

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I take it that tomorrow or some other time it will be taken up.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes, if I allow it.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: It is a serious matter.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I know.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: On the 29th August the Law Minister denied. Therefore I would request you to take it up with the Home Minister and the Law Minister and kindly tell us in your wisdom which Minister was telling the truth.

SHRI A. K. SEN-/ Both are telling the truth.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I will find out. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.

#### **MOTION RE: INTERNATIONAL SITUATION**

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU) : Mr. Chairman, Sir, I beg to move:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

Some hon. Members of this House expressed their wish to have a discussion on the question of the Sino-Indian conflict on the border and also the White Paper that I placed before the House a short while ago containing the correspondence between the Governments of India and China. It seemed to me then that it would be better to have the discussion on a somewhat wider canvas because things are connected with each other and if hon. Members so wish, they can concentrate on the White Paper or on the Sino-Indian conflict but it is better, I think, to take these matters all together because they affect each other. It is obvious that international affairs, so far

as we are concerned, are largely affected by our conflict with China and to some extent with our strained relations with Pakistan but nevertheless it is better to have before us the full perspective. In thinking of the world perspective, I would like to state that the two most important things that have happened in recent more than months, in recent years almost, are first of all the signing of the Test Ban Treaty—Partial Test Ban Treaty—by the United States of America, by the Soviet Union, by the United Kingdom and, I believe, by about a hundred other countries subsequently. That treaty does not take us very far but it is highly important and significant because after years of discussion and arguments, this has happened and it breaks the ice, as it were, and gives us an opportunity to go ahead both in regard to disarmament and in putting an end, gradually perhaps, to the cold war attitude of nations to each other. That is a very vital matter and if it leads in that direction, as I hope it will, it will be a significant event in history.

The second thing that has happened more or less in recent months—but it took some time to grow to that extent—is the strained relations between the Soviet Union and China. It is a matter of world importance, not merely to those two countries but also to the general position in the world and it is clear now that it has arrived at a critical stage that affects us also, not that we are anxious to see other countries falling out among themselves but still something that affects us, something that increases our good relations with other countries is welcome, and otherwise too it has an effect on the Sino-Indian conflict. These are the two major events in the world picture today that governs the international situation and will probably continue to govern it for some time and I would like these to be borne in mind when considering our own particular problems.

There is a third thing which is not of so much importance but local importance and that is the development

in Viet-Nam, the conflict between the Buddhist element there and the Government and it should be remembered that the Buddhist element is 80 per cent, of the population. On the one hand it has been our desire not to interfere in their internal happenings. Naturally, that is our normal policy. On the other, normally our sympathy went down to the Buddhists there, not merely because they are Buddhists although it is natural for us to feel for them, but also because of the extraordinary developments there which led to a number of Buddhist Bhikkhus or Monks to burn themselves up, immolate themselves by burning themselves which is not a usual thing and can only happen if there is very strong feeling. Apart from that, this thing affects the whole outlook in South East Asia and that is, a difficult question is made more difficult. Our attitude has been informally to approach President Diem to which he was good enough to reply saying that they were coming to an understanding which they did on paper but apparently according to the Buddhists, that understanding was not lived up to or was not implemented. Again some efforts are being made to that end. Also we have been in touch with the Government of Ceylon especially and our view has been that whether the matter is to be taken up in the United Nations or in some other Conference of Buddhist countries, we shall largely abide by the decision of the Buddhist countries. If they want a Conference, we shall go to it. If they want to take it up in the United Nations, we shall, naturally, express our opinion there. But we have felt that perhaps it might not be worthwhile or desirable to take it up in the U.N. because that would introduce many other factors into this question and it might become even a question of the cold war there, and all those factors may come in the way of a solution. But nevertheless—and although some other countries felt that way too—we have clearly stated that if it is desired to take it up in the U.N., we shall participate there. For the present, these discussions are taking place in New

York and in the U.N. and in some of the Buddhist countries and in Viet Nam, and I hope they will lead to some satisfactory result which would be far better than having long discussions in the U.N. which might, instead of helping to solve the question, embitter the various parties concerned. The General Assembly of the United Nations is going to meet soon this month in about less than three weeks time, and many of these important questions may probably come up there. And yet where it is a question of vital importance, the question of disarmament and so on, one feels that it is not likely to be settled in the General Assembly, and the real progress is made between the big countries, chiefly and notably the United States of America and the Soviet Union. And that is why this Test Ban Treaty is of so great a significance, because it opens the door for further consideration of those problems. Once some kind of an understanding is arrived at outside, between these various countries, then probably it will be the right time to bring it up before the U.N. and get it passed with a measure of unanimity.

So far as we are concerned there is often talk of our policy of non-alignment. We adhere to it and we consider it important. Non-alignment so stated, the very meaning of the word, is a negative thing. It is important; but our real policy is much more definite, a policy of working definitely for peace in the world and for cooperative relations between our country and other countries. The policy flows from that and we have adopted the policy of non-alignment and it is important. It is important because it is part of that very approach, which is a vital approach today for the world, we think, and which we think is to some extent at least, helped by the new developments in the international situation.

Sir, as I said, the most important thing for us at the present moment is the Sino-Indian conflict. With regard to that, a short while ago I made a statement in this House which rep-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] resents our position, and I placed a new White Paper. The Chinese Government, as one could see from the White Paper, has carried on a virulent propaganda against us in a large number of countries and, of course more especially, in China itself. Even the messages we receive from them are couched in offensive language, often departing greatly from the truth. In spite of this our policy has been and continues to be one of solving our problems, in so far as we can, by peaceful methods and at the same time naturally, to strengthen our defensive apparatus as much as possible, to meet all contingencies. There is no conflict between the two policies and we can give up neither. If we give up the first and rely only on military means to solve this problem that will be not only rather opposed to our approach to the world but also possibly harmful ultimately even to us. But although we adhere to our approach and try for a solution by peaceful methods, we must make it perfectly clear that such a solution can only be in keeping with our honour, self-respect and integrity. It is impossible for us or for anyone to say what action the Chinese Government might or might not take at a particular moment. Therefore, we have to strengthen ourselves and we are doing so.

I may remind the House that on the 3rd April of this year, we sent a note to the Chinese Government where we laid stress on five points, given in the White Paper No. IX. I shall read those five points.

"(i) The Government of China should accept, without reservations the Colombo proposals just as the Government of India have done.

(ii) The acceptance by both sides of the Colombo proposals can be followed up by a meeting of the officials to arrive at settlement of various matters left by the Colombo Powers for direct agreement between the parties and to decide the details regarding implementation of the Colombo proposals on the ground.

(iii) The officials of both sides concerned can then take action to implement these proposals on the ground so that agreed cease-fire arrangements are established on the ground.

(iv) Thereafter, in the improved atmosphere, India and China can take up the question of their differences on the boundary question and try to reach a mutually acceptable settlement in one or more than one stage. If a settlement is reached, this can then be implemented in detail on the ground.

(v) If a settlement is not reached in these direct talks and discussions between the two parties, both sides can consider adoption of further measures to settle the differences peacefully in accordance with international practice followed in such cases. Both India and China can agree to make a reference, on the differences regarding the boundary, to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and agree to abide by the Court's decision. If this method of peaceful settlement is for any reason, not acceptable to the Government of China, both parties can agree to some sort of international arbitration by a person or a group of persons, nominated in the manner agreed to by both Governments, who can go into the question objectively and impartially and give their award, the award being binding on both Governments".

A little later, on the 1st of May, I wrote a letter to Prime Minister Chou En-lai in which I referred to this Statement of yours, this note of yours, to the Chinese Government and I emphasised it.

"Despite the crisis of confidence created by Chinese aggression and massive attacks, the Government of India is determined to seek all peaceful avenues of settlement of the Sino-Indian differences on the border question as indicated in the Government of India's note dated

the 3rd April, 1963. While taking necessary precautions against the repetition of the events of October-November, 1962, it continues to follow the policy of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and development in peace and freedom for the betterment of the conditions of 450 million people of India who stand united in their support of the Government of India's firm resolve to pursue these policies."

In spite of that note and this reminder, no answer has come to us yet to these proposals although many notes have come from them in regard to other matters and they are continuously carrying on propaganda that it is they who want a peaceful settlement and we come in their way by bringing in such things as the Colombo Proposals and the rest. It is quite extraordinary, the method of Chinese propaganda. It is extraordinary in two ways, firstly, the great departure from truth and secondly, the offensive language. We have been used to some offensive language from other countries also. Occasionally but nothing approaches the attitude of the Chinese Government and the press in regard to India. So, that is our broad attitude to this Sino-Indian dispute or conflict and the other side of that attitude is speeding up our Defence apparatus to meet all the perils that face us.

Then, Sir, a new development has taken place, as the House knows, in recent months. This is in regard to the coming closer together of Pakistan and China. With Pakistan, as is well-known, it has been our constant, continued and earnest endeavour to settle all our problems and develop a peaceful, friendly and co-operative attitude. We are convinced that that is the only objective we must aim at in regard to Pakistan. In spite of Pakistan and India becoming separate and two independent countries, they cannot get rid of geography and history and the ties that have bound them together in the past. It is inevitable that we should aim at friendly and

co-operative relations. We have tried to do so without success. We shall continue to do so but in addition to the animus which Pakistan appears to have against India, she has now, chiefly because of that animus, developed closer relations with China because both these countries are unfortunately full of hostility against India. It is clear that in existing circumstances, that is, Pakistan tying up more and more with China, there can be no hope of a satisfactory settlement with Pakistan. The whole outlook of Pakistan must change before any satisfactory agreement can be approached or realised. Some days ago I placed on the Table of the House a statement in regard to the talks we have had with Pakistan and other developments. That represents our approach to this question and we stand by that.

I might inform the House, in regard to the Colombo Proposals and the developments since then, that we have kept all the Colombo Powers informed of these developments as well as of Chinese concentration along our borders.

I do not wish, Sir, to take up much of the time of the House at this stage. I would rather leave such time as there is for hon. Members to make their criticisms and suggestions. I would again repeat that in our external policy we attach great importance to what has been called non-alignment with any particular bloc. It is true that because of the Chinese aggression we have developed further bonds with some countries who have helped us. Naturally, that was the result but that does not mean that we have weakened in our desire to adhere to non-alignment fully, that non-alignment again being a part of the broader policy of working for world peace and co-operation. We have arrived at a stage when any other policy may lead to world disaster and as our part of it, we adhere to non-alignment.

May I say a few words about certain matters which have distressed me? The House knows that our

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] respected President visited the United States of America and the United Kingdom some time ago. His visit was a remarkable event from every point of view. As the President of India, he was greatly welcomed but also in his own individual capacity, because of his learning and wisdom he created a great impression wherever he went. Now, some people, including, I believe, some Members of this House, and some newspapers criticised the President and said that he had given expression to views which are not in consonance with our foreign policy. This criticism is completely wrong and baseless. In fact, it is not proper to criticise the President in this way but factually too it is incorrect. There is no word said by the President in his foreign tours which does not completely fit in with the policy of the Government of India. It is unfortunate that this was done because the President cannot obviously go about defending things- and replying to such allegations. Therefore, I am taking this opportunity of mentioning this matter before the House.

I submit, Sir, that although we have got into difficulties—there are the old difficulties with Pakistan and the new difficulties, not very new but relatively new, with China—the foreign policy we have pursued has been broadly the correct one. Naturally, we cannot control the other countries. We cannot effect their policies too much and we have to face certain developments which are partly historical, partly the effect of previous events and partly such things as are bound to happen in some form or another after the growth of independent India and the revolution in China—these two countries coming into close contact, having different views, different approaches and the Chinese possibly disliking the presence of any great country next to them, a country which adheres to different structures of Government and economic policy. And, in accordance with their past

history, whenever they have been rather strong, they have been expansive. Evidently they thought that we came in their way of expansion. They have given us trouble on our borders and yet probably it does not seem a mere expansion of their vast territories that is behind this move. It is stated, as one reason for this action they have taken against India, that it was not connected with India directly but rather connected with their growing conflict with the Soviet Union. They have been deeply annoyed at the fact that the Soviet Union has ceased to help them, technically, financially, with credits and otherwise.

The Soviet Union have withdrawn their technicians and these people who had gone from the Soviet Union to China laid the basis for the industrial growth of China, rapid industrial growth. It was quite impossible for China to have made the progress it has made without the help of the Soviet Union. Even so, though the Soviet Union helped them they did not like, and criticised the Soviets helping other countries like India and possibly according to their thinking they could prevent that in the future by the action they took against India. It is a curious argument and I do not say it is wholly a correct one. I am merely putting it forward that many competent observers think so. It may be observed that no country in the world is keener on, showing that India is not non-aligned than China. Some hon. Members of this House may be in line with China on this issue but at the present moment no country in the world says with such force that India is not non-aligned; in other words China does not want India to be non-aligned. Our being non-aligned according to them, and our talking about peaceful coexistence, etc., goes against their policy completely. They believe in a country being with them or against them; no middle course and that is one of the reasons why they have fallen out with the Soviet Union and by creating conditions when we cease to be non-

aligned they think that that would produce an effect on Russia and would show that their policy is wrong. According to their thinking there cannot be any peaceful co-existence with countries or any real non-alignment. In that sense the Whole conflict between China and India takes this wider international aspect. Of course, China has been and is trying its hardest to increase its strength, to become powerful industrially, militarily and otherwise. As it is from the point of view of the army, it is a country probably with the biggest army in the world, No. 1 country, not in regard to its technical development, not in regard to other things but in regard to army, it is. But in spite of that it has suffered a great deal lately by its development being checked by various factors, some because perhaps of the policy it has pursued, some climatic reasons and natural disasters, and there is a feeling of anger and frustration at anything that comes in the way and the possibility is that because of this feeling of frustration they may indulge in adventures which ultimately may not do them any good but for the moment they might. There is a question frequently asked as to whether China is going to attack India in the near future. It is difficult to give an answer to it because the answer can only be given by the Chinese. The fact that they have undoubtedly gathered large numbers, concentrated large numbers of forces in Tibet and more especially on the Indian frontiers, not only troops but supplies in dumps etc., can only be thought of in terms of some action which they contemplate because it is a very expensive process for them to do this. They have to bring them from 3,000 miles from China. Why should they indulge in this expensive process unless they have something in their minds? On the other hand their political declarations are opposed to this and other factors too seem to be opposed to it. Anyhow we cannot take a risk about that and we must prepare ourselves with all our strength to meet such contingencies as might arise.

I shall not take up more time of the House now because I should like to hear other Members and their criticisms and then possibly reply to them later.

Thank you.

*The question was proposed.*

MR. CHAIRMAN: There are nine amendments to the motion and they may be moved at this stage without any speech.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO (Andhra Pradesh): Sir, I beg to move—

1. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House approves of the said policy'."

SHRI A. D. MANI: (Madhya Pradesh) : Sir, I move—

2. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House views with concern the collaboration of Pakistan with China in many matters, especially in so far as they have a bearing on the defence of India, and therefore, records its view that in the present context there should be no further reopening of talks regarding Kashmir with Pakistan or with any other country'."

3. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House expresses its deep regret that the Government of France has not signed the nuclear test ban treaty, thus keeping open a small focus in the world for free testing of nuclear weapons which is fraught with serious danger to humanity'."

4. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House approves of the steps

[Shri A. D. Mani.]

taken by the Government of India in agreeing to hold joint air exercises with the Air Force of the United Kingdom and the United States of America with a view to strengthening the defence preparations in India to meet adequately the threat of a renewal of Chinese aggression."

5. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added namely: —

'and having considered the same, thi3 House expresses its deep sympathy for the Buddhist population of South Vietnam in their struggle for equality of opportunity and trusts that the Government of India will take appropriate steps for the creation of world opinion which will lead to restoration of harmony among the Buddhists of Vietnam and accord them their legitimate rights in respect of equality of opportunity and freedom of their faith'."

SHRI K. V. RAGHUNATHA REDDY (Andhra Pradesh): Sir, I move: —

6. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same this House is of opinion that Government should use its good offices to secure relief for the Buddhists in South Viet-Nam from being persecuted'."

SHRI ABDUL GHANI (Punjab): Sir, I move: —

7. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House regrets that Government have failed to have the territories unlawfully occupied by China vacated'."

8. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House regrets that Government have failed to negotiate a

satisfactory settlement with Pakistan'."

9. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House recommends that in view of the recent Sino-Pakistan Air and Trade agreements, the Government of India should sever diplomatic relation with both countries.'"

श्री गोटे मुराहरि (उत्तर प्रदेश): अध्यक्ष महोदय, मैंने भी एक संशोधन दिया था लेकिन ताज्जुब है कि वह संशोधन न तो पेपर में भेजा गया है और न यहां पर है।

MR. CHAIRMAN: You did not send it, I am told by the Office, in the form of an amendment but in the form of of a statement.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: It simply says that this House takes the Motion into consideration and deplores it and that is the . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: I am afraid it has not been entertained as an amendment.

*The questions were proposed.*

#### STATEMENT RE THE NEFA ENQUIRY

MR. CHAIRMAN: Before we proceed to the discussion of the Motion I would request the Defence Minister to make his statement. He could not be here before the Motion because he was in the other House.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE (Uttar Pradesh) : His Deputy could be here.

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA (Bihar): Sir, the Defence Minister is the Leader of our House and it is in the fitness of things that he should have made the announcement here and his Deputy could have made the announcement in the Lok Sabha simultaneously.