

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.]

'ter should tell the House that an explanation has been called for. It is a matter of great public importance. Therefore I would like to know whether there is any truth in the report.

Tins PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): I am totally unaware of this allegation; I do not know. The hon. Member should not rely on everything he reads in print

MR. CHAIRMAN: I am not asking you to answer Mr. Bhupesh Gupta; I am asking you to reply to the debate on your Motion.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I am grateful, Sir; by a mischance I got the answer.

MOTION RE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA—continued.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr Chairman, Sir, I am grateful to hon. Members for all that they said in the course of this discussion even though some of it was in criticism of our policies and what I may have done. I am glad of their criticism because it enables me to deal with certain aspects of this matter and to remove, possibly, some doubts that may remain in Members' minds. Naturally it is rather embarrassing for me to discuss personal matters, whether the personal matters refer to me or to a colleague of mine.

Now the hon. Member opposite, Mr. Ganga Sharan, after paying me some compliments, mostly undeserved, said that—well—I was suffering from a certain rust, mental or otherwise, or bodily. Well, I am no judge of my mental or other condition, and if I have, in his opinion, lost the lustre that I once possessed, that is my misfortune. But Mr. Ganga Sharan

perhaps wrongly thought that I was endowed with certain qualities or misjudged me in the past I cannot function today as I functioned forty or fifty years ago. That is a natural result of the lapse of time. But so far as the policies are concerned, which I seek to pursue hard, I believe that they are in line with all that I have said and done in the last forty years, whether it was in the course of our struggle for our independence or later. I am too much rooted in those thirty - years of our struggle to start on a new line in the later years of my life. Nevertheless, whether it was twenty or thirty or forty years ago, I was always trying to look to the future, trying to look to the future for which we were attempting to prepare India. That question always loomed before me—what of India's future, what do we want India to be, what do we want the world to be, although I was involved very deeply in the then din. Nevertheless, the future occupied at least half of my mind. I wonder how far that is the case with Mr. Ganga Sharan or Dr. Kunzru.

Mr. Shiva Rao gave a very relevant quotation from a speech by Sir Winston Churchill, the first speech he delivered when he became the war premier because of the last great war, when he said: "If the present sits in judgment on the past, it may lose the future." It is a wise saying from a man of great experience of war and peace, both. It does seem to me that the hon. Dr. Kunzru is always so wrapped up in the past that he hardly has any idea of the future. Now it has been my misfortune not to have been able to agree with Dr. Kunzru in the course of the last forty years*. I am not talking about minor agreements or disagreements—they may occur anywhere—but of rather a basic approach to life and its problems, a basic approach to India and its problems, a basic approach to national and international problems; for forty years we have differed, and forty years ago the hon. Member differing from these new policies left the great

organisation to which I had the honour to belong and have belonged all this time. He did not agree, he had every right not to agree of course, as everybody has the right. But he put himself away from the national current of the day because he did not look at the future; he did not look at the currents of life that were convulsing Indian humanity.

He judged me, Mr. Ganga Sharan, and tells me about public opinion. I should bow to public opinion, of course. What am I here except as a representative of public opinion, and the moment I do not represent them, I shall bow my way out and seek some other occupation—that is obvious. Of course opinions may differ as to what public opinion is. Naturally; and there is no single public opinion; it varies and agrees very seldom. There are varieties of public opinion as there are varieties of groups and classes and occupations and all that in a great country. Undoubtedly Shri Ganga Sharan represents a body of public opinion. Undoubtedly Dr. Kunzru represents a body of public opinion. Whether that body is small or big is another matter. The question therefore, is—when we talk about public opinion—to what public opinion we refer to. Is it the opinion of the masses or the city folk? Is it the opinion of a number of intellectuals? Is it the opinion of a small group or a big group? All these things arise. Is it the opinion of a few newspapers? All that arises. I venture to think that I have, among my many failings, one quality, and that is judging public opinion having my hand or my mind on the pulse of public opinion, affecting and changing public opinion. Of course, it is wrong to be swept away by public opinion. If you consider it wrong, you have to resist it. But broadly speaking I try to keep in touch with public opinion and the public have been generous to me in this matter, not only in their affection but also in accepting often the advice I gave them. Therefore, I would submit, let us not discuss here in balance

what public opinion is. What I am afraid of in the present instance, and I shall be quite frank with this House, is that here we are facing the gravest problems—that a country can face. There was a brief but very important reference to this in Mr. Panikkar's short speech yesterday. We are facing one of the major historical changes of the world, of Asia, and of India. That is what we are facing. It is not a minor matter. Some people argue, some people say, that it is a minor matter, a border raid, some killing. It is something very big, not in terms of that invasion or aggression or border raid. I am not going now into semantics and legal, wordy quibbling, as Dr. Kunzru was pleased to do yesterday as to whether any violation of the frontier is more or less not expansionism. Is that the way we deal with major problems of the day when the whole picture of the world is changing so far as India is concerned and India's borders are concerned? That is a major issue that we have to face, to which reference was made by Mr. Panikkar. Here is a historical change of the greatest magnitude. For the first time two major powers of Asia face each other on an armed border. For the first time a world power or would be world power sits near our borders and frontiers. It is quite immaterial whether we are friendly or not. Even if we are hundred per cent friendly with them, the fact remains that here is a mighty power sitting on our borders. That itself changes the whole context, the whole picture. That we have to observe and see. And we are not a mean country or a weak country. So, we face each other there and we face each other in anger at the present moment, and we are going to face each other, not today or tomorrow but for hundreds and hundreds of years. Neither China nor India is going to walk out of Asia. That is the question of the present and the future and that is the broad aspect. And I am glad that Mr. Panikkar, with his great experience of both these countries, drew attention to this major historical

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] fact; that is, we are sitting or we are looking at these problems at a turn of history's wheel, a major turn which has never taken place in the past. Look at it from this point of view—not this petty, quibbling point of view of a little area being here or there, of what somebody has said and somebody has not said.

Behind this, look at this other picture—both China and India trying¹ with more or less success to move out of a traditional form of society with traditional structures as they used to be, into something new because all over the world for the last hundred years, 150 years if you like or more, there has been this change from traditional forms to what might be called modern forms—I am using the word 'modern' rather technologically modern, scientifically modern,—which has changed the face of the world, which has made the great powers as you see them today because of the technological advance, scientific advance. Now, I am not going into another and a deeper question as to whether technological advance is enough for a country. I should say not. The other forms, call them what you like, ethical, moral, spiritual, are necessary to give a country any sound foundation. And surely in the case of India, a country which has believed in that kind of thing, it is important.

But I am not going to discuss that. The major fact that I am pointing out is that here is this mighty change which has come over the world, over

the Western world to begin with and now spreading over the Asian world

—the advance of science and technology changing the ways of living, the methods of life and bringing the problems of higher standards, more food, more clothing, more of everything that a man needs. And in the course of all this not only a nation's prosperity increases, but its armed power increases. Armed power today is above all based on technological advance. It does not matter how brave the people are in a country. If they

are technologically backward, they are supposed to be weak and they are weak in that sense. Now, we see those changes coming over Asia, tremendous, mighty waves of change coming over every part of Asia in various degrees. You see in China a revolution, one of the most basic and fundamental in history, taking place, something convulsing 600 millions of people. We see mighty changes in India, in the 400 millions; not in that violent way, not with those abrupt and violent methods, which we have seen in China, but nevertheless big changes, tremendous and revolutionary changes taking place in the whole structure of life here. And I doubt if even we who are today sitting in Parliament fully realise how the base of life in India is changing by a variety of ways, by the spread of education, by the spread of industry and all that. Now, in this background each of these countries is groping forward, and when a country like India or a country like China gropes forward, it makes a change—too big not to affect the world—where these two mighty countries come against each other and face each other in an armed way, in anger. That is a major event of the world. What is happening today perhaps in the world is that the centre of gravity of conflict is shifting, from Europe to Asia. All these /are major historical things and cannot be disposed of by petty arguments, petty criticisms and this or that. Here is the future unveiling itself, unravelling and bringing tremendous new problems which cannot be answered by any traditional way of thinking, whether in war or peace. Therefore, I would beg of Mr. Ganga Sharan Sinha to keep this in mind because I have great respect for Mr. Ganga Sharan Sinha. But I do think that he is too rooted in traditional ways of thinking to realise the present or think of the future. And as for Dr. Kunzru, whom I have respected always and respect now, I have always somehow felt this difficulty that he loses himself in innumerable detail* and the big thing passes by unnoticed.

So, this is my difficulty. I shall deal with some of the points that Dr. Kunzru raised in so far as I can. But I do wish this House and this country to realise what has happened and what is happening—I dislike it, this House dislike it. I appreciate and I welcome the surge of emotion that has passed through this country because of these border troubles. A healthy community ought to react in this way, and having reacted in this way we should turn this energy, this enthusiasm in the right, constructive direction, to build up and strengthen the country to face any peril or adventure that might come our way. But what troubles me is this turning of this, enthusiasm into wrong channels, into effervescent channels which do not last, and sometimes cries are raised which I have fought 'against all my life when they' were raised in other countries. And I am not going to accept those cries being raised in India because I am an Indian. I dislike jingoism., whether it is in England or America or Russia or China or India. I am not a jingoist; I do not want my country to be Jingoist, and especially when the jingoism has not even any basis of that great strength to enforce it, it becomes ridiculous to talk in that way. We are not weak. I do not accept it when anybody says we are weak. We are strong enough to face any contingency partly because we have developed industrially and otherwise; we are stronger than we were some years before, much stronger and may I say that the principal strength to which I attach importance has come to us, to our war machine, during the last two or three years and I wish Dr Kunzru did appreciate this fact.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU (Uttar Pradesh): I appreciated it much earlier than you. Have a little modesty. That will befit you.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Why? If I may say so, why should I be modest when I think of India?,'

I am not modest when I think of India.

Our war machine, as all war machines, depends on an industrial apparatus behind it. I am not talking about the general industrial apparatus of the country, but of the specialised, broad industrial apparatus. That has progressed more in the last two or three years than at any previous time, because more attention, organised attention, has been given to it. That is a thing which comes from a new approach. In this country in whatever line we move we are restricted, limited, constrained, cabined by our old habits of government and everything; Whether it is the army, whether it is the civil structure—we have the advantage of carrying on with every kind of structure, but there is a very grave disadvantage of being cabined and confined by all this structure. It takes up all the time and we have to consider this matter today, more especially when we talk about policies and other things. But the real difficulty that comes in our way is the delay in the implementation of any policy whether in the States or the government here because of procedures, all kinds of procedures. It has to go through so many grades of officials and others to get through, noting and all that. We all complain 'against it and yet, we find it exceedingly difficult to get out of it. This kind of thing does not apply, of course, to the Chinese Government. There is no Parliament to discuss anything there. They decide and they order and it is done. And I am not talking that Parliament should not discuss it—of course, not—and I was really talking about the difference in the whole approach there, how things can be done rapidly, whether rightly or wrongly. Our procedures have, been inherited from the old British times. The delay is there. Good procedures are there, good in the sense that theoretically they are good, good in the sense that they aim at perfection, perfection of the official procedure, checks and counter-checks this must not go wrong, that must

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] ot go wrong. But they result in great delay and that u a very vital matter when we have to do things quickly whether in a peace situation or in a war situation. In a war situation, of course, all that has to go in a chain. So we are- tied up. In the same manner, I submit, we are tied up in our mental processes, most people are. It is difficult to adapt ourselves to a world which is rapidly changing, and we are tied up in our mental processes also, because we represent, by and large, as we should not only the urban people, the technical people in India, the new type of human being that has risen in this technological world in India, but we represent above all the rural masses of India. They require representation, of course. That is the principal problem. But we bring with that also the traditional mind. We see that great forces are at work which are changing India, changing China, changing Asia, changing the world. Therefore, we have to look at these problems in this wide perspective and realise that we have to prepare not for some trouble, on the border today. But, of course, we have to, to the best of our ability, protect our integrity, but this is the major problem of the future, of two nations armed facing each other. People say, why don't you drive them out? "Why don't you", as if it is some kind of a children's game and not realising what this means. If we can drive them out, they can drive us out of some place and we enter into theirs. So, I do beg of this House to get this broad picture of the vast historical change that has come in and that haa to be faced, and that . . .

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Rajasthan) :
They driva us out, all right.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There speaks the traditional mind again. I cannot get rid of it, I can't. I cannot really deal with the situation if he goes on repeating some pet ideas.

We have got here to face a situation which can only be faced by strength. If that is so, we have to build up that strength as rapidly a* possible, and we have to find out how to build up that strength. That strength can be built up in many ways—armies, etc.—but basically again, it has to be built up by the industrial background that you have. And remember always, this is not a question of today or six months or a year; years ahead we shall have to face this problem, peace or war. Apart from peace or war, whatever it may be, the facta are that two great nations face each other across * tremendous frontier and they are both pretty strong, stronger than in the past. Then how are we to live? Are We to live in permanent hostility or are we to find some way of existence as friends, if not as friends, as people who tolerate each other? Now, look at this picture even in the wider context of the world. What is happening? All the world is talking about President Eisenhower's visit here. The visit of President Eisenhower would have been important at any time because he represents a great nation. He is a great man. But particular importance attaches to his visit today here, not because of our trouble on the border, but because he is moving about all over, at great trouble and inconvenience is visiting numbers of countries in Europe and Asia, because we feel that he is pursuing an ideology of peace. And that is why wherever he goes, he finds a tremendous welcome, not only from governments, but from the people, and that is why I have no doubt that this afternoon or tomorrow or the day after the people of Delhi will welcome him in their vast numbers, but not a formal welcome, but a welcome from the heart, because we welcome the messengers of peace, the builders of peace, and we feel that he is trying his utmost to achieve peace in spite of great difficulties. Why is all this turn taking place itt the Western world? Why suddenly —not suddenly, but nevertheless,

very rapidly—has the cold-war mentality gradually changed? It has not gone, of course—of course, not—but the change has been remarkable in these last year or so. And everybody is hoping that as months pass, more progress will be made on the question of disarmament, on the question of stoppage of nuclear tests, which is so vital and in putting an end to this cold war. All over the world the masses of people hope that this will happen. They have had that hope, of course, for a long time past. But today a change is taking place with even governments; stolid as they are, they have been moved somewhat by popular emotion and by the facts of life facing them, and so, Governments are also moving in that direction. Now, they are doing so, I take it, not because of, shall I say, humanitarian reasons or just love of everybody, and I hope this element of humanitarian reasons enter into them. But really Governments function, shall I say, not for humanitarian reasons. That is supposed to be rather tough—the government way of dealing with a national question. A Minister may not be tough but Governments are tough and I suppose they have to be tough but Governments have come to the conclusion that this toughness in the present day does not pay. Toughness leads to consequences not on the other party but on themselves. Toughness might lead to utter destruction of themselves and their countries. Here is a great power, England, a nuclear power. What is the fate of England in a nuclear war? Every Englishman knows that They are brave people, they do not shout and complain. In a major nuclear war, England is destroyed just like any other country—of course not only England. I am merely mentioning England. Here is one of the greatest countries in the world, a most advanced country, one of the most prosperous countries and even a member of the so-called nuclear club. Even that country cannot protect itself if there is war. They can destroy others but they cannot protect themselves. A curious situa-

tion has arisen in this world. Therefore, these statesmen of the world of many countries are trying their hardest to get rid of these fears and suspicions and find some way of living with the people across their borders, some way of co-existence. There is no other way. And let us hope that they will succeed. Now I refer to this matter because you have to consider even your problems from the context of these larger developments because those larger developments will affect us, will affect China. It is not a question of, as some people say, 'How can you put your trust in China?' It is not a question of trust at all. Frankly, first of all no country finally puts its trust in any other country. They may be more favourably inclined or less but in the ultimate analysis, they have always to keep a loophole in their minds that the other party will not play up or that other things may happen or national interests may come into play. The safer thing is for the national interest to be more or less in line with international interests. Where they conflict, you do not quite know what will happen. So it is not a question of my trusting China or not trusting it but it is a question, nevertheless, of my realising that China and India, two great countries, are going through enormous changes which are strengthening them, making them powerful, modern power-States and they will be and they are next to each other and have to remain for millennia to come, for geological ages, next to each other. All these questions come up. This does not mean, of course, that we should think of what will happen hundred years hence and forget what is happening to-day. In the context of to-day, you have to take every possible step to protect your integrity, your freedom and your self-respect. That of course is so. That is common ground. I need not argue that. You may go into details as to how you do it but it is common ground that we should face this position and protect our country's territories, to the best of our ability and in that comes again a certain morale of the nation, a certain discipline, a certain unity

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] and not constantly nibbling at each other and nagging at each other and blaming each other, because that is just the thing which undermines that very basis when you have to face a national crisis. Then you prepare for to-morrow also by our developing industrial growth and the rest. That is admitted. I do not refer to it because it is no good going on repeating the same phrases, but the basic thing remains. What is your picture of to-day, and what will be the picture tomorrow and the day after and you have to prepare for it because basically and fundamentally I know that we must work for peace in the world. We must work for peace on our borders and we must work but at the same time not talk about peace—If I may be forgiven for saying so—in an Utopian way, just reciting a Mantra of peace and doing nothing. I do not believe that the weak can do anything worth while. A weak nation cannot do and even the cry of peace from a weak nation or individual has no influence on others. It is only when there is strength behind it, the strength of will and the spirit of the nation and organized strength of the nation, that its voice counts. It has been an amazing thing and a surprising thing that India's voice has counted for so much in the councils of the world in the last several years since independence. Progressively it has counted for more and more without the material background of strength behind that voice. It has been a surprising thing how that has happened. We may have been taken in by it that we are getting bigger and bigger. We may have become conceited about it—there was some room for conceit, I admit—but the fact is that a country like India, which, in the modern world is in terms of physical might not to be compared with the great powers or with many of the armed nations, which cannot be even called great powers, a country which is poor and which is struggling hard to get rid of its poverty, how has this country's voice, with no great military might,

with no financial or other resources, has counted for so much in the world for the last few years. Whether it is in the United Nations or whether it is elsewhere, we are respected all over the world; let us remember that. Now there must be some reason for it. Maybe, you may say—well, I am not saying it but somebody may say that—that it is clever diplomacy, it is cleverly putting ourselves across to others. Maybe, there is something in it, not wholly.' It may be due to the remembrance in the world of a mighty personality like Gandhiji and we shine by it or we have got something of the radiance that he possessed. It may be that we have spoken with conviction and earnestness and sincerity about peace and our desire for peace and our desire for tolerance and when we have talked about co-existence and all that, it was not phrase in our mouths and lips. It was a deep feeling from inside our hearts and it was a deep understanding of the world as it is to-day because there can be nothing else but co-existence in the world. I do say it—because the emphasis is deeper—that there can be nothing else but Panchsheel in this world. I say it with all the emphasis at my command. It may be broken by individuals or nations. They will suffer if they break. The world will suffer. It is a different matter. So we have followed a policy not of the day, not of the moment, but a policy which looked into the future and millions and millions of people in other countries were affected by that. They looked up to India in a sense—they could get nothing out of us, not money, not arm;—they looked up to us because they felt that India did have the chance to stand for something even though it was a poor country and a lightly armed country. There was something in that. It was the policy we pursued, the policy of non-alignment, the policy of co-existence of the policy of Panchsheel, call it what you will, basically. It was—I will not say immaterial—largely immaterial all the same what China did or some other country did about it. In so far as China is concerned, if China breaks

that policy, that type of contact with us breaks—between China and India but the policy is not wrong." So we attained a measure of stature among nations which normally nations do not attain unless they have financial power, industrial power or military power. We had none of these three, to any large extent. We attained that because of the policies we have pursued, the policies which some hon. Members here seem to think have been wrong *ab initio*, which, Dr. Kunzru seems to think is completely wrong and even if it was right basi-oally, it was implemented wrongly. Therefore I am pointing out .

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: I never said that the principles underlying Panch-sheel were wrong. All that I said was that the manner in which the Prime Minister had interpreted it and implemented it was wrong, is quite wrong and I repeat it now.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL. NEHRU: I »m glad that Dr. Kunzru has made it clear beyond any shadow of ':->ubt. That is exactly what I meant, because he said that the policy in theory was right but the manner the Prime Minister has interpreted and acted upon it has been wrong, wrong and wrong—three times. Now so far as the world is concerned, the world judges of that policy not by some Sastric document preserved in our ancient archives. The world has heard of this policy from -what the Prime Minister has said about it and the world has reacted to it from learning of it from my lips, from my writings and from statements made by me. . Therefore the world has fallen out of step with Dr. Kunzru. That is my humble submission. Of course, Dr. Kunzru has a habit of falling out of step. He fell out of itep forty years ago with the national movement. He cannot keep pace with the advance of our nation or of the world. He is so deeply engrossed in the vast extent of his old learning that the new learning passes by.

Now, Sir, I, would beg this House 10 keep these broad pictures in mind, I shall briefly repeat them. There is the broad picture of the world undergoing a tremendous change. As I said yesterday, new horizons, new visions, come up, something almost going outside the scope of physical existence, when you talk of going to the moon and of scientific developments today. They almost take you to something which I do not know how to describe. I may call it the fourth dimension. We live in a ihree-dimensional world and now we might almost be on the' verge of the fourth dimension for aught I know.- Anyhow there are two types of existence,, two types of experience which are beyond the normal experience of humanity, individuals apart. That is happening in the world today. Science savi matter and energy are one and the same thing almost. We do. repeat these phrases, not understanding them. So there is this change. Then there is this big change in the world; the change away from the cold war, in which the lead has been taken by these two great., the - two biggest and strongest nations of the world—America and the Soviet Union. That is one aspect of it. The other aspect is this particular problem that is raised when China and India, if I may say so, come to grips with th» problem of historical significance. That is represented today by the aggression or invasion of our territory, or call it what you like, by the violation of our territory and all that. But behind that question—that is important enough and we have to face it— but actually behind that stretches this vista of the future whcih I see all the time and I try ta evolve or meet this equation or see how to solve this problem. But I want this HOUJP and not only this House b't millions of .our people must have some glimpse-of this, for otherwise they will decide wrongly. Otherwise they will los'e all the enthusiasm and energy that they possess by taking shelter in jingoistic and chauvinistic cries. That would be a tragedy, a very grave. tragedy, because we shall become a nation not

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] of depth but of effervescence. We shall become a nation which has lost its anchorage. I am afraid of that kind of thing and that is why I talk about this sometimes in public and elsewhere. People think I am afraid of China or I am afraid of this or that, because I do that. I am elsewhere. I am not afraid of anything of that type. I am only afraid of our nation losing grip of the fundamentals in which it has believed. That is the only thing I am afraid of.

Now, may I refer briefly to some of the points raised? Dr. Kunzru referred to a certain Border Committee that was appointed. I shall tell the House about this Committee. But I suppose enough facts have come out in the papers, in the White Papers and in the speeches here and in the other House to indicate that right from 1950, or at any rate from 1951, when the Chinese* forces came into Tibet, we have had this problem before us. It has not suddenly come up before us this year or last year. We have had this problem before us and this developing picture which I have put before you, of two power States emerging, two power States coming face to face with each other on a tremendous border—Ever since 1950, this has been the picture before us. We may have differed as to the timing in our minds, as to when this will happen, whether in 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, 15 years, it was difficult to say. But we had that picture. And looking through my old papers when this occurred, I was surprised myself to see how we had referred to these contingencies, 8 or 9 years ago, in our papers and how we had written to our ambassadors in Peking and others, especially at Peking and asked for his reactions. In those early years of this present day Republic, the Chinese Republic, Mr. Panikkar was our ambassador there and I read through his notes on the subject and our notes to him and our decisions. From the very first day and all the time this problem came before us, about our fron-

tier. It is not a new problem. The question was whether we should raise it in an acute form at that stage. We decided—whether it was right or wrong you can judge now, it is easy to be wise after the event, for hindsight is always easy to take—we decided not to, and still we do not see how we could have decided otherwise. We might have done so, of course, but I do not see any reason yet. But with all the material that was before us at the time, we decided that we must make clear in every possible way what our frontier was in our opinion, clear in our manner, clear in our statements, clear to the world and clear to China and clear to our own people, of course, and hold by it, stick by it. Why should we go about asking China to raise this question when we felt more about it? Why invite discussion about a thing on which we had no doubt? But as I said, we might, with hindsight, say that that was not a very wise policy, that is a different matter. The point is, this was discussed repeatedly in our notes, in our papers, and despatches. I believe, if I may say so, Mr. Panikkar himself advised us at that time, "Yes, you need not raise it; but declare it openly". We declared it in Parliament. We declared it before the Chinese Government and all that. And during all this period, remember, the only way this question came up before us was because of the Chinese maps. When we saw the Chinese maps we protested and the answer always was, "These are old maps which require revision and we shall, when we have leisure, revise them." But at no time during this entire period did they challenge our map. They did not accept it in so many words but they never challenged it. And they never raised this question themselves and all that they said about their own maps was that these had to be revised. Now, I wish to admit that a lingering doubt remained in my mind and in my Ministry's mind as to what might happen in the future. But we did not see how we were going to decide this

question by hurling it in that form at

the Chinese at the moment. We felt that we should hold by our position and that the lapse of time and events will confirm it. and by the time perhaps, when the challenge to it came, we would be in a much stronger position to face it. I may be perfectly frank to the House. It is not as if it was ignored or that it was not thought about. After the longest and clearest thinking and consultations with those who were concerned, between our Ambassadors and others, our Foreign Affairs Committee and others, we came to this decision. This was discussed again and again, after two or three years, whenever a new contingency arose.

Then came the period of the Tibetan Treaty or the Tibetan Agreement of 1954. Again we considered it at length. Should we bring this question positively into the front—the recognition of the MacMahon Line? An hon. Member—I forget who—asked, "Why did you not ask them to recognise it"?

Well, what exactly was the *quid pro quo*? They were sitting in Tibet. Our telling them that we did not recognise it would mean nothing. What were we supposed to say? It is not clear to me. Was it a question on non-recognition of the Chinese Government? Were we going that far? "All right, we do not recognise you. We break off relations with you because you do not recognise the MacMahon Line" or, as some people going on saying, we do not recognise the Chinese sovereignty or suzerainty over Tibet. They were sitting there and our saying anything to them would make no difference. It is rather infantile to think that they would have been frightened by our saying something. The result would have been that they would have achieved their dominance over Tibet completely and the only thing is that we would have quarrelled with them and we would have come to a breaking point with them. The trouble on the frontier would have come immediately, not now but years back we would have had to face it. So, this business of saying that we

123 RSD.—5.

should have insisted on this and insisted on that, we should have asked them to guarantee this and guarantee that, we should have made them commit themselves to this or that envisages all kinds of ultimatum and the like being issued by us and their being compelled to accept that ultimatum. It does not fit in with the facts of life, with the facts as they are in Asia, in India, in China and in Tibet. I can imagine some argument being based on some high moral principles, regardless of what happens to India or to Tibet or to anybody. That, of course, may be advanced but such an argument usually by itself does not influence Foreign Offices.

Now, Sir, Mr. Ganga Sharan and others sort of seemed to have an idea that there has been negligence and said that past negligence should not be repeated. I really am not ashamed to confess errors; maybe we had been negligent here and there in various places but in our broad policy in regard to our frontiers I do claim that we have not been negligent keeping this broad picture in view because any other step of a major character would have created a crisis earlier than we would have been prepared for it. You may say, and you would be right in saying, that we could have pushed ahead with more of road building or building lines of communications, etc. I think we have been going on fast there.

SHRI GANGA SHARAN SINHA (Bihar): That is what precisely I said in my speech.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: But then, you should remember another aspect. It always becomes a question of balancing things. Here we are struggling with our Five Year Plans and the like. We have to balance and to see whether we should spend so much more on the development of a frontier area or in some other area which will bring in quicker results, say a steel plant or a fertiliser plant. One has to balance all these things. Maybe the balancing is wrong. One

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] makes a guess; one has to judge. There is the danger of slow progress in one direction and the dangers in the frontier. All these things have to be done and one makes a guess about the future and goes ahead.

Now, Dr. Kunzru referred to the Border Committee Report. There was another Committee also. Last evening I got the report and looked through it again. The North and the North Eastern Border Committee was appointed in 1951. This committee made a large number of recommendations and these recommendations were examined by an ad hoc committee of Secretaries and finally by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. An overwhelming number of recommendations made were accepted and implemented. Among the major recommendations were the re-organisation and expansion of the Assam Rifles, the extension of administration in the NEFA area, development of intelligence network along the border, development of the border areas, development of civil armed police, development of communications and check posts. Our position in regard to Nepal was considered separately. All these recommendations, barring a few, were accepted and they have been implemented some time ago. So far as the development of the border areas was concerned, the Ministry of Home Affairs took up this question with the State Governments concerned and provision was made for these in the Five Year Plans, the Centre giving substantial help. This development included road communications, schools, hospitals, tribal welfare animal husbandry, etc. The construction of a number of roads was entrusted to Army engineers, especially in NEFA. The Ministry of Transport was also entrusted with making a number of roads. Some of these roads have been completed, some are being constructed and a few were not accepted or not proceeded with, either for tactical reasons or because expenditure on the construction of such roads was colossal and out of proportion to the good that they may do.

So, Sir, broadly speaking, it may be said that nearly all the recommendations made by the Committee were accepted and implemented.

Dr. Kunzru referred to what our representative said in the United Nations in regard to Tibet. He was surprised at it. First of all, I am afraid, our representative did not say the words which were quoted by Dr. Kunzru. That is neither here nor there but our policy in regard to Tibet was laid down after full discussion in Parliament long before the question came up in the United Nations. I stated it—I am not quite sure if I stated it here or in the Lok Sabha—in answer to questions. We have discussed this clearly and we have laid it down also. We declared it publicly, in Parliament, in Press Conferences and the like and that is exactly what was repeated there. You might disagree with that policy; that is a different matter. I think that was a right policy and the only policy to be pursued but to state that this is something new evolved there is not correct. There is, Sir, an intimate relation between the domestic policies of a country and the foreign policies of a country. Sometimes they diverge a little but broadly speaking—presumably because there is the same mind behind both—they act and interact against each other and I have a feeling that the difficulty that some hon. Members may have in appreciating my argument for the foreign policy we pursue really relates back to their difference in view about the domestic policies we pursue. I have no doubt about it in my mind. Not always, but in varying degrees it is there and you will find that even today, while I have ventured in all humility to say that the foreign policy that we pursue is supported by the widest measure of public opinion that you can have in India—it has been supported and it is supported—there are minor criticisms. The critics of

12 NOON that foreign policy, you will find—the major

critics—are critics of our domestic policy also. They are tied up—the two things—and I can understand that. That happens; some people think differently; it is not necessary for everyone to think alike in the country. There are parties that think differently—honestly, sincerely. But WR must realise the urges behind it, the roots of the thoughts which govern their domestic outlook as well as their international outlook. And if they are different, they can convert me: I shall be happy. I try to convert them, sometimes with success, sometimes I fail.

Now, Sir, I have ventured to take up nearly an hour of this House and for the rest all I wish to say is that so far as the present situation is concerned, obviously we have to prepare for it to the best of our ability. On the one hand I have referred so much to our industrial development even from the Defence point of view. Now I want to expedite it, to hurry it up; I want Government procedures to become quicker in doing these things. I try to do it but it is a very difficult thing in a machine, in a huge machine, that has grown up from generations to change it quickly. We have been changing it; we have changed it partly; we will change it more, I hope, and make it a swift-moving machine. We have to think again of the future, the next few years, how we are to face that future. We cannot deal with the issue today; we have to deal with it in the military sense today and we propose to give opportunities to our young men to be trained in the N.C.C., the Territorial Army or the Special Force that we may raise.

Sir, there is one fact which might be remembered when people think so much sometimes of obtaining outside aid. Maybe they imagine that in my conceit I say that I will not take outside aid. Well, it is not for me to judge myself but I certainly have a little conceit about India's standing on

its own legs. Of course I cannot say what in an eventuality we may do; that is a different matter but I do not want this idea to go out to our people that others will preserve our freedom, that others will help us. I do not want India to go on crutches. We have faced grave difficulties, grave crises, and survived them and I have no doubt at all in my mind that we shall survive not only because of the development we have got now and the way we are developing but more so because I have got a fundamental faith in the Indian people. Therefore I am not worried; certainly I have to think and I have to take counsel in Parliament and we have to devise general ways of meeting such tests. So what I was saying was, it is an odd thing you talk of aid. The type of warfare we are dealing with is warfare which requires stout men, not machines very much. Certainly, some machines you want, not big machines. The type of aid that one gets from abroad are machines and in these mountain areas those machines do not reach. If they are big machines there is little good. We want stout and trained men, not only stout and trained men, but men of the mountains who are used to high altitudes, who are used to terribly cold climates, who are used to hardship. We want young men who physically are in A-1 condition. From the physical point of view our conditions are not generally A-1 or A-2 even. So this is the type of thing we want and we have got enough of them, I am sure, and I hope that we shall build up for the present our defence as much as possible in this way and build up our industrial apparatus for the future and while doing all that always aiming at a peaceful settlement, always aiming at peace, and not losing ourselves in some kind of vague Chauvinistic or jingoistic ideas which will do enormous injury to our country and to the larger causes that we have supported.

There are some amendments, Sir. I need not say that I will gladly accept the amendment which is in my favour, that is, Mr. Samuels. Thank you, Sir.

[Mr. Chairman.]

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

3. "That at the end of the Motion the following be added, namely:— 'and having considered the same, this House regrets—

(1) the failure of Government to take prompt and active steps to check Chinese aggression;

(2) the failure of Government to protect the time-honoured trading and other rights at Indians in Tibet which have been wiped out by the Chinese."

The motion was not moved.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is—

1. "That at the end of the Motion the following be added namely:— 'and having considered the same, this House approves of and endorses the policy of the Government in this regard'."

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I will now put the amended motion. The question is:

"That White Paper No. II and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China, laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha on the 23rd November, 1959, be taken into consideration and having considered the same, this House approves of and endorses the policy of the Government in this regard."

The motion was adopted. [MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair.]

THE KERALA APPROPRIATION (NO. 2) BILL, 1959

THE MINISTER OF REVENUE AND CIVIL EXPENDITURE (DR. B. GOPALA REDDI) :
Sir, I move:

"That the Bill to authorise payment and appropriation of certain further sums from and out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of Kerala for the services of the financial year 1959-60, as passed by the Lok Sabha, be taken into consideration."

This Bill arises out of the supplementary demands of Rs. 19,27,300 voted by the Lok Sabha on 4th December 1959 and the expenditure of Rs. 1,05,700 "charged" on the Consolidated Fund of the State as detailed in the Supplementary Demands statement presented to the House on 24th November last. Of these Rs. 15,52 lakhs is on revenue account and Rs. 4,81 lakhs for capital expenditure.

The Supplementary Demands for Grants circulated to the Members explain the necessity for the additional requirements in each case and I do not therefore intend to take the time of the House by dealing with them at length, except to make a brief reference to the main items.

A sum of Rs. 3,99 lakhs is required for the staff appointed in connection with the implementation of the schema for the assignment of surplus lands initiated by the State Government. The political agitation in the State last summer accounts for an increase of Rs. 5 lakhs in the administration of the Jails Department and a further sum of Rs. 1,69 lakhs is required for Jail manufactures due to larger turnover and the decision to allow wages to the prisoners employed there. A sum of Rs. 1,97 lakhs has been asked for the two additional Companies for the Malabar Special Police.

On Capital account, the main demand is for Rs. 2,28 lakhs for meeting the capital cost and other incidental expenses relating to the transfer of the Premo Pipe Factory which was established under the Norwegian Aid Programme and has now to be run by the State Government. A sum of Rs. 1 lakh has also been included for the running of the factory, on the revenue side. A provision of Rs. 5 lakhs has been made under Capital outlay on Civil Works for the land acquisition and other charges in respect of a District Board road taken over by the State Government.

Sir, I move

The question was proposed.