताशकंद डिक्लेयरेशन की हिमायत में तकरीरें कीं, उनको भी बड़े गौर से सुना किसी ने यह कहा कि यह बड़ा महत्वपूर्ण डिक्लेयरेशन है, किसी ने कहा कि एक बड़ा ऐतिहासिक है, किसी ने कहा कि यह बड़ा सौलम डिक्लेयरेशन है और किसी ने कहा कि यह बड़ा ही मैमोरेबुल डिक्लेयरेशन है। लेकिन मैडम मैं बड़े अदब के साथ अपने फ़ारेन मिनिस्टर से पूछना चाहता हूँ कि किस लिहाज से यह डिक्लेयरेशन मैमोरेबुल है और किस लिहाज से यह ऐतिहासिक है। सिक्योरिटी काउंसिल ने जो रिजोल्यूशन सीज फायर के बारे में पास किया था उसमें और इस डिक्लेयरेशन में क्या फर्क है? मैं उनसे यह अर्ज करना चाहता हूँ कि जब वे जवाब दें तो इस फर्क के बारे में बतलायें कि सिक्योरिटी काउंसिल ने जो सीज फायर के बारे में रिजोल्यूशन पास किया था उसमें और इस ताशकंद घोषणा में क्या फर्क है जिस पर हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान ने दस्तखत किये हैं। जिस समय सिक्योरिटी काउंसिल में यह रिजोल्यूशन पास हुआ उस समय पाकिस्तान की तरफ से श्री भुट्टो और हिन्दुस्तान की तरफ से सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह मौजूद थे। ताशकंद में जो डिक्लेयरेशन हुआ उस पर पाकिस्तान की तरफ से मार्शल अयूब ने और हिन्दुस्तान की तरफ से श्री लाल बहादुर शास्त्री जी ने दस्तखत किये और मैं यह जानना चाहता हूँ इन दोनों रिजोल्यूशन में क्या फर्क है?

उसमें कोई फर्क नहीं है। फर्क सिर्फ इतना है कि एक बड़ी पावर ने बीच में बैठकर फैसला कराने का क्रेडिट लिया। दरअसल बात बड़ी सीधी है। मैं समझता हूँ कि झगड़े चल रहे हैं बड़ी ग्रेट पावर्स में, अमरीका, बरतानिया, रूस और चाइना में कि कौन क्रेडिट लेता है हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान की सुलह करवाने का सीज फायर के बाद जबकि पाकिस्तान ने बाकायदा तौर पर सीज फायर का भी

उल्लंघन करना शुरू किया हुआ था। इसलिए क्रेडिट लेने की बात थी। क्रेडिट रूस को मिला कि उन्होंने सुलह करवाई, वरना जो कुछ सिक्योरिटी काउंसिल का मुआहिदा था वही यह डिक्लेयरेशन है। इसमें रस्ती भर भी, एक लाइन का भी फर्क नहीं है।

यहां पर कहा गया कि हमें पाकिस्तान के साथ सुलह करनी चाहिए, हमें पाकिस्तान के साथ बिल्कुल ठीक ढंग पर रहना चाहिए। कौन कहता है कि नहीं रहना चाहिए? जहां हम कहते हैं कि यह एक बड़ा सौलम डिक्लेयरेशन है, बड़ा हिस्टोरिक डिक्लेयरेशन है, वहां यह भी देखना चाहिए कि पाकिस्तान के नेता प्रधान अयूब और मिस्टर भुट्टो क्या कहते हैं। इस डिक्लेयरेशन के बाद उनका जो ख्याल है वह मैं आपके सामने रखना चाहता हूँ। अयूब साहब ने कहा —

"The Declaration was a statement of intent and Pakistan had not departed from the support to Kashmiris, he told a meeting of Government and army leaders."

The President, who returned from a fortnight's energetic campaigning in the provinces for support to the Declaration, said the criticism that Pakistan had abjured its rights in Kashmir was very unfair and uncharitable.

"If both sides acted with goodwill and honesty of purpose, it could pave the way for a solution of all disputes with India, he said. The Declaration reflected the two countries' determination to solve their differences through peaceful negotiations."

He maintained that India would gain most if she settled her differences with Pakistan.

President Ayub scotched reports in the Press here and among poli-



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tical observers that he was about to reshuffle his Cabinet. He described the rumours as "stupid and fantastic".

He also denied rumours about "imaginary differences" between himself and Foreign Minister Zulfi-kar Ali Bhutto."

यहां पर सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह जी ने कहा कि हमें वहां जो इस तरह की तकरीरें की जाती हैं, जो गलत ढंग पर की जाती हैं, उनका कोई नोटिस नहीं लेना चाहिए। वहां पर तकरीरे दो आदमियों ने की, या तो भुट्टो ने की या अयूब ने की हैं। बाकी छोड़ दीजिए। यह कहना कि भुट्टो इरेसपॉसिबिल है, गलत बात है। अखबारों में यहां पर आया कि अयूब और भुट्टो में डिफरेंसेज हो गए हैं, भुट्टो को वह निकाल रहा है। उसने कहा ऐसी कोई बात नहीं है। भुट्टो ने इससे भी ज्यादा कहा जब उसने स्टेटमेंट दिया। वह कहते हैं—

"According to Radio Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto said in a statement yesterday that, 'the slates can only be sponged clean when the people of Jammu and Kashmir have exercised their inherent right of self-determination.'"

The Tashkent Declaration, Mr. Bhutto said, was only a dialogue between India and Pakistan for a permanent solution of the 'tragic dispute' over Jammu and Kashmir.

He said that a fitting tribute to the Soviet Union would be if its initiative were to result in a significant contribution to the realization of 'the legitimate aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.'

He said the Soviet leaders were no doubt mindful of their own rich heritage as fighters for freedom and liberty when they agreed at Tashkent that a solution of the "Kashmir dispute must be found."

Referring to the provision in the Tashkent Declaration for renunciation of force under the U.N. charter, Mr. Bhutto said Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognized the right of a nation to wage struggle for freedom.

It is precisely in this context that in the Tashkent Declaration we have reaffirmed our obligations under the Charter. The fact that we were unable to immediately arrive at a settlement at Tashkent does not detract one iota from our resolve to seek a just settlement under this very declaration or even outside its framework, Mr. Bhutto said.

He said the day must come when the people of Jammu and Kashmir would be enabled to 'decide their future in freedom and without coercion'."

भुट्टो का यह स्टेटमेंट बड़ा साफ है उस डिक्लेयरेशन के बारे में जिसको आप बड़ा आगस्ट और हिस्टोरिक डिक्लेयरेशन बताते हैं। ताली एक हाथ से नहीं बजती, ताली हमेशा दो हाथों से बजती है। जो भाई यह समझते हैं कि यह बड़ा सेक्रेड डॉक्यूमेंट है, यह नेशन का डॉक्यूमेंट है, वे भी आज हमारे स्वर्गीय पूजनीय प्रधानमंत्री लाल बहादुर शास्त्री के साथ बेइन्साफी करते हैं। शास्त्री जी का इमेज और स्टैचर उस समय बना जबकि उन्होंने अपनी फोरसेज को लाहौर की तरफ कदम बढ़ाने के लिए कहा। मेरे भाई दीवान चमन लाल ने कहा था कि भुट्टो यह कोशिश कर रहा था कि दिल्ली पर कब्जा कर लें और एक हजार साल तक हिन्दु-स्थान पर मेरी हुकूमत चले। मैं कहता हूं कि यह बात ठीक है कि पाकिस्तान का इरादा होगा एक हजार साल तक हुकूमत करने का और यह भी इरादा होगा कि वह दिल्ली पर मार्च करे और कब्जा करे। उसके इस आइडिया के खिलाफ किसने फाइट की, किसने उसे पूरा नहीं होने दिया? हमारे प्रधानमंत्री श्री लाल बहादुर शास्त्री

ने नहीं होने दिया। पिछले डेढ़ सौ साल में, महाराजा रणजीत सिंह के बाद, वह पहले प्राइम मिनिस्टर हुए हैं जिन्होंने बड़ी बहादुरी से अपनी फोरसेज को उस इलाके पर मार्च करने का हुक्म दिया, जो कि दुश्मन का था। मैं यह समझता हूँ कि हमें सेन्टीमेंट से कोई बात नहीं करनी चाहिए, डिस्पेन्शनेटली इस डिक्लेयरेशन को देखना चाहिए कि वाकई श्री लाल बहादुर शास्त्री जी का यह संसा था। मैं क्या कहूँ। जब यू० एन० ओ० में, सिक्योरिटी कौंसिल में यह फैसला हुआ सोज फायर का तो उस वक्त मुझे अच्छी तरह याद है—यहाँ पर हमारे अपोजीशन के दो नेता बैठे हैं, बाजपेयी साहब और मणि साहब—जब यह मामला पेश हुआ कि आपने सोज फायर मान लिया तो क्या आप कारगिल वगैरह पाकिस्तान को दे देंगे, तो प्रधान मंत्री जी ने कहा था कि मैंने एक बात रख ली है इसमें कि जब तक वह इन्फिल्ट्रेटर्स को नहीं निकालेंगे तब तक हम भी इनको खाली नहीं करेंगे। उन्होंने यहाँ तक कहा कि हम अगर दुनिया में अकेले भी रह गए, तब भी खाली नहीं करेंगे, अकेले पाकिस्तान के साथ फाइट करेंगे। इतना स्ट्रांग था उनका डिटरमिनेशन। अब उन्होंने यह कैसे किया, क्या मजबूरी हुई, उन पर कितना प्रेसर पड़ा, यह तो वही बतला सकते थे या जो उनके साथ हमारे नेता थे वह बतला सकते हैं। एक बात बड़ी क्लियर है। मैडम शायद आपने उनकी वहाँ की न्यूज रील, जो कि सिनेमा में दिखाई जा रही है, देखी होगी। मैं वह देखने गया था। पैक्ट के बाद लाल बहादुर शास्त्री जी को, अपने कमरे में अकेले टहलते दिखाया गया है बड़े पेंसिव मूड में। जब कोई आदमी, कोई बड़े से बड़ा नेता बड़ा अच्छा काम कर लेता है तो उसको खुशी महसूस होती है, वह अपने साथियों को साथ बुलाता है, पार्टी करता है, गप्प लगाता

है, खुश होता है कि आज हमने एक बड़ा महत्वपूर्ण फैसला किया है, हमें महत्वपूर्ण फतह हुई है, लेकिन शास्त्री जी का अकेला दिखलाया जाना घूमते हुए पेंसिव मूड में—उससे यह बात साफ जाहिर होती है कि उन पर किसी न किसी ढंग से कोई दबाव जरूर पड़ा होगा और वह सोचते होंगे कि मैं कर तो चला हूँ पैक्ट को साइन लेकिन यू० एन० ओ० में, सिक्योरिटी कौंसिल में हमारे फारेन मिनिस्टर ने सीज फायर का पैक्ट साइन कर दिया उस वक्त मैंने हिन्दुस्तान में कहा था कि कारगिल वगैरह हम खाली नहीं करेंगे। तो जब प्रधान मंत्री ने अपोजीशन को यकीन दिलाया तो मैं समझता हूँ कि इस पैक्ट पर दस्तखत करने के बाद—परमात्मा उनकी उमर दराज करता—वे हिन्दुस्तान में पहुँचते तो वे इस पैक्ट के बारे में कोई रास्ता जरूर निकालते। मगर उनसे यह कैसे कराया गया, कैसे हुआ, किसने प्रेशर डाला, यह तो मैं नहीं कह सकता, वही कह सकते थे कि क्या हालात थे। मैडम, मैं समझता हूँ कि जिन हालात में आज हम उनकी इतनी रिवरेंस करते हैं, वह रिवरेंस इस वजह से नहीं है, इस पैक्ट की वजह से नहीं है। यह कोई सेक्रेड डाक्यूमेंट नहीं है। उनकी जो इज्जत है वह इस वजह से है कि उन्होंने हिस्टरी में तारीख में पहली दफ्ता हिन्दुस्तान के लोगों को, हिन्दुस्तान की आर्मी को दुश्मन मुल्क पर हमला करने का आर्डर दिया। यह इसकी वजह थी कि लाखों आदमियों ने, बीसों लाख आदमियों ने उनकी वाह वाह की। इसलिये उनकी इमेज को हमें कम नहीं करना चाहिये। उनके साथ यह मुआहिदा या सालेम डिक्लेयरेशन की बात करके हमें सेंटीमेंट में नहीं आना चाहिये। हमें देखना चाहिये कि इस मुआहिदे में और सिक्योरिटी कौंसिल के मुआहिदे में क्या बात है।

## [ श्री जगत नारायण ]

दूसरी बात मैं यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि हमें यह नहीं भूलना चाहिये कि पाकिस्तान का चीन के साथ पूरा ताल्लुक है और यह ताल्लुक इस तरह पर है कि मेरे पास अपनी केन्द्रीय सरकार का यह एक पैम्फलेट है ए० बी० सी० आफ दि काश्मीर क्वेश्चन, उसमें यह छपा है, लड़ाई के बाद छपा है:—

"In 1954, Pakistan signed a military aid agreement with U.S.A. and pledged fealty to CENTO and SEATO, both directed against Communist countries. This was only one side of the medal. While taking a pledge to resist any aggression from Communist countries, Pakistan was at the same time assuring China, as recently revealed by Premier Chou En-lai, that the military aid agreement and her membership of CENTO and SEATO were not directed against China, but only against India. She thus tried to deceive U.S.A. or China or both."

और पहले मैंने यह बताया कि किस तरह आगे भी उन्होंने लिखा है कि पाकिस्तान हमेशा हिन्दुस्तान को डिसीव करता रहा है। फिर इसके आगे इसी पैम्फलेट में यह लिखा है:—

"In December 1963, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Nan Han Chen, then on a visit to Pakistan, said:

"If ever there is a war between India and Pakistan, China will surely support Pakistan and not India."

Chinese Foreign Minister, said in Lahore last February, "Pakistan and China

फिर आगे जाकर उन्होंने कहा है:—

will continue to be friends even after you get Kashmir and we take Taiwan."

यानी चाइना का जो इंटेंशन है वह बड़ा क्लीयर है, पाकिस्तान के साथ चाइना का ताल्लुक है जो कि बड़ा क्लीयर है। यह हमारी गवर्नमेंट खुद मानती है, हमारे डिफेंस मिनिस्टर ने कहा है कि अभी भी चाइना का जो खतरा है वह बदस्तूर कायम है, वह अपनी फ्रोंटें हमारी फ्रंटियर पर एमास कर रहा है। तो अगर यह हालत है कि चाइना और पाकिस्तान बिल्कुल हैंड इन ग्लव हैं, वह बिल्कुल एक लीग में हैं। तो हमको यह सोचना चाहिये कि जो कुछ हमें करना है वह हम करते चले जाय तो उसके बाद क्या होगा, क्या वही हालत रिपीट होगी जैसी कि पहले रिपीट हुई थी कि हम सतर्क नहीं थे और उन्होंने 10 हजार घुसपैठिये, इन्फिल्ट्रेटर्स, काश्मीर में दाखिल कर दिये थे।

उपसभापति : 15 मिनट से ऊपर हो गये हैं।

श्री जगत नारायण : 20 मिनट के लिए कहा था।

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please wind up. There are too many-speakers; we are sitting through the lunch hour for that reason.

SHRI LOKANATH MISRA (Orissa): We do not have the quorum; then I will raise the question of quorum, Madam. We may decide to sit after 5 p.m. but there should be a lunch break. We may even continue tomorrow. What is the hurry about it?

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE (Uttar Pradesh): Let the Minister reply tomorrow.

THE DEPUTY CAHIRMAN: That I do not know, but five and a half hours were allotted by the Chairman, according to which we should finish by 5 o'clock.

SHRI M. M. DHARIA (Maharashtra) : Let us continue today, Mr. Vajpayee.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The only course is that we sit through lunch time.

SHRI M. M. DHARIA: Yes, yes, we are ready.

SHRI LOKANATH MISRA: I do not know if there is a quorum now.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: There are too many speakers and they should be here by now. If they are not here, it is all right.

SHRI LOKANATH MISRA: We are sitting till the 4th of April, at least. What is the hurry about it, I do not understand.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It is the Chairman's decision. He has given five and a half hours, and we must finish the debate today.

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE: The Minister can reply tomorrow.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You please wind up, Mr. Jagat Narain.

SHRI JAGAT NARAIN: All right, Madam.

मैंडम मैं एक बात अपने फारेन मिनिस्टर से पूछना चाहता हूँ कि क्या जो यह बड़े जोर से कहा जाता है कि काश्मीर जो है वह भारतवर्ष का अटूट अंग है—ठीक है, आपका डिक्लेरेशन दुस्त है, काश्मीर का एक्सेशन हो चुका है तो आप यह तो बताइये कि कितना काश्मीर भारतवर्ष का अटूट अंग है, जो इस वक्त हमारे कब्जे में है वही अटूट अंग है या जिस पर पाकिस्तान का कब्जा है वह भी भारत का अटूट अंग है। अगर वह भी है तो फिर आपका यह एग्जीमेंट करना क्या माने रखता है। जब चीन ने हमला किया था तब आपने प्लेज लिया था, बड़े जोरदार लफ्जों में आपने यह प्लेज लिया था, यहां पार्लियामेंट के मेंबरो ने

लिया था, जिसमें शायद आप भी शामिल थीं : . . .

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: If you read from reports it will take more time.

SHRI JAGAT NARAIN: I am just finishing.

I now quote:

"With hope and faith, this House affirms the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be."

आज इसको चार साल हो चुके हैं, चाइना हमारा 20 हजार मुरब्बा मील ग्रेब किये हुये हैं और उसके मुतालिक हमने सोचा भी नहीं है कि उनको यहां से निकालना है या नहीं, उसके मुतालिक क्या ऐक्शन लेना है यह सालेम, कसम इस हाउस में ली थी, यह रेजोल्यूशन पास किया था और यह कहा था कि हम इस चैलेंज को एक्सेप्ट करते हैं। तो मैं समझता हूँ कि इस वक्त इस किस्म के हालात पैदा कर के अगर आप पाकिस्तान पर एतबार करेंगे, यह समझेंगे कि वह अपना प्लेज पूरा करेंगे तो मैं यह समझता हूँ कि वह अपना प्लेज पूरा नहीं करेंगे हम धोके में रहेंगे और हमारी हालत वही होगी जैसी की पहले हुई आगे तीन दफ़ा पाकिस्तान ने हमला किया है और चौथा हमला छः महीने में, साल में, पूरी तैयारी करके करेगा हमें इससे सतर्क रहना चाहिये। मैंडम आपका बहुत बहुत शुक्रिया।

SHRI M. M. DHARIA: Madam Deputy Chairman, when we look at the incidents and the events of the last six months, we are really surprised to look at the dramatic events that have taken place in the history of our country. There were the intruders. There was the aggression in the Chhamb area by Pakistani armies and to protect the sovereignty and integrity of our country our

[Shri M. M. Dharia] Army had to walk into the Sialkot and Lahore regions, and in that way there was nearly a war between the two countries—it was not a simple conflict. Then the United Nations Organization and the Security Council had to intervene and the Security Council had passed a Resolution on the then situation. The ceasefire was there in the Resolution, but on the borders the fire never ceased. It was then that the intervention by Russia took place, and the Prime Minister of Russia, Mr. Kosygin, invited both the countries, our Prime Minister, the late Prime Minister of our country, and the President of Pakistan. They met at Tashkent, and the Tashkent Declaration, which is now under consideration and discussion here, took place at Tashkent. Now when we have to scrutinise the Declaration made at Tashkent, Madam, we shall have to look at the background of the past. This country of ours had insisted all the while that there may be disputes between the two countries, but that all the disputes must be solved amicably, sitting round a table. There are three cardinal principle which we have accepted so far as our foreign policy is concerned. We all the while insisted that (1) peaceful coexistence and (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of any country and (3) negotiated settlement of inter-State disputes should be the cardinal principles, and that we should act accordingly. Our late Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlalji was all the while requesting the leaders of Pakistan that they should solve their disputes with us not through war, not by means of force, but by having some negotiated settlement wherein the sovereignty of either country will not be challenged. But, unfortunately, Pakistan was not prepared for that. They said that there could not be a no-war declaration so long as the Kashmir question was not resolved. May I refer, Madam, to one of the speeches of Pandit Jawaharlalji, even though he was referring to this no-war

agreement since long, since 1948 onwards? In 1956, while making a speech in Parliament on the 29th of April, 1956, Pandit Jawaharlalji said:

"Some time back I had offered a no-war declaration to the Pakistan Government that, under no circumstances, would India and Pakistan go to war for a settlement of any dispute. There was considerable correspondence. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who was then the Prime Minister, did not agree to it because he said: "Before we make that declaration, you must settle the questions at issue, or you must agree to their being settled automatically by some process like arbitration."\*\*\*

This was their insistence and when we look at this sort of approach and attitude on the part of the leaders of Pakistan, then we can realize the importance of the Tashkent Declaration. It is here at Tashkent that this stand and opposition had to be given up by the leaders of Pakistan. They had to sign a no-war declaration even though the Kashmir issue did not at all come into the purview of that statement. I think, Madam from this point of view we have gone definitely ahead, and Pakistani leaders had also to change their own position. Madam, many times it is said that what was not done by this country during the last eighteen years was possible during the last eighteen months. Many times a comparison is also made between our late Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlalji and our late Prime Minister Shastriji. I am not one of those who are prepared to have that sort of comparison. I always feel that it is because of the foreign policy adopted by the late Panditji that this country could get enough opportunity to make so great an industrial and technological advance, to have that much military strength, and it is because of the progress that we made during the last eighteen years, we could show the results we showed during the last eighteen months. Of course many times it so happens that it is the

structure that is visible and not the stones that are there beneath in the foundation. Here the foundation had been laid quite firm and it was on that foundation that we could raise that structure and we are on the way to victory, and we could take a definite and firm position. During the war, we could show to Pakistan that our Army could give excellent results because we had made those preparations during the last eighteen years. This was the country which was able to stand on its own legs under those conditions, in spite of the fact that the aids were stopped by our friendly countries. When the aids were stopped to both countries there was no choice before Pakistan but to give up her ideas and whims.

When we look at this Declaration we find that the material clauses in it are in our favour. There is the First Clause which is absolutely clear. I quote it:

"They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means."

It was against this background that the Jammu and Kashmir question was discussed. It says:

"It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position."

Nowhere have we, in these discussions given up our stand so far as the question of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. Again Madam, in clause 3 it is stated in the Declaration:

"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan should be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other."

SHRI LOKANATH MISRA: Madam there is lack of quorum in the House.

Should we continue the debate in the way we are doing now?

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: There is lack of quorum. I thought Members would come, but there is lack of quorum. So we adjourn now till 2.60 p.m. and you can continue your speech afterwards.

The House then adjourned for lunch at fortytwo minutes past one of the clock.

The House re-assembled after lunch at half-past two of the clock. The VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA) in the Chair.

SHRI M. M. DHARIA: Mr. Vice-Chairman while making a reference to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir which does not come within the ambit of the Agreement reached at Tashkent, I referred to clause 3 of the Agreement.

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE: Mr. Vice-Chairman, the Foreign Minister took the plea that discussions should not be held simultaneously as he would like to be present in the House. He has replied to the debate in the other House but he is not present here.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M.P. BHARGAVA): He has started from his house. He is coming.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL (Gujarat): He is having a little rest after his speech.

SHRI M. M. DHARIA: Clause 3 of the Agreement categorically states that the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan are agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. It is made categorically clear that Pakistan will not intervene

[Shri M. M. Dharia] in our internal affairs and about our own intentions, the Prime Minister and the others have on several occasions made it absolutely clear that Jammu and Kashmir forms an integral part of this country and so it would not be possible for Pakistan to have any sort of interference it being our internal affair. Under these circumstances to say again that this issue was not discussed at Tashkent, that it remains open for Pakistan to bring in this issue will not be fair. Besides, I feel that this Declaration cannot be compared with the Security Council's Resolution because, the two parties to the Agreement, India and Pakistan themselves, jointly decided and that is why this Declaration took place. Under these circumstances, such an Agreement has been signed, after both the parties have agreed. This has been done at the instance of Russia and Russia has witnessed it. When this has been hailed not only by Russia but by all the countries of the world, including the United States of America, I feel that both the countries in future shall have to implement this Agreement and I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that if this Agreement is implemented faithfully, honestly and sincerely, we shall be opening a new era in the life of these two countries. Six hundred million people are absolutely in need of peace and this peace is necessary for several reasons. We shall be going in for peace because we want to wage a war of another kind, a war which shall be against poverty, which shall be against ignorance, which shall be against disease and which shall be against un-employment. This war shall be for the prosperity of this country. During the last eighteen years we could progress only because of the policy adopted by the great Panditji. It is because of his policy of mutual co-operation and peaceful co-existence that this country could use that period of eighteen years for its progress and by this peace if this country could get a period of five, ten or fifteen years, I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that in the years to come this country shall

grow more and more powerful. The real guarantee to the people is not this Declaration or Agreement. The real guarantee is our own strength. The more and more we are self-reliant, I have no doubt in my mind, the more and more we shall be coming nearer to peace. By accepting this Declaration, we cannot remain complacent. It has been announced by the leaders on several occasions that the danger of China exists and we do know that it does exist and under these circumstances even though there is the ceasefire so far as Pakistan is concerned, we cannot remain complacent and idle. We shall have to utilise this period for making our country more and more self-reliant. It is said that this Agreement will be the finest possible and the fittest memorial to Shastriji. There is no doubt whatsoever that he was a man who fought with courage and determination when the war was going on and again, in order to have this peace, he again dedicated his life for the cause of peace. His second appeal to the country was self-reliance. To me, Sir, this agreement may be a good memorial for Shastriji but the fittest possible memorial for Shastriji will be true. I feel that we must have faith in our developing the self-reliant attitude in this Agreement. Let us do all in our power to implement it faithfully. Several doubts will be raised and some doubts have been raised. Some people have asked why the Haji Pir Pass, Kargil and Tithwal which were in our possession have been given up. A stronger plea can also be made but we cannot forget that from that point of view also, our position was absolutely clear—and it was so made—in the letter that was written by the late Shastriji to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation on the 14th September, 1965. Shastriji made this quite clear—and I quote it here. He said:

"Let me make it perfectly clear, Mr. Secretary-General, that when, consequent upon cease-fire becoming effective, further details are considered we shall not agree to

any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltrators or prevent us from dealing with the infiltration that has taken place. I would also like to state quite categorically that no pressure or attacks will deflect us from our determined resolve to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part."

This was the firm stand that was taken by the hon. Prime Minister. When that guarantee came forward, when Pakistan signed this "No War Declaration" which it was reluctant or hesitant to do before, all these seventeen years, we agreed to give up the Haji Pir Pass and other areas. Therefore, Sir, on this occasion I would like to point out that our aim throughout this conflict was absolutely limited. This Declaration is not a list or catalogue of the surrender terms between the two countries. In that case total defeat is necessary and for a total defeat we should have gone in for a total war but that was never our claim, that was never our idea, that was never what we thought of in the past. Our aim was absolutely limited. Whatever has now occurred is according to our claim. We wanted peace, we wanted this mutual co-existence and peaceful co-existence and it is from this point of view that we shall have to scrutinise the Tashkent Agreement. I would like to repeat again, Sir, that there is a lot of misunderstanding being created by certain interested persons and political parties that there is a difference between the Government and its Army.

Our Defence Minister has made it absolutely clear in one of his speeches. Speaking at a public meeting in Delhi on February 1, the Defence Minister said that the Tashkent Declaration was a bold step towards the establishment of world peace. He added:

"I have had discussions with the Chiefs of the Services before and after the Agreement and they have nothing but praise for it. National

policies are formulated with complete agreement between the military and the Government."

So if some parties are trying to take any political advantage of this situation, if they are trying to make some political capital with their eye on the next general elections, it will not be fair. We have to take the agreement as it stands. We shall have to take into consideration the basic policy of this country and, having regard to our basic policy, I have no doubt in my mind that this agreement consistent with the same, opens a new era in our life. As it was rightly said by our hon. Prime Minister, Shrimti Indira Gandhi, we seek to maintain the friendliest relations with our neighbours and we seek to resolve our differences peacefully. Tashkent Declaration is the expression of those sentiments and we have no doubt that we shall implement it fully in letter and in spirit. I stand by it and I support the Declaration.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA): I may inform hon. Members that the Prime Minister will make a statement at 3-30 regarding her talks about Nagaland.

PROF. SATYAVRATA SIDDHANTALANKAR (Nominated): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, there has been criticism regarding the Tashkent Declaration on the plea that it has let us down. In Pakistan there has been a cry that they have been let down and in India also there are some people who say that we have been let down. The question is whether India has really been let down. India has got an ideology of its own. India never believed in war. India fought the battle of freedom with non-violence. Our battleground has always been a non-violent battleground. We have been soldiers of Mahatma Gandhi and we have sent hundreds and thousands of people into British jails. So the ideology that we have been following all along has been the ideology of non-violence and this ideology of non-violence is amplified by our action. We see that even in



[Prof. Satyavrata Siddhantalankar.] our history we have been always revering people who have devoted themselves to non-violence. Budha and Gandhi have been our heroes. Of course, non-violence does not mean that if there is aggression on the part of any nation, then we have to submit to it. Aggression has to be met by counter-aggression. India never committed aggression. If we did anything that could be called aggression, it was only to counteract aggression. India's philosophy has been—

If an enemy comes, and attacks us then only we have to use violence. Then we have to show no mercy to the enemy. That has been India's philosophy all along. On the other hand what has been Pakistani ideology? Pakistan never believed in non-violence. When Pakistan was created they

said:

हंस कर लिया है पाकिस्तान.

^if has been the basic policy, the basic philosophy of Pakistan. When this war started, it was not India that started the war; it was Pakistan that embarked upon aggression. All along they have been preparing to commit aggression against India. Year after year they were preparing for a war and sudden^ when nobody thought that India will be attacked Pakistan committed aggression. So Pakistan's ideology has always been an ideology of aggression and war. So this has been a conflict between India's ideology and the ideology of Pakistan. And what have we achieved in Tashkent? In Tashkent *ahimsa* has prevailed over *himsa*; non-violence has prevailed over violence. Pakistan to whom a no war pact was offered several times—and every time it was offered she rejected it—accepted non-aggression at Tashkent. So when it is said that India has been let down, I would ask the people who say that India has been let down, where has India been let down. India's ideology has always been the ideology of non-

violence, while Pakistan's ideology has always been the ideology of violence. And at Tashkent Pakistan accedes to the demand of India that all disputes should be settled at the conference table and not in the battle field then it is India which has scored victory over Pakistan. Therefore I say that nothing has been done in Tashkent which can in any way be said that India "has been let down. I am surprised when people say that the Tashkent Declaration goes against the interests of India. The fundamental interest of India is to uphold the ideology of non-violence. We are committed from the very beginning to non-violence and we committed violence only to meet violence. Independently on our own we have never committed violence. So if Pakistan comes to this conclusion after 18 years that she should settle her disputes with India at the conference table, then surely it is a victory for India.

We have always been calling this declaration as Tashkent Declaration. Lal Bahadur Shastri all along in his speeches had been declaring that if Pakistan renounced violence and wanted to discuss things at the conference table then India will not go all out for war. If Lal Bahadur Shastri had been saying this and if this has been accepted by Pakistan, then it is not Tashkent Declaration but I would call it Shastri Declaration. Shastriji wanted Pakistan to renounce violence and at Tashkent Pakistan did renounce violence. As such I would say that India has scored a victory at Tashkent and there has been nothing done which can be said to have let down our country.

There is one point, which I would like to stress. It has been asked: though there has been an agreement between India Pakistan, still how can we believe Pakistan? Pakistan has never acted up to its professions. Whenever there has been an agreement, such agreements have been broken. This agreement also may be treated as a waste paper later on. Of course there is an apprehension

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of this nature but every agreement is likely to be broken. Who can give a guarantee that an agreement which is being entered into today will not later on, when circumstances change, be broken? If every agreement can be broken, then this agreement also may be broken but why should we presume at the very beginning that it will be broken. Here there are also two guarantees to vouch that this agreement will not be broken. The first guarantee is that this agreement has been witnessed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. He is not just an ordinary individual; he represents a mighty force in the world. If this agreement has been witnessed by a great Power of the world then that itself is a guarantee to it. If this guarantee were not sufficient then the other guarantee is India's own might and strength. In this conflict India has shown that India is not going to be cowed down. India has shown that if Pakistan commits aggression then Pakistan will be paid back in her own coin—Pakistan also has learnt to its own disadvantage that by playing with fire and burning its own fingers if it tries to play the same game again, then it is not going to pay Pakistan any more. So, these are the two guarantees that stand us in good stead. If anything happens Russia is there and if nobody is there then we ourselves are there. Our forces have proved in the battle-field that they are inferior to none. So, why should anyone go on saying that Pakistan will break it, that Pakistan will not accept it, that Pakistan will treat it as a wastepaper. Let Pakistan do what they may like to do, but here in India we are going to abide by it. If Pakistan does anything to the contrary, Pakistan will be paid back in its own coin.

One doubt arises in my mind and I would like to draw the attention of the Minister of External Affairs, who is sitting here, to the question of Haji Pir and Kargil. We have been saying all

along that Kashmir is non-negotiable. We have been saying that there cannot be any understanding on the question of Kashmir. We have been saying that Kashmir is an integral part of India. I would ask the External Affairs Minister—please hear what I say. You have been saying all along that Kashmir is non-negotiable. You have been saying all along that Kashmir is an integral part of India. The question is whether Kargil and Haji Pir are integral parts of Kashmir or not. If they are integral parts of Kashmir and Kashmir is an integral part of India, then how can there be any negotiation, in going back on this issue? A friend of mine said that our supremacy is in abeyance. It is a very good argument, but how can our supremacy be in abeyance. It could be in abeyance so long as we had not captured Kargil, Haji Pir and Tithwal. When we have captured them, when we have taken possession of them, when we have been saying that these are part and parcel of Kashmir—and they are non-negotiable, then, how can our supremacy be in abeyance? It can be said to be in abeyance so long as we had not gone there. After having taken possession of it, having repeatedly said times without number that Kashmir is non-negotiable and these places are a part and parcel of Kashmir, how can we go back? Had these not been part and parcel of Kashmir, of course, we could say otherwise. But we have been saying that these are part and parcel of Kashmir and Kashmir is part and parcel of India. So, you give away Kargil and Tithwal and also give away Kashmir. The logic of it is that either we are not to give them away or if we are not to give them away Kashmir itself. So, this is my doubt. This doubt has been expressed by some others also. I do not express this doubt as an opposition. Perhaps that has been placed before the Government, but this is a very genuine doubt that is agitating my mind and it has been agitating not only my mind but the minds of most of the persons of the Congress itself. The only answer that I can think of is that in all agreement, it is give and take. You may say that when we have to take some-

[Prof. Satyavrata Siddhantalankar.] thing, we have also to give something. If, on this plea you are giving away these parts of India—they are part of India being part of Kashmir—then, you will have to come to some understanding with Pakistan with regard to the question of Kashmir. We have been saying that Kashmir is non-negotiable. Now, here we are making a compromise regarding Kashmir and I for one do not see why we should not come to terms somewhere with Pakistan on the question of Kashmir itself. No nation on earth can continuously go on fighting for years and years. Mr. Bhutto might say that Pakistan would continue to fight for thousands of years. History tells us that no country in the world has continued to fight for thousands of years. There have been wars between England and France, but they continued a hundred years. After one hundred years or so, they disappeared. You cannot continue war with a nation indefinitely. Therefore, if some understanding could be brought about between India and Pakistan, it must be brought about. In a country like ours, everyday there are calling attention notices about Kerala, about Bengal, from this side and that side. For a country to think of continuously fighting, frittering away its energy, frittering away its resources in fighting which we can use for the development of our economy, is not possible. Therefore, I would urge upon the Government that they should find out some formula according to which there should be some understanding between India and Pakistan. You have already taken a step in the right direction by coming to some sort of understanding between India and Pakistan on the question of Tithwal, Kargil and all that but that is only on an informal basis. There should be further negotiations and understanding so that this continuous war, this continuous agitation, this continuous perturbation that is agitating the minds of people in India and Pakistan might disappear.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Vice-Chairman, melancholy interest attaches to the Tashkent Con-

ference, for it was the place of death of our eminent Prime Minister, who had rendered distinguishing services to the country during his short period of office. Pursuant to the Resolution of the Security Council and the undeclared war launched against us by Pakistan with the aid of American weapons given to her for aid purposes, it was left to the Soviet Union to extend an invitation to him and thrash out our differences at Tashkent.

[THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair]

The highest credit must go to Prime Minister Kosygin and his colleagues for taking the initiative in bringing about direct talks between our high-powered delegation led by Mr. Shastri—we find Sardar Swaran Singh here—and President Ayub and some of his colleagues on a question which affected the security and happiness of this sub-continent. There is no doubt that as a result of Tashkent Declaration, the Soviet Union, and I wish to emphasise this fact, has emerged as the greatest power for the maintenance of peace and the promoter of goodwill between our country and Pakistan. The objective attitude adopted by the Soviet leaders, who were present at Tashkent, has forged unbreakable links between us and that great country. The attitude of the Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, was different from that of Mr. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister of a Leftist Government in Britain and the U.S.A., it must be admitted, was more fair to this country than Britain. Tash-3 P.M., Tashkent will be remembered in history as a place where the Soviet Union, which was regarded as a revolutionary country, for the first time played a vital role as a peacemaking country between two countries who should have been friends but who were drifting into a war which would have spelt disaster for this subcontinent and added in the ultimate analysis to the strength of the People's Republic of China which, ostracised by the nations of the world, is tending to become an aggressive force in the world of today.

When Mr. Shastri and his colleagues accepted the invitation to the Tashkent Conference, it was thought that failure was writ large on the mission that they had undertaken. But that was not to be, and Tashkent will be remembered—thanks to the efforts of Prime Minister Kosygin and other Soviet leaders—as a place which has created climate for a solution of outstanding differences in a peaceful manner between two countries which were at one time one country and which nature, geography, race and history intended to be one. It would be a travesty of truth to say that Mr. Shastri or Mr. Swaran, Singh or Mr. Chavan purchased a peace there at the cost of the honour and the prestige of this country. For years we had been pleading that before questions between our two countries could be discussed in an amicable spirit there should be a no-war declaration. Now it is true that there is no no-war war declaration in the Tashkent agreement in the precise terms adumbrated by us. But there is no doubt that both of us have pledged ourselves to settle questions by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. This is, in my opinion a historic declaration. This is in my opinion a historic declaration in essence, viewed in proper perspective, it is not different from a no-war-declaration for which we had pleaded. There is nothing much in a name. The declaration has made it possible for us to withdraw our armed personnel to the positions occupied by us on, 5th of August 1965, and the process will be completed by February 25th. I hope that thereafter we shall send some delegations to Pakistan, and Pakistan will send some delegations to this country of a cultural character. There are many common problems which two nations can discuss, can thrash out, and there are many other questions of visas and other things which these delegations can discuss. It may be that we have paid for this declaration a certain price, namely, the giving up of Kargil, Haji Pir and other places which—

thanks to the valour of our Armed Forces to whom I wish to pay *my* humble tribute—we had taken back from Pakistan. But it must be borne in mind that there is no recognition, on our part of the sovereignty over these places of Pakistan. Constitutionally and legally, as was explained very lucidly by Mr. Pathak the other day, they remain part of our country, and there has been no surrender of the position that Kashmir, which was only informally discussed at the conference, remains part of our country.

Not less important is the further fact that Pakistan has recognised that there shall be no interference on, her part with our internal affairs and we in return shall not interfere with her internal affairs. No doubt the question whether territories about which there is a dispute are one's internal affairs or not has not been defined. It is for our two countries hereafter to adhere in letter and spirit to this declaration which will require a certain amount of elasticity on the part of both the countries in dealing with matters which had been the subject-matter of dispute between us for the last 18 years. What is important however is that Pakistan has accepted the principle that there will be no resort to force in settling disputes which may include indirectly even Kashmir. That I think is a great gain, and I am not disposed to quarrel with the arrangement that we should withdraw from Haji Pir and other places for purposes of peace on the sub-continent. What is important is that while our disputes may or may *not* be settled, the method of force has been unequivocally and completely ruled out under this agreement by our two countries. Not less important is the assurance contained in paragraph 4 of the declaration that there will be no propaganda encouraged by our two countries against each other and that it will be their endeavour to develop friendly relations. I hope that this will be borne in mind not only by-organs of the ruling party or the party

[Prof. Satyavrata Siddhantalankar.] in power by also by organs of the parties in opposition. I hope that they will not come out with filthy articles in this matter. I do not want to go more into this question.

We have further agreed to resume normal diplomatic relations and agreed to consider measure which will promote economic and trade relations, communications and cultural relations. We have further agreed that there shall be no exodus of persons from one country to the other, though I hope that there will be freer interchange of visits from one country to the other.

In other words, the method of infiltration for gaining its ends which Pakistan had in view has been ruled out. It has been further agreed that there will be from time to time summit meetings to discuss our mutual problems and it may be hoped that at these summit meetings, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, our new Prime Minister, who is the bearer of an illustrious name, will approach her task in the spirit in which her great father would have approached it.

It is to the credit of the late Shastriji and his colleagues that they did not discuss in a formal manner the question of Kashmir, the legality of whose accession to this country cannot be questioned. The big question is, what the future is, whether this agreement will be implemented by both sides in the spirit in which the late Shastriji and President Ayub Khan wished it to be implemented.

May I just refer rather in a deep manner to this very delicate question of Kashmir? About the legality of Kashmir's accession to India, there can be no doubt. But all questions are not of a purely legal character; political and ethical considerations also enter into the calculation of the methods by which these questions should be solved. We cannot be blind to the fact that there is a Kashmir problem but that really is a problem between us and the people of Kash-

mir; it is not a problem between us and the people of Pakistan. It is not so much a problem between us and the people of Pakistan as a problem between us and the people of Kashmir. We gave to the people of Kashmir a special status under article 370 of our Constitution. We gave to Kashmir the right to frame its own constitution. We should examine carefully whether that special status amounts to self-government as distinguished from what one may call independence. It may be that a solution to that problem can be found by adhering in letter and in spirit to the pledge of special status which was given by us to the people of Kashmir. And I do earnestly hope that it will be possible for us to have general elections shortly in that State in which Sheikh Abdullah who was the father of the Kashmir national movement at one time may have a part to play. Now, this view may be unacceptable to the House but I am entitled to have my views on this. It is, however, for Sheikh Abdullah to review this question and take a realistic view of what is possible and what is not.

There are many other matters which affect both those countries and I hope that it will be possible to dream of a time when there will be a sort of confederation of India and Pakistan which, without affecting the independence of these two countries, will make them friendly neighbours even as the United States of America and Canada are on the American continent. The Tashkent Declaration has not settled all our differences with Pakistan. That was outside the scope of that conference. China is an enigma to all lovers of peace. But here again, it is possible to express the hope that the day is not far off when we shall be able, without either country being rigid in this attitude, to settle this big question on which the solidarity of the Asian continent prevails. For the solidarity of the South East Asian continent, peace is something worth having, something which will rid it of

the fear of war which increases our defence expenditure and make it hard for us to concentrate our energy on the big issues of tackling the problems of poverty, ignorance, superstition and idleness in this great continent of ours.

Finally, I would like to say that the Tashkent agreement has my fullest support. I hope that it will be implemented in our side in the right spirit. I wish to pay my tribute to the late Shri Shastri who lost his life working for it and his colleagues, Sardar Swam Singh and Shri Chavan I would also like to pay my humble tribute to Prime Minister, Mr. Kosy-gin, who played a role very different from that of Mr. Harold Wilson or, for that matter of 'our American friend.

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : महोदया, राष्ट्रपति डॉ० राजाकृष्णन के शब्दों में ताशकंद घोषणा कोई कानूनी दस्तावेज नहीं है, यह कोई राजनैतिक समझौता भी नहीं है और न ही यह कोई नैतिक उत्तरदायित्व का उद्घोष है। उनके शब्दों में ताशकंद घोषणा हृदय परिवर्तन के लिए एक पुकार है "A call to conversion" मैं इस कसौटी पर ताशकंद घोषणा के बाद जो कुछ हुआ है उसको कसना चाहता हूँ।

18 साल तक पाकिस्तान ने क्या किया, ताशकंद सम्मेलन के पूर्व पाकिस्तान का आचरण क्या रहा, मैं इस समय उसकी चर्चा नहीं करूँगा। ताशकंद में एक घोषणा पर दस्तखत करने के बाद पाकिस्तान किस तरह व्यवहार कर रहा है, उसकी ओर सदन को ध्यान देना होगा। कोई भी समझौता एक तरफ नहीं हो सकता अगर दोनों पक्ष समझौते से बंधे नहीं हैं, दोनों पक्ष ईमानदारी से उस समझौते को अमल में लाना नहीं चाहते हैं, तो उस समझौते की कीमत उस कागज की कीमत के बराबर भी नहीं है जिस कागज पर वह समझौता लिखा जाता है। अगर कागज कोरा है तो कुछ और लिखने के काम आ सकता है।

लेकिन ऐसा समझौता जिसको दूसरा पक्ष ईमानदारी से पालन करने को तैयार नहीं है, कागज पर लिखा जा चुका है, तो वह उस कागज को नष्ट करता है और खराब करता है।

महोदया, ताशकंद घोषणा पर दस्तखत करने के तीन घंटे बाद ताशकंद में ही पाकिस्तान के विदेश सचिव श्री अजीज अहमद ने कहा कि ताशकंद घोषणा पाकिस्तानी घुसपैठियों पर लागू नहीं होती। शास्त्री जी उस समय जीवित थे। यह समाचार उन तक जरूर पहुंचा होगा और मुझे विश्वास है कि पाकिस्तान के विदेश सचिव की घोषणा से उनको जरूर धक्का लगा होगा। अगर पाकिस्तान यह मानने के लिए तैयार नहीं है कि घोषणा घुसपैठियों पर भी लागू होती है, अगर पाकिस्तान यह मानने के लिए तैयार नहीं है कि वह भविष्य में घुसपैठियों को नहीं भेजेगा और उसने घुसपैठिये भेजे यह जिम्मेदारी अपने आपने के लिए तैयार नहीं है तो जिन तीन खम्भों के ऊपर ताशकंद घोषणा खड़ी है उनमें से एक खम्भा गिर जाता है।

हमारे विदेश मंत्री जी ने 16 जनवरी को एक ब्राडकास्ट में कहा था :—

"The late Prime Minister and the entire Indian delegation felt that conditions laid down by the Prime Minister had been completely met by Pakistan's agreement not only to withdraw all armed personnel but also to respect, after withdrawals, the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line."

विदेश मंत्री जी ने कहा कि पाकिस्तान ने घुसपैठियों को वापस बुलाना मान लिया है। पाकिस्तान कहता है हमने ऐसी कोई बात नहीं मानी। किसकी बात पर विश्वास किया जाय ? हम चाहते हैं कि हम अपने विदेश मंत्री की बात पर विश्वास करें।

श्री अबुल अरोड़ा (उत्तर प्रदेश) : यही मुनासिब भी है।

**श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी :** लेकिन घोषणा पर दस्तखत करने वाला दूसरा पक्ष अगर घोषणा का मनमाना अर्थ लगाता है, तो उस घोषणा की कीमत घट जाती है। सरकार को यह भी बताना होगा कि पाकिस्तान ने कितने घुसपैठियों को अभी तक वापस बुलाया है। क्या एक भी घुसपैठिया अभी तक वापस गया है? उस दिन रक्षा मन्त्री ने एक सवाल के जवाब में कहा कि कुछ घुसपैठिए पकड़े गए, कुछ मारे गए, मगर कुछ अभी भी जम्मू काश्मीर में हैं। क्या पाकिस्तान ने उनको वापस बुलाने का ऐलान किया? क्या पाकिस्तान का ऐलान मान कर वे वापस गए हैं? आखिर घोषणा को हमें आचरण की कसौटी पर कसना होगा। शास्त्री जी ने 24 सितम्बर 1965 को कहा था:

"Pakistan must own and discharge the responsibility of withdrawing the infiltrators from our State of Jammu and Kashmir".

बार-बार संयुक्त राष्ट्रसंघ के सेक्रेटरी जनरल को लिखे गए पत्र का हवाला दिया जाता है, मगर मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि अगर पत्र के अनुसार शास्त्री जी ने ताशकन्द घोषणा में हाजी पीर, कारगिल, टिथवाल से हटाना मान भी लिया तो उस घोषणा पर दस्तखत करने के बाद पाकिस्तान का आचरण क्या है? मैं पूछना चाहूँगा कि क्या पाकिस्तान ने माना था कि घुसपैठिए वापस लेगा? फिर वह पलट कैसे गया, और अगर वह पलट गया तो नई दिल्ली चुप क्यों रही? अभी भी सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह जी यही रट लगाए जाते हैं कि ताशकन्द घोषणा घुसपैठियों पर लागू होती है। यह बात मेरी समझ में नहीं आती। महोदया, प्रश्न यह है कि जब तक पाकिस्तान घुसपैठियों पर ताशकन्द घोषणा को लागू करने के लिए तैयार नहीं है, तो फिर हाजी पीर से, टिथवाल से, कारगिल से अपनी फौजें हटाने के निर्णय पर हम क्यों कायम रहें। आप कह सकते हैं कि हमने ताशकन्द में माना था कि हम अपनी सेनाएं हटा देंगे—यद्यपि वह मानना गलत था, मैं उसकी चर्चा

करूँगा—लेकिन हमने इसलिए मान लिया था कि यह घोषणा करके पाकिस्तान घुसपैठियों को भेजने की जिम्मेदारी लेगा, उन्हें वापस लेने का आश्वासन देगा, मगर पाकिस्तान ने हमारे विश्वास को ठेस पहुंचाई है। पाकिस्तान ने ताशकन्द घोषणा की पहले ही दिन हत्या कर दी तो हम भी हाजी पीर से, कारगिल से, टिथवाल से फौजें न हटाएं। क्या आपत्ति है यह रवैया अपनाने से? लेकिन हम यह रवैया अपनाने के लिए तैयार नहीं हैं।

ताशकन्द जाने से पहले शास्त्री जी को चिन्ता थी कि कहीं पाकिस्तान ताशकन्द में यह न मान ले कि घुसपैठिए हमने भेजे हैं और हम उन्हें वापस लेने को तैयार हैं, और शास्त्री जी ने मुझ से, विरोधी दल के अन्य नेताओं से कहा था कि अगर पाकिस्तान ने घुसपैठियों को भेजना मान लिया और वापस लेने की गारण्टी दे दी तो हम कठिनाई में पड़ जाएंगे। लेकिन पाकिस्तान ने ताशकन्द में घुसपैठियों को भेजने की जिम्मेदारी नहीं ली। अगर सरकार चाहती तो इस बात पर अड़ सकती थी। एक बार पहले भी पाकिस्तान ने कहा था 1947 में कि हमारी सेनाएं काश्मीर में नहीं लड़ रही हैं और बाद में पाकिस्तान ने माना कि सेनाएं लड़ रही हैं। पाकिस्तान के लिए अपना गुनाह कबूल करना कोई नई बात नहीं है, मगर हम पाकिस्तान से मनवा नहीं सके।

इस सम्बन्ध में शास्त्री के आश्वासन स्पष्ट थे। जब युद्ध-विराम माना गया, विरोधी दलों के नेताओं ने उनसे कहा "क्या आप आज युद्ध-विराम मान रहे हैं?" उन्होंने कहा—मैं "सिम्पल सीज़ फायर" मान रहा हूँ। हमने कहा आज आप "सिम्पल सीज़ फायर" मान रहे हैं, कल आप हाजी पीर से, कारगिल से, टिथवाल से फौजें हटाना मानेंगे, उस सवाल पर भी आपके ऊपर दबाव पड़ेगा। विरोधी दल के अन्य नेता गवाह हैं। शास्त्री जी ने मेज को पीट कर कहा था कि मैं रहूँ या न रहूँ, यह सरकार चले या बदल जाय,

दुनिया में कोई भी हमारे साथ न हो, हाजी पीर से, कारगिल से, टिथवाल से हमारी फौजें नहीं हटेंगी। तब हम में से किसी ने कहा था कि अगर हमारी सेना हाजी पीर से नहीं हटेगी तो पाकिस्तान छम्ब से नहीं हटेगा तो शास्त्री जी ने कहा कि अगर पाकिस्तान छम्ब से नहीं हटेगा तो हम लाहौर, सियालकोट से नहीं हटेंगे। आज हमसे कहा जाता है कि कि अगर हम हाजी पीर से न हटते तो पाकिस्तान छम्ब से न हटता। यह बात उस समय भी कही गई थी, मगर क्या सरकार ने जो आश्वासन दिए वे विरोधी दलों के नेताओं के मुँह बन्द करने के लिए दिए ? क्या देश की, जनता की भावनाओं के साथ खिलवाड़ करने के लिए दिए ? क्या शासन चाहता है कि उसके आश्वासनों पर देश विश्वास न करे। यह स्थिति बड़ी गम्भीर है।

महोदया, एक पहलू और भी है। हाजी पीर, कारगिल, टिथवाल कानूनी रूप से, वैधानिक दृष्टि से, भारत का भाग हैं। हाजी पीर उतना ही भारत का हिस्सा है जितना श्रीनगर है। हम उसे खाली क्यों करें जबकि हमें घुसपैठियों के बारे में स्पष्ट आश्वासन नहीं मिल ? सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह कहते हैं कि पाकिस्तान ने मान लिया कि युद्ध विराम का आदर करेगा और अगर वह घुसपैठिए भेजेगा तो युद्ध विराम का उल्लंघन होगा। मगर पाकिस्तान मानेगा ही नहीं कि वह घुसपैठिए भेज रहा है। आप अभी नहीं मनवा सके जब यूनाइटेड नेशन्स आब्जरवर्स की रिपोर्ट आपके पक्ष में है, जब जनरल निम्मो ने साफ कह दिया कि 5 अगस्त से घुसपैठिए आए। यह बात पाकिस्तान ने नहीं मानी कि घुसपैठिए उसने भेजे हैं। आगे भी भेजेगा तो कहेगा कि घुसपैठिए हमने नहीं भेजे, वे तो मुजाहिद हैं जो जम्मू-काश्मीर में से पैदा हो गए हैं।

हाजीपीर पर जब हमारी सेना गई तो जवानों ने बड़ी बहादुरी दिखाई, वहाँ की जनता ने हमारी सेना का स्वागत किया। श्रीमती

गांधी सदन में नहीं हैं, वे हाजी पीर की जनता को आश्वासन दे आई थीं कि अब उसे पाकिस्तान के हाथ नहीं सौंपा जायगा। आज हम 15 हजार जनता को जो भारत के नागरिक हैं, जिन्हें अधिकार है कि हमारी सेना का, पुलिस का संरक्षण प्राप्त करें, पाकिस्तान को सौंप रहे हैं। हाजी पीर में हमारा सिविल एडमिनिस्ट्रेशन लागू कर दिया गया था। हम उस जनता के साथ न्याय नहीं कर रहे हैं। श्री पाठक जब से विधि मंत्री बने हैं अपनी भाषा ही भूल गए हैं। वे सदन में नहीं हैं, मैं चाहता हूँ कि वे सदन में होते। उस दिन मैंने पाइन्ट आफ ऑर्डर रोज़ किया तो पाठक जी कह रहे थे कि हाजी पीर, कारगिल, टिथवाल, से हटना कोई बात नहीं है मगर जब वह मिनिस्टर नहीं बने थे, इधर बैठते थे तो 24 सितम्बर को उन्होंने जो भाषण दिया था मैं उस का एक अंश आपके सामने पढ़ना चाहता हूँ। उन्होंने कहा था :—

"Another problem may be whether we can be asked to give up those strategic positions, those territories which we have taken without which it will not be possible to have the security of the territory which is in our possession. Out of sheer necessity, on the ground of our sovereignty those should not be allowed to be vacated."

ये श्री पाठक के शब्द हैं। मंत्री बनते ही वे अपने शब्द भूल गये, अपने भाषण को विस्तृत कर बैठे, हाजी पीर से कारगिल से, टिथवाल से सेनाएं हटाकर हम सारे काश्मीर पर अपने अधिकार को कमजोर बना रहे हैं हम पाकिस्तान के दावे को अकारण शक्ति प्रदान कर रहे हैं। किन्तु श्रीमती गांधी ने कहा कि बड़ी चीज़ के लिए छोटी चीज़ छोड़नी पड़ती है। इसलिए हमने कारगिल छोड़ दिया। मैं जानना चाहता हूँ कि बड़ी चीज़ हमें क्या मिली है ?

लेकिन कहा जाता है पाकिस्तान ने बल-प्रयोग न करने का वायदा किया है। हम चाहते थे कि पाकिस्तान नो-वार-पैक्ट करे, पाकिस्तान



[श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी]

नो-वार-पैक्ट नहीं किया। नेहरू जी ने नो-वार-पैक्ट का सुझाव 1949 में रखा, क्या नेहरू जी जानते नहीं थे कि पाकिस्तान युनाइटेड नेशंस का मेम्बर है, क्या नेहरू जी जानते नहीं थे कि पाकिस्तान युनाइटेड नेशन के घोषणापत्र से बंधा हुआ है, फिर भी वह इस बात पर जोर दे रहे थे कि पाकिस्तान को युनाइटेड नेशंस के चार्टर से अलग एक नो-वार-पैक्ट करना चाहिये, क्योंकि नेहरू जी जानते थे कि चार्टर काफी नहीं है। युनाइटेड नेशंस का सदस्य होते हुये पाकिस्तान ने काश्मीर पर हमला किया था। शास्त्री जी भी यह जानते थे, इसलिये उन्होंने नो-वार-पैक्ट की बात कही थी क्योंकि शास्त्री जी के सामने पाकिस्तान ने कच्छ पर हमला किया था, काश्मीर में पहले घुसपैठियों द्वारा और फिर छम्ब में खुला आक्रमण किया था।

#### STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER RE MEETING WITH NAGA LEADERS

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You please wait for the Prime Minister to make a statement.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY: (SHRIMATI: INDIRA GANDHI): I can wait till the speech is over.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It will take some time; it may take another ten minutes.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): Normally we are told what the statement is about.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: So the Prime Minister may make the statement now.

SHRIMATI INDIRA GANDHI: The statement is about the Naga talks. A delegation of Nagas including Shri Khugato, Shri Inkongmeron Ao and Shri Isack Swu, accompanied by the three members of the Peace Mission, met me on the 18th and 19th February, 1966. This meeting, as the House will recall, had been arranged in the

time of my predecessor. It was intended to be a goodwill visit, and the talks which took place were fully in conformity with this idea. The main subject of our talk was the importance of preserving peace and stopping the many ugly incidents which still take place resulting in loss of life and property. The observer team of the Peace Mission is being strengthened by attaching two officials on each side to ensure that all incidents of breach of the agreement on suspension of operations are speedily investigated. It has also been agreed that both parties will take effective and quick action on the findings of the observers. In order to create a better atmosphere and to facilitate a final settlement, the Peace Mission have suggested the release of the Naga prisoners. This matter will be examined. I was impressed by the sincerity and earnestness of the Naga leaders whom I met. They seemed genuinely anxious to ensure the implementation of the agreement entered into in September, 1964, and to prevent further violent incidents and loss of life. I am not without hope that as a result of this meeting a certain amount of unnecessary distrust and suspicion, which had developed on both sides, has been dispelled. We have agreed to have a further meeting for which the Naga leaders will visit Delhi again some time in April, 1966. It is possible—and I would not put it more strongly than that—that at this next meeting some real progress may be towards a settlement which would put an end to bloodshed and see the restoration of peace throughout Nagaland. The way will then be clear for all sections of the Nagas to play their rightful part in the progress and welfare of Nagaland.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I naturally welcome the political initiatives implied by these talks, and the talks that would follow, and I am also glad to hear that certain steps would be taken in order to inspire such a constructive approach over this problem—I have in mind the proposal for