

enclose herewith a copy of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 1963, as passed by Lok Sabha at its sitting held on the 21st January, 1963."

## II

"I am directed to inform Rajya Sabha that Lok Sabha, at its sitting held on Tuesday, the 22nd January, 1963, adopted the annexed motion in regard to the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Bill, 1963.

2. I am to request that the concurrence of Rajya Sabha in the said motion, and also the names of the members of Rajya Sabha appointed to the Joint Committee, may be communicated to this House."

### Motion

"That the Bill further to amend the Constitution of India be referred to a Joint Committee of the Houses consisting of 45 members; 30 from this House, namely: —

1. Shri Brij Raj Singh-Kotah
2. Shri S. N. Chaturvedi
3. Shri Homi F. Daji
4. Shri Ram Dhani Das
5. Shri R. Dharmalingam
6. Shri Kashi Ram Gupta
7. Sardar Iqbal Singh
8. Shri Madhavrao Laxmanrao Jadhav
9. Shri Madeppa Bandappa Kadadi
10. Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath
11. Shri Paresh Nath Kayal
12. Shri Nihar Ranjan Laskar
13. Shri Harekrushna Mahaiab
14. Shri M. Malaichami
15. Shri Mathew Maniyangadan
16. Shri Bibudhendra Misra
17. Shri F. H. Mohsin
18. Shri H. N. Mukerjee
19. Shri D. J. Naik
20. Shri V. C. Parashar
21. Shri Ram Swarup

22. Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao
23. Shri C. L. Narasimha Reddy
24. Shrimati Yashoda Reddy
25. Syed Nazir Hussain Samnani
26. Shri Ramshekhar Prasad Singh
27. Dr. L. M. Singhvi
28. Shri U. M. Trivedi
29. Shri Balgovind Verma
30. Shri Asoke K. Sen.

and 15 from Rajya Sabha;

that in order to constitute a sitting of the Joint Committee the quorum shall be one-third of the total number of members of the Joint Committee;

that the Committee shall make a report to this House by the first day of the next session;

that in other respects the Rules of Procedure of this House relating to Parliamentary Committees will apply with such variations and modifications as the Speaker may make; and

that this House recommends to Rajya Sabha that Rajya Sabha do join the said Joint Committee and communicate to this House the names of 15 members to be appointed by Rajya Sabha to the Joint Committee."

Sir, I lay the Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 1963, as passed by the Lok Sabha, on the Table.

### GOVERNMENT MOTION RE COLOMBO CONFERENCE PRO- POSALS ON INDIA-CHINA RE- LATIONS

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion to be moved by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.

SHRI G. MURAHARI (Uttar Pradesh): हिन्दुस्तान की संसद् ने एक प्रस्ताव द्वारा यह घोषित किया है कि जब तक हिन्दुस्तान की पवित्र भूमि से चीनी हमलावर बिल्कुल न हट जायें तब तक हमारी लड़ाई जारी रहेगी ।

MR. CHAIRMAN: What is the point of order?

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I am coming to that.

THE MINISTER OF LAW (SHRI A. K. SEN): Before the motion is moved there cannot be any point of order. The motion has not been moved.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: The motion cannot be moved because it is against the spirit of the Resolution.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have allowed the motion to be moved.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Prime Minister I beg to move the following Motion:

"That the proposals of the Conference of six non-aligned Nations held at Colombo between the 10th and 12th of December, 1962, with the clarifications given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana in the meetings with the Prime Minister of India and his colleagues on the 12th and 13th of January, 1963, laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha on the 21st January, 1963, be taken into consideration."

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I move the point of order because now he has moved the motion.

जो प्रस्ताव रखा गया है वह संसद् में की गई घोषणा के विपरीत है क्योंकि कोलम्बो प्रपोजल के मानी यह होते हैं कि हिन्दुस्तान की जो सीमा १५ अगस्त १९४७ में थी उसकी कई हजार वर्गमील भूमि चीनी हमला-

वरों के कब्जे में रह जाती है । इसलिये कोई ऐसा प्रस्ताव जो हमारे प्रस्ताव के विपरीत होगा वह यहां पर स्वीकृत नहीं होगा ।

MR. CHAIRMAN: यह आपका खयाल है, ऐसा नहीं है । यह मूव हो सकता है ।

SHRI T. S. AVINASHILINGAM CHETTIAR (Madras): May we know in English what you said?

MR. CHAIRMAN: The case is not as he thinks. Therefore I have allowed the motion to be moved.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Mr. Chairman, the proposals of the six non-aligned powers which met in Colombo between the 10th and 12th December 1962 have already been laid on the Table of this House and are now known to all hon. Members. May I take the liberty of reading them out again and later on also to read the clarifications which should be read together with the proposals themselves? The proposals relate to the three sectors, the Western Sector\*—that means the Ladakh Sector, the Middle Sector, namely the Bara Hoti Sector, and the Eastern Sector, namely, the NEFA Sector. These are the proposals:

"The Conference considers that the existing *de facto* ceasefire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian Chinese conflict

2. (a) With regard to the Western Sector, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21 and November 28, 1962".

There is a slight clarification here, that is, there was no letter dated the 21st November from Prime Minister Chou En-lai to our Prime Minister. It

was really a unilateral declaration of Prime Minister Chou En-lai made on 21st November.

"(b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position."

SHRI T. S. AVINASHLINGAM  
CHETTIAR: What about the 28th?

SHRI A. K. SEN; There was a letter of 28th, a letter to all the Heads of Governments in which the proposals of 21st November were stated.

"(c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals will be a demilitarised zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area."

This is a very substantive part of the proposal as has been explained by the delegations which came here in January and according to them, this forms the substantive part of the proposals.

"3. With regard to the Eastern sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both the Governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions."

Which are the remaining areas will appear from the clarifications given.

"4. With regard to the problems of the Middle Sector, the Conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force."

That is the Bara Hoti Sector.

"5. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the ceasefire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the ceasefire position."

"6. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries."

This is also very important because this really explains that these proposals are only meant as a ceasefire arrangement and would not prejudice the respective contentions of the parties about the ultimate and final alignment of the boundaries. We asked for clarification when the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Bandara-naike, the Minister of Justice of Ghana, Mr. Ofori-Atta, and the Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Ali Sabri, came here to represent the Colombo Conference and held discussions with us. Upon our making enquiries regarding various points, clarifications were given which are put down in writing and have now been circulated to hon. Members. May I read, with your permission. Sir, these clarifications, because they form, according to us, an essential part of the Colombo proposals and any consideration of the Colombo proposals would be incomplete and would not be proper without reading them along with these clarifications? They are as follows:—

"Upon request from the Government of India, the following clarifications of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Colombo Conference proposals were given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana:

#### Western Sector

(i) The withdrawal of Chinese-forces proposed by the Colombo'

[Shri A. K. Sen.]

Conference will be 20 kilometres as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21st November and in Prime Minister Chou En-lai's letter of 28th November, 1962,"

We have corrected it here because the reference of 21st November was really to the statement.

"i.e. from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China."

This line we have re-laid exactly and precisely on the map which has been circulated to hon. Members and that line is the yellow line where the Chinese came up and remain today, after overwhelming our posts in the Galwan valley and the Chip Chap river valley. This 20 kilometre withdrawal will take them to the position indicated in the map by the purple line.

"(ii) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to will be on and up to the line indicated in (i) above."

That means the purple line so far as the Chinese military forces are concerned and the yellow line so far as the Indian military forces are concerned.

"(iii) The demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo Conference proposals."

I have made it quite clear that this was an essential part of the Colombo Proposals. I shall explain later on why we wanted that clarification, because the Chinese, in the guise of interpretation, wanted to introduce a reservation to the effect that in this demilitarised zone, China will have the posts and not India. The clarifications, therefore, are of a very important

nature as to what is envisaged under the proposals and so form a substantive part thereof, namely, that this area would be administered by posts of both sides, excepting that these will be civil posts and not military posts. The House will recall that before the 8th September, in this area both China and India had military posts and in the maps circulated to hon. Members the Chinese military posts are shown in red dots and the Indian military posts are shown in blue dots. After the 8th September, particularly after the 20th October, the Chinese overwhelmed the blue dots, i.e. our military posts, and came right up to the yellow line. Therefore, on 8th September there was in this area, the area which is sought to be demilitarised to the extent of 20 kilometres measured from the Mac-Mahon Line up to the purple line, a territory where both India and China had their respective military check posts, posts which are indicated by the red and blue dots respectively. What is proposed under the Colombo Proposal is that this area should again be put under joint control of both the countries, by their civil posts instead of military posts that existed originally before the 8th September. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there had to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China. What was not open for negotiation was the principle of dual control. Both must share control over this area as they did before the 8th September. That was not open for talk at all. In other words, it was not *res Integra*, not open for discussion. What was open for discussion between the two Governments would be only the number of posts, their location and the number of the personnel for each post. They would be matters for negotiation and for further agreement.

#### *"Eastern Sector"*

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo Conference proposals, move right up to the south of the line of actual control,

i.e. the MacMahon Line, except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right up to the north of the MacMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo Conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China, according to the Colombo Conference proposals, are Chedong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is, a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments."

The House will recall that under the proposals made by China through Premier Chou En-lai on the 21st November, they claimed that both sides must withdraw militarily from the MacMahon Line which they called the line of actual control, and create a demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres on either side, making an agree-gate of 40 kilometres, taking both the sides, and each will control by civil posts 20 kilometres of demilitarised zone on its side, that is, China controlling 20 kilometres of demilitarised zone to the north of MacMahon Line and India controlling 20 kilometres of demilitarised zone to the south of MacMahon Line, through civil posts. That was the proposal of China. The further implication is—a specific implication—that so far as the Thagla ridge was concerned, this area would, according to the Chinese, be north of the MacMahon Line and therefore within the civil control of the Chinese exclusively. The reason for this is, as the House will recall, that according to the Chinese Thagla ridge falls on the north of the MacMahon Line, in other words, that the MacMahon Line goes south of the Thagla ridge. According to us it goes to the north of the Thagla ridge, because according to us the MacMahon Line followed the highest mountain

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ridges and watersheds throughout and we could not contemplate a deviation from the highest mountain ridge south of the Thagla ridge because of that. We need not go into the merits of it now. But that was the difference. Therefore, according to the Chinese the Thagla ridge falls to the north of the MacMahon Line and according to us it falls to the south. Therefore, according to this position, it naturally follows that the civil control of the Thagla ridge will be done by the Chinese. But so far as the Thagla ridge and the Longju area are concerned, the Colombo proposals were, according to the clarification given to us, that control of these two areas—Longju area and the Thagla ridge area—in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments, will be settled by the two Governments. That is, the truce arrangements, the control of this area of dispute which is shown in the maps circulated by black seriated lines.

In the Middle Sector, the Ceylon Conference desired that the *status quo* should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*. This is a comparatively easy matter because so far as Bara Hoti is concerned, the *status quo* which had been followed for some time had not been disturbed by the Chinese since the 8th September and, therefore, to maintain the *status quo* as it existed before the 8th September would be a comparatively easy matter so far as the Middle Sector is concerned. Now, the House will appreciate in contra-distinction with the Chinese proposals of the 21st November, the salient points which are contained in the Colombo proposals. I took a little trouble in explaining what the proposals of the Chinese were on the Eastern Sector only for this reason and I would also take a little time of the House in explaining once again what the Chinese proposals were, namely, their proposals of the

[Shri A. K. Sen.]

21st November, about the Western Sector. They reached what they call their line of actual control as on 7th November, 1959, after the series of attacks which they launched on a large scale on the 20th October and which continued right up to the 21st November, 1962. This expression 'line of actual control' used by the Chinese ever since November 1959 is as elusive as many of their past profession and expressions. What was the line of actual control was in fact a line of actual demand as I had stated earlier on other occasions and had not matured into the line of actual control until a major invasion which was mounted in October 1962, on the 20th October 1962. It remained a line to be realised and yet they called it the line of actual control and they have ever since called it the line of actual control as on 7th November, 1959, possibly with a view to creating that impression in the outside world, and I think many even in this country, having read these expressions only thought that this was the actual line of control in the physical sense, in November, 1959. I mean, words can create such a mirage and in the hands of some countries like the Chinese, by constant repetition, they are sought to be given a sense of reality but the fact remains that on the 7th November, 1959, they were nowhere near what they have now achieved after the 20th October 1962. They had then only contemplated claiming a line which they in fact put out before our officers in 1960 during the discussions which started between Indian Officers and Chinese Officers pursuant to the meeting of the two Prime Ministers. There for the first time they put out a map which showed large chunks of territory as within Chinese territory, Tibetan territory, whose western extremity was indicated by what is now the yellow line. They were still quite east of what they call the line of actual control as on 7th November 1959 and they had just crossed a line which they had earlier claimed in the maps which

they had put out in 1956 against which we had protested. If some maps are consulted, you will find that the Information and Broadcasting Ministry had published certain maps which show in green line a boundary which the Chinese claimed in their maps published in 1956. They claimed that to be the boundary but that line put the boundary quite a distance to the east of this so-called line of actual control. What they did is an excellent lesson in history particularly an excellent history of Chinese aggression when we see how, step by step, they have moved their line of actual control, a strategy which, I think, ought to make everybody adjoining China rather careful and alert. In 1956 and 1954, certain old maps of China published by the old regime, the Kuomin-tang regime, were seen by Government and in them certain territories in Ladakh, not as far as the Chinese now claim, were shown as Chinese territory, and we pointed them out to the Chinese, particularly after they had re-published those maps in 1956. They then said that they were old maps and, therefore, they had no time to ponder over them or to correct them and that they would make up their mind after studying the matter carefully. What they did in the meantime was this. The careful study took the shape of taking up surreptitious possession of the entire Aksai Chin territory and cutting a road across until we, taking them as our good neighbours and not capable of indulging in surreptitious encroachments, discovered to our utter surprise about the end of 1957 that this road had not only been cut but actually used for communication between Sinkiang in China and Tibet. When we protested about this, they put out a map which was published in 1956 as including Aksai Chin and they not only started the road but started moving westwards until, you will remember, in 1958, in their movements westwards they encountered our posts and there were clashes. You will remember there were clashes in 1958. At that time they had not reached the line

of 1956. I call it as the line of 1956 as that is shown in the maps. Now, having reached the line of 1956, they suddenly started moving westwards again without even telling us and our posts confronted them.

SHRI FARIDUL HAQ ANSARI (Uttar Pradesh): Why should they tell you?

SHRI A. K. SEN: No, possibly no. TTou are quite right there. They would have now learnt quite well that they should not tell us.

Anyway, they started moving westwards and they were confronted there by our posts which were there beyond the line of 1956, near Kongka Pass, near Hot Springs and so on and there were serious clashes. You will remember that nine of our armed police personnel were injured and when we protested saying that they had come even beyond their line of 1956—this was in 1959—they said that this 1956 line was the Kuomin-tang line, Chiang-kai Shek line and, therefore, like other things, they were not bound by that line and in 1960, for the first time, they put out this new demand covering an extra bit of territory of nearly twelve thousand square miles, I think, whose western extremity was this yellow line which you now see in the maps and which they call the line of actual control of 7th November, 1959. When this was put out they were quite a distance from it and you will find from the maps which have been given to you that they had established only the red posts beyond the line of 1956 approaching towards this yellow line, the line of actual control, in the areas of Chip Chap Valley and Galwan Valley which are indicated by the red spots. All these have been built up since November 1959 gradually moving westwards and in their endeavour to reach this line which they claim as the line of actual control—and naturally we had to put up our own posts which you find in the shape of blue dots in this area—various clashes occurred from 1959 onwards

which formed the subject-matter of prolonged correspondence and protests from us without apparently making any impression on the Chinese. Then what happened is well known. On the 8th September the respective military positions were as indicated in that map by the red dots and the blue dots. In this area which is part of the demilitarised zone that is proposed by the Colombo Conference we had put up our blue posts and they had put up their red posts and in most areas they were confronting each other; in other areas they were interlocked; some of our posts were behind theirs and some of theirs behind ours particularly in the Dehra side. On the 8th September what they did was, they suddenly moved a large army across the Thag La Ridge where they were nowhere. It is a peculiar position that while they were disputing about the western sector and everything appeared to be quiet on the eastern side they suddenly moved a big army across the Thag La Pass and crossed the Kechilang River which is at the base of Thag La Ridge, overwhelming our very small forces, very thinly manned, and started on a march of invasion followed up in the western sector by an equally aggressive invasion. And on the 20th October both sides were aflame with a full scale invasion. Small posts thinly manned fought bravely in Ladakh and the House has already paid homage to the bravery and valour of those who had fallen in defence of these isolated and rather thinly manned posts against overwhelming numbers and against insurmountable odds. Many of these posts had fallen only after the last man had died fighting and even foreign observers who were given accounts of the valour which our jawans had shown in these deadly fights have paid tributes to the valour and bravery of those who have fallen. When they started this invasion we were completely shocked because never did we imagine that these border conflicts would be converted into an excuse for launching a major invasion against

[Shri A. K. Sen] a friendly country, a country that had not only been friendly but had been positively helpful. We would not recount the past but while we do so we shall have nothing to regret but there will be plenty of materials to put the Chinese to shame for the way in which they have answered the call of friendship and the positive acts of friendliness with which we had always treated them not only in our dealings with them but in relation to their dealings with the outside world in defence of what appeared to them to be legitimate grievances. We are not sorry for what we have done because this is part of our peaceful principles, this is part of our non-alignment philosophy and principles which we have tried to build up for years. Now, when this invasion came, what they did was, they overwhelmed all the posts that we had built up in the western sector, in Ladakh in the Chip Chap Valley and the Galwan Valley, marked by those blue dots and they come right up to the line which they claimed in November 1959, which they call the line of actual control shown by the yellow line. Then on the 21st November after having crossed over into large parts of NEFA in their onward march from Thag La Ridge to Tawang, Bomdi La and in the east to Walong and so on, they announced that they would accept a truce arrangement which they called was an act of generosity so far as they were concerned because they will withdraw 20 Kms behind the line of actual control. The line of actual control in the western sector would be the line which they had reached after invasion while the line of control in the east would include the Thag La-Chedong area under their control, that means, the disputed area which they conquered by force and they said that India must go back 20 Kms on our undisputed territory, that is, our own territory. This is a very important thing which I would request the House to notice with care. They claimed in their proposals of the 21st November that not only will they

withdraw from the territories which they had conquered so far as military forces are concerned retaining their civil control but that we should also withdraw in our own undisputed territory in Ladakh, west of the yellow line, which they never claimed and about which there never was any dispute and that we should also withdraw south of the MacMahon Line in areas where again, there was no dispute whatsoever except in the Longju area and the Chedong area. And they said that if we did not do that, they would not be bound by these truce arrangements and they would hit back in defence. The expressions used by the Chinese exemplify the wonderful flexibility of the English language or possibly the wonderful flexibility of the Chinese language translated into English. "To hit back in defence" is an expression which I have never heard either in history or elsewhere. If I do not go back in my own undisputed territory, somebody else will hit back at me in my own territory. This is an expression which astounds every sensible person.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR (Uttar Pradesh): But not the India Government.

SHRI A. K. SEN: The hon. Member knows better of the Indian Government.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Yes; of course, I know it better than the Minister himself.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I give him that credit.

SHRI ARJUN ARORA (Uttar Pradesh): Very brave of you.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Yes, of course.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Let him proceed.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Now, Sir, I would request the hon. Member to be a little patient because this is hardly a matter . . .



SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: We shall request the Minister not to make this a class room. Every Member is expected to know the past history. We are interested in the Colombo proposals only, not in the past history.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Would you please sit down?

SHRI A. K. SEN: I hope, Sir, I am only trying to be of assistance and I do not think I have ever tried to pose as a teacher. I am very sorry if that impression had been conveyed to the hon. Member.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY (Mysore): Everyone is not like my hon. friend. So we want the hon. Minister to speak that way.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Of course, you are proving your loyalty.

SHRI A. K. SEN: As I said, Sir, I wish that we all realise the gravity of the matter and I was impressed by the way in which leaders on the other side have been listening to me because this is a matter on which we should not be very easily divided on party lines. This is a matter which deeply affects the nation and its future and it hardly brooks any feats of levity if I may say so.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I wish the Prime Minister had the same sense before accepting the Colombo proposals in principle.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Without consulting the leaders of the Opposition.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am absolutely sure when I look at the leaders of the Opposition that this subject will receive the utmost of mature and serious consideration which the nation expects that we should give it.

Now, I was explaining this position—and I do not think there would be any dispute about it—and about

the wonderful flexibility of language which the Chinese appear to be using, coining expressions and circulating them, like 'hit back in defence', 'line of actual control' and so on. Whatever it is, this was the proposal they gave and the Prime Minister fittingly replied that this proposal was not acceptable to us.

This I say because somebody said that the Prime Minister ought to have done something different. He did the only thing that was possible, namely, to reject the Chinese proposals which he regarded, as the nation did, as an affront. He said that there was no question of our even agreeing to talk with the Chinese Government so long as aggression remained and the positions which had been occupied by the respective Governments and their forces on the 8th of September were not restored. There was nothing magical about restoration of the positions on the 8th September. That date was chosen to signify a date which marked the latest phase of Chinese aggression, namely, the launching of a major invasion on Indian soil by crossing the Thag La Ridge. Mind you, on the 8th September nothing happened on the Western Sector in Ladakh. What happened was that on the 8th of September the Chinese had mounted a major invasion across the Thag La Ridge, marking for the first time a sharp departure from a principle which we 'all accepted at the Bandung Conference, namely, that disputes between nations, friendly nations, have to be settled by negotiations and not by arms.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Was it not broken before the 8th September by the Chinese? You only realised on the 8th September that the Bandung spirit had been broken by China?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Chandra Shekhar, I think you will have a chance to speak if you want. Please let the hon. Minister proceed.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I assure the hon. Member that I for one would sit patiently and listen to all that he has to say when he rises. I would only appeal to him to accord to me the same reciprocity. Now, Sir, that was the reason why the 8th of September was specified as the date in relation to which the restoration of positions should be effected. Now, on the 8th of September, may I again recall for the assistance of the House that on the Western Sector the Indian positions were as indicated by the blue dots and the Chinese positions were as indicated by the red dots? Therefore, restoration of that would mean restoration of control of the territory, part of which now falls within the territory bounded on the west by the yellow line and on the east by the purple line because this territory bounded on the west by the yellow line and on the east by the purple line is a wider territory than the territory in which the two positions remained on the 8th of September, because the purple line goes beyond the Chinese positions as they were on the 8th of September indicated by the red dots. It meant that what we had in this territory we should occupy, what the Chinese had they should occupy, and none more. Or in other words on principle—this was a question of principle—the idea that one could retain in one's control what one has gained by force would be undone. That was the main reason why the proposal, called the proposal of the 8th September position, was put forward by our Government, by the Prime Minister, the main reason being that what you have taken by force since the 8th of September you cannot retain as your exclusive possession. An<j this, I can assure you, we made it our key point. While I had gone myself for talks to some friendly countries and others had gone to other countries, we made it our key point that we shall never accept a settlement which would give the Chinese exclusive control of the territories they have gained by force, since the 8th of September, because it is a basic principle from which we cannot deviate. Eighth of SeD-

tember means this, the undoing of what has been done so as to give exclusive control and possession of the territories to the very party who has taken it by force.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: What about Aksai Chin in Ladakh?

SHRI A. K. SEN: So far as the 8th of September position is concerned, that envisaged Aksai Chin remaining with the Chinese. The hon. Member will kindly consult the map. The 8th of September position was the Chinese were well ahead to the west of Aksai Chin.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: Why do you not say 15th August 1947?

SHRI A. K. SEN: The hon. Member would kindly follow me. If he has any quarrel with the 8th of September proposal, that is a different matter. But I am now trying to . . .

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Of course, we have a quarrel. Parliament has never endorsed it.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Because the House has already endorsed it.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: No. The House has never endorsed it. I object to it. The House has never endorsed the 8th of September line.

SHRI A. K. SEN: The hon. Member's memory may be failing, but it does not fail us.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: I certainly object to the statement. I assert that the House has never endorsed the 8th September line.

*(Interruptions)*

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order. One Member is enough, not two or three at a time.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): May I suggest that these two hon. Members disengage themselves for a while?

SHRI G. MURAHARI: Mr. Chairman, | I would like the Minister to withdraw the statement because the House has never committed itself to this position, and if the Prime Minister goes about making speeches, it does not commit this House.

MR. CHAIRMAN: If you want to contradict it, you will have a chance. The other speakers too will have a chance. The Minister is giving his view of the matter.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I humbly maintain that when we had a debate last and the House met, after the proposal of the Prime Minister was made, insisting upon the restoration of positions as they existed on the 8th of September—the debate took place on the 10th of December, 1962 if I am not mistaken—the House, both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, expressed approval of the measures and policies adopted by the Government to meet the situation resulting from the invasion of India by China.

*(Interruptions)*

SHRI ROHIT M. DAVE (Gujarat): Not in this House. It was only in Lok Sabha.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: May I recall in this connection that when the Prime Minister was on the floor of the House and made his last speech during the last Session, I wanted a full endorsement of that formally, but naturally it could not be done? Then, you said that the entire House agreed with it and there also the 3th September position is reiterated. You will find it in the very proceedings. The sense of the House was clearly given.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

PROF. M. B. LAL (Uttar Pradesh): Never reiterated. We only committed to the Resolution passed on the 14th November that every inch of Indian land will be vacated,

SHRI A. D. MANI (Madhya Pradesh) : There is no reference to 8th September in the Resolution.

*(Interruptions)*

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order. Every inch of Indian land is one thing and beginning of negotiations on the basis of the 8th September line is another thing.

PROF. M. B. LAL: A difference was made between talk and negotiation by the Prime Minister. Negotiations will be only when our land is vacated.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I maintain again and I remember what you, Sir, said that the entire House was behind the Prime Minister in his policies.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: No, no. We certainly object to it.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: We cannot question your remark. You will find it in the record.

MR. CHAIRMAN: We can And it from the records.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL (Gujarat): We want the Prime Minister to have the aggression vacated, not to give anything, not to surrender our territory.

*(Interruptions)*

MR. CHAIRMAN: This is a matter of record. We shall consult the record. What I have said must be there. Even if I repudiate it, it will not be repudiated. If I change it, it will not be changed. Whatever I said must be on record.

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: (Bihar): I do not want to intervene, but I do not want that in this way

[Shri Ganga Sharan Sinha.] indirectly this thing should be put in the mouth of all of us. Whatever has been passed by the House—whatever commitment we have made—we stand by that. But I assure you—I think it can be seen in the proceedings—that 8th of September line was never approved in this House. And if the Law Minister has made the statement that it was approved, that statement is incorrect, I mean the statement that this House has approved of the 8th September line. Such incorrect statements must not be made by any Member and especially by the Law Minister.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: The impression should not go from this side of the House at least that we have something else to say now.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: No, no.  
(Interruptions)

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: We will not allow that. You get the proceedings, Sir, and see for yourself that with regard to the Prime Minister's policy we approved of it in this House, and when he reiterated the policy on the 12th of December *vis-a-vis* the Colombo proposals, I raised the point that it should be endorsed and Mr. Yajee from that side also supported it. The House was in favour of it, behind the Prime Minister.

(Interruptions)

MR. CHAIRMAN: I am afraid we are discussing a very serious thing. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, please sit down. I think this is absolutely unnecessary. Let us allow the Law Minister to proceed. The Opposition will have its chance. It can repudiate every word of what he has said and say what it likes. Why cannot you have patience?

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: Sir, when something is said which is not correct, it is our duty to draw your attention to that. It is not a question of interpretation or anything like that. When something is said

which is not a fact, I think it is our duty to draw your attention to it at that stage.

MR. CHAIRMAN: If you want to draw my attention, that attention has been duly drawn.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Permit me to say, Sir, that we on this side have been listening to the Law Minister without interrupting him, as he himself said. But we cannot allow a statement of the type that he made that we are a party to forgetting the earlier aggression by China to go on record. We are united in this. Of course we know where Mr. Bhupesh Gupta is.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE (Uttar Pradesh): The 8th of September position was never placed in the form of a formal motion before the House. So, the question of accepting it does not arise.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Vajpayee, let us not be deviated from the main business in this way. Let the Law Minister proceed with his argument. When you are making your speech, you can substantiate your position.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am sorry, Sir, if I gave the impression, which I never wanted to, that there was a formal motion approving of the 8th September position. What I meant was that when we had a debate on the policies and measures of the Government on the 10th of December, if I remember aright, I cannot off hand quote it, the principal part of the discussion centred round the proposal of the Prime Minister insisting upon restoration of the positions of the 8th of September as a preliminary step for the resumption of discussions between the two Governments, and the Prime Minister's proposal was that he will refuse, this country will refuse to go to the conference table unless the 8th of September positions were restored, and he explained in detail why he insisted upon that date, because that was the date from which invasion had started.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: We quite agree that that had been the position of the Government, but on our part we are not a party to any formal motion for the restoration of the 8th September line.

SHRI A. K. SEN: If what I stated is referred to again, I never said that anybody was a party to a formal motion of this type. I never said so. I am entitled to say that I never mentioned any formal resolution authorising it. But if I remember aright, the discussion was only with regard to the Chinese aggression and India's insistence on that position. *(Interruption.)* Therefore, it was not that the 8th of September proposals were not placed before the House. They were placed immediately after they were made, and I think the House was called earlier than it was scheduled to meet, and there was elaborate discussion on it in both the Houses, and the Government is entitled to presume—if I am entitled to put it that way—entitled to presume . . .

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am entitled to presume. You may question that entitlement.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: I think the Law Minister will do well to skip over that and go on with his speech instead of insisting on that.

SHRI A. K. SEN: What is the latest advice?

MR. CHAIRMAN: I hope Members will let the speech proceed.

SHRI A. K. SEN: As I was saying, that was the insistence of the Government of India. What would have happened, had the positions been restored as they were on the 8th of September, that is examined sector-wise. On the western sector on this area which is now sought to be demilitarised fell the positions. On the wes-

tern side of the purple line fell all the positions of China and India expecting a few near Dehra, two or three. If the 8th of September positions were restored, the Chinese would have gone to the red spots with their military forces or would have withdrawn to the red spots because they are really on the yellow line, and we would have gone forward to the blue spots from where v/e were ejected after the 20th of October; or in other words, this area which is now sought to be demilitarised would have been under the dual control of both the Indian and Chinese military forces. The Colombo proposals are that instead of this area being under the dual control by military forces of both the powers, they should be under the dual control of both the countries through their civil forces, but naturally since military posts are not envisaged, the locations, the number and others have to be determined having regard to the changed situation. If truce comes, all the dozens of military posts would not be necessary for either side. All that is necessary is that both sides\* share the control of this area, and if control is envisaged through civil posts, the number of civil posts, the composition and the location have not been determined by the Colombo Powers as they should not have really, because it really is a matter for administrative detail and arrangement which the people sitting in Colombo could hardly do. That is the first difference between our strict position of the 8th of September restoration and the Colombo proposals.

With regard to the eastern sector, so far as the entire MacMahon Line is concerned, the Colombo proposals accept that we are entitled to take our military forces right up to the MacMahon Line and there should be no withdrawal beyond the MacMahon Line. As on the western sector, the Colombo proposals accept that there is no question of our withdrawing further westwards from the line of control on our own undisputed territory,

[Shri A. K. Sen.] and they concede that we are entitled to take our military forces right up to the yellow line. The only difference with regard to the eastern sector is that with regard to Thagla Ridge area which is disputed as to whether this is north of the MacMatoon Line or south of the MacMahon Line, or in other words a disputed area, the Colombo proposals leave it to the two countries to negotiate the interim arrangement of control instead of saying themselves who should control and how, because civil control is conceded, but whose civil control is to be determined by negotiation. Now so far as Longju is concerned, it hardly creates any difficulty because ever since 1959 by arrangement with the Chinese, we had not sent our civil or military forces there. So, on the 8th of September neither side had their civil or military forces in Longju. Therefore, it may remain as it was before the 8th of September 1962.

This, therefore, Sir, is the position that follows from the Colombo proposals as compared with the proposals of India made by the Prime Minister in his letter to Premier Chou En-lai in answer to his letter of the 28th of November, in which he said that there could be no talk until the positions as they obtained on the 8th of September were restored.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Just a minute. In view of the very large number of speakers who want to speak and the importance of the subject, I am afraid we shall not have lunch interval today and tomorrow.

1 P.M.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: We cannot go on without lunch.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Then you must go without speeches.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: We may try to sit up to 6.00 p.m. and we may break for one hour for lunch. There is no harm.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Would you be able to finish in half an hour?

Sum A. K. SEN: In about less than half an hour, I should be able to finish.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Let him finish and then we can have a shorter lunch interval.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I should have thought that fighting men would go without lunch.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Now, Sir, when the Colombo proposals were communicated to us, the question was as to how far they approximated in essence to the proposals which were made by ourselves regarding the restoration of the positions as they obtained on the 8th of September. If they did, it was a case for acceptance of these proposals. If they did not, we naturally could not accept them. It followed logically. Therefore, the whole question was how far in essence the Colombo proposals approximated to or approached our proposals for the restoration of the 8th of September positions which in essence means the undoing of the principle of aggression, of retaining control on the basis of aggression. That is the principle on which we fought and we insisted. When the representatives of the Colombo Conference came here, namely, Mrs. Bandaranaike from Ceylon, Mr. Aly Sabri from the U.A.R. and Mr. Ofori Atta from Ghana, we had these clarifications only for the purpose of ascertaining the implications of these proposals with reference to the basic position which we had taken, namely, that we could not agree to talks with the Chinese Government until the principle of retaining what had been gained by aggression was undone.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN (Andhra Pradesh): The latest . . .

SHRI A. K. SEN: That is right, the 8th of September position. Our proposals did not deal with the earlier aggression though we never reconciled ourselves, and we said that this should

not exclusive on one side. And the Colombo proposals, according to us, conceded that also because this territory of twenty kilometres took the Chinese military forces away even from their positions of 3th of September, as the maps will indicate, in most areas and in south of Spanggur even beyond the frontier which, according to us, is the frontier, and conceded also the principle. This is the substantive part of the proposals that both sides should have their civil posts in this area and what was open to talk was only about the location, the number and the personnel. Therefore, the undoing of the aggression by not allowing the aggressor to retain the exclusive control of this area was conceded. On the Eastern side also, we found that we are entitled to occupy the entire area up to the MaeMahon Line with our military forces and there is no withdrawing twenty kilometres on our own undisputed territory . . .

AN HON. MEMBER: Very close?

SHRI A. K. SEN: Hon. Members will no doubt be entitled to express a contrary view. I could conceive that there is some other. But what we felt was, having compared the proposals with the clarifications given, that they conceded in principle what we had been insisting upon and also in substance they approximated to our proposals very closely and they were quite different from the Chinese proposals. And I would submit the reasons for our coming to that conclusion in brief for the consideration of the House. The first was the principle on which we stood strongly that we cannot withdraw on our own undisputed territory either on the Western or on the Eastern Sectors. There is no question of withdrawing twenty kilometres on our own undisputed territory which the Chinese wanted in their proposals of the 21st of November. That was conceded by the Colombo proposals. Then we said that this area which had been gained by force since the 8th of September should be restored. That is, let us take the Western Sector first. It cannot be retained by the Chinese in their exclusive control even if they want to do so by civil posts, because that would be really retaining control of areas gained by aggression. And the restoration of posts that we insisted upon had only one objective, namely, that both sides should move up to the same territory again, so that the control becomes dual and

not exclusive on one side. And the Colombo proposals, according to us, conceded that also because this territory of twenty kilometres took the Chinese military forces away even from their positions of 3th of September, as the maps will indicate, in most areas and in south of Spanggur even beyond the frontier which, according to us, is the frontier, and conceded also the principle. This is the substantive part of the proposals that both sides should have their civil posts in this area and what was open to talk was only about the location, the number and the personnel. Therefore, the undoing of the aggression by not allowing the aggressor to retain the exclusive control of this area was conceded. On the Eastern side also, we found that we are entitled to occupy the entire area up to the MaeMahon Line with our military forces and there is no withdrawing twenty kilometres on our own undisputed territory . . .

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY (Mysore): Does it not mean parity of control to the aggressor and the victim of the aggression in our own area?

SHRI A. K. SEN: . . . which in effect had existed on the 3th of September. (*Interruption.*) Dual control was there. If the hon. Member would kindly look at the map, he will find that if the 8th of September positions were restored, there would be this dual control in this area

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: They were not there with our approval. That makes a lot of difference.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am talking of the physical position.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Does it not mean that this dual control is an implicit admission on our part that the entire border is negotiable? This has not been our stand in the past.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I do not at all agree with the hon. Member, with respects to him. We have made it quite clear that this is only an interim

[Shri A. K. SEN.]

arrangement and the border is not negotiable, and the Colombo proposals themselves say in the last clause—we made it quite clear; I read it *in ex-tenso*—that this was not going to be the final arrangement at all. And even the restoration of the 8th of September position, as I said—I say this to the hon. Mr. Vajpayee—would take them to the original positions in this very area, with our consent, if I may say so. If the proposals are accepted, they go back to their positions in this area with their military force, with our consent, for the interim time, not for all time. Of course when it is said, "Go back to your position," what is it? What the Colombo proposals say is that you give up your positions but keep only civil posts as may be agreed upon. I think in one sense it is not worse but an improvement, if I may say so.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU (Uttar Pradesh): But the whole border should be discussed.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Therefore, Sir, having examined these matters from every possible angle and in the context of the proposals and their clarifications, we came to the conclusion that on principle this was acceptable and the Prime Minister therefore wrote, after these clarifications and the conference, to Mrs. Bandaranaike, the representative of the Colombo Conference nations which came here, that these proposals and the clarifications would be acceptable on principle as a basis for the cessation of hostilities and for resumption of talks, as only a basis for talks, not for anything else, but said that we could not give our final answer until we took the further step of placing the proposals and the clarifications before the House which we have done now.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: May I request you to direct the Law Minister to place a copy of the letter which the Prime Minister is reported to have written to the Ceylonese Prime Minister on the Table of the House?

SHRI A. K. SEN: The Prime Minister would be speaking (here tomorrow). There was nothing secret in that because the Prime Minister has already indicated the substance of the letter to the leaders of the Opposition, I think.

AN HON. MEMBER: No, no.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: In substance ...

PROF. M. B. LAL: If a quotation is read out in the House, the whole thing should be placed on the Table of the House.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Hon. Members have not even heard . . .

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: The Law Minister was not here. So, in connection with that matter, I want to say something. If I remember correctly, day before yesterday, it was raised here and the Minister of State for External Affairs said that she would find out. Yesterday when this question was raised in this House it was still left in vagueness.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Rejected.

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: What I am saying is this: Now that some reference has been made to some part of the letter—it has been read out here in this House—I think it is proper that the whole letter and the memorandum should be made available to us.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I want to ask: Is the point about the memorandum or the letter?

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: No, no, the letter.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Yesterday, Sir, you will remember that a question was raised in this House about a memorandum.

AN HON. MEMBER: Both.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Now, we are shifting to fine position of the letter. In any case let the Government say.



MR. CHAIRMAN: What the Prime Minister said yesterday was that it was a confidential document which he would not like to place before the House and which he would not like to publish, and even when it was pointed out that it had leaked, he said he would not be responsible for the leakage. He has not been responsible; he does not want to be. But you are mentioning a Memorandum that he has submitted to the Prime Minister of Ceylon.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: This letter is different from the Memorandum.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Is this a different thing? (Interruptions.)

PROF. M. B. LAL: I beg to submit, Sir, that he is quoting a passage from a letter or from a document. I say that the whole document, the whole letter, be placed before the House, a passage of which is being quoted by the Law Minister.

SHRI A. K. SEN: That is the difficulty, Sir, when questions are asked, even before I have finished. But I did yield the floor because I did not want to be obstructed. What I was explaining was that there was a letter, but like the proposals themselves and the clarifications, the request from these Colombo Powers was to keep everything confidential until they released them, because it must be appreciated, Sir, that we are dealing with certain powers who had met in conference and the documents are primarily meant to be kept secret in their possession. That is why even the Colombo proposals were not released by us. (Interruptions.) Will the hon. Member kindly allow me to finish? Then I shall be . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: Have a little patience please. Let him finish.

SHRI A. K. SEN: Nothing will be left unanswered because there is nothing secret about it. What happened was that they even requested us to keep the proposals confidential until they had communicated the gist

of the discussions they had with us, and various other things among themselves and with the Chinese Government and so on. But we requested them that the proposals and the clarifications should at least be released to the outside world, before Parliament met, as otherwise Parliament . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: This is not the point. Is it the memorandum or the letter?

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am coming to that, Sir. The Memorandum is nothing but the clarification that we sought. That is also a document which is with them; the Memorandum is nothing but the clarification which we sought with Mrs. Bandaranaike even before she came here in pursuance of which these clarifications have been given. We only wanted to know, Sir, what this meant or that meant, and so on. The letter was one written after the Conference by the Prime Minister. This also they wanted to be kept confidential, and I have no doubt, Sir, that the Prime Minister will answer this. Whether it will be proper for us to release it before the Colombo Powers released it is a thing which no doubt the House and the Leaders of the Opposition may consider, but since they have made the request we have not done it, have not released it. There is nothing secret . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: You may also bring this to his notice.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I have no doubt ... !J

MR. CHAIRMAN: And I do not quite see the difference between the Memorandum and the letter.

PROF. M. B. LAL: I beg to submit, Sir, that if a letter cannot be released without the consent of the Prime Minister of Ceylon or without the consent of the other non-aligned powers, a passage of that letter also cannot be quoted.

MH. CHAIRMAN: I do not agree with that view. I think the Minister in question can decide what he should, in the public interest, publish and what he should not publish.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: It a passage is quoted, the whole document is to be produced in the House according to the rules.

MB. CHAIRMAN: What do you say?

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Sir, I submit that if a passage is quoted from a certain document and if Members demand, that document should be laid on the Table of the House. It is under the Rules.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Under what Rule?

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: I have not got the book here, and if I have, I may perhaps be able to quote it here and now.

PROF. M. B. LAL: Equity demands that if a document is secret, a passage in it is also secret, and if the passage is not secret, then the entire document is not secret.

DR. NIHAR RANJAN RAY (West Bengal): I wanted to submit, Sir, that this paragraph was intended to be made known to Parliament, it is presumed.

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE (Maharashtra): May I make a submission, Sir?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes, what is it?

SHRI A. K. SEN: No, Sir, I am not going to yield the floor any more.

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE: The Chairman has given me permission to make my submission. You have given me permission, Sir, to make my submission.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I have not yielded the floor, Sir.

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE: The 'hon. Minister has been resisting and

he has been opposing the placing of that particular document on the Table of the House because, he said, a principle was involved in it, because the Colombo powers had stated that it was a confidential document and that therefore it should not be placed on the Table of the House. Now, if it is a confidential document, how can the hon. Minister, with that assurance given to the Colombo powers, quote one particular passage from it in this House, and if by quoting one passage the hon. Minister does not violate the assurance given to the Colombo powers, why should not the whole document be placed today? The hon. Minister was saying that because of the principle involved and because of the assurance given to the Colombo Powers that particular document could not be placed on the Table of the House. But if one passage has been quoted, it means that the assurance and that principle has already been violated and therefore now there should be no objection in placing that particular document on the Table of the House.

(Interruptions)

MB. CHAIRMAN: The Rule in the matter is this:

"If a Minister quotes in the Council a despatch or other State paper which has not been presented to the Council, he shall lay the relevant paper on the Table.

Provided that this rule shall not apply to any documents which are stated by the Minister to be of such a nature that their production would be inconsistent with the public interest."

So the choice is with the Minister.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: But the hon. Minister does not say that the document, that the letter is of a secret nature and its publication would not be in the public interest.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I was going to say that myself. The question is, those hon. Members, who are very anxious to give a lesson to me about propriety.

were not anxious to hear me as to what I thought of propriety in this matter. I was given advice from all sides as to what is proper under the circumstances and what is not proper, and Government considers it not proper to disclose it or to lay it before the House without first of all getting the concurrence of those with whom the negotiations had gone on.

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE: On a point of information, Sir . . .

SHRI A. K. SEN: I have not yielded the floor, I cannot any more.

MR. CHAIBMAN: I do not allow you, Mr. Khobaragade. Under my protection you had made your submission. I do not allow you now. Please sit down.

SHRI B. D. KHOBARAGADE: On a point of order, Sir. The hon. Minister has said that without the concurrence of the Colombo Powers he cannot place a document on the Table of the House. May I know from the hon. Minister whether he has got permission from the Colombo Powers to read that particular passage which he has already read?

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is extremely bad; I hope you would not instruct me to be rude; it is thoroughly a bad thing. I have given my ruling and yet you have raised the same point.

SHRI A. K. SEN: If the hon. Member is a lawyer himself, he ought to know what is a point of order and what is not a point of order. Sir, I thought it was also equally proper at least to give an indication to Parliament as to what the Prime Minister had said after the Conference, and I think it would have been absolutely improper not to indicate at least how the Government had reacted after the Conference, as else we would have been told later on that such an important thing we had kept secret from the House. I know what would have happened if I had not given an indication. Therefore we thought it proper first of all to inti-

mate the leaders of the different parties how the Prime Minister had reacted and also to indicate to the House how the Prime Minister had reacted, and I told the House the reasons why the Government thought that the proposals which were conveyed to us with the clarifications approximated in essence -> in substance to our proposals for the restoration of the 8th of September position, on principle certainly, in substance particularly, though they were not identical; they could not be because tfaa dual control is not by military posts but by civil posts. Now, therefore, Sir, the Prime Minister has made it quite clear that we could not give our final response to the proposals and the clarifications until we took the further step of placing these proposals and the clarifications before the Houses of Parliament—which we have now done. In the meantime, Sir, hon. Members no doubt have read reports in the papers that China is supposed to have accepted in principle the proposals of the Colombo Conference.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Is it formally conveyed to us?

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am just coming to it. Just before the House assembled we had received a telegram from the Prime Minister of Ceylon which reads as follows. Since it has not been requested to be kept secret I am taking the trouble of reading it instead of giving the gist of it.

"In response to my telegram of January the Fourteen I have received today reply from Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Prime Minister Chou En-lai has reiterated his earlier acceptance in principle of proposals of Colombo Conference as a preliminary basis for the meeting of Indian and Chinese officials to discuss the stabilisation of cease-fire and disengagement and to promote Sino-Indian boundary negotiations."

The Chinese, however, maintain two points of interpretation in their memorandum that I had handed over to you. But they hope that difference in inter-

[Shri A. K. Sen.] pretation between the Chinese and Indian sides will not prevent the speedy holding of talks between the Indian and Chinese officials. They hope these differences will be resolved in their talks.

Sir, the Chinese earlier had given out news, after Mrs. Bandaranaike and Dr. Subandrio had seen the Chinese Government representatives before Mrs. Bandaranaike came to India, that the Chinese Government had made a positive response. We found later on that the positive response was nothing but introducing substantial variations to the Colombo proposals which, according to us, make it quite different. For instance, they said that in this demilitarized zone they would not allow any Indian post, military or civil, to be set up. They alone would set up their posts. They shall set up only seven posts. On the question of principle that they will not exclusively retain control of it they are not yielding. According to their so-called interpretation which, according to us, was no interpretation at all but a question of positive variation introduced, and positive response may again, according to the Chinese language, mean positive variation.

As I said, the language is very flexible. In their language positive response was positive variation and we naturally could not accept that. After the clarifications we found that their so-called interpretation was not what the Colombo proposals had given. But they said it was a substantive part of the proposal that they obviously will have civil posts in this area. What they meant by acceptance in principle, its interpretation, we do not know yet until they say so. But what we feel is that our position substantially and essentially was the proposal as clarified by the Colombo Powers, namely, dual control of the zone from which the military forces of the Chinese would withdraw 20 kilometres behind the yellow line. That is the position.

In the meantime may I remind the House that what is being proposed by '

the Colombo Powers and what was proposed by us when we said that the position of the 3rd September should be restored was only the truce and cease-fire arrangement after which the talks could start, if at all. Before that no talks can start, as I said, for the solution of the boundary dispute and the final demarcation of the boundaries acceptable to both the sides. We cannot refuse talks. In fact, we are committed to talk. Our very principle in history has been that we are ready to negotiate and settle differences by negotiation, and the letters of the Prime Minister, which will be found in the pamphlets which have been distributed to all the hon. Members, show that he has all the time been saying 'Yes, we are not at all unwilling to talk. We are wedded to talk and negotiate and settle our differences through peaceful means. But we shall not talk under the pressure of aggression, and unless their forces vacate and the position is restored as was on 8th September we shall not talk'. Therefore, the question of not talking is out of the question.

The Prime Minister has said that for final solution he has already suggested the International Court of Justice or some other form of arbitration. If direct negotiations do not succeed. Therefore, the question of the ultimate boundary is not in dispute. I appeal to the hon. Members not to confound issues at all. The issue is a proximate issue, of immediate cease-fire, how and when could talks for settlement of this dispute start. That is the whole point. The Chinese wanted to start these talks immediately. We said, "No, until you withdraw your military and the dual control is restored by the restoration of the original positions of the 8th September, we shall not talk". To that extent we have at least succeeded in convincing the six non-aligned powers who had met.

Sir, hon. Members should not forget what the position was before the Colombo Conference was held

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA:  
(Bihar): May I, Sir . . .

SHRI A. K. SEN; I shall certainly be very obliged to answer whatever he asks me. But please let me finish; otherwise the whole flow gets rather spoiled.

Hon. Members would kindly recall the tone, the attitude, the reactions in the non-aligned countries which had met in Colombo. More than that I do not want to say. Hon. Members will not forget that all that we may say here might not have cut much ice or carried conviction to all of them and it was not a very mean feat or achievement if the Colombo Powers, -all the six of them, unanimously accepted this principle that the Chinese must withdraw from where they had come by aggression, by force, that dual control has to be established before talks can start. The Chinese wanted the talks to start. They wanted this Colombo Conference to meet. They made their last effort to call us to the Conference table without saying anything else, just call upon both the parties to come to the conference table which was against our very principle. We would have resisted it. It has been achieved that we have not been called to the conference table without certain other preliminary points being settled, points of principle for us.

Sir, one must not forget also that one cannot in these matters achieve identical things. What one is concerned with is whether the principle and the substance for which we have really stood has been met or not. From the facts which I have taken pains to disclose, it will be for the House to decide whether the substance has been met, the substance of our stand in the entire arrangement. I heard hon. Members there saying about August and various other things. We are not concerned with that. We are not concerned with the ultimate determination of this because we have conceded nothing, we have done nothing. The call has gone and will go on going that since we have found it difficult to repose any trust in the word of the Chinese Government our preparations to safeguard our ultimate right and to

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prevent further aggression must go on unabated, and that call can only become feeble if within this House we seem to the outside world as being disunited on such fundamental issues. Nothing is more important today, and I am sure hon. Members have already exhibited that attitude from the absence of any amendment to this motion . . .

SOME HON. MEMBERS: No, no. It does not mean anything.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Have you received any amendment?

SHRI A. K. SEN: What is necessary more than anything else is a completely united attitude la regard to these matters, and in my submission; Sir, what has been achieved in the Colombo Conference, what has been clarified and what has been communicated by the Government of India after mature consideration of these proposals and their implications confirm in substance and in spirit and in principle to our basic demands on principle and on substance. I, therefore, Sir, would welcome a discussion on this and also on the policies and measures pursued by the Government.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: May I seek a clarification from the Government for the benefit of the debate?

SHRI A. K. SEN: Mr. Sinha may see me outside.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I am afraid I will not allow any clarifications. The time is up.

*The question was proposed.*

MR. CHAIRMAN: This will be open to debate. We meet again at 2-30 and we will continue longer than usual, and tomorrow we shall have no lunch interval.

The House stands adjourned till 2-30.

The House then adjourned for lunch at thirtyone minutes past one of the clock.

The House reassembled after lunch at half-past two of the clock, Mr. Chairman in the Chair.

**श्री गंगाशरण सिंह :** जनाब चैयरमैन साहब, जो मोशन हाउस के सामने है, उस पर बोलते समय मुझे प्रारम्भ में ही दो दिक्कतों का सामना करना पड़ रहा है। अगर ये दिक्कतें नहीं होतीं तो इस विषय पर ज्यादा सफाई से विचार हो सकता था और ज्यादा अच्छा होता। पहली दिक्कत तो यह है कि बहुत से ऐसे कागजात हैं जिनका सम्बन्ध इस विषय से है और वे हमारे सामने मौजूद नहीं हैं। इसका कारण जो भी रहा हो अखबारों से पता चलता है, और अखबारों में उनके कुछ अंश निकले हैं जिन से यह पता चलता है कि कई ऐसे कागजात हैं जिनका इस मामले से बहुत ही गहरा सम्बन्ध है और जो बहुत वाइटल डोक्युमेंट है, बहुत महत्वपूर्ण कागज हैं, जिनका इस मामले पर विचार करते समय रखना और उन पर विचार करना जरूरी था। पहली दिक्कत तो यह है।

दूसरी दिक्कत यह है कि अगर जैसा पहले पहले अखबारों से पता चला कि हमारी सरकार ने रफट शब्दों में कोलम्बो पावर्स के प्रतिनिधियों को कहा कि इस सम्बन्ध में पार्लियामेंट में वह मामला रखेगी और पार्लियामेंट जो कुछ तय करेगा वह होगा, तो हम लोगों ने यही समझा था कि मामला बिल्कुल खुला हुआ है और सारा मामला पार्लियामेंट के सामने आयेगा मगर बाजाब्ला तीर पर तो नहीं लेकिन बेजाब्ला तीर पर अखबारों में जो खबर अभी निकली और अब बाजाब्ला तीर पर यहां स्वकार को जा रहुं है उस से पता चलता है कि जहां तक सिद्धान्त का प्रश्न है हमारी सरकार ने सिद्धान्त रूप में कोलम्बो पावर्स के सजेसन को, मुताबिकों को नाग सिद्धा है। मैं समझता हूं, यह अधिक उचित होता जब पार्लियामेंट का अधिवेशन हो रहा था तो पूरी बात पार्लियामेंट के सामने रखी जाती। पार्लियामेंट के

अधिवेशन के पहले कोई आंशिक या पार्लियामेंट कमिटमेन्ट इस तरह का नहीं किया जाता तो ज्यादा अच्छा होता, इसलिए कि प्रिन्सिपल में एक्सैट कर लेने के बाद, सिद्धान्त में मान लेने के बाद, उसमें कुछ रूकावट ऐसी पैदा होती है जिस रूकावट से शायद इस मामले पर पूरी तरह से बहुतों के लिए विचार करना संभव नहीं होगा और आम के लिए रूकावट खड़ा होगी। इसलिए मेरी इच्छा है कि शायद कोई ऐसी चीज हो, शायद कोई ऐसा मामला हो तो पार्लियामेंट के सामने मामला रखा जाय। ऐसा नहीं हो कि आधी चीज तो पूरी कर ली जाय, जो मुख्य चीज है वह खत्म कर दी जाय और तब अन्त में यह चीज पार्लियामेंट के सामने आये। इस से बड़ी दिक्कत होती है। इसलिए कि कोई भी आदर्श; बातचीत करने से इनकार करना नहीं चाहेगा, बातचीत करना चाहेगा, लेकिन यह बातचीत कैसा बातचीत हो, किस परिस्थिति में बातचीत हो, किस चीज के सम्बन्ध में बातचीत हो, इस पर निर्भर करता है। हम बातचीत करने से कभी इनकार नहीं करते लेकिन जो आक्रमण हुआ सितम्बर के यहाँने में, अक्टूबर के महीने में, उस आक्रमण से पहले चीन ने बातचीत करने के लिए कहा, चीन ने बातचीत करने को बात चलाई लेकिन हम ने इनकार किया, हम ने उसको स्वीकार नहीं किया। हम ने यह मांग की कि कुछ उसके लिए पृष्ठभूमि होनी चाहिये, बैकग्राउन्ड होना चाहिये तब हम बातचीत कर सकते हैं। इसलिए बातचीत से इनकार नहीं करने पर भी बातचीत के लिए पृष्ठभूमि होनी चाहिये, बैकग्राउन्ड होना चाहिये, और जब तक वह पृष्ठभूमि, वह बैकग्राउन्ड, नहीं हो तब तक बातचीत का कोई नतीजा नहीं निकलता है। इसलिए यह दो दिक्कतें हैं जिनके सामने मुझे आज खड़ा होना पड़ रहा है।

जहां तक सवाल है सिद्धान्त का, इस हाउस को पता है, देश को पता है, कि चीन का

यह जो भयानक आक्रमण अभी हुआ उससे पहले जो बातें हम ने कहीं, जो शर्तें हम ने रखीं, उन शर्तों का, उन बातों का, सैद्धान्तिक आधार था। उन सिद्धान्तों के कई अंग थे। हम ने कहा था जब तक हमारी जमीन पर से चीन पूरी तरह नहीं चला जाता है तब तक समझौते की बात हम नहीं कर सकते। हम ने कहा कि यह सिद्धान्त, सार्वभौमिक सिद्धान्त, हमारे देश के लिए भी होना चाहिये कि एक देश की जमीन पर दूसरे देश का अधिकार नहीं होना चाहिये। और तिसरी चीज हम ने यह भी कही, और उस समय यह स्पष्ट था कि, चीन हमारे जगह से हट जाय लेकिन हम को अपनी जगह से नहीं हटना पड़ेगा। ये तीन बातें सैद्धान्तिक रूप में शुरू में चीन के इस आक्रमण से पहले। आज हम क्या पाते हैं? चीन का जब आक्रमण हुआ तो जो हमारा मुख्य सिद्धान्त था कि जब तक चीन हमारी जमीन से पूरी तरह नहीं चला जाये, पूरा तरह से वापस नहीं चला जाय—पूरी तरह से हमारी जमीन खाली नहीं हो जाती तब तक हम बातचीत नहीं करेंगे। लेकिन हम उस सिद्धान्त से थोड़े नीचे आये और हम ने ८ सितम्बर की नई बात की। ८ सितम्बर को चीन का आक्रमण हुआ। जिस समय चीन का आक्रमण नहीं था उस समय तो हम ने वे सिद्धान्त रखे और हम ने बातचीत नहीं की उसके निमंत्रण के बावजूद। लेकिन जब चीन का आक्रमण हुआ तब आक्रमण के बाद उस सिद्धान्त से हम नीचे उतरे और हम ने ८ सितम्बर की नई पहली देश के सामने खड़ी की और ८ सितम्बर का नया मामला, नया मुद्दा, नया विचार देश के सामने रखा, एक नया आधार रखा उस सिद्धान्त को छोड़ कर। इसलिए जो हमारा प्रिन्सिपल था, जिस सिद्धान्त पर हम अड़े हुए थे, मैं तो कोलम्बो के जो प्रस्ताव हैं उन में किसी सिद्धान्त का अभाव पाता हूँ और इसलिए आज जब हमारी सरकार सिद्धान्त रूप में इसे मानती है, मुझे आश्चर्य होता है, ताज्जुब होता है, दुःख होता है, परेशानी होती है।

कोलम्बो पावर्स ने जो कुछ किया, उनका जो इरादा है, उनका जो मंशा है, जिस तरह से वे शान्ति बनाये रखना चाहते हैं, उसकी सब कोई प्रशंसा करेंगे। दुनिया में शान्ति रहे दो देशों के बीच शान्ति रहे, उसकी हर आदमी तारीफ़ करेगा जो कोई भी समझदार आदमी हो या शान्तिप्रिय आदमी हो। उनका जो इरादा है उसका अनुकूल काम होता, वे शान्ति के काम को आगे बढ़ाते तो और ज्यादा खूबी होती। लेकिन मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि अच्छे इरादे रहने पर भी जिसके लिए हम उनके प्रति आभारी हैं, अच्छे इरादे और अच्छी मंशा रहने पर भी जो कदम उन्होंने उठाया है उससे शान्ति होने के बजाय अशान्ति होने के संभावना है।

दूसरी चीज यह भी है कि यह शान्ति बड़ी तात्कालिक चीज है—तात्कालिक ही, यह विवादास्पद शान्ति होगी—किसी तात्कालिक शान्ति के लिए एक मूल सिद्धान्त को छोड़ना यह एक अवसरवादिता होगी, यह कोई सिद्धान्त नहीं ही। यह अपरचुनिष्क होगा। यह जो कोलम्बो पावर्स के लोग हैं वे और हम प्रायः सब के सब निरपेक्ष देशों में गिने जाते थे, नान अलाइनमेंट वाले देशों में गिने जाते थे, हम लोगों ने मिल कर सामूहिक रूप से या अलग अलग भी निरपेक्ष देशों के बारे में एक नीति निर्धारित की थी। उसके मायने क्या हैं, निरपेक्षता के, इस नान अलाइनमेंट के अर्थ क्या हैं? जो दो पावर ब्लाक हैं, दो शक्तिशाली गुट हैं, उन दोनों गुटों से अलग रहना, न्याय के साथ खड़ा होना और न्याय का पक्ष लेना, यही नान अलाइनमेंट की निरपेक्षता की परिभाषा है, यही चिह्न है। इसलिए जब कभी किसी देश ने अत्याचार किया, अन्याय किया, किसी देश पर आक्रमण किया, बिना किसी बात को परवाह किये, चाहे वह देश हमारा मित्र हो या दुश्मन उस देश में क्या प्रतिक्रिया होगी वह कहीं हमको किसी गुट में तो नहीं समझ लेगा, तो हमने निरपेक्ष रहते हुए भी जहाँ कहीं

### [श्री गंगाशरण सिंह]

न्याय का पक्ष और उचित समझा वहां साथ दिया, वहां हमने अन्याय और अत्याचार की भर्त्सना की, निन्दा की, और आक्रमण के खिलाफ आवाज उठाई। आज हम क्या पाते हैं? नान अलाइनमेंट का दूसरा रूप हमारे सामने आया, निरपेक्षता का दूसरा रूप हमारे सामने आया है। वह क्या है? वह रूप यह है कि एक देश पर दूसरे देश ने आक्रमण किया, एक देश पर दूसरे ने हमला किया, और हमारे जो निरपेक्ष राष्ट्र हैं आज इसमें भी निरपेक्षता बरतना चाहते हैं। जो अपराधी है उससे और जिस पर ज्यादाती की गई है उससे उन दोनों के बीच में भी बराबर की दूरी बनाये रखना चाहते हैं। यह निरपेक्षता के, नान अलाइनमेंट के अनुकूल नहीं है, बिल्कुल उलटा है। ठीक ठीक है नहीं। याद है, बहुत से ऐसे अवसर आये, इजिप्ट में आये, स्वेज के मामले में आये, जहां नान अलाइन्ड रहते हुये भी हमने और उन बहुत से देशों ने भी वहां जिन्होंने ज्यादाती की, जिन्होंने आक्रमण किया, उनकी निन्दा की, उनकी भर्त्सना की। लेकिन यहां हम यह पाते हैं कि वही नान अलाइन्ड लोग, भारतवर्ष पर जो आक्रमण हुआ है, भारतवर्ष की जो जमीन चीन के कब्जे में चली गई है, जो ज्यादाती की गई है, उसका कोई नोटिस लिये बगैर, चीन की भर्त्सना किये बगैर, उस पर राय जाहिर किये बगैर, ज्यादाती करने वाले को और जिसके साथ ज्यादाती हुई है, दोनों को बराबर कटघरे में रख करके, इक्वी-डिस्टेंस, बराबर की दूरी के सिद्धान्त के साथ, वे हमारे सामने आते हैं। इससे मुझे दुःख हुआ है। उनके इरादे अच्छे होने पर भी जो तरीका अख्तियार हुआ है, उससे मुझे परेशानी होती है और मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि इससे नानअलाइनमेंट का, निरपेक्षता का जो रूप है वह विकृत हो जाता है, वह सही माने में नहीं रह पाता है। इस लिये मैं समझता हूं कि निरपेक्षता के दृष्टिकोण से भी यह आवश्यक है कि वे चीन को आक्रमणकारी कहते, वे लोग यह मानते कि उसने ज्यादाती की है। मेरा ख्याल है कि इससे

उनका हाथ और भी मजबूत होता और ज्यादा वे इस हालत में होते कि चीन को सही रास्ते पर ला सकें और पंचायत ज्यादा सही तरीके से कर सकें क्योंकि जब आप दोनों को बराबर की दूरी पर मानते हैं तो होता यह है कि आक्रमण करके, अन्याय से जितना हासिल कर लिया है चीन ने, उसको और भारतवर्ष जिसका हिस्सा गया है, दोनों को आप एक बराबर समझते हैं और चीन का पलड़ा इसमें भारी होता है। यह सबसे बड़ी दिक्कत हमारे सामने तीसरी आई।

अब बात यह चल रही है, बहुत से लोग ऐसे हैं इस मुल्क में और अभी मुझे आश्चर्य हुआ जब हमारे ला मिनिस्टर साहब ने भी यह कहा कि ये जो कोलम्बो प्रोपोजल्स हैं, ये हमारे प्रोपोजल्स से, हमारी दृष्टि से, ज्यादा मिलते हैं बनिस्वत चीन से। यह तो एक अजीब गोरखधन्धा है। मैं बतलाऊं आपको कि मुझे तो ऐसा लगता है कि ये प्रोपोजल्स चीन के प्रोपोजल्स से ज्यादा मिलते हैं सिवाय इसके कि बीस किलोमीटर से हमारे हटने की बात को छोड़ कर उसके अलावा बाकी मामलों में अगर आप इस पर गौर कीजिये, विचार कीजिये, ये चीन के प्रोपोजल्स के ज्यादा करीब हैं, अगर तफसील में जाइये तो। लेकिन तफसील में जाने के पहले सबसे पहली बात यह हमको तय करनी चाहिये कि जिस सिद्धान्त के आधार पर हम अभी तक अड़े रहे हैं, उस सिद्धान्त को हम छोड़ना चाहते हैं या उस सिद्धान्त पर हम अड़े रहना चाहते हैं। ये जो प्रोपोजल्स, ये जो बातें कही गई हैं, ये उसके करीब नहीं आती हैं। मैं याद दिलाना चाहता हूं ला मिनिस्टर साहब को, गवर्नमेंट को और इस सदन को कि अनेकों बार हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने कहा सदन में कहा, सदन के बाहर भी कहा कि हमारे आत्म सम्मान के खिलाफ जब तक कोई चीज होगी, हमारी जमीन पर जब तक कब्जा रहेगा, हम कोई बातचीत नहीं करेंगे। इसके क्या माने हैं कि जब तक शुरू में हम जिस



हालत में थे, उस हालत में तो हमने कहा कि हम बात नहीं करेंगे और चीन जब आक्रमण करके आगे बढ़ आता है तो हमें ऐसा लगता है कि एक विवशता की परिस्थिति में हम अपनी उस जगह से पीछे हटते जाते हैं और सिर्फ जमीन पर से ही पीछे नहीं हटते हैं, लगता है डिप्लोमैसी में हम अपनी बात से अपने सिद्धान्त और आधार से भी पीछे हटते जाते हैं। मुझे यही कहना है कि यह बन्द होना चाहिये। आज की परिस्थिति में अब इस तरह की और चर्चा नहीं की जानी चाहिये। जब तक कि जो बातें हमने शुरू में कहीं थीं, वे बातें पूरी न हो जायं, तब तक मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि इस बारे में बात करना चीन को बढ़ावा देना होगा, देश में ऐसी परिस्थिति पैदा करनी होगी जिससे पस्ती आवे। और मुझे यह भी लगता है कि जो हमारी तैयारी है वह भी पूरी तरह से नहीं हो सकेगी। दोनों चीजें आप साथ नहीं कर सकते। दोनों चीजें एक साथ नहीं हो सकतीं कि एक तरफ तो आप चीन से निगोसिएशन करें, चीन से डेबिल पर बैठ कर बातें करें, समझौते की बातें करें और दूसरी तरफ आप युद्ध की भी तैयारी करें। आज की परिस्थिति में यह सम्भव नहीं है। न तो यह देश में सम्भव है और न यह बाहर के लोगों के लिये सम्भव है। चीन के लिये हो सकता है, ऐसे दूसरे जो तानाशाही मुल्क हैं उनके लिये हो सकता है क्योंकि उनके दो रुख होते हैं, एक रुख होता है बाहर के लिये और एक रुख होता है अन्दर के लिये। वे यह कर सकते हैं कि एक तरफ डेबिल पर बैठ करके बातें करें, आपसे सलाह करें, और दूसरी तरफ छुरे भी पजाते रहें, बन्दूक भी तैयार करते रहें। लेकिन हमारे जैसा मुल्क जो डेमोक्रेटिक मुल्क है, हमारे जैसा देश जो प्रजातंत्रिक मुल्क है, जहां हम कुछ छिपा कर नहीं रखते, सारी चीजें खुले आम करते हैं, वहां ऐसे मुल्क के लिये इस तरह की दोहरी नीति न तो चल सकती है और न चलाना उचित है। इसीलिये मेरा कहना यह है कि आज की परिस्थिति में हमको स्पष्ट रूप

से कहना चाहिये कि यह जो कोलम्बो पावर्स का प्रोपोजल हमारे सामने आया है, यह हमारे अनुकूल नहीं है, इसे हम एक्सेप्ट नहीं कर सकते, इसे हम ग्रहण नहीं कर सकते, इसे हम स्वीकार नहीं कर सकते, इसलिये कि यह चीन को बढ़ावा देता है। चीन के आक्रमण को एक तरह से मान लेता है व्यवहार में और सिद्धान्त में, दोनों में, और इसको मानने के माने यह होंगे कि हम अपने स्थान से हटेंगे और एक सिद्धान्त जिसके लिये हम अब तक अड़े रहे, वह हम छोड़ देंगे। ऐसा हुआ है पहले भी कि जब किसी एक सिद्धान्त का प्रतिपादन हमने किया तो प्रारम्भ में बहुत से मुल्क हमारे खिलाफ हुये, बहुत से मुल्क थे जिन्होंने हमारी निन्दा की, बहुत से मुल्क थे जिन्होंने हमारी भर्त्सना की। जब यह नान अलाइनमेंट का, निरपेक्षता का सिद्धान्त हमारे देश ने आजादी के बाद माना, तो मुझे स्मरण है कि स्टालिन साहब के रूस ने और उस जमाने के अमेरिका ने, दोनों ने हमारी उस नीति की निन्दा की, दोनों ने उसकी भर्त्सना की और दोनों ने उसको नापसन्द किया। लेकिन फिर भी हम उस नीति को सही समझ कर उसका उल्लेख करते रहे उस पर जमे रहे और उसका नतीजा यह हुआ कि आज परिस्थिति में परिवर्तन हुआ है और मेरा ख्याल है कि अमेरिका और रूस, दोनों का रुख इस मामले में बदला है और आज शायद वे यह अनुभव करते हैं कि हमारी नानअलाइनमेंट की जो नीति है वह ज्यादा सही और ज्यादा मुनासिब है। इसी तरह से मेरा कहना यह है कि एक छोटी सी ऐसी चीज जिसके बारे में हम आप स्योर नहीं हो सकते, हम आप कुछ निश्चित नहीं कह सकते, ऐसी चीज के पीछे अपने सिद्धान्त को छोड़ना, देश के अभिमान को छोड़ना और एक गलत तरीका अस्तित्वार करना हमारे लिये मुनासिब नहीं है।

जहां तक सवाल है इन कोलम्बो प्रोपोजल्स की तफसील का, आप देखिये कि क्या है? डोला का और थायला रिज का जो

[श्री गंगाशरण सिंह]

प्रश्न है वह तो इस प्रपोज़ल के मुताबिक बिल्कुल चाइनीज़ जो कहते हैं, वही चीज़ होती है। जो चीज़ ८ सितम्बर तक हमारे कब्ज़े में थी, उस पर भी हमारा अधिकार नहीं हो पाता है, उस पर भी हमारा कब्ज़ा नहीं हो पाता है। अगर आप लद्दाख को लीजिये तो उसकी हालत और भी विचित्र है। उसकी हालत विचित्र यह है कि यह कहा जाय कि जो हिस्सा चीनियों के कब्ज़े में रह जायेगा, ८ सितम्बर वाले में और कोलम्बो प्रोपोज़ल में जो फर्क है हजारों वर्ग मील का, उसमें जो हिस्सा रहेगा, उसमें हमारे कोई बहुत चेक पोस्ट नहीं थे, शायद तीन चार थे। लेकिन कितने चेक पोस्ट थे उनकी संख्या का सवाल नहीं है, सवाल है हमारे देश की ज़मीन के जाने का, हमारे देश के अभिमान का, और अभी जो जगह ली जा रही है वह एक ऐसी परम्परा कायम करती है जिससे कि सारा हमारा प्राउण्ड सारी हमारी नींव ढह जाती है।

कुमारी शान्ता वशिष्ठ (दिल्ली) : वह पोस्ट उनके पास थी। कोई नई चीज़ नहीं ले रहे हैं।

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह : अभी ४३ पोस्ट हमारे बने थे और उन ४३ पोस्ट में से चार पोस्ट उनके पास रह जाते हैं इसके मुताबिक भी। और बाकी जगह ऐसी रहती है जिसमें हमारे पोस्ट नहीं थे। लेकिन वह खाली जगह थी, वहां हम पोस्ट नहीं बना सके शायद समय की कमी से या दूसरे साधनों की कमी से या दूसरे कारणों से। और जो बने हुये पोस्ट थे उनमें से भी कुछ पोस्ट उनके हाथ में रह जाते हैं। फिर पोस्ट हैं या नहीं हैं, यह अजीब प्रश्न है। मान लीजिये कहीं हमारी जगह है तो हर जगह हम थाना कायम नहीं कर सकते, हर जगह हम पुलिस नहीं रख सकते, हर जगह हम अपने अधिकारी नहीं रख सकते। इसके भाने क्या यह है कि जहां हमारा अधिकारी मौजूद न हो, वह जगह दूसरे की हो गई। यह अजीब सिद्धान्त होगा और अगर इसको हम

मानेंगे तो हमको देश का बहुत सा हिस्सा दूसरे को देना पड़ेगा।

श्री अर्जुन अरोड़ा : यह कोई नहीं कहता कि वह उनकी हो गई।

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह : मैं उस पर आ रहा हूं।

شہی فریدالحق انصاری : کیا ایک

مرتبہ دیلے ے بعد آپ اس کو لے لیجئے گا؟

श्री फ़रीदुल हक़ अन्सारी : क्या एक मर्तबा देने के बाद आप उसको ले लीजियेगा ?

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह : मैं आ रहा हूँ उस पर। अभी मेरे मित्र श्री अर्जुन अरोड़ा ने जो प्रश्न उठाया, उस पर मैं बाद में आना चाहता था, लेकिन चूंकि उन्होंने उठाया, इसलिये मैं अभी उसके सम्बन्ध में निवेदन कर दूँ।

श्री अर्जुन अरोड़ा : आप अपने समय पर आइये।

श्री चन्द्र शेखर : दो सदस्य ऐसे हैं जो बड़े उदार हैं।

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह : बराबर हमारा तरीका यही रहा है दुर्भाग्यवश कि हमने शुरू में जो स्टैंड लिया, शुरू में जहां हम खड़े हुए, उसके बाद जब कोई प्रेशर पड़ा, जब कोई दबाव पड़ा, तो दबाव के बाद हमने उस स्थान को, उस जगह को छोड़ा और उसके बाद धीरे धीरे हम इस हालत में आज आ गये हैं कि आज जो चीज़ टेम्पोरेरी कहते हैं, आज जो चीज़ क्षणिक कहते हैं, वही चीज़ कल स्थायी हो जाती है और जब यह कहा जाता है कि क्यों ऐसा हुआ, आपने तो क्षणिक कहा था, फिर यह स्थायी क्यों हुई, तो बार बार हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब और दूसरे लोग कहते हैं कि चीनियों का

भरोसा नहीं है, चीनी बड़े ट्रेबर्स हैं, बड़े दयावाज हैं, हमने क्षणिक समझा था, लेकिन उन्होंने उसको क्षणिक नहीं रहने दिया।

मैं इतिहास में नहीं जाना चाहता, काश्मीर के बारे में और दूसरी जगहों के बारे में भी ऐसा हुआ कि जो चीज क्षणिक हुई वे अन्त में स्थायी हो गईं, वे फिर क्षणिक नहीं रहीं और मैं समझता हूँ कि आज अगर इस चीज को कबूल कर लेंगे तो स्थायी रूप से उस चीज के प्राप्त करने का हमारा जो अधिकार है उसमें भी कमजोरी आ जायेगी, उसमें भी ताकत नहीं रहेगी, उसमें शक्ति नहीं रहेगी, और हमारे पास वह दलील नहीं रहेगी, अगर आज हम इसको कर लेंगे तो। और दूसरी चीज यह भी है कि अगर हम यह समझते हैं कि हमें अपनी चीज को हासिल करना है और देश के पूरे हिस्से को अपने कब्जे में लाना है और उसके लिये पूरी तैयारी करनी है तो उस तैयारी में हमें इस बात का भी खयाल रखना चाहिये कि देश में आज क्या बात हो रही है। एक ओर चीनियों से मुलह की, समझौते की बात करते रहे, कुछ हिस्से पर उनका कब्जा मंजूर किये रहे और दूसरी ओर देश में तैयारी की बात करते रहे, ऐसी स्थिति में देश में हम तैयारी कर सकेंगे ऐसी कोई सम्भावना नहीं है। इससे देश में एक तरह की पस्ती आयेगी और मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि देश में ही नहीं, देश के बाहर भी जो हमारी मदद करने वाले हैं उनमें भी उदासीनता आयेगी। अगर चीनियों से किसी तरह से बातचीत शुरू की तो उन बाहर वालों की भी मदद हमको नहीं मिलेगी और बाहर की वह मदद जिसके भरोसे पर तैयारियां हो रही हैं वह मदद भी नहीं रहेगी। इसलिये देश के लिये भी और बाहर के लिये भी, दोनों तरफ की दृष्टि से भी, इसकी कोई चर्चा आज नहीं होनी चाहिये।

एक चीज और मैं कहता हूँ। अभी मुझे सुनना पड़ा—हमारे ला मिनिस्टर साहब ने

कहा—कि कोई अमेंडमेंट नहीं आया है अपोजीशन की तरफ से, इसके माने हैं कि सब लोग इस चीज को स्वीकार करते हैं। उस बारे में मैं बहुत . . .

SHRI A. K. SEN: I did not say that. I said, I am happy to note that there has been no . . .

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह : जी, मैं कह रहा हूँ। तो मैं इस बारे में यही निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि शुरू से ही, जब से आक्रमण हुआ है इस देश पर तब से ही, कम से कम मैं अपनी तरफ से और दूसरे हमारे जो साथी इधर हैं—जिनको जहाँ तक मैं जानता हूँ—हम लोगों ने, इस बात की बराबर चेष्टा की है कि देश में एकता बनी रहे और देश में एकता बनाये रखने के लिये जितनी दूर तक हम जा सकते थे उतनी दूर तक जाने की हमने चेष्टा की है और मैं यह चाहता हूँ कि यह एकता अन्त तक बनी रहे। मैं यह चाहता हूँ कि यह एकता सिर्फ चीन से लड़ने के लिये नहीं बनी रहे बल्कि यह एकता देश को चलाने के लिये भी बनी रहे। मैं तो यह चाहता हूँ, लेकिन इसका दूसरा अर्थ नहीं लगाना चाहिये। जो बातें प्राइम मिनिस्टर से और अपोजीशन के लीडर्स से हुईं, जो बातें कही गईं कांग्रेस की तरफ से, जो कांग्रेस के विह्व हैं उन्होंने जो कुछ कहा, जो बातें अपोजीशन के लोगों की तरफ से कही गईं, उन सबका यह परिणाम हुआ कि अपोजीशन की बहुत सी पार्टियों ने यह माना कि हम कोई संशोधन नहीं लायेंगे, कांग्रेस की तरफ से, सरकार की तरफ से भी कोई संशोधन नहीं आयेगा और जहाँ तक मैं समझता हूँ—जो मुझे सूचना मिली है—कि दूसरे सदन में शायद प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने भी यह कहा कि इस बहस के माने कोई कमिटमेंट के नहीं हैं, इस बहस के माने कोई किसी चीज की स्वीकृति के नहीं हैं, यह बहस सिर्फ बहस के लिये है। ऐसी अवस्था में मैं समझता हूँ कि अगर वह सिद्धांत या प्रिसिपिल मानने वाली बात नहीं होती तो ज्यादा अच्छा होता और तब यह बहस,

**[श्री गंगाशरण सिंह]**

बहस के लिये होती। लेकिन परेशानी तो यह है कि प्रिसिपल एक्सेप्ट कर लिया गया है और प्रिसिपल एक्सेप्ट करने के बाद सिर्फ बहस के लिये, यह बात रखी जाती है। आधी बात कबूल कर ली गई है और न तो उस के लिये स्वीकृति ली जाती है और न वह पूरी चीज यहां रखी जाती है। इसीलिये मैं यहां कहना चाहूंगा—जैसाकि मैं ने शुरू में निवेदन किया, मैं फिर कहूंगा—कि आइंदा से इस तरह की आधी बात नहीं करनी चाहिये और पूरी बात पार्लियामेंट के सामने रखी जानी चाहिये, इसलिए कि देश की एकता बनी रहे नहीं तो मुझे इस बात की आशंका है—मैं चाहूंगा कि अन्त तक देश की एकता बनी रहे, लेकिन मुझे इस बात की आशंका है—कि अगर इस तरह की बातें हुईं तो जो एकता हम बनाये रखना चाहते हैं वह किस हद तक बनी रहेगी, उसमें मुझे शंका होने लगती है। हमारे ला मिनिस्टर ने जो कहा उसके साथ मैं पूर्ण रूप से सहमत हूँ। उन्होंने अपने भाषण में कहा कि यह पार्टी का प्रश्न नहीं है, पार्टी की दृष्टि से इसको नहीं सोचना चाहिये। मैं फिर उसको दोहराना चाहता हूँ कि हम पार्टी की दृष्टि से नहीं सोचते हैं, आप भी पार्टी की दृष्टि से मत सोचिये और सिर्फ किसी एक मामले पर पार्टी की दृष्टि से मत सोचिये इससे काम नहीं चलेगा बल्कि इस पूरे प्रश्न को एक राष्ट्रीय दृष्टि से आप भी देखने की कोशिश कीजिये। पार्टी की दृष्टि से मत सोचिये, राष्ट्रीयता की दृष्टि से सोचिये लेकिन यह बहुत मुश्किल है कि बिना सलाह मशिवरा के अकेले आधी चीज कबूल कर ली जाय, आधी चीज एक्सेप्ट कर ली जाय, कमिटमेंट कर दिया जाय और तब कहा जाय कि इसे राष्ट्रीयता की दृष्टि से हम देखें। मैं समझता हूँ कि राष्ट्रीयता की दृष्टि से दोनों को सोचना चाहिये। कांग्रेस बड़ी पार्टी है, उनकी तादाद ज्यादा है, हमारी कम तादाद है लेकिन मैं समझता हूँ कि जब किसी प्रश्न पर हमारी

एक राष्ट्रीय दृष्टि हो, ऐसा कहा जाय, तो वही पैमाना उन पर भी लागू होना चाहिये जिसकी उम्मीद हमसे की जाती है। मैं चाहता हूँ कि सरकार को कमिटमेंट करने से पहले अपोजीशन के जो लोग हैं, उनसे भिन्न मत रखने वाले जो लोग हैं, उनकी राय ले ले और सलाह ले ले उनसे बातें करें तब कोई कमिटमेंट करें। सरकार यह बात मानेगी कि जो बातें उसने आज तक कही हैं उसका कभी कोई दुर्ूपयोग किसी अपोजीशन की तरफ से नहीं हुआ है, प्रेस में देने की बात या उसका नाजायज फायदा उठाने की बात। मैं कोई गुप्त बात नहीं कह रहा हूँ लेकिन मैं ला मिनिस्टर साहब को बतलाऊंगा—प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब इसके गवाह होंगे और मेरा खयाल है कि जो मिनिस्टर आफ स्टेट फार फारेन अफयर्स हैं वह भी इसकी गवाह होंगी—कि जहां तक अक्सार्डिन एरिया का और वहां रोड बनाने का सवाल है और नक्शे में गड़बड़ी का सवाल है चार साल पहले, मैं उसको प्राइम मिनिस्टर की जानकारी में लाया था और कभी मैंने इसका पार्लियामेंट में जिक्र नहीं किया। जो गलती की गई थी उसका मैंने अनुचित फायदा नहीं उठाया। जो कुछ संभव था वह मैंने किया है। यही स्पिरिट उस तरफ की भी होनी चाहिये। ऐसा लग रहा है, और मुझ पर ऐसा असर होता है कि हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर की अवस्था उस आदमी की सी हो गई है कि जो आदमी जब बाहर पिटता था तो घर में आकर अपनी औरत को पीटता था, बाहर वालों पर उसका जोर नहीं चलता था तो घर में आकर वह अपनी औरत को पीटता था, वही हालत है कि डिप्लोमेसी में बाहर जब फेल हो जाते हैं, बाहर जब हमारी डिप्लोमेसी नहीं चलती है, तो देश में आकर देशवासियों के साथ, अपोजीशन के लोगों के साथ, अपनी डिप्लोमेसी चलाने की चेष्टा करते हैं। मैं ला मिनिस्टर से यही कहूंगा कि यह तरीक बन्द होना चाहिये। हम आपके साथ हैं,

डिप्लोमेसी चलाइये बाहर वालों के साथ, लेकिन वह डिप्लोमेसी का प्रयोग यहां अपने घर में न कीजिये, बाहर में हार जाने के बाद ।

हमारे देश में जो आक्रमण हुआ उसमें चीनियों के विश्वासघात के कारण, हमारे यहां पूरी तैयारी होने के कारण और दूसरे कारणों से भी आज हमारी जमीन पर चीनी कब्जा जमाये बैठे हुए हैं लेकिन इसमें तो कोई शक नहीं है कि हमारा देश हारा नहीं है, हमारे सिपाही हारे नहीं हैं और हम इसे अधिक दूर नहीं समझते हैं जब कि अपनी जमीन पर हमारे सिपाही, हमारे देश के लोग, फिर कब्जा कर लेंगे । हम युद्ध से नहीं हारे हैं—मैं यह मानता हूँ कि हमारे लोगों को पीछे हटना पड़ा, हमारी जमीन पर कब्जा हुआ लेकिन वह हमारी हार नहीं है । लेकिन एक बात मैं कहूँगा कि सरकार की तरफ से गल्ती हुई है, एक मामले में सरकार की हार हुई है, वह इस तरह से कि हमारे देश का जो कैस है, हमारे देश का जो हक है, हमारे देश का जो अधिकार है उसको जिस तरह से दूसरे देशों के सामने, दुनिया के सामने रखा जाना चाहिये था वह हमारी सरकार रखने में असमर्थ रही है, मुझे यह बहुत दुःख के साथ कहना पड़ता है । यही कारण है कि हालांकि चीन ने हम पर आक्रमण किया लेकिन दुनिया के लोगों को, दूसरे देशों को, हम समझा नहीं सके कि चीन आक्रमणकारी है और बहुत से देशों के लोग और बहुत से अखबार जो कि चीनियों के खिलाफ हैं वे भी यह समझते हैं कि आक्रमणकारी हम हैं । यह कम्पलीट फेल्योर हमारी डिप्लोमेसी का, हमारी एन्सर्टनल अफेयर्स मिनिस्ट्री का हुआ है और मैं समझता हूँ कि इसका सारा रिवॉरियंटेशन होना चाहिये, नये तरीके से सारी चीज काम में लानी चाहिये । यह घर में डिप्लोमेसी नहीं चलानी चाहिये । सच्चे दिल से, सीधे दिल से जो

बातें हम करते हैं उसका नाजायज फायदा उठाने की कोशिश नहीं करनी चाहिये । मैं पीछे की बातों में नहीं जाना चाहता लेकिन यहीं जो प्रिंसिपल को एक्सेप्ट करने के बाद हम लोगों के सामने यह मामला लाया गया है इसको मैं ऐसा ही समझता हूँ ।

दूसरी चीज यह है कि हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने प्रिंसिपल में एक्सेप्ट किया, हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने क्या लिखा हम लोगों को मालूम नहीं है, पार्लियामेंट को मालूम नहीं है, पार्लियामेंट को एक्स्प्लेन दिया गया था कि जो कुछ इस मामले में होगा पार्लियामेंट से पूछने के बाद होगा लेकिन दूसरी तरफ चीनियों का क्या है, और तो और, कोलम्बो प्रोपोजल्स का जो इंटरप्रिटेशन है वह इंटरप्रिटेशन भी चीनी खुद करना चाहते हैं, यह कोलम्बो पावर्स पर भी नहीं छोड़ना चाहते हैं । कोलम्बो पावर्स का क्या प्रोपोजल है, उस प्रोपोजल का इंटरप्रिटेशन गिनका प्रोपोजल है उनके हाथ में नहीं छोड़ना चाहते हैं और वह इंटरप्रिटेशन खुद करना चाहते हैं । ऐसी अवस्था में, मैं समझता हूँ कि जो बात बार बार कही गई उस चीज को स्मरण रखना चाहिये, उन पर दृढ़ रहना चाहिये । हमारी सरकार, हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर—यह तो मैं नहीं मानता कि भुलक्कड़ हैं लेकिन मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि जो बात एक बार कही जाती है उन्हें पूरी तरह दूसरी बार स्मरण नहीं रखते, चीन के आक्रमण के बाद से जो बात कही गई कि चीन की बातों पर भरोसा नहीं किया जा सकता, चीन पर विश्वास नहीं किया जा सकता, चीन की बात पर भरोसा करके कोई इस तरह की बातें नहीं की जा सकती जब तक कि सही माने में वह काम पूरा न हो जाय, तो मुझे यही निवेदन करना है कि वह चीज बराबर स्मरण रखना चाहिये, उस चीज को बराबर धाद रखना चाहिये । यह नहीं कि कोलम्बो पावर्स ने कह दिया था चीन ने एक तार या चिट्ठी भेज दी या कोई बात कह दी तो हम यह विश्वास कर लें कि चीन का जो रवैया है, जो तरीका है,

[श्री गंगाशरण सिंह]

वह बदल गया। इसलिये आज देश के सामने एक ही प्रश्न है और वह प्रश्न यह है कि हमारा हिस्सा जो गया है हमारे देश से छिन कर उस हिस्से को हम हासिल करेंगे और उसके हासिल करने का सबसे अच्छा तरीका यही है कि हम अपने देश में पूरी तैयारी करें। हम अपने केस को, अपने मामले को, दुनिया के सामने सफ ई के साथ रखें, हम इस बात की पूरी चेष्टा करें कि जिनको आज तक इस बारे में पूरी जानकारी प्राप्त नहीं हुई है उनको पूरी जानकारी प्राप्त हो और इस तरह से जिनको गलतफहमी है, जिनके पास तक हमारा केस नहीं पहुँचा, उनका भ्रम दूर हो। मुझे आश्चर्य हुआ कि हमारे ला मिनिस्टर जैसे योग्य व्यक्ति भी गये, हमारी मिनिस्टर आफ स्टेट हैं फरेन अफेयर्स की वे भी गईं, सब लोग गये, लेकिन उसके बाद भी आज तक सही मामले में जिस तरह से हमारा केस रिप्रेजेंट होता चाहिये था, दूसरे मुल्कों को तो छोड़ दीजिये, एफो एशियन कन्ट्रीज के सामने भी वैसे नहीं रखे पाये। पता नहीं वे समझ नहीं पाते हैं या हम उनको समझा नहीं पाते हैं या वे समझने से इंकार करते हैं, क्या परेशानी है, मेरी समझ में नहीं आता।

3 P.M.

श्री अटल बिहारी वाजपेयी : डरते हैं।

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह: हमारे मित्र वाजपेयी जी ने कहा वे डरते हैं। डरते होंगे शायद। लेकिन मैं तो यह मानता हूँ कि हम अगर पूरी ताकत से अपनी चीज कह पाते तो डरने के बावजूद उनके दिल को तो कनविन्स कर पाते, दिल में तो उनको समझा सकते, दिमाग तो उनका हमारी तरफ रुजू होता। लेकिन आज तो किसी भी काम से ऐसा नहीं पता चलता है कि वे हमारे साथ हैं...

श्री एन० एम० अनवर (यमरास) : हमेशा तो पूरी तरह हमारा साथ दिया है यूनाइटेड अरब रिपब्लिक ने।

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह : मैं उस तफसील में नहीं जाना चाहता। अगर मित्र ने पूरा साथ दिया होता तो जो बात पहले कही गई थी—एग्जेशन वाली बात—वही शायद प्रस्ताव में भी होती कि चीन आक्रमणकारी है। वह तो नहीं हुआ। मैं समझता हूँ कि मित्र ने जो साथ दिया उसके बारे में खुद मित्र के मिनिस्टर का जो बयान निकला वहाँ के अखबारों में, वह पढ़िये और मालूम करिये कि उसमें कितनी हमारी नाकामयाबी रही मित्र को समझाने में। मित्र के मिनिस्टर ने एक प्रेस बयान में जो बातें कहीं वे अखबारों में निकल चुकी हैं। मैं उन बातों में आपका समय नहीं लेना चाहता हूँ। मैं इतना ही निवेदन करना चाहूँगा कि मेरी निश्चित राय यह है कि यह कोषम्बो प्रपोजल्स को कबूल करने के मानी यह होंगे कि हम अपने सिद्धांत से भी हटते हैं और अपनी नीति से भी हटते हैं और उसके साथ ही साथ जो हमारी जगह है वह दूसरों के हवाले करने की एक परम्परा हम स्वेच्छा से कायम करते हैं। अभी तक जो हुआ हमारी लाचारी से हुआ, हमारी बेवसी से हुआ। हम नहीं चाहते थे कि हमारी जमीन पर दूसरे का कब्जा हो। लेकिन हमारी जमीन पर उन्होंने कब्जा किया हमारी लाचारी से, बेवसी से, जो भी कारण हो, और अगर इनको हम कबूल करेंगे तो इसके मानी यह होंगे कि हम समझ बूझ कर, सही माने में, सही तरह से, उनको अपनी जमीन पर कब्जा करने का अधिकार देंगे। इसलिये मैं तो सरकार से यही चाहूँगा कि सरकार ने शुरू में जो कहा था कि जब तक चीन का हमारी जमीन पर कब्जा है तब तक हम कोई बात नहीं करेंगे, कोई समझौते की बात नहीं हो सकती है, उस बात पर हमको दृढ़ रहना चाहिये और मुल्क की एकता को बनाये रखना चाहिये, नहीं तो अगर बीच में कोई बातचीत हुई तो ऐसा लगता है—पं० जवाहरलाल नेहरू का व्यक्तित्व है, कांग्रेस पार्टी का बहुमत है—आप अपने बहुमत के जोर से, उनके व्यक्तित्व के जोर से कोई चीज पार्लियामेंट में बहुमत

जैसे पास करा लें, बाहर भी शायद बहुत हो जाये। लेकिन यह सर्वसम्मत चीज होनी चाहिये, सब की राय से होनी चाहिये। मुल्क का जहाँ तक सवाल है, देश के किसी अन्तः का सवाल है, वह सब की राय से होना चाहिये। मुझे इस बात का खतरा और आशंका है अगर यही तरीका रहा तो सब की राय से नहीं हो सकेगा। इस एकता को सुरक्षित रखने के लिये चीन के संबंध में तो कम से कम हम लोगों का दृष्टिकोण एक होना चाहिये। आंतरिक बहुत से मामलों में अगर दृष्टिकोण एक नहीं हो सके तो चीन के मामले में जहाँ मतभेद का कोई प्रश्न नहीं है वहाँ तो कम से कम आपस में मतभेद का मौका, मतभेद की गुंजाइश, आपको नहीं होने देनी चाहिये।

मुझे तो ऐसा लगता है, अगर आज कोलम्बो पावर्स की बात को हमें मानना है तो इससे अच्छा था कि चीन ने जब शुरू में कहा था तब उसी समय आप बातें करने को राजी हो जाते, वह अच्छा था आज की अपेक्षा हमारी दृष्टि से,। जब चाऊ एन लाइ ने आक्रमण के पहले कहा उस जमाने में भी हन बातचीत करने को राजी नहीं हुए, उसके बाद भी हम बातचीत करने को राजी नहीं हुए, और यह उचित था लेकिन आज इस परिस्थिति में जब हम बातचीत कर रहे हैं तो मुझे लगता है कि बहुत ही हेठी से, बहुत ही नीचे उतरकर, और दुनिया के सामने एक आदर्श नहीं पेश कर रहे हैं बल्कि एक बुरा उदाहरण पेश कर रहे हैं, हम कि जब तक आक्रमण नहीं हुआ था, जब तक हम नीचे नहीं गिरे थे, जब तक हम पराजित नहीं हुए थे तब तक तो हम बात करने को तैयार नहीं थे लेकिन जब हमारे ऊपर चीन ने हमला किया, हमारी जमीन पर हथियार के जोर से दखल कर लिया तब हम बातचीत करने को राजी हुये हैं। यह एक पस्ती का वातावरण होगा, एक ऐसी परिस्थिति का वातावरण होगा, ऐसा एक डिमारेलाइजेशन होगा जिसका असर हमारे देश में ही नहीं होगा,

हमारे देश के बाहर भी होगा और इसीलिये मेरा कहना यह है कि अगर इस चीज को यहाँ समाप्त कीजिये, बन्द कीजिये और फिर अपनी जगह पर बूढ़ रहिये और बार-बार फिसलने, बार-बार लुढ़कने की इस प्रक्रिया को बन्द कीजिये। कोलम्बो पावर्स के प्रस्ताव को एक्सेप्ट करना फिसलने और लुढ़कने की इस प्रक्रिया को प्रश्रय देना होगा जिसका कहीं अन्त नहीं है और जिसके बारे में संस्कृत के एक श्लोक में कहा गया है कि कुछ लोग जब गिरते हैं तो उनका—भवति चिनिपात शतमुखः। मैं नहीं चाहता हूँ कि उस तरह शतमुख से हमारा और आपका पतन हो।

MR. CHAIRMAN: You have spoken for a fairly long time.

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: With these words, I request the Law Minister to put a stop to all this type of talk and all these types of commitments.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: (Andhra Pradesh): Sir, I rise to support wholeheartedly the motion moved by the hon. the Law Minister, on behalf of the Prime Minister, that the proposals of the Colombo Conference be taken into consideration.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADA SWAMY: What is it that you support?

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: We are considering it. That is what I support.

MR. CHAIRMAN: He is supporting what is happening.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: When we dispersed after the close of the last session of Parliament the six non-aligned countries were holding a conference at Colombo which lasted for three days. At that time their deliberations had not been completed and we had no definite idea of the proposals that might usefully be formulated by them to be placed before China and India. They intended to create a more congenial climate for peaceful negotiations. As hon. Mem-

[Shri B. Ramakrishna Rao.] bers of Parliament were eager to keep themselves constantly in touch with the important developments that took place in connection with the Chinese aggression and our resistance to it, this short session was convened and as the emergence of the Colombo proposals and their formal presentation to the Prime Minister synchronised with the session, it is natural that they should be placed before the Houses of Parliament for consideration. I am glad that considering the gravity of the situation and the delicate stages through which the negotiations are passing, the official motion does not call upon us to take any positive decision or give any verdict on the acceptability of the proposals or otherwise. It was a very wise decision that the Government took so that the House, placed as it is in this condition, is not called upon to give a definite opinion. It is not possible for this House at this stage to pass any judgment on the acceptability of the proposals.

It is true that the hon Law Minister analysed these proposals and indicated certain points which seemed to show that these proposals are an improvement on the previous proposals which came from the Chinese Prime Minister but I agree with many of the views and sentiments expressed by my friend, Shri Ganga Sharan Sinha; we have to take these proposals as they are for the present. It is true that the neutral powers which formulated these proposals have not been able to agree entirely with our point of view. Of course, it is inherent in the situation. These non-aligned powers who are our friends did not perhaps take a decision to condemn Chinese aggression, as we expected them to do, because they took upon themselves the responsibility to act as mediators. We know very well that nearly sixty nations of the world have supported our point of view and though all of them have not condemned Chinese aggression as such and called it aggression, all of them have considered that the action that China took in regard to resolving this dispute about boundaries is not in con-

sonance with international behaviour. This is certainly a great diplomatic gain. It is quite true—and I agree with my friend—that there is some defect in our machinery of publicity and propaganda outside our country which is responsible for the fact that even our friends have not been able to understand our case, perfectly. The point that my friend made in that connection is entirely supported by facts. I would, therefore, certainly urge upon the Government to strengthen that aspect of our efforts. I have been told by many who have recently been to foreign countries that in Germany, in France and many other European countries where the newspapers devote many columns to news relating to the India-China dispute, they have devoted three-fourths of the columns to the Chinese version and only one-fourth to the Indian version. It is not their fault, I am told, but the defect lies in our defective machinery and not in any unwillingness on the part of the foreign press to give importance to our point of view in this dispute. That is a very good and constructive suggestion that has been made by my friend and I do hope the hon. Law Minister will convey the sense of this House to the Prime Minister. I am sure that he will take suitable steps to strengthen that aspect of our efforts.

I do not wish to go into the background of the Colombo proposals. The Law Minister has given the whole background. For the Chinese I suppose talk of war and talk of peace and preparation for war simultaneously are quite natural. They are just the changing instruments of the same single policy. But we are situated in a different manner. When we recollect the sequence of events that happened before these Colombo proposals emerged, I think we should give great importance to the delicate situation in which we are placed today. China threw its first peace offensive on the 24th October, just four days after their massive attack on NEFA and the Western Sector began. Our Prime Minister immediately reacted to it,



naturally, in the manner in which he ought to react, and as the whole nation reacted. He rejected the proposal outright. Of course, he asked for certain clarifications. After receiving those clarifications and after receiving the letter of the Chinese Prime Minister of 28th November, he sent him a letter on the 1st of December rejecting those proposals. And I think all of us approved that reply of the Prime Minister so far as the rejection of the Chinese proposals was concerned. At the same time, our Prime Minister, according to the traditional policy that we have always followed of not leaving any stone unturned for exploring possibilities of a peaceful solution of problems, made a counterproposal. It is in that counter-proposal that our Prime Minister has said that unless the Chinese withdrew to the position which existed before the 8th of September, 1962, there could be no possibility of any talk with China regarding the border dispute. Now, with regard to the counter-proposal or offer of terms contained in it by our Prime Minister, there was some reference this morning in this House. It is true that there was no formal resolution asking the House to give its approval to the proposal contained in that letter, namely, the letter which gave 8th September, 1962 as the position to which the Chinese should withdraw before talks began. That "was, of course, the minimum, preliminary condition imposed for beginning any talks. But, on the 12th December the Prime Minister made a statement in this House and in that he mentioned that he had made this counter-proposal. When some of the hon. Members on this side remarked that the approval of this House was not taken, they were perfectly correct in the sense that there was no resolution.

SHRI SANTOSH KUMAR BASU (West Bengal): Not 'this side', but the -other side.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: I ;am saying this side, to my right.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: He ha\* Indicated the right side, not the wrong side.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: I shall say that side, not this side. There was no approval of the House to the 8th September proposal as such because there was no resolution in that form in the House and the House did not vote for it. But there was a mention of this proposal by the Prime Minister in his statement. If we look into his statement, we will find it mentioned. The Prime Minister said:

"I made this reference first in the Lok Sabha and then here and I stated that if the present aggression since the 8th September is vacated, then—and I have stated it repeatedly in the letters as hon. Members would have seen—we shall consider various peaceful methods of deciding this problem. I have said that even if we have talks and they do not yield fruitful results, I would be prepared for them."

In another place on the same day, at the conclusion of that statement which was clarified in reply to various interruptions by hon. Members, you, Mr. Chairman, said:—

"I take it that the House is unanimous with the Prime Minister." Then, there were certain questions and in the end again you. Sir, said:—

"It is absolutely obvious that we are all united in our stand and we stand behind the Prime Minister."

AN. HON. MEMBER: It is a general statement.

*(Interruptions.)*

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: I am placing the facts before the House. I am not saying anything. The Prime Minister in his statement gave a detailed account of what had happened and he mentioned it before this House, probably also before the other House. In the other House there was a motion, if I recollect rightly, and in this House there was no motion. But he mentioned it and the

[Shri B. Ramakrishna Rao.] attention of hon. Members was drawn to that part of his statement in which he had described the previous correspondence between Premier Chou En-lai and himself. In that correspondence a very firm ground had been taken and our Prime Minister had rejected the so-called peace proposals, their three-point peace proposals along with the explanations which were contained in the Chinese Prime Minister's letters. However, whatever be the position, the fact remains that if not expressly, impliedly this House also approved the policies that were being pursued by the Prime Minister and about which he made a statement in this House. And I do not think personally that it would be correct for any section of Members of this House to say that they were not a party to approving that counter-proposal.

*(Interruptions.)*

HON. MEMBERS: We were not a party.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: May I make a submission? I do not know why the hon. Member is making this point. I would like to submit that under no parliamentary convention or under the rules of our House is a resolution adopted on a subject if it has not been accepted through a positive motion. It should be recorded as having been accepted by the entire House. Everybody has a sense of reservation. They may have their reservations.

MR. CHAIRMAN: He has made it abundantly clear.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: There may not be an explicit but implicit acceptance by the House. There is no parliamentary practice, there is no rule of this House which warrants such an interpretation being given.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Under the parliamentary rules, since the point has been raised . . .

AN HON. MEMBER: Under what rule?

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: It is our duty to tell the Chairman what the rules are, and it is for you, Sir, to decide. Very often even without a motion under the parliamentary rules the sense of the House is taken.

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Just a minute. In the course of ten years I can show you many occasions and this is a common parliamentary practice.

SHRI ROHIT M. DAVE: No.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: You may say no, but I say yes.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: I would like to refer to the various points made out by our very esteemed friend, Shri Bhupesh Gupta, himself where he has agreed several times with me. He may not agree with me on this point.

PROF. M. B. LAL: The question is that this section of the House denies: that it has accepted it.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Dr. Ramakrishna Rao has put the point. They may or may not agree with that.

PROF. M. B. LAL: We objected to that. In the same way we have not moved an amendment, and yet our leader has definitely said that we do not approve of this particular arrangement. Yet you\* may say the next day that the entire House including this section has accepted the Prime Minister's commitment.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: The hon. Member has raised the point . . .

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: The hon. Members are misunderstanding me. I have made it abundantly clear . . .

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Sir I would like to say . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: I will give you fifteen minutes to say what you have to say. But please say it once. You have got up at least ten times.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Some Members have said that we have accepted it. On that day I objected to the statement and said that any proposal on that basis was not acceptable to us. How can we be a party to that statement of the Prime Minister?

MR. CHAIRMAN: You have made your point several times and by repeating it nothing is gained. The speaker has made it abundantly clear that he is not saying that there was any motion passed but he has the impression, and I think there is justification for the impression, that there was general approval for what the Prime Minister said. He is not saying that the motion was passed, he is not saying that it was explicit, and he is not saying that it was approval of a motion.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: That is exactly what I was saying.

SHRI PANNALAL SARAOGI (West Bengal): Sir, on the 10th of December the House did approve both in letter and in spirit—I was present on that occasion—all that the Prime Minister had done in connection with the starting of negotiations only after the vacation of aggression, after the restoration of the September 8th line.

MR. CHAIRMAN: How many minutes would you need?

SHRI PANNALAL SARAOGI: You had repeated again that the whole House was behind the Prime Minister in the action that the Prime Minister had taken so far. It does not lie in the mouth of the Opposition Members now—there were no dissentient voices on that day. nobody dissented on that day—it does not lie in the *mouth* of the Members of the Opposition today to resile from that position. The House today can again bring in a fresh resolution and say

that we are resiling from that position, that we do not want to give a mandate, that we do not want that to be done in this particular fashion, or that we want to reshape our foreign policy in this matter. But what happened on the 10th of December was quite categorical and you yourself, Sir, mentioned it not once but repeatedly.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I am afraid you have finished before I expected.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: I am afraid these interruptions were made due to a misunderstanding altogether of what I stated. I never said that the proposal made by the Prime Minister came before this House and it was accepted. I made it abundantly clear that the Prime Minister mentioned this fact before this House and the House generally supported the Prime Minister and agreed with the policies pursued by him. Not beyond that. I certainly do not say in this House . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: They say they have not agreed. You please carry on.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: I was just referring to this fact because that proposal made by the Prime Minister is very relevant and important in so far as the consideration of the Colombo proposals is concerned. That is why I mentioned that fact and read extracts from the Prime Minister's speech. Sir, so far as the interpretation of the Colombo proposals is concerned, it is quite true that they fall short of our requirements. The requirements mentioned in the counter-proposal made by our Prime Minister are not exactly identical with the proposals made by the Colombo Powers. That is quite true. It is inherent in the situation. The point was made that the Colombo Powers or non-aligned powers should have condemned the Chinese aggression. In point of theory, I entirely agree with my friend. Shri Ganga Sharan Sinha, that they should have

[Shri B. Ramakrishna Rao.] done it. Some people have ascribed it to the fear of these Powers of China. Some people ascribed it to other reasons. But whatever it may be, it is I think not proper for us to complain that those Powers did not express themselves against Chinese aggression in any strong terms or other terms, because they undertook upon themselves this responsibility of being mediators. I think in our eagerness to see that our proposals are accepted intact, we should not blame the Colombo Powers for having taken a slightly different view. It may be that when we go into detail and when further interpretations are given by China, we might find ourselves in agreement with Shri Ganga Sharan Sinha. It may be on the other hand that the Chinese may change their previous methods and give the same interpretation as the Colombo Powers themselves have given. I understand that the latest position is still more doubtful so far as China is concerned. They have informed the Prime Minister of Ceylon that they do not agree with the interpretation with regard to proposal No. 1. They have their own interpretation and differences, and they feel that those differences could be discussed by the officers of the two Governments concerned. This is a very serious matter. If the same interpretation is not coming forward from both sides, that is India and China, well, we do not know where we stand in regard to the Colombo proposals, and I think the Prime Minister is considering the matter very seriously. I do hope that he will take into consideration this new development which has arisen.

So far as these Colombo proposals are, as the Law Minister has explained this morning, they may be considered an improvement on the previous proposals that emanated from China. That is all perhaps we can say. At the same time I would ask the House to refrain from going into details at this stage. We have expressed our fullest confidence in our Prime Min-

ister. We are placing before him all the doubts and suspicions that we have in our minds in regard to the policy that has been pursued by China. The Prime Minister himself is aware and he knows and has repeatedly said that the Chinese Government is not reliable. Their line of actual control shifts from time to time, from day to day and from month to month, and in each letter there is a different interpretation made of this line of actual control by the Chinese Government. If these proposals are accepted in toto by the Chinese Government with the interpretations given by the Colombo Powers, then there may be a question of our considering their acceptance in their final form. So far as we are concerned today, at this stage, I think the Government have placed their motion just for consideration and not for asking us to put our seal of approval on any particular definite proposals. We should support the policy that is being pursued by the Prime Minister and ask him to examine these proposals in the light of our previous commitments and principles that we have given repeated expression to, and then if he feels satisfied that these proposals approximate either fully or substantially to the principles enunciated by him in his counter-proposals about the 8th of September line, then he must be free to accept them. We should not in our discussions say anything which will forestall any final decision of the Government. That is the position that we are in today. We are not accepting the proposals as they are nor are we rejecting them. Some hon. Members have expressed their views in favour of rejection because of the previous background of these negotiations or because of the suspicion and scepticism that we naturally entertain about the future behaviour of the Chinese. All these are there. All these will be taken into consideration by the Prime Minister and when the proper time comes for signifying our definite consent for or approval of these proposals as a basis for future talks, well, then I think he should be free to do so if

he feels satisfied about them. We should not put any obstacles in the Way of his acting freely under these circumstances. There is no doubt that it is a very delicate situation, there is no doubt that there are several lacunae in the proposals and the clarifications. It is also true that • China has not expressed its definite opinion; it has not given what the Chinese Government itself called "positive response". That positive response was not forthcoming and is not forthcoming, I think, even today inspite of the statement made by the Chinese Foreign Minister at a banquet in Hong Kong which has now been confirmed, I believe, by the Chinese Prime Minister in a telegram to the Ceylonese Prime Minister.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: At Peking.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: At Peking, I am sorry. These are still uncertain things because their full implications are not yet known and if the information that I received just now is correct, there is a further obstacle placed by the Chinese Government by not accepting the interpretation of the Colombo proposals or by differing from them. So, let all these matters be clarified, let things take their own shape and let the Prime Minister consider all aspects of the question before he takes a final decision. I think the letter which was written by our Prime Minister to the Prime Minister, of Ceylon signifying his approval is tentative, it is not a final reply because he has himself said that a further communication would follow after Parliament considers these proposals. We are expressing our views freely and frankly and our doubts are there. The Prime Minister knows about all of them and I think at this moment the only thing that we should do is to support the Prime Minister in whatever he does after considering all these facts, when at the proper time he comes before the House. That is all that we can do today. Our work has been, I think, very easy so far as this stage is con-

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cerned, and we should not really probe into all the dangers that lie ahead or speak about not accepting ...

SHRI LOKANATH MISRA (Orissa): It would have been easier if we did not discuss it at all.

SHRI B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO: Certainly, it might have been so but we wanted that this session should be convened, we wanted a discussion. It would have been better if all these things had been considered and finalised and then the thing had come to Parliament at a later stage. But then as we wanted that this short session should be convened, it has been convened and the Government has placed all the cards on the table. They have explained the whole situation as it has emerged and it is for us to discuss and express our views. Nothing more and nothing less. That is what I have to say.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Mr. Chairman, Sir, I have listened very patiently to the speech of the Law Minister this morning. I am rather nervous about accepting what has been placed before us as the position of the Colombo Powers or their suggestions. There is something absolutely unreal about all these. Why do you call them 'Colombo Powers'? Are they Powers? They are the weakest nations perhaps that you can find in the whole world. When the Chinese aggression came about they were even reluctant to express an opinion. It was the free world that rallied round and came forward to condemn the Chinese aggression, not these people who are called 'Colombo Powers'.

DR. SHRIMATI SEETA PARMANAND (Madhya Pradesh): Every country is a Power.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Why don't you seek the advice or help, if you want, of people who are in a position to help us, instead of running after people who have been sitting on the fence? Why do we want to join another camp of tight-rope walkers

[Shri Dahyabhai V. Patel.] though our Prime Minister has been in the habit of doing it quite often? Why do we mention Bandung? I do not understand. Bandung has gone by the board long ago when the senior partner or the junior partner of the Bandung Conference invaded this country with his massive forces. The spirit of Bandung has gone, non-alignment has gone. Why do we go on talking about them? I do not understand it.

SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: No.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Mr. Arora roars ignoring whole facts. Facts are there. (Interruption). I am sorry. I misunderstood, I did not look back. I thought customarily it was Mr. Arora. I stand corrected. It was the learned Dr. Sapru

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Soviet-returned Doctor.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Because indoctrination after he went to the Soviet Union has made this. Sir, I say that we have been looking the wrong way. Why have these people come forward with these proposals? Who asked them? Why have they come? They have come forward because of the fear of China, of Chinese aggression. They are looking at this situation in that sense. If it is India today, what about 'us' tomorrow? So, let us make peace with China at the expense of India. Ask India to concede what China has already swallowed, the 8th of September line. Don't talk of Aksai Chin or anything, though If you look at the meaning of the word 'Aksai Chin', the original meaning is the border of China. That place is called Aksai Chin because it is on the border of China. Our Government has failed to take notice of the fact that China was building roads across it even though at least on this side of the House we have been pointing to it not after the aggression started but years before. We have been expressing our doubts about the intention of the Chinese for the last four or five years at least from this side of the

House. Unfortunately we were not listened to and now we have come into this situation. Please do not use any indirect means of this Conference or whenever you go to the conference table. You said '8th of September line.' That means that you have given your condonation to the earlier aggression. Never do it. The country will never forgive you for that, (Interruption) No, Sir. We have not done it. This country has never agreed formally to give up the territory occupied by China before the 8th of September. We have always said that we are prepared to start. . . .

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: That is the Government's stand.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: All I am saying is that these have been the activities of the Government in power. But we have always been protesting against it, that we have given up our right. (*Interruptions*) When this country became free, it was under the Treaty rights of this country to defend Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and there was no reason to give up that right. It was an atrocious act to give up our right to defend Tibet without even asking Tibet, without even informing the Tibetans that "we are going to do this; be prepared", and we forsook our sacred duty.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: Nepal is an independent State and it cannot be classed with Bhutan and Sikkim.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: I am quite entitled to give my view of the background, and I think the facts that I am giving are perfectly correct; these cannot be challenged. This country was warned against this happening by many eminent people. It is well known. History records it. But for certain reasons, for the sake of the friendship of Mr. Chou En-lai all this was ignored. Sir, against the background of what has happened in the last few months one must look at the comments of the press here and

abroad. Recently there was some big conference in Europe and Mr. Khrushchev was angry with China, not because India was invaded but because Chinese aggression against India has not served the cause of International Communism. What is our intention? What is the intention of our Government? What was the intention of the Bandung Conference? Was it to serve the cause of International Communism? It does matter very seriously. We have not joined the Communist Bloc and we do not want to be partners in International Communism. If we accept these proposals, that have been made to us by these six non-aligned nations—of course I would give them all credit for their intention to bring about world peace—what does it mean? It means, on the other hand, that you are thinking only in terms of International Communism. You are not thinking in terms of the breach of peace, the aggression committed by China, against which world opinion stood up and protested. We are ignoring world opinion. We do not go to the world that is willing to help us, that can help us, and we give *so* much importance to these six small nations, and with the best of intentions that they have they would not be able to defend themselves even. If this situation comes, what are they going to do? And what is the first sugar-coating of their pill, one on which there is all this trouble in this House since this morning? The first sugar-coating that you accept is the 8th of September position, which means that you give up what has been taken already. Sir, this country will never accept it. If that is the intention of the Congress Party . . .

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: . . . I suggest they hold General Elections to face it.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: It is not their intention, they think.

SHRI CHANDRA SHEKHAR: It is not the intention of the Congress Party but that of the Prime Minister.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: I hope the Congress Party will at least now be able to stand up to the Prime Minister if that is his intention. (*Interruptions*) The Prime Minister himself put forward the thesis that the aggressor should not be allowed to take advantage of his aggression. I submit, Sir, in all humility, that the aggressor will get all the advantages if we accept the proposals that are before us. It gives the aggressor the advantage of having beaten us and thereby frightened the smaller nations around us to go and tell us, "Now make your peace with these people." They forget the earlier aggression. That is the greatest service that these nations will do to International Communism. Does this country want that?

The other point I would like to mention is that the Prime Minister should have taken this House into confidence ' before finally accepting the proposals of these nations—the Prime Minister has not been taking Us into confidence, telling us things. If my information is correct, the Prime Minister has written to the Prime Minister of Ceylon to say that he is accepting their proposals.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL (Punjab): No, no; what he has said is that he is accepting them in principle.

SHRI A. K. SEN: I am every sorry to interrupt and say that it is quite different from what the hon. Member is saying. While the Prime Minister is being quoted, I hope he will be quoted correctly. I used his exact words and I do not want any misreading of that quotation.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL; I could not follow what you said. Please correct me if I am wrong; I shall be very grateful.

SHRI A. K. SEN: You said that your information was that he had accepted them, I mean that gives the impression as if he has accepted them

[Shri A. K. Sen.] finally, and that is some other information, apart from what I have stated, and I stated, Sir, that it should not be taken in isolation regardless of what followed it. He has said that in principle he was accepting them but that no final word could be given until the proposals were placed before Parliament. The whole thing is to be read together.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: I hope it is an improvement and I would stand corrected thereby, if I was mistaken. But as to what is meant by acceptance of these proposals in principle, I should like to be cleared. Does it condone, does it accept as a *fait accompli* the earlier aggression?

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Sir, I am glad to see so many protests from that side. If that is so, particularly after having heard the respectable speaker who spoke just before me, if that is the mind of the Congress, I would be only too glad, and if only they go a few steps forward, then they will think exactly as I am thinking.

SHRI M N. GVOVINDAN NAIR (Kerala): You have a number of friends there.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Sir, since the Chinese aggression came and we suffered reverses we have lost the initiative. What I object to very much is our acquiescing in that sort of position where we wait and see that the initiative is on the other side. That is exactly what I am objecting to. Now there is the so-called one-sided, unilateral cease-fire, and that cease-fire coming from China is also like the Chinese puzzle. What sort of cease-fire it is? But we have been waiting and asking for clarification of the puzzle before we take the next step. What is our intention? What is the promise that,

the Houses of Parliament made to the people? In violation of the terms of that promise to the people why should we sit tight and wait even for reoccupying the areas that have been vacated by the Chinese? I do not understand, Sir. Complete surrender of the initiative to China looks as if we have entered into partnership or we are about to enter into partnership with International Communism. We wait for a word from there. Comrade Dange has to go there with a special message, and what he brings and what he takes, nobody knows. Whether he went there to persuade Monsieur Khrushchev to ask Mr. Chou En-lai to restrain himself, we do not know. He had a long talk with the Prime Minister before he went, and afterwards. And all this leads us to suspect that we are entering into a long-term agreement with International Communism, and that is what we want to object to.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Irrelevant.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: It is very relevant.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: We are subjected to great aggression, by him, on our intellect.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: When intellect is mortgaged to international communism, where is the aggression to be committed? My friend, Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, and his comrades were sitting mum for ten days after the aggression. When the whole free world and the whole country stood up as one nation and asked the Prime Minister to resist, the Prime Minister as usual was hesitating like Arjuna . . .

SHRI A. K. SEN: That is not fair.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: . . . the country gave the message as Krishna gave to Arjuna, "Stand up and fight. It is your duty to fight", and the Prime Minister for once stood up. But the Communist bloc got up and again put him back.



SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Like Shakuni.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Wavering.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: Sir, the history of our relations with China is unfortunately a history of the failure of our Government at every stage. Time has come when this country must take stock of these failures and end them if it is not possible to mend them. But in the circumstances, as they are, it does not look as if they can be mended. We have been going and abusing the free world unnecessarily, rightly or wrongly leading the cause of the people. « .

SOME HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: . . . who do not believe in peace, who believe in international communism, and we have got a lesson that we deserve for doing so.

SHRI M. GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore): Why this complex?

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Even the free world stands non-aligned, my hon. friend will appreciate.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: I do not believe in this sort of non-alignment that you remain neutral and peaceful as long as it suits you and go on chewing up the other man's territory and go on lying to the world, and then you call it non-alignment. This sort of Chou En-lai non-alignment I am not capable of understanding. I have got limited intelligence, I am quite prepared to admit. But it is beyond me to understand this sort of non-alignment. If the honourable Nawab Sahib understands it, perhaps he has got a superior intellect.

Sir, let us not forget the lessons of history. There is a case where the powers of the world capitulated once before; they let down small neutrals and the world was in for a holocaust.

There was a severe propaganda machinery which the Prime Minister himself condemned, the propaganda machinery of Hitler. Today the propaganda machinery of international Communism is aligned against us completely. Are we going to stand up against it or are we going to capitulate? It is the duty of this country to stand up, and I hope the Prime Minister will stand up and tell this country that we are in for trouble, we are in for a long-drawn war and we must face it.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: After hearing your speech he will say that no doubt.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: If he and Comrade Dange do not go and mislead him, I am sure he will listen to me. But the trouble is that he has been listening to these people a bit too often. In this House I have been saying it not today, not yesterday, but for the last three or four years since I came here that it seems to me that he listens to the leader of this party who is sitting here. I repeat it again today and I would ask this House to consider in all seriousness to end this partnership between international communism or partnership between China and this country, to enable them to give up the sacred soil of this country according to the pledge that we took before the country, a pledge that was acclaimed all over.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, Sir, what are we considering today? The Colombo Powers have presented certain proposals before us and have enquired of us whether we would be agreeable to accept these proposals in case China also accepts them. Now, we have merely said that we accept in principle those proposals. China has not yet said that it has accepted the proposals. Now, is it possible for us in the international sphere to re-

[Shri G. S. Pathak.] fuse to give a reply to six other nations? Is it possible for us not to consider what other nations present before us as a possible solution to a dispute which may spread war? Is that the way in which an international community behaves, or is it the proper international behaviour? What have we done? We are merely considering whether those proposals could be acceptable to us? For what purpose? Not for the final solution but only for the purpose of our negotiating, our coming together at one table. It is only for that purpose that we are considering certain proposals which have been offered to us as a possible solution by the six friendly powers. Now, Sir, has any hon friend here given a reply to the very lucid exposition of the hon. Law Minister? Has he not shown that the proposals which the Colombo Powers have formulated are very close to what we were thinking? They are very far away from what China was offering. Is there any reply *to* that? Have those proposals been objectively considered by those who want to oppose them? Is it not a fact that in the Eastern Sector, according to these proposals, China will be on the other side of the MacMahon Line and we shall be able to go militarily up to the MacMahon Line itself? Is it not a fact that these proposals which have been offered by the Colombo Powers are so close to our thinking that we could say that in principle we accept them or we could accept them provided China accepted them? Now, has it been considered by those who are opposing the exposition of the Law Minister that we are getting joint control in an area which was very doubtful?

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: It became doubtful because of your Government's failure.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: Please wait. You have not heard me out why I said "doubtful". Please consider what I am saying. I am comparing, as the

Law Minister compared, the Chinese proposals with the Colombo Conference proposals. The Chinese proposals never contemplated that we could have joint control in any demilitarised area. If the Colombo Powers are offering to us a proposal which means that we can have joint control over that area, is it not more close to our line of thinking and is it not farthest away from the Chinese line of thinking? How could We then say that we are not going *to* consider them, we do not accept the proposals of the six friendly Powers?

4 P.M.

Now it has been said today by one of my friends in the Opposition: "We do not accept the proposals of these six Colombo Powers. They are small nations." Kindly consider the implications of this statement. No nation in the world is small today. Every nation is as good and as big as any other nation and every nation in the world has got the same interests, vital interests, in the peace of the whole world as any other nation. The peace of the world is not the concern of only the big nations or one or two nations. The peace of the world is the concern of the entire international community. If there is any breach in the peace of the world in any part of the world, the entire international community is concerned with it and it is in recognition of that obligation that aid has been offered to us because the international practice, the international law as it has developed today, is that if anywhere there is aggression committed, then it becomes the right of all other States in the world to come to the aid of the victim.

AN. HON. MEMBER: Duty.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: It becomes the right and duty too. Therefore every nation in the world is interested. We are forgetting the present set-up of the international community if we can isolate small nations and say that they have nothing to do with

this matter. Every nation in the world today is concerned and vitally concerned with the matters of peace and it is for this reason that at the U.N. and other international conferences we became interested in the disputes to which we were not parties. Why did we say that Britain and France should not have attacked Egypt when there was an attack on Egypt? It was no concern of ours and if the argument of my friend on the other side be correct, then the entire work in the U.N. will be stopped. The U.N. will have to close its doors. Therefore all that is being said against these Powers, I say and I say with some emphasis is completely out of place, is completely in disregard of what the world is today. Now, no one has ever said that China has not committed an aggression. The Government's view has always been and this is the view of the entire country today, that China has committed aggression and China must vacate every inch of our country. No one has ever said that China has not committed aggression or that aggression be condoned. What is the objection now raised by the Opposition? The objection is about the procedure. Why negotiate? Is it not again completely disregarding what the international community in the world is today? What is the other alternative? Is not the other alternative the spread of war? There are well-recognised methods of preventing war and it is the obligation of every country in the world to prevent war so far as possible and where war is inevitable, then to localise it, not to allow it to spread because the spreading of the war may end in a big holocaust.

AN. HON. MEMBER: Mr. Chamberlain could not prevent a war.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: You go on remembering Mr. Chamberlain. First hear me.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: That is ancient history.

AN. HON. MEMBER: They are creating history.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: I submit that to say that negotiation should not be made with a country which might have committed an aggression and which might have been engaged in an armed conflict is completely forgetting what the international community is today and what the U.N. Charter is. The whole country is dedicated to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Charter. Is it not written there? Is it not in the interests of peace that all the methods which are peaceful methods, negotiation among them, should be exhausted before the war spreads on a large scale? Is it not a well-recognised method? People will laugh if they were to be told that negotiations should be tabooed. Whenever there is an aggression committed, you tell the aggressor: "Clear out of this land, I say; otherwise, we will not talk to you." The result will be, either he clears out of the land and then there is no question of talking left or if he does not clear out, then the war will spread and there will be a violent conflict. It is in the interests of this country, it is in the interests of the people of this country, that all methods which are alternative to the spreading of war may be devised before the war spreads more extensively and this is a very well-recognised method. Therefore one is amazed to hear that there should be no negotiation, or that we cannot accept negotiation unless somebody vacates the aggression completely. Where is the question of negotiation or anything else left if the other party were to vacate aggression completely at our bidding? Are we dealing with a child who, by merely hearing from the Parliament that we want him to clear out, will clear out? These things have to be proceeded with in a normal manner, in a realistic manner, in a manner which is well recognised. We are not saying that China should not be turned out and the Government, in accepting the principle, never even impliedly could accept the proposition that China should not leave every inch of our territory. These are merely procedural matters and

[Shri G. S. Pathak.]  
 they are tied up with very important issues. You cannot merely, on looking at maps, decide these matters. They are linked up with diplomatic activity. We must have the whole world on our side. China is completely in isolation today because of our diplomatic activity and because of the wrong that has been done to us, because of the feeling of injustice that every good nation, every nation which is interested in peace, has had. All praise to these six Colombo Powers. Look at what H. E. Ali Sabry has done, when he said: "We will not recognise the fruits of aggression." The actual words are probably different but that is the substance. Was he not proclaiming the principle and acting upon the principle that aggression shall not be recognised? Is it necessary that you must tell the person with whom you want to negotiate: "You are an aggressor, you are a criminal." How will he negotiate? He will not talk to you if he has the military power but H.E. Ali Sabry's language is the diplomatic language. "We shall not recognise the fruits of invasion". That is the basis of his approach and when he was making that approach, he had in his mind another aggression with which his country was once faced.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: I do not want to interrupt the hon. Member, but may I put a simple question to him as to how the people of the United Arab Republic would have felt if India had not condemned the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez?

DR. NIHAR RANJAN RAY: India Was not playing the part of a negotiator there.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: We did not want the United Arab Republic to play the part of a negotiator. They should have condemned the aggression.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That is not the point of the debate. You please proceed

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: The point is: is it not open to diplomats, to responsible persons, to use language according to their choice? If a statesman of the world says 'We shall not recognise the rules of invasion . . .'

AN HON. MEMBER: You mean aggression.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: . . . does it not amount to saying that we shall not recognise aggression?

SHRI M. GOVINDA REDDY: It is far more effective.

AN HON. MEMBER: It can be both ways.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: You may understand it that way, but it is possible that other people may not understand it that way. They know that in English you have more than one word for a thing. There are many synonyms. There are several expressions which can be used for conveying the same idea, there are different expressions for the same thing. We have to consider the language which a man functioning in the diplomatic sphere would use. We must place ourselves in the position of one who wants to bring about peace between two nations at conflict and in a particular vital area 'of the world. Can it be said that a person who uses this language—we shall not recognise the fruits of invasion—is inspired by any fear? Is a great country like Egypt, situated as it is, likely to be inspired by any fear of China? That is the suggestion made by one of the hon. friends here. So far as the other nations are concerned, they have in effect, I submit, accepted the fact that there has been aggression 'on India, because otherwise the proposals which the Colombo Powers have framed would not have been framed in that manner and those proposals would not have come so close to 'our own thinking. If you examine those proposals minutely, you will find inherent in those proposals, the fact that China has

committed aggression. Why should China be asked to move behind the MacMahon Line which according to the Chinese was illegal? I am using the word used by China itself. Therefore, I submit that we must look into this matter objectively. We must look into this matter minutely and we should also look into this matter having regard to the fact that these big questions of war and peace are not decided academically. They are tied up with military questions. They are tied up with diplomatic questions. It is possible to say today that China has been isolated, along with Albania, from other communist countries. If it is possible for us to say that we are prepared to accept some of the proposals, subject to conditions, then these non-aligned powers would consider us to be reasonable persons and the whole international community would treat us with sympathy and consideration and would be prepared to give us help if we need it. But that will be so, because we are reasonable in our attitude. If the argument that has been raised today by the opposition is a valid argument, the result will be that we shall be throwing away all the help and sympathy from the entire world. Therefore, I say that we have not lost anything in self-respect by saying that we accept in principle these proposals. I submit that it was essential to say this. We have raised ourselves in the estimation of the whole world by showing that we are amenable to reason, that we do not want war, that we want peace. But we want our land and therefore, we shall have our land. Is it, therefore, a correct argument to say that we have failed in the diplomatic sphere if we find today that China is in complete isolation so far as the diplomatic world is concerned? So far as military strength is concerned, this military strength cannot be acquired in one night. It requires development of our industries. It requires the use of the aid that we may get from other countries, and it requires the development in our own arsenals, of our war potential. There-

fore, the Government is the best judge of what should be done in a matter of this kind. In the diplomatic sphere and in the military sphere there are some secrets which cannot be disclosed without incurring risk to our security. It is proper diplomatic conduct, when the subject-matter of the negotiations is of a delicate character, not to disclose at each and every stage what is going on. If it is once disclosed, the whole press in the world will be full of it, or may be full of it—I am taking a typical case—and what is intended to be achieved would end in failure. Therefore, we must realise that there are certain matters which, consistently with the security and safety of the country, it is not possible for the Government to disclose. We are entitled to have broadly the picture of what is going on. So far as military matters are concerned, we may put numerous questions to the Government, but a stage will always come where it will not, consistently with the security of the country, be possible to disclose the secrets and the development of our military potential. Therefore, these questions are closely and intimately linked up with diplomatic matters and with military matters and they cannot be decided in isolation.

The principle on which His Excellency Ali Sabry has acted is the principle to which we have always adhered. We have adhered to it in the international world and always in our diplomatic activities, and that principle is that no one shall be allowed to reap any advantage out of his aggression. We have always adhered to this principle and it is the ordinary principle that there cannot be any right arising out of a wrong. Look at the records of the United Nations. Have we not worked for this principle? Shall we give it up when our town case is concerned? Is that the argument of the other side?

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA:  
Who has said that?

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: Well, it has been implied here.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: What is implied?

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: Please do not try to put something in our mouth which we have not said.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: That His Excellency Ali Babry was wrong..

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Nobody has said that. Who said it?

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: Well, Mr. Patel.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: No, all these people have not come on behalf of the United Nations. I have not said that he was wrong. Has anyone condemned the aggression? That is what I asked.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: It was suggested that we are not adhering to this principle. If you have not suggested it . . .

AN HON. MEMBER: So far so good.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: If you have n'ot suggested it, then no difficulty arises. I am not saying that you are not adhering to that principle.

Therefore, the position is that we are dealing with . . .

[THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair.]

I am sorry, I never said that Mr. Patel said that.

HON. MEMBERS: That is all right.

SHRI A. D. MANI: It is Mr. Dahya-bhai Patel who said that

SHRI DAHYABHAI V, PATEL: I never said that.

SHRI G. S. PATHAK: I am sorry. The matter is closed.

Madam Deputy Chairman, we know that we have to deal with a peculiar kind of oppoent. The opponent is a government which has acted contrary to its professions, a government which while signing the Treaty in 1954, while speaking at the Bandung Conference, was all the time preparing and planning for war against us stealthily, seizing our territory, as has been pointed out by the Law Minister and was acting in a manner contrary to its professions. We also remember how the Chinese Delegate, acted in Korea; anyone who recalls that story knows how tough negotiators they turned out to be. How cunning they are, we know. People of that type are working under that government. Therefore, we have to be very careful about it in the matter of negotiations. We also know that they do not believe in co-existence. We also know that they believe in the inevitability of war which is quite contrary to our policies. We also know now that they are claiming fifty thousand square miles of our territory. Forty thousand square miles they claimed at one stage and now their written demand is for fifty thousand square miles. Now, knowing all this, what we should do must be to prepare ourselves militarily as strongly as we can because if it is their intention to play for time, if it is their intention to play for such a thing, then we should not lag behind. That is one thing that we must do and I am sure Government is doing it. Another thing which is important and which has been repeatedly emphasised by the leaders of the Government is that there should be no complacency. We should not lapse into complacency. The war potential or the defence potential must be strengthened and we must prepare for every possible eventuality and we must not allow an impression to be created on anyone's mind that in India there is no emergency. I would, therefore, submit that what the Government has done has been done correctly and what the Government has to do should be within the judgment of the Government. Thank you.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Madam Deputy Chairman, I have listened with ver.v great attention to the defence which the Minister for Law put up for what I consider a faltering case for the acceptance of the Colombo proposals. He went a good deal into the history of this matter . . .

DR. SHRIMATI SEETA PARMANAND: Where does the question of defence of the case come in? There is no question of the defence of the case.

SHRI A. D. MANI: May be an offence on his side but it is defence from our point of view.

He went a good deal into the history of this matter and I would like to draw the attention of the House to his repeated assertions that the Chinese have tried to step up claims in respect of the border of these areas. What does it show? The Prime Minister declared in this House as well as in the other House that he has come to the stage when he does not rely on the word of the Chinese. I should like to ask the Government, and I should like to ask the Prime Minister in particular, what has happened during the last few weeks which has made him change the opinion that a situation has arisen where he can really have some reliance on the *bona fides* of the Chinese. On the contrary . . .

(Interruptions)

SHRI A. K. SEN: Where do the Chinese come in?

SHRI A. D. MANI: Any negotiations with the Chinese at this stage would mean on our side, our giving them the benefit of doubt about their *bona fides*. Is there anything that has happened during the last few weeks which makes the Prime Minister realise that the Chinese have changed their attitude and are really in a genuine negotiating mood? That is the question which is very vital in a consideration of the proposals . . .

SHRI ARJUN ARORA: Does the hon. Member advocate that we should never negotiate with the Chinese?

SHRI A. D. MANI: I do not say that we should never negotiate with the Chinese. I would like to remind my hon. friend, Mr. Arora, of what happened in Europe in the days of Dr. Schuschnigg when he was asked to negotiate the surrender of Austria with Hitler. At that time, the question of the *bona fides* of Hitler was raised. Does the Government sincerely believe that the atmosphere is ripe for any kind of friendly negotiations with the Chinese on the border dispute?

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: If they accept the proposals of the Colombo Powers, then certainly there is a change.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I am coming to that. Even if they accept it, in view of their blatant record of aggression on the frontier, does the Government believe that the Chinese would be in a reasonable mood to discuss this matter across the table?

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: Does the hon. Member mean to suggest that we resume fighting?

SHRI A. D. MANI: I must be allowed to develop my point. Fighting comes last, when I conclude my speech. I will come to fighting and I will comment on that. My time is short.

The point that L raised in an interjection this morning when the Law Minister was speaking was that the acceptance of a demilitarized zone in Ladakh where the boundary has been sanctified by a treaty between the Government of Tibet and the Government of Kashmir means our accepting that the border issue, at least as far as Ladakh is concerned, is an open question.

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI A. D. MANI: It will be contrary to this stand that . . .

SHRI A. K. SEN: I never said, Madam Deputy Chairman, that the border is an open question.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I am saying, that is the interpretation that I place on your action. When you talk of a demilitarized zone, it means <sup>that you are</sup> more or less going to give in the hands of a Court Receiver this zone. The Colombo Powers are the Court Receivers and we are placing the entire demilitarized zone in their hands and allowing two posts which we held to lie beyond the Mauve line. My hon. friend, Mr. Pathak, said just now that the Colombo proposals do not mean, as Mr. AH Sabry has said, a recognition of the fruits of aggression, the aggressor being allowed to retain the fruits of his aggression. This is not borne out by the proposals of the Colombo Powers in respect of Ladakh. They are allowed to reap the fruits of aggression because two posts which are lying on the Mauve side of the line would be out of our control. Madam, we will be setting up an extraordinary precedent in international relations as well as in our own political decisions if we allow a demilitarized zone with civil check posts on both sides. It has never happened. That means that we will be allowing the aggressor to have his foothold with our consent on Indian soil and this is contrary to the Resolution which the House adopted in November last when we met to consider this crisis. Now, Madam, I am surprised that the Colombo powers about whose peaceful motives much has been said—and I would like to pay a tribute to the sincerity of their intentions—in a vital issue of this character did not say an explicit word condemning the Chinese aggression on our frontier.

*(Interruptions)*

SHRI P. N. SRPRU: Are you speaking with your tongue in the cheek?

SHRI A. D. MANI: My tongue is very much out and I am saying that I expected that the Colombo powers on an occasion like this—as on the occasion of the Suez crisis we went to the

rescue of the United Arab Republic or Egypt as it was at that time, and condemned Anglo-French aggression in very unmistakable terms—should have condemned this aggression. There has been a good deal said about this non-alignment bloc and so on. I expect the non-aligned bloc when a clear issue of aggression has arisen on Indian soil, when a peaceful country like India was invaded by China which was one of the signatories to the Bandung Conference and which had taken a leading part at the Bandung Conference, should have condemned Chinese aggression.

Madam, I would like to point out the implications of our accepting to negotiate on the basis of the proposals of the Colombo powers. Our stand in resisting the Chinese troops did create a vital impression on the western world. It also created, as the pamphlet of Press extracts which has been circulated by the Government will show, a very powerful impression in the neutral countries. If we agree to negotiate now, we will be staging a Munich. Let us be quite clear that this will be nothing but a surrender of the position that we took that China was the aggressor and that our border was invaded by China and I think that this action of ours would amount to a condonation of aggression. They suggest that we negotiate on the basis of the proposals of the Colombo powers. *(Interruptions)* I am for negotiations with honour but not with dishonour, not on the basis of the Colombo proposals. *(Interruptions)* This country believes in negotiations but believes in negotiations with honour and not with shame and dishonour as the Colombo proposals would imply. I would like to say this that we in this part of the world for the first time have set up a standard of resistance against Chinese aggression.

DR. SHRIMATI SEETA PARMANAND; Will the hon. Member kindly say what exactly is dishonour in this particular case?

SHRI A. D. MANI: The dishonour is tin's. You allow Chinese civilian posts



to be set up with your approval, with the approval of this country, on your soil. No foreign Government has got that right. I would like to say . . .

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: No question of approval. We are not parties. The question is this. The Colombo powers have given certain proposals and we are only committed to start negotiations and do nothing else.

SHRI A. D. MANI: The proposals of the Colombo powers amount to the proposals which Hitler made to Czechoslovakia asking it to surrender Sudetanland. I am surprised that Members on the other side should stand up and defend this surrender of Indian territory to the Chinese.

HON. MEMBERS: Nobody is saying that.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Madam, I would like to pass on. When we have set up a standard of resistance to Chinese aggression in this area, that standard of resistance will get supporters from other parts of the world. The countries of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan are watching very carefully what we are doing. If at this time we give up the stand that we had taken in the Resolution adopted by both Houses of Parliament, we will be striking a blow at the forces which want to resist Chinese aggression and it will not be conducive to resistance by other countries which are exposed to Chinese aggression, to the Chinese menace. I want this country to set up a shining example by saying that we are prepared for negotiations but we are not prepared to negotiate on the basis of a surrender of our territory.

SHRI N. M. ANWAR: That is exactly our stand.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Madam, when speeches were made from the other side of the House in November last when this House met to discuss the Resolution moved by Government declaring the will and the resolve of the people to resist aggression, we thought that this was going to be an

unending struggle till the restoration of the areas that India had lost. Now we find that we are met here today to discuss proposals which have secured certainly a disengagement; even the disengagement has not been produced by the Colombo powers but by the Chinese offering to withdraw and cease fire with contempt and in the face of a contemptuous offer made by China that they will not fight, that they will order cease-fire, they want India to make a response. And we are making this response in the form of accepting the principle by implication that the entire border is negotiable. And further we are going to sit with people who have told lies throughout on this question of border dispute. Our Prime Minister does not have any reliance on their words. How are you going to negotiate this matter when the record has been so black as far as the Chinese are concerned and when there has been no tacit expression in these proposals which amount to a condemnation of aggression?

Madam, I would like to raise one other point. When do we negotiate the terms for a peaceful settlement? The prisoners of war who have been taken by the Chinese are in Chinese hands. We do not know their exact number and we do not get full information. And I am told that the Chinese Government have refused to recognise the International Red Cross. It is prepared to recognise only the Indian Red Cross. We do not know even the names of people who are in the hands of the Chinese. It will be a blow to the prestige of the Indian Army for us to sit at a conference table with the Chinese when our prisoners of war are in the hands of the Chinese. If at least the Colombo powers had said that the prisoners of war should be released by China first as a gesture to restore a peaceful atmosphere . . .

SHRI PANNALAL SARAOGI: It is a corollary.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Where is the corollary? The corollary is not to be

[Shri A. D. Mani.] seen anywhere. It is not given here. Where is the offer by the Chinese?

*(Interruptions)*

DR. GOPAL SINGH (Nominated): What happened in Korea?

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA: We are not Koreans; we are Indians. I do not think you want to make a Korea of our country. Please do not try to turn our country into Korea.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Look at the proposals and the way the proposals are presented. We are asked to express our opinion. Who expresses the opinion first? It is the defeated party. We express the opinion in a letter written by the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of Ceylon that the proposals are acceptable in principle. And what do the Chinese leaders say? Mr. Chen Yi says that China also accepts them in principle but has got mental reservations. I feel this is not honour at all. The refusal is on the Chinese side. I do not know. When the hon. Minister was . . .

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: We accept it with the clarifications. You are forgetting that.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Clarifications make matters worse. You have accepted the location of Chinese forces on Indian territory which is a matter of dishonour and disgrace to this country.

Madam, I would like to ask, where was the need for the Government to signify their assent to even the acceptance of the proposals in principle when a parliamentary session was going to meet? The Prime Minister himself gave an assurance that the House will be consulted before the Government took a decision. I quite agree that the signature accepting the proposals in the final form has not been put down by the Prime Minister but when the Prime Minister writes a letter to the Prime Minister of Ceylon saying that he accepts it in principle—he has got the party backing behind

him—it means virtually the ultimate decision of Parliament.

SHRI ARJUN ARORA: The backing of the country.

*(Interruptions)*

AN HON. MEMBER: Presumptuous.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: You are forgetting what the Law Minister said. He said that the final decision, will be sent to them after Parliament's views are given.

SHRI A. D. MANI: My good friend, Mr. Akbar AH Khan, is a very able lawyer. I would ask him, what is done when a lawyer decides to settle a case outside the court? He comes to some settlement which has to be filed in the court. The parties meet and say, 'These are the terms of the settlement and we shall sign it in court.' That is what is being done here. Acceptance has been given in advance before the meeting of Parliament and we are asked to approve the stand taken by the Government.

SHRI PANNALAL SARAOGI: In anticipation.

SHRI A. D. MANI: Madam, I would like to make it clear that I firmly believe that any border dispute cannot be settled by force, that there has to be mutual give and take. There has to be an understanding on either side of the issues involved. It has got to be settled by negotiations. I do not think in terms of a perpetual war with China. But since the ceasefire was offered with contempt to us, now by sitting at the negotiating table and by agreeing even to discuss the matter on principle, I do not think we will be gaining anything for our country. What is going to happen when we are entering the conference-room is that they are going to confuse world opinion still more and make it feel that it is India which has taken an unreasonable stand in the dispute. The result of our publicity abroad and the result of the work of our Embassies abroad has been that when China invaded our border, a good part of the neutral

world was wondering who was the aggressor. The Chinese propoganda has been so effective that they confuse world opinion.

SHRI ARJUN ARORA: It is a great pity that the "Hitavada" is not read outside India.

SHRI A. D. MANI: It is to the disadvantage of the world that the "Hitavada" is not read outside India. This Mr. Arora himself would realise.

SHRI ARJUN ARORA: I read your daily occasionally, not regularly.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: The "Link" is read outside India, to which paper Mr. Arora is fond of addressing letters.

SHRI ARJUN ARORA: Not to the "Organiser", your organ.

SHRI A. B. VAJPAYEE: Your letter will not be published in the "Organiser".

*(Interruptions)*

THE DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI A. D. MANI: The danger of negotiations with the Chinese at this stage is that without the issue of aggression being squarely determined—and there are a number of people who believe outside this country that we have been the aggressors—we will be only confusing the situation. The Chinese are better propogandists and can tell lies far more fluently than any nation. We cannot tell lies and any negotiations will only crack the morale of our country. This country is peaceful at heart.

SHRI M N. GOVINDAN NAIR: What is it that you want?

SHRI A. D. MANI: I am coming to that. You must allow me time. You have done all the mischief. *(Interruptions)*. The country has been roused as it has never been roused in its history by the stirring call for arms which the Prime Minister issued when the Chinese army invaded our territory. People want to make their

greatest sacrifices. If at this stage we enter into negotiations with them, I believe we will be cracking the morale of this country and a large number of people will think that this is a compromise Government, that this Government cannot be expected to fight. It will be a very poor service to our jawans who lost their lives on the front, many of whom have been maimed and injured and are being treated in hospitals, that after having declared our intention to fight we now stage a comeback to the conference table. *(Interruptions)*. Now, the question has been asked. What are we going to do? It is a very relevant question, a very pertinent question. I accept here that we are a defeated nation.

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

AN HON. MEMBER: Please withdraw it.

SHRI A. D. MANI: I accept that in the war on our frontiers we have suffered the worst. But it is not a disgrace. If a man is beaten up by some 'goondas' in Janpath, it is not a disgrace. If some 'goondas' assault a man in Janpath, he is not disgraced. I want to use very parliamentary expressions. A similar treatment has been extended to us on the international scene. Our border is there. The Chinese are in occupation of our border. We want them to vacate and we want to occupy it. We stay where we are. We stay as a symbol of the free world, that we are going to stand up and fight this Chinese tyranny. It is an attempt of the Chinese at world domination. We are not living in a world of vacuum. The Western world is interested in carrying on this fight in every corner of the globe. If we stand up and declare our intention, we will mobilise world opinion against the Chinese. It is a matter of some time. It does not mean that Burma will come over to our side tomorrow, that Indonesia will rush to us with arms, but a large number of people will see before them an exhibition of Mahatma Gandhi's spirit, the spirit of non-violence, the spirit of"

[Shri A. D. Mani.] resistance to tyranny and injustice. I would like to stay where we are, build up our defences, tell our children and grand-children that this is a problem which we are going to face for generations to come, that we have got to liberate this soil which has been taken away by the invaders.

DR. SHRIMATI SEETA PARMANAND: That is what the Prime Minister has been telling.

SHRI A. D. MANI: The Prime Minister has been telling, but he has not been acting.\* It makes a lot of differences.

SHRI G. MURAHARI: The Prime Minister has been saying so many things that one does not know what he tells.

SHRI SONUSING DHANSING PATIL (Maharashtra): Through Veiled gestures.

SHRI A. D. MANI: These veiled gestures are started by you and we find that you are running away. Now all that I say is that we stand where we are. We mobilise public opinion against Chinese tyranny and the Chinese tyranny will be understood by every other country when it is invaded and when it is attacked. We will get Western help and many things may happen, thanks to the very restraining influence the Soviet Union has been exercising, there may be a split in the communist world. There may be a break-up of the communist State itself in China. There may be an invasion from Formosa. A nation does not think in terms of a few months when it is carrying on a war. It is a war for centuries perhaps. It is a war for decades. We wait in patience. We wait in hope. We are now at the cross-roads of the future. Whatever decision we are going to take now is going to determine the future of this country and its position in Asia for the next 25 years or for the next 50 years. I know that the Government has got its difficulties, that it is not possible for the Government to take what may be considered an aggressive action. I do not want to show any discourtesy to

the Colombo Powers which have offered these proposals. We accept the sincerity of their intentions. But we must realise that a nation comes to a stage when it has got to fight for its soul and today India has got to fight for its soul and the soul is this country has got a right to maintain its freedom and to maintain its democratic institutions which have been menaced by China. That is the fundamental issue involved. This is a matter where the decision which the Government is going to take is going to affect not only this generation, it is going to affect posterity. And I hope that we will take what would be a courageous decision so that the coming generations will bless this Government and will bless this Parliament for giving a correct lead to this country and for refusing to cow down before aggression or condonation of aggression which these Colombo proposals represent.

DR. NIHAR RANJAN RAY: Madam Deputy Chairman, I rise to speak in support of the observations made for consideration of the Colombo proposals this morning by the Law Minister. It is an earnest of our faith in democracy that a delicate subject of this kind was allowed by the Government to come up to Parliament and to be discussed in public. I have not known many instances in the history of democratic procedure where such delicate matters have ever been brought up before Parliament for public discussion. It is all the more reason, therefore, that we should discuss matters of this nature with a bit of restraint, poise and dignity.

I must confess, Madam, that I am in the midst of a crisis of conscience, a situation in which deep emotions are in open and sharp conflict with equally deep intellectual experience. Here we are a people whose national honour was violated, prestige very deeply hurt, whose territory was widely intruded into by a massive and treacherous military attack. Taken by surprise, we suffered serious reverses, and when out of agony and humiliation the nation rose up as on\*

man determined to drive out the aggressor and avenge the humiliation, a sudden dramatic unilateral ceasefire was announced by the invader. This invariably put into operation certain chain of actions and reactions. One of the end products of these chain reactions is what have come to us as the Colombo proposals, far our serious and earnest consideration.

The hurt in the national pride, in the national honour remains. The humiliation remains. The deep suspicion of the enemy persists, and hence also the uncertainties in respect of his further and future aims and objectives.

Yet, on the other hand, intellectually speaking, I cannot for a moment forget that we are a people and Government who have expressly dedicated ourselves to the cause of world peace and committed also to the principle of resolving all international disputes, even the most violent ones, by negotiation, direct and indirect. We are committed both in home affairs and in the affairs of the outside world, to a relatively more civilised pattern of behaviour than others, say, the Government of China, for instance. I cannot forget some of the realities, diplomatic and military, that are associated with the situation, realities that have been explained so ably by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Pathak. I cannot forget also the wise minds in the United Kingdom that rushed to our aid. They want us to give the proposals a chance. I cannot forget the friendly attitude of the Soviet Union and the friends of the Soviet Union in Europe. Fully alive to the context of the world today, conscious of what the world realities today are, we owe it to ourselves to look at the proposals from a slightly more objective point of view, not merely emotionally.

In the last session on the 10th of December, when this House was giving  
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its general approval to the policy pursued by the Prime Minister and his willingness to negotiate on the basis of the line of 8th September, 1962, certain important things were happening elsewhere in the world. Six non-aligned nations of Asia and Africa— we must not forget that they are members of a family having very deep cultural and political ties with us—led by that gracious figure, Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike, took upon themselves to do something to stabilise the cease-fire, and taking advantage of it to bring India and China to the negotiating table. They met, produced a set of proposals with which they travelled to Peking and Delhi, held discussions and produced further clarifications. We are thankful, we must be thankful to the Colombo Powers—there are no small or big powers in this world today—and especially to Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike. We must feel thankful to the Government of the United Arab Republic which stood by us and gave us vigorous support. Their proposals along with their clarifications are toe-fore us, and we owe it to ourselves as a responsible people, we owe it to the Colombo Powers and we owe it to the world in general that we earnestly consider the proposals and let them know our responses and reactions. That is what the Government is trying to do.

In the meanwhile this morning the Chinese Government has made known to us through the Ceylon Prime Minister their final reactions and responses to the Colombo proposals. They have made it clear that while they accept the proposals in principle, they do not do so in substance in toto. Indeed they reserve the right of their own interpretation on more than one important point. Yet they maintain that these reservations should not stand in the way of the officials of both sides meeting at the negotiating table.

All that the Colombo proposals want us to do is to go to the negotiating table, nothing more, nothing less. In the context of what I have just said,

[Dr. Nihar Ranjan Ray.] our attitude, reactions and responses should, therefore, be clear and unequivocal.

First, since as a nation we are definitely committed to resolving any dispute of an international character by negotiation, since we do not want areas and arenas of war to be widened, we do want definitely to resolve this menace of war by negotiation, in a constructive spirit. We believe that this is not only morally correct but more important in the world today, it is diplomatically correct. Mr. Pathak pointed out that we played our diplomatic card in a manner that has practically isolated China. This is important. I would, how-5 P.M. ever, go further. I do believe

that diplomatically speaking it is the most correct attitude to take. There is no question of national honour involved in the question of negotiations. We are not committing ourselves to anything except going to the negotiation table and finding out what the Government of China wants. Even if we want to gain time, even if we want to complete our preparations, we must negotiate.

Secondly, let me confess that we are not altogether satisfied with the Colombo proposals and their clarifications though we are prepared to accept that if the Government of China accepts them in substance, in toto, they would by and large be vacating the aggression indulged in by them and the 8th of September, 1962 line would be more or less honoured, except only in one sector, the Western Sector in Ladakh. Yet, when you go to negotiate, you cannot start negotiation by saying that this is the absolute position. Yet, howsoever the proposals leave us dissatisfied, we are prepared to accept the proposals in principle. That is what has been done and perhaps also very largely in substance, as serving the basis for starting negotiations between India and China. I do not want it to be said of us anywhere in the world that we did not want to see reason, nor do I want

it to be said that we did not want to negotiate. I for one do not want to place our friends, the six non-aligned Powers of Asia and Africa, in the Wrong.

Thirdly, our going to the negotiation table can be effected only when the Colombo proposals are accepted by China, not only in principle but also in substance. The ball must now roll on the grounds of China and the six non-aligned countries have to find out how the Chinese play the game and prove their goodwill, their mouthful professions of peace and friendship.

Fourthly, therefore, Parliament must give full authority to the Prime Minister, his Cabinet and his Government to act and take decisions as and when necessary, in pursuance of our declared policies and programmes and in the best interests of our country and, I must also say, of the world.

In the meanwhile, we remain deeply suspicious of the present Government and regime of China. When we go to the negotiation table, we must know that the Government of China is a very crafty government and one cannot depend on what they say. This has been amply proved in the course of the last four or five years. We remain suspicious not only of the present regime but also of their neo-imperialistic, expansionist and aggressive intentions and therefore we must remain determined to fight them when, ever necessary, fight them for what we consider to be our right, to restore our national integrity and honour. My esteemed friend, the leader of the Praja Socialist Party, said that the two could not go together. I do not believe it. Even if the Colombo proposals are accepted in substance by China, remember, there will be a big gap between the South-easternmost end of the Karakoram and Demchok, and we must remember that to protect the entire northern frontier, we have to build up our military potential in such a manner that we may have no further apprehensions from

the north. That by itself is going to be a very big task. Therefore, peace or no peace, negotiation or no negotiation, our defence preparations must go on at full tempo and strengthen as at present. There must not be any slackening on this account and our national resistance must be built up and steeled more and more. Everything must be carried out on the basis of national emergency. The realities of the situation today in India and the world dictate that these are items of life, items that are very important as much in war as in peace. Thank you.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Madam Deputy Chairman, after listening to some of the speeches here today, I feel that it is my first duty to express my gratitude to the Colombo Powers who have undertaken the thankless job of trying to bring the two countries to the negotiating table. It is also gratifying to note that in principle both the Governments have accepted the Colombo proposals. I wish the Colombo Powers complete success in their endeavour.

It was very interesting to note that much heat was generated here on the question of the 8th of September line. Well, immediately after the recent aggression by China, our President made a statement wherein he said that negotiations could take place only if China withdrew beyond the 8th of September line. You should remember that the recent aggression took place at a time when some correspondence was going on regarding negotiations. Again, this position of the Indian Government was repeatedly stated both inside the House and outside but that heat that was generated here today was not observed at that time. Even in Parliament in the statement made by the Prime Minister, special mention was made about 8th September line. At that time, whether you accepted it formally or not, no one in this House challenged this position of the Government . . .

SHRI ROHIT M. DAVE: We have a Resolution,

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Then, why all this controversy now? The point is very clear. Unless you reject the 8th of September position, you cannot reject the Colombo proposals. That is why some of our friends who want to reject the Colombo proposals, instead of going into the merits or demerits of the Colombo proposals, have started attacking the 8th of September position. Now I feel the country stands committed to this September 8 position.

HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Some of you may not, whereas the Prime Minister of this country, in his dealings with another nation, has announced to the entire world that if the Chinese vacated their recent aggression, India would go to the negotiating table, and when it is not properly challenged by others, then it means that the nation stands committed to that position. So when we are considering the Colombo proposals, the yard-stick with which we have to measure them is whether the Colombo proposals are at least in agreement with the September 8 position which our Government have taken. I was looking at the proposals from that angle. I do not agree with some of the observations made here, that even in Ladakh we are in a disadvantageous position. The maps have been distributed. The Law Minister has explained which posts belong to us and which posts belong to the Chinese. I would request my friends to count the number of posts that the Chinese held before September 8 in the Ladakh region, and I would also request you to find out the number of posts that we had. Now what is the proposal of the Colombo powers? They say, in this area we can have joint control, that means, an equal number of civilian posts for both India and China with an equal number of men to man them. Now what was the position before September 8? Of course we had 43 posts. I remember the occasion when the Prime Minister himself called the Opposition Leaders to explain

[Shri M. N. Govindan Nair.] position in Ladakh—a few months ago. We had the posts and we < had airlifted some men there, but compared to our military strength in that region, it was explained at that time that China was having a much stronger position in that area. I think my friend sitting here, he was also in that conference. We had 43 posts with 30 or 40 people in each check post. At that time itself the Prime Minister explained the military advantage of the Chinese. And today the proposal of the Colombo powers puts both of us militarily in the same position. Is it advantageous to us or not? It is very easy to condemn the proposals, it is easy to look down upon our friends who are trying to help us. But facts are facts and they cannot be denied. I challenge anybody to deny these facts. By the Colombo proposals our position in Ladakh has improved. That is the main point. I need not explain that the proposal of the Chinese and the proposal made by the Colombo powers are different.

As far as the other regions are concerned, what is the Position? Now, as far as NEFA region is concerned, except for the Thagla Ridge, our military can occupy the whole area which we previously held, and as far as this part is concerned, the Chinese cannot occupy it, and who should occupy is to be decided by mutual discussion. So if we stick to the position of September 8, I find no reason why we should reject the Colombo proposals. They offer us a reasonable' ground to start negotiations. Now the starting of the negotiations depends of course on the acceptance of the proposals by the Chinese too, but I would suggest that if they refuse, if they reject them, and as a result no talk takes place, then we will be in a more advantageous position than the Chinese Why? The world opinion will swing more in our favour than in favour of the Chinese. So whether the Chinese accept them or not, I feel that we should accept the Colombo proposals. We should show that we 'are prepared to

go to the negotiating table provided the Chinese accept the conditions. Now I ask of those friends who want us to reject the Colombo proposals as to what is the alternative they propose.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL:  
Blood, toil and tears.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: Very brave words are spoken, but, when, as representatives of the people of the country, we express our views, we must take a realistic and sober stand and express our opinion. Now India is placed in a peculiar situation. How are we to get out of it? What is your suggestion? Well, one of the great veteran politicians of this country, I mean the Founder Leader of the Swatantra Party, Shri C. R. Raja-gopalachari, had the kindness to extend his opinion to Members of Parliament through a letter. I believe most of you might have received it.

AN. HON. MEMBER: I have not received it.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: I do not know; perhaps he might have taken for granted that you politically agree with his views and therefore there is no need of giving you any further information. Anyway we have received it. After he had written his article on this matter in the "Swarajya" when the Colombo proposals had not been published, he further explains his attitude in this letter. Now I would have expected the Leader of the Swatantra Party in this House to come out and openly place before this House that this is what they stand for. Here are his words. This letter was written after the Colombo proposals had been published and here are his words.

"If we seek and are able to secure wholehearted allied support from the West—not merely weapons on a commercial or gift basis—but full co-operation as from allies bound by treaty, not only the fighting but any negotiation thereafter can be conducted with confidence on our side,"



So he wants us to enter into a military alliance with the Western Bloc. Well, if that would save the integrity and freedom and independence of our country, we could consider it. When the Chinese aggression took place and when armaments were flown into our country from America, all of us expressed our gratitude and we welcome-ed their gesture. We were told that this military aid was without any political strings, but before their Military Mission left our soil we were made to understand that if we were to get long-term military aid, then we must come to an agreement with Pakistan. I am not opposed to coming to an agreement with Pakistan. But what was the condition imposed? What was the proposal made by both the United States and Britain? Britain broadcast openly asking us to hand over the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan and come to a settlement. The friends in the United States say, "Have joint control of the Kashmir Valley. And if that is not possible, leave it to the United Nations." So, we found strings, very strong strings. Are we to sell Kashmir for getting American arms? Wonderful. Are we to sell Kashmir to establish check-posts in Ladakh? Strangely wonderful.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: Now the Chinese are purchasing Pakistan.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: If the Chinese are purchasing Pakistan, it is the lookout of the Pakistani people whether they should surrender their integrity and independence. Here the question is this. Recently, as the London Economist observed, "He who pays the piper will have to right to decide the tune". This was said by no other a person than Mr. Kennedy when he referred to his relationship to the junior partner, the British. If this is the attitude of America to Britain, well . . .

SHRI DAHYABHAI V, PATEL: Why pot China?

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: . . . where are you, Mr. Dahyabhai Patel? You say that our borders will be protected by the American military without surrendering our freedom and integrity. Have you forgotten the lessons of history which say that if we have to defend our territory, if we have to defend our freedom, we have to defend it with our own strength.

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL: I am not forgetting the struggle for independence, Where were the Communists when the Congress and we were all fighting the British?

DR. A. SUBBA RAO (Kerela): Many of your friends were not in the struggle for freedom. Do not talk like that.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: The question is not that. I am not very much worried by his question because he has only one obsession. He is not even bothered about the Chinese aggression on our borders. He is only bothered about international Communism. My point is that for more than a century, of course, our borders were defended by the British. The Indian people did not want it and said, "You please go. We will look after our affairs". And now he wants the Americans and the British to come back and again defend our borders. That would not happen since nationalism in India is strong enough to look after itself and whatever you or your old leader says, the country is not going to accept it.

Madam, he was speaking about the initiative of the U.S.A. to defend our border. To defend our borders we have to look to the initiative of other nations. So, Madam, this kind of alliance to defend our territory will not help us and the only way to defend ourselves is by strengthening our defence potential.

Now, there is another view. Some do not say that we should go with the Americans or that we should barter away Kashmir or anything like that. They say, let there be no peace, let

[Shri M. N. Govindan Nair.] there be no war. All right. Will it help us? Today, during the question hour. Shri Manubhai Shah answered that our textile mills in Gujarat and Bombay, some of them are getting closed because trade is not moving to the Eastern States. It has come to my notice through press reports that after this Chinese aggression foreign investments in our industries are not forthcoming as they used to do. What will happen if the cold war with China is to continue? We are not a highly industrialised nation where we could build up our defence industries, keep up the boom and strengthen our economy. It is not like that. Here our economy will be adversely affected and that will further weaken our nation. This point has to be borne in mind by those people who advocate that a "No-war-no-peace" policy should be followed.

Madam Deputy Chairman, all of us share the feelings of national humiliation we had to suffer because of the reverses met by us on our borders. And in order to recover from that we have to follow a policy by which our nation gets strengthened. That can be done only by developing our own defence industries on our own industrial base. Now, there is talk of scuttling the Five Year Plan in the name of defence. That would be a wrong policy. Of course, we may have to reorientate our Five Year Plans, but on the whole we have to strengthen our Five Year Plans so that we may be able to strengthen ourselves at a quicker rate.

Then, Madam, when we consider the question of strengthening the country we generally take into consideration only the military aspect of the matter. That would not be enough. The social and economic disparity that exist in the country today have to be eradicated, and by that we have to increase the strength of our nation.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Please tell us something about the Colombo Proposals.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: You were not here, I am sorry. Clearly and categorically I had said what I had to say about the Colombo Proposals.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY That is enough.

SHRI M. N. GOVINDAN NAIR: So my point is that in order to strengthen our nation, in order that at least in future we may not be threatened by any foreign country, we should strengthen our defence potential. We should strengthen the country economically and socially. And this can be done not by rejecting the policies that have been followed by the Government till now. Here reference has been made that this non-alignment has been the biggest handicap. During the last Session of Parliament so many people were making comments on it. Now I want even those people who were opposed to non-alignment at that time, from the experience they have had during this period, to reconsider whether their attack on non-alignment was right or wrong. Today what is the position? Six of the non-aligned countries have taken the lead in trying to find a peaceful solution to this problem. The opinion among the non-aligned countries has been swayed in our favour. Among the socialist countries you know the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, one after the other, have strongly condemned the attitude of the Chinese especially with regard to this border conflict. Not only that but a number of Communist countries had come out openly condemning the attitude of the Chinese. So we have an opinion, world opinion, very much in favour of India because India did not rush into the lap of the American imperialism, because India maintained the policy of non-alignment. As somebody said the other day, non-alignment involves also alignment of the rational elements in both the Blocs. We got the benefit of both the Blocs, rational elements from both the Blocs, and that is why we are today in a much better position than when this aggression

started. Further if it is our intention to build up our own defence industries, we have to continue this policy of non-alignment. So basing ourselves on our policy of non-alignment, giving priority to defence industries, strengthening the Five Year Plans and also trying to end the disparity, both social and economic, we should try to build up our strength and thus face the problems that are confronting us. Thank you.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: How long are we sitting?

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: We are sitting till 6.

SHRI\* N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Madam, I am rather taken 'by surprise. Anyway, having been called upon to say what I have to say, my first prompting about the Chinese proposal was that in the ultimate analysis it was not to be rejected.

DR. A. SUBBA RAO: Chinese or Colombo?

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: I am sorry, Colombo proposal. For this the background was the background of the trouble with China and the subsequent . . .

DR. A. SUBBA RAO: The Chinese proposal was not rejected.

SHRI N. SRI RAMA REDDY: Sorry if that is so. The background of the trouble with China as well as the subsequent aggression committed by China was very historically traced by our learned Law Minister here this morning. I do not want to go into it but the Colombo proposals, let us say, make a complete departure from the Chinese proposals of cease-fire which we had on November 21st or so. Now we have taken a definite stand that we are prepared to consider talks initially with the Chinese provided the latest aggression committed by China is vacated. Let us see what the Colombo proposals have asked us to do and have asked China to do. Let us compare it that way. Of course the facts are the same but let us know what the

Colombo proposals have asked China to do and what they have asked us to do.

[THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI M. P. BHARGAVA) in the Chair.]

First of all they have asked China in the Western Sector to withdraw 20 kilometres from the actual line of control and similarly they have asked us in the Ladakh sector to maintain our present position. Secondly in the Ladakh sector in regard to the demilitarised zone, they have asked both the countries to administer the area by setting up check-posts. The composition and the positions etc. of these check-posts are matters for future negotiations. So far as that part of it is concerned, I think we are at par with the Chinese. On the other hand, in the Middle Sector, they have asked China to maintain the present position and they have asked us also to maintain the present position. There also we are in parity with China. In the Eastern Sector we are at a definite advantage. What have the Colombo Powers asked us to do? According to the cease-fire proposal, China asked us to withdraw from the present line 20 kilometres. Now according to the latest proposals we are allowed to occupy militarily and otherwise, completely up to the\* MacMahon Line. The only places that have been kept away from our occupation are Longju which in any case was not on 8th September in our possession and the Thagla ridge. Thagla ridge is a very important place and it ought to have been with us but they have asked us to negotiate with regard to Thagla ridge because according to China Thagla ridge is on the northern side of the MacMahon Line, not on the Southern side. Therefore with regard to more than 99 per cent, of the dispute, so far as NEFA is concerned, the proposal has gone in our favour. Of course there is the matter of Thagla ridge. It is a small matter but I do not mean to say that we surrender our right as most of the Opposition Members have made it out. Certainly Thagla ridge is a matter to

[Shri N. Sri Rama Reddy.] be discussed. It is left over for future negotiations. How else are we to settle it? If Thagla ridge or any territory that we have asked for and which is under dispute is asked to be vacated, then where is the question of talks at all or discussion at all? Where is the question of negotiations? You settle everything. That means the problem is settled unilaterally. You want a unilateral settlement. It does not stand anywhere. A unilateral decision will not bind anybody. So that matter is kept open. That is what the Colombo proposals have asked us to do in respect of these three sectors.

What is it that they have asked China to do? So far as India is concerned they have asked us to stay where we are in the Ladakh sector and not to proceed further militarily. Similarly they have said that in the middle sector the same position should be there and it should be maintained. This broadly is the position. With regard to the check-posts, that is a matter to be settled later on. So far as the Chinese are concerned, the maps given to us bear out the fact that they have been asked to go even a little beyond the international line. So far as the Pangong Lake and the Demchok areas are concerned the Colombo proposals want them to go beyond them. Now it is not for us to question any of these things. So far these substantially concede our demands for holding talks. I do not see why we should refuse to talk to them at all. After all, straightway we are not going to the negotiating table. We have set down a procedure for the talks. We have said that these things should be decided first and then we shall start discussions with regard to laying down the principles, principles by which we will be prepared to go. After settling all these things, ultimately, we are prepared to go to the table to discuss with China, aggressor though China happens to be, to settle matters broadly.

What is going to happen to us if we reject the proposals, as has been suggested here? Of course, we would

be making a fundamental mistake. I have listened carefully to the hon. Members who have spoken and I can say that there is absolutely no question of our surrendering our sovereignty over any territory which we can have on our own, because they are matters to be settled later on. What is the political aspect of the entire problem? Suppose we say we do not want to talk and we reject these proposals, then we will be straightway committing a big political blunder, the implications of which I would request every hon. Member present here to ponder over and consider. Diplomatically also, to reject the proposals would be a great disadvantage to our country. Primarily all the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries are in our favour, though they may not have said so in so many words. Barring North Vietnam, and North Korea, there is no country which is opposed to us in the diplomatic world. All the countries are sympathising with us. Even in the case of countries like Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia, which it may be said are not whole-hog with us, who may not be able to see eye to eye with us, their sympathies must necessarily be with us because otherwise these unanimous proposals of these Powers from Colombo, these Colombo proposals as they are called, would not have come about. So diplomatically also it is a very good gain to accept these proposals. We will be creating a very good world opinion and climate in our favour in the entire world. After all, as our Prime Minister has said so often as we all know, to refuse to talk is a brutal method. So we shall not refuse to talk.

(Time bell rings.)

Finally, I would say that militarily also it is of advantage to us. I will not venture to say all that is implied in the military way. But if I say that this is going to enable us to equip ourselves, arm ourselves properly and to improve our military and defence positions and make them invulnerable, I will not be revealing anything, for that is known to everyone. There-

fore, politically, diplomatically and militarily, this is a position which is very very advantageous to us. Therefore, I strongly recommend its acceptance. After all, what are we going to accept? We are not going to tell China that we accept it this way. We are not now on talking terms. We are now only talking to the Colombo Powers and we are going to tell them that these proposals provide a basis for further talks with China. In other words, we are in principle accepting these suggestions. By this we are not by any means surrendering any of our sovereignty over an inch of our soil that is our own. Therefore, I very strongly commend that these proposals may be given our blessings. Thank you very much.

SHRI K. V. RAGHUNATHA REDDY (Andhra Pradesh): Mr. Vice-Chair-man, before I deal with the merits of the Colombo Proposals, with your permission I would like to quote a passage from Sir Winston Churchill while writing on the role of diplomacy in war, he has written this in the chapter on "The Gathering Storm":

"Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting goodwill! Religion and virtue alike lend their sanctions to meekness and humility, not only between men but between nations. How many wars have been precipitated by fire-brands! How many misunderstandings which led to wars could have been removed by

temporising! How often have countries fought cruel wars and then after a few years of peace found themselves not only friends but allies!"

This, Sir, is one of the historic statements made by Sir Winston Churchill who cannot by any means be called or be accused of being a defeatist, because the world knows that Sir Winston Churchill revelled in a crisis and he had been a great war leader. It is said that he treated war more like a feast than being frightened about it. Nevertheless, he had emphasised the role of diplomatic negotiations in the context of war. Though I do not share his optimism that after negotiations we may become friends even if the negotiations become successful, at least for another 25 years to come, the point to be considered is that even a person who had been accused of being a war-monger has not hesitated to consider the role of diplomacy in times of war for the purpose of settling problems.

Keeping this principle in mind, Sir, if we take into consideration the proposals placed before us by the Colombo Powers and if we consider also the favourable international climate and public opinion created in favour of India, we will see that they have cleanly vindicated the moral position that the Government has taken, both in terms of peace and in terms of war. We have won not only in terms of war but we have also won in terms of peace. While acting with the policy of non-alignment we have made such an impression on world public opinion that we really mean peace and also that we do not hesitate to fight against injustice. This is the position which has been indicated by our policy and this position has been completely recognised and appreciated by the Colombo Powers. Though the proposals of the Colombo Powers may not be able to completely have the aggression vacated, still, they have recognised it. If we take all the circumstances into consideration, an irresistible inference can be drawn from the proposals that