

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE: It should be placed, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I took that into consideration, Mr. Prime Minister. You were ready, you have shown your readiness to place the paper on the Table. But I am not asking you to lay the paper on the Table because I do not wish to create a precedent. I want to be guided by this Rule.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: May I submit? Is it a healthy precedent to refer in the Government's reply to a party's report? Is it a healthy precedent?

MR. CHAIRMAN: I will not discuss it now, please. That is the end of this discussion. I have allowed a much fuller discussion than was ever perhaps, allowed on a question like that.

(Shri M. N. Govindan Nair stood up)

I will not allow any further discussion on this. We are now passing on to the next item on the Order Paper.

شری مہدالنگی : اس کو رکھنے کی
اجازت دی جائے تاکہ وہ ہاؤس کی
کاروائی کا حصہ بن جائے -
†[श्री अश्वल गरी : इसको रखने की
इजाजत दी जाये ताकी वह हाउस की
कार्रवाई का हिस्सा बन जाये ।]

ALLOTMENT OF TIME FOR CONSIDERATION OF MOTION *RE*. STATEMENTS ON THE NEFA ENQUIRY AND ON 'OUR DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS'

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have to inform Members that under Rule 153 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Rajya Sabha, I have allotted one day for the consideration of the motion regarding the statements on the NEFA Enquiry and on 'Our Defence Preparedness'.

t[] Hindi translation.

MOTION *RE* STATEMENT ON THE NEFA ENQUIRY AND ON 'OUR DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS'

SHRI A. D. MANI (Madhya Pradesh) : Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to move:

"That the statements on the NEFA Enquiry and on 'Our Defence Preparedness' made in the Rajya Sabha on the 2nd and 9th September, 1963, respectively, be taken into consideration."

Sir, a very grave responsibility rests upon those who take part in the discussion on this motion and the responsibility is that nothing should be said in the course of the debate which will weaken the morale of the jawans and hurt their feelings. I on this side of the House—and I am sure everybody in this House—fully believe that the jawans have done a splendid job of work. We are proud of the Indian Army. The Indian Army has been one of the finest armies of the world and has crowned itself with distinction in many theatres of war. We grant all that, we are not going to say a word about the jawans. I would have been glad if the Report had been captioned not as "the Report on the NEFA reverses." It is not the army which has sustained reverses in NEFA or, for that matter, in any theatre of war, but it is the reverses of certain foreign policies which we have followed in our country and the failure of our whole defence policy which is reflected in the Report.

Sir, I am not interested in holding *post-mortems* or inquests. But a *post-mortem* is called for when the situation points out to the need of avoiding in future mistakes of the kind that have happened in the past. If I refer to some of the statements made in the past, it is only to highlight the point that whatever might have happened in the past, we should not commit the same mistakes in the future.

Sir, I have an objection to the kind of enquiry which has been conducted. There have been demands that there should be a fresh enquiry. I do not believe that much - public purpose can be served by holding a *de novo* enquiry. My criticism of the method of enquiry which has been adopted is that this enquiry confined itself to written statements submitted to it. I may inform the Defence Minister that this is not the first time that a military enquiry has been conducted by a democratic country. During the years of the First "World War, there was a failure of the British armies in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, and a full-fledged commission of enquiry was appointed to take evidence. When General Mac Arthur was dismissed, a committee was appointed by the Senate and that committee examined not only the General "but also the Secretary of State for Defence. Oral evidence was also taken before this committee.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN (Andhra Pradesh): In both the cases the danger had ended and the wars had finished.

SHRI A. D. MANI: My point is this. The report was published in the United States in full. It has not been published here. But what I am saying is that this Committee would have had greater information if persons concerned had been allowed to be examined *in camera*. I am told—do not know how far it is correct—that Lt. Gen. Kaul was not prepared to come forward before the Enquiry Committee to be examined orally. The question of military protocol seems to have arisen, for example, Whether a Lt. General should appear before a Brigadier as Brig. Bhagat was on the Committee. I do not know how far these facts are true. But I would like the Minister to make a statement on the subject at least to dispel public misgivings.

551 RS—3.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN): May I tell the hon. House that really speaking Lt. Gen. Kaul did offer and he did make a statement before the Committee.

SHRI A. D. MANI: A question was asked in this House and there was a written statement. So far as we know . . .

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: Certainly he offered. There was, really speaking, no question of oral examination by the Committee. The Committee never demanded that.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I would have liked the Committee to examine the former Defence Minister who was responsible for the Defence policy. In the United States, in the MacArthur case, Dean Acheson, who was then Secretary of States, was also examined. Nothing is lost by an examination of witnesses so that we may have a proper appraisal of facts. The Secretary of State holds a very important portfolio. He holds the rank of a Minister as far as we are concerned. There is no parliamentary democracy in the United States, we know that. But he was the principal Secretary of State, and he was examined.

Sir, I would, however, like to congratulate the Defence Minister on at least laying this statement on the Table of the House. This is the first time in many years when the Government have made, what it called, a fairly, frank appraisal of their own failures and shortcomings. It is a very significant advance in parliamentary practice that the Government should have given so much of information on Defence as they have done in these two reports. We are grateful to Mr. Chavan for the statement that he has made.

Sir, paragraph 9 of the statement on N.E.F.A. reverses says:

"It is admitted that the training of our troops did not have orientation towards operations vis-a vis the

[Shri A. D. Mani.] particular terrain in which the troops had to operate. Our training of the troops did not have a slant for a war being launched by China. Thus our troops had no requisite knowledge of the Chinese tactics and ways of war, their weapons."

I do not know, Sir, whether the statement contained in paragraph 9 is correct. General Thimayya served as India's Member on the Korean Commission. The Korean theatre of war was an excellent demonstration of Chinese massive tactics and it also gave a demonstration of the weapons that they made use of, particularly mortars. Our General had no knowledge of Chinese tactics.

Further, it would not be correct to say that the Government did not have a slant of war with China. Sir, we take Government statements made in the two Houses of Parliament as firm, clear indications of their policy. The Prime Minister speaking in the Lok Sabha on November 28, 1961 that is, one year before the hostilities broke out, said:

"The frontier in N.E.F.A. became a live frontier. We realised that this frontier had become important and so we planned to build communications. We are building roads and the border has been relatively a well-defended border."

In other words, the Prime Minister knew as far back as 1961 that NEFA was going to be a vulnerable area and was likely to be a scene of invasion and, therefore, he had taken steps to protect it.

Later, he also made a statement on August 22, 1962 in this House, I believe, wherein he said that one, place which had been adequately protected, more or less adequately, was the NEFA frontier. And on November 8, after the statement that the NEFA frontier was well-protected, the Prime Minister addressed the Lok Sabha where he said:

"It is perfectly true that we were not prepared to face two or three divisions of the Chinese army descending upon our Forces there. I was talking about unpreparedness, It is quite true, as I said, that we were unprepared to meet * massive invasion of two or three divisions."

Sir, I would very respectfully like to ask the Prime Minister whether we in this House and the Members of that House or not entitled to regard the statements made by him and other Ministers of the Government as serious policy statements. When we were told that the NEFA frontier was well-defended, that steps had been taken to have a relatively well-defended frontier, we expected that the troops would have been prepared for emergencies. To come forward later and say that we are thoroughly unprepared means, in consequence^ that the earlier statements were not fully implemented. This is a very serious matter because when the Government makes a statement in Parliament, we expected the Government to> implement that.

Sir, while the Prime Minister in his speeches had referred to the danger of an invasion from China in NEFA and Ladakh, and while he said that he came to know that it was a live frontier when Tibet was occupied by the Chinese, when he was making the statements, our Defence Minister,, on the Tth October, 1958, said at the United Nations General Assembly—* very important statement—I would read it slowly:

"So far as we are aware, China presents no menace to the internal stability of any country. We are their closest neighbours. This is not a testimonial meeting. But we express the opinion that it presents no menace to the stability of any country any more than of the 8! nations represented in this Assembly."

I do not want to use harsh words. But it is almost in writing that Chin* was going to be a very peaceful

nation, that there was no danger of menace from China. This statement, was made by the Chief Delegate of the Indian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly on the 7th October, 1958. All this clearly shows that we did not really take the Chinese menace seriously whatever statements might have been made by the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister on this subject.

Sir, we go to judge the military preparedness of a country on the basis of actual performances. I have no doubt that the former Defence Minister, Mr. Krishna Menon, placed reliance on the production of goods and ammunitions of war. I might be critical of him on other points. But I think he was the first

Minister since independence who laid sufficient stress on it. But there seems to have been complete lack of co-ordination, also in his own Ministry, when he was in charge of the Ministry of Defence.

Sir, an unstarred question, No. 1668, was asked in the other House on the 9th September, 1963 which revealed the following figures. I want the House to watch how the figures of surrender go up as the Chinese menace was deepening on the frontiers. When the Chinese menace was deepening on the frontiers we expected the Government to spend more and more and increase its preparations and strengthen our defence. At that time more expenditure was expected. Here is the comparative statement:

Year	Sanctioned grant in crores Rs.	Actual's Rs.	Amount surrendered Rs.	Percentage of surrender
1957-58	316.55	306.53	10.02	3.2
1958-59	327.92	305.24	22.68	6.9
1959-60	312.17	294.98	17.59	5.6
1960-61	339.20	311.03	28.17	8.3
1961-62	364.93	343.9	28.15	5.8
1962-63	532.34	499.97	32.37	6.1

You see, the percentage goes up as the Chinese menace is threatening the security of this country.

Now, some people may argue that those were the years of deepening foreign exchange crisis and the Government had to effect economies. In the audit report on the 12th Nov. Defence Services the Ministry of Defence does not offer that explanation. They say (that the framing of Defence Estimates particularly in regard to stores was beset with certain difficulties. The Budget estimates were framed on the basis of developments at that time. During the course of the year either due to a

change in the policy or due to the rapid changes in the supply officers which occurred for a variety of reasons, the original expectations were considerably altered. There is no reference whatever to foreign exchange difficulties. All that they say is that the expenditure was tailored to meet the actual requirements. I would like to ask seriously whether the Government was aware that China was going to be a great menace to us. As I said earlier, it is the bankruptcy of the policy of the Government in regard to China that was responsible for the disasters which descended on our armies and covered us with humiliation. The Government, including every Member of the Government and particularly the

[Shri A. D. Mani.]

Minister for Defence, Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, have got to bear a very heavy responsibility for the debacle in NEFA which has disgraced the very good record of the Indian Army.

I would like to go to paragraph 12 of the statement on the NEFA reverses where it says that the enquiry revealed that proper leadership is required. I do not want to quote from the statement because that is mentioned there. Now, whose leadership was required? Not the Army Officers', not the big Commanders', but it was the leadership of the Defence Minister—of the former Defence Minister—and it was the political leadership of the Government of India that had failed.

AN. HON. MEMBER: May be the Corps Commander.

SHRI A. D. MANI: The Corps Commander—I was going to mention that.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM (Madras): That was beyond the terms of reference of the enquiry—to determine the political responsibility. You are bringing in something extraneous.

SHRI A. D. MANI: This is on the basis of an abridged edition of the version of the Report. I do not have what other facts have been mentioned. I am entitled to draw any inference unless you come and read out the whole Report to me and say that my information is unjustified.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: We know the terms of reference. How could they go beyond the terms of reference?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Let the speaker continue.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I would like to say that when it comes to the question of leadership, General Kaul, whom I have had the honour of knowing for several years and for whom I have a great esteem, was sent as a Corps Commander. He had Been

battle in the Arakans in the Second World War but he was not a battle tested veteran as other persons were. Now, what does a Government, which is alive to its responsibilities, do when the country is faced with an invasion? They send out the 'best General and the best soldier to be the Corps Commander. The Defence Minister, when there was a debate in this House two years ago, defended his policy of promoting people over the heads of senior men and made a caustic reference to dead man's shoes. He said: 'We must choose men of capacity and promote them irrespective of their seniority. General Kaul was one of those promoted in that manner. The Prime Minister paid fulsome tributes to him in the Lok Sabha. He said that he was a brave man. I agree, he was a brave man but he was not the officer to be sent when the country was faced with invasion and more than two divisions of Chinese had descended on it.

The statement goes on in para 17 and says:

"The enquiry has also revealed the practice that crept in higher army formations of interfering in tactical details even to the extent of detailing troops for specified tasks."

There have been some kind of rumours current in this country and these rumours are bound to arise particularly when there is a veil of secrecy covering all these operations. There are persistent rumours that in regard to actual battle operations in the NEFA, the decisions were taken by the politicians, by the Defence Minister and the Government and not by the Army Commanders. The statement does not make a mention of that but it mentions:

"The inquiry has also revealed the practice that crept in higher army formations of interfering in tactical details even to the extent of detailing troops for specified tasks."

Now, I would like to ask the Defence Minister, when he replies to the debate, whether the decision to defend the Thag La Eidge with a depleted and attenuated force was a decision recommended by the Army Commanders or was it taken politically? The Prime Minister left for Ceylon on 12th October. The country was treated with the spectacle of the Leader of the Government going on a goodwill visit to a neighbouring country when the country lay open to the forces of the Chinese. The Defence Minister went to New York to make a speech. He did not go to New York like Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari to get arms from the U.S.A. He went there to make a speech in the U.N. General Assembly as if nobody else could have made that speech. I have got heaps of quotations but I do not want to waste the time of the House to show that the assessment of the Defence Minister at that time was that only one hundred Chinese entered the Kameng Division. Later the Prime Minister said 'massive invasion' was there. Now, I would like to ask: Who took all those decisions when the Prime Minister announced on 12th October when he left for Ceylon that in NEFA the army had been asked to throw the Chinese out? If there has been interference of politicians in the military operations and if directions had been given to Military Commanders, it is a very unhealthy precedent.

The report makes reference to Military Intelligence and admits very candidly that Military Intelligence was not up-to-date. I congratulate Mr. Chavan on the candour with which he has placed that part of the Report before the House. While Mr. Chavan says that our Intelligence was not up-to-date, We have the Prime Minister speaking in the Lok Sabha on 10th December as follows:

"Some reference was made to Intelligence. It is difficult to judge Intelligence . . ."

That is true—

". . . but I think that on the whole our Intelligence has been first-class."

Which is first-class and which is third-class, I would like to know.

THE DEPUTY MINISTER IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (SHRI D. R. CHAVAN) : I think the Prime Minister had in mind Civil Intelligence.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I was coming to that matter also. Which is first-class and which is third-class? The Prime Minister is very fond of referring to other people's intelligence when he replies to questions and makes statements that he expected some of these gentlemen to have better intelligence. I quite agree that many of us have not been blessed by Almighty God with all the brains that the Prime Minister would expect in us but I would like to ask him what kind of intelligence is this which makes the Minister say after the country had been invaded and disgraced, on the 12th December, not earlier, when the country has been humiliated in the theatre of war; what kind of intelligence the Prime Minister was speaking about. It was plain to all of us and the complaints have been made in the newspapers that the Intelligence Services had failed. I would like to make one suggestion to the Defence Minister. In the matter of Intelligence the old Fourth Division and the Formations which took part in World War II have had the requisite experience. The Report mentions that the troops must have battle experience. Unless there is battle, people do not know how to act in the face of a battle. In regard to overhaul in the Military Intelligence, I would like to request the Government to explore the possibilities of both the

Soviet Union as well as the U.S.A.

we will make a request to both of them—to help us in reorganising our Military Intelligence Services. In regard to Military Intelligence I heard—and I confess that I am not *au fait* with all aspects of defence matters, it is not possible for any individual to be so unless he is connected with the

[Shri A. D. Mani.] Government—that the Director of Central Intelligence of Delhi had complete control over the collection of information from all parts of the country including the border areas. If that were the position, I would like to make a suggestion that the Civil Intelligence works for a different purpose and the Military Intelligence works for a different purpose also. It is not possible to get the best results from the C.I.B., the results that the army expects; and I would suggest, therefore, that the collection of Intelligence should be done separately by the Military Authorities; otherwise this fantastic mistake of the former Defence Minister imagining that only 100 men had entered the Kameng Division would not have occurred. I would like to make a reference to the system of training which has been described as good. Here I would like to mention a series of three articles which have been published by the "Indian Round Table", brilliantly written articles, a complete defence of the Government of India's policy of defence in so far as NEFA and Ladakh are concerned.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE (Uttar Pradesh) : Who is the author of it?

SHRI A. D. MANI: Mr. Chavan. I don't think Mr. Chavan would have written those articles. I don't think the Prime Minister would have written those articles. Who wrote those articles? I have the reference here and I will give these articles. These articles show access to some of the most confidential and secret files. The articles say that in Ladakh in 1960 there was only one infantry group commanding the post. One article also shows that in 1960 there was shortage of 3,000 officers. Members of Parliament are not told these; but somebody who calls himself as Indian Military Commentator, writes all this in a magazine in England called the "Indian Round Table". And there is an almost familiar tone of persuasiveness underlying what-

ever is said in these articles. When the Defence Minister is keen on strengthening the military intelligence, I would ask him to find out who this Indian Military Commentator is who has become a literary genius overnight. It is a fair question to ask, and if there is a military Intelligence, they have to find this out.

These articles make out that there was everything in the army, that the equipment was first class, the only thing they lacked, it says, was mortars. The Prime Minister also said later that mortars were lacking. They said that guns also were lacking.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: The article mentions all the shortcomings of the Indian Army at that time.

SHRI A. D. MANI: When these things are highlighted, they are very irritating.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: Not irritating. It is a factual presentation of the position.

SHRI A. D. MANI: With regard to the manufacturing of ammunitions, in 1962 when the danger was serious, the Audit Report mentions that even the money sanctioned for the manufacture of army ammunitions was not fully spent, that 15-9 per cent and 20-207 per cent were surrendered. When war was descending on this country, we were not making the necessary ammunitions.

With regard to the system of training, I would like to mention that the Chinese radio constantly broadcast to India. I have not heard it, but one retired officer, Lt. Gen. Rao, made a statement in one paper—I have got a cutting of it and I can give it to the hon. Defence Minister—that the Chinese radio says:

"Look at your army. It is based on old British lines. *I-* There is the officer and there are the sepoy's. But we are all working together".

And the suggestion is made that the entire old British idea of mess system should be abandoned and the officers and the javans must have many opportunities of taking part in social meals from time to time so that a sense pf comradeship is built up. I would ask the Defence Minister, when we talk of a socialist society and economy, whether for the army we can nave a nineteenth century idea of command, based on British military traditions.

I would like to make one final suggestion before I conclude. We are very glad of the preparedness which the Government has announced and they envisage the creation of some 8,000 officers in about a year's time. The statement makes a reference to that. I do hope that the Government will have the necessary support from the public in the matter of supply of experienced technical and engineering personnel for which there is shortage. But as long as Mr. Chavan, who is himself heir to military tradition, is in charge of the Defence portfolio, I am sure he will see to it that we get as great a help as possible from the public with regard to recruitments to the army.

With regard to the joint air exercises, I am one of those who enthusiastically welcome this arrangement. No country can wage a war by itself. Even Russia could not do it. Russia had her allies. If there is a war, we have got to depend on our allies. Russia is our friend. The United States of America is our friend. Yugoslavia is our friend. England is our friend and we should take help from all quarters. I would go even further and say that I would not mind, in the event of an invasion, let us even ask our friendly countries *to come and assist us in resisting the <enemy. I may mention here that

Lord Ismay whose memoirs have been published, has said that in Greece where there is a local feeling against the British Army, when Crete was invaded, they sent a request to the British Government to help them and they flew their troops. So taking help when one is menaced by invasion is no derogation of sovereignty and if necessary we may enter into arrangements with a few friendly countries, including the Soviet Union, and I do hope that the Soviet Union will give help and support to India.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mani, you have to wind up now.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I am just finishing, Sir. Sir, the battle for retaining Indian freedom has just begun. We got our freedom in 1947. But this battle to retain it has begun just now. It is going to be a continuous process and it is going to be a battle which has got to be fought by our children and grand-children and for fighting this battle, we must have a strong army, a strong army which will fight for a just cause. I do hope that whatever might have been the mistakes committed by the Government in the past, the Defence Minister and the Government of India would be able to raise a strong army, an army which will be capable of defending our national honour and our national self-respect and which will wipe off the stain of humiliation which had been thrown on it, on account of the recent reverses. This is going to be a mighty struggle and all I can say as one who really wants the army to be strong, who really wants the army to be a credit and honour to this country, is that I hope God will be with us in this struggle. Thank you.

The question was proposed.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Before I call upon Mr. Vajpayee, I may say that we will have to sit through the lunch hour. There is a long list of speakers with me and unless the speeches are brief, I am afraid I will not be able to call all boil. Members. I hope the

[Mr. Chairman.] speeches will be brief.
The House will sit through the lunch hour.

श्री ए० बी० बाजपेयी : सभापति जी, चीनी आक्रमण के पश्चात् प्रधान मंत्री जी ने यह आश्वासन दिया था कि सैनिक पराजय के कारणों की जांच की जायेगी और तथ्यों को संसद् और जनता के सामने लाया जायगा। मैं बड़ी विनम्रता से निवेदन करूंगा कि उस जांच को कायम करने का प्रस्ताव इस सदन के सामने अभी जो रिपोर्ट आई है, उससे पूरा नहीं होता। सुरक्षा मंत्री का यह कहना ठीक नहीं है कि वह किसी के पीछे नहीं पड़ना चाहते, वह विच-हंटिंग नहीं करना चाहते। इस सदन में कोई भी विच-हंटिंग नहीं चाहता है, लेकिन हम विच-हंटिंग नहीं चाहते इसलिये इस सैनिक पराजय के लिये जो जिम्मेदार हैं उन की जिम्मेदारी को नियत करने और अगर वे अपने कर्तव्यपालन में विफल रहे हैं तो उस विफलता के लिए उन्हें दण्ड देने से यह सदन इंकार नहीं कर सकता है। चोरी का केवल माल बरामद करना ही काफी नहीं है। भविष्य में चोरियां न हों, इसकी व्यवस्था करना भी जरूरी है। लेकिन चोर साहूकार बन कर चला जाय और हम यह दावा करें कि उस का चोरी में कोई हाथ नहीं था, यह तो न्याय के सामान्य सिद्धान्तों के अनुकूल नहीं होगा। जो रिपोर्ट रखी गई है वह बड़ी भयंकर है और उन लोगों के लिये आखें खोल देने वाली होनी चाहिये जो बायें और दायें के मतभेद के नाम पर अपने कर्तव्य का पालन न करने वाले राजनैतिक नेताओं और सैनिक अफसरों के पापों पर पर्दा डालना चाहते हैं। जो रिपोर्ट का हिस्सा रखा गया है उसे पढ़ कर ऐसा लगता है कि जो हिस्सा नहीं रखा गया वह कितना गंभीर होगा? इस सदन में हम यह जानना नहीं चाहते कि सेनायें कहाँ थीं, कितनी संख्या में थीं—जैसा कि सुरक्षा मंत्री ने अपने वक्तव्य में कहा है—यह तो जानकारी हमने कभी मांगी नहीं। जो जानकारी शत्रु को सहायता देगी, हम इस सदन में कभी नहीं मांगेंगे, देशभक्ति में हम भी थोड़ा हिस्सा रखते हैं। लेकिन जो रिपोर्ट रखी

गई है, वह तसदीर को पूरी तरह पेश नहीं करती। फिर भी कुछ नहीं से कुछ अच्छा है और अगर पुराने सुरक्षा मंत्री होते तो शायद जांच कमेटी भी न बनती और जांच कमेटी की रिपोर्ट सूरज की एक छोटी सी किरण भी न देखती। मैं इस व्यवस्था का स्वागत करता हूँ कि जनता को, सदन को देश की सुरक्षा के मामले में अधिक से अधिक विश्वास में लिया जाना चाहिये। अगर केवल सरकार लड़ाई नहीं कर सकती, अगर केवल फौज लड़ाई नहीं करती, सारे देश को लड़ना है तो फिर उस जिम्मेदारी के अनुरूप जनता को, संसद् को विश्वास में भी लिया जाना चाहिये।

इस रिपोर्ट से साफ है कि सरकार ने देश की और सेना को विशेष रूप से सेना को चीनी आक्रमण का सामना करने के लिए तैयार नहीं किया। क्यों नहीं किया गया, इस का उत्तर हमारे सैनिक अफसर नहीं दे सकते, इस का उत्तर प्रधान मंत्री ने देना होगा। यह दावा करते हुए भी कि जब तिब्बत में चीन की सेनाएं आ गईं तभी हम चीन के प्रति संशंक हो गये, इस रिपोर्ट से पता लगता है कि सरकार ने उत्तरी सीमा की रक्षा के लिये कोई ठोस कदम नहीं उठाये। सेना को ऊंची जगह पर लड़ना पड़ेगा, उसके लिये जवानों को ऊंचे स्थान की जलवायु में रहने की आदत डाली जाय; चीन से लगे हुए इलाके में सड़कें बिछाई जायें; आक्रमण का सामना करने के लिये सेना के पास पर्याप्त हथियार रहें; सरकार ने इसकी भी व्यवस्था नहीं की।

सभापति जी, सुरक्षा मंत्री के वक्तव्य में बताया गया है कि केवल २४,००० जवानों ने चीन के आक्रमण का सामना करने में भाग लिया। क्या इस से यह साबित नहीं होता कि हम अपनी विनाश सेना के २४,००० जवानों को भी इतनी ऊंचाई पर लड़ने का शिक्षण नहीं दे सके? पूरी सेना की तो बात ही नहीं है; मगर २४,००० जवान भी हमारी

सेना में ऐसे नहीं थे जो भारतीय सीमा का उल्लंघन करने वाले चीनियों का रास्ता रोक सकते ? और जब उन्हें लड़ाई में झोंक दिया गया तो जो परिणाम हुआ वह हमारे सामने है। परिणाम की जिम्मेदारी से सरकार बच नहीं सकती। किसी अन्य लोकतन्त्रवादी देश में यदि ऐसी रिपोर्ट आ जाती, तो सरकार को इस्तीफा देना पड़ता। और अगर सरकार में स्वयं कुछ लज्जा होती, शर्म होती तो सरकार इस्तीफा दे कर चली जाती। यह जांच कमेटी की रिपोर्ट नहीं है। यह वर्तमान सरकार की अक्षमता की, अदक्षता की, राजनैतिक अदूरदर्शिता की और सैनिक असावधानी की जोती जागती तलबीर है। मगर इस रिपोर्ट के पीछे जो कुछ है, वह और भी अधिक भयानक है।

आखिर सेना को चीन के हमले के लिये तैयार क्यों नहीं किया गया ? क्या इसका कारण यह है कि सरकार समझती थी कि चीन से लड़ना नहीं पड़ेगा ? क्या इसका कारण यह है कि सरकार समझती थी कि चीन ने नेफा में तो वचन दे दिया है कि वह नेफा की सीमा को तोड़कर भारत में नहीं घुसेगा और जहां तक अक्साईचिन का सवाल है, सरकार कुछ ले-देकर चीन के साथ शर्मनाक समझौता करने की तैयारी कर रही थी ? यह मैं नहीं कहता हूं, कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी के चेयरमैन मिस्टर डांगे कहते हैं। और अभी तक उनके उस आरोप का खंडन नहीं किया गया है। मैं उनके एक लेख के अंश को आपके सामने रखना चाहता हूं— उन्होंने एक रहस्योद्घाटन किया है—मैं उनके शब्दों को उद्धृत कर रहा हूं :

"The Indian Government, before relations became bitter, was prepared to recognise the Chinese need for the Aksai Chin road to link up with their Sinkiang Province. No one in India, except the hardened

warmonger." and American agents, would have quarrelled on that. A suitable formula honourable to both sides could have been found and it was in the offing."

इस वक्तव्य का खंडन किया जाना चाहिये। आखिर राजनैतिक नेतृत्व क्यों विफल हुआ ? हमें चीन से लड़ना पड़ेगा, हम चीन से लड़ेंगे, हमने चीन से लड़ने का संकल्प किया हुआ है—यह भाव शासन में नहीं था, क्योंकि शासन अक्साईचिन को चीन को देकर समझौता कर लेने का विचार कर रहा था, क्योंकि शासन के कुछ नेता समझते थे कि हम समाजवादी देश हैं, चीन भी एक समाजवादी देश है, भला एक समाजवादी देश दूसरे समाजवादी देश पर हमला करने की गलती कैसे कर सकता है। मैं पूछना चाहता हूं : क्या यह सोचने का तरीका बदल गया ; क्या सरकार इस बात को समझ रही है कि अब चीन से शांतिपूर्ण तरीके से समस्या का समाधान होना संभव नहीं है और क्या उसके अनुरूप, जैसा कि सुरक्षा मंत्री ने कहा है, उन्होंने इन पराजयों से कुछ शिक्षाएं ली हैं, कुछ पाठ पढ़े हैं : क्या उन शिक्षाओं के अनुकूल भविष्य की तैयारी की जा रही है ?

मेरा निवेदन है कि जब चीनी सेनाएं हमारा दरवाजा खटखटा रही थीं, तब हमारे पुराने सुरक्षा मंत्री आक्रमण की गंभीरता को कम करके बताने की कोशिश कर रहे थे और हमारे प्रधान मंत्री बार बार कहते थे कि लद्दाख में हमारी स्थिति कमजोर हो सकती है, मगर नेफा में हम मजबूत हैं, पूरी तरह तैयार हैं। मगर हमारी पराजय का इतिहास नेफा की पहाड़ियों पर हमारे जवानों ने अपने रक्त से और देश की जनता ने अपने आंसुओं से लिखा है। जो सेना विदेशियों के अधीन संभार की हार लड़ाई के मैदान पर अपनी विजय की गाथाएं लिखती थी, वह सेना परास्त हो गई, अपमानित हो गई। इसलिये नहीं कि जवान लड़ने में कम थे, इसलिये नहीं कि वे जान पर खेलना नहीं जानते थे,

[श्री ए० बी० वजपेयी]

इसलिये कि उस सेना को सरकार ने तैयार नहीं किया। क्या आज सेना को तैयार किया जा रहा है? हमारे सुरक्षा मंत्री कहते हैं, हम ८,००० अफगान नये रख रहे हैं, हम तीन डिवीजन्स और तैयार कर रहे हैं, ८ में से दो आर्डिनेन्स फैक्टरियां लगाने के लिये ब्रिटेन और अमेरिका से आश्वासन मिल गया है, मगर ये आर्डिनेन्स फैक्टरियां कहाँ लगायेंगे, शेष फैक्टरियां किसके सहयोग से लगायेंगे, इसका पता नहीं है। हमने सेना को बढ़ाने का लक्ष्य रखा है। क्या हम चीन के साथ अपना सैनिक संतुलन बनाये रखने का विचार कर रहे हैं? क्या चीन की हवाई शक्ति का मुकाबला करने के लिये हम हवाई शक्ति खड़ी कर रहे हैं?

कहा जाता है, सेना इसलिये हारी थी कि चीनियों ने लहर पर लहर भेजी। यह चीनियों की लड़ाई का तरीका नया नहीं था। कोरिया में कम्युनिस्ट चीन इसी तरीके से लड़ चुका था। मगर दिल्ली के देवता आंखों पर पंचशील की पट्टी बांध कर बैठे रहे। हमारे पुराने सुरक्षा मंत्री चीनी आक्रमण से देश को बेखबर रखने का पाप करते रहे और इसका नतीजा यह हुआ कि चीन सीमा पर सेनाएं अड़ता रहा और हमने अपनी सेनाओं को चीन के लड़ाई के तरीकों का शिक्षण तक नहीं दिया। आपको जानकर ताज्जुब होगा, अभी जनवरी-फरवरी में पहली बार चीनी सेना के लड़ने के तरीकों के बारे में एक किताब छापी है हमारी फौज ने—उससे पहले नहीं छापी गई। उससे पहले सेना को यह बताया ही नहीं गया कि चीनी आक्रमण का कैसे सामना करेंगे। पुराने सुरक्षा मंत्री तो पाकिस्तान की रट लगाते थे और समझते थे कि चीन हमला नहीं करेगा। क्या इसके लिए उन्हें जवाबदेह नहीं ठहराया जाना चाहिये, क्या इस पराजय की जिम्मेदारी तय नहीं की जानी चाहिये, क्या जो दोषी व्यक्ति हैं उन्हें दंडित नहीं किया जाना चाहिये?

मैं किसी का नाम नहीं लेना चाहता हूँ, मगर इस रिपोर्ट की लाइन-लाइन से दाँ चेहरे झाँक रहे हैं, एक गौर वर्ण का और दूसरा श्याम वर्ण का। इन चेहरों को देश की जरूरतों से ओझल नहीं किया जा सकता।

राज्य सभा में अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय परिस्थिति पर दुर्रिवाद का उत्तर देते हुए प्रधान मंत्री जी ने इस रिपोर्ट का एक तरह से खंडन शुरू कर दिया, उन्होंने राजनैतिक और सैनिक नेतृत्व की विफलता पर लीपापोती शुरू कर दी और कहने लगे कि जब सेनापति हमारे पास पैसों के लिए आते थे, तो हम कहते थे पैसा नहीं है। अभी हमारे मित्र श्री मणि ने सुरक्षा मंत्रालय को प्रतिवर्ष कितना रुपया दिया गया, कितना उसने खर्च किया और कितना उसने वापस कर दिया, इसके आंकड़े उपस्थित किये हैं; फिर प्रधान मंत्री जी कैसे कह सकते हैं कि पैसा नहीं था? जितना पैसा दिया वह उन्होंने खर्च नहीं किया, उसमें से कुछ वापस कर दिया। मेरा दूसरा आरोप यह है कि जो रुपया दिया गया और खर्च किया गया, वह भी ठीक तरह से खर्च नहीं किया गया। क्या हथियार बनाने के कारखानों का काम काफी परकुर्नेटर तैयार करना है, वाष टब तैयार करना है, फोटो लेने के यंत्र बनाना है? लेकिन अगर चीनी आक्रमण का खतरा अनुभव किया गया होता, तो पुराने सुरक्षा मंत्री देश की सुरक्षा के साथ यह खिलवाड़ करने की भूल नहीं करते, या फिर कहना होगा कि उन्होंने जानबूझ कर ऐसा किया, इसका कोई तीसरा स्पष्टीकरण नहीं हो सकता है।

सभापति जी, इस सुरक्षा मंत्री के बयान में और जांच कमेटी की रिपोर्ट में मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेन्स की विफलता के बारे में बहुत कुछ कहा गया और सुरक्षा मंत्री ने यह आश्वासन दिलाया है कि उसका पुनर्गठन कर रहे हैं।

लेकिन मेरा निवेदन है कि मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेंस जिस तरह से चलना चाहिये वैसे आज भी नहीं चल रहा है। मैं चाहूंगा सुरक्षा मंत्री इस बात पर प्रकाश डाले कि जब चीनी आक्रमण चल रहा था और मित्र देशों के एयर मिशन भारत में आये हुए थे तो उन की सुविधा के लिए, उन को दिखाने के लिए हमारे विदेश मंत्रालय और सुरक्षा मंत्रालय ने कुछ नक्शे तैयार किये, युद्धभूमि के हमारी सीमा के—क्या यह सच नहीं है कि वे नक्शे नई दिल्ली में बैठे हुए एक विदेशी राजदूतावास में पहुंच गये? क्या यह सच नहीं है कि उस विदेशी राजदूतावास में काम करने वाले भारतीय कर्मचारी ने उन नक्शों की फोटो कापियां ला कर सरकार को दीं? क्या यह सही नहीं है कि उस विदेशी राजदूतावास के विरुद्ध कोई कार्यवाही नहीं की गई? क्या यह सच नहीं है कि उस विदेशी राजदूतावास ने चीन और पाकिस्तान के साथ मिल कर भारत में एक गुप्तचरों का जाल बिछाया हुआ है और उस जाल को तोड़ने के लिए कोई कोशिश की गई है? अभी पाकिस्तान के कुछ गुप्तचर पकड़े गये। मैं सुरक्षा मंत्री जो से कहना चाहता हूं कि तसवीर में केवल पाकिस्तान ही नहीं है चीन भी है और चीन के साथ दक्षिण पूर्वी एशिया का एक राजदूतावास और है जिस की गतिविधि के बारे में सरकार को जानकारी है मगर सरकार ने कोई कदम नहीं उठाया और जिसका नतीजा यह हुआ कि वह कार्यवाही आज भी जारी है।

हमारे सेना के कुछ अफसर ऐसे विदेशी तत्वों से सम्पर्क रखते हैं जिन का आचरण संदिग्ध है। मैं चाहूंगा सुरक्षा मंत्री इस बात का स्पष्टीकरण करें कि क्या एक स्वीडिश महिला जो पेकिंग और हांगकांग होते हुए दिल्ली आई और जो सेना के दो अफसरों के साथ आगरे जा रही थी वह रास्ते में दुर्घटनाग्रस्त हो गई और आगरे के मिशनरी अस्पताल में पड़ी हुई है। उस के साथ जो

दो सैनिक अफसर शामिल थे वे कौन थे और उन का इस महिला के साथ कैसे सम्पर्क हुआ? वह महिला किस कार्य के लिए यहां पेकिंग से वापस आई? क्या यह सच है कि इस स्वीडिश महिला का उस राजदूतावास से भी सम्बन्ध रहा जिस का अभी मैंने जिक्र किया? क्या सुरक्षा मंत्री सुरक्षा के रहस्यों को गोपनीय रख सकते हैं? संसद् को तो अंधेरे में रखा जा सकता है देश की जनता को विश्वास में नहीं लिया जा सकता लेकिन जो तथ्य शत्रु को मालूम नहीं होने चाहियें वे शत्रु को मालूम हो रहे हैं। क्या मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेंस विफल नहीं हुआ और क्या सिविल इन्टेलिजेंस भी फेल नहीं हो गया है? जो मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेंस डायरेक्टोरेट के डायरेक्टर हैं क्या इस विफलता के लिए उन्हें कोई सजा दी गई? आप को मुन कर ताज्जुब होगा कि डायरेक्टोरेट आफ मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेंस में अभी तक चीन के कुछ नागरिकों को रखा गया है जो चीनी भाषा में आने वाली सामग्री का अनुवाद करते हैं। वे पार्ट टाइम काम करते हैं, चीनी नागरिक हैं और मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेंस में जा कर अनुवाद करते हैं। क्या हम इस बात के लिए भारतीय नागरिक नहीं रख सकते? क्या यह सच नहीं है कि चीनी भाषा जानने वाले अफसरों की जो भी छटाई होती है, जो भी चयन होता है वह चीनी राष्ट्रजनों की राय से होता है। क्या यह सच नहीं है कि पब्लिक सर्विस कमिशन में भी चीनी भाषा में जो इम्तिहान लिया जाता है वह एक चीनी नेशनल लेता है? क्या यह सच नहीं है कि एक ऐसा चीनी राष्ट्रवादी हमारे देश में रहता है जिसका एक लड़का पीकिंग में फौज में काम करता है और जिसका छोटा लड़का डायरेक्टोरेट आफ मिलिटरी इन्टेलिजेंस में काम करता है? उनकी निष्ठा किधर है यह मैं नहीं जानता। मैं किसी की निष्ठा पर संदेह नहीं करना चाहता हूं। लेकिन क्या सरकार को भी यह पता है कि उन की निष्ठा किधर है? किस आधार पर वह विश्वास करके चलती

[श्री ए० बी० वाजपेयी]

है और क्या उस विश्वास को आगे कोई ठेस नहीं लगेगा ? क्या चीनी भाषा जानने वाले, चीनी अनुवाद करने वाले भारतीय हम सैकड़ों की संख्या में तैयार नहीं कर सकते ? देश में चीनी भाषा की शिक्षा के चार स्कूल चलते हैं, दो सुरक्षा मंत्रालय के अन्तर्गत, दो गृह मंत्रालय के अन्तर्गत । दोनों की किताबें अलग हैं, पाठ्यक्रम अलग हैं और चारों स्कूलों की चलाने के नियमों में कोई एकरूपता नहीं है । चीनी भाषा सीखने के लिए वे लोग अमरीका भेजे गये, जिन्हें नहीं भेजा जाना चाहिये था । ऐसे लोग भेजे गये जो वापस आने के बाद भी भारतीय भाषा में अनुवाद करने के लिए भारत में रहने वाले चीनी नागरिकों की मदद लेंगे । यह तरीका नहीं है मिलिटरी इंटेलिजेंस को रिआगनाइज करने का ।

हांगकांग में, पीकिंग में चीन के अखबार क्या लिखते हैं, उन की छानबीन करने के लिए, आने वाले संकेतों को समझने के लिए, उन की सही सूचना सरकार को देने के लिए हमें बहुत से कर्मठ कार्यकर्ता चाहिये । मगर हांगकांग खाली है । चीन में जो हमारे मिलिटरी अटैची हैं मैं उन के बारे में कुछ नहीं कहना चाहता हूँ । अगर सुरक्षा मंत्री उन के बारे में जानना आवश्यक समझेंगे तो मैं उन से व्यक्तिगत रूप से मिल कर ऐसी बातें रखूंगा जो आखें खोलने वाली होंगी । स्पष्ट है मिलिटरी इंटेलिजेंस विफल हो गई और शायद इसीलिए प्रधान मंत्री ने कहा "मैंने कह दिया चीनियों को निकाल दो ।" हम ने इस घोषणा का बड़ा स्वागत किया कि प्रधान मंत्री का ऐसा रूप प्रकट हुआ है जिसका हम अभिनन्दन कर सकते हैं । लेकिन नतीजा क्या हुआ ? कितनी चीनी सेना इकट्ठी हुई, कितनी सेना वे मैदान में ले आये, उस सेना के पीछे कितनी शक्ति है, इस का हमारी सरकार को पता नहीं था ।

प्रधान मंत्री को किस ने राय दी यह घोषणा करने की यह स्पष्ट होना चाहिये । मैं समझता हूँ कि पुराने सुरक्षा मंत्री की यह कार-गुजारी होगी और अगर नहीं है तो मुझे जान कर खुशी होगी कि आखिर प्रधान मंत्री ने किसी से पूछा या बिना पूछे ही घोषणा कर दी ।

जिस लेख का श्री मणि ने हवाला दिया है उसमें भी यह बात कही गई है कि प्रधान मंत्री की घोषणा राजनैतिक दृष्टि से थी, सैनिक दृष्टि से नहीं । उसका लेखक कौन है, इसका अनुमान मैं लगा रहा हूँ, आप भी लगा सकते हैं, लेकिन लेखक कोई भी हों, जो बात उन्होंने लिखी है वह स्पष्ट होनी चाहिये । उस लेख में एक बात और कही गई है कि चीन ने हमला कर दिया तो उसकी पहली खबर नई दिल्ली में हमारे सूत्रों से नहीं आई, मिलिट्री इंटेलिजेंस से नहीं आई, उसकी पहली खबर बी० बी० सी से आई । बी० बी० सी० ने एलान किया चीन के पीकिंग रेडियो को सुन कर कि भारत ने हमला कर दिया है, तब इन्होंने अनुमान लगाया कि सचमुच में चीन ने हमला कर दिया होगा । यह एक ऐसी तस्वीर है जिसको देख कर लज्जा से सिर झुक जाता है । यह राजनैतिक लड़ाई का सवाल नहीं है । सुरक्षा का प्रश्न शासन का और विरोधी दल का सवाल नहीं है । देश हार गया तो एक पार्टी के माथे पर ही कलंक का टीका नहीं लगा, सारे भारत की जनता लज्जा से कलंक का कीचड़ में धंस गई । हम इस कलंक को मिटाना चाहते हैं । हम इस पराजय का बदला लेना चाहते हैं । लेकिन यह तब तक सम्भव नहीं है, समापति जी, जब तक दिल्ली के नेताओं के दिमाग में यह साफ न हो कि हमारा राजनैतिक उद्देश्य क्या है । सेना तो एक हथियार है । जैसा कि रिपोर्ट में कहा गया है सेना को नीति सम्बन्धी निर्देश देना सरकार का काम है । किस शत्रु का मुकाबिला उसे करना है, यह बताना सरकार का काम है । सेना अपना काम

करेगी मगर नीति अगर विफल होगी तो सेना किसी देश के भाग्य को नहीं बदल सकती । मेरा निवेदन है कि आज भी चीन के आक्रमण का प्रतिकार करने के लिये और चीन के चंगुल में चली गई भारत की भूमि को वापस लाने के लिये जितनी सैनिक शक्ति की आवश्यकता है उतनी सैनिक शक्ति एकत्र नहीं की जा रही है ।

मैं यह भी कहना चाहता हूँ कि इस रिपोर्ट से हमारा समाधान नहीं होता । हमने मांग की थी, चीनी आक्रमण के पश्चात् जब बाद विवाद हुआ था कि सारे तथ्यों की जांच के लिये और जिम्मेदारी तय करने के लिये और जो जिम्मेदार हैं उन्हें दण्ड देने के लिये संसद् की एक कमेटी बनाई जानी चाहिये । मुझे खेद है कि वह प्रस्ताव नहीं माना गया, मगर इस रिपोर्ट में जो तथ्य सामने आये उनके प्रकाश में फिर मैं उस मांग को दोहराना चाहता हूँ और मैं यह भी कहना चाहता हूँ कि जो दोषी प्रमाणित हुये हैं इसी रिपोर्ट के आधार पर उन्हें सजा मिलनी चाहिये । लेफ्टिनेंट जनरल कौल को केवल आर्मी से रिटायर करना काफी नहीं है । उनका ग्रेड, उनका सम्मान और उनका रैंक वापस लिया जाना चाहिये जिससे सेना में यह विश्वास पैदा हो कि जो भी गलती करेगा, जो भी निर्देशों का ठीक तरह से पालन नहीं करेगा, जो नीचे के अफसरों के मामले में दखल देगा, उसको न केवल निन्दा दी जायेगी, उसे न केवल जापान भेज दिया जायेगा बल्कि उसको सजा भी दी जायेगी । क्या सेना में कोर्ट मार्शल का स्थान नहीं है ? क्या कोर्ट मार्शल केवल जवानों का होगा, अफसरों का नहीं होगा ? मैं कड़ी बातें कहना नहीं चाहता । महापति जी, मैं आपके द्वारा सुरक्षा मन्त्री से कहना चाहता हूँ और उनकी रिपोर्ट पर आगे कार्यवाही की मांग करता हूँ । अगर उसके अनुरूप आगे कार्यवाही नहीं की गई तो सम्भव है कि भारत फिर अगले खतरे का सामना करने के लिये तैयार न हो ।

SHRI SUDHIK GHOSH (West Bengal): Mr. Chairman, all we can usefully say about the enquiry into the military disasters we suffered last year in NEFA is that we are determined that it shall not happen again. A *post mortem* of past failures is useful only to the extent it helps us to avoid any such mistakes in the future. Only the fainthearted cry over spilt milk. The Defence Minister has given the House a detailed statement of the steps he has already taken to put right what had gone wrong. And the most important assurance we have before us is that we have at the head of the Defence Ministry today a man with a totally uncomplicated personality, a man who is wholly acceptable to the Armed Forces and to the country as a leader; his directness and his courage give us all the sense of confidence that we need.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, that it is far more important for us to give some serious thought to our preparedness for the future, to deal with any eventuality, however grave, that may develop in the India-China situation.

The Prime Minister has told Parliament about the massing of troops by the Chinese at strategic point* all along our northern borders. We have also noted the steady and constant build-up of military supplies, construction of barracks, gun emplacements and airfields for fighters and bombers by the Chinese and many other items of military preparation next to our borders. Some friendly countries have given us their assessment that a repetition of the invasion of India by the Chinese is not likely. Whether it happens or does not happen, it is the primary duty of a sovereign Government, worth the name, -that it must acquire military strength to resist effectively the kind of dangerous thrust that we experienced from the Chinese last year in NEFA, if it happens and when it happens. No nation, situated as we are, can bank upon the optimistic assessment that

such a disaster may not happen. And I think we have good reasons to believe that if it happens again this year the Chinese will receive from the Indian Armed Forces what they deserve.

The position with regard to our Air Force is very much more satisfactory today than it was a year ago. As a result of more satisfactory supplies of spare parts and other stores the number of effective fighting aircraft at the disposal of the

When we talk about the military might of Communist China, we are often misled by hearsay. It is quite true that the Chinese land army is enormous in size and their men are very well trained in mountain and jungle warfare; but we need not be unduly bothered by the size of their army; because it is not possible for them to deploy against us more than a fraction of their army; and their supply routes; are incredibly long; and they have formidable logistic problems. Large parts of their armed forces are also required in other areas of their country because the present Chinese leadership has created for itself quite a few other problems both on the Russian front and on the Formosa front. Their air force is nothing like what it is generally believed to be in India and that part of the Chinese air force which can be deployed against us is not particularly formidable. So when we talk about preparedness, we have to be prepared in terms of the assessment of that part of the Chinese armed forces which can possibly be deployed against us. And as far as I know, and I know a few things about these matters, our armed forces are today in a position to deal with another Chinese invasion very effectively if it happens. And

I am saying nothing new to the House when I say that the fighting quality of our officers and men—both in the Army and in the Air Force—is something that we can all be proud of.

Now, my submission to the House is that when we talk about preparedness to meet any eventuality in the India-China situation, we have to realise that the India-China situation is not something which can be isolated from what is happening in the rest of the world. Our problem and our preparedness have to be understood in the world context. What is going to happen between India and China much depends on what is going to happen between China and Russia and between Russia and the United States. The hard thinking that is going on in Moscow and Washington will have plenty to do with what happens to the India-China situation in the Himalayas. There are powerful elemental forces at work; and our defence preparedness has to be related to an understanding of the working of those forces. I, therefore, crave the indulgence of the House to share with our colleagues, very briefly, my analysis of that situation which has a direct bearing on what happens in the India-China border.

I am sure the House will agree with me that we are somewhat puzzled by the nature of the problem that China has created for us. And I often wonder if there is a real military solution of this peculiar problem. As I have already said, any Government worth the name must do everything in its power to acquire military equipment from wherever it can to give its armed forces adequate strength to resist effectively the kind of dangerous thrust which we experienced from the Chinese last year. Quite rightly, therefore, we are doing our best to acquire equipment for our Army and Air Force from our Russian friends as well as our Western friends. Neither our Western friends nor our Russian friends have any quarrel whatsoever with our foreign policy of non-

alignment. Chairman Khrushchev has no objection at all to our acquiring arms and equipment from the United States and President Kennedy has no objection at all if we can get from the U.S.S.R. more and more military equipment for our armed forces that we might require for preventing a repetition of the invasion of India by the Chinese. Indeed the inadequacy of our military strength which attracted the evil attention of China appears to have become a source of embarrassment equally to Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy; because they are both clearly anxious to see that an invasion of India is prevented.

There appears to be an extraordinarily large degree of identity of interest between the Communists and the non-Communists of this world in this India-China situation. It seems that according to the assessment of our Communist friends—I do not mean the Indian Communists—last year's invasion of India was not a genuine invasion. Well, what was it? It was according to them, an outcome of the ideological conflict between the Chinese Communists on the one hand and the non-Chinese Communists on the other: it was in their view in the nature of a demonstration carried out by Communist China for the benefit of Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the Communist world and, according to the understanding of these friends, the real purpose of *this* demonstration was to discredit the two basic concepts in international politics, namely, non-alignment and co-existence. These Communist friends appear to think that what was invaded last year was non-alignment and not India. What they seem to mean is that the Chinese wanted to convince Mr. Khrushchev and other Communist leaders about the hollowness and invalidity of this concept of non-alignment of which Prime Minister Nehru is the great architect. As if the Chinese Communists were saying, through this action: "Here we Chinese give the Indians a push and what happens? The Indians immediately throw themselves into the

[Shri Sudhir Ghosh]

arms of these imperialist Americans and there goes the non-alignment, and that is all there is to it".

So, according to these Communist friends of India the invasion of India was a part of the great debate between the Chinese Communists and the non-Chinese Communists; because the Chinese do not share with the others their faith in non-alignment of unaligned countries and co-existence between the Communists and non-Communists of this world. In these circumstances they, that is, the leaders of the non-Chinese Communist countries want India not to be too excited about the India-China situation; according to their assessment the repetition of the invasion of India by the Chinese is a very remote contingency and they assure India that they are doing everything in their power to restrain China and to prevent a repetition of the invasion of India by the Chinese.

1 P.M.

Now, last February I paid a brief visit to Moscow on my way to the United States and had a chance to check on some of these thoughts. It was interesting for me to find that the diplomatic representatives of the Western Powers stationed in Moscow and watching from their outposts the India-China conflict were in complete agreement with the view that Mr. Khrushchev and the other leaders of the East European Communist countries were genuinely anxious to prevent another invasion of India by the Chinese. They had no doubt at all about Mr. Khrushchev's warm feeling for India and they were completely convinced that Mr. Khrushchev wanted to prevent the Chinese from invading India again. But the question was: "Can he?" And the answer was: "No." They, the Western diplomats, felt that in spite of

Mr. Khrushchev's great desire to help India, the leverage which he used to have with the Chinese and by using which he could prevent a repetition of the invasion of India by the Chinese had become non-existent by then. That was in February. Therefore, while they were completely convinced about Mr. Khrushchev's desire to help India and to prevent another invasion of India, they felt that Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the eastern European countries were really not in a position to prevent it.

From Moscow I proceeded to Washington. I talked individually with more than 40 of the key-men in the American Senate, the House of Representatives and in the American Administration and rounded it off with a talk with President Kennedy himself. I was impressed to find that the leading politicians and the leading men in the American Administration virtually said, almost in the same words and phrases, what I had been told in Moscow. They, too, were extremely anxious that the Indians should not get unduly excited about the India-China conflict and the repetition of an invasion of India by Communist China was not, according to them, so real and imminent a danger as we Indians thought it was.

While there was no lack of feeling for India and a general determination that India shall not go under and a general agreement that the United States should give military equipment to raise India's military capability to what India considered a necessary minimum, I got the impression from the very large number of talks I had with these key-men that they were most reluctant to get too deeply involved in the India-China military situation and they desired as ardently as their Russian counterparts that this conflict, which was a real danger to world peace, should be restrained and contained and reduced to as small a problem as possible. It seemed clear to me that both the

leaders of the Communist world and the non-Communist world had the same feeling that everything possible should be done to contain the potentially dangerous India-China situation and they all counselled India to show patience and forbearance.

In these circumstances, while we give our attention to military preparedness, it is obviously the duty of all serious-minded men and women to give their attention also to any possible non-military solution of this India-China problem, which is a source of danger to the world's peace and to India's peace and progress.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I would like you to finish.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH: The immediate job is to try and reduce this problem to a border dispute which unfortunately it has long ceased to be. I, therefore, took courage to make last March, when the signing of the partial test ban treaty was not yet in sight, a suggestion, entirely on my own responsibility, to the President of the United States that he, President Kennedy, and Mr. Khrushchev, Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., make a joint declaration to the world regarding their deep concern about the India-China situation and their willingness to make a joint US-Soviet move to reduce this dangerous situation to a border dispute between two neighbours. I ventured to suggest that they might care to say that They were both eager to see the border dispute between India and China settled by methods of peace and they were equally anxious to see that India was not invaded. There was no question of any backing of any such declaration with a military guarantee. I pleaded that even if such a joint declaration was nothing more than an expression of a hope and a sentiment, these sentiments were sure to find an echo in the hearts of so many hundreds of millions of men and women all the world over that the impact of it might very well reduce the problem to a mere border dispute. And

551 RS—30.

once this problem is reduced to a border dispute an impartial international machinery could be devised to look into the actual dispute over the border on its own merits. But you cannot discuss a border dispute with any hope of success when a vast and well-prepared military machine of one party is breathing down the neck of the other. And it seems to me that it is not within the means of the Colombo Powers to achieve this objective in spite of their great goodwill.

I will take only one more minute. Now, it may be that Mr. Khrushchev alone, in spite of his great goodwill towards India, does not have the power to prevent another Chinese invasion of India but if he and the President of the United States were to move together, such joint action would acquire a moral force which is bound to make a powerful impact.

Only two men in this world, Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy, have stared in the face the nuclear equation of personal responsibility for the potential destruction of hundreds of millions of fellow human beings and this shared experience must have created between these two men a special kind of bond. In the Cuba crisis when the world was on the brink of an abyss, the President and Chairman Khrushchev stood like two duellists with loaded pistols aimed at each other; these two men alone in the world can know both the awe and the relief of that decision, at the last moment, not to pull the trigger. Each of these two men knows that the other alone went through the same lonely hell. It is to the common bond of that shared nightmare between these two men that my appeal was addressed. And I made this appeal entirely on my own behalf and not on behalf of any other person or organisation or Government; and I did so as a person who deeply believes that, as history reveals itself with the passage of time, the US and Soviet Russia will emerge as the world's policemen for the maintenance of

[Shri Sudhir Ghosh]

world peace. And if the land of Gandhi and Nehru were to admit that there is no solution of this India-China problem except through military preparation, then in my view, Mr. Chairman, that would be a terrible admission of defeat.

SHRI SANTOSH KUMAR BASU (West Bengal): May I ask one question of the hon. Member who had been to America and had the occasion to meet President Kennedy whether he has noticed in the press the day before yesterday an item that President Kennedy in his last press conference had definitely declared that China might attack India next fall? Has he got anything to say about that?

SHRI A. D. MANI: What did President Kennedy tell him?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Would you like to say something? You are supposed to know what President Kennedy felt.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH: Whether I have read that? I have read it. What I have said is in no way inconsistent with the statement of the American President.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Govindan Nair.

SHRI LALJI PENDSE (Maharashtra): I am seeking light from you as to how it is germane to the subject-matter of the discussion here? NEFA has not been referred to at all.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Your question comes rather too late. Mr. Govindan Nair.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR (Kerala): Mr. Chairman, Sir, two statements made by the Defence Minister, one on the NEFA reverses and the other on 'Our Defence Preparedness' are before us for discussion.

[THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair]

This discussion assumes great importance in the wake of the recent developments on our border. We have been informed that the Chinese are massing their military on our border. We have also the news that Pakistan also is active. There was a time when we hoped that we could get Pakistan on our side to fight the Chinese. That hope has been belied and today the feeling is that Pakistan will take the initiative in launching an offence against us. Earlier, when we had hoped that we would get Pakistan on our side, we made the generous gesture of withdrawing our army from the Pakistan border. I think it is time for us to reconsider this question.

Anyway, coming to the reports, the scope of the N.E.F.A. reverses enquiry is limited. My hon. friend, Shri Mani, said that he could not make out anything about the scope since the whole Report was not placed on the Table. I do not agree with him on that because in the text of the statement already made before the House, it has been made clear that the investigation was about:—

- (i) our training;
- (ii) our equipment;
- (iii) our system of command;
- (iv) the physical fitness of our troops; and
- (v) the capacity of our Commanders at all levels to influence men under them.

This was the scope of the Report. The personnel selected for this investigation was also military personnel. So to drag any political factors into this discussion, I do not think is quite proper. All the same I agree with what my friend, who spoke before me, reminded the House, that is to say, the whole conflict between India and China is a border dispute, and it was never the understanding of anybody in the country that a military solution can be found for this border dispute.

Even before the Chinese invasion, I remember, when we had to discuss this India-China border question, I myself quoted General Thimayya when he said that we should never seek a military solution. On the other hand, we should try other political and diplomatic solutions. As far as the scope of this conflict with China is concerned, we should not forget this aspect of the question. Nor should we forget that the policy of non-alignment did really pay dividend even in this conflict with the Chinese. But all the same this gives no excuse for unpreparedness that has already been revealed by this Report. I agree that the political policy followed by us was correct, but at the same time it does not justify the unpreparedness we were faced with.

Well, as reminded by Shri Mani, for the last few years we knew that our northern border had become alive and assurances were given especially with regard to the NEFA region, both by the Prime Minister and by others that as far as preparedness is concerned, on the NEFA border we are all right. Even if there is any weakness, it is only on the other side, on the La[^]akh side. This was the impression given. About roads, about military equipment, about training, the general impression in the country, before this massive invasion from the Chinese, was that we were strong enough to meet the Chinese offensive if it so happened. But, unfortunately, to our national humiliation we found that we were not prepared to meet the challenge. And for this weakness that has already been demonstrated I do not want to put the entire blame on the ruling party alone. Because our weaknesses are more basic and more deep, hence all the parties—the ruling party has a special responsibility, I agree—have contributed for the continuance of this basic weakness that is inherent in our nation. I was reminded when Christ was faced with a similar situation on an occasion.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Communist speaking of Christ.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Quoting scriptures.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: There was a woman, a sinner and the people wanted to stone her to death. Then Christ went there. The people said that she deserved to be stoned to death. Then he said, "He who is not a sinner, let him cast the first stone". And the story is that there was none to throw the stone. In the same way, unless you discuss the whole question as a national question, as a question wherein all the people, all the parties have contributed in their own way for this state of affairs, I do not think we will be able to come to a proper solution of the matter. That is why I want to raise it above party consideration.

It is true that nobody has said that on the border issue a Communist country like China will attack us in such a massive way. That is true. But at the same time if such an occasion arises, we have to be prepared for it. And in that preparation what counts most is our own industrial strength. If this is forgotten, if people see that only by borrowing arms from other countries, or by getting military aids from other countries, our country can be defended, I feel we are mistaken. Thereby I am not denying that we may not have to take help from other people. But the basic factor is whether we have the inherent strength that an independent nation should have to defend itself. Basing on that strength we may take help from our friends. But our strength is mainly in our basic preparation. Whenever any question of industrialisation comes, whenever any question of heavy industries comes, I feel that some of our friends are not very much in favour of it. They point out the attitude we have taken earlier. When the Plans were discussed, when special emphasis was laid on heavy industries, some of our friends were not at all enthused about it. They wanted to lay more and more stress on agriculture. Today what is the position? We have to fight tha

[Shri M. N. Govindan Nair.]

Chinese. Their production of steel today is 18 million tons. What is our production? It is not even 6 million tons. It is 3- 5 million tons. Then with regard to the • nation-building industries, Madam, where are we? Everybody knows our weaknesses. This industrial weakness is there. We have never taken all the parties together. We have not tackled this problem with the seriousness that it deserves.

In the statement made by the hon. Minister it is very interesting to note that we are short of engineers and doctors. We could not get even 40 per cent, of the doctors needed.

AN HON. MEMBER: Engineers.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Doctors also. It has been mentioned that with regard to the recruitment of officers for technical work such as engineering and medical, considerable difficulties are being experienced. On the medical side we have been able to recruit 40 per cent, of the officers that we would need for 1963-64. I was just conveying with regret to the House that with regard to engineering graduates, the response has been unsatisfactory. I am pointing out these things to show not only the industrial backwardness but even in the matter of technical staff we could not find 40 per cent, of the staff that is needed. You know from this Report itself that in order to sufficiently equip and strengthen your Army what has been done till now is not sufficient. On the technical side we are backward, on the industrial side we are backward. Unless there is some urgency in the whole country to change the whole pattern of development, I think we will not be able to cope with the situation.

SHRI N: SRI RAMA REDDY (Mysore): Does the hon. Member mean that all these engineers will be born overnight?

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: I do not say that engineers can be born overnight. That is why I said that in the past, when you won independence, as an independent nation, in order to defend the freedom certain basic things were necessary. But that was not done by anybody. You did not do it. Your Party had a greater responsibility in regard to that matter.

Now, I would take up some other question about which nothing has been mentioned in the matter of our preparedness. In this Report about the NEFA reverses an important chapter should have been on our Military Intelligence. Its failure has been discussed here and it has been mentioned in the statement also. This report, i.e., the report on military preparedness, is completely silent on this question. The Government have not yet done anything to improve our Intelligence system. One factor which has come to our notice is that there is none among Indians who can decode the Chinese messages and for that some gentleman was brought from Hong Kong. So, we are entirely dependent on him for decoding whatever information we get from them. Recently I heard that another Chinese who was residing in Viswabharati has been brought here for Intelligence work. Now, Madam, if you are to depend entirely on foreign nationals for decoding the material gathered by your Intelligence, then I think it is a very pitiable state of affairs. So, my point is that we should accept our basic weakness and that basic weakness arises out of certain historical factors.

As far as the Chinese are concerned. Madam, for the last 30 or 35 years they were always in war with one group or the other or with some other country. The entire country has been conditioned for war. But as far as we are concerned, the biggest violence was shouting of slogans, and we discourage violence in every way, because non-violence has been our creed.

Even now we feel that if we shout too much, we can strengthen our country. I think we should change that attitude. When I heard certain statements from the Government side about our preparedness and all that, I thought that they should not have been made; they should not make such statements because statements will not defeat anybody. When you do not have even engineers and doctors, when you do not have even a well-organised Intelligence Department, I do not think the situation can very much change. The impression that you are giving that today we are prepared to face any situation is wrong. Even today we have to prepare ourselves much more if we are to face the situation.

With regard to another aspect, that is to say, with regard to our jawans . . .

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nair, you have taken 20 minutes.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Just two minutes more, Madam. I have one point to make.

Everybody agrees, Madam, that our jawans are first-rate people. Nobody has any complaint against them. What about the leadership in the Army? They had no experience. They were always guided by the British. So, we are short of proper leadership. If they failed, I am not blaming them for that, because that was also due to their want of experience. But I cannot understand this attitude of the Government. When certain persons are condemned by the public for their failures, these persons get encouragement from the Government directly or indirectly. That, I am afraid, will spoil the morale of the military as well as that of the public. General Kaul might have had influenza at that time and that was the reason why he was in Delhi. But it was almost a scandal at that time, that when we were facing reverses in NEFA, we heard the report that this person was in a Delhi hospital. Now, I under-

stand this gentleman has been employed somewhere in a shipping concern.

AN HON. MEMBER: How much • will you hold Shri Krishna Menon responsible for the reverses?

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Whosoever may be responsible for putting him in a shipping concern. . .

AN HON. MEMBER: Not into the hospital.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Let me finish this point. I will come to deal with Mr. Krishna Menon later. Whosoever may be responsible for putting Gen. Kaul in a shipping concern may say that this is a private concern and they have nothing to do with it. But I say there is some constructive responsibility on the part of the Government of India. Otherwise no shipping concern would employ him.

AN HON. MEMBER: They have allowed him.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: At that time another name was also famous or rather notorious and that was one Pathania, Col. Pathania, I think. «

AN HON. MEMBER: No, General Pathania.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: There was talk that he too was responsible for our failures. But I find that he has been given some other post. He is now, I think the leader of our National Discipline Scheme. Sir, this attitude of the Government is very wrong and it will never heighten the morale either of the people or of our jawans. So, the Government should change this attitude. They should also stop this kind of talk about their preparedness and their strength and all that. They should assess the situation in all its reality and make amends for past weaknesses and try to build up and strengthen our defences. Following a

[Shri M. N. Govindan Nair.] policy of peace does not mean that we should be militarily weak. Following the policy of non-alignment does not mean that we should be militarily weak. For example, look at a country like Indonesia which is following the policy of non-alignment, look at their military strength. The most modern weapons are in their possession. A country like the Soviet Union which follows the policy of peace, is militarily strong. It is militarily second to none. So, do not confuse your political policies or do not use them as a cover to cover up your weaknesses and unpreparedness. Face them squarely and try to overcome them. That is all I have to say. Thank you.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Madam Deputy Chairman, we are dealing with the two statements that the Defence Minister placed before the House, one dealing with the question of training, equipment and our failures in that direction, the other dealing with the measures that the Defence Minister has taken to make up those deficiencies and to prepare us for any eventuality. In other words, one is the diagnosis and the other is the remedy. Madam Deputy Chairman, in matters of debate on our foreign policy and particularly so on defence matters, this House has got a very great and serious responsibility. We have to see what is the object of such discussions in Parliament. With your permission, I would say, Madam Chairman, that the only object of such discussions is to create terror in the minds of our enemies and to give a message of hope and inspiration and confidence to the public and particularly to our military forces. These objectives have to be maintained throughout the discussion. These discussions in Parliament have far-reaching effect on the future of the country and it is true to say that not only on this side of the House but also on that side of the House, I have no doubt that everyone in the House, no matter to which party he may

belong, no matter whether he belongs to the ruling party or to the Opposition, we are all patriotic and we all have the good of our country at heart.

AN HON. MEMBER: There is no "side" as far as that is concerned.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Yes, there are no two opinions. So, it is our responsibility to keep the main objective before our mind when we discuss this problem.

Madam Deputy Chairman, our responsibility is heightened still more, because the danger about which we are having these discussions is not yet completely eliminated. I know my friend Mr. Mani referred to certain reports and enquiries. They took place after the war was over. But so far as our position at this juncture is concerned, the danger is still greater than what it was in last October. Forces have been concentrated on our border and they are much more than what they were in last October. Another element is that last October we had only China to face. Now there is a new alignment between China and Pakistan and so our responsibility is still greater. Let them all feel that no matter what difference there may be in our internal problems, so far as defence is concerned, so far as the security of the country is concerned, so far as the honour of the country is concerned, we are all united and all our attention, all our energy, are directed towards the task of doing what should be done tomorrow, not what has happened yesterday.

Of course, it is very necessary to consider the problem fully. I do not mean to say we should neglect our failures. I do not want to say that those mistakes are not to be very carefully examined. We should do that and we should take lessons from our failures, so that in the future our steps may be correct ones. To that extent, I am sure we all agree. But

what I am referring to is what Mr. Mani and Mr. Vajpayee said. They were rather anxious to have a regular enquiry. They felt that it should have been a regular enquiry, in a way, an open enquiry. But is this the right occasion for it? Even in order to fix the responsibility, you will have to go into such details and such matters will be brought to light as will not be in the best interests of the country. This House will have to decide whether, in order to fix up the responsibility—I am not defending anybody, let it be clear—and in order to have an open and public enquiry, it would adopt a process which is full of dangerous possibilities of our enemy getting advantage of the information—which danger is much more now—or whether we should confine our attention to our lapses and deficiencies so that such lapses and deficiencies can be made up. In the light of this submission, and having a clear objective of giving a message of hope and confidence to our own people, let us consider these two reports.

As regards the first report, I do not think anybody on this side has ever said that the reverses that we suffered last year were something which did not make us feel pained and grieved. We have never said that we did not feel humiliated. Let me tell you, all Members belonging to all parties and the whole country felt humiliated and felt grieved at these reverses, but I do not agree with suggestions indirectly made by Mr. Vajpayee that the ex-Defence Minister did it intentionally. He may have committed mistakes—he has committed mistakes and I do not agree with him—but I do not doubt his patriotism. What we have to see is whether our preparations were adequate or not, and if they were inadequate, we have to look to our background of the relations with China and also the background out of which we have come up. I do not want to argue for or justify anybody or any person. Let it be very clearly understood because, when the interests of the country are

concerned, nobody is greater than the country itself. There is no doubt about it but what I want to point out is this. At the same time as India attained independence, China attained independence. We had a certain unpleasant background with Pakistan on account of the partition of the country. It is really the best strategy to see that when our relations with Pakistan are not cordial we maintain cordial relations with another mighty neighbour of ours. We had friendly relations with that country and we proceeded on that basis. The result of this was that we prepared ourselves so far as Pakistan was concerned and, so far as China was concerned, let me admit, we did not prepare and as I would show immediately, we could not prepare in those circumstances against the mighty strength of China, with the result, Madam, that several delegations were exchanged, cordialities were exchanged and we were fighting for the entry of China into the United Nations consistently.

In 1959, it appeared that our cordiality and our friendly gesture were likely to be misunderstood and we further felt that so far as the border problem was concerned, things were not quite as o.k. as we thought they should be. You will remember, Madam, that after 1959, we started a road-building organisation and we started work on strengthening the means of communication which was the most difficult problem in view of the terrain. In 1960, Mr. Chou Eri-lai, the Prime Minister of China, came to India. We had discussions with him. We felt that we did not agree with him but even then, mind you, it was only a border dispute and nothing more. Then, a committee of officials was appointed to go into the whole question. This was the situation so far as our relations with China was concerned.

So far as our own economic and industrial condition was concerned, this was no hidden matter. When we

[Shri Akbar Ali Khan.] became independent, we had inherited the backward economy, the poverty, the illiteracy and all those things which accompany foreign rule. Not only this, Madam, but we had also the huge responsibility of rehabilitation and the problems that arose out of the partition of the country. That was the background and we had then to decide on the priorities to allocate our resources of men and money. In order to do this, we established the Planning Commission which had to take into consideration all these matters. Now, with due respect to our friends on the side opposite, I would say that nobody before 1962 asked for an increase in our armed strength, nobody asked for an increase in the military budget and nobody said that we should prepare ourselves in the same way as we have done in the present Budget. On the other hand, veteran leaders of the Opposition charged us with spending too much on the military and added, "When we think of the Gandhian philosophy and the moral principles for which we stand, we feel ashamed at your spending so much money on the army." That was the position. We had been brought up and we had won our freedom also on moral grounds and by our sacrifices. We had been trained in a non-violent way and to us the supreme task after gaining independence was to get rid of poverty, to see that our people got a square meal, got proper education, fair wages, accommodation and such other facilities. I want to know which patriot would have said or asked why we were spending so much on education, on these big irrigation projects so that agriculture may improve, on the establishment of the big steel mills in order to develop our country industrially. In those circumstances, and having in mind all the circumstances of the case, nobody could have said that the allotment for the armed forces should be increased. I share the humiliation that we have suffered but I think no other Government, in the place of the one that is now functioning, could have taken

a different action before, 1962. because our priorities of development would have been adversely affected.

Now, just one word about this humiliation. I think we all remember what happened at Pearl Harbour when the Japanese attacked the United States. Certainly the United States felt humiliated and soon after that joined the war. What happened at Dunkirk? What happened in Russia in the last War when they had to face the enemy with their back to the wall at Stalingrad, when, their whole country was run over by the Germans? Let those people who gloat over our reverses understand that we have got great traditions, our forces have great traditions. In the two World Wars they have proved their merit and after independence they have proved their merit with greater ability and greater courage.

SHRI SHEEL BHADRA YAJEE (Bihar): Even though they were hired solidiers.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: At that time, yes. Now, let us bear this in mind. When our friends on the opposite try to criticise us for lack of preparations let them remember that in those circumstances the economic development was the supreme duty of the Government and the public would not have tolerated if they would have spent the money sanctioned in 1962 for defence purposes.

Now, Madam, with your permission, I would like to suggest that so far as the other report is concerned, on the question of preparations there are some basic policies which I want the Ministry to bear in mind and I am sure the whole House will agree with me in this that the burden of defending the country will ultimately fall on the shoulders of the people of this country and they will have to bear the whole responsibility. Having this in our mind our first aim should be that we should manufacture our own

ammunition, our own weapons and all other things connected with warfare in our own country. I quite appreciate that we cannot manufacture them overnight but our object should be that we manufacture them in our own country, that we make our own weapons so that in case of necessity we may not be put to any great risk by depending on others. That is one thing.

The other thing is that I do not share the view of my hon. friend, Shri Vajpayee when he said that we should get military men also from outside to fight on our borders and to defend our country. I think a cursory glance at history will show that when the people came to defend you they do not come only to defend you; they come to rule you. So, let this be our basic policy: so far as the defence of the country is concerned, we shall prepare ourselves and we should lace the burden. As my time is up, I would only like to say this. I would request the Defence Minister to see that the plan that we have made to educate our young men and to give them military* training in our universities is taken up earnestly with all the care that is necessary. And I would like no exception to be made except on very serious medical grounds. Let all our young men be trained for the defence of our country. At the same time it gives them a sense of comradeship which is not to be found anywhere else. Madam, Deputy Chairman, it is the experience of most of us that the feeling of comradeship and affection among the different groups, different communities and among people of different provinces that we find in the military is hardly to be found anywhere else. Keeping in mind the necessity for unity and strength and also the fact that we should defend our country with our men and with our own material. I would say that very careful attention should be given to this matter. Our young people should not feel frustrated; they should not feel that they are not being given proper education and training.

I had a few suggestions to make but as my time is up I would close now. I would only say that so far as this debate is concerned let us look to what preparations should be made and how best we can face any future danger rather than look to the past because industrial progress and unity are very much important for the defence of the country. I would just say a word about world opinion and the sympathies of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. World opinion is needed. Certainly we welcome it and we are grateful to those countries who have given us help at the time of the crisis and who have shown sympathy to us. That itself is the guarantee of the success of our non-alignment policy that both the two great world Powers who do not see eye to eye in many things are sympathetic towards us and are prepared to help us.

Thank you, Madam.

شری پیارے لال کرپل بدطالب،
(اثر پردیہ): مہودیہ - میں آپ
کا زیادہ سے نہیں لوں گا میں آپ کا
شکر یہ ادا کرنا چاہتا ہوں کہ آپ نے
مجھے بولنے کے لئے تائم دیا - نیفا
میں ہماری فوج کو جس شکست کا
سامنا کرنا پڑا ہے وہ ایسی شکست ہے
یا وہ ایسا کلک ہے جس کو شاید
ہم کبھی دھو نہیں سکتے - یہ تو
آپ جانتے ہی ہیں کہ پہلی جنگ
عظیم میں ہماری فوجوں نے بڑی
بہادری دکھلائی - ہماری فوجوں میں
ایسٹ یورپین کلتیریز میں گئیں
فرانس وغیرہ میں گئیں جہاں انہوں
نے بڑی بہادری کے کارنامے دکھلائے -
اب یہ بھی اچھی طرح سے جانتے

[شری پیہارے لال کوریل مطالبہ]

ہیں کہ ہماری فوج وزیرستان اور افغانستان کی لڑائی میں بھی گئی ہے۔ چہاں اس نے بڑی بہادری دکھلائی۔ پتھانوں کی لڑائی میں بھی ہماری فوج نے اپنی بہادری کا پورا ثبوت دیا اور ایسا ثبوت دیا کہ ہماری فوج کا نام ساری دنیا میں روشن ہو گیا۔ ہمارے سپاہیوں کی بہادری اور ان کے ہونے کا طریقہ اور ان سب صفتوں کے متعلق جو ہماری فوج میں تھیں عام شہرت ہو گئی تھی مگر نیفا میں ہماری فوج کو جو شکست ملی ہے وہ شکست ایسی نہیں ہے جس کو ہم خاموشی سے برداشت کر لیں۔ یہاں جس پر ہم غور و خوض نہ کریں۔ ہماری فوج کی جو نیفا میں ناکامی ہوئی ہے وہ ہمارے چہرے پر ایک بڑا بھاری طمانچہ ہے۔ ہماری فوج کو اتنی بہادر ہونے ہوئے بھی اتنی بڑی ناکامی ملی ہے ایک ایسی چیز ہے جس پر گورنر ملک کو سرکاری سوچنا چاہیئے۔

میں آپ سے عرض کرنا چاہتا ہوں کہ ہم سب لوگ ایک ہیں ہم آپ کے دشمن نہیں ہیں ہم آپ کے دوست ہیں اور یہاں ملک کی حفاظت کا سوال اٹے گا اگر آپ کا پسینہ بہے گا تو ہم اپنا خون بہانے کے لئے تیار رہیں گے۔ یہ ہم سب اپوزیشن کے لوگ جو ہیں ان سب

کا یہی خیال ہے مگر جب ہم سرکار کا اذیتورہ دیکھتے ہیں تو ہم پاتے ہیں کہ ہماری طرف سے جو باتیں کہی جاتی ہیں ان پر کبھی غور نہیں کیا جاتا۔

میں نے پہلی لوک سبھا میں ۱۹۵۲ کی لوک سبھا - مجھے سال یاد نہیں ہے ۵۴ ہو یا شاید ۵۳ ایسا ہی ہے ایک سوال ڈیفنس اور اپنے فوجیوں اور افسروں کے متعلق پوچھا تھا میں نے اس وقت کانگریس کا ممبر ہوتے ہوئے بھی یہ سوال کیا تھا جس پر مجھے کانگریس کے آدمیوں نے بہت برا بھلا کہا اور شاید کانگریس سے نکلنے کی ایک بڑی وجہ یہ بھی ہو سکتی ہے۔ میری پرورش صوبہ سرحد میں ہوئی ہے۔ پنجاب میں ہوئی ہے اور میں ملٹری فمیلی سے تعلق رکھتا ہوں اس لئے میرا تعلق فوج سے ہے اور میں اس کی بہت کچھ باتوں کو جانتا ہوں اور اب بھی جانتا ہوں۔ انگریزوں کے زمانہ میں آج کل کے سینیٹر کمیشن آفیسروں کو کلنگس کمیشن آفیسر کہتے تھے اور ان آفیسروں کو کچھ خاص رعایتیں اور فیسلیٹیٹیز ملی ہوئی تھیں اور انہیں کے بارے میں میں نے یہ سوال کیا تھا۔ لڑائی بندی کے بعد ہماری کانگریس سرکار نے اس طرح کی فیسلیٹیٹیز اور کچھ رعایتیں اور امینٹیٹیز جو انہیں انگریزوں کی حکومت کے دوران ملا کرتی تھیں

انہیں ایک دم بند کر دیا یا اس میں کمی کر دی جس کی وجہ سے افسروں میں ایک بڑی تشویش پھیلی۔ میں نے اس وقت اس کے بارے میں سوال کیا تھا اور جس کا بی - این - داتار نے پہلی لوک سپہا میں کوئی تسلی بخش جواب . میں دیا تھا -

2 P. M.

تو ہم نے اسی خیال سے کہا تھا کہ ہماری آرمی میں کسی قسم کا دس سیٹسٹیکشن ہونا چاہیئے۔ ان کو سٹسٹائٹڈ رکھنا چاہیئے - آرمی آفیسرس کو آپ دیکھئے - دوسری لڑائی کے بند ہونے کے بعد ۵۰ فی صدی آرمی آفیسر ایسے ہیں جو قرضہ کے بوجھ کے چپے دیے ہوئے ہیں اور جو اپنا گذارا شکل سے کر سکتے ہیں - یہ ایک حقیقت ہے ان کی چمک دمک اور جس طرح وہ لباس پہنے دھتے ہیں اس کو مت دیکھئے - اگر آپ ان کے خانگی حالات کو دیکھیں تو آپ کو معلوم ہوگا کہ انکی مالی حالت بہت خراب ہے جو سہولتیں ان کو پہلے ملی ہوئی تھیں وہ اب نہیں ہیں - ایک تو سب سے بڑی وجہ اور سب سے بڑا کارن جس کو ہم سمجھ سکتے ہیں وہ یہ ہے کہ ایک بڑا دس سیٹسٹیکشن آرمی نے اندر تھا اور اب بھی ہے - میں آپ سے یہاں تک کہہ سکتا ہوں اور بہت ذمہ داری کے ساتھ کہہ سکتا ہوں کہ ۵۰ فی صدی سے زیادہ فوجی آرمی کمیونسٹ دیشوں کے ہم درد ہیں - یہ میں بالکل صحیح آپ کو بتا رہا ہوں آرمی انٹیلیجنس نے کہا

کیا ہے ؟ کچھ آدمی ضرور انہوں نے نکال دیئے آرمی سے - مگر حقیقت یہ ہے کہ جتنے بڑے بڑے آفیسر ہیں جتنے ہمارے سینئر کمیشنڈ آفیسر ہیں ان میں سے زیادہ افسروں کی ہمدردی جو ہے وہ کمیونسٹ دیشوں کے ساتھ ہے - اس کو آپ معلوم کریں اور حقیقت کا پتہ لگائیں کہ یہ اصلیت ہے یا نہیں - محض یہ کہہ دیئے سے کہ ہمارے پاس ہتھیار نہیں تھے ہمارے پاس آدمی نہیں تھے - ٹھیک ہے یہ بھی ایک وجہ ہو سکتی ہے - مگر ہم کو سب سے بڑی وجہ جو نظر آتی ہے وہ یہی ہے کہ ہمارے آرمی کے نرجوانوں اور آفیسروں کے اندر ایک بڑا بھاری دس سیٹسٹیکشن تھا -

اس کے علاوہ جو دوسری سب سے بڑی وجہ ہو سکتی ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ اوپر کے افسروں میں اور جو سپاہی لڑنے والے ہیں ان کے بیچ میں آج ایک بڑی بھاری خلیج بڑھتی جا رہی ہے - ان کے آپس کے ریلیشن جو ہیں وہ اچھے نہیں ہیں - پہلے انگریز آفیسر تھے اور وہ سپاہی کے ساتھ بہت ہمہ داندہ سلوک کرتے تھے ان کے ساتھ بہت محبت سے پیسے آتے تھے - مگر ہم نے دیکھا ہے کہ اندین آرمی آفیسرس کا سلوک اپنے سپاہیوں کے ساتھ اچھا نہیں ہے - اسی طرح ان سپاہیوں کو جو خوراک ملتی ہے اور بڑے افسروں کو

[شری پیارے لال کرپل مطالبہ]
جو خوراک ملتی ہے اس میں بھی
بڑا بھاری انکڑ ہے - یہ تمام باتیں
ایسی نہیں ہیں جن کو سرسری طور
پر نظر انداز کر دیا جائے -
یہ بہت ہی سیریس
باتیں ہیں اور ان کو سمجھنے کی
ضرورت ہے - تو یہ دس سیٹسٹیکشن جو
آرمی کے اندر ہے یہ ایک بڑا بھاری
کارن ہو سکتا ہے -

اس کے بعد آپ کو یاد ہوگا کہ
آزادی کے بعد ہم لوگوں نے اپنی طرف
سے ایک بڑی کمزوری دکھلائی - میں
۱۹۵۴ء کی بات بتا رہا ہوں جب
ایوزیشن کے لوگوں نے سوال اٹھایا تھا -
۱۹۵۴ء میں ڈاکٹر اسہدکار نے اس
داجیہ میں ایک تقریر کی تھی
اور اس میں یہ کہا تھا کہ تبت نے
چلے جانے کے بعد لوائی کا اور اندیشہ
ہو سکتا ہے اور ہمارے لئے زیادہ خطرہ
بڑھ سکتا ہے - انہوں نے بہت صاف
الفاظ میں یہ بات کہی تھی -
پچھلی دفعہ میں نے ان کے وہ الفاظ
اس سدن میں دیکھے تھے انہوں نے
وارننگ دی تھی کہ سب سے بڑی
بھول جو ہم کر رہے ہیں وہ یہ ہے
کہ تبت کی آزادی کو ہم بڑی آسانی
سے ختم کرنے جا رہیں - وہاں پر
انگریزی دوران حکومت میں لہاسا
میں ہماری فوج دھتی تھی باقاعدہ
ہمارے آدمی دھتے تھے اور وہاں پر

ٹیلیگراف ٹیلیفون ریست ہاؤس اور
آگ بلنگوز جب موجود تھے جن کو
ہم نے بہت معمولی داموں پر چائڈا
کے حوالہ کر دیئے - یہ ایک ہماری
بڑی بھاری بھول تھی جس بھول کی
طرف ہمارے بہت سے لیکچرس اور
بہت سے سربراہ آورد، لوگوں نے دھیان
دالایا تھا مگر افسوس ہے کہ اس پر
کبھی غور نہیں کیا گیا - انگریزوں کے
وقت میں چین کی کبھی ہمت
نہیں پڑی کہ وہ ہندوستان کی طرف
نظر اٹھا کر دیکھتا محض اس لئے کہ
ہماری فوجیں لہاسہ کے اندر موجود
تھیں - ہمارے ملک کی حفاظت کرنے
کے لئے ہماری فوجیں وہاں پر تھیں -
اگر ہم نے پہلے تبت کی آزادی کا
سوال اٹھایا ہوتا تو یہی نہیں کہ
تبت کے قریب چین نہ آ پاتا بلکہ
سارے دیشوں کی ہمدردی آج ہمارے
حانہ ہوتی - مگر ہم نے کبھی بھی
اس سوال کو نہیں اٹھایا اور کبھی
یہ نہیں سمجھا کہ تبت ایک بفر
اسٹیٹ ہے جس کو قائم رکھنا چاہیئے -
یہ ہماری حفاظت کے لئے ایک بڑا
بھاری سوال ہے اور بڑی اہمیت کا
سوال ہے مگر ہم نے کبھی اس طرف
دھیان نہیں دیا -

ہم وارننگ دیتے رہے ۱۹۵۶ء سے
کہ چائڈا ہماری زمین کو روپ رہا ہے
لیکن اس پر بھی غفلت سے کام لیا

گیا اور یہ نہیں سوچ سکتے تھے کہ
چائنا ہم پر حملہ کریگا - یہ کہدینا
ٹھیک نہیں ہے کہ ہم تیار نہیں تھے -
گورنمنٹ کی طرف سے گاہے بگاہے ایسے
بیانات اشو ہوئے تھے کہ ہم بالکل
تیار تھے ایڈٹ کا جواب ہم پتھر سے
دینے کے لئے تیار تھے گورنمنٹ کی
طرف سے ایسے اسٹیٹمنٹ دئے گئے -
وزیر اعظم کی پہلی تقریر کو آپ نے
سنا ہوگا جب انہوں نے کہا تھا کہ
چائینز کو دھکیل دو ان کی سرحدوں
کی طرف ان کے ملک کی طرف -
بعد میں جو ان کی دہائی سی تقریر
ہوئی اس کو بھی آپ نے سنا ہوگا
اور وہ اس وقت ہوئی تھی جب چائنا
نے حملہ کیا اور جب ہمیں شکست
ہوئی پتے درپتے اگر پہلے سے ہم اس طرف
دھیان دیتے تو ہماری یہ شکست
کبھی نہ ہوتی اور اس طرح سے دنیا
نے سامنے ہمارا مذہ کالا نہ ہوتا - مگر
ہم نے کبھی اس طرف دھیان
نہیں دیا - اس لئے میں یہ آپ سے
درخواست کروں گا کہ جو باتیں اس
سین میں ہوں ان کی طرف
آپ دھیان دیں - آج جمہوریت کا
زمانہ ہے - ہم بھی گورنمنٹ کا ہاتھ
بٹانا چاہتے ہیں اور اس دیش کی
حفاظت کرنا چاہتے ہیں - اس لئے
جو ہماری طرف سے باتیں کہی جائیں
ان پر بھی آپ غور کریں -

دوسرا جو ہماری شکست کا کارن
ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ ہمارا کمیونیکیشن اور
ٹرانسمیوٹ کا کوئی بلندیست نہیں

ہے ان مقامات میں - معلوم ہونا
چاہیئے تھا سرکار کو کہ ہماری فوجوں
کو ایک دن یہاں پر لڑنا پڑے گا ان
پہاڑوں پر چڑھنا پڑے گا اور یہاں پر
سہائی کا انتظام کرنا پڑے گا اور فوجوں
کو بھیجنا پڑے گا - آزادی کے بعد یہ
آپ کا فرض ہے اور سب سے پہلا سوال
ہے کہ دیہی کی حفاظت ہو - اگر
دیہی کی حفاظت نہیں ہوتی ہے تو
ہم ترقی کر کے کیا کریں گے اور یہ
بڑے بڑے کل کارخانے اور فیکٹریاں
بلانا سب بے کار ہے - تو سب سے پہلا
سوال ہمارے سامنے یہ ہے کہ ہم ملک
کی حفاظت کریں اور ملک کی
حفاظت کا پورا بندوبست کریں مگر
ہم نے کبھی اپنی فوجوں کا پہاڑوں
پر لڑائی کرنے کی پہاڑوں پر چڑھنے
کی پہاڑوں پر سامان لے جانے کی
ٹریننگ نہیں دی - ہمارے پاس
ٹرانسمیوٹ کا کوئی انتظام نہیں تھا -
سڑکوں کا انتظام نہیں تھا اور ہمارا
یہ فرض تھا کہ ہم اس کا انتظام کرتے -

پچھلی لڑائی میں ہمارے پاس
پائینیر بیٹیلین تھیں - اس سلسلہ
میں روز سوال کرتا ہوں مگر متوجہ
تسلی بخش جواب نہیں ملتا ہے -
تو پائینیر بیٹیلینس پچھلی لڑائی کے
دوران میں تھیں اور بہت سے لوگ
اس میں رہے روت کئے گئے تھے - ان
کو تجربہ تھا سڑکیں بنانے کا ہی
نہیں - سڑکوں کی حفاظت کرنے کا

[میری پیارے لال کرپل مطالبہ]
ہی نہیں بلکہ اپنے ہاتھوں سے اور
اپنے ہتھیاروں سے لڑنے کا بھی - مگر
لڑائی کے بعد دفعتاً یہ بٹھلین ڈسپلنڈ
کر دی گئیں - آخر یہ کیوں کیا گیا
اور اگر کر ہی دیا گیا تھا تو ان کو
دیوانیو کرنا چاہیئے تھا ہماری سرکار کو -
آج جو ہمارے ڈیفنس منسٹر ہیں
ان کو آدمی کے متعلق بہت کم نالچ
ہے - وہ نہیں جانتے ہیں کہ کس
طرح سے انگریزی دوران حکومت میں
ٹرانسپورٹ اور کمیونیکیشن کا معقول
انتظام ہوتا تھا - یہ تھیک ہے کہ آپ
نے روڈ ڈیولپمنٹ بورڈ بنا دیا ہے مگر
اس میں نئے آدمی ہیں اور وہ کچھ
جانتے نہیں ہیں - ہماری پائینٹر
بٹھلین جو ہیں وہ مدت سے فوج کا
ایک حصہ وہی ہیں فوج کا ایک انگ
رہی ہیں جن کو ہتھیاروں کا استعمال
کرنا سکھایا جاتا تھا - آپ جس روڈ
ڈیولپمنٹ بورڈ کی بات کرتے ہیں اس
میں ذیلی ریجنز پر لوگوں سے کام کرایا
جاتا ہے مگر ہماری پائینٹر بٹھلین اور
لہر بٹھلین جو ہیں سیپرس اور
مائٹرس جو ہیں ان کو اوزار چلائے
کی ہتھیار چلانے کی بھی ٹریننگ
دی جاتی تھی ان کو بخود استعمال
کرنا اور لڑائی لڑنا بھی سکھایا جاتا
تھا اور لڑائی کے وقت اس کا ثبوت
انہوں نے دیا - اس وقت ہمارے
سی - این - سی جو تھے ان کا آپ
بیان پڑھئے وہ سیپرس میں بھی

نکلا تھا کہ اگر کبھی ضرورت پڑ گئی
تو انہوں نے جاپانیوں کا پورا مقابلہ
کیا - برما میں پور اور اسمال میں
انہوں نے جاپانیوں کا مقابلہ کیا - تو
یہ سوال جو میں نے اٹھایا وہ اس
لئے اٹھایا کہ ہماری سرکار نے ٹرانسپورٹ
اور کمیونیکیشن کی طرف کوئی توجہ
نہیں دی - اگر اُس نے اس طرف
توجہ دی ہوتی اور ہمارے آدمی
وہاں پہنچ سکتے ہمارا سپلائی کا
وہاں انتظام ہو سکتا تو جو شکست
ہم نے کھائی ہے وہ ہم نہ کھاتے - اس
لئے ہم چاہتے ہیں کہ وہ پہلی پائینٹر
بٹھلین جو ہیں وہ دیوانو کی جائیں -

پہلے گورنمنٹ میں لہر بٹھلین
کا سینٹر تھا اور وہاں لیپرس کو
ریکروٹ کیا جاتا تھا - اس کے علاوہ
کئی ایک چمار بٹھلین تھی - میں
نے ایک پرسنل سپنٹرل اسمبلی میں
۱۹۴۳ء میں رکھا تھا کہ ان چھوٹی
چھوٹی ڈانہوں کو لڑاکا فوج میں
ریکروٹ کیا جائے - تو راجپوت ذاتیاں
ہیں ان کو مارشل ریمس کہا جاتا ہے
ہم اُس میںٹلہٹی سے سفر کرتے ہیں اور
مارشل کمیونٹی اور نان مارشل
کمیونٹی کا سوال اپنے سامنے رکھتے
ہیں مگر اصل میں راجپوت قومیں
جو ہیں وہ لڑتے لڑتے کمزور پڑ گئی
ہیں اور ان کے اندر سے اب بہاندری
چلی گئی ہے - یہ ایک سائکولوجیکل

فیکٹ ہے۔ اس کو آپ سمجھیں اور یہ جو چھوٹی چھوٹی قومیں ہیں جن کو کہیں لڑائی ۲ موقعہ نہیں ملا اگر ان کو موقعہ ملے تو وہ بہت بہادری دکھا سکتی ہیں اس سلسلہ میں میں مہار بٹیلین کی مثال پیش کرتا ہوں۔

اس وقت ۱۹۴۳ء میں اس کو دوبارہ لڑائی میں بھرتی کیا گیا اور انہوں نے پچھلی لڑائی میں وہ نمایاں بہادری دکھائی کہ کچھ کہنا نہیں۔ وہ شہدولت گاسٹ کی بٹیلین تھی جو کہ اب ہندوستان کی فوج کے اندر پوسٹل انٹینگری ہے۔ اور اس نے اس لڑائی میں بھی کتنی بہادری کا ثبوت دیا ہے اس کی مثالیں کئی دفعہ میں سدن میں رکھ چکا ہوں۔ تو یہ وہی اچھوت ہیں۔ آپ نے اندر جو ذہلیت ہے اس کو نکال دیجئے۔ بہادری کسی ایک قوم کی ملکیت نہیں ہے وہ سب قوموں کی ملکیت ہے۔ جس وقت سکھ گرو گوبند سنگھ نے لاکڑا کہ کون ہے جو کہ ہمارے لئے جان قربان کر سکتے ہیں تو یہی لوگ اٹے جن کو پانچ پیارے کہا جاتا ہے وہ سب کے سب اچھوت ذاتوں سے تعلق رکھتے تھے جنہوں نے اپنے آپ کو سب سے پہلے قربانی کے لئے پیش کیا۔ آج ہماری فوج کے اندر مددگار اور مذہبی سکھ ہیں جن کی فوج ۱۹۴۷ء سے قائم ہے اور جنہوں نے

مقابل ایسٹ۔ میں کافی نمایاں کام کیا۔ وہ بھی اچھوت ذاتوں کی فوج ہے۔ تو یہ جو ذہلیت ہے اس کو دل سے نکال دیں اور اس بات کہ میں پرورد الفاظ میں کہوں گا کہ جس قوم سے میں تعلق رکھتا ہوں اس کے اندر ماسٹل اسپرٹ ہے۔

I can fight like a bull when the time comes.

اگر موقعہ مل جائے تو میں ہاتھ سے لڑ سکتا ہوں اپنی جان دے کر رکھا سکتا ہوں دیش کے لئے خون کا قطرہ قطرہ بہا سکتا ہوں مگر آپ اس ذہلیت کے شکار نہ ہوں اور یہ سمجھیں کہ ہر ایک آدمی کہ آدمی کے اندر بھرتی ہونے کا حق ہے اور ایک گروولی نیشنل آرمی بنانے کی ضرورت ہے۔

Every man is a soldier at the time of war.

مگر ہمارے یہاں جب کہ دیش کے اندر صرف ایک چوتھائی آدمی کو فوج میں بھرتی ہونے کا ادھکار ہو تو کیا ہم اپنے دیش کی رکشا کر سکتے ہیں کیا ہم اپنے دیش کی حفاظت کر سکتے ہیں؟ تو اس خیال کو اس ذہلیت کو چھوڑئے۔ آپ اپنی پہلے کے وقت کی مثالوں کو دیکھئے کہ کس طرح کی ذہلیت ہم نے دکھائی اور کس طرح سے بورونی حماء آوروں نے ہم پر قابو پایا اور ہم پر حکومت

[شری پیارے لال کرپل مطالبہ]
کمی - تو ان سب باتوں کو دیکھتے
ہوئے ہم اپنی ذہنیت کو بدلیں اور
پرانے خدشہ کو اپنے دل و دماغ سے
نکل دیں -

شری عبدالغنی : سیکورٹی پہلے آئے
و یا اکانامی پہلے آئے گی -؟

پرائم منسٹر نے کہا تھا کہ ہمارے
افسروں نے کہا کہ کچھ چیزوں کی
ہمیں ضرورت ہے کچھ اوزاروں کی
ضرورت ہے جس کا ہم نہیں دے سکے
مگر بہت افسوس کی بات ہے کہ
پچھلے کئی سالوں سے جو روپیہ سدن
دیتا تھا منظور کرتا تھا وہ بھی پرانی
استعمال نہیں ہوتا تھا اور اس
علاوہ کافی روپیہ ایسا تھا جو کہ بیچ
کیا جاو کہ لیمپس ہو گیا - تو اس چیز
کو دیکھنے کی ضرورت ہے -

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have
taken nearly twenty minutes. Please wind up.

شری پیارے لال کرپل : مطالبہ :
کرشنا مہلن کو آپ نے قربانی کا بکرا
بنا دیا - اس سب کا کرشنا مہلن
ہی ذمہ دار نہیں تھا یہ تو جوئلٹ
ریسپنسبلٹی کیپیبلٹی کی ہے
اور اگر کرشنا مہلن کو استعفیٰ دینا
پڑا تو میں یہ کہوتا کہ اس کو قربانی
کا بکرا بنایا گیا ورنہ تمام کی تمام
پوری کیپیبلٹی کو اس بات پر استعفیٰ

دینا چاہیئے تھا - اتنا بڑا کلک نیفا
کی وجہ سے ہمارے چہرے پر لگا ہے
ایک ہی آدمی کے استعفیٰ دینے سے
سوال حل نہیں ہوتا پوری کیپیبلٹی
کو استعفیٰ دینا چاہیئے تھا - ہمارے
چلتا نے کرشنا مہلن کو استعفیٰ دینے
پر مجبور کیا اور اسی طرح سے ہمارے
چلتا کو وزیر اعظم سے استعفیٰ دلانے
کے لئے اور پوری کیپیبلٹی کا استعفیٰ
دلانے کے لئے مجبور کرنا چاہیئے تھا -
یہ ہمارا حق ہے - اتنی قربانی دینے
کے بعد جان اور مال کا نقصان کرنے کے
بعد ہم نے یہ آزادی حاصل کی ہے
اور اس کی حفاظت کرنا اس کو قائم
رکھنا ہمارا پھل ضر ہے چلتا کا فرض
ہے - یہ ملک ایک آدمی کا نہیں ہے
یا یہ ملک ان چند آدمیوں کا نہیں
ہے جو کہ کیپیبلٹی کے اندر ہیں یہ
تو سارے دیس کا ہے اور اس آزادی کو
ہم نے سالوں کے بعد صدیوں کے بعد
قربانیوں کے بعد پایا ہے اور اس کو
قائم رکھنا ہے -

میں زیادہ نہیں کہنا چاہتا ہوں
یہی کہوں گا کہ آئندہ کے لئے ہماری
گورنمنٹ کو زیادہ رزیبلٹ ہونا
چاہیئے اور جو خامیاں ہیں ان
کو وہ جلدی سے جلدی دور کرے تاکہ
یہ کلک کا داغ جو ہمارے چہرہ
پر لگا ہے اس کو کسی نہ کسی
طرح سے دھو سکے - تھلک ہو
وہی میچ -

[श्री प्यारेलाल कुरील "तालिब" (उत्तर प्रदेश) : महोदया, मैं आपका ज्यादा समय नहीं लूंगा। मैं आपका श्रुतिग्राह्य अंदा करना चाहता हूँ कि आपने मुझे बोलने के लिए टाइम दिया। नेफा में हमारी फौज को जिस शिकस्त का सामना करना पड़ा है वह ऐसी शिकस्त है या वह ऐसा कलंक है जिसको शायद हम कभी धो नहीं सकते। यह तो आप जानते ही हैं कि पहली जंगे अजीम में हमारी फौजों ने बड़ी बहादुरी दिखाई। हमारी फौजें मिडिल ईस्ट, योरोपियन कण्ट्रीज में गयीं, फ्रांस वगैरा में गयीं जहां उन्होंने बड़ी बहादुरी के कारनामे दिखाए। आप यह भी अच्छी तरह से जानते हैं कि हमारी फौज वजिरिस्तान और अफगानिस्तान की लड़ाई में भी गयीं, जहां उसने बड़ी बहादुरी दिखाई। पिछली लड़ाई में भी हमारी फौज ने अपनी बहादुरी का पूरा सबूत दिया और ऐसा सबूत दिया कि हमारी फौज का नाम सारी दुनिया में रौशन हो गया। हमारे सिपाहियों की बहादुरी और उनके लड़ने का तरीका और उन सब सिपाहियों के मृतल्लिक जो हमारी फौज में थीं आम शोहरत हो गयी थी मगर नेफा में हमारी फौज को जो शिकस्त मिली है वह शिकस्त ऐसी नहीं है जिसको हम खामोशी से बर्दाश्त कर लें, या जिस पर हम गौरो-खौस न करें। हमारी फौज की जो नेफा में नाकामी हुई है वह हमारे चेहरे पर एक बड़ा भारी तमाचा है। हमारी फौज को इतनी बहादुर होते हुए भी इतनी बड़ी नाकामी मिली, यह एक ऐसी चीज है जिस पर गवर्नमेंट को सीरियसली सोचना चाहिए।

मैं आपसे अर्ज करना चाहता हूँ कि हम सब लोग एक हैं, हम आपके दुश्मन नहीं हैं, आपके दोस्त हैं, और जहां मुल्क की हिफाजत का सवाल आएगा, अगर आपका पसीना बहेगा, तो हम अपना खून बहाने के लिए तैयार रहेंगे। यह हम सब अपोजीशन के लोग जो हैं उन सबका यही खयाल है। मगर जब हम सरकार का एटिचूड देखते हैं तो हम पाते हैं

कि हमारी तरफ से जो बातें कहीं जाती हैं उन पर कभी गौर नहीं किया जाता।

मैंने पहली लोक सभा में, १९५२ की लोक सभा में— मुझे साल याद नहीं है कि शायद ५४ हो या ५३ ऐसा ही है— एक सवाल डिफेंस और अपने फौजियों और अफसरों के मृतल्लिक पूछा था। मैंने उस वक्त कांग्रेस का मेम्बर होते हुए भी यह सवाल किया था जिस पर मुझे कांग्रेस के आदमियों ने बहुत बुरा-भला कहा और शायद कांग्रेस से निकलने की एक बड़ी वजह यह भी हो सकती है। मेरी परवरिश सूबा-सरहद में हुई है, पंजाब में हुई है; और मैं मिलिटरी फैमिली से ताल्लुक रखता हूँ इसलिये मेरा ताल्लुक फौज से है और मैं उसकी बहुत कुछ बातों को जानता हूँ और अब भी जानता हूँ। अंग्रेजों के जमाने में आजकल के सीनियर कमीशन आफिसरों को किंग्स कमीशन आफिसर्स कहते थे और उन आफिसरों को कुछ खास रियायतें और फैंसिलीटीज मिली हुई थीं और उन्हीं के बारे में मैंने यह सवाल किया था। लड़ाई-बन्दी के बाद हमारी कांग्रेस सरकार ने इस तरह की फैंसिलीटीज और कुछ रियायतें और एमेनिटीज जो उन्हें अंग्रेजों की हुकूमत के दौरान मिला करती थीं उन्हें एकदम बन्द कर दिया या उसमें कमी कर दी जिसकी वजह से अफसरों में एक बड़ी तशवीश फैली। मैंने उस वक्त इसके बारे में सवाल किया था और जिसका बी० एन० दातार ने पहली लोक सभा में कोई तसल्लीबख्श जवाब नहीं दिया था।

तो हमने इसी खयाल से कहा था कि हमारी आर्मी में किसी किस्म का डिस-सैटिसफैक्शन नहीं होना चाहिये। उनको सैटिसफाई रखना चाहिये। आर्मी आफिसर्स को आप देखिये दूसरी लड़ाई के बन्द होने के बाद पचास फीसदी आर्मी

†[] Hindi translation.

[श्री प्यारेलाल कुरील "तालिब"]

आफीसर्स ऐसे हैं जो कर्ज के बोझ के नीचे दबे हुए हैं और जो अपना गुजारा मुश्किल से कर सकते हैं। यह एक हकीकत है। उनकी चमक-दमक और जिस तरह से वो लिबास पहने रहते हैं उसको मत देखिये। अगर आप उनके खानगी हालात को देखें तो आपको मालूम होगा कि उनकी माली हालत बहुत खराब है। जो सट्टलियतें उनको पहले मिली हुई थीं वो अब नहीं हैं। एक तो सबसे बड़ी बजह और सबसे बड़ा कारण जिसको हम समझ सकते हैं वह यह है कि एक बड़ा डिससैटिसफैक्शन आर्मी के अन्दर था और अब भी है। मैं आपसे यहां तक कह सकता हूं और बहुत जिम्मेदारी के साथ कह सकता हूं कि पचास फीसदी से ज्यादा फौजी आदमी कम्युनिस्ट देशों के हमदर्द हैं। यह मैं बिल्कुल सही आपको बता रहा हूं। आर्मी इन्टेली-जेंस ने क्या किया है? कुछ आदमी जरूर उन्होंने निकाल दिये आर्मी से मगर हकीकत यह है कि जितने बड़े-बड़े आफीसर हैं, जितने हमारे सीनियर कमीशंड आफीसर हैं उनमें से ज्यादा अफसरों की हमदर्दी जो है वो कम्युनिस्ट देशों के साथ है। इसको आप मालूम करें और हकीकत का पता लगायें कि यह असलियत है या नहीं। महज यह कह देने से कि हमारे पास हथियार नहीं थे, हमारे पास आदमी नहीं थे — ठीक है यह भी एक बजह हो सकती है मगर हमको सबसे बड़ी बजह जो नजर आती है वह यही है कि हमारी आर्मी के नौजवानों और आफीसरों के अन्दर एक बड़ा भारी डिससैटिसफैक्शन था।

इसके अलावा जो दूसरी बड़ी बजह हो सकती है वह यह है कि ऊपर के अफसरों में और जो सिपाही लड़ने वाले हैं उनके बीच में आज एक बड़ी भारी खलीज हायल है और वो खलीज बढ़ती जा रही है। उनके आपस के रिलेशन जो हैं वो अच्छे नहीं हैं। पहले अंग्रेज आफीसर थे और वो सिपाही के साथ बहुत हमदर्दानी मुलुक करते थे और

उनके साथ बहुत मुहब्बत से पेश आते थे। मगर हमने देखा है कि इंडियन आर्मी आफीसर्स का मुलुक अपने सिपाहियों के साथ अच्छा नहीं है। इसी तरह उन सिपाहियों को जो खुराक मिलती है और बड़े अफसरों को जो खुराक मिलती है उसमें भी बड़ा भारी अन्तर है। यह तमाम बातें ऐसी नहीं हैं जिनको सरसरी तौर पर नजरअन्दाज कर दिया जाय। यह बहुत ही सीरियस बातें हैं और इनको समझने की जरूरत है। तो ये डिससैटिसफैक्शन जो आर्मी के अन्दर है यह एक बड़ा भारी कारण हो सकता है।

इसके बाद आपको याद होगा कि आजादी के बाद हम लोगों ने अपनी तरफ से एक बड़ी कमजोरी दिखलाई। मैं १९५४ ई० की बात बता रहा हूं जब अपोजीशन के लोगों ने सवाल उठाया था। १९५४ ई० में डा० अम्बेदेकर ने इसी राज्य सभा में एक तकरीर की थी और उसमें यह कहा था कि तिब्बत के चले जाने के बाद लड़ाई का और अंदेशा हो सकता है और हमारे लिये ज्यादा खतरा बढ़ सकता है। उन्होंने बहुत साफ अल्फाज में यह बात कही थी। पिछली दफा मैंने उनके वो अल्फाज इस सदन में रखे थे। उन्होंने वार्निंग दी थी कि सबसे बड़ी भूल जो हम कर रहे हैं वह यह है कि तिब्बत की आजादी को हम बड़ी आसानी से खत्म करने जा रहे हैं। वहां पर अंग्रेजी दौराने हुकुमत में ल्हासा में हमारी फौज रहती थी, बाकायदा हमारे आदमी रहते थे और वहां पर टेलिग्राफ, टेलिफोन, रेस्ट-हाउसज और डाक बंगलोज़ जब मौजूद थे जिनको हमने बहुत मामूली दामों पर चाइना के हवाले कर दिया। यह हमारी बड़ी भारी भूल थी जिस की तरफ हमारे बहुत से लीडर्स और बहुत से सरवर आवदी लोगों ने ध्यान दिलाया था। मगर अफसोस है कि उस पर कभी गौर नहीं किया गया। अंग्रेजों के वक्त में चीन की कभी हिम्मत नहीं पड़ी कि वह हिन्दुस्तान की तरफ नज़र

उठा कर देखता महज इसलिये कि हमारी स्थासा के अन्दर फौजें मौजूद थीं। हमारे मुल्क की हिफाजत करने के लिये हमारी फौजें वहां पर थीं। अगर हमने पहले तिब्बत की आजादी का सवाल उठाया होता तो यही नहीं कि तिब्बत के करीब चीन न आ पाता बल्कि सारे देशों की हमदर्दी आज हमारे साथ होती। मगर हम न कभी भी इस सवाल को नहीं उठाया और कभी यह नहीं समझा कि तिब्बत एक बफर स्टेट है जिसको कायम रहना चाहिये। यह हमारी हिफाजत के लिए एक बड़ा भारी सवाल है और बड़ी अहमियत का सवाल है, मगर हम ने कभी इस तरफ ध्यान नहीं दिया।

हम वार्निंग देते रहे १९५६ ई० से कि चाइना हमारी जमीन को हड़प रहा है, लेकिन इस पर भी सक्रियता से काम लिया गया और हम यह नहीं सोच सकते थे कि चाइना हम पर हमला करेगा। यह कह देना ठीक नहीं है कि हम तैयार नहीं थे। गवर्नमेंट की तरफ से गाहें-बगाहें ऐसे बयानात ईशु हुए हैं कि हम बिल्कुल तैयार हैं, ईंट का जवाब हम पत्थर से देने के लिये तैयार हैं। गवर्नमेंट के तरफ से ऐसे स्टेटमेंट दिये गए। वजीरेआजम की पहली तकरीर को आप ने सुना होगा जब उन्होंने ने कहा था कि चाइनीज को धकेल दो उन की सरहदों की तरफ, उन के मुल्क की तरफ। बाद में जो उन की रोनी सी तकरीर हुई उस को भी आप ने सुना होगा और वो उस वक्त हुई थी जब चाइना ने हमला किया और जब हमें शिकस्त हुई पै दर पै। अगर पहले से हम इस तरफ ध्यान देते तो हमारी यह शिकस्त कभी न होती और इस तरह से दुनिया के सामने हमारा मुंह काला न होता। मगर हम ने कभी इस तरफ ध्यान नहीं दिया। इसलिए मैं यह आप से दख्खास्त करूंगा कि जो बातें इस सदन में हों उन को तरफ आप ध्यान दें। आज जम्हूरियत का जमाना है। हम भी गवर्नमेंट का हाथ बटाना चाहते हैं और इस देश की हिफाजत करना चाहते हैं। इसलिए जो हमारी तरफ से बातें कही जायें उन पर भी आप गौर करें।

दूसरा जो हमारी शिकस्त का कारण है वह यह है कि हमारा कम्युनिकेशन और ट्रांसपोर्ट का कोई बन्दोबस्त नहीं है उन मुकामात में। मालूम होना चाहिए था सरकार को कि हमारी फौजों को एक दिन यहां पर लड़ना पड़ेगा, इन पहाड़ों पर चढ़ना पड़ेगा और यहां पर सप्लाई का इन्तजाम करना पड़ेगा और कौजों को भेजना पड़ेगा। आजादी के बाद यह आप का फर्ज है और सब से पहला सवाल है कि देश की हिफाजत हो। अगर देश की हिफाजत नहीं होती है तो हम तरक्की कर के क्या करेंगे और ये बड़े बड़े कल-कार-खाने और फैक्ट्रियां बनाना सब बेकार है। तो सब से पहला सवाल हमारे सामने यह है कि हम मुल्क की हिफाजत करें और मुल्क की हिफाजत का पूरा बन्दोबस्त करें। मगर हम ने कभी अपनी फौजों को पहाड़ों पर लड़ाई करने की, पहाड़ों पर चढ़ने की, पहाड़ों पर सामान ले जाने की ट्रेनिंग नहीं दी। हमारे पास ट्रांसपोर्ट का कोई इन्तजाम नहीं था, सड़कों का इन्तजाम नहीं था और हमारा यह फर्ज था कि हम इस का इन्तजाम करते।

पिछली लड़ाई में हमारे पास पायनीयर बटैलियन थीं। उस सिलसिले में मैं रोज सवाल करता हूं मगर मुझे तसल्लीबख्श जवाब नहीं मिलता है। तो पायनीयर बटैलियन पिछली लड़ाई के दौरान में थीं और बहुत से लोग उस में रिक्रूट किये गये थे। उन को तजुर्बा था सड़कें बनाने का ही नहीं, सड़कों की हिफाजत करने का ही नहीं, बल्कि अपने हाथों से और अपने हथियारों से लड़ने का भी। मगर लड़ाई के बाद दफ्तेन यह बटैलियन डिसबैंड कर दी गई। आखिर ये क्यों किया गया और अगर कर ही दिया गया था तो उन को रिवाइज करना चाहिए था हमारी सरकार को। आज जो हमारे डिफेंस मिनिस्टर हैं उन को आर्मी के मुतल्लिक बहुत कम नालिज है, वो नहीं जानते हैं कि किस तरह से अंग्रेजी दौराने हुकूमन में ट्रांसपोर्ट और कम्युनिकेशन का माकूल इन्तजाम होता था। यह ठीक है कि

[श्री प्यारेलाल कुरील "तालिब"]

कि आप ने रोड डेवलपमेंट बोर्ड बना दिया है, मगर उस में नये आदमी हैं और वो कुछ जानते नहीं हैं। हमारी पायनीयर बटालियन जो हैं वो मुश्किल से फौज का एक हिस्सा रही हैं, फौज का एक अंग रही है, जिनकी हथियारों का इस्तेमाल करना सिखाया जाता था। आप जिस रोड डेवलपमेंट बोर्ड की बात करते हैं उसमें डेली वेजेज पर लोगों से काम कराया जाता है। मगर हमारी पायनीयर बटालियन और लेबर बटालियन जो हैं, सेपर्स और माइनर्स जो हैं उन को औज़ार चलाने का हथियार चलाने की भी ट्रेनिंग दी जाती थी, उनको बन्दूक इस्तेमाल करना और लड़ाई लड़ना भी सिखाया जाता था, और लड़ाई के वक़्त उसका सबूत उन्होंने दिया। उस वक़्त हमारे सी० इन सी० जो थे उन का आप बयान पढ़िये, वह पपर्स में भी निकला था कि अगर कभी जरूरत पड़ गई तो उन्होंने जापानियों का पूरा मुकाबला किया। वर्मा, मनीपुर और इम्फाल में उन्होंने जापानियों का मुकाबला किया। तो ये सवाल जो मैं ने उठाया वो इसलिए उठाया कि हमारी सरकार ने ट्रांसपोर्ट और कम्युनिकेशन की तरफ कोई तबज्जो नहीं दी। अगर उसने इस तरफ तबज्जो दी होती और हमारे आदमी वहां पहुँच सकते, हमारी सप्लाय का वहां इंतजाम हो सकता तो जो शिकस्त हमने खाई है वह हम न खाते। इसलिये हम चाहते हैं कि वो पहली पायनीयर बटालियन जो हैं वो रिवाइव की जायें।

पहले गोरखपुर में लेबर बटालियन का सेक्टर था और वहां लेवर्स को रिक्रूट किया जाता था। इस के अलावा कई एक चमार बटालियन थीं। मैं ने एक प्रस्ताव सेन्ट्रल एसेम्बली में १९४३ ई० में रखा था कि इन छोटी छोटी जातियों को लड़ाका फौज में रिक्रूट किया जाये। जो राजपूत जातियां हैं

उन को मार्शल रेस कहा जाता है, हम इस मेन्टेलिटी से सफर करते हैं और मार्शल कम्युनिटी और नान-मार्शल कम्युनिटी का सवाल अपने सामने रखते हैं। मगर असल में राजपूत कोम जो है वो लड़ते लड़ते कमजोर पड़ गयी है और उन के अन्दर से अब बहादुरी चली गयी है। ये एक साइकालाजिकल फ़ैक्ट है। इसको आप समझें और ये जो छोटी छोटी कौमें हैं जिनको कभी लड़ाई का मौका नहीं मिला अगर उनको मौका मिले तो वे बहुत बहादुरी दिखा सकती हैं। इस सिलसिले में मैं महार बटेलियन की मिसाल पेश करता हूँ। उस वक़्त १९४३ ई० में उसको दुबारा लड़ाई में भर्ती किया गया और उन्होंने पिछली लड़ाई में वो नुमायां बहादुरी दिखायी कि कुछ कहना नहीं। वह शिङ्ग्यूल्ड कास्ट की बटेलियन थी जो कि अब हिन्दुस्तान की फौज के अन्दर परमानेंट इन्फैन्ट्री है। और उसने उस लड़ाई में भी और इस लड़ाई में भी जितनी बहादुरी का सबूत दिया है, इसकी मिसालें कई दफा मैं सदन में रख चुका हूँ। तो ये वो ही अछूत हैं। आपके अन्दर जो जहनियत है उसको निकाल दीजिये। बहादुरी किसी एक कौम की मलकीयत नहीं है, वो सब कौमों की मलकीयत है। जिस वक़्त सिख गुरु गोविन्द सिंह ने ललकारा कि कौन है जो कि हमारे लिए जान कुर्बान कर सकते हैं तो ये ही लोग आये जिनको पांच प्यारे कहा जाता है; वो सब के सब अछूत जातों से ताल्लुक रखते थे जिन्होंने अपने आपको सब से पहले कुर्बानी के लिए पेश किया। आज हमारी फौज के अन्दर रमदसिया और मजहबी सिख हैं जिनकी फौज १९१४ ई० से कायम है और जिन्होंने मिडिल ईस्ट में भी काफी नुमायां काम किया। वो भी अछूत जातियों की फौज है। तो ये जो जहनियत है इसको दिल से निकाल दें और इस बात को मैं पुरजोर अल्फ़ाज में कहूंगा कि जिस कौम से मैं ताल्लुक

रखता हूँ उसके अन्दर मार्शल स्प्रिट है।
I can fight like a bull when the time comes. अगर मौका मिल जाए तो मैं हाथ से लड़ सकता हूँ, अभी जान देकर दिखा सकता हूँ, देश के लिए खून का कतरा कतरा बहा सकता हूँ, मगर आप इस जहनियत के शिकार न हों और ये समझें कि हर एक आदमी को आर्मी के अन्दर भर्ती होने का हक है और एक दूली नेशनल आर्मी बनाने की जरूरत है। Every man is a soldier at the time of war. मगर हमारे यहां जब कि देश के अन्दर सिर्फ एक चौथाई आदमी को फौज में भर्ती होने का अधिकार हो तो क्या हम अपने देश की रक्षा कर सकते हैं, क्या हम अपने देश की हिफाजत कर सकते हैं। तो इस खयाल को, इस जहनियत को छोड़िये। आप अपनी पहले वक्त की मिसालों को देखिए कि किस तरह की जहनियत हमने दिखाई और किस तरह से बुरी हमलावरों ने हम पर काबू पाया और हम पर हुकूमत की। तो इन सब बातों को देखते हुए हम अपनी जहनियत को बदलें और पुराने खयाल को अपने दिलो-दिमाग से निकाल दें।

प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने कहा था कि हमारे अफसरों ने कहा कि कुछ चीजों की हमें जरूरत है, कुछ औजारों की जरूरत है जिसको हम नहीं दे सके। मगर बहुत अफसोस की बात है कि पिछले कई सालों से रुपया सदन देता था, मंजूर करता था वो भी प्रोपरली इस्तेमाल नहीं होता था और इसके अलावा काफी रुपया ऐसा था जो कि बच गया, जो कि लैप्स हो गया। तो इस चीज को बेखर्चे की जरूरत है।

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have taken nearly twenty minutes. Please wind up.

श्री प्यारेलाल कुरील "तालिब" :
कृष्णा मेनन को आपने कुर्बानी का बकरा

बना दिया। इस सब का कृष्णा मेनन ही ज़ुम्मेदार नहीं था, यह तो जाइंट रिस-पांसिविलिटी कैबिनेट की है। और अगर कृष्णा मेनन को इस्तीफा देना पड़ा तो मैं यह कहूंगा कि उसको कुर्बानी का बकरा बनाया गया वरना तमाम की तमाम पूरी कैबिनेट को इस बात पर इस्तीफा देना चाहिये था। इतना बड़ा कलंक नेफा का बजह से हमारे चेहरे पर लगा कि एक ही आदमी-इस्तीफा देने से सवास हल नहीं होता, पूरी कैबिनेट को इस्तीफा देना चाहिए था। हमारी जनता ने कृष्णा मेनन को इस्तीफा देने पर मजबूर किया और इसी तरह हमारी जनता को बजीरे आरम्भ से इस्तीफा दिलाने के लिए और पूरी कैबिनेट को इस्तीफा दिलाने के लिए मजबूर करना चाहिए था। यह हमारा हक है। इतनी कुर्बानी देने के बाद, जान और माल का नुकसान करने के बाद हमने यह आजादी हासिल की है और इसकी हिफाजत करना, इसको कायम रखना हमारा फर्ज है, जनता का फर्ज है। यह मुल्क एक आदमी का नहीं है या यह मुल्क उन चन्द आदमियों का नहीं है जो कि कैबिनेट के अन्दर हैं, यह तो सारे देश का है। और इस आजादी को हमने सालों के बाद, सदियों के बाद, कुर्बानियों के बाद पाया है और इसको कायम रखना है।

मैं ज्यादा नहीं कहना चाहता हूँ। यही कहूंगा कि आइन्दा के लिये हमारी गवर्नमेंट को ज्यादा विजिलेंट होना चाहिए और जो जो खामियां हैं उनको वह जल्दी से जल्दी दूर करे ताकि यह कलंक के दाग जो हमारे चेहरे पर लगा है उसको किसी न किसी तरह से धो सकें। थैंक यू वैंरी मच।

SHBI N. M. LINGAM (Madras): Madam Deputy Chairman, I am happy that the movers of the Motion are present in the House at the moment. They expressed the concern of

[Shri N. M. Lingam.] the country at our state of unpreparedness at the time of the Chinese attack last fall. We share their concern that we should not be caught napping again.

But, Madam, after listening to their speeches very carefully, I feel that certain issues emerge. It is true, and the statement of the Defence Minister makes it abundantly clear that we were unprepared at the time of the attack. To put it briefly, we were outnumbered, we were out-intellegenced, we were out-gunned, we were out-maneuvred, and we were out-weaponed. This sums up the whole position in which the Indian Army found itself at the time of the Chinese attack last year. One could go on with each of these aspects and wax eloquent over the details of our unpreparedness in each one of these fields. But the basic thing was that we were unprepared, and because of our unpreparedness all the other things flowed. Because we were not prepared for a massive Chinese attack our numbers were not large enough, our armour was not adequate, our training was not adequate. But I would like the House to pause, Madam, and consider why we were unprepared, and what led to the unpreparedness in spite of the warnings of the Chinese since 1956 if not earlier. That is the point that the House has to seriously consider.

The Government admit that they were not prepared for a massive Chinese invasion, but why were the Government unprepared? I venture to submit to the House that Government were alive to the emergence of a colossus on our northern frontiers ever since 1950. Government were also aware, as the world was aware probably, that this colossus had been in the business of war for more than 30 years, and a type of war with which we are not familiar. Most of the countries in the world fight in the traditional way, and the Indian Army has been trained in the British tradition. But this adversary has

evolved his own methodology, his own techniques, call it guerilla warfare, mountain warfare, unorthodox warfare or a combination of all these. He has perfected almost a system while trying it in different climes and different parts of the country, the mainland of China, in Korea and in Southeast Asia, with different weapons and with different adversaries. He had perfected his own system with which we were not at all familiar. We also know, Madam that this army of the Chinese is in millions. We do not know the correct position, but we have heard it said that the regular army itself is of the order of 3 million apart from the national militia and irregulars and other wings. They have an air strength of 3000 planes. They have the navy. They are a nation of 700 million people. All this is known. And what were we to prepare for? Was the nation to prepare for a frontal assault, a direct confrontation with a neighbour at this magnitude? Surely it would have been the height of folly for a country like India to have tried to match the Chinese in armed strength.

Then what was the world situation? What was the perspective in the world? The United Nations, ever since it has come into being, has been having as its objective the establishment of peace and cordial relations between nations and the settlement of disputes by negotiations. And we may humbly claim that we have played no mean part in the evolution of the policies of the United Nations. By tradition, history and training, we have always preached peace. I would request my hon. friend, Shri Vajpayee, who is one of the strong pillars of the Jan Sangh, to listen to this particular part of my speech. What is the mission of this land? What has been the mission of this land for ages? It has not been military might. Although our soldiers are second to none in the world in bravery: our mission, the central purpose of our national life, has been peace, the spreading of peace, the message of peace. India is known for a

Buddha or a Rama or a Krishna or a Ramakrishna but not for its military heroes. That is the image of India and we are translating this image in the political field and in all the forums of the world and particularly in the United Nations. And the world itself as the House will remember, after the Second World War was entering into an era of peace, in spite of the arms race among the big Powers and the ideological conflicts. And in this troubled world, India tried to play her humble part by trying to bring the warring nations together by giving its message of peace. And it is an irony of fate that such a nation should be attacked by the most aggressive nation in Asia during last year. It was at that time in the phase of history when the world itself was gravitating towards broad peace, towards the settlement of disputes by negotiations and towards cordiality, it was at this juncture that we were confronted with aggression by a mighty Power.

Was it any wonder, therefore, that -we did not foresee this and even if we foresaw that we did not go on scurrying for arms? We did not go, losing our balance, into a mad race for arms. We took it calmly, we took it quietly. You may say that it was a gamble in the peaceful intentions of China. You may say so if you like. But I am not at all ashamed to say that the Government of India did not lose sight of its fundamental policies. It hoped against hope that China would see reason, that China would see the signs in the world, that they would see the strong currents, visible and invisible in the world towards harmony, towards peace and towards cordiality. It was at this juncture when we were hoping that China would see the error of its ways that it decided to attack us. And it is not the first time that a peaceful nation has suffered reverses by an unscrupulous aggressor. During the First World War we know how the Allies had a disaster at Gallipoli. During the Second World War there were the Dunkirk disaster and the

Pearl Harbour incident. So it is not for the first time; it is not as if India had to undergo an unparalleled disaster. It is because we knew that we were pursuing a policy of peace not only in keeping with the genius of the country but towards helping the forces of peace in the world that we took the Chinese aggression itself in its stride. And what has been the result? China stands isolated today and the moral support of the world is with India. It is this that we have been anxious to establish and we may humbly claim that we have established the image of India more firmly than ever before in the councils of the world.

I do not for a moment suggest that because we have been standing for peace through ages, because the world itself is trying to settle its major disputes without war, India should remain at the mercy of any aggressor. I do not suggest that at all but it is simply fantastic, it would be unrealistic to think that because there has been aggression, we should throw everything overboard, that we should lose our sense of proportion and just get entangled in an arms race. I would ask the House to imagine what would happen if there is a surprise nuclear attack by the Soviet Union or by the USA against one of them. One of the powers will be destroyed. The Power that has the element of surprise will surely gain the upper hand. What is the safeguard against it? Absolutely nothing. What prevents a major Power now from overrunning the newly independent countries of Africa? Absolutely there is no defence. The number of independent nations has grown from 55 when the Charter was signed to 105 today. Would all these have been possible but for the current constructive forces working for peace, for the elimination of colonialism and for the acceleration of the economic progress of the world? It is these forces that determine the fate of the world and no amount of arming by a country would be a bulwark against aggression.

[Shri N. M. Lingam.]

It has been repeatedly said that our real strength is in our organic unity and our coherence. And the Chinese made that dramatic withdrawal on the 21st of November, it was not because it was afraid of the possible aid that we might get but it was because of the internal unity manifested by the Indian nation. It is the unity of purpose that is basic to all our endeavours. Then, of course, comes a strong economic base. We must have the wherewithal, the industrial base, to supply the sinews of war. These are basic in any scheme of things to deter aggression. At the same time, I would warn the House that even if we achieve the height of prosperity, we should not in our arrogance think that we can dominate over others, that we can bully others, even if we are stronger than China, in total military strength I mean.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: But what about the steps by way of your building roads in NEFA?

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: I am coming to that. Even if we are stronger than China, for argument's sake, we should not be bellicose. We should not say that we should invade Tibet, that we are going to regain by force of arms what we lost in Tibet, the region of Tibet. We must still continue to preach our message of peace. We stand for peace and our armed strength is for the limited purpose of safeguarding our borders and for defending our integrity. Nothing beyond that. If the most peaceful country in the world, if a country of five hundred millions is to enter the arms race throwing all its ideals overboard, then the future of the world is bleak indeed. The law of the jungle will then prevail in the world, and if India goes under, the whole civilised world goes under. The perspective that we have to keep in mind is that in this state of affairs, it is the basic unity of the country and

international action that deter aggression and we must wake up. If the world's moral force is not behind us or behind any nation for that matter, that nation, however mightily it might be armed, cannot deter aggression. That is the truth we have to face. Having said that, I would like to ask the House to consider if the Government had been remiss in not going feverishly with military preparedness in anticipation of a mighty aggression. We are in an era in the world where the developed nations are trying to help the underdeveloped nations economically. And it would be most odd if such a nation were to think of raising its strength militarily and running into an arms race with a country whose traditions and whose objects and ideals are entirely different from ours.

Then, I come to the limited question which is why the roads were not developed. My hon. friend has raised that question. I would remind him that even as late as 1960, we were negotiating with the Chinese, when Mr. Chou En-lai came here, and as a result of his visit an official team was appointed to go into the whole question of the border dispute. He admitted that it was only a border dispute in 1960. And even as we were talking, we had set up the Border Roads Organisation and we were building the roads. I am amazed that my hon. friend, whom I thought to be a serious student of at least recent history, has forgotten all this. So it is not as if the question of border roads had been neglected.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: My point is not that. You may negotiate with Mr. Chou En-lai. You may conclude a treaty. That is a different matter. The question is, if you want to have some military force, the elementary thing is that you have to have roads. And, secondly, there should be elementary arrangement for intelligence. Why did you bring in all this peculiar thing- to cover up your failures? Unless you decide that

there shall be no army, there would be complete, general, disarmament, till then you should have some elementary arrangements. Were you lacking that? That is what the Report has exposed.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: I thought I had answered that. I said a little while ago that the United States of America, the mightiest nation in the world today. Madam, could be destroyed by the Soviet Union if it indulges tonight in a surprise nuclear attack. I admitted at the outset and the Government has said that we never expected a major attack in NEFA, it is a most difficult terrain, our logistic support has been very poor and that we did not have the roads because road building in that terrain is a very slow process. And when we knew the danger was looming large, we established a Border Roads Organisation, and it has done a wonderful job of work today. People have no idea of the problems involved in constructing roads in these inaccessible regions.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: My point is, I agree that we were unprepared. But did you read this report about your unpreparedness with regard to the building of roads?

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: I shall come to this point shortly.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have hardly two minutes more.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: I know, I was trying to present this problem in a wider canvass. I was trying to show why we did not anticipate a major Chinese aggression on our border.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: In that process you have finished your time.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: I will conclude now. I was trying to show why we were not hundred per cent.

prepared on the 20th October when the Chinese indulged in a perfidious attack against India.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR (Uttar Pradesh): Not even 5 per cent.

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: But the Second statement of the Defence Minister says that we are wide awake, wide awake not only in the military sense, not only in the sense that we are making up our deficiencies in every field of military preparedness, but the whole nation is awake, that it shall sleep no more. It is true that the time at our disposal is short. We are up against an enemy who has had half a century to build up but we are racing against time. I assure my hon. friend that we are building up feverishly our roads. We are not neglecting any branch of military preparedness. If he cares to see them, it is up to him to go to the NEFA and Ladakh borders and test the transformation that has taken place.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: But the point was . . .

SHRI N. M. LINGAM: I am not yielding. Madam, although we were wrong in placing hundred per cent, reliance on the intention of the Chinese, although we have suffered reverses, it has not been a national humiliation. It may be a setback, but it does not mean a major defeat. And thanks to the Chinese, again the nation is galvanised and the Chinese will never have an opportunity to see India humiliated. China has already learnt the lesson. Our military preparedness is going on according to schedule to safeguard the integrity of the nation.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY (Mysore): Madam Deputy Chairman, when Parliament demanded an enquiry we were very clear in our minds what we were asking for. We did not definitely want a monotonous, ritualistic enquiry which has to be gone into, but a thorough clean, comprehensive enquiry. We knew what we wanted, what type of enquiry

[Shri M. S. Gurupada Swamy.]

should be conducted. Madam, we wanted the causes of this NEFA debacle to be gone into—they are very important indeed—at the same time, Madam, we wanted further probing by a competent authority, we wanted those elements who were responsible for this debacle, for this tragedy, to be found out, and some punitive treatment to be meted out to those elements. Further, we also wanted to know the nature of the enemy and the various steps that were taken during the past and even at the time of the Chinese aggression to prevent such aggressive thrusts on our border. When this demand was made by Parliament, the Prime Minister, with a certain amount of hesitation, all the same admitting the wisdom of this demand, conceded that there ought to be an enquiry which should be comprehensive enough, which should include the finding out of such elements who were responsible for any lapses, bunglings and faults during these operations. And even later it was conceded by my friend, the Defence Minister. While he was referring to the terms of reference in the House he made it clear that the enquiry would not be half-hearted, it would not be incomplete, and it would be as thorough as possible. This is the promise made, but how this promise has been kept up. That is the question that has to be discussed.

Madam Deputy Chairman, later on I find an amazing change in the attitude of the Government in this matter. They said that the enquiry should be conducted in order to draw certain lessons out of this debacle and to profit by that. Later a rider was added. There was no rider in the beginning. It was added later that this enquiry is not intended to punish anybody who was responsible for the debacle and the statement makes it very clear. The Defence Minister says there is no witch-hunting. He says "We do not believe in witch-hunting." I do not know if anybody

wishes to have witch-hunting here. I can assure the hon. Defence Minister that there is no McCarthyism or any lobby projecting that outlook or that attitude. But we want a real and realistic assessment of the whole situation and responsibility to be fixed on persons who were responsible for the debacle. But the rider says that nobody should be held responsible or accountable. This is an amazing change in the approach of the Government. I do not know why this change was brought about. Again I do not know why the enquiry was not full, complete, absolute and thorough. As it is we have been given only a small portion of the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Commission. We have not even had the benefit of the epitomised version of the Enquiry Report. Madam, here I would like to ask whether in any other democratic country in the world today such an attempt to conceal certain vital things in matters of defence is made. We can only draw parallels and precedents. I would like to quote some precedent to substantiate my view.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: There is no country where such an enquiry is fuller when the danger is on.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: I anticipated your question. I would draw the attention of the Members, Madam, to the year 1940 when there was a blistering air attack on England. When, after a week's attack by the Nazi air force on the British cities and population, a debate was conducted in Parliament in 1940—I think it was in the month of August, if I remember correctly—a demand was made that there should be an enquiry. The reply was "No enquiry is necessary. We are prepared to place before the House every detail." Mr Churchill who was at that time the Prime Minister—he had taken over by that time—gave details of the losses, the weapons used, the forces deployed in various places and sectors and the kind of strategy that

had been adopted. I would draw the attention of the Members to the historic debate in the House of Commons.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA (Bihar): May I ask one question? Was that not a secret session, secret in the real sense of the term, when nothing leaked out of the House?

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: I do not know whether it was secret or not. But if it was secret, we have no objection to have a secret session here also.

SHRI N. C. KASLIWAL (Rajasthan) : At that time there was a non-Party Government in England.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: I think my friends are having all sorts of illusions.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: There was a coalition.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: There was a coalition. There was an open debate and all the facts of the situation were placed before the House. A point was made by too familiar a figure now—he was then just a junior Member of Parliament—Mr. Profumo. He said one thing which was admitted later on by Mr. Churchill. He said that the Nazi Germany suffered from one drawback. Their own forces, their own people did not know the amount of munition and equipment, the number of forces and all the rest of it. That is why they said the Nazi Germany was bound to suffer in morale after some time when they had lost certain percentages in the course of the War. The whole Germany would collapse because there would be no morale left there. I am just drawing the attention of the House to the debate conducted in the month of August 1940. It was said that the morale of the British people was high in spite of that blistering attack, because everybody knew what was happening. But today what is the situation here? We take shelter and say that military

secrecy is a very valuable thing. It is a valuable thing but we must know which is a military secret and which is not. Unfortunately in this country there is no proper view about military secrets. Madam, is it the contention of the hon. friends here that the publication of this Report will involve a military secret?

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Certainly.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: Is it not true, Madam, that even after this gist of the Report is placed before us the misgivings that are persisting today in the House and outside the House are as much as they were before? In future these misgivings may deepen. Should you work in this fog of unreality with so many misgivings? Is it good for the morale of the country? We all agree that the morale of the country should be kept up.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: It depends upon the speeches of the Opposition Members.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Are you going to fight the Chinese with the speeches?

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: We have to keep up the morale of the people.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Morale is there but the Government is not prepared.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: Madam, it is said that there should be faith in everything but faith will not be found in a cupboard. Faith has to be created. It cannot be kept in a drawer to be opened later on. Later on it will not be found, I am sure. We all agree that faith has to be instilled. How? The persistent misgivings about our defence efforts should, as far as possible, be cleared. That is an elementary thing that has got to be understood. Unfortunately this country did not have a major conflict before. The question which

[Shri M. S. Gurupada Swamy.] is a military secret and which is not has not been properly understood and properly decided. Therefore, in this context of confusion and doubt, we must as far as possible err on the right side, that is to say, we must give more details and the Houses of Parliament should be taken into full confidence. But the position now is that misgivings still persist in spite of this debate, because the enquiry itself was narrow, partial, circumscribed, half-hearted, tardy and most unsatisfactory.

AN HON. MEMBER: Wishy-washy.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: I am one with the Government with regard to maintaining essential military security. But the Government itself admits that the Intelligence Service was unsatisfactory and therefore, there was no effective checking on either those elements that infiltrated or on those people who traded on information. Therefore, let us be very clear and see that when we do such things, we do them well.

My next point is this. This Enquiry Report says that there should not be any witch-hunting. I agree with that. But I do not know why the Defence Minister should be using this expression "witch-hunting". Who is after witch-hunting? Nobody is after any witch-hunting. What we want is to place responsibility on certain individuals. We want accountability for action. Taking this view, if there is to be accountability, if there is to be responsibility, then there has got to be a new approach to the whole problem. We still believe that there should not be persecution. We do not have any sadistic persecution complex. The Ministry says it, but I want to bring it to the notice of the hon. Minister and to the House that it is not as if there has been no persecution. Departmental actions have been taken or are being taken against a few unfortunate creatures like ch. apra. sis. clerks and other junior people. They have been

proceeded against and action is being taken against them. It is not as if action is not being taken. When that is the case, why this hush-hush policy with regard to taking action against the bigger people? Is it because they enjoy a certain prestige? Is it because they enjoy a certain place in Delhi society? What is it then? I want a clear answer. Therefore, I feel that there is a sort of anxious concern to conceal certain things. I know many many things the Defence Minister has given. What he has given is very important and very interesting. But I would also say that what he has concealed is equally vital and I would really have felt happy if these important, vital and inseparable issues had been gone into and a thorough enquiry made. I would have been happy if a separate commission had been set up for the purpose, a commission on which there is an independent Judge and an ex-General. That would have made the enquiry objective and impartial.

Let us realise the gravity of the situation today. The country still does not want to believe that the tragedy was unavoidable. The main question is whether the tragedy in NEFA was avoidable or unavoidable.

(Time bell rings.)

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have taken 20 minutes. Two more minutes you may take.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: I would require only five minutes more.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: That would make it 25 minutes and there are many more speakers.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: As I said, the question is whether the tragedy was avoidable or unavoidable. My feeling is that if things had been done properly, if proper steps had been taken in time and effectively, this NEFA tragedy could have been

avoided. Surely our defences were at a disadvantage. Defence was belittled both quantitatively and qualitatively in the past and defence never came up at all for serious thinking in the Government. What is the result? The result was the debacle in NEFA. It was made inevitable, I would say. It was not unavoidable. It became inevitable because of the false steps that had been taken. Madam, what is the position today? What is the dynamics of the situation? There is no gun booming at any target today, but there has been massive build-up of the enemy forces. I am told that 25,000 divisions have been concentrated all along the frontier.

AN HON. MEMBER: 25,000 divi-
sions?

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: I am sorry, I mean 25 divisions have been concentrated, I am told, all along the frontier. Also I am told that the present concentration is much bigger than the entire military strength of India before the Bomdila and Sela tragedy. If that is true, how is my hon. friend the Defence Minister going to meet this situation with three divisions or with even six divisions? The other day the Defence Minister was good enough to say that military supplies were flowing in, that they were streaming in. Where are they streaming in, I want to know. What about the East European countries? In spite of missions by various committees and visits by individuals, the supplies are not streaming from the East European countries. Even from the West the supply is negligible, not much. If you look at the budget of England, it is very clear that they have made provision for Aid-India only from the next budget year. So enough supplies will not be coming now. In this present position, how will you meet this danger that is growing? It is growing much more now because there is a premarital political fornication between Pakistan and China and there is a sort of *entente*

between these two countries. So unless we build up our forces in time, how do we check these two evils? Today China has invaded and then withdrawn. But China is in physical possession of those areas, all those areas which they claim to be theirs. In spite of the fact that the Prime Minister has said that we were free to occupy those territories, those areas, we are not able to go there. That is a fact. Why can't we go there? That is because we are still weak and that is accepted. The only way is to make up our will and to have adequate means to translate that will into action. We must fight the enemy as long as it pleases them to fight, and our determination should be to fight China as long as China wants us to do so. That should be our determination, and that can only be done if we mobilise on a much larger scale than at present, our men and material for this purpose.

Madam Deputy Chairman, I wish our Defence Minister would be much more dynamic than he is now. He is dynamic, I know, and he has brought about considerable changes in the Ministry by the way he has been functioning. But that is not sufficient. I must say that much more effective steps have to be taken. Complacency and inertia have to be removed. The main bottlenecks are inertia and complacency. We have to remember that anything may happen at any time and we must be alert, we must be vigilant and we must be prepared. Madam Deputy Chairman, we must also understand that war with China may be a 30-year war, or even a 100-year war, and we must be prepared for it. So if you want to fight, fight well. You must remember one thing, that this is a conflict of strategy, resources, organisation, materials, morale and science. We have got to be clear in all these things; otherwise, we will be finished. Therefore, I want the Defence Minister to give a bold lead, take us into confidence and we will assure him that so long as we live, we will fight and when we fight, we will succeed.

3 P.M.

DR. GOPAL SINGH (Nominated): Madam Deputy Chairman, it is a very delicate matter that we are discussing today because the future of our nation and its independence are at stake. We should not, therefore, discuss this matter from the party standpoint but from the national and the country's standpoint. Whatever we say here has a certain effect on the morale of the people outside and if we try to take advantage of the situation created by this crisis, I am sure the enemy would be more pleased than any advantage that might accrue to us as a result of the brave speeches that we make here. Two of the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government by the leaders of the Opposition are: one, why did our Military Intelligence fail and, two, why could not we build border roads in time? I will first reply to the point raised by Mr. Govindan Nair because I am very happy that he, being a member of the Communist Party, has the courage to stand up for his nation against the Chinese aggression and to be with us at this time of crisis. Unfortunately, we had been witnessing for the last few months, ever since the Budget was presented to this Parliament and was passed, a good deal of agitation on the part of the Communist Party of India, to reduce taxes, to bring down the price level, to do everything . . .

DR. A. SUBBA RAO (Kerala): What is unfortunate about it?

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Tax the rich.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Just listen to me. Have a little patience and I will reply to almost all the points.

SHRI FARIDUL , HAQ ANSARI (Uttar Pradesh): That they would never have.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Unfortunately, Mr. Govindan Nair and his Party brought out a huge procession of about a lakh of people to parade

through the streets of Delhi at a cost, I should say, of about fifty lakhs of rupees or more, merely to demonstrate their resentment against the taxes that have been imposed as a result of the Chinese aggression against our territory. I would only ask him this simple question,

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: There were less than fifty thousand, not one lakh.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: I am "putting it at as high a figure as they themselves make it out to be. I believe it was fifty thousand, maybe less but they say that it was more than a lakh of people who paraded through the streets of Delhi.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: Their claims are always tall.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Even if their claims are tall, they brought people here at a cost of fifty lakhs of rupees.

AN HON. MEMBER: From where did they get the money?

DR. GOPAL SINGH: From anywhere, I do not bother. Even at this time of crisis they brought large number of people to Delhi at a cost of fifty lakhs of rupees to bring down the morale of the people. Why did they take out this huge procession?— to overawe the Government, to demoralise the people, to tell the world outside that they were not with the Government, that the prices were rising, that the people were being crushed under the burden of taxes and, therefore, this Government should be brought down as speedily as possible in the interests of a Communist regime in this country.

DR. A. SUBBA RAO: It was only to bring down the prices and for nothing else.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: No, no, it was to demoralise the Government. The price issue was only an excuse put forth.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: One more objective, they got photographed by the Chinese.

D«. GOPAL SINGH: I think they are not very happy about it, but there is, it happened. Even at this time of crisis, when taxes have risen on account of the Chinese aggression they have taken upon themselves to attack the morale of the people which is an ammunition of war. Not only they but also the Jan Sanghis, the Swat-antrites—everyone of them has attacked the Budget. On the one hand, they have attacked the Government for non-preparedness and when taxes are increased—and there is no other means by which the preparedness of the nation can be assured—they attacked the Budget. Once you do not allow the Government to build up huge resources to fight the Chinese menace, then you should not expect this nation to be prepared for the coming fifty years to meet the Chinese aggression that is facing us, not only the Chinese aggression but also the Pakistani aggression. You must choose between the two things. Either you must sacrifice and sacrifice fully, be a part of the nation when it is passing through a great crisis or you bring about confusion and chaos in the country in which case, I would respectfully suggest that you are not playing the part worthy of the great citizens of this country.

Secondly, we have been accused—the Government has been accused—of lack of intelligence, military intelligence, I mean to say.

HON. MEMBERS: Both.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Now, you laugh at my cost.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: We are dealing only with military intelligence.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Now, you laugh at my cost and I am going to laugh at your cost. Wait a minute.

They have accused the Government of lack of military intelligence. The Government has been told that not enough resources were available for the military intelligence of the kind

that was necessary at that time with the result that we came to grief. Now, if the military intelligence of every country were to be that perfect then you would never have seen Dunkirk, Singapore, Korea. There would have been no wars and perhaps there would have been no history to talk about. There is a proverb that nothing succeeds like success but there is also its counterpart that nothing fails like « failure.

PROF. M. B. LAL (Uttar Pradesh): You have always followed the second.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: I may also say that you have not followed the first. You have never succeeded in anything so far, not even in getting the votes of the people.

PROF. M. B. LAL: You have succeeded in one and failed in the other.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: It is good to be amusing sometimes but one should not always be amusing at the cost of one's own nation's distress. What I am saying is that if the military intelligence would not have failed or if it would not have been that imperfect as it turned out to be then we would not have suffered reverses. But it is not merely the lack of military intelligence, it was not merely the lack of roads, it was something else.

Now, we are told that the Government, in spite of the warnings that the Chinese gave by their skirmishes on the borders, did not pay any heed and did not prepare. Now, right from 1959 when the border with the Chinese became live, when the Border Roads Organisation was set up, more and more border roads were built, and as the statement of the hon. Defence Minister would show, about 1600 miles of roads were built up to June, 1963. More and more roads are being built now-a-days and this Organisation is doing remarkable work in spite of the deficiencies here and there. We in India have never seen the destruction war causes. We

[Dr. Gopal Singh.]

see this now for the first time since independence. Earlier, somebody else was fighting for us all the time. We were either part of an empire or slaves of the Moghuls and the Afghans. If during the last sixteen years that we have been independent, we have committed certain mistakes then, on account of those mistakes, you cannot damn the Government outright and say that everything that the Government has done is wrong, or all that opposition, hopelessly divided, would have done would have been right. And Madam Deputy Chairman, I want to submit that there is a good deal of difference between a defensive war against border incursions and the requirements of a counter-attack. Once the enemy takes the offensive he always gives you initially a bloody nose, you are flabbergasted; you do not know where you stand. It happened not only with us but with all the nations of the world. Whosoever attacked first, whosoever aggressed, had the initial advantage. That is the lesson of history. You read any nation's history. You take the history of the last War and you will get to know that whosoever aggressed first had the initial advantage. The Chinese too had the initial advantage, but we must also remember that we were fighting on three fronts, not on one front. NEFA is divided into two Divisions, one is the Lohit Division and the other is the Kameng Division and the third was the Ladakh front. At the Ladakh front we fought very well indeed. We did not give in and we fought as heroically as possible and in the Lohit Division also the results were spectacular. But it was only in the Kameng Division that there were reverses. Now, General Kaul who has been criticised rather severely in this House was in charge not only of the Kameng Division but also of the Lohit Division. If he was a bad General in one Division he could not have been a good General in the other or if he had been a good General in one Division he could not have been a bad General in the other. But some-

thing did misfire. I do not say that something did not misfire. I am glad the Defence Minister has accepted the shortcomings of those days and has also assured us that the mistake would not be repeated. But when we speak of our reverses, our successes in the Lohit Division must be put by the side of what we suffered in the Kameng Division.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: What successes?

SHRI A. D. MANI: Yes; what successes? Where?

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Let us first of all see the over-all picture. Well, we had to withdraw against overwhelming numbers, and we did withdraw but in one Division we withdrew in a very orderly way taking a heavy toll and . . . (*Interruptions*). It is very good to shout like this from the Ramlila Ground but military operations are not carried on from the Ramlila Ground.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Nor they are carried on from Trimurti or sitting here in Parliament . . . (*Interruptions*). And you are praising all those Generals who have been sacked by the Government.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: They have not been sacked. They resigned.

AN HON. MEMBER: They *deserve* to be sacked.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: They may deserve anything but the point is that they were not sacked.

SHRI FARIDUL HAQ ANSARI: Probably he has been removed to become Prime Minister later on.

(*Interruptions.*)

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Madam Deputy Chairman, when it is suggested that there was a good deal of interference on the part of the higher commanders with the work of the local commanders then all that I have to suggest is that it is the duty, the business, the function, of the local commander to refuse to obey the orders.

PROF. M. B. LAL: Wonderful!

DR. GOPAL SINGH: You have not then studied war history, nor have you studied what many officers of integrity have been doing in times of war. It is always open . . .

(Interruptions.)

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: I think Dr. Gopal Singh should be allowed to speak. My friends can have their say later on.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: I think the Defence Minister must be saved from such friends.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: And the nation from you and your Party.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have only five minutes more, Dr. Gopal Singh.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Madam Deputy Chairman, I would submit in all humility that I should be given some more time because most of my time has been consumed by these interruptions. If they are very keen on interrupting me, certainly I am keen on proceeding with all the arguments that I can advance against* their frivolous attacks. As I said, it is the business of the local commander always to refuse to obey wrong orders, because it is he who is on the spot and it is he who can judge the local situation as it develops from time to time. No military commander has so far been charged with dereliction of duty if he has done so. I will give you two instances. Firstly, when Mr. Churchill ask-

551 RS—5.

ed General Wavell to attack in North Korea he refused because he thought he did not have the wherewithal which was necessary.

SHRI A. D. MANI: You say North Korea?

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Not North Korea, North Africa.

SHRI FARIDUL HAQ ANSARI: But he became the Viceroy of India

DR. GOPAL SINGH: I know every body who failed became the Viceroy of India.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Here unfortunately Pandit Nehru has got no colonies; otherwise we can send him there.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Similarly, when General Auchinleck was asked to attack, he also did not have the necessary wherewithal but he did attack and lost the battle. And we must remember that Mr. Churchill used to direct the operations from his bedroom. Here you have accused the political leaders of having directed the military operations from here, though I can vouchsafe that nobody directed the operations from here. But certainly it is their business, their right and their prerogative to lay down the policy from here but nobody in his senses would direct the operations from his office here. But Mr. Churchill did even that. When General Auchinleck obeyed Mr. Churchill and attacked and lost even then in his case and in the case of General Wavell also the nation upheld Mr. Churchill and not the Generals. But here we are out for a witch-hunt and we want to have the heads rolled in dust of those people whom . . .

SHRI FARIDUL HAQ ANSARI: Not people; but the man chiefly responsible.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: ... we can get hold of. It is the nature with us Indians that whenever we have some scores to settle outside and if we cannot settle those scores then we come down upon our womenfolk and children when we go back home. That is what the leaders of the Opposition are doing and that is not at all correct. (Interruptions.)

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Order, Order.

DK. GOPAL SINGH: They are disgracing the House by saying all kinds of things about our defence forces,

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE Does it apply to the Government also?

PROF. M. B. LAL; They are an exception to the rule.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: It has been suggested by Mr. Mani that the Defence Department surrendered Rs. 32 crores during the last five years for it could not build up all the material for which Parliament had sanctioned money. Now, if I may be permitted, I would like to read out an extract from an article that appeared in the "Statesman" of September 9. The article is entitled "Some Facets of Defence Production—Complete Self-sufficiency—a Distant Goal". In that article the military correspondent of the "Statesman" says:

"To begin with, in the manufacture of defence equipment, it is not simply a question of foreign collaboration, obtaining technical know-how and the setting up of ordnance factories. Prior to all this it is essential to determine the suitability of item "X" for use in our own country _____

To ascertain this, user trials, that is. tests by troops in the field have to be carried out over protracted periods of time in all climes and over varying conditions of terrain. These tests may indicate some shortcomings, which in turn may mean the introduction of modifications to

the original design of the item -----
At first a prototype is produced on the basis of the qualitative requirements. This may take, say, two years, that is, after the factory has been set up and tooled for the purpose. Then comes a period of trials. These are exhaustive and time-consuming, and may weffll cover another ' two years. Defects are eliminated, further trials are carried out, and finally item "X" in its acceptable form is ready to go on to the production line."

Therefore, merely to suggest that if you have the money, if you have taxed the people, then you must immediately arrange for the production of armaments is to ask for the Mocn. You cannot build up a military potential just because you have the money. If you have the money all that you can do is to go and buy arms from abroad and we all know that there is an enormous arms racket in the world. If you are not allied militarily with one nation or the other then nobody is prepared to part with his strategic weapons. But Pakistan is on a different footing. We have only learnt very recently from the official briefings to American newsmen that Pakistan has received hundreds of modern M47 and M48 tanks from the United States as military aid. And further we learn that Pakistan has also received F-104 supersonic fighters, armed with sidewinders. And then this briefing also discloses that Pakistan is staill getting about 50 to 60 million dollars worth of military equipment annually. This is after Pakistan has joined hands with China and We know that Pakistan is either going to or has already entered into a military pact with China. With all this on our borders, with all this happening around us in respect of China and in respect of Pakistan, to suggest a further probe into the military weaknesses in NEFA or to launch upon a witch-hunt, I think, would be disastrous. What we need now is to give a blank cheque to the hon.

Defence Minister, who has during the last nine months or so, done yeoman's work to the admiration of everybody. We should give him our support and our encouragement in the great task that lies ahead of him.

One point more and I shall have finished. This is in respect of the retirement of the officer class. Now, much has been said about the senior army officers, that at very high levels the leadership failed. But I wonder if the Defence Minister has applied his mind to the fact that our officers are retired at the level of Colonel and Brigadier at the age of 47. When Marshal Zuhov of the Soviet Union was here about ten years ago he was astounded that at such a young age, when the nation had invested so much money in the training of an officer, he should be retired. Unfortunately, because we want people who are coming behind to be promoted, we retire officers at the age of 47 to 50. This, I think is not germane to the build-up that we all have in view. Not only should their age limit be increased to round about 60, depending on the physical fitness of the officer concerned, but also there should be some kind of gradation of officers into 'A', 'B', 'C' class, etc. What we are seeing now is that the officer who gets promotion does not do so because of his character or toughness or because of his inherent qualities as a military leader but because he has a better look, because he is very sociable or because he has some connections and this is disastrous to any army.

With these words, I thank you.

SHRI MOHAN LAL SAKSENA (Nominated) : Madam Deputy Chairman, ordinarily I do not take the time of the House, but this is an important occasion and I rise to speak with a sense of duty—duty to my countrymen, duty to the House, duty to my old colleague and leader, the Prime Minister, with whom I have had the privilege of working for over 40 years now, and to myself, to speak out as I feel about the present situation.

[THH VICK-CHARTMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA) in the Chair.]

It is an important discussion. Two statements of the Defence Minister are before us and they deal not only with the situation as it was before the NEFA debacle, but also with our preparedness to meet any future aggression from the enemy.

Now, as regards the findings of the Committee, I agree with him that nothing should be said here that is likely to hearten the enemy or demoralise our men. I do not ask for any further information nor I want him to say anything about the enquiry that has been held. From the report that he has laid before us we find that things have gone wrong and I want to know what steps have been taken to set those right. Here I may refer to what Mahatma Gandhi had said. If things around you go wrong, you have to look into yourself for the cause. We are the makers of the cause of our surroundings and to set them right we have to direct the searchlight inward. With the crusader's spirit we have to fight our shortcomings. Your shortcomings have been there. Your shortcomings have been responsible for the humiliation the country has suffered. The whole question is: Are we following this with a crusader's zeal, to set right those surroundings which were our own creation according to Gandhiji?

Another thing I would like the Defence Minister to remember is this. Our motto is: "Satyameva Jayate". It is truth which will prevail ultimately. If the hon. Minister and his colleagues follow these two rules of the Father I am sure we will come round and we will have avenged this humiliation. The whole question is this. We find here that all these five points were considered here and there were certain shortcomings. But what steps have been taken? Why were these shortcomings there? Explanations have been given by some members. Other Members have found grounds to accuse the Government for the mistakes. I

[Shri Mohan Lai Saksena.]

would like to ask them who amorig them can guarantee that he will not commit any mistakes. Mistakes, of course, will be committed. To err is human. But to recognise one's errors, errors of judgment, errors of omission and commission, is divine and it pays in the long run.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: It has been done in the Report.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: That has not been done.

SHRI MOHAN LAL SAKSENA: If it is done, it is all right. I do not want it to come out here. But I say we must know what the mistakes are which are responsible for these happenings. There are three prominent actors in this drama. They are the Defence Minister, the Chief of the Army Staff and General Kaul. These are the three main actors. How have they come out of Lhis? Fortunately for us they are no more connected with the Defence Ministry and, therefore, anything that we may have to say here in regard to them is not likely to affect the morale of our men. I had some correspondence, with the Defence Minister regarding Lt. General Kaul. I wanted to know why he was retired, what were the grounds of his retirement. When retired Generals are coming forward to join the Army, here is a General, who was highly spoken of and eulogised in the other House, he was retiring before his time. I asked them whether it is due to his illness or due to anything else. I did not have any reply. I can ready my letters. The reason given is that he wanted to go and he has been allowed to go. What an explanation! After all, if a General who has got two more years to put in goes and retires at a time when the emergency is there, it does not speak to his credit. And then, again, what about the Chief of Arm_v Staff? He was also allowed to retire. When other retired Generals were coming forward, volunteering their servtaas, he also was asked to retire.

After his retirement, General Kaul has been permitted to join, to take up a job on a salary of 20,000 dollars a year. On the other hand we want to impose limits on salaries here in the private sector. What for, for what purpose? Simply to advise Dr. Dharma Teja, whatever the name be. When an enquiry was still on, General Kaul was permitted to retire and go abroad. And what are his actions? Was he ill when he came back from NEFA to Delhi? Did he come for treatment? I went to see Dr. Kunzru in the hospital and I heard stories. The General had come saying: "I am ill, I am ill". And what was the doctor's diagnosis of the case? He was never treated in the hospital. He had come all the way from there. Was it homesickness? It is a very bad disease for a General. You know how Rajput ladies turned away their relations who had returned from the battlefield. Then he goes back and then he comes back again, and I know that he was allowed to retire. I do not say anything more, but taking all these into consideration the inference is that the local officers were not taken into trust, and there was interference and all that. I feel that General Kaul might have done very well in the past but in this debacle he did not come out creditably. That is what I say. So I feel that it was not a proper thing for the Government to have done. If he was fit to serve, he might have been employed in some other Department, but not in the Defence Ministry. He might have been employed on some other job. To permit his appointment on such a high salary as 20,000 dollars, I think it does not redound to the credit of the Government which talks of socialism and working for it.

I will not say anything much about the Army Chief. I know there was some trouble between General Thi-mayya and the e^x-Defence Minister. After all the Prime Minister intervened and things were squared up. So there was some sort of feeling, not harmonious feeling, between the then

Defence Minister and the Chief of Army Staff. (*Interruption*) In the Report itself it has been said that if the ordinary course had been followed in the matter of promotions, there would have been no discontent, there would have been no trouble. So there was come interference which should not have been allowed. This comes out in the Report itself.

Coming to the ex-Defence Minister himself, personally he is a friend of mine. He may be an able advocate, he may be a clever politician, he may be a dextrous diplomat, but he is not an administrator. I think it was a mistake to have anybody as Defence Minister who could give no time to his work, who had no experience of administration. People speak of administrative experience because they "give their whole time and attention to it. Then the second mistake was that he was also made the leader of the Indian delegation To the United Nations. He had to spend much of his time there. He could not give his time to his work here, he could not have worked with single-minded devotion, and so he must have depended upon his officers and others. In such cases when the Minister is away, vested interests get round, and in this particular case I think it was a mistake to have appointed Mr. Krishna Menon as Defence Minister because he was connected with what is known as the jeep scandal, and there are persons who can trace by a chain of action and reaction from jeep scandal to NEFA. I can give a story. There was a *halwai*. He was preparing sweetmeat. By mistake he had sprinkled liquid sugar on the wall which attracted a lot of flies. The spider came to eat the flies. Then the lizard came to kill the spider, and then came the cat. The *halwai* rushed at the lizard. A beggar was standing outside and his dog ran towards the cat. There was trouble. This *halwai* felt that he belonged to the other community, and there was danger of communal trouble. Then some wise men came and went into the cause of the trouble. They pointed out that he was respon-

sible for sprinkling that liquid sugar. What happened here? I have got the Report of the Public Accounts Committee in my hands. There were several transactions connected with the Defence Ministry in which it had been found that the officers had not acted according to the rules laid down. There was no inspection. Orders were placed for jeeps and those jeeps were of course not inspected properly. Contracts were entered into, but there were losses which Government had to suffer because the jeeps were never supplied. You might file a suit but nothing would happen. Now, we find even in this report that we lack material. This is how material is purchased. We know what would happen. But what happened in that case? The High Commissioner had to resign and he came away. Not only the High Commissioner resigned but some of the officers in the Ministry had to be transferred to the States and sent away from the Defence Ministry. But when Mr. Menon took charge of the Defence Ministry, those very officers came back and we know how things worked like that. Personally I feel that what has happened has happened, I do not blame anybody. As early as 1954 I had written a letter to the Prime Minister. In this letter I said that the Defence Ministry was not being properly run. In fact he himself was in charge of Defence. There was no Defence Ministry at that time. It was only called Ministry of Defence Organisation, MDO. In the telephone directory you did not find mention of Defence Ministry. I must pay my tribute to Mr. Gopalaswamy Iyengar. He was an able administrator. He was the right man for the Defence Ministry. He was dead. Nobody else was found. Therefore, the Prime Minister had to take it himself. In this letter I wrote to him that it was high time he had a Defence Minister. Not only that, I also said . . .

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Dr. Katju was Defence Minister.

SHRI MOHAN LAL SAKSENA: He was appointed afterwards. In this

[Shri Mohan Lai Saksena.] very letter I had also warned him that his Central Intelligence was not satisfactory, that it was not as satisfactory as in other countries, and I gave him instances. That was in April 1954. It was a long letter, it dealt with many other problems. I have been writing to him off and on acquainting him with all things that occur to me. I am obliged that he reads letters, he pays them some attention, but busy as he is I do not think that he can be expected to attend to everything. In that letter I suggested that he must have a Defence Minister.

Now, I come to the other aspect, and that is preparations. Whatever the Report says I am prepared to accept. But I am one of those who believe that if we have to meet the Chinese menace it is not by having only military might. We have to mobilise the millions, and then we can meet it effectively. It is not a question of one year or two years. There may be a shooting war or none. We have got a border of 2600 miles with China. We know that so far as the Himalayas are concerned, they have been our natural defence line. But now they have become pregnable. History shows that the people have to suffer for the negligence of their rulers for not having properly fortified the vulnerable places in the Himalayas. Therefore, if we had suffered, it is not anything unprecedented, but we have to profit by our experience. We have to make the Himalayas impregnable, and because of the importance of the Himalayas, it has become a part of our culture, of our religion, and our literature is full of vivid accounts of the fabulous wealth of the Himalayas. Not only that, people from other parts of the country like Joshis and Pandeys went and settled there. So, now it will not be only the military forces that can safeguard our country but we will have to make the Himalayas impregnable and that can be done only by doing this. For every five miles or ten miles—we should have a settlement like the

one that they have got in Palestine to safeguard their border from being over-run by the Arabs. They do have the soldiers there all the time. They settle the people there. They have industries there, they have got agriculture there. They are interested in safeguarding their border. Therefore, keeping all this in view, I have made a suggestion that we must raise a memorial to Rajendra Babu, and it should be called the Himalayan Development Fund. All the parties should join it. Every district should feel that its boundary is not the district's boundary but its boundary is the Himalayan boundary. Let every district contribute ten people, retired persons, even unemployed and the rest, who will go and settle there. After all, the peace and security and the well-being of the people of this country will depend upon the safety and security of the Himalayas. They are not impregnable.

In the end, I would refer to only one point. As I have said, we have to mobilise the might of the millions and not depend only on the mighty nations of the world whom we look to. When there is a difference between Russia and China, when something happens, we feel elated. Everything will depend upon our own strength. Even God helps only those who help themselves. We have to mobilise the might of the millions and it is a great source. We should not depend upon the funds of the mighty nations, whether they are roubles or dollars.

Lastly, I might remind the House of what Swami Vivekananda said some years ago—it is spirituality which has been the sheet-anchor of India. It is because the people are spiritual that the nation lasts so long. But, unfortunately, we find sometimes that we have the onslaught of materialism; spirituality is just overwhelmed. I hope and pray that it may be given to us to realise the fundamental fact that the foundation of India's freedom is its

spirituality, it is our sheet-anchor, and we must do all that lies in our private life and public life to strengthen it; we must give it higher values than what the other materialistic countries

do. ^y
 SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL (Gujarat): Mr. Vice-Chairman, I think a well-deserved tribute has been paid by friends particularly on this side to all the ranks of our fighting forces, particularly the lower ranks, who have distinguished themselves in the service of the country during the period when we were under foreign domination and thereafter, and even under the United Nations.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Not only that side but the whole House has paid a tribute.

AN. HON. MEMBER: Hope so.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: However, a reading of this statement shows a certain lack which, is not due to their fault but for which they had to pay the price. Even while the Defence Minister was reading the statement about the enquiry in this House—I remember he came here to make the statement when the Prime Minister was speaking on the international situation—immediately after him, what the Prime Minister said was not on international affairs, more than half of his speech was a white-wash or trying to wash out from our minds the impressions about the statement that the Defence Minister made with regard to the NEFA debate, not only NEFA but all over the front. Therefore, one needs to go a little deeper into this.

An assurance was given to this House that there would be a thorough enquiry. Shri Chavan himself said that if the allegations against certain army officers were proved, Government would take action against them. Slowly, the Government shifted its ground. In the Lok Sabha, in answer to a question in March, the Defence Minister said that Government had not decided whether even the terms of reference could be disclosed. But ha

repeated that the enquiry was only a military appraisal. How this happened within the space of a few months is difficult to understand. Then about the enquiry itself, how did the enquiry proceed? Who were the people interviewed? I would like to know from the Defence Minister whether the persons who were actually fighting, the jawans who were at the front, how many of them were interviewed and examined, how many of the junior officers present at Tawang or at Sela were interrogated to know what the situation was actually. Serious allegations have been made about the failure of the Government, of the Defence Ministry, in supplying equipment about sending the flower of our army for slaughter without even the requisite equipment, without even snow boots. We should like to know from the Defence Minister whether any real enquiry into this has been made. The Prime Minister has taken shelter under a very useful word 'witch-hunting'. Nobody wants witch-hunting. But this House and the people of this country do want to know who is responsible for this debacle.

A person who has been connected with the Government of this country, who knows many people in the Government and who has been knowing for some time people who have served as Ministers, has given some of his views. It is not possible to escape the observations that he has very rightly made in the background of how the former Defence Minister came into this country from London. About the jeep scandal case, our Public Accounts Committee has quite a lot to say. It is not possible to forget "the way in which he had gone into this and the suspicions of the people that the defence of the country was not in the right hands even though the Prime Minister might go on defending him. The Report of the recent Public Accounts Committee is before this House; the matter has been referred to more than once. Last year, after a visit after the emergency came, the members of the Public Accounts Committee have commented and pointed

[Shri Dahyabhai V. Patel.]

out that while we had well-equipped defence workshops, they were *not* producing what they should. Not only were they not producing what they should, but they were not even helping the industry. In most progressive countries defence production and industrial production are co-ordinated. We should have trained people in charge of machines, we should have the machines in full use. We should have men that could be switched on to defence production, to the production of armaments at the time of crisis. Some sort of prevention of unemployment was really begun there. But instead of producing useful things, the ordnance factories were producing coffee percolators, photo-enlargers and bathtubs.

PROP. M. B. LAL: Do you think they are not useful.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: As I said in this House, in one of my questions, I think the bath-tub would be very, very useful to be sent to people responsible for this debacle if they followed the Chinese method. And you know what the Chinese Generals do when they are responsible for defeat or a failure? For that the Japanese word is '*Harakiri*'.

When this enquiry was promised, as I said, it was stated clearly that if any of the allegations or certain things, or lack of foresight on behalf of Army officers was proved, action would be taken. Has any action been taken? Our questions are not answered. I have myself asked several questions particularly with reference to the Prime Minister's statement in the Lok Sabha that General Kaul has seen a lot of active service, that he has a useful record of service I should like the Defence Minister to tell us whether General Kaul has seen active service anywhere. If he has not seen active service, is the Prime Minister misleading this House? I am afraid I have found the Prime Minister misleading this House.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: No no.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Only this morning he has tried to mislead the House.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Only this morning Mr. Mani was saying that he had seen active service in Ara-kans and Kashmir. Has he not?

SHRI A. D. MANI: He was not a battle-tested veteran.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: Not one of our higher officers is.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: That is a wrong statement.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Mr. Vice-Chairman, hair-splitting is an easy way when you do not want to do anything. Active service is something different from sitting behind with the supply lines, as a person in charge, what they call, Quarter-Master General. It is that type of officers who sit behind and see that the supplies are maintained. They are not in charge of defence strategy. They are asked by the General to provide so much, so much, and they provide it. Has General Kaul ever been in charge of fighting forces? Has he in charge of fighting forces? Has he any experience of war? Will the hon. Member who is so anxious to defend everything that the Government does say something?

SHRI ABDUL GHANI: (Punjab): Trimurti.

DR. GOPAL SINGH: What kind of remarks Mr. Abdul Ghani makes? What is Trimurti?

SHRI ABDUL GHANI: Everybody knows it.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Parliament has been pointing out repeatedly the necessity of defence preparedness. I find that on the 8th April in the Lok Sabha, Mr. U. C.

Patnaik made the following observations: —

"I am just giving instance after instance of our requirements for Ladakh as well as for NEFA which our Ministry has not taken care to produce."

This was 1960. Mr. Krishna Menon says in April 1961: —

"We are in the same position with regard to medium artillery and our production establishments are able to meet whatever demands the Armed Forces may make upon them ... Of course if there was an emergency of a serious character, it is calculated that defence production should go up by ten times."

How many times has the defence production gone up since the emergency came? And how far are we from it?

We have been hearing such a lot all out the semi-automatic weapon which has been produced in our ordnance factories. Last year, when I went with the Public Accounts Committee, to see an ordnance factory, we were shown a demonstration of it. As a matter of fact, on that very day the gentleman in charge of the ordnance factory told us that they were taking a proving trial and after they had proved successful, as we hope it would be, they would send it up to the Defence Ministry for approval. Fortunately, it is true, and production of that has gone up. May I ask the Defence Minister what is the rate of production of that automatic rifle and what is its proportion? He may not give the exact number. I can understand such type of military information may be secrets though foreigners manage to get them, and Mr. Krishna Menon, after he left the Cabinet, wrote books about them. The people and Parliament are kept in ignorance.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Which book is that?

AS HON. MEMBER: Why do you provoke him?

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: "India and the Chinese Invasion" by Mr. Krishna Menon. He has written it after he left office. Anyway, the point is, is there co-ordination between the rate of recruitment to the Army that we are trying to build up and the rate of the production of automatic weapons? Is it commensurate with the requirements in terms of assurances that have been given to the House in the past, both by the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister? I would like to hear from the Defence Minister whether there is something like that.

A word about our intelligence. What does the report say?

"The size of the Chinese force still remaining on Indian soil is believed to be less than 200. Official circles here hope the intruders will desist from further provocations and withdraw peacefully."

This is from New Delhi, dated the 17th September, 1962. What is the position? And what was the size of the intruders? Is the information of our intelligence correct? On the 20th October Mr. Krishna Menon said at a public meeting . . .

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Is it a press report or a report by some correspondent?

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Yes, it is a press report by a responsible paper. It is not denied or contradicted.

"Addressing a well-attended meeting at the L.I.C. grounds, Mr. Menon said, 'some posts had been lost to the enemy in Ladakh. But they were of little military significance.' He reiterated, 'To the best of our ability we will defend our land'".

(Time bell rings).

Sir, you will kindly allow me a little indulgence.

[Shri Dahyabhai V. Patel.]

China and Pakistan, professing different systems, were partners in the game of plunder. They both have claimed parts of Jammu and Kashmir. The Defence Minister said that the Chinese as aggressors had to be thrown out and for doing so the Government did not count the strength. This is what the departing Defence Minister said. The manner in which statements are made by different people in the Government is really confusing. In Lucknow, in December, 1961, Mr. Krishna Menon said that so long as he was the Defence Minister he would not expose a single soldier to unknown danger.

"Mr. Krishna Menon who was addressing a largely attended public-meeting pointed out that the country was governed not by Mohammad Tughlak but *by men who were sincere' and he took realities of the situation into account."

"... Those who asked India to fight China to regain lost territory did not know what they were talking about. If there was a war everything would have to be flown across, a match box to a tent."

I want to know what our intelligence, what our Defence Ministry has been doing. From this side of the House we have been asking again and again that China has been building roads in our territory. This fact has been concealed from this House. After five long years, after persistent questioning in this House, no clear explanation has been given as to why they were allowed to build these roads and what we were doing. If China was building roads, what were we doing? That is a serious matter. And are we now catching up with them? It is no use telling us that the terrain is difficult. There are mountains. We cannot build roads. Then how are you going to defend the country there?

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA): That will do.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: A few minutes.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA) : There are several other speakers, Mr. Patel. You must realise that also.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: I will conclude in a few minutes.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA) : One more minute.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: It is time that the Government should realise that the enemy cannot be fought by the Gold (Control) Order or the Compulsory Deposit Scheme. The enemy can be fought by building up the morale of the people. And you did not build it. You cannot build it up by oppressive measures. You can build up the morale of the people by inspiring confidence in them. Gandhiji out of nothing built up a people that could resist a mighty Empire, not by coercive measures, but by voluntary co-operation, with their help. I am sorry the Government is not 4 P.M. doing that and for that in any free country the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister who retired would have been impeached. Unfortunately things are not done that way. We hope that some day the people of this country will realise what they are getting by blindly voting for the Party that has been in power, that has done nothing to improve the condition of the masses, talking of the socialist pattern but only building up the party position again and again. I hope the new Defence Minister will see reason and a practical man that he is he will be a little more practical and assert himself if he can. But I am doubtful if he can do that, because even while he was making his statement on the enquiry I saw how he was being interfered with and when the Prime Minister got up, he whitewashed the whole thing.

SHRI MOHAN LAL SAKSENA: Mr. Vice-Chairman, I want to point out that the people of this country are not to blame for placing the Congress Party in power. It is the Opposition which is to blame, because 45 per cent, of the votes were given to the Congress Party and the majority was given to the Opposition candidates.

THE VICE CHAIRMAN (SHRI MP. BHARGAVA): Mr. Rama Reddy.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Mr. Vice-Chairman, I have heard very carefully the speeches made in this House on this crucial question of our NEFA reserves and our defence preparedness. Sir, my hon. friend, Mr. Dahyabhai Patel, was saying just now what he probably did not intend. He was condemning his own countrymen for bringing the Congress Party into power by blindly voting. He was condemning his own countrymen thereby and nothing more. I only wish he knew what he was doing.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Sir, may I say . . .

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Sir, I am not yielding.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: If you misquote or misinterpret me and if you put wrong words into my mouth, I have got a right to clarify the position.

Sir, I never said that the people of the country, were doing this but the people of the country were being misled into something that they do not understand and therefore they are going to pay for it.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: That itself is a slur. Our people are ready to understand things.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Our people are wise enough that way. It is a common canon that they can never be misled. (*Interruption.*) Sir, Mr. Dahyabhai Patel was saying that the enquiry should have been con-

ducted among the jawans, the officers and everybody else without any discrimination whatsoever and the report should have been placed here. That would have been the worst thing to do. As it has been made clear by the hon. Defence Minister in his statement, that would have only benefited the enemy, if such a step had been taken.

I come next to my friend, Mr. Gurupada Swamy who said that the people who were responsible for such a state of affairs were not punished. Certainly that was not the intention. At any rate, so far as I understand it, it was our intention to enquire into the matter in order to find out where our soft corners were, our weaknesses were so that we could improve our defence preparedness as best as possible for all time to come. He also demanded the original Report which, I am sure, is not, as is well known by now, in the interests of the country.

Now, I come to Mr. Kureel who said that Tibet ought to have been considered as a buffer State. What can be more fallacious than this? Everybody knows that in the year 1947 our economy was so backward, with no roads on the Himalayan border, with traditions handed over by the British Army, with all kinds of weaknesses that were existing and with no proper home-front development in the country. Even after 12 years We have not been able to build such roads. It is a formidable task to create all those defence equipments that were necessary. Under these circumstances I do not know how Mr. Kureel was asking us to create a buffer State of Tibet in order to protect India. This is a most theoretical, fallacious and probably—I do not know if it is parliamentary—a stupid argument that could be advanced.

Now, Sir, Mr. Mani and Mr. Vajpayee were saying that this is a document of incapacity. Certainly even our hon. Defence Minister did not claim it as a document of success.

[Shri N. Sri Rama Reddy.] He was only analysing the causes of *our* failure. I am sure on that account they cannot claim any credit more than that claimed by the hon. Minister.

The main point that was made by Mr. Mani was that it was the failure of our foreign policy and our defence policy. Of course, it was a sorry state of affairs. By no means can we gloat over such a state of affairs on our northern borders. They were saying that it was the failure of our foreign and defence policies. I would like to elaborate it a little. Sir, it is true that China was preparing for the last 35 years. The present military rulers of China had no other business but to prepare themselves in order to plunder. They had the traditions handed over to them of guerilla warfare and all sorts of treacherous warfare and hard and tough battle inoculation was going on for the last 35 years. What was our state of affairs? (Interruption) We were preparing ourselves. As soon as we got freedom we knew what we had to do. What could we do except prepare ourselves on the home-front? We had to strengthen our economy; we had to increase our production. Even today, after 12 years, we do not have enough number of engineers to be recruited to the Army after such a terrific and hectic movement of educating the people. Is the Opposition able to produce technicians overnight?

شہزاد گل : سیکورٹی پہلے
آئے گی یا اکنامی پہلے آئے گی -
†[श्री अब्दुल गनी : सिक्योरिटी पहले
आएगी या इकनामी पहले आएगी ?]

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: First things are to come first. Our industrial economy, our agricultural economy, our home-front, our education ought to be set right. That

f[] Hindi transliteration.

was the first thing to be done. Otherwise you cannot fight any battle even for a single day. Our Prime Minister has been saying that for every soldier fighting on the battle-field so many people have got to work on the home-front. I am sure not less than 50 people have got to work on the home-front in order to make one man fight on the battle-field. In spite of that, Sir, what did we do? The Prime Minister has definitely stated that right from the year 1950 when the Chinese marched into Tibet, in a big way we were conscious and we were making preparations. All this is preparation. If we build irrigation projects, it is preparation. If we set up steel projects, it is preparation. If we build schools and colleges, it is preparation. So this preparation was going on in a very big way. All the same, Sir, one thing must be admitted that there was a certain slant in our minds that China would not attack.

Certainly so. It was admitted. Why do you quarrel about a fact which was admitted? It was admitted by no less a person than the Prime Minister himself. He said there was a slant in our mind. It is stated in the document itself.

AN HON. MEMBER: Why did you allow yourself that slant?

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: We had our approach to problems. My hon. friend Shri Lingam has already stated how our approach is a peaceful approach to every problem. We make our approach in a peaceful manner in order to bring about the good of humanity as a whole, not only that of India. We have taken up in our foreign policy, the cause of the backward people and backed it. We backed the cause of the people who were under colonial rule and we have secured a victory and we have made a name for our country unheard of before. This country never in its history had earned such a famous name as it did during the regime of

the great Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru. There was a battle in Korea, a war in Korea. Who was invited? Our Prime Minister was invited. There was a battle in Suez. Who was invited? Our Prime Minister was invited. There was trouble in Congo. Who was invited? It was the Prime Minister of India who was invited. This is the glory of the policy of the Prime Minister of this country. Coming nearer home, even with regard to China, what is the state of affairs? We suffered reverses in NEFA, it is true. But we fought valiantly in Ladakh where* only 120 men held back 10,000 Chinese soldiers near about Chushul. Is that not in your memory? Don't you recognise these valiant acts of our jawans? With regard to NEFA we did suffer reverses. But who stopped the Chinese from coming on? Probably they would have occupied all this area. Had it not been for our great Prime Minister anything might have happened. Of course, it is not easy for China to walk over to Delhi, just as it is not easy for us to walk over to Peking. That is why the Prime Minister has said that great nations behave in a particular way. He said that we must be prepared to resist whatever might be the cost. And that is the way we proceeded in this matter. Who compelled China to stop and make that unilateral declaration of cease-fire? How did that come about? That was due to our own essentially good stand, our noble stand, our courageous stand. Who compelled them? Did the opposition parties stand on the Himalayas and say to the Chinese: You declare a cease-fire?

AN HON. MEMBER: No, Congressmen did it.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: History will record that on account of the valiant and good policy of the Congress Party under its illustrious leader, a unilateral cease-fire came about. Not only did that unilateral ceasefire come about, but they said they would withdraw about 20 kilometres

behind even the McMahon Line and also the international line. So this is where Prime Minister Nehru's policy, both in political diplomacy and in defence matters, has paid us dividends. Who compelled the Colombo Powers? The Colombo Powers on their own declared the Virtuous stand that the Prime Minister had taken with regard to this conflict and the whole world knows it. Now the Chinese have withdrawn, and what is more, a wonderful thing has happened. History has been created in this country On this planet. Could you ever imagine such a thing? Today, as was pointed out by Shri Akbar Ali Khan and others, China is isolated in the matter of the Test Ban Treaty. Nearly 95 countries have signed it against the bitter opposition of China.

AN HON. MEMBER: We have also signed it.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Even this kind of a treaty, who initiated it? It was our Prime Minister who initiated that idea of a test ban treaty some 12 years back and he has been asking for it all these years, in the international forums, to bring about this Test Ban Treaty.

Another most wonderful thing has happened. Our non-alignment policy is approved both by the West and by the East and all the world over, except perhaps China. China is the only country which does not. China stands today isolated, utterly isolated, demoralised and defaced. That is the position that China occupies today, as against India which is occupying a pre-eminent position of honour and dignity in the world today. Let the Opposition Members find out from history, from the events that have taken place in this country, if it is not a fact that China today is despised by the West, that China today is disowned by the East, that China today is neglected by Africa and that China today is suspected by all?

AN HON. MEMBER: What about our own neighbour?

SHRI N. SRI RTMA REDDY: By mere moral strength, China can be brought to its knees and I am sure Prime Minister's policy is good and it only the opposition also would give it support, we will be able to strengthen our country and we shall be able to take back every inch of our country which has now gone into Chinese hands. Thank you.

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE: (Maharashtra): Mr. Vice-Chairman, before I deal with the Report itself, I want to congratulate the hon. the Defence Minister, Shri Yeshwant Rao Chavan, for taking the Parliament and the public into confidence by making this statement. Of course, I am not quite satisfied with the disclosures made in the statement, for I expected that there would be some more revelations. But even then, this is a welcome departure from the old practice of keeping Parliament and the public in utter darkness about our defence preparations. There had been some criticism of it in some papers which enjoy the patronage of the erstwhile Defence Minister, Shri Krishna Menon, but I hope Shri Yeshwantrao Chavan, will not be influenced by such adverse comments and that in future also, he will continue this policy of taking Parliament and the public into confidence. That is essential if he wants to strengthen the defences of the country. For that it is very necessary that we should tell the people what We are doing about our defences. Of course, it should be done without jeopardising our security.

Now, coming to the Report, if we go through it, we can come to only one conclusion and it is this, that the Government had miserably failed to defend our motherland.

[THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair]

We find that in all respects we have been lacking. There was no proper equipment. There were no proper roads. Our Intelligence Depart-

ment or Service was extremely poor. We had not been prepared in the least to face the Chinese aggression. And what is most astounding to find is that there were no battle schools for training the troops and no battle inoculation. These steps are being taken only just now. It is mentioned in the Report that our forces and troops did not have orientation tours vis-avis the particular terrains in which the troops had to operate. Then what were we doing during the past ten years or so? We had anticipated that China would invade our country some day or the other. We had that fear lurking in our minds since long. Then why did the Government not take the steps earlier? I will not quote at length from the statement because many hon. Members have already quoted from that statement in this House. One conclusion we all arrive at from this statement is that we had not made adequate preparations to defend our country against the Chinese aggression.

Apart from that Madam, we have also been misled about our defence preparations. We were informed that whatever defeat we may have suffered in Ladakh, we will not suffer any defeat in NEFA, that we were strong in NEFA. That is what we were informed by the Prime Minister. He informed us that we have built up thousands of miles of roads in NEFA land. I will quote from the Prime Minister's speech made in the Lok-Sabha, just before the Chinese invasion. He mentioned this in the Lok Sabha on 14th August, 1962:

"We had a special Border • Roads Development Committee formed which has done very well and built thousands of miles of roads in very difficult terrain."

This is what the Prime Minister stated in the Lok Sabha but just now the Report reveals that there were no roads at all. If there were no roads in NEFA, why did the Prime Minister

try to mislead the House by giving this information that thousands of miles of roads had been constructed in that area? All this clearly indicates that the Prime Minister did not expect that the Chinese would invade our country. I will again quote from the same speech of the Prime Minister in which he had said that it would be absurd to think that China would invade us. On the 14th August, 1962, this is what the Prime Minister said:

"It is quite absurd to talk about China invading India and all that. China has committed aggression. That is bad enough. We should face it and try to get it rectified. But imagining that, she is swooping down the whole of India and swallowing it has, I submit, nothing to do with reality or possibility of any situation."

This is what the Prime Minister said just two months before China committed aggression against our country. After going through the statements, and if we recollect the events, we find that the responsibility for this NEFA debacle lies squarely on the shoulders of the Prime Minister, the Government and the former Defence Minister and high ranking Generals. It was clearly mentioned by the Prime Minister, not in Delhi but in Madras on his way to Colombo, that he had directed his Generals to expel the Chinese forces from the Himalayan borders. If we did not have the necessary equipment, if we did not have sufficient forces, if there were no roads, why should the Prime Minister have made that statement without consulting the Generals? It is clear that the Prime Minister had made that statement without consulting the Generals. Therefore, this was not a military decision but a political decision which the hon. Prime Minister took. Therefore, the whole responsibility for this debacle lies on the shoulders of the Prime Minister as well as the former Defence Minister. In this context of this NEFA debacle, Madam, I must state that our Prime Minister has lost

all the moral claims and rights to head this Government and to govern this country.

Madam, this Report reveals that our soldiers on the front fought bravely and heroically. They struggled hard to defend our motherland and what we were lacking in was efficiency in the higher ranks. Our soldiers were determined to fight and were determined to lay down their lives—actually they did lay down their lives—but our high-ranking officials were not up to the mark and, therefore, it is as much the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the former Defence Minister as that of the Generals. Madam, it has been mentioned in the statement that the Defence Minister does not want to carry out a witch-hunt. I am surprised at this. The hon. Minister of Defence had stated on the 1st of April, 1963,

"If, in the course of the enquiry and as a result of the report, certain allegations are proved against any officers, certainly Government will take action against them."

Let us see what was the stand of the Prime Minister. He said, on the 9th November, 1962 in the Rajya Sabha:

"So, I hope there will be an enquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who was responsible for them."

The Prime Minister had assured this House in November last that the object of the enquiry would be to fix the responsibility on those officers who were responsible for this debacle. Madam, I consider it more important that we must try to fix the responsibility on those irresponsible Generals because, even after the NEFA debacle not only did the Prime Minister try to exonerate General Kaul, but he also gave him a clean certificate. I will again quote our Prime Minister:

"On 2nd October, we called back the Chief of the General Staff, General Kaul, who was on leave then. I want to mention his name

[Shri B. D. Khobaragade.]

specially because, quite! extraordinarily, unjust things have been said about him ... I doubt, knowing a good many of our officers and others—many of them are good—in sheer courage and initiative and hard work, if we can find anybody to beat him."

The Prime Minister says that General Kaul was not only good but there was nobody who could beat him in initiative, sheer courage and hard work. This is the certificate given by the hon. Prime Minister to this General who had brought utter shame and disgrace to this country and, therefore, it is more important, Madam, that we should institute an enquiry and try to fix responsibility on the Generals who were responsible for this debacle. It is not a question of witch-hunting. I hope the hon. Defence Minister will take these suggestions into consideration.

Now, coming to this question of preparedness, I have to make an observation or two. We are making preparations but in my opinion these preparations are not sufficient enough. Apart from that, I want to know from the hon. Defence Minister, the object and aim of our defence preparations. What do we want to do? Is it that we will not allow the Chinese to commit further aggression or is it the aim and object of our Defence policy to expel all the Chinese forces from the Indian territory? What is the aim and object of the policy of our military preparedness? What do we want? Unfortunately, in this statement, Madam, there is no mention about it and it seems that we are not taking any steps to get the aggression vacated. I will quote from the statement itself:

"In the current climate of hostility and tension however, we have, while keeping in view our main objective of settling, when there is an appropriate climate for peaceful talks and discussions, our differences peacefully, to take necessary

measures for defence of our territorial integrity against any aggressive threat the more so, because of our experience last year of a sudden and unprovoked massive aggression by our northern neighbour."

This statement only makes specific mention of our aim of not allowing China to make further aggression. At the same time it says that if there is a proper atmosphere, we will try to solve this problem of border dispute and aggression peacefully. It means that we are not taking any steps so as to compel the Chinese to vacate the aggression. Therefore, my suggestion is that we must make preparations—we must be militarily prepared—and take effective steps so that we can defend our country not only from further Chinese aggression but, whenever it is possible, we can expel the Chinese aggressor from our motherland. Of course, it is a very difficult task—I realise that—and it is not possible for us to build up our military forces within five months, six months or one year. It does not matter; it may take one year, it may take two years. But that should be our aim. If we have to build up our military force, if we have to build up our armed strength, the objective should be that today or tomorrow, after one year or after two years we will drive away the Chinese aggressors from our motherland. Therefore, we should keep in view these two suggestions that the responsibility must be fixed on the persons who were responsible for this debacle and secondly that we should not remain satisfied with merely checking further Chinese aggression but we must fully prepare ourselves to take all necessary steps whenever we can to recover our lost territory from China.

Thank you.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: Madam Deputy Chairman, I am indeed grateful to this hon. House for debating for the whole day both the statements I had the honour to present to this hon.

House. When I say, 'I had the honour to present' I do not mean that I was ever proud to present the statement about the NEFA enquiry because it was certainly a disquietening document, a document which conveyed a sort of self-criticism which was essential not only in the interests of the Army itself but which was necessary in the interests of the nation as a whole, and I was looking forward to this debate to have an objective assessment or evaluation of that document. I know that the criticism that was made, though on many points it was off the mark, was actuated by the concern for the defence of the country, and therefore I am grateful for whatever criticism was made about it. I said that this document was a sort of self-criticism and this self-criticism was necessary in one sense or the other.

As we all know, though our Indian Army is considered traditionally to be functioning for a couple of centuries, the Army of the Republic of India has been functioning only for the last sixteen or seventeen years. Formerly it was functioning as a part of a bigger military machine under a different military leadership for other political objectives. And as in any other field, in the field of military operations also it is not the theoretical knowledge that is of any use but really speaking ultimately it is the experience which is a great teacher. Looking to the experience of our Army from this point of view the experience of our Army was certainly very limited in the last sixteen or seventeen years. Whatever little military operations we had was in the Hyderabad area which was in the nature of police action—I am not underestimating the value of those operations—and similarly in Goa while there was some bigger operation in Kashmir. And that was certainly quite a valuable experience but as a matter of fact what happened in the last year in NEFA, Ladakh and in the eastern part of NEFA near Walong was certainly a major experience for

our Army and it was necessary to evaluate properly what we learnt in that experience for the benefit of the Army in the future.

I was expecting some sort of a criticism from the defence point of view. Of course, certain political considerations do get connected with defence preparedness and defence considerations, I do agree, but I was rather disappointed, I must say, that most of the criticism here was aimed at with certain political objectives in mind. My friend, Mr. Dahyabhai Patel, made a remark that while I was making the statement I was interrupting the Prime Minister who later on made a statement whitewashing what I said. I think there is nothing farther from the truth than that. I can tell this hon. House that my statement on the NEFA enquiry had been prepared with the approval and full consent of the Prime Minister.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Read the speech yourself.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: And there was no question of the Prime Minister whitewashing what was said by me because what I had said was on behalf of the Government and with his previous consent. So this type of approach is rather a wrong one. I just wanted to mention this first.

What I expected was an objective assessment of whatever we have placed before this hon. House. When I said that there is no need for having any witch-hunt, when I used that word 'witch-hunt' I had this in mind. Because once you try to fix responsibility on A, B, C, D or whoever they are, the nature of the enquiry will get changed and an objective enquiry becomes impossible. Calling names does not help self-criticism and really speaking whatever information we had been able to collect in that statement we would never have been able to collect if we had started with the idea of fixing responsibility on persons. Human nature being what it is, one must understand what the re-

[Shri Y. B. Chavan.]

suit would have been. But what is more important? As to who is responsible, I am not going into that matter but what is more necessary, what is more essential for this country is to find out what the mistakes were, what the deficiencies were and what the lessons are which the country could learn because we are not at the end of the trouble, we are in the midst of the trouble. We are in the process of defending our country. Our trouble with our neighbour is not yet over. We have to prepare ourselves and prepare for a long time. Perhaps this defence preparedness and the consciousness of defence preparedness for this country has come to stay and stay permanently, if I may say so. If that is to be done, then certainly we have to look at this whole problem in an objective manner. Therefore whether 'A' General was wrong or whether 'B' General was wrong or whether 'A' politician was wrong is not the problem. As I said, there was something militarily wrong and that has to be corrected. And I can tell with all seriousness with my hand on my heart—if that phrase would satisfy my hon. friend, Mr. Patel—that I have tried to share with this hon. House and the country as much about it as I can consistent with public interest. That I can say without any fear of contradiction.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: We have not questioned that.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: I know. Really speaking what we have to do and what matters is how we look at the NEFA Enquiry Report. Unfortunately I have got a feeling and I can say that from my own personal experience. I am not criticising anybody. Before coming here I was the Chief Minister of a big State and even though I came to take up the responsibility here I found I knew very little about the problems of defence of the country because there is very meagre background about the defence problems of the country among the

public. They have some romantic ideas about the defence of the country or there is some wishful thinking about it. Now, we have said that we did not have any slant of China launching an offensive against us and that really speaking is the main reason for this. But what is wrong with it? Do hon. Members suggest that immediately after independence our country ought to have started taking up military postures against all the neighbours around India? Is that the idea? Mahatma Gandhi, I think, even before winning independence or even before starting the struggle for independence, before he became the General of India, had made one very important statement in the All India Congress Committee that India's foreign policy should be evolved on the basis of friendship with our neighbours. That was the right approach. I do not think basically that approach was wrong. And the foreign policy based on that approach was certainly correct. In this particular instance one neighbour proved to be treacherous.

I have tried to think out what the reasons for our reverses are despite our own mistakes and despite our own deficiencies whatever they were and according to me there were three reasons for this. One was the natural advantage of China. They have got overwhelming superiority in number because for the last thirty years they have done nothing else but to build up their army. Their whole revolutionary concept is based on military preparedness. Their civil war was carried on with the idea of military preparedness. That was one reason. Secondly, they have got the natural advantage of terrain from which to operate against India. Thirdly, every aggressor, particularly an aggressor who is a military dictator, has initiative which a democratic country has not. We have seen it at least in the last two World Wars. Even before that we have seen it in the case of many countries that

democracies will always have a disadvantage. We saw the mighty empire in the eastern part of Asia, the British Empire, what types of reverses they had to face. Even in the case of another military Power, Russia, in the Second World War, we found what initial reverses they had to face. So. these are the three main reasons.

We have to find out how we can remedy these matters. I must say I do not want to give any wrong ideas to this hon. House about the state of our military preparedness. I shall try to be rather more realistic about it. Somebody asked me just now whether our production is commensurate with our requirements. Let me tell you very frankly that it is not. If you expect merely the Minister to have the production required for war consumption, ready within a few months, it is not possible. Your defence preparedness cannot be separated from your economic base, from your economic capacity, your economic capabilities, your technological capabilities, your scientific development and other connected matters. You cannot isolate those things and just say: Get yourself prepared. You were given nine months, ten months, one year, two years. Do all these things. We have to prepare for all these continuously. What we have done is we have certainly tried to look at us critically. From this experience of the Army, from the sudden experience, from the sad experience that they went through, we want to learn lessons. This enquiry was made for that. That is why I said military appraisal. It was not for something else. It was a military appraisal. That is much more essential. If you sit in judgment and say, 'A' is bad, hang him, your work is not going to be over. We have to see how we prepare our own defence forces. We have to see that they not only do not repeat the old mistakes they had done before but they will also have to meet the problems of

defence better and maintain the integrity of this country. That is more essential.

As we have said, those who control the Himalayas will control the plains of India. We have to defend our country in the Himalayan ranges and for that we will have to prepare and prepare for a long time to come. This is my general approach to looking at this whole enquiry. I would request every Member, first of all, to look at it from this point of view. It is not enough. I would like to make two or three corrections in the statement or the impressions that it has created. One impression I want to correct is this. I find while I have been making a reference particularly to the jawans, I was generally saying that their performance was fair. Having studied the Report again I think that their performance was rather very good. Then, again, I must say one thing. Even about the higher Generals I have said whatever I have said. But there I must make an exception and I must make one point very clear that these remarks do not apply to the higher Command in the western sector in Ladakh, where really speaking they did a very good job. Otherwise, it would have been unfair to these Generals, who functioned very fairly there. I must make that clarification before I proceed. Thirdly, I must say about military intelligence. I have very clearly stated what I wanted to say about it. There I must make one clarification which clarification the Prime Minister made in the other House. It is not the responsibility of military intelligence to get intelligence outside the borders of this country. That responsibility is somebody else's. I must make this point clear.

Then, I must refer to specific points made by some of the hon. Members. I would like to make a mention of the point made by my hon. friend, Shri Mani, with which he started the discussion. He made a reference to the propaganda of Chinese radio about

[Shri Y. B. Chavan.]

discrimination between the officers and the jawans. I am afraid Mr. Mani appears to be the first victim of the efforts at indoctrination by Chinese propaganda. I hope he is not. I find it was exactly the line of approach that the Chinese took about indoctrinating our prisoners of war. Please do not have that idea, as if all their officers and all their jawans are treated equally. They partially try to put up a drama like that and they created some sort of feelings in some of our people. But certainly we do not deserve that sort of criticism. Certainly we do inherit some of the traditions of the British Army. I may tell you that the present Generalship, the present leadership at Army Headquarters is very much aware of this problem. They have issued instructions to all the officers to create a new pattern of relationship between the officers and others in the Army which will be consistent with democratic traditions. I entirely agree with the proposition that it is very essential. We need not learn this lesson from Chinese propaganda. This is something which is within us. These new traditions have to be laid down by our own people and it is being done. Series of instructions have been sent saying how this should happen.

We know in the field particularly it is this quality of leadership that matters most. What is the quality of leadership? What is the test of leadership? The test of leadership is that it must command loyalty in a crisis. When there is no crisis it is very easy to give loyalty, but it is in a crisis, really speaking, that loyalty is tested. And that quality which commands loyalty in a crisis is called leadership. May I tell you that this quality of leadership is not a one-way traffic? It is a two-way traffic. As the leader expects loyalty from his followers, the followers also must have loyalty from their leaders. When they are under fire, the gun or the bullet does not make any distinction between a leader and his follower. Whether he

is a soldier or a Commander it treats everybody equally. It is that feeling of fellowship, camaraderie, which really speaking creates the fighting quality which is essential for any army. From this point of view, from this attitude, instructions have been issued. These things are not done overnight. Sometimes old habits die hard, as they say. Particularly with the present Chief of Army Staff I have had many discussions on this point and I think he is very particular to see that this new attitude is taken as regards the relationship between the Army officers and the jawans.

The other point that was made by Mr. Mani is about the slant. He said some of our old Generals were in Korea. There was really speaking some idea about what China wanted to do, Chinese tactics, etc. Certainly theoretical knowledge with the leaders has been there. When I used the words 'not having the slant of China taking an offensive against India', it had certainly political significance. If Mr. Mani would read that sentence again in the sense in which I have used it, possibly he will not put me that question that "General Thimayya was in Korea; how is it that you have not got any idea of what was happening there?".

SHRI A. D. MANI: If the Defence Minister would yield for a moment, what I said about Korea came in as a sort of side argument. What I said was that Government knew that China was moving. Government gave the assurance that they would protect NEFA, but they did not carry out the assurance.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: Really speaking, what started happening from 1959 was some sort of border trouble. Let us try to understand what the assessment of the Government then was. Even when the trouble started, even when the Chinese army entered Indian territory, what was Government supposed to do? Some people have asked why the Prime Minister said "throw them out". Would they have

expected the Prime Minister to send them a welcome song and bouquets? Really speaking, it was certainly a political guidance that the invading army must be thrown out. What else should be there, how to do it and when to do it, was certainly a military proposition, and I must say with all the responsibility that I command that there was no political interference so far as that part is concerned. Suppose tomorrow the armies of the enemy start coming in, what would you expect the Defence Minister to do? Political guidance will have to be given. The civil authorities must guide the army because the army is the instrument of the civil power. When the enemy was entering our country, nothing else could have been done. So the Prime Minister was very much right in saying 'that it should be thrown out. But to throw it out, what preparation should be done for that, when it is to be done, these were certainly left to the military officers and military leadership. We were very clear about it and I have no doubt in my mind that there was anything hanky-panky about this matter.

SHM M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Just one question.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: I am trying to answer all your questions. So, this is the main approach from which we will have to look at it. When suddenly an enemy who had prepared for an offensive started entering, certainly we found that it was rather difficult to induct a large number of people there. Whatever number we tried to induct, we found that they were not acclimatised. Certainly the weapons could not be sent to the right place in the right time. That was the problem. These are some of the defects and deficiencies and lessons that we have learnt. I think we have not merely learnt them well but we will have to correct them in the future.

I must now come to the speech of my hon. friend, Mr. Vajpayee. I can

say that whatever useful suggestions all the hon. Members have made, I have taken note of them and I will try to make use of them. But on some of the points they have made I must give some explanations. About the military intelligence, I do not think the House would expect me to give in detail what we are doing and what we are not doing. It would be absolutely wrong of me to go into those things. But he made mention of some of the instances. He made mention of one instance that we are using some Chinese people to teach us Chinese. What is wrong in it? May I tell the hon. Member that he forgets that there are two Chinas, and we certainly want to make use of the other China. *(Interruption)*. Please listen to me. It is a mistake to think that those people are a part of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. We are merely making use of them as instructors in the Chinese language. What else one can do? Certainly we have to send our people for training to other places in other countries. Certainly we have to do that. Well, I would like to assure the hon. Members that we are not depending merely on Chinese teachers. We have got other teachers also in the Chinese language. But there is nothing wrong in these things. Merely because there is a Chinese teacher we should not get frightened. When we get the Chinese teachers, we are very much certain that they are not going to make wrong use of their stay in India, and it is quite safe to make use of them.

Then he made reference to an incident of two officers getting involved in an accident with a Swedish woman. I am sorry that there was such an incident, but I do not know whether that lady had returned from Sweden. But I can tell him that WP have already held a court of enquiry about that. How the officers came into contact with that lady, and so on. I do not know whether she had returned from Peking. Only because she had returned from Peking that she is a bad woman—I cannot say that.

[Shri Y. B. Chavan.]

He also mentioned one or two other things. I would invite my hon. friend, Mr. Vajpayee, that if he gets some very serious information which is useful for the military intelligence of this country, instead of making a mention of it in the House like this, he is always welcome to my residence or to my office where I can very confidentially listen to him and make use of the very valuable information that he will give me.

AN HON. MEMBER: Will he accept that sporting offer?

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: I am sure he will do that because he is a sport. He has come to me before also with some grievances and I have tried to look into them.

Then I must say, I was not here but I am told, that some hon. Member made a reference that 50 per cent of the army personnel are pro-communist. I must say it is a defamation of our army, defamation of our country. Somebody said this, at least I am told that somebody made this statement. If that statement is made, I am sure this hon. House will dissociate itself from that statement. Our Army is an absolutely patriotic army, nationalist army, and an army which has made a splendid sacrifice for the defence of our country for which we are all proud, for which we shall continue to be proud. Our young men sacrificed their lives and the large number of young men are offering themselves for an army career—this is something very noble, and not only noble but this is a very heartening thing. Really speaking, it is this gesture of this new generation that is really giving us the real thing that we need for ourselves. So let us not have this wrong notion about this.

Then somebody said something in regard to promotions. I can assure the hon. House that the promotions are absolutely made on merits,

SHRI A. D. MANI: Now, in your time. Not before.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: It will be unfair for me to say that it was not so before. I can certainly say it is now. (*Interruption*) I must certainly speak for myself, but at the same time I am speaking not only for myself as an individual, I am speaking for Government. I can assure this hon. House that the promotions are not based on any social connections or their looks, as somebody said. The promotions are really speaking based on the assessment of their fighting qualities and their qualities of leadership. Of course, I know that this is being done on the assessment of their past performances, but the Chief of the Army Staff has assured me that he is going to test the fighting qualities of the new promotees and other officers in the course of the different types of exercises that we are going to hold, to test their fighting qualities, because what is really needed is the fighting quality of the officer and not merely his look or smartness or his turnout. That matter is, really speaking, before the Army Headquarters and is certainly before the Government. I do not want this House to have that impression about promotions, because if that sort of thing is done, that would be another bad lesson that we have to learn again some time. We are very much aware of this particular position. I can assure this hon. House that for promotions particularly in the higher ranks—because, as I said, the deficiencies about the qualities of leadership in the higher ranks have become more apparent, and therefore we have to be more cautious when the officers are promoted to higher ranks—their fighting qualities and their other qualities are tested properly before they are given the right to promotion.

5 P.M.

Well, Madam, these are some of the more important points that some of the hon. Members made. I can only say

to them that the problem of India's defence is a continuous problem, for which a continuous effort will be necessary, for which, as some Member very rightly said, our scientific effort, technological development and economic development also are material factors. You cannot create morale by giving them lectures about patriotism, about fighting in war, and they do not get prepared for it. I must give one good point. The hon. Shri Mani said objectively; he said that he gave credit to my predecessor about his emphasis on the approach to local defence production. I think that was very much correct because it is the capacity and capability of a country to produce its own material that are, really speaking, going to help us ultimately. As I have mentioned in my statement on the defence preparedness, we really wanted to make preparations by starting some six new factories. But, you know, how helpless we were.

Then again, somebody made a mention,—I think it was Shri Mani—about the surrender of the financial allotments, etc. But this is not something new that happens. I think in a government administration this is a normal feature. Surrenders are there. I must say as a precaution for myself that this time you have given me hundreds of crores. I cannot guarantee that I would not make any surrender because that would be a wrong thing to do. I can certainly say—I have made some study of these things—that this surrender was less than what was before, that is five years before, because surrenders are in every department. It is not only in the Defence Ministry. Surrenders are to be there but the Defence-----

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: The Defence expenditure from 1950 till last year has gone up from Rs. 186 crores to Rs. 522 crores.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: You have answered that question. That is why I do not mention that. I would only assure this hon. House that I am not

trying to reply to the debate in the spirit of giving replies or in a spirit of explaining away things. I am only trying to say that this country needs an attitude of objectivity to have a self-appraisal or self-criticism so that not only does the Army get prepared for any adverse circumstances that may come but we prepare our whole nation and face them bravely.

SHRI SANTOSH KUMAR BASU: The Defence Minister is the Leader of this House. I am sure I am expressing the sense of the whole House when I say that we are grateful to him for his great speech.

SHRI GOPIKRISHNA VAJAIVAR-GIYA (Madhya Pradesh): The Report mentions that we are not self-sufficient in our own production and that much has to be imported. Have we imported already in considerable number what we require looking to the condition in Lathi Tilla and all these places?

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: I think I have answered that question in my speech. Our requirements, as I said, are not enough—whatever we are importing. If we are depending on imports, then we are not self-sufficient and we are not going to be strong enough.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Was there anything wrong in the conception of strategy for the defence of NEFA because Ministers off and on said that as far as NEFA was concerned, we were well prepared. So, I want to know whether in the conception of our strategy for the defence of this area, there was anything wrong.

SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN: I would request you to read my statement again. You will find the answer in it.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Madam, I would just take one minute to reply if it is called a reply. I am very grateful to all the Members who took part in this debate and I must say that though the points of view were sharp and the

ship, will grow in strength and will do credit to the country.

I thank the Defence Minister for his extremely conciliatory speech in reply to the debate.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The House stands adjourned till 11.00 A.M. tomorrow.

The House then adjourned at six minutes past five of the clock till eleven of the clock on Saturday, the 21st September 1963.