

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Very well.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Great men and great women think alike.

AN HON. MEMBER: What nice company.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I should like to be in that company, but in the opposition.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL (Gujarat): Does this show the shape of things hereafter?

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Not at all, there is no chance. That I can assure the Swatantra Party.

MOTION RE THE TASHKENT DECLARATION—contd.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I have called you, Mr. Vajpayee. You will have ten minutes.

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE: Only ten minutes?

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have had fifteen minutes. All right, you go on.

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : महोदया, मैं आपसे निवेदन कर रहा था कि पाकिस्तान के साथ नो-वार-पैक्ट करने की हमारी मांग ताशकंद घोषणा से पूरी नहीं होती क्योंकि ताशकंद घोषणा में संयुक्त राष्ट्र संघ के जिम चार्टर का हवाला देकर हथियारों का उपयोग न करने की बात कहा गई है वह पाकिस्तान पर लागू होती थी और उसके बाद भी पाकिस्तान ने तीन बार भारत पर आक्रमण किया। एक और भी पहलू है कि जिमकी ओर मैं सदन का ध्यान खींचना चाहूंगा। यूनाइटेड नेशन्स चार्टर के आर्टिकल 2 में कहा गया है— मैं उद्धृत करता हूँ :

"To develop friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;"

पाकिस्तान काश्मीर में आत्मनिर्णय के सिद्धान्त की दुहाई देकर अभी तक गड़बड़ कराता रहा है। यूनाइटेड नेशन्स के आर्टिकल 2 में कहा गया है कि राष्ट्रों का सबंध आत्मनिर्णय के सिद्धान्त के आधार पर कायम होना चाहिये। कल पाकिस्तान कह सकता है कि हमने हथियार न उठाने की बात कही थी। लेकिन वह हमने यूनाइटेड नेशन्स चार्टर के अंतर्गत कही थी। चार्टर में यह भी कहा गया है कि देशों के सबंध सेल्फ डिटरमिनेशन के सिद्धान्त के आधार पर तय होंगे और क्योंकि भारत सेल्फ डिटरमिनेशन के सिद्धान्त को काश्मीर पर लागू करने के लिये तैयार नहीं इसलिये हम इस घोषणा से अपने को अलग करते हैं।

यूनाइटेड नेशन्स चार्टर के आर्टिकल 33 की ओर भी मैं सदन का ध्यान खींचना चाहूंगा। इसमें कहा गया है :—

"Parties in a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies" etc. etc.

पाकिस्तान की चाल साफ है। जैसे की फौजों की वापसी हो जायगी पाकिस्तान भारत में कहेगा कि काश्मीर के ऊपर चर्चा करो। हमारी सरकार दावा करती है कि पाकिस्तान ने माना है कि वह भारत के घरेलू मामले में दखल नहीं देगा और सरकार यह भी कहती है कि काश्मीर हमारा घरेलू मामला है। मगर पाकिस्तान कहता है काश्मीर भारत का घरेलू मामला नहीं है। 13 फरवरी को पाकिस्तान के एक प्रवक्ता ने कहा कि :—

"The article referring to non-interference in each other's internal affairs did not apply to Kashmir because it was a disputed territory and was not an internal affair of India."

[श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी]

पाकिस्तान की नीयत का पता इससे भी लगता है कि अभी फौजों की वापसी पूरी नहीं हुई है और उम्मेद चिट्ठी भेज दी है और चिट्ठी में मांग की है कि जब दोनों देश के मन्त्री मिलेंगे तो एजेन्डा में पहला मवाल काश्मीर का होना चाहिए। ताशकन्द में भारत ने काश्मीर को एजेन्डा पर लाने के प्रस्ताव का विरोध किया था जब सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह और मिस्टर भुट्टो मिले थे। मैं नहीं जानता मिलते समय सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह के हृदय में क्या भावनाएं उठ रही थी, जिसने हमें कुत्ता कहा उसी के साथ उन्हें बात करनी पड़ी। लेकिन सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह ने कहा था कि काश्मीर एजेन्डा पर नहीं जा सकता— मैं उनके शब्दों को दोहराता हूं :

“Sovereignty of India over Kashmir was not a matter for mediation or arbitration or discussion.”

क्या भारत सरकार इस रवैये पर कायम है ? मुझे आशा है, कायम है। लेकिन मैं उसका एक सबूत चाहता हूँ, और वह सबूत एक ही है कि 3 फरवरी की चिट्ठी जो पाकिस्तान ने भेजी है, जिसमें दोनों देशों के मन्त्रियों की बैठक में काश्मीर को एजेन्डा में पहले नम्बर पर रखने की बात कही है, उस चिट्ठी का भारत सरकार को जवाब देना चाहिये कि काश्मीर एजेन्डा पर नहीं आ सकता। वह चिट्ठी 3 फरवरी को आई थी, अभी तक उसका जवाब नहीं दिया गया है। क्यों नहीं दिया गया है ? दो टुक जवाब होना चाहिये—काश्मीर के ऊपर चर्चा नहीं होगी। लेकिन जैसे ही सरकार यह कहेगी कि हम काश्मीर पर चर्चा करने के लिये तैयार नहीं हैं, पाकिस्तान मिक्कुरिटी काउन्सिल में जायेगा और कहेगा कि 20 मिनट के प्रस्ताव के अनुसार लड़ाई बन्द हो गई, 5 अगस्त की रेखा तक फौजें वापस चली गईं, अब भारत पाक संघर्ष में निहित राजनीतिक प्रश्नों का हल निकाला जाय। पाकिस्तान यह प्रस्ताव कर सकता है कि कच्छ की तरह से काश्मीर के मवाल को भी आरबिट्रेशन के लिये सौंप दिया जाय।

बीच में चर्चा भी चली थी कि पाकिस्तान तीन व्यक्तियों का ट्राइब्यूनल बनाने के लिये मांग करेगा—यूनाइटेड नेशन्स के सेक्रेटरी जनरल, वर्ल्ड बैंक के चेयरमैन और इन्टर नेशनल कोर्ट आफ जस्टिस के चेयरमैन। पाकिस्तान कहेगा : तीन लोगों का ट्राइब्यूनल तय करे कि काश्मीर पर किमका पक्ष ठीक है। भारत आरबिट्रेशन स्वीकार नहीं कर सकता। इस पर पाकिस्तान कहेगा कि भारत ने शान्तिपूर्ण तरीके से काश्मीर के मवाल को हल करने का रास्ता बन्द कर दिया है, अब पाकिस्तान के सामने इसके मिवाय कोर्ट रास्ता नहीं है कि पाकिस्तान बल प्रयोग करे, पाकिस्तान घुसपैठिये भेजे, पाकिस्तान जम्मू और काश्मीर में तोड़फोड़ करे। हम जहां थे वहीं पहुंच जायेंगे।

रक्षा मन्त्री श्री यशवन्तराव चव्हाण ने जयपुर में पूछा गया कि अगर पाकिस्तान ने फिर घुसपैठिये भेजे, पाकिस्तान ने फिर गडबड की, तो आप क्या करेंगे ? रक्षा मन्त्री ने कहा, हम वही करेंगे जो हमने पहले किया था। इस पर बड़ों तालिया बजी। मतलब यह है कि हम हाजी पीर पर, तिथवाल पर, कारगिल पर, फिर से कब्जा कर लेंगे। मैं पूछना चाहता हूं : क्या हम अपनी मेना के साथ न्याय कर रहे हैं ? आज जवानों ने खून की कीमत देकर इन स्थानों पर कब्जा किया है, शान्ति की मुग मरीचिका में फंस कर हम सामरिक महत्व की इन चौकियों को, घाटियों को, छोड़ रहे हैं—इसलिये कि हम उन पर फिर से कब्जा करें ? क्या हमारे जवानों का खून इतना सस्ता है ? माताओं की गोदें फिर से सूनी होंगी, बहनों के सुहाग मिहूर फिर से लुटेंगे, बच्चे पुनः आया होंगे, क्योंकि सरकार पाकिस्तान के भुलावे में आ गई। प्रेसीडेंट अयूब ने साफ कहा है कि “नो वार पैक्ट” हम तब तक नहीं करेंगे जब तक काश्मीर का मसला हल नहीं होगा। प्रेसीडेंट अयूब ने यह भी कहा है कि हमने ताशकन्द में “नो वार पैक्ट” नहीं किया है, हमने सिर्फ इतना

कहा है कि जब तक शान्ति से काश्मीर का मसला हल होने का रास्ता खुला हुआ है, हम हथियार नहीं उठाएंगे। उनका मतलब साफ है—अगर शान्ति से काश्मीर उन्हें मिल जाय तो वे लड़ने की तकलीफ गवारा करना नहीं चाहते। लेकिन हम काश्मीर उन्हें दे नहीं सकते। फिर वह बल प्रयोग के लिये गमता खोलेंगे।

महोदया, ताशकन्द में क्या हुआ जो हमने ऐसी घोषणा पर दस्तखत किये? मुझे अभी तक इसका कोई तर्कसंगत जवाब नहीं मिला है। पाकिस्तान ने घुसपैठियों को वापस बुलाने की जिम्मेदारी नहीं ली, पाकिस्तान ने काश्मीर को हमारा घरेलू मामला नहीं माना, पाकिस्तान “अयुद्ध सन्धि” के लिये भी तैयार नहीं है जब तक काश्मीर का मसला उसकी दृष्टि से सन्तोषजनक रीति में हल न हो जाय। फिर भी हमने घोषणा पक्ष पर दस्तखत कर दिए हैं। इसका यही उत्तर है कि हमने सोवियट रूस के दबाव में आकर यह किया। सोवियट रूस ने कहा कि अगर ताशकन्द में समझौता नहीं होगा तो भारत को सुरक्षा परिषद् में जाना पड़ेगा। सुरक्षा परिषद् का सर्वसम्मति प्रस्ताव है कि 5 अगस्त की रेखा तक सेनाएं वापस जानी चाहिये, ताशकन्द में भारत मान ले यह अच्छा है। सोवियट प्रधान मन्त्री ने यह भी कहा है कि अगर भारत यहां समझौता नहीं करेगा तो इसके लिये भारत को मदद देना कठिन हो जायेगा, भारत अकेला पड़ जायेगा।

वैदेशिक कार्य मन्त्री (सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह) : किमको कहा, आपमें ?

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : आप लोगों को कहा।

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : बिल्कुल गलत बात है। आप यू ही कुछ कहे जा रहे हैं जिसका कोई सबन नहीं है।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : देखिए, मुझे भी कुछ जानकारी है। मैं यहां नाम नहीं लेना चाहता क्योंकि जो कुछ मुझे बताया गया है कान्फिडेंस में बताया गया है।

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : तो कान्फिडेंस को आप यह पूरा कर रहे हैं कि उसको आप कहते हैं।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : नहीं, मैं नाम नहीं बता रहा हूँ। यह कान्फिडेंस पूरा कर रहा हूँ। मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ यदि उसने दबाव नहीं डाला तब आपने क्यों माना? तब तो यह घोषणा, यह समझौता, और भी खराब हो जाना है। इस घोषणा का एक और एक्स्प्लेनेशन दिया जाता है

श्री एम० एम० धारिया : नाम तो बता दीजिए।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : यह मेरे ऊपर छोड़ दीजिए। समझिए यह मेरा अनुमान है। किमी का नाम लेने की जरूरत नहीं है। रूस ने दबाव डाला। इस सम्बन्ध में जो भारत के पत्रकार गए थे ताशकन्द में, उनकी रिपोर्टें पढ़ लीजिए। मैं उनको पढ़ कर मुनाना चाहता हूँ।

श्री मन्त्री जी “नौ बाग पैक्ट” पर अड़े हुए थे मगर कोसीगिन ने आधी रात में कहा, मैं तो ताशकन्द में नहीं था, सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह कह सकते हैं, मगर भारत के पत्रकार थे। टाइम्स आफ इंडिया ने लिखा है। महोदया, मुझे समय दे क्योंकि विदेश मन्त्री जी मेरा थोड़ा समय ले रहे हैं (interruption) महोदया, यह रिपोर्ट टाइम्स आफ इंडिया की है जिसको पढ़ना चाहता हूँ :

“Mr Kosygin and his officers come forward with the suggestion about midnight last night that the UN Charter to which both India

[श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी]

and Pakistan were signatories offered an appropriate basis in this context for them to reaffirm their obligation to each other not to have recourse to force in settling their disputes. The Indian plea for an independent declaration by the two countries was thus bypassed. When Pakistan accepted this advice, India was left with no choice except to fall in line."

पहले कहा गया था कि ताशकंद में काश्मीर के बारे में वार्ता नहीं होगी। यह भी कहा गया था कि जब मि० भुट्टो मास्को गये थे तो मि० भुट्टो द्वारा कह दिया गया था कि राष्ट्रपति अयूब काश्मीर के बारे में ताशकंद में कुछ नहीं कह सकेंगे और रूस ने मान लिया था। लेकिन जैसे ही पाकिस्तानी डेलीगेशन ताशकंद पहुंचा उसने यह कहना शुरू कर दिया कि हम तो काश्मीर के ऊपर बात करने आये हैं।

मैं पूछना चाहता हूं कि विदेश मंत्रियों की बैठक में एजेन्डे के सवाल पर गतिरोध हो गया था तो किसने शास्त्री जी को मजबूर किया कि काश्मीर के सवाल पर पाकिस्तान के प्रेसीडेंट के साथ अनौपचारिक रूप से बात करो? क्या कोमीगिन ने नहीं कहा? क्या दोनों पर रूस का दबाव नहीं था कि तुम काश्मीर पर बात करो? अगर अखबार सब गलत लिखते हैं तो विदेश मंत्री जी को ...

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : किसी अखबार ने यह नहीं कहा कि चेयरमैन आफ़ दी कौंसिल आफ़ मिनिस्टर आफ़ सोवियट यूनियन ने यह कहा कि आप काश्मीर के मुताल्लिक बात करो। आप बड़े जोश में जो चाहें कहें, लेकिन वाक्यात के मुताल्लिक तो ठीक कहें।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : महोदया, सब अखबारों ने यह लिखा है।

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : किसी सरकार ने नहीं कहा कि सोवियट यूनियन के चेयरमैन आफ़ दी कौंसिल आफ़ मिनिस्टर ने दोनों से कहा कि तुम काश्मीर के मुताल्लिक बात कीजिये। किसी अखबार ने इस तरह की बात नहीं कही।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : क्या आप अपने आप बात करने के लिए तैयार हो गये?

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : मैं तो आपकी बात का जवाब दे रहा हूं।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : मेरे पास अखबारों की प्रतियां नहीं हैं, मेरे पास फ़ाइलें नहीं हैं। वहां पर सब पत्रकार गये थे। श्री किशन भाटिया, श्री रंगा-स्वामी, श्री स्वामीनाथन, ये सब लोग ताशकंद गये थे और सबने ताशकंद से यह रिपोर्ट भेजी है कि जब विदेश मंत्रियों की वार्ता विरुद्ध हो गई तो रूस के प्रधान मंत्री नखरीर में आये और उन्होंने कहा कि अच्छा काश्मीर को एजेन्डे पर नहीं लाते हो तो कोई बान नहीं मगर इन्फ़ारमली बात करो। आपने आज तक उसका खंडन नहीं किया।

SARDAR SWARAN SINGH: There is no mention at all anywhere.

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : कमाल कर रहे हैं, आप कल जवाब देंगे तब आपके सामने अखबार लाकर रख दूंगा और बता दूंगा कि क्या रूस ने इस बान पर दबाव नहीं डाला?

महोदया, ताशकंद में रूस ने हर कदम पर पाकिस्तान के पक्ष का समर्थन किया। मैंने रूस की तारीफ़ इसी सदन में खड़े होकर की जब मेरे मित्र श्री डा. ह्याभाई पटेल ने रूस की अलोचना की थी। तब रूस हमारे हित में काम कर रहा था और इस बात से

कोई इन्कार नहीं कर सकता है। लेकिन प्रब रूस का रवैया बदला हुआ है। यह ठीक है कि रूस अपना रवैया अपने स्वार्थ में बदलेगा क्योंकि वह पाकिस्तान को चीन से अलग करना चाहता है, वह पाकिस्तान को अमरीका से अलग करना चाहता है। उसके इस उद्देश्य के साथ हमारी सहानुभूति हो सकती है मगर हम रूस से इतना कहना चाहते हैं कि मेहरबानी करके हमारी कीमत पर यह काम न करें मगर रूस यह कर रहा है। श्री रंगा स्वामी हिन्दू के कारोस्पोन्डेंट हैं। उन्होंने हिन्दू अखबार में रिपोर्ट लिखी है 14 जनवरी को। श्री रंगा स्वामी गैर जिम्मेदार कारोस्पोन्डेंट नहीं हैं। उन्होंने लिखा है कि शास्त्री जी ने कहा था कि फौजों की वापसी के लिए तीन महीने का समय चाहिये क्योंकि शास्त्री जी चाहते थे कि इतना समय मिल जाय जिससे पता लग जाय कि पाकिस्तान समझौते पर अमल करता है या नहीं। मगर रूस के प्रधान मंत्री ने कहा कि तीन महीने तो बहुत होते हैं जब फौजें वापस कर लेने की बात को मान लिया है तो जल्दी वापस कर लें और फौजें वापस हो रही हैं।

मैं कहना चाहता हूं कि पाकिस्तान का इरादा साफ नहीं है। कांग्रेस कार्य-समिति ने अपने रिजोल्यूशन में कहा है कि अगर ईमानदारी से ताशकंद घोषणा पर अमल किया जाय तो दोनों देशों के बीच शान्ति का रास्ता खुल सकता है। मगर पाकिस्तान ईमानदारी से अमल करने को तैयार नहीं है और इस लिए ताशकंद घोषणा समर्पण का मार्ग प्रशस्त कर रही है। अभी देश में चर्चा चलने लगी, मंत्री मंडल के सदस्य श्री जगजीवन राम जैसे व्यक्ति कह रहे हैं कि 10.12 मील का और इलाका देकर हमें युद्ध विराम के आधार पर समझौता कर लेना चाहिये। जब श्री कृष्णा मैनन कहते हैं कि पूरा जम्मू और काश्मीर हमारा है तो हमारे कांग्रेसी मेम्बर तालियां बजाते हैं, लेकिन मंत्रीमंडल के सदस्य श्री जगजीवन राम जी कहते हैं कि सीज फायर के आधार पर कुछ क्षेत्र देकर पाकिस्तान

के साथ समझौता कर लेना चाहिये तो प्रधान मंत्री जी खंडन नहीं करती और विदेश मंत्री जी भी नहीं बोलते।

जब से हमने ताशकंद घोषणा पर दस्तखत किये तब से समर्पणवादियों का बल बढ़ा है और लोग मांग कर रहे हैं कि यदि कुछ देकर पाकिस्तान के साथ समझौता हो सकता है तो चीन को अस्साई चीन की भेंट चढ़ाकर शान्ति का सौदा क्यों नहीं कर लिया जाता? मुझे डर है कि अगर यही रवैया रहा तो देश फिर से असावधानी में फंस जायेगा। हमारे जवानों ने अपने बलिदानों से लड़ाई के मैदान में जो कुछ प्राप्त किया है उसको हमने टेबुल पर बैठ कर गवां दिया है। हम युद्ध में जीत गये थे मगर सन्धि में हार गये हैं।

मैं पाकिस्तान से दोस्ती करने के खिलाफ नहीं हूं। सारा देश पाकिस्तान के साथ सम्बन्धों को सुधारना चाहता है, लेकिन जब तक काश्मीर पर पाकिस्तान का दावा कायम है, जब तक काश्मीर के बारे में पाकिस्तान के नेता अपनी शर्तों पर काश्मीर का समझौता चाहते हैं, तब तक शान्ति नहीं हो सकती है। हम शान्ति की मृग-मरीचिका में न फंसे। देश फिर से खतरे में पड़ जायेगा अगर हमने आने वाले संकट से आंख मूंदने की गलती की।

महोदय, मैं विदेश मन्त्री से कहूंगा कि ताशकंद घोषणा की पाकिस्तानी नेताओं ने जो गलत व्याख्या की है उसका खण्डन करें। वे अभी तक बोले क्यों नहीं?

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : आपने देखा ही नहीं होगा, मैंने तो उत हाउस में भी कहा है।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : मैं अब देखूंगा कि आप क्या कहते हैं।

सरदार स्वर्ण सिंह : पहले मैं आज देख रहा हूं कि आप क्या कह रहे हैं।

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : जी हा, तो फिर आप बोल क्यों रहे हैं। पाकिस्तान को घोषणा का मन्तव्य अर्थ लगाने का मौका नहीं दिया जा सकता है। ताशकन्द की घोषणा को काश्मीर हथियाने का साधन नहीं बनने दिया जा सकता है। शीघ्र ही पाकिस्तान सुरक्षा परिषद् में जायेगा, पाकिस्तान रूस को बीच में खींचने की कोशिश करेगा। दो तीन महीने बाद फिर से संकट पैदा हो सकता है। उस समय हम असावधान न पाये जायें। यही कहता हुआ आपको धन्यवाद देकर समाप्त करता हूँ।

4 P.M.

SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA (Uttar Pradesh): Madam Deputy Chairman, I rise to give my wholehearted support to the Tashkent Declaration. The Tashkent Declaration is to be viewed in the light of Shastriji's life, his actions and pronouncements. There was an uneasy truce prevailing in the country when Shastriji went to Tashkent. I had the honour of knowing Shastriji for over sixteen years. His life was really a living implementation of the teachings of the Gita. He was calm and composed whether it was war or it was peace. He was a true Congressman in the true sense of the word. He was a staunch disciple of Gandhiji and a firm believer in the principles of *panchsheel* enunciated by our late Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. If I may say so, there were three guiding principles under which Shastriji used to act. The first was selfless service in the cause of peace and welfare of his countrymen in particular and mankind in general. The second was, no compromise with basic principles involving self-respect and national honour. And the third was to face calmly and coolly any situation that may arise.

If the House will bear with me I will give one instance which will show how calm and composed Shastriji always was. In 1957 Shastriji was flying to Allahabad from Delhi. I happened to be with him. We were flying over Allahabad. The plane

would not come down. After about half an hour Shastriji asked me, 'What is the matter? Why are we not getting down?' I went to the pilot and asked him quietly what the matter was, and why the plane was not landing. The pilot told me that the undercarriage was not coming out and therefore it was not possible to land. I came out of the pilot's cabin and sat in front of Shastriji without speaking a word. After two minutes Shastriji asked me, 'What is the matter? Why don't you speak?' I told Shastriji the position that the undercarriage was not coming out, that they were trying to exhaust the petrol and then land. Shastriji said "I am sorry to find Bhargava that over such a trifling affair you are perturbed. What is there? Go and tell the pilot to belly-land by the side of the Ganges." Then on second thoughts he said: "Tell the pilot to get in touch with the Allahabad airport and find out if the particular pilot who was handling this plane was available at the airport." Fortunately, the pilot happened to be there and he went on giving instructions. Ultimately it was suggested that the plane might go up and then take a deep dive with the switch for the undercarriage on and it might work. And it did work; the undercarriage came out and the plane was able to land. This incident I have only cited to show that whatever the circumstances he might be facing he was always calm and composed. On this particular occasion he had the knowledge that he was facing death in front. Yet he was calm, he was cool; he was composed and was giving various instructions which a normal person would be giving.

Now, when Shastriji went to Tashkent he went with an open mind. And if I just read out what he said in the opening remarks, the House will realise what problem he was facing and how he went about tackling it. He said:

"I know there are many unresolved differences between our two countries. Even between countries

with the best of relationship there are differences and even disputes. The question which we have both to face is whether we should think of force as a method of solving them or whether we should decide and declare that force will never be used. If other countries, even those with vast resources and much deeper differences, can avoid an armed conflict and live together on the basis of peaceful co-existence, should not countries like India and Pakistan whose main problem is the economic betterment of their people give up the idea of solving any problems by recourse to arms?"

Then he goes on and enunciates other things. Now let us also examine what was working in the mind of President Ayub Khan. I may be allowed to read out two paragraphs from his opening speech also:

"The eyes of the world are on Tashkent. History has offered both India and Pakistan a great opportunity to resolve their dispute on a peaceful, just and honourable basis. We have come here determined to use this opportunity in a positive and constructive manner."

And he goes on to say further down:

"Both of us have limited resources and we need all that we have and much more to raise our people from their present level of existence. Neither of us can afford war, nor can we divert our resources to preparations for war. This is the one lesson which we have learnt through our recent experience."

And the last sentence is the most important sentence:

"What we must provide to our people and what they demand are instruments of life, not instruments of death."

This is the sentiment which was working in the mind of the Pakistan

President at that time. He had realised fully the dangers of war and he had gone there to seek ways of peace. If anybody doubts now the intentions of Pakistan without giving them a fair trial, I personally feel it is not being fair to them. If we see the history of the Tashkent talks we will find that on the 9th it seems that the talks were on the verge of failure. What was the reason? It was because Shastriji was not prepared to compromise with basic principles or national honour. He had full knowledge of the assurances he had given to Parliament in this august House and in the other august House. Now if we analyse the Tashkent Declaration we will know that it is not an end in itself but it is only a means for going towards a particular path and that is the path of peace. The first paragraph of the Declaration is the usual preamble. The first numbered paragraph deals with the affirmation that no recourse to force would be taken and disputes will be settled through peaceful means, and both sides made a statement about their respective positions as far as the question of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. Here again we have not compromised anywhere with the stand we had taken. We simply reiterated that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and is not negotiable.

The second para deals with the question of the withdrawal of armed forces. The third para deals with non-interference in the internal affairs of each other's territory. The fourth para deals with discouraging any propaganda against the other country and promote friendly relations. The fifth para deals with the restoration of diplomatic relations, which had almost been severed during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The sixth para deals with the restoration of economic and trade relations. The seventh para deals with the question of repatriation of prisoners. The eighth para deals with the problem of refugees, the exodus of people and the question of property and assets.

[Shri M. P. Bhargava]

The ninth para provides for consultation at all levels to solve the problems facing both the countries in the light of the Tashkent Declaration. The last para shows gratitude to the Soviet Prime Minister for the part played by him. Now, what does the Tashkent Declaration achieves. If we look back on the last eighteen years of the history of the unfortunate relations between India and Pakistan, the Declaration has a tremendous significance. It reverses past trends and opens out the possibility of peaceful and good neighbourly relations between the two countries. In the Tashkent Declaration India and Pakistan have chosen to turn away from mutual conflict and have resolved to base their relations on peace, friendship and good neighbourliness. Now, whenever there is to be any agreement or a joint declaration, it has to be on the basis of give and take, conciliation and compromise. It cannot be one-sided. In regard to the withdrawal from Haji Pir and other areas across the cease-fire line, the position of the Government of India was as stated in the Prime Minister's letter of the 14th September to the U.N. Secretary-General, which was repeated in Parliament by the Prime Minister. It will be recalled that in this letter he had stated:—

"Let me make it perfectly clear, Mr. Secretary-General, that, when consequent upon cease-fire becoming effective further details are considered, we shall not agree to any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltrations or prevent us from dealing with infiltrations when they take place."

Now, as far as the present so-called infiltrators in Kashmir are concerned, nobody prevents us, under the Tashkent Declaration, from dealing with them as we like. The Tashkent Declaration does not put any ban on our dealing with them, because Pakistan has not owned its responsibility for the infiltrators. As far as fresh infil-

trators are concerned, the Tashkent Declaration provides an assurance through the agency of one of the biggest powers of the world that it will not be allowed to happen. What further assurances could they give in an agreement which is meant for turning the trends of the past eighteen years into other directions, from the path of war to the path of peace?

Now, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's and Prof. M. B. Lal's Parties are opposed to the Tashkent Declaration. Now, speaking on the 10th December, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee said—

"मुझे विश्वास है, अपनी यात्रा में प्रधान मंत्री जी जहां विश्व शान्ति की खोज करेंगे वहां अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय दबावके सामने वज्र की दृढ़ता का परिचय देंगे और जब अगले सत्र में उनसे मिलेंगे तो फिर उनकी कूटनीतिक विजय के लिये उन्हें बधाइयां दे सकेंगे।"

I do not understand where Shastriji had failed the country or had not kept up to the assurance given by him to Parliament and why there is a change in the attitude of Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee so soon after the Tashkent Declaration. I have the greatest regard for Atal Bihari Vajpayeeji and what he says. Usually he is very precise and to the point. He was not sure about his stand on Tithwal, Haji Pir and Kargil and, therefore, he did not give one amendment, which is the usual method with him, to be precise and to the point. He has given three amendments on the same subject, not knowing whether any of the amendments could be fitted in with the motion on the Tashkent Declaration. So, he was groping in the dark. Let me give three, some may fit in, some may not. I may not be able to impress the House. Therefore, he took a chance of giving three amendments. This is not the usual manner of action that Shri Vajpayee takes on all major issues. That shows how he was not quite sure of his stand. Now, he has said a lot about all this. Unfortunately, he is not here, otherwise I would

have humbly asked him one question and if he had replied to it, I would have said that something wrong had been done. The simple question is, if Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee were placed in the position of Shastriji, would he have not signed the Declaration? If his reply is 'No', then I would say that there is strength in what he says. But I am sure Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee would not be in a position to say that if he were in Shastriji's position he would have refused to sign the Declaration.

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE: Yes, I would have.

SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA: And put the country again open to the dangers of war?

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE: There was a cease-fire already and there is no question of war.

SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA: Now, let us examine how the world has taken the Tashkent Declaration. The Declaration has been hailed throughout the world, with the exception of China, as a great act of statemanship and as a major contribution towards peace. There has been high praise throughout the world for the wisdom and love of peace of the late Prime Minister Shastriji.

Another question which is asked is whether the Tashkent Declaration is consistent with India's basic policies. The Tashkent Declaration is not only consistent with, but is also a vindication of India's basic policy of peace and peaceful co-existence, so ably advanced all these years by the Party to which I have the honour to belong. We want that all nations should have good relations with their neighbours. In pursuance of this policy, India had, ever since 1949, urged that India and Pakistan should sign a declaration renouncing the use of force for the settlement of their disputes. It has been the earnest wish of the Government and the people of India to live in friendship and fraternal relations

with the people of Pakistan. The Tashkent Declaration provides a basis for the fulfilment of these aims and policies. Commenting on the Tashkent Declaration Walter Lippman says:

"The world is better for what was done at Tashkent, for mankind has needed badly to be shown that it is still possible to get on top of the intractable violence of the human affairs".

In conclusion, Tashkent would be a place of pilgrimage for Indians. To every Indian who had love and respect for Shastriji the Tashkent Declaration should be like a sacred will of the late Prime Minister. As such it becomes the imperative duty for such citizens to try to help in its implementation in letter and spirit, and I have no doubt that the Government of India and the people of India would act accordingly. Let the Tashkent spirit grow to bring the much-needed era of peace and prosperity to this sub-continent.

Thank you.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): Madam Deputy Chairman, we have this historic Declaration before us for some time, and the matter has been debated from various points of view not only in this country but practically in all the countries in the world. The reason why the world reacted to this declaration is plain and simple. There has been with us for eighteen years the problem of Indo-Pakistan tension and conflict giving rise occasionally to war, loss of life, destruction of property, and so on, bringing in its wake terrible disappointment and anxiety among the peoples of both the countries. When such a problem came to be discussed at Tashkent under the aegis of a friendly power, the Soviet Union, which had no interest and has no interest in this affairs except to see that the two neighbours live in good neighbourly relations, naturally the expectations of all decent-minded

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.] human beings were aroused. When Tashkent came as a harbinger of peace and tranquillity, when Tashkent brought its promise of better days and indicated the line of advance to a durable peace, it was acclaimed as a great achievement in all parts of the world where peace-loving humanity lived and toiled. Naturally on this side of the border we were happy specially because we never wanted war with Pakistan or any conflict with Pakistan. We had sought the ways of peace, friendship and good neighbourly relations. It had been so under Mahatma Gandhi, and in the last days of his life, as history will bear testimony to that fact, he was striving for establishing that amity and became in the process a martyr to that immortal cause and he immortalised himself. Then we had Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru taking the responsibility of leading the country, and in that context too he wanted the friendship to be restored between India and Pakistan. Naturally he could not undo the fact that the two States had come into existence, but he thought that it was worth while for us and the people of Pakistan to shake hands across the border, radiate goodwill from each side of the border and make it possible for us to live as friends and good neighbours frustrating the machinations and designs of the enemies of our people, whether they live in India or Pakistan. Naturally we always supported on this side of the House such effort on his part, and many agreements had been signed, some of them were not fulfilled, and we have not always a very exciting or encouraging memory about them. But what are we to do? A nation that seeks peace must pursue the path of peace. Peace is what we seek. War we did not want. It was forced upon us, and we were driven to take up arms because as that time there was no alternative but to take resort to arms. But we did it not as a militarist nation, not as champions of war and aggression, but to defend our territorial integrity and at the same time uphold the mission of peace for us and peace for the rest of mankind.

That is why, Madam, the moment the opportunity came, not only did we accept the cease-fire but at the same time we accepted the offer of good offices by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and went to Tashkent in quest of peace. A nation lives not in war, not in destruction not in fighting, as history has shown time and again. It lives in peace and amity and brotherhood amongst nations. What was wrong then if we went to Tashkent and sought the ways of peace and tried to arrive at an agreement of the kind that we have in our hand? What is wrong there? Nothing. First of all in this debate one point has to be settled once and for all. Do we want the ways of peace with our neighbours? Do we want to seek the ways of peace? Are we to show initiative for that or are we to condemn ourselves fatalistically to the destructive ways of war, abandon the ways of peace and be ready with a sword in hand to fight every time, for an opportunity to fight? Let this question be settled by us. Let militarists say that it is their way to fight, that gunpowder policy is their policy. Let us not speak in those terms. After all we became free by evolving certain ideals not only for us but for all mankind. After freedom we preached to the world the ideals of peace. We told the world to live in peace. We made our humble contribution through our policy of peace and non-alignment. But when the test came to us, are we to behave as a selfish and mean nation, abandon all that we have preached and assume a bellicose and intransigent and rigid attitude? That cannot be, and that was not so. This is all to the glory of a great nation.

Madam, India shall live, as the British after two hundred years of rule could not do away with our lofty ideals and traditions and our immortal heritage; nor shall it pass away into oblivion if some people hold demonstrations outside the Parliament House and denounce the Tashkent Declaration. Tashkent embodies the

spirit of a nation; it embodies the history of a nation; it embodies the hunger and desire of a nation for peace with Pakistan, brotherly people of Pakistan, with whom we are bound by culture, tradition, history, years and years of common travail and struggle, sorrow and suffering. We have lived with them in conditions of agony; we have shared with them days of peace and happiness also for some time. But we know that today the third party is coming in. The Tashkent Declaration takes the vexed issue of Indo-Pakistan relations from the scope of the Security Council to an arena where imperialist conspiracy is no longer possible, is ruled out. On the soil of Tashkent are buried once and for all the imperialist intrigues of all kinds, and there comes the Soviet Union not to manipulate, not to dictate, not to pressurise but to help two nations, who ought to live as friends, to live as friends. That is what we find. It was therefore a great blow to those gentlemen in the U.S.A. and Britain who had been exploiting for eighteen years the Indo-Pakistan conflict against the interests of the people of both these countries and for furthering their own selfish neo-colonialist designs on our sub-continent. Naturally, today they are disappointed—naturally so. Our good American friends are pretending that they are in favour of the Tashkent Declaration. What were they doing in September? Why were they stopping the economic aid to our country committed under the Third Five Year Plan? Why were they writing all that rubbish and nonsense in their journals when the Indian people were defending, rightly, their territorial integrity? Now, after the Tashkent Declaration has been signed, which they could not undo with all their malice and perversity, those American gentlemen come and tell us, implement this Declaration, only then shall we give you aid. What a political chicanery? I cannot think of a worse type of affront to our intelligence. They want to show as if they are very happy. But we know what they are after now. Having lost on that point,

having lost on the score of Indo-Pakistan relations, they are raising another thing: 'Oh! Both of you settle in order to fight out China'. Cold war is the theme of American policy even now. Therefore, when the Americans support in this manner, I should like to ask the hon. Members opposite not to be inveigled into believing something which they could not believe at all.

Therefore, the Tashkent Declaration has been a success. Look at it from every angle. Who are opposing it in Pakistan?

AN HON. MEMBER: China.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I am coming to that. China does not lie in Pakistan—somewhere else. It is geography. (*Interruptions*) I do not know whether it is history.

Madam Deputy Chairman, therefore, in Pakistan the most bellicose elements have openly come out against it. But there again, they are in a disarray and you cannot say that all the opposition parties are opposed to the Tashkent Declaration. The opposition parties in West Pakistan, and in East Bengal are not opposed to it. Mr. Narul Amin, one of the opposition leaders, has supported the Declaration. Therefore, such a situation has been created for this Declaration.

I say that we must implement it. But let us imbibe the spirit of it. Now, Shri Vajpayee has posed a question. What is the guarantee that Pakistan will observe it? The same question may be put in respect of any international agreement. Guarantees in international agreements arise from very many national and international factors, the national factors being that the forces that stand for such an agreement should be strengthened both in India and in Pakistan. Don't you think that the Tashkent Declaration has encouraged and strengthened the forces that stand for peace and amity with India? Don't we have the demonstration in Pakistan, in different ways, that the forces—the reasonable forces and healthy forces there—are all in favour of it and are in a better

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.]
position to assert themselves and prevent the bellicose elements from getting an upper hand in Pakistani's political life in order to frustrate the Declaration? Is it not an objective guarantee that is being created as a result of the Tashkent accord itself? That has to be taken into account.

Similarly, internationally also today guarantees are being created. In the Tashkent Declaration, the last line is significant and I would invite your attention to it:

"They"

"They" means Mr. Ayub Khan included—

" . . . invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to witness this Declaration."

Is it a mere phrase? The Declaration was signed under certain historical backgrounds which themselves created the guarantee, because these historical forces are not going to disappear. Secondly, one of the greatest powers in the world which has no selfish interest with regard to either of these countries and which is interested in seeing that the Declaration is implemented in a manner that would promote the very purposes of this Declaration—namely, better relations between India and Pakistan and the further improvement in that direction—is a party to it directly, is a witness to it. Is it a small matter? Suppose somebody—I will take any name—wanted to violate it, would he not reckon with the fact of the background of the Declaration and also the fact that the Declaration has been witnessed by a great neighbouring power like the Soviet Union? Is not the Soviet Union's influence going to bear on the subject should somebody think that the Declaration has to be thrown to the scrap? Would not some people, if they want to behave malevolently in this matter, have to reckon with the fact that should they behave in

this manner contrary to the spirit and letter of the Declaration, that will make the Soviet Union act in a particular way which may not be very palatable to them? If they violated the Declaration, would not the world opinion which has been so nobly and eloquently roused over it be against that violation or attempted violation? Are these not international sanctions? We do not have an international police force; we do not have an international DIR or emergency to put people in detention as we like. But we do have an international public opinion, an international sanction arising out of certain agreements not only in what they contain but also in the background in which they are signed. Therefore, I think the Government should be congratulated for creating by their accord the greatest international sanction conceivable in the present situation. And if that sanction does not work, I do not know what will work. That does not mean, for a moment, that I think that the path of peace is all roses. Not at all, it is a thorny path. But what other paths are we going to traverse? We have to try, take this path, come what may; we have to try to see that we advance along that line and carry the rest of the world with us, we have to see that our persuasion and implementation are of such a nature that they disarm the enemies of this Declaration, the enemies of Indo-Pak relations, wherever they may live. That is how we should behave. There comes the importance of the Tashkent spirit.

Madam Deputy Chairman, mention has been made of some speeches by Pakistani leaders. I do not like those speeches. I can tell you that these leaders are great, but greater are the forces of history. That is what we should remember today. And I think that if we act in the right spirit, the caravan of this Tashkent accord shall continue to pass, how many dogs may bark elsewhere or in this country, for that matter, because we have taken

the right step, and a right step that has been taken to the knowledge of the entire world, a step to which everybody has given his support, every nation has given its support, practically and openly. Therefore, I say that these are matters of importance.

In this connection, it is true that no no-war pact has been signed. It is true. We should have liked to have that pact. But the second clause of the Declaration says—

"They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means."

Is it not an international commitment? Suppose a pact had been signed. That would have been also a contract; that would have been open to violation by one party or the other, as any international pact is violated. If this could be violated, that could also be violated. If that could not be violated, this could not also be violated. What makes the violation or observance possible is not that you have signed a no-war pact as such; what makes it possible that such a state of affairs comes into existence between our two countries is the creation of a climate—which is, ideologically and politically disarming the protagonists of war in both countries—certainly in Pakistan—so that the other forces prevail, they got armed with this Declaration which is by all accounts an international agreement meant to be solemnly observed, and which can be violated only by inviting the opprobrium and wrath of the entire world. Therefore, I treat it as a solemn agreement. I am not much bothered about whether it is a no-war pact as such signed as a separate contract. But we have got Pakistan to sign for what we have been asking, maybe not exactly in the same clause or exactly in the same way or exactly in the same wording. But these few words that I have read out to you are a matter of great historic importance for us, not only for the sake

of guiding the relations as obtain today but also giving an orientation to the relations of tomorrow and the day after as between two countries. Therefore, that has been a great achievement. I think the efforts of all those who made it possible to sign the Declaration should be appreciated by us in this House.

Madam, many things have been said about Haji Pir and others. Now it seems that the arguments of our friends from Jana Sangh concentrate not on the fundamental but on the incidental. Why do I say this thing? Did we go to war with Pakistan to capture Haji Pir or other passes important as they are? We went to war with Pakistan in order to repel aggression, in order to make them observe what they had committed and to see that infiltrators get out from this side of the ceasefire line to the other side. Certainly, we did not spend Rs. 500 crores in order to wage a war, in order to get back Haji Pir. If it had been so, we would have chosen the time, we would have done it differently. After all, it is not that we started the war. It is the other side which came in, sent infiltrators and then started war. We went in for a defensive war in order at least to see that what had been done since August 5, 1965 was undone. That was the position. That is why we went to war and fought it. Our stand was very clear. It is no use pointing out to Shastriji's statement. He made it very clear that as soon as we have the guarantee that infiltration would not take place, we would be prepared even to withdraw from Haji Pir. That has been made very clear. Now the question is whether the guarantees have been obtained. Now, you cannot think of only one set of guarantee, military guarantee. Are we in a situation when the only guarantee conceivable on earth today is to keep our armed forces in Haji Pir and there is no other guarantee open or available to India, a peace-loving country? Such a posture if we take, we shall be misunderstood by the whole world.

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.]

Therefore, we have sought, as a peace-loving nation, guarantees, that conform to the standard of peace, guarantees that conform to the requirements of improving the climate in which the Sun shines and the dark clouds of war disappear. That is the position. Have we not got it under the Tashkent Declaration? What else?

If you say that infiltrators are there, we'll deal with them as you like, as my esteemed friend from that side said. Besides, Pakistan has no right to speak for them, and if they speak for them, the only alternative for them under the agreement is to expeditiously withdraw them in terms of the agreement because the agreement speaks of armed personnel. Therefore, is it not a positive gain of which we should be very happy and which politically strengthens and buttresses our position. Therefore, Madam, that argument of Haji Pir etc. is a weak one, if I may say so, and is meant for political propaganda.

It is easy to excite passion. Mr. Vajpayee says: How many times our people, our jawans, must give blood to capture Haji Pir? I may tell him that we do not like our jawans to give their blood if we can help it. Therefore, we want the ways of peace. We want our soldiers also to live in peace. We are not a military nation to see our soldiers marching and brandishing their swords. We need defence in order to defend our country and our territorial integrity. That is why we need the defence forces. Therefore, today if we have to be loyal to our defence forces and their vital interest, what else could we give them better than a Tashkent Declaration?

Madam Deputy Chairman, we have seen in history great generals coming, behaving irresponsibly, showing a flare for fighting and then disappearing into the dustbin of history. We have seen in this struggle for peace wisdom, statesmanship prevailing over the counsels of despair and anger in war, thus making mankind richer by such

contribution. We want to leave our impression not only on our time, but on the times that lie ahead of us, we want to tell not only ourselves but posterity that we are a peace-loving nation at no point of testing time but we are essentially a peace-loving nation.

Madam Deputy Chairman, Tashkent is a tribute to our genius, to our heritage, to our peace-loving aspirations and so on, and I think it is our bounden duty not only because Shastriji fell martyr to a noble cause, a martyr that shall always be remembered in history, but because we have to implement honestly the Tashkent Declaration, carry forward the Tashkent spirit, not only to improve the relations between the two countries make it easier to achieve lasting peace between two brotherly nations but also to make a noble contribution to all progressive mankind whom the thought of war causes the greatest anxiety. Therefore, I think Tashkent shall remain as a great landmark in history and serve the great people of this country and the people of Pakistan, and indeed all peace-loving mankind. Hence all our good wishes, all our goodwill, all our fervent support go to the Government in this matter for the fulfilment and implementation of this Declaration. We only hope that on the other side of the border goodwill, peace-loving forces, shall prevail in the same way and shall cultivate the same spirit so that we can join together with the Tashkent Declaration as our Charter of the future to reshape our relations for the good of both India and Pakistan.

Thank you.

SHRIMATI LALITHA (RAJA-GOPALAN) (Madras): Madam Deputy Chairman, I am not going to make a critical analysis of the Declaration nor am I going into the legal clarifications of this Declaration. From my point of view the Tashkent Declaration is not only a significant, solemn pledge for peace from the point of view of India and Pakistan but of the whole world. Renunciation of violence and peaceful settle-

ment of all disputes which the world and the big powers have been loudly thinking has been put to test for the first time, and the credit for that goes to the sub-continent of Asia.

For all practical purposes, one should not forget that for safeguarding humanity from degradation and destruction this Declaration is indispensable. Some people say that it violates the constitutional provisions, and for accepting this Declaration we should have an amendment of the Constitution. But let them remember that to safeguard humanity and to maintain peace all over the world and to follow the policy of peace and non-violence, this Declaration is a very significant one.

While one has to have a flashback of events prior to the departure of the late Prime Minister to the U.S.S.R. The picture was not a very happy one then. In the United Nations Security Council the Pakistan delegation accused the Indian delegation in a very indecent manner. There was a violent conflict going on on the border all over between India and Pakistan. At this juncture when our mind was very much saddened at these events the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. extended an invitation to both President Ayub Khan and our late Prime Minister to come to Tashkent. Our Prime Minister, of course being a man of peace, a follower of Gandhiji, with a very heavy heart but at the same time with a determined will, decided to proceed to the U.S.S.R. This acceptance by our Prime Minister to visit the U.S.S.R. has only raised our position in the international thinking. While accepting this Declaration, neither our prestige nor our stand on the Kashmir issue has been in any way jeopardised. On the contrary, it only reveals that Pakistan has realised that aggression and threat do not pay in the long run. And, Madam, it should be viewed from the national as well as international point of view. Eighteen years ago, one should not forget, Pakistan was a part and

parcel of India, and that Hindu and Muslim brethren are living on both sides, and that they want amity and peace which they have been deprived of so far.

Now for another thing, for a developing country like ours friendliness, cooperation and mutual understanding with neighbours is indispensable for progress and prosperity. Some people say, "Why should we vacate these places which we have captured?" but I would like to point out to them that this Declaration proves that the occupation of the Haji Pir Pass was only to check further infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and this Declaration provides a reasonable guarantee against any further infiltration by armed military personnel including armed infiltrators. So I think the critics can take this as an assurance and try to give it a fair trial. Then some people have been saying that we have to fight to the finish. But I would like to ask them, "Where is the end and what is the price for it?". I am sure some of the opposition Members also visited the military hospitals in the front areas and they would have seen, our young men in the age group of 20 to 27 years completely disabled. Did anyone of them give a thought as to what their future would be? Can any power on earth restore them to normal conditions of life? Do we still have to pay such a heavy penalty when the door for peace is open before us? I only appeal to them on moral grounds. I am not going into the legal or any critical analysis of the Declaration. Then another thing that critics of this Declaration should also bear in mind is that Pakistan's attitude is changing. They are more receptive to the implementation of this agreement. The recent normal relationship being resumed between Pakistan and India, and the recent news that our Commerce Minister as well as our Civil Aviation Minister are proceeding to Pakistan only bears testimony to the fact that Pakistan is showing reciprocity in implement-

[Shrimati Lalitha (Rajgopalan)]
ing this Declaration, and I am sure we can give a fair trial to it. As for the public I should say that I have never seen that the public here or in Pakistan have resented or agitated against this Declaration as soon as it was announced. No resentment was shown by them. It is only some of the opposition parties here or there that are carrying on this propaganda against it, and I think the public in both the countries have welcomed it with a sigh of relief. And as for the world opinion I would definitely say without a shadow of doubt that foreign papers flashed this news the very same day when this agreement was signed. In fact *Le Monde*, a French paper, paid a glowing tribute to our late Prime Minister in its editorial for this achievement. I can, without any hesitation, say that by signing this agreement, our international prestige has gone high.

Before I conclude I would like to mention just one or two points made by the Opposition. Now Mr. Jagat Narain said that after signing this agreement Mr. Shastri, our late Prime Minister, instead of being jubilant over this event, was pacing up and down in his room, and that that was seen in the newsreel by him. But I would like to say, if Mr. Jagat Narain has correctly understood our late Prime Minister, Shastriji was a very well-balanced man, who never showed any difference between sorrow and happiness, and that was the reason perhaps why he was just walking in his room here and there. Another thing; Mr. Vajpayee was saying that it was U.S.S.R. that pressurized our late Prime Minister to come to this decision. But I would like to say to this also that just before leaving for Tashkent he made a statement in this House on the 10th December, 1965, in which he referred to the totality of relationship between India and Pakistan so that the two countries could live on the basis of enduring peace and mutual co-operation. He added that the facts of history and geography made it imperative for India

and Pakistan to live in harmony and mutual co-operation, one with the other, and that we had always believed that war and military conflict could not provide a real solution to any problem between nations. It is with this determination that he proceeded to the U.S.S.R. and it is not a fact that he was pressurized by the U.S.S.R. or by any other country to sign this agreement, as Mr. Vajpayee thinks. Now, Madam, the stage is set for the implementation of this agreement and it is our duty, irrespective of any political party, as true citizens of India, to strengthen the hands of the Government. We should not forget that the proud and glorious honour of safeguarding peaceful co-existence is being entrusted into the hands of Pakistan and India, and let us not at any stage jeopardise these intentions. This is all I would appeal to the opposition Members. I am sure, Madam, that if this Declaration is fully implemented, the credit not only goes to the U.S.S.R., India and Pakistan, but at the same time it will be an eye-opener to other countries which have similar conflicts in their own spheres.

With these words, Madam, I fully support this Declaration, and I thank you for giving me the time.

SHRI A. D. MANI (Madhya Pradesh): Madam Deputy Chairman, the Tashkent agreement will be regarded as the last will and testament of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, and future alone will show whether he has been the architect of peace between India and Pakistan. It has been alleged that Mr. Shastri was working under the stress of a great emotion, and my hon. friend, Mr. Jagat Narain, referred to the newsreel shot which showed Mr. Shastri pacing up and down the room. As soon as this was exhibited on the newsreel I made it a point to call on one of those who were present in the room of Mr. Shastri when he died. Mr. Shastri had a heart attack, and the person concerned, whom I met, went to help him—he was there at that time. So

I asked him why he was pacing up and down his room, and his answer was that he was not for pacing up and down the room but that the newsreel man or the man who made the documentary wanted him to pace up and down the room in order to have a shot to be exhibited on the screen. It appears that Mr. Shastri had said that he would do only after he had finished his dinner. He finished his dinner and then he paced up and down the room. Now the cameraman took out the camera and from the garden outside shot him in that posture. I do not know why the newsreel wanted to show that Mr. Shastri was a perplexed man. From the point of view of a little publicity for the newsreel they wanted and got a shot like this, and this is a point that I am making on the basis of a personal conversation that I had with one of those who were present in the room when Mr. Shastri died. Madam, many of us had a chance of knowing Mr. Shastri intimately, many in this House as well as in the other House, and I can say this that, whatever he did, he did in full consciousness of what he had in mind, and when he had signed the agreement in such a state, it would have been on the basis that he thought that the agreement was in favour of India. Madam, I am not one of those who regard the Tashkent agreement as a victory for India. It is not a victory for India, or a victory for Pakistan, but it is a victory for peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. It certainly gave me a great wrench to see our forces pulling out of Haji Pir Pass and Tithwal. And when we consider the constitutional and legal arguments against such a move, we ought to bear in mind that a part of the Chhamb sector was in the hands of Pakistan, and so also was a part of Rajasthan. The question which we have to ask ourselves is this. Suppose we had failed to sign the agreement, what would have happened? It is a very relevant question which we should raise, because all of us have to answer that question. Suppose Mr. Shastri had refused to

sign the agreement, then the United Nations Security Council would have put pressure on us to conform to the Resolution adopted by them on the termination of the India-Pakistan conflict, and if it had been decided by the Security Council, that decision would have been definitely disadvantageous to India, because there are a number of members on the Security Council, who are not well disposed towards our country. It is a question of time for us to pull out of Haji Pir Pass and the Lahore sector. It was a question of time for Pakistan also to pull out of the Chhamb sector, and they could not have stayed in these areas indefinitely; one day they had to pull out. Now the question is whether we should have done it at the behest of the Security Council, or under the friendly aegis of the Soviet Union. I think that on the whole it is a matter of satisfaction to us that this question was decided under the aegis of the Soviet Union. A salient feature of the Tashkent Declaration, which appears to me, is that nowhere in that Declaration is there a reiteration of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. It has been made clear that, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Pakistani claim on Kashmir is a matter of no relevance at all, and it is a very significant gain for us that the Soviet Union has made Pakistan agree at a conference that it was not pressed in its presence at least—its title to Kashmir—and we can rest assured that, whatever may be the evolution of the Kashmir dispute in the Security Council, we can count upon the goodwill and support of the Soviet Union. Madam, the other point is that the Soviet Union has emerged as a factor for stability in the Asian continent.

It has proved in this case that 5 P.M. It is as powerful as the Security Council. We were not prepared to implement the Resolution of the Security Council. But when the Soviet Union tried to persuade us—Mr. Shastri unfortunately is no longer with us to tell us

[Shri A. D. Mani.]

what arguments the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union used to persuade us to withdraw from Haji Pir and Tithwal. He must have given some assurances to us. Also he must have given some assurance to Pakistan. Madam, I would like the hon. Minister of External Affairs to give information on a particular point. I was one of those who felt that some of the speeches made in Pakistan after the Tashkent agreement were not in conformity with the spirit of that agreement. But now I have been very credibly informed that the Pakistan authorities have informed the Naga hostiles that in view of the Tashkent agreement they would not be able to give shelter to them, and this is one of the reasons why the Naga Peace Mission is here to have talks with the Government. I am sure the Minister of External Affairs would say that he does not have first-hand information.

PROF. M. B. LAL: Is it not a fact that these talks were arranged before the Tashkent agreement was signed?

SHRI A. D. MANI: But the readiness shown and the tone of the talks are there. I am only asking for information. If this is going to be the pattern of the developments between India and Pakistan, then it is a development which all of us should welcome, because we cannot think in terms of the armies of both the countries being locked up in massive strengths on each other's border. Neither can the two countries afford to maintain these armies. If this is the trend of events then I think Mr. Shastri's efforts would not have been in vain.

Madam, the hon. Minister of External Affairs mentioned that one of the significant gains of the Tashkent Declaration was that both Pakistan and India accepted, and particularly

Pakistan, the principle of non-interference in the affairs of each other. Now, I do not attach the same importance which Sardar Swaran Singh attaches to this Declaration, because Pakistan's stand has always been that Kashmir is not an internal affair of India, that Kashmir is a matter of dispute between India and Pakistan. What appeals to me in this Declaration is that for the first time and in the presence of the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, the President of Pakistan has said under article 4 of the Declaration that he will discourage propaganda directed against the other country and will encourage propaganda directed towards developing friendly relations between the two countries. The history of Pakistan during the last eighteen years will show clearly that their effort has been based on the hate of India. But now for the first time in a solemn document witnessed by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, the President of Pakistan has said that he will encourage friendly propaganda between India and Pakistan. I attach a good deal of importance to this, more importance than what the Minister of External Affairs attaches and has said with regard to the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs.

The other point that makes an impression on me is clause 8 of the Agreement wherein it is stated:

"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict."

Madam, one of the potent causes of irritation between India and Pakistan

has been the ill-treatment of the minorities in Pakistan and the fact that the President of Pakistan has said that he will try to see that all these sources of irritation will disappear is itself a significant gain because if the minorities are treated well by Pakistan there will be very little or few grounds for tension between us and Pakistan.

Madam, I would also like to say that this disengagement which has come about, this disengagement to the 1949 level, which has come about as a result of the talks between the two Army Commanders is again another development which will be welcomed. But I would like to mention here that in an important matter like this, the Government should have made a statement in Parliament or publicly before the announcement was made at Rawalpindi. It has been alleged that there are some secret clauses to the Tashkent Agreement but I am prepared to accept the Government's statement that there are no secret clauses at all. But a matter like the scaling down of forces to the 1949 level should have been the result of a political decision. This morning when the matter came up in the form of the statement made by the Defence Minister and I asked for a clarification of the point, the Minister of Defence said it was a political decision. But Parliament should have been informed. We welcome it and I would go even to the extent of saying that there should be a lowering of the forces on other borders also, on the East Bengal border also, because we do not want this kind of a continuous tension going on.

Madam, it has been said that Pakistan has not given us any assurance of not sending infiltrators into Kashmir. I do not claim that I am a diplomat. But I have been a member of a U.N. delegation and I have seen diplomacy at close quarters and I can say that in no diplomatic agreement signed between one party and another is an attempt made to extract assurances and

to humiliate another party. I have no doubt whatever in my mind, that Pakistan must have given assurances to Prime Minister Kosygin that he would not send infiltrators into India. It has not been spelt out in the agreement, no doubt. Suppose Pakistan does send out infiltrators. Suppose Pakistan goes against every clause of the Declaration, then we will be in a very strong position to go to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and say, "At your instance we signed this agreement. At your instance, in spite of a vocal minority opposing the agreement, we carried it through Parliament. Now the word has been broken by the other side. We are free to answer Pakistan and in retaliation use the same methods and try to meet the situation." The onus will be on the Soviet Union which has secured a triumphant lead in the space race to see to it that a document signed in the presence of its Prime Minister is honoured. I think we have taken a very wise move by proceeding on the basis that the *bona fides* of Pakistan are to be granted and that the Soviet Union will see to it that this Declaration is implemented.

Madam, the final point that I would like to make is this. I see that the Pakistan Government is trying to revive the debate on Kashmir in the Security Council. I do not know whether anything said in this Chamber or for that matter in the other Chamber, is going to influence the President of Pakistan or his advisers. But since the Tashkent Declaration is being debated openly, I would like to say this, that this is not the time for the President of Pakistan to reopen the Kashmir question, because any reopening of the Kashmir question by the Government of Pakistan would lead to propaganda in either country directed against the other and will destroy the very basis of this Agreement. I hope that Prime Minister Kosygin would advise President Ayub Khan not to raise this matter now not until a proper atmosphere of conciliation is

[Shri A. D. Mani.]

created in both the countries and minorities in each of the countries and particularly in Pakistan, are well treated. When the atmosphere is built up then that will be the proper time for a discussion, between India and Pakistan on the adjustment of the Kashmir question. I do not pretend to envisage in what manner the Kashmir question would be solved. But there ought to be some kind of agreement between India and Pakistan.

First of all, we have to rebuild an atmosphere of conciliation and confidence between India and Pakistan and it is not fair for the President of Pakistan to raise the Kashmir question in the Security Council at the present time. It will be, in my opinion, a breach of the spirit of the Tashkent Agreement. Madam, we have to be very watchful about what Pakistan is going to do. We do not want to start on distrust but in view of all that has happened during the last few years, we cannot take Pakistan's words for granted but we take Mr. Shastri's words for granted. Mr. Shastri signed that Agreement and this country should honour the Agreement in spirit and in letter. If the Agreement is broken, the person who breaks the Agreement will get himself condemned by international opinion and international opinion condemning Pakistan will be a great help to India because we want an international climate for assistance to this country in its economic affairs. This is a long-term process and we hope that the country will give its support to this agreement and as a result of friendly co-operation between India and Pakistan which is not a mirage but which is a fervent hope of those who have seen these two independent Governments come up, I hope, as a result of such co-operation, we may come to a stage twenty-five years hence, thirty years hence, of discussing common defence arrangements between India and Pakistan so that this ruinous expenditure on armies on either side may stop and all the moneys saved could

be used for the welfare of the people in the economic and social spheres.

Thank you.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The Minister will reply tomorrow. The debate is closed.

SHRI G. MURAHARI (Uttar Pradesh): I have given my name. I wanted to speak.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Whatever it is, I have said that the Minister will reply tomorrow. We have already exceeded the time allotted for this.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: We can sit till 5:30 P.M.

SHRI A. D. MANI: He represents a Party and he may be given time.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: If the House so desires. What is the opinion of the House?

SHRI G. MURAHARI: It is extremely unfair to me because I have noticed that when you are in the Chair this happens.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I do not want you to cast any reflections on the Chair in that manner. I have tried to be very impartial. Your name is not yet on my list.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: This is the fifth time this has happened, every time you are in the Chair that I am . . .

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I have always tried to be impartial and I do hope the House does believe that I am impartial but your name is not here on the list.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I told the Secretary the day before yesterday.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Anyway, if the House desires, it may sit longer. May I know the will of the House, whether it wishes to sit longer?

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: May I appeal to you, Madam? Let it not be said that discussion has been shut out. If some one wants to speak, let him speak.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: As I said, the Minister will reply tomorrow. If the House wants to sit any longer, it can sit today. This should not be carried on for tomorrow.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I would appeal to the Congress Party not to stop the discussion.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Let the House sit a little longer. He might take ten or fifteen minutes.

SARDAR SWARAN SINGH: I have no objection. Let the hon. Member speak.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It must finish today. The reply will be tomorrow.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: But he should withdraw the remarks.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Murahari should withdraw the words where he said that it is very unfair.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I have never said anything which is unfair because it is a fact, it is the fifth time that this has happened to me.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I do not think so. Every time you were given a chance to speak.

SHRI M. M. DHARIA: If he does not withdraw the words, what is to happen?

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Madam Deputy Chairman, why do we quarrel with this? He said that he gave his name but you have not received it. If he does not know that you have not got it, why carry it forward? Let us bury the hatchet.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It is not a question of not burying the hatchet. It is a kind of reflection on the Chair.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: He was under a certain misapprehension.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I think the House should have the last word on this. You must withdraw the reflection on the Chair.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN (Andhra Pradesh): Please withdraw.

SARDAR SWARAN SINGH: Withdraw.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: In view of what you say, Madam, that you had no intention of shutting out the discussion, I would withdraw it but at the same time it is a fact that this is the fifth time . . .

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: No, that is not a withdrawal then. You must withdraw.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I am withdrawing that part which said that the Deputy Chairman is shutting out the discussion. That is all.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The House will continue to sit till all those who want to speak get a chance. The Minister will reply to the debate tomorrow. The debate will close today. Yes, Mr. Murahari.

(The VICE-CHAIRMAN (Shri M. P. BHARGAVA) in the Chair.)

श्री गोडे मुरोहरि : वाइस चैयरमेन महोदय ताशकन्द के बारे में जब यह आलोचना करते हैं तो मैं इस राय का हूँ कि अगर ताशकन्द के बारे में पाकिस्तान और हिन्दुस्तान के बीच में जो सारे झगड़े, सारे मसले हैं, वे हल हो जाते तो मैं भी, जिस तरह से श्री भूपेश गुप्त ने इस घोषणा का स्वागत किया है, वैसे ही मैं भी करता। लेकिन अफसोस के साथ यह कहना पड़ेगा कि सरकार को एक आदत पड़ी हुई है,

[श्री गाडे मुगहरि]

एक बहुत पुरानी आदत है कि जो खास मसला होता है इस पर तो वह नहीं जाती है लेकिन मसलों के साथ जो छोटी मोटी समस्याएं उत्पन्न हो जाती हैं उनकी ओर सरकार का ध्यान हमेशा जाता है और जो भी हल निकालने की वह कोशिश करती है वह केवल इन छुटपुट मसलों के अन्तर्गत ही हल निकालने की कोशिश करती है। इसका नतीजा यह होता है कि जो असली मसला होता है वह हल नहीं हो पाता है क्योंकि सरकार असली मसले पर सोच विचार ही नहीं करती है।

पाकिस्तान और हिन्दुस्तान की जब हम बात करते हैं तो सरकार को ताशकंद घोषणा के अन्तर्गत यह कोशिश करनी चाहिये थी कि इन दोनों देशों के बीच जो बुनियादी सवाल है उसको लेकर बात करनी चाहिये। क्योंकि मैं यह मानता हूँ कि ताशकंद में जो एग्रीमेंट हुआ है, उससे सारे मामले, सारे झगड़े खत्म नहीं हो जायेंगे। इसलिए मुझे तो इस एग्रीमेंट की कोई खास अच्छाई हिन्दुस्तान के लिए निकलती दिखाई नहीं देती है, क्योंकि जब तक पाकिस्तान और हिन्दुस्तान के बीच जो मामले हैं, उनका हल नहीं होता है तब तक ये झगड़े किसी न किसी रूप में हमारे सामने खड़े होते ही रहेंगे अभी हम जो कुछ कर रहे हैं उसका कोई नतीजा निकलने वाला नहीं है, इसलिए मैं यह चाहता हूँ कि सरकार को चाहिये कि जो बुनियादी सवाल है, उसको लेकर पाकिस्तान के साथ बातचीत करना चाहिये। हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान के बीच जो अलगाव है, उसके बारे में बात करते और दोनों को एक करने का जो बुनियादी सवाल है उसके बारे में हमको बात करनी चाहिये।

अभी इस मदन में भी और उस सदन में भी शास्त्री जी ने बहुत कुछ कहा था। उन्होंने कहा था कि हम काश्मीर में एक इंच भी नहीं हटेंगे, वहां पर हमने जो कुछ हासिल किया है, हाजी पीर, कारगिल और टिथवाल तथा दूसरी जगहों पर हमारी सेना ने जो कब्जा किया है, उससे हम हरगिज नहीं हटेंगे। लेकिन ताशकंद

घोषणा के बाद पहले जो स्थिति थी उसी पर हमारी सरकार आ गई है, यह बात हमारी समझ में नहीं आती है। एक बार तो यद्ध की बात करते हैं, उस पर चर्चा है और फिर ऐसी स्थिति पैदा करते हैं जैसे पहले थी। सरकार बुनियादी मसले पर तो नहीं जाती है लेकिन जो छुटपुट मसले होते हैं उन्हीं के ऊपर मारी बाराबो चलाती है और फिर ऐसी स्थिति पैदा करती है कि वहां पर हम पहले थे वहां पर फिर वापस आ जाते हैं। इसलिये मैं चाहता हूँ कि रूस और अमरीका जो हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान के मामले में बातचीत करना चाहते हैं उन्हें बुनियादी बात को हल करने की कोशिश करनी चाहिये और मैं समझता हूँ कि इससे कुछ अच्छा नतीजा निकलेगा। लेकिन आज हम क्या देख रहे हैं कि अमरीका और रूस दोनों एक हैं कि हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान में झगड़ा न हो लेकिन बुनियादी सवाल को ज्यों का त्यों छोड़ रखा है।

मैं यह भी पूछना चाहता हूँ कि सरकार से ताशकंद में आपने एग्रीमेंट कर लिया, लेकिन पाकिस्तान में जो और मामले हैं, जिनके बारे में हमने राय प्रगट की है पख्तूनिस्तान के बारे में या पूर्वी बंगाल के बारे में, उसके बारे में आपका क्या रुख है? यह तो नहीं होना चाहिए कि ताशकंद में एक एग्रीमेंट साइन करके उसका नतीजा यह निकालें कि पाकिस्तान में जो पख्तूनिस्तान का सवाल है या पूर्वी बंगाल का सवाल है इन सब चीजों के बारे में हम चुप रहें। मुझे कभी ऐसा लगना है कि हम कभी किसी को उकसा देते हैं और बाद में उसका हाथ छोड़ देते हैं ऐसा नहीं होना चाहिए। फिर किसी को हमारे ऊपर भरोसा नहीं रहेगा।

जब हम लोग हाजी पीर को छोड़ते हैं तो एक बुनियादी सवाल उठता है कि काश्मीर के बारे में क्या होगा। एक बात सुनने में आती है कि जो आज कल सीन-फायर लाइन है उसको सोलीडिफाई किया जाय। परसों हमने देखा कि एक एग्रीमेंट पर रावलपिंडी में दस्तखत किए गए दोनों

सेनाओं के अधिपतियों के बीच ताकि काश्मीर में सेनाओं को कम किया जाय । इस सारी चीज को देखते हुए, ऐसा मालूम होता है कि शायद नाशकद में जो एग्रीमेंट हुआ है, उसके अलावा भी कुछ बात चीत हुई है और कुछ फैसले लिए गए हैं, और अगर ऐसा हो तो यह जरूरी है कि हम हिन्दुस्तान के लोगों के सामने यह सारी चीज रखें और पार्लियामेंट के सामने रखें और पार्लियामेंट की राय लें क्योंकि अगर सरकार ने ऐसी कोई बातचीत की हो तो उसको गुप्त रखने से कोई नतीजा नहीं निकलने वाला है क्योंकि कभी न कभी यह सारी चीज सामने आने वाली है । इसलिए जल्द इन चीजों का सामने रख कर बहस हो जाय तो अच्छा होगा ।

अन्त में मैं यह कहूंगा कि अगर हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान के सवाल को ठीक करना है तो बुनियादों में जाओ और हिन्दुस्तान और पाकिस्तान की बुनियाद के बारे में चर्चा करो चाह पाकिस्तान के राष्ट्रपति उससे राजी हो या न हों । बातचीत अभी से शुरू होनी चाहिये क्योंकि जब तक बुनियाद के बारे में बात चीन नहीं होगी, कोई नतीजा नहीं निकलने वाला है ।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA): The House stands adjourned till 11.00 A.M. tomorrow.

The House adjourned at twenty-two minutes past five of the clock till eleven of the clock on Tuesday, the 22nd February, 1966.