

SHRI B. R. BHAGAT: Also on behalf of Shri Raj Bahadur, I beg to lay on the Table, under sub-section (3) of section 458 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, a copy each of the following Notifications of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Department of Transport):—

- (i) Notification G.S.R. No. 1549, dated the 17th December, 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Indian Ships) Rules, 1960.
- (ii) Notification G.S.R. No. 1550, dated the 17th December, 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Tonnage Measurement of Ships) Rules, 1960.
- (iii) Notification G.S.R. No. 1551, dated the 16th December, 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Apprenticeship to Sea Service) Rules, 1960.
- (iv) Notification G.S.R. No. 1552, dated the 16th December, 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Distressed Seamen) Rules, 1960.
- (v) Notification G.S.R. No. 1553, dated the 16th December, 1960, publishing the Sailing Vessels (Assignment of Free Board) Rule*, 1960.
- (vi) Notification G.S.R. No. 1554 dated the 16th December 1960, publishing the sailing Vessels (Statement of Crew) Rules, 1960.
- (vii) Notification G.S.R. No. 1555 dated the 16th December 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Tonnage Measurement of Sailing Vessels) Rules, 1960.

- (ix) Notification G.S.R. No. 1557, dated the 16th December, 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Continuous Discharge Certificates) Rules, 1960.
- (x) Notification G.S.R. No. 1568, dated the 30th December, 1960, publishing the Merchant Shipping (Crew Accommodation) Rules, 1960.

(i) to (x).]

THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOUR
(SHRI ABID ALI): Sir, on behalf of Shri L. N. Mishra, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of a note entitled "Incidence of indirect taxes on the Consumer Price Index (A limited analysis)". [Placed in Library. See No. LT-2773/61.]

SECRETARY: Sir, I lay on the Table a copy of the Insurance (Amendment) Bill, 1961, as passed by the Lok Sabha.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, the recent meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London was rather an unusual one; at any rate, it was not the normal meeting which is held to consider

various problems in which the Commonwealth is interested. It was specially convened to consider specific problems like disarmament and, to some extent, the future of the United Nations. As it happened, when it met, there were one or two very important and urgent matters like the situation in Africa and more particularly in the Congo which were considered at some length. Although these problems were considered rather fully, throughout this meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the thing which seemed to overshadow the proceedings of the meeting was the question of South Africa and the racial policy followed by that country. We have discussed this matter before on many occasions, and reference has been made to it almost annually in our debates on foreign affairs and annually this matter has been raised in the United Nations also on behalf of India and other countries, and resolutions have been passed there by overwhelming majorities. We have been interested in this naturally for a long time past. In fact, it is well to remember that it was in South Africa fifty years ago, almost fifty years ago from now, that is, in 1911, that our leader, Mahatma Gandhi, started his first campaign against racial inequality and racial domination and suppression. We have been deeply interested in it, and ever since we became independent, our interest has grown, so also that of other countries. Originally we were largely interested because of the fact that the number of Indian descendants is considerable. I say, people of Indian descent because they are not our nationals; they are South African nationals but people who are descendant from former Indians who went there. Normally, as they are not our nationals, we would take no interest in them but this is a very much more intricate problem and there is history behind it in our relations with the South African Union in regard to these people. Apart from that, the question of racial inequality is not a question of merely the Inter-

nal affairs of a nation. It raises wider, international issues.

Now, Sir, this matter came up in a particular way. The South African Government have recently had a referendum on the issue of a Republic and by a small majority it has been decided to have a Republican form of Government there. So, the Prime Minister of South Africa made a statement before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference informing them of the result of the referendum and requesting that the South African Union might continue in the Commonwealth in spite of becoming a Republic. We could take no exception to any country becoming a Republic; we ourselves are a Republic and we approve of the Republican form of Government everywhere, but because this application was made, the allied question or the other question of racial relations in South Africa arose and it was discussed. Even the Prime Minister of South Africa agreed to its being taken up. So, while we did not oppose at all of a Republic being taken into the Commonwealth, we did lay stress many of us on the incompatibility of any country being in the Commonwealth which followed racial policies of the South African Union Government. I would like to add here that the main thing was that in South Africa this is the official policy: it is not the failure of an official policy. In many countries, it would be easy to point out undesirable happenings which are opposed to the policy of Government. Government tries to put an end to them. It is not an easy thing to change social practices, and even in India there are many things that I am sure this House strongly disapproves and which still happen in social sphere but our policy is against them. We try to suppress them, to liquidate them and to end them. We have largely succeeded, but in South Africa there is this policy of what has been called apartheid, of suppression, separation and segregation. This is the official declared policy of govern-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] ment. This matter was discussed and this incompatibility became quite obvious to all. It became a question, practically speaking, of whether the South African Union Government should continue in the Commonwealth or whether a number of other countries should continue in the Commonwealth. As a result of this, the South African Prime Minister decided to withdraw his application for continuing membership of the Commonwealth and this was agreed to. As soon as the South African Union becomes a Republic, that is, on the 31st May, South Africa will cease to be a member of the Commonwealth. This was an unusual and far-reaching decision for the Commonwealth organisation to take up. It is an important one and I think that it has strengthened the Commonwealth as this very tenuous and vague association has thus developed certain basic formulae on which it stands and one of them is equal treatment of races, equal opportunities, no racial suppression and certainly no segregation. I might add that Mr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of the South African Government, in presenting his case stoutly denied that there was any racial suppression but he based his case on what he called separate development of different races. I am merely informing the House about it; a great deal can be said about it but he said that, no doubt trying to win over those who are opposed to this policy. He laid stress on this that the South African Government's policy was separate development and not of suppression, allowing them to develop equally. Of course, that does not happen there but there it is. He might almost have gone a step further, I thought then, and said that this policy was one of peaceful coexistence, but perhaps that did not strike Mr. Verwoerd at that time.

I think this is a very significant happening, this decision of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting which will no doubt have far-reaching effect not only on the Commonwealth

but on racial questions all over the world. At the same time, I should like to remind the House that this mere fact shows that the South African Government's policy is going to continue. That Government is going to continue this policy as it has been doing in the past, this policy of apartheid, although they may not call it apartheid in the future, and they have officially said that it shall not be called apartheid; nevertheless, it is one of segregation and suppression. This policy obviously is going to continue. In fact, it is because of that that this break or split came in the Commonwealth Conference. If they had said that they would vary this policy even to a small extent, it would have had some effect on some members of the Conference but they were completely rigid. They would not vary it or change it at all and they would hold on to it in its entirety. Therefore, it should be realised that the major problem continues and the fact that the Commonwealth has given its opinion rather forcibly against it is helpful no doubt, but it has not solved the question. It continues in a variety of ways. It will, no doubt, come up before the United Nations as it has done annually, and the question may well arise as to what the United Nations should do about it, about a country which violates the very constitution and Charter of the United Nations in regard to this vital matter. Also, there is one aspect of this question relating to South West Africa. Now, South West Africa was a mandated territory. A mandate was given by the old League of Nations to the United Kingdom Government, to His Britannic Majesty who handed it over to the South African Union Government. Now, South Africa has treated this practically as part of its own territory, and not as a mandated territory, which is very improper. And even in this referendum the votes of the Europeans only in South West Africa were taken for the Republic but it is very improper. This matter has gone up in various forms to the

World Court and we may have to deal with it in its various aspects because obviously we cannot accept the fact of South Africa merely absorbing a very large area by reason of the mandate given to it. This was one of the dominating features of the conference.

The other points that arose in the conference were disarmament and the Congo situation and also to some extent Laos and the future of the United Nations. So far as disarmament is concerned—that was the main purpose of the conference—in the Resolution and to the final communique that was issued is attached an annexure about disarmament which hon. Members may have seen. This covers very largely the ground covered by some of the Resolutions put forward in the United Nations, and more especially the Resolution put forward by India and ten other countries. That is called the 11-Power Resolution. It is not exactly the same because the Resolution is a more detailed one but the main principles laid down in this are the same. In dealing with the problem of disarmament we have not considered it desirable to take up too rigid a line about the various steps to be taken. We are rigid, I hope, in regard to the main problems of disarmament, that there must be disarmament and further that there must be comprehensive and total disarmament, not merely some kind of partial disarmament because the time for partial disarmament is now gone. It has no meaning. Of course, even total disarmament has to be brought about in phases; that is inevitable. You can't do it overnight. But one must think in terms of total disarmament because the halfway house to disarmament at the present juncture and in the present state of armaments would have really no particular meaning. It would have no meaning if countries possessing, let us say, nuclear bombs said that 'instead of 1,000 bombs we shall have 500 each in future'. That is 50 per cent disarmament, a big advance but really all the tensions and fears will continue with

the 500 bombs. They have to go, and that applies even to what is called the conventional arms. And may I mention that gradually the conception of conventional arms is changing? That is to say, some of the things called conventional arms now are really some tactical nuclear weapons. Almost we might say we are coming to a stage when the kind of bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima might be almost considered conventional arms; not quite yet but there are certain tactical nuclear weapons that are coming within the scope of conventional arms because the real nuclear weapons have grown so tremendous in their power to destroy, the hydrogen bombs and others. So, Sir, I would commend the attention of the House to this disarmament part of this communique which I think lays down right principles in so far as it goes. It does not go into every detail because essentially the problem of disarmament, although it concerns each one of our countries whether we have big armies or not, is a problem in the first place of the two super-Powers, that is, the United States of America and the Soviet Union and we have always advocated that they should discuss it themselves and try to come to some basic agreements and then the other countries should be brought into the picture to work out the details. I do not mean to say that the future of the world should be handed over to these two great countries much as we respect them. Nevertheless, it would not be safe for any 2, 3, 4 or 5 countries to be put in charge of the future of the world in regard to disarmament or any other matter. Still facts have to be recognised and today as armaments are in a sense concentrated—nuclear arms especially—in these two countries especially, it is their consent that is essential for any progress to be made and, therefore, the first step appears to be a general agreement about the basic principle, about the basic objective of total disarmament—that indeed has been accepted by the General Assembly of the U. N.—and other steps to be taken and then, later to

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] work out in committees because this cannot be worked out in a large assembly like the General Assembly of the U.N.

There is one thing also in regard to nuclear tests. There has been a committee of scientists and others working in Geneva, I think, for 3½ years or so and we understand that there is some possibility, some probability even, of their coming to an agreement in the course perhaps of the next few weeks. That would be very good indeed. If they succeeded in this, it would be good and it would clear the way for an agreement on the subject of disarmament.

Then the question of the Congo was considered at considerable length because it was an immediate and dangerous issue. In this matter the Security Council of the U. N. passed a Resolution a little more than a month ago—I think on the 21st February—and while broadly we accepted that Resolution—we, meaning the conference; there we all accepted it—we called for its full implementation. There certainly were differences of approach to this problem. Our own approach in India has been that it was right for the United Nations to go to the Congo—when it went there—to help and it is essential that it should continue because, if the United Nations comes out of the Congo, it will do enormous harm to the future of the United Nations and the Congo will go to pieces in a series of not only internal racial wars, tribal wars and factional troubles but because in all probability there will be intervention by some of the major powers of the world and then it will become something even bigger. Having admitted that we felt also that the United Nations has been functioning in the past few months there often in a very weak and ineffective way. In fact it is because of this weakness that many of the problems there have become more difficult of solution. It is true that the United Nations functions naturally only to the extent it

can function in the existing conditions in the world; it can't go beyond the world as it is today and the difficulties of the United Nations are often the reflection of the difficulties caused by the major conflicts and the cold war etc. in the world. Nevertheless, we do feel that it is the ineffectiveness of the functioning of the United Nations there that has led to the serious situation which we have to face in the Congo today. Because of it we felt that the time had come for a strong lead to be given and the Security Council did give a certain lead. The problem then became one of implementing that lead in that Resolution. It was about that time—or a little before that perhaps—that we were asked by the Secretary-General of the U. N. to send some armed forces from India. This was a novel proposition for us. Although we have sent previously some armed forces to Indo-China and to Korea, the House will remember that it was under a different set of circumstances so that this request to send forces to the Congo was entirely a novel approach to us, a novel question for us to consider. We had even then a thousand men in the Congo but they were dealing with medical—we have opened large hospitals—supplies, signals and the like but not combat troops. It was not an easy decision for us to take. But at the same time, we felt strongly that in the circumstances as they were, it was essential for the United Nations to be strengthened. If the United Nations failed in the Congo, it failed elsewhere also. In fact, it would gradually fade away almost in importance. The United Nations, therefore, should not be allowed to fail in this matter. At the same time, we made it perfectly clear that we could not send our forces there merely to sit there and do nothing or to be insulted and vilified, as has been the case before. Then came the Security Council Resolution **more** or less on the lines we had ourselves advocated and we felt, to some extent, in honour bound to support **that**. Even so, we made it clear to the **Sec-**

retary-General that we could only send our forces if we were assured that that policy laid down by the Security Council Resolution would be implemented thoroughly. We do not want our people to be wasted by sitting there and doing nothing or to go into a wrong kind of conflicts. We made it clear that our forces should not be used against the people or force of any member-nation of the United Nations, except, of course, the Congo, where they had gone, except against the factions in the Congo, if it was necessary, as well as against the mercenaries from abroad who are serving these factions in the Congo, because the major problem in the Congo, has been and continues to be these mercenaries, chiefly Belgian mercenaries and some others. Right from the beginning of the Congo trouble, the U.N. has laid stress, the Security Council has, on the withdrawal of the Belgians. They did withdraw to a slight extent in August last or thereabout, but then they came back in much larger numbers thereafter and the place is swarming with Belgians today—soldiers, officers, trained men, technical personnel, advisers, political people and all kinds of people there—against the decision of the U.N. And they are supporting some factions in the Congo, which are working definitely against the United Nations. The crux of the problem in the Congo today is the presence of Belgians there and I do not think the problem will be solved until the Belgians are withdrawn. I am not referring to every Belgian. They may be doing technical work there. They may continue to do that, but I am talking about the military and paramilitary forces, and political and like advisers to those Governments of Katanga and Leopoldville. In fact, I think we would be justified in thinking that the Katanga Government is—just formally it may be a separate Government—otherwise practically carried on by Belgians—Belgians from top to bottom almost. Therefore, this is the crux of the problem and I repeat it because, if the Belgians go from there, as they must, there will

not be any real question of fighting there. It is through Belgium's support, and their officers, men and armies especially, that all this trouble has arisen there. Anyhow, if there is some trouble afterwards, it can be easily dealt with. Now, an unfortunate feature of the situation has been, in the past few months, that the presence of Belgians has, in effect, been directly and indirectly supported by some of their allies in Europe and America, because they are in the NATO alliance, and because I cannot imagine that, if these great powers had made it perfectly clear that Belgians must withdraw, they would have continued there. Yet, they have continued and when the U.N. has tried to take some action, it is the U.N. that has been criticised or the U.N. representative there who has been criticised. So, it is an extraordinary state of affairs. They go on passing resolutions in the Security Council and some of these powers then come in the way of the implementation of the very resolutions they have approved of, and the result is confusion or weakness. And until this is removed, nothing much can happen there. We agreed ultimately, as I said, to send our forces there. A part of them have reached there by air and a part of them are going by sea. Meanwhile some other developments have taken place. That is, the port of Matadi, which is the port for Leopoldville, has been forcibly occupied by Mobutu's forces and the Sudanese, who were holding it on behalf of the United Nations, were driven out. Now, this creates a new complication because unless the port of Matadi is occupied by U.N. forces, it will not be easy for them to get supplies or even for the people who go there by sea to land there. The United Nations must, therefore, necessarily occupy the port of Matadi and, if necessary, to use force in such occupation. I have no doubt about that and certainly we cannot go on sending troops there, if they are not assured of a safe landing. These problems arise.

Again, the other problem arises, which has been there always, as to the

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] attitude of the great powers—as I said, I am not referring to the small powers—who pass resolutions in the Security Council and then yet permit the Belgians to remain there or do not encourage the U.N. taking steps to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgians. These are issues which will have to be solved soon, in the next few weeks or even days.

Then, Sir, the question of Laos has become a very urgent and important one and almost one might think that the issue of war and peace in a big way depends on what happens in the next few days there. Laos, again, is a peculiar example of wrong policies being pursued deliberately till they take one to the very edge of disaster and then an attempt being made to retrieve the position. Laos and all the Indo-China countries are patently examples of countries which can only subsist, can only continue, if they remain uncommitted to the major blocs and if they follow what is called a neutral policy. That was the decision of the Geneva Conference five or six years ago. It is only when an attempt is made to change that position and to draw Laos into one group or other that conflict occurs. That attempt was made, and as a result of the so-called neutralist Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was in Delhi a few days ago and passed through Delhi, was pushed out. His Government was broken and others came in. Always when a military solution is sought in favour of one group and it is aided by a foreign power on one side, another power aids the other group and the conflict increases. This is what has been happening and the military situation has been a changing one. Now, on behalf of the British Government, which are one of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference—the other being the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union—an offer has been made, which is a constructive offer, I think, and which is very near the proposals made some little time ago by the Soviet Union, not quite the same, but very near it. Therefore, I might hope that some

agreement will be arrived at. I hope so, because anyhow a solution by military means will be no solution and if these conflicts continue, the result will be disastrous for Laos and the conflicts may become very much bigger. The prestige of great powers becomes involved, each side wanting its own protegee to succeed. That is the position, Sir, and I earnestly hope that some way out to a solution will be found. But it can only be found if it is fully recognised that these attempts to rope in these small countries into one sphere of influence or other will lead to war, because one attempt to do so leads to the opposite attempt and then the big powers come in. Then finally the question of the future of the United Nations was discussed at this Conference. We could not go very far into this matter. But two facts are clear. One is that the present structure of the United Nations is rather out of date. In 1945 when it was formed, I am not sure of the exact number but I think there were about 47 or 48 members of the United Nations—under 50. Today there are 99 members. The only constant quantity—both today and 15 years ago—is the figure for Latin America which remains the same I think at 22 or 23. But in Asia and Africa many new members have come, and Asia and Africa are, therefore, very much unrepresented in the various organs of the United Nations. Therefore, the U.N. does not reflect the world position as it is, and if it does not reflect it, then it cannot deal with it properly. Therefore, the structure has to change. How and in what ways it is rather difficult to say, because that structure can only change by mutual agreement, by agreement at any rate of the great powers. Otherwise you cannot change the Charter. It is for this reason that we in India have not pressed for the change, because we did not want to introduce another bone of contention there at this stage when there were so many other quarrels, and it seemed to us essential that the change should come by agreement among, we might say, the permanent members of the Security Council. But

then among the permanent members is, as we know, what is called China, the Nationalist China, that is Formosa, and it is a remarkable position, therefore, that the Nationalist China or the Formosan Government has got the right to veto every change. Obviously the United Nations cannot go on functioning when one of the principal subjects that come up before it from time to time is that of representation of China, and the present representative is never going to agree to his own elimination from there as it is. As a matter of fact about three years back there was a general agreement in the United Nations on a package deal of representation. A number of countries were accepted by both the contending parties and in that list was the Mongolian People's Republic. We in India, of course, have a Mission there, we recognised it for some time past. That was agreed to by every country, but this Nationalist Chinese representative at the Security Council vetoed that even though all the big powers and others had agreed to their coming in. It is an impossible situation in this way and something will have to be done. But again, the question is how to do it and the timing of it. We are so anxious for the disarmament proposals to go through that we would not like delay to take place there by another argument which might almost split up the United Nations, an argument about the future of the United Nations itself. It is, therefore, that we thought that those matters should be considered at a later stage when some of these had been removed from the realm of our present disputes. But anyhow we feel that the United Nations, if it has to function, has to function effectively. It is not merely a body to pass pious resolutions. If it has to function, let us say, in the Congo, it must function effectively, and, therefore, the executive apparatus of the United Nations must be an effective apparatus, not one which pulls in different directions. That seems to us essential, and that will become even more essential if the question of disarmament comes to implementation. That raises very diffi-

I cult points, the implementation of a disarmament agreement. Obviously the present United Nations as it is, the Secretariat etc., cannot easily deal with such a vast subject as the implementation of a disarmament agreement. At the same time it must be within the scope of the United Nations, this agreement, and they must be connected with it. Therefore, presumably some authorities connected with the United Nations, but different; will have to be built up to deal with disarmament. Those authorities must necessarily be such as to create a sense of confidence in all the countries concerned because, if they do not, they would not disarm. Therefore, all these various aspects of the disarmament problem are now before the U.N. and the world generally, and I hope that they will lead to some successful agreements. There has been, as the House knows, a marked change in the approach of the United States administration to these issues and it does appear that this change may lead to successful results.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): Sir, before I seek one or two clarifications from the hon. Prime Minister, I might request you to provide for a discussion on the Statement. The Prime Minister himself said in the last session or before that that it is better to discuss certain specific issues rather than overall foreign affairs. Here is a specific subject, the Commonwealth Conference and the statement he has made, which gives scope for discussion of certain limited subjects, and it would be very helpful. We have four days. We are now very glad that the South African Government is out of the Commonwealth, and we are happy that the Prime Minister along with other important members succeeded in securing the exclusion of the South African Government from the Commonwealth.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Clarification.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Yes, Sir, clarification. Was there any proposal in the Commonwealth Conference on

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.] the part of any Commonwealth Prime Minister that the United Nations should be approached jointly by Commonwealth countries that the Human Rights Charter should be invoked as well as sanctions applied against South Africa? That is within the ambit of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, was there any suggestion when the disarmament matter was discussed that the establishment of the "Polaris" submarine base in the United Kingdom complicated the situation and led to a heightening of tension? I say this thing because the United Kingdom is a Commonwealth country and one of the nuclear powers. Thirdly, the Prime Minister has spoken about the structure of the United Nations Organisation. I would like to know what exactly is meant by the general consent which is mentioned in the communique that has been issued on the structural change. It is important to change it now. Finally, about the Australian Prime Minister's statements: it seems that after the Commonwealth Conference he has made a number of statements assailing indirectly the position taken up by India and others. The statements are not at all good. I would like to know whether that particular view of the Australian Prime Minister is shared by other members of the Commonwealth. I can say that it seems to be shared by Mr. Macmillan and some others. But I would like to know what the position is, whether what the Australian Prime Minister is saying, is the view of a certain group of members in the Commonwealth or whether that is his own personal view. These are matters which I would like to get clarified. But it would be better perhaps if we had a discussion since we have time. My motion is ready.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Your motion is
■ always ready.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Rajasthan) :
Sir, one clarification I seek. It is a very
minor matter. I would i say that now the
Government of the

Union of South Africa has been excluded from the Commonwealth. What will be its position? It will not be a member of the Commonwealth, but has it also been discussed in the Conference that South Africa would be made to realise its mistake and that they would not help it in any way? As far as I can see from the papers, it would in no way be affected. Britain is anxious to give it all the benefits that the Commonwealth countries will get, and similarly other countries in the Commonwealth will also extend all the help to South Africa.

Mn. CHAIRMAN: That will do. The Prime Minister has to go to the other House.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH: I would like to know whether this question was discussed.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have to be in the other
12 NOON House at 12. Therefore, I cannot say much in answer to what Mr. Bhupesh Gupta said. My recollection in regard to the first two points is, the answer is in the negative.

MR. CHAIRMAN: He has forgotten what the first two points are.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have forgotten, Sir, what the point was. But I remember that the answer is in the negative.

MR, CHAIRMAN: Number three?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: About the third, I have forgotten what the point was.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: After the Prime Minister has dealt with the adjournment motion in this House, we can remind ourselves of the points and we can better answer them. He is in a hurry.