

Notification G.S.R. No. 2665, dated the 23rd November, 1959, publishing the Standards of Weights and Measures (Conversion of Railway Mileage) Rules, 1959. [Placed in Library. See No. LT-1813/59.]

**EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT (1958-59) or
COMMISSIONER FOR SCHEDULED CASTES AND
SCHEDULED TRIBES**

THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS (SHRIMATI VIOLET ALVA) : Sir, I beg to lay on the Table, under clause (2) of article 338 of the Constitution a copy of the Eighth, Annual Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the year 1958-59—Parts I and II. [Placed in Library. See No. LT-1842/59.]

**LEAVE OF ABSENCE TO SHRI T. V.
KAMALASWAMY**

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have to inform Members that the following letter dated the 15th December 1959, written from Berlin has been received from Shri T. V. Kamalaswamy:

"As I have reason to believe that I may not be able to return to India before another fortnight, I pray that the Rajya Sabha will be pleased to grant me leave of absence for this entire session. I request you to place this letter before the Sabha and shall be grateful if you could kindly get their sanction."

Is it the pleasure of the House that permission be granted to Shri Kamalaswamy for remaining absent from all meetings of the House during the current session?

(No hon. Member dissented.)

MR. CHAIRMAN; Permission remain absent is granted.

**REFERENCE TO NOTICES OF
MOTIONS FOR PAPERS**

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (Weat Bengal): Sir, before you go on, may I enquire from you as to whether you have got any information from the hon. Minister with regard to my motions for papers regarding the oil exploration concession and the Karnal thing? I do not know. I would like to know. Today is the last day.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have disallowed that question.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Which one?

MR. CHAIRMAN; I think the oil question.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Then, I did not receive any intimation.

**MOTION RE RELATIONS BET-
WEEN INDIA AND CHINA**

MR. CHAIRMAN: About relations between India and China, two hours are allotted. No one should take more than fifteen minutes and you will be temperate in your language and helpful in your observations.

SHRI D. P. SINGH (Bihar): Sir, I beg to move:

"That the relations between India and China, in the light of the latest communication dated December 17, 1959, received by the Prime Minister of India from the Prime Minister of China, be taken into consideration."

Mr. Chairman, it is unfortunate that we have to return to the topic of our relations with China again and again. Personally I would not very much fancy it, returning to a topic like this again and again, but China leaves us no option. The latest reply that our Prime Minister has received to his letter from Mr. Chou En-lai is a very disappointing reply, although I think it was more or less expected. Our Prime Minister was not only

reasonable in his proposals to the Prime Minister of China, he was even moderate, in our humble opinion. But even that proposal has been turned down almost unceremoniously by Mr. Chou En-lai. We are sorry about it, because we feel that the strained relations between India and China are something which we all have to deplore. We have a very long frontier with China, a frontier extending over two thousand miles. We have got to stay—our Prime Minister has emphasised it again and again—in Asia, both these countries, and if we have to face each other as hostile countries, then certainly it will mean such a terrible strain on both these countries that our progress will be retarded, our psychology will be distorted. I am, therefore, very sorry that this topic comes up. Certainly it is not we who want this topic to come up. It is China which is primarily responsible.

Sir, when our Prime Minister suggested in his letter that Longju should be vacated and that we would also not occupy Longju, and later on we talk about the whole thing, Mr. Chou En-lai has replied that not only Longju but many other places, which he thinks belong to China, but which we all know belong to India—should be vacated. That is the answer to a very reasonable suggestion made by our Prime Minister. When we suggested that we vacate Ladakh and you also do the same, that we vacate the whole territory, the area which you show in your map and which you claim to be yours and the area which we claim to be ours and which we know is ours, our Prime Minister was more than reasonable in making a suggestion of that kind.

But in reply to that Mr. Chou En-lai has said that this should be applied to our eastern sector also, to our frontier on the eastern sector. It is very difficult to understand how the mind of China is working. Perhaps, it is not so difficult also. As our Prime Minister himself has emphasised, China has become a very strong

power and it is very conscious of it and is aware of its strength and whenever China has become strong and become aware of its strength, it has become expansionist. This view has been expressed time and again by our distinguished Prime Minister. But how are we, in view of what Mr. Chou En-lai has said in his letter, to be assured that as a result of negotiations some kind of an amicable settlement would be reached? I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not at all in favour of any conflict if it can be avoided. Far be it from me to suggest that we should try to settle our differences with China, or for that matter with any other country, on the basis of a conflict, on the basis of a war. Conflict, I know, Sir, will mean such a terrible destruction for both these countries, for the peoples living in these two countries, that no one here can view the prospects of a conflict with equanimity. I am entirely opposed to it. All that I say is that negotiations do not seem unfortunately to be leading us anywhere. It might be said that after all what we are to do if negotiations are not leading us anywhere, after all, that is all that is open to us. That argument might be advanced by some of us. Most respectfully I suggest that our attitude—I cannot say how it can be different from this, but I think it should be—should be different in certain respects. I do not say that we should involve ourselves in a conflict with China. Certainly not. But are we to keep on waiting for Mr. Chou En-lai to become reasonable? Are we to keep on waiting for Mr. Chou En-lai Or China to agree to our reasonable proposals so that a fruitful discussion between the two Prime Ministers may become possible? How long are we to go on like this? Great tension has developed. Our nerves are frayed, but this whole tension is being kept up. We do not seem to be coming to an end of it.

I personally feel that it was a very great mistake—I repeat that it was a very great mistake in all humility and with all respects—not to have taken note of the fact that a Communist

[Shri D. P. Singh.] regime had been set up in China, that it was a strong regime and as our Prime Minister in his extraordinarily illuminating speech had said in the other House some time back, whenever China was strong, China was expansionist. It was always so in history. China has become strong as he again repeated, as a result of the success of the Communist revolution. Now we should have been prepared then, at that time, for some kind of a trouble on our border particularly when China invaded Tibet. In 1950, it should have been absolutely clear to us that we were going to have trouble with China because China, as our Prime Minister himself said, is expansionist whenever China becomes strong and they had become strong as a result of the Communist revolution. What did we do? About the past history again, much has been said and I would not like very much to go over all this. I would not like to go over it again but I will merely point out, Sir, that we certainly did not do what we should have done. We certainly were complacent so far as Ladakh and other areas were concerned. We allowed the Chinese to build roads. The Chinese say that they have been in occupation of those areas for a very long time. We did not know about it. We did not know anything about it. A road was built in the Aksai Chin area and till after the road was completed, we did not know anything about it. This is how we have neglected the situation. This is how we have not taken note of the fact that a mighty power has emerged on our frontier and that we have got to be very careful so far as that power is concerned.

Now, Sir, it is on the basis of this occupation by force that Mr. Chou En-lai claims that this territory is Chinese. It is Mr. Chou En-lai who has occupied this territory and it is his forces which are keeping that territory occupied. We were not "there" because we thought China was a friend of ours and that was a big mistake that was committed. We know China is expansionist and we should

have thought that China might be » threat to our border. We did not do anything to protect our frontiers, to protect that territory. If the Chinese can build roads, if the Chinese can colonise that territory, that area, if the Chinese can perhaps build airstrips and if the Chinese can do a number of things, why should it not be possible for us to have done all those things in our own territory? Why did we make it possible for the Chinese to do what they have done there? It is because we took China's friendship for granted, and that was a big mistake.

Now certain territories of ours have been occupied by China, by force, and claims are being advanced to them. So, what is there now that we have to do? A very peculiar situation has arisen. Maybe the Chinese will stop short and will not encroach any further on our territory. But, again, on the basis of the argument that China is expansionist, how can we be sure? It is not only India but Burma and other countries also that are frightened about it and there are troubles between all these countries and China—border disputes and all that. Then, how is it that we did not take the necessary steps? What are we now going to do? Are we going to wait and wait till Premier Chou En-lai decides to settle our disputes amicably? Maybe it is not proper for us to try to retake that territory which had been occupied by China by force. I think in those territories they must be building up their military strength and making them into a Chinese stronghold. I do not know, but knowing China, as we do now, we cannot rule out that possibility that on the territory that they have occupied which is our territory, which is India, on that territory they are building up a Chinese stronghold and that stronghold may be used against us at a later date. Supposing they advance further, they encroach a little more on our territory and we are pushed out. What are we to do? Shall we be able to avoid conflict between China and India in that case? There will be conflict.

China seems to be keen on it. We have got to try to come to a peaceful settlement with China in a friendly way on the basis of negotiation. But what I say is that we should be prepared also, at the same time, for any conflict that may come up at a later date. Are we making the necessary preparation? A few good speeches, a few inspiring speeches, by our Prime Minister, I do not think, are going to serve any purpose. A great deal has to be done. A kind of psychology has to be created in this country that we have a danger coming, that we have got to stand up to that danger and that we have got to prepare ourselves to face that danger. Are we preparing that psychology? I do not know. But I want to emphasise that. It would not be correct to say that I am in favour of promoting a war psychology. Certainly not. Are we doing our best to fill the minds and hearts of our people with enthusiasm, to make our people realise the danger which is there so that our people may really work hard? I do not suggest that our living standards should be cut down because we are so poor that we cannot cut them down any further, but can we not be made to work harder? What is it that we are doing to make ourselves work harder? I therefore suggest, Sir, that a proper psychology should be created in this country. Every effort should be made by our Government and by our great Prime Minister to energize the people, to canalize the energies of the people in proper directions.

Sir, I would like to say just one word about our friends, the Communists. It is unfortunate that we have to return to the Communists again and again whenever we talk. They supported our Prime Minister, they supported his proposals in his letter to Mr. Chou En-lai, as far as I remember. Now Mr. Chou En-lai has sent a reply rejecting the proposals of our Prime Minister. I would like to know where the Communists stand now. Are they still behind the Prime Minister's proposals or has their allegiance gone to Mr. Chou En-lai's latest proposals?

Jr, I have very great faith in our great Prime Minister. We know that in this crisis it is he and he alone who can save this country and no one else. If I am criticising him or his Government, it is certainly with the sole aim of strengthening his hands and not for the purpose of weakening them at all. We have got in him a shining instrument, which he has always been, so that from the crisis with which we are faced today we will be able to emerge triumphant and victorious. Sir, I move.

The question was proposed.

DR. ANUP SINGH (Punjab): Mr. Chairman, I was not particularly enthusiastic about this debate. Since you allowed this and the Prime Minister very graciously agreed to it, I think it is just as well that we expressed our views.

Sir, as I was listening to my predecessor, I was not at all sure whether we were going to contribute anything new, and I am not presumptuous enough to think that I have anything original to add, but I do take this opportunity of expressing my views. Sir, it has been argued by the opposition, both here and in the Press, that our foreign policy of independent approach and non-alignment has failed. I repudiate that categorically. I think that on the contrary all the events that have led up to our present position have vindicated our approach. It is quite 'obvious that it has already got its impact on the statement in the 'West, and they are driving closer, to each other. It is singularly unfortunate, therefore, that the two great countries, India and China, which propounded the doctrine of Panchsheel and co-existence should be confronting each other with an attitude of hostility and antagonism, and I think we should advise our Chinese friends that they have done damage not only to the prestige of their country, damage not only to Indo-Chinese friendship, but they have also done enormous damage to the growing unity and solidarity which were emerging among the Asian countries and which were so vividly symbolised at Bandung. Apart from-

[Dr. Anup Singh.] the merits of the case, I think if the Chinese could be persuaded to realise the gravity of the situation, the damage they have done already and the vast repercussions that are very likely to take place, they may be in a better frame of mind to consider the matter.

Some time back, Sir, 'one of the leading dailies—whether it was the 'Hindustan Times' or the 'Times of India', I am not sure—criticised the Prime Minister in a very ironical editorial and said: While our people are being shot, while our solidiers are being tortured, the great Prime Minister in a very philosophical mood keeps on referring to the ancient friendship. Personally, Sir, I think that we should make repeated reference to this friendship, because our disappointment is proportionate to our expectation. Besides, we did not expect this treatment from the Chinese. We are very sorry, we are hurt. I feel, therefore, that repeated reference to friendship is necessary and is well-warranted.

Sir, I recall a great meeting which took place in New York and in which I also participated as a speaker on the occasion when Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and Madam Chiang Kai-shek visited India. China was represented by Mr. Huesi. I spoke for non-official India and our late Shri Shanmukham Chetty spoke for official India. Mr. Wendell Wilkie presided at this meeting, and the theme of all the speeches was the friendship between India and China • and how it was going to safeguard the newly-won independence of the Asian countries. And it was a very great occasion. Pearl Buck spoke on behalf of America welcoming this growing friendship between the two countries. Naturally, during this crisis, one's mind goes back to those occasions. I may also draw the attention of the House to the visit of Noguchi, the great Japanese philosopher, who came to India—I do not recall the time, but I think it was in the late thirties, perhaps 1935. On his return there was an exchange of letters between Rabin-dranath Tagore and Noguchi. Here"

I am speaking from memory. Noguchi said: "The great trouble with Indian leaders and the people is that they do not realise the new mission on which Japan is engaged, namely, to build up a New Asia, Asia for the Asian." And Tagore was reported to have said: "I also subscribe to the doctrine 'Asia for the Asians'. But I am afraid that you are laying the foundation of this New Asia on the skulls of the Chinese, and I am very apprehensive what might happen to the Indians if the Japanese ever came to India." I was thinking the other day as to who could have imagined at that time that it would be the Chinese who would be shooting the Indian people.

So, Sir, we have to refer back to these great event, and episodes in order to get the larger perspective. I came across an essay by Bertrand Russell which I quoted on another occasion. He wrote an essay in 1924 while he was teaching philosophy in the University of Peiping, and the essay said¹ something of the Chinese character, and I think it will be very interesting for Members of this House to know what the great English philosopher said in 1924. He said: "The Chinese find amusement In everything, and a dispute can always be settled over a cup of tea or a joke. They are not self-asserting either individually or nationally because their pride is too profound for self-assertion. Then among their qualities I place first the pacific temper which seeks to settle all disputes by peaceful negotiation." Now this should be very reassuring, but it was in 1924. Either Bertrand Russell was absolutely wrong or what has happened should prove what Communism can do to the character of a nation in less than ten years. But Bertrand Russell was equally penetrating towards the end of his essay:

"They are capable of wild excitement, toften of a collective mind."

One can imagine a section of them becoming fanatically Bolshevik or anti-Japanese or Christian or devoted to some leader whom they will blindly follow even if he has declared himself?

as an emperor. I am not sure whether we are witnessing the collective-behaviour of a very wild kind of excitement. Russell said at the end:

"One can possibly envisage a period in which the Chinese will become very dangerous for their neighbours."

Now, I recall this only to give an idea about the mind of the Chinese people. My friend, Diwan Chaman Lall, and I had an occasion for a little exchange of ideas with some of the Chinese representatives in Europe and I recall very well what I said during that conversation. I said, "Why don't we stop making such speeches against each other?" and one of them said immediately, "Well, it is not we the Chinese, but it is the Indian press that started it." He almost said that that was on such and such dates and mentioned the papers. "Well," I said, "unfortunately, we are operating under a system where it is not possible for the Government or the Prime Minister to switch on and off the campaign." And he asked, "Well, if this is the case, why don't you change the system"? For three days—morning, noon and night—Diwan Chaman Lall, I and one of the friends argued with them and I came back with the impression that the mind was single-tracked, as the Prime Minister has said, and completely certain that they were right and we were hopelessly wrong. We started from different premises, and for three days we argued and never came to any conclusion. They produced a document there which was, I think, entitled "Tibetan Crisis and Nehru's Philosophy"—an article of about 50 pages long. And the central theme, as I gathered, was that the whole difficulty about the Tibetan problem was that Prime Minister Nehru was never an authentic Socialist; he never fully grasped what materialistic dialectics meant—this was during the Tibetan crisis—and he was not at all aware of the fact that the Chinese were there to liberate the down-trodden people,

difficulty with the whole India-China problem was that our Prime Minister had never fully grasped socialism.

There was no use arguing with them, because one of them—I think he was the deputy leader of the group—asked me what precisely was the mood of the Indian people during this Tibetan Crisis. I said, "We feel very sorry for all that has happened", and without a moment's hesitation, one of them said, "You are sorry, but we are angry." And may I, with your permission, Sir, relate an anecdote referring to Diwan Chaman Lall? When they gave us this document, the next day I met them at a lunch. I was asked to give my opinion, and I knew that I was speaking to the author of that article. So, I was naturally very polite. "Well," I said, "I do not agree with this author", and underlined some of the portions. When they met Diwan Chaman Lall the next day, the same person asked him, "What do you think about it?" He said it was preposterous and used all the pungent words that he could think of. Later on, I asked him, "Do you realise that that gentleman was the author of that article?" Diwan Chaman Lall, after a moment's hesitation, said, "Then, I was talking to the right party." So, I would like to suggest that no matter what else we do in the military sense, we should keep the door for negotiations open. I cannot subscribe to the view expressed by Acharya Kripalani that there is no use of any further negotiations. (*Interruptions.*) It was reported in the press. I may be wrong. He was reported to have said that there was no use of further negotiations. Anyhow, my own feelings are—and I repeat what somebody else said during the Geneva Conference—that fifteen hours or fifteen months of negotiations are preferable to fifteen minutes of the modern war which would be devastating and annihilating.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I have not much to say because I do not think there has

[Dr. Z. A. Ahmad] been any material change or shift in the situation. Frankly speaking, Sir, I do not know what purpose would be served by this discussion except that it would give another opportunity to some of us to reiterate and reassert our respective positions on this question.

It is indeed a matter of deep regret that as yet, matters have not moved ostensibly in the direction of a peaceful settlement of the issues involved, and that it has not been possible for the two Prime Ministers to meet, an eventuality to which the entire peace-loving humanity is looking forward. And yet, in this difficult situation, we cannot think or act in a mood of anger, exasperation or despair. We stand firmly by our national policy as enunciated by our Prime Minister, a policy that has been unanimously endorsed by Parliament and acclaimed by the entire country. The main pillars of that policy stand out in bold relief. It is a policy based on certain principles which cannot be treated lightly or tampered with. It is precisely because India has behaved in this crisis in a principled manner that our prestige and stature have risen enormously in all parts of the world. Today all nations, big and small, know what we stand for and what we shall do. We shall guard our frontiers and defend the territorial integrity of our country with all our might. We shall leave no stone unturned for settling the border problem through peaceful negotiations. And, Sir, thirdly, we shall stand firmly and unswervingly by the principle of non-alignment, I submit that these are the three pillars of our national policy on the border issue and let there be no mistake about it, if you pull down any one of these pillars, the entire superstructure of that policy collapses.

Let me here reiterate my deep-seated convictions—others may not agree with it, but that is my deep-seated conviction—that there is no question of a war between India and China. There cannot be a war and there shall not

be a war, because there are no basic factors of a political or practical nature underlying the relations between both these countries which make for war. And my conviction in this matter* grows stronger when I see that despite the serious differences on border issues the two Prime Ministers never failed to emphasise in their communications to each other the need and urgency for settling the disputes through peaceful negotiations. I know, Sir, that there are friends who at a very difficult turn in the present circumstances start shouting aloud that the policy of peaceful negotiations has failed; let us abandon it; let us turn to other methods. I can only hope and pray. Sir, that time and experience would give these friends a little better understanding of the problems of war and peace in this extremely complicated world of ours.

I have nothing more to say except that at this juncture, let us hold on to our basic policy on this issue unitedly with the confidence that we have in the person of Pandit Nehru a leader of the nation who can fully be depended upon to implement with the necessary firmness, discrimination, tact and skill, this policy. I am convinced, Sir, that we shall succeed in defending our national interests and simultaneously resolving all the outstanding disputes in a peaceful manner because our cause is just, our policies are sound, and above all, because we are great and immortal people whom nobody on earth can overawe or dominate.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL (Punjab): Sir, when my learned friend, Dr. Ahmad, said just now that there has* been no material change in the situation, I was wondering whether he had really read the letter that has been addressed by Premier Chou En-lai to our Prime Minister.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: That is what the Prime Minister has said.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL: There has been no material change in the situation as far as the policy of our Prime

Minister is concerned; that is certain enough, and it is a policy which, I am glad to know, everyone in this House supports; sports whole heartedly.

Now, Sir, the material change that has taken place is in reference to the renewed demand made by China, not only in respect of the territory that is under their occupation in Ladakh, but in respect of the southern area, area south of the MacMahon Line. That is an important change to be noticed in the reply that has been given by Premier Chou En-lai. I think, therefore, it is necessary to recall certain basic matters connected with the various communications that have passed between our Prime Minister and China's Prime Minister. In essence, what has been said to the Chinese Prime Minister is this:

"We have been shocked by the explanations that you have given to us. We have been angered by the actions that you have indulged in against our people and our territory. We were the first to recognise China. We were the first to befriend China." "We"—as the Prime Minister has said—"have constantly sought to maintain and strengthen friendship between India and China." These are the Prime Minister's words. We have tried to do that and we had hoped—as the Prime Minister has also said—that when we entered into this agreement known as the Panchsheel Agreement, all our problems had been solved, problems that had been bequeathed to us by history.

We were, as I said, Sir, a few years ago, on the floor of this House, a sort of window to the world for China, across the blankness and the silence of the Great Wall of China. That is how we treated China. And then, what happens live years later? Five years later, claims are laid to vast areas of our territory; forcible intrusions and invasions take place and occupation of our territory takes place. Some of our people were killed. Some of our people were grievously maltreated.

Now the change that has come about is—I draw Dr. Ahmad's attention to it—that other claims are laid to other portions of our territory south of the MacMahon Line.

Now there are, I agree, *only two* ways to settle this matter. And we are very happy—and we are all unanimous in this behind our Prime Minister—that in spite of the grievous provocations that have been offered by China, our Prime Minister has avoided the path of war and violence and has chosen the path of peace. Sir, any impartial observer in the world would pay his tribute—as indeed the world has paid its tribute—to our Prime Minister for his wise statesmanship and for the courageous and statesmanlike manner in which he has handled this very dangerous situation. The prestige of India, somebody said just now, was high, and indeed the prestige of India and his own personal prestige has risen to unprecedented heights throughout the world as a result of the action that he has taken, the manner in which he is dealing with this easily explosive problem. This has happened externally. And internally what has happened? We lessed this today, Sir, in the course of this debate. What has happened internally is this, that the peaceful approaches to the problem, the firm manner to which the Prime Minister has handled this problem, has resulted in the creation of a great unity in the country, in creating a united nation behind him in whatever he chooses to do in regard to this matter. That is a tremendous achievement.

In this situation we have met to consider Premier Chou En-lai's reply to our Prime Minister. Now, Sir, in considering this reply one must try to prise open the mystery, examine every sentence, every word that has been uttered, in order that we may pick up some of the little pieces of the shattered jar of confidence and trust in order that we may try to put them together again. And in doing so, what do we find? We do find that there are two steps in advance, two steps that

[Diwan Chaman Lall] he has taken in advance although there are certain steps that he has taken in a backward manner. The two steps are and I want to emphasize these two steps;

No stationing of armed forces at Longju and other places.

He has accepted that proposition in this letter, that henceforth there will be no stationing of armed forces in Longju or in any other disputed areas.

The second thing that he has said, Sir, is this, that armed patrols should no longer be sent out. He says that, after the Kongka Pass incident, orders had been given to the frontier guards not to send out any patrols.

That, I take, is a welcome move on the part of the Chinese Government as far as this limited move goes. But having done that, there are several steps that have been taken, which are backward steps, and one of these is this. Insistence on the occupation of the Ladakh area on the ground that it is part of Hotien County and Rudok Dyong area of Ari.

Now there can be no doubt whatsoever that our Prime Minister in his letter of September 26, and in the annexures attached to that letter made the position perfectly clear, as to where we stand historically in the matter of this area of Ladakh. He has not replied to that letter. He has promised to send his reply but he has not yet sent a reply to that letter. Nevertheless, he still holds on to an area of 33,000 kilometers, a territory which we claim to be ours, and I should have thought, in the situation, in the offer that was made by our Prime Minister, that he would have accepted that offer and withdrawn to the line demarcated by us as our boundary, whereas we offered, according to our Prime Minister, to withdraw to the line marked by them as their supposed border. Now that would have decreased tension straightaway. But that offer was unfortunately not accepted. I do hope that

the time will come when the Prime Minister of China will take the necessary step to accept this very welcome offer by the Prime Minister of India.

Then, Sir, what Premier Chou En-lai says is that up to now they have not made any demand in regard to the area south of the MacMahon Line as a pre-condition or interim measure. Having said that, he promptly proceeds to make a demand in regard to an area south of the MacMahon Line.

He then says in regard to the Ladakh area that it would be ludicrous to think that such a country would still want to seek trouble in some desolate areas of a neighbouring country.

We do consider this ludicrous, but the fact still remains that he does still try to maintain his force in this area— 33,000 kilometers or whatever the exact area may be, in Ladakh—in spite of the fact that we claim that that area, by tradition and by history and by treaty belongs to India.

And he adds, Sir, that—

"China has not stepped into the vast area south of the so-called MacMahon Line which, not long ago, was still under the jurisdiction of the Tibetan region of China (part of the area up to 1951)."

And I do not know what he exactly means by that. Now we all know that that is not correct.

There is an area which is absolutely defined, namely the MacMahon Line area. There can be no doubt whatsoever about the legitimacy of the line that has been drawn, or as to who is the possessor of that particular area. Now, Mr. Chou En-lai refers to the new MacMahon Line and denies having provoked those two incidents and the ill-treatment of our patrols and then says regretfully:

"I must say that both our Government and people feel extreme regret at such a serious state of affairs."

Obviously, we feel a great deal of regret that such things should have happened, but they have happened not because of any choice on our part; they have happened because of the action taken probably without the authority of the Central Government in that particular border area.

Mr. Chou En-lai wants an immediate meeting with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has already replied to that that unless and until the principles are settled, the facts are settled, there is no question of a meeting to decide on the principles. How can you decide about any principle unless and until you have got the facts clear in your mind as to what the facts are?

Finally, Mr. Chou En-lai says that our two countries are backward culturally and economically, and there is no need to divert our attention from domestic matters. I think it has been made quite clear to Mr. Chou En-lai, Sir, that India cannot accept this thesis. The Prime Minister has made that perfectly clear. What is happening now is a crisis of confidence. We must pay our tribute to the various nations which have shown by silence sometimes or otherwise their sympathy to our cause. First and foremost, I must pay my tribute to the Soviet Union, not so much by what they have done or by what they have not done in regard to this matter. Here is the country which has attempted to lower tension throughout the world and it is necessary for our neighbours to listen to the insistent cry of that country, the Soviet Union, the insistent cry of the world for the decrease of tensions throughout the world. I have not the slightest doubt about the attempts made by the Soviet Union to decrease tension which have now been crowned with success in so far as a Summit Conference has now been fixed. On the one side, we notice the decrease of tension or attempts being made to decrease tension in the Western world, on the other hand, we see an increase of tension as a result of the Chinese action against our own borders.

Now, Sir, it may be—I do not know—that there is a bargain implied in what the Chinese have said to us, that is to say, the Ladakh area to remain with China on the condition that they agree to the MacMahon Line being the border as far as the eastern border is concerned. I do not know, but if it is a question of a bargain, China should really know that no bargains can be struck at the expense of India's honour and integrity, and I am sure that this House and the country are behind the Prime Minister of India in taking this particular step. The world should also know that under the leadership of Shri Nehru we do not abandon our noble policy of friendship, peace and freedom but we are as solid as steel in resisting encroachments upon the basic principles of that policy.

Dante, the great scholar—with whose work, you, Sir, also a great scholar, are familiar ----- in one of the cantos of his Divina Commedia says:

"Brothers stoop not to
renounce the quest

Of what may in the sun's
path be essayed,

The world that never mankind
hath possessed

Think of the seed ye spring up."

The world that is still to be possessed is the world of the future. We shall always be the seekers in the quest of this new world, this quest for peace and friendship.

And we, thinking of the seed we spring from still offer our hand of friendship to those who must learn to respect it.

شہمی پیر، متعدد خان (جموں اور
کشمیر) : جناب چیرمین صاحب -
میں پہلے مختصر طور سے لداخ کے
متعلق کہو پوائنٹ منسٹر چو-این-لای
کے خط کے متعلق اپنے خیالات
ظاہر کروں گا - لداخ جموں اور کشمیر
کا ایک حصہ ہے - میں یہیں کا

[شری پیدو محمد خاں]

رہنے والا ہوں۔ چھن جو کہ ہمارے ساتھ بہت دوستی کا دم بھرنا رہا اس نے پہلا قدم یہ لیا کہ وہاں سوک بنائی اور پھر دوسرا قدم یہ لیا کہ ہمارے ایک پیٹروئل پز فائو کیا جس سے کچھ آدمی مارے گئے، کچھ زخمی ہوئے اور پھر ان کو قیدی بنایا۔ اور قیدی بنا کر ان لوگوں کو جو تکنیکیات دیں وہ ہاؤس کو اچھی طرح معلوم ہے۔ یہ کہنا کہ ہمارے آدمی لڑائی میں مارے گئے تھے اس لئے ہم فکر نہ کریں تو وہ لڑائی نہیں تھی۔ لڑائی وہ ہوتی ہے جو دونوں طرف سے قیلولو کی جائے اور اس طرح سے دونوں طرف کی فوجوں آپس میں لڑیں۔ یہ ہے لڑائی کی انٹرنیشنل توضیح۔ یہ ایک قاکہ تھا جو پیٹروئل کے ان آدمیوں پر مارا گیا جو اپنے علاقہ میں پیٹروئل کر رہے تھے اور کسی دوسرے کے علاقہ میں پیٹروئل نہیں کر رہے تھے۔ اس لئے اس واقعہ کے بعد ہم وہاں کے لوگ اور ہمارے جذبات کیا ہیں اس کے متعلق ایک فارسی کا مصرعہ عرض کئے دیتا ہوں۔۔۔ وہ کہ ہم انہیں زہر پا ہیں۔۔۔

پھر اگر آپ وہائٹ پیپر دیکھیں گے اور اس کے ساتھ جو نقشہ ہے اس کا ملاحظہ کریں گے تو آپ کو معلوم ہوگا کہ لدانج میں وہ میل چوڑا اور سو

میل لمبا علاقہ اس وقت تک چھوٹے نے اپنے قبضہ میں کر لیا ہے۔ اور کس طرح سے کر لیا ہے۔ ایکریشن کر کے۔۔۔ خوہن قسستی سے ہا آپ کچھ سمجھتے ہیں اس خاندان سے تعلق رکھتا ہوں جس کے بزرگوں نے مہاراجہ گلاب سنگھ کے وقت سے ان بارقر کی حفاظت کرنے میں اپنا خون بہایا ہے اور وہاں بہت بڑی ذمہ دار پوسٹوں پر رہے ہیں۔ میں نے خود بھی بارقر قیوتی دی ہے اور وہ بھی گانگت کی طرف۔

میں ایک اور دوستی کی مثال پیش کرنا چاہتا ہوں۔ ہم سے چین کی اتلی دوستی تھی کہ ہندوستان میں یہ ایک عام نعرہ بن گیا تھا کہ وہ ہندی چینی بھائی بھائی، گویا دوستی سے آگے بڑھ کر بھائی بھائی بن گئے تھے۔ تو اب لدانج پر چائنا نے ایکریشن کیا اور قبضہ کیا۔ اس سے بھی زیادہ امپارٹنٹ علاقہ ہمزہ کے شمال میں ہے جو کاشغر کی طرف ہے۔ اس پر پاکستان نے حملہ کر کے اپنے قبضہ میں کر لیا تھا۔ یہ دو علاقے وہاں پر ہیں۔ ہمارا تو چین تھا دوست اور وہ بھائی-بھائی، اور پاکستان کا وہ تھا دشمن کہونکہ پاکستان اس کے دشمنوں کے ہلاک کے ساتھ ملا ہوا ہے۔۔۔ رمان بھائی بھائی چھوڑ کر دوستی یا شناسائی بھی نہیں تھی۔ تو آپ یہ دیکھیں گے

کہ بھائی بھائی نے کیا کیا - اس نے دشمن کے اس علاقہ پر کچھ نہیں کیا جو اسٹریٹیجکلی زیادہ اہمیت تھا - اس نے ڈاکہ مارا یا انگریزوں کو مارا تو وہ بھائی کے علاقہ میں - یہ دوستی اور دشمنی کی ایک مثال ہے کہ دشمن کی طرف ملے نہیں کریں گے اسے کوئی تکلیف نہیں پہونچائیں گے اس سے دترے رہیں گے اور دوست کی سب چیزیں ہماری ہیں - ہم تو دونوں دوست ہیں کوئی بات نہیں ہے - وراثت اسے سمجھ لیا ہے - تو میں یہ عرض کروں گا کہ ہمارے پرائم منسٹر نے بڑے واجب اور فیاضانہ طریقہ سے کچھ سنجیشنس کئے تھے جس میں بات چیت کی بنیاد رکھی تھی - اس کے جواب میں پریمیر چو-این-لائی کی چٹھی ابھی حال میں آئی ہے - تو ہمارے پرائم منسٹر کے سنجیشنس اسے تھے کہ جن میں چیت کرنے کی بنیاد تھی اور آپ سب کو معلوم ہے کہ وہ بڑے فیاضانہ تھے لہذا اس کو دھرانے کی ضرورت نہیں ہے - لیکن چو-این-لائی قطعی نہیں مانے اور کہہ دیا کہ آپ ۲۶ دسمبر تک مجھے ملیں چائنا میں یا برما میں - تو اب سوال یہ ہے کہ وہ ملیں تو کس بنیاد پر بات چیت ہو - بنیاد تو یہ ہے کہ جس طرح سے ہمارے پرائم منسٹر نے ایک بنیاد اپنی

اس چٹھی میں رکھی کہ یہ لائینس مان لو - اس بنیاد پر بات چیت کرو - اب میرا اپنا خیال ہے کہ چو-این-لائی کی اس جوابی چٹھی میں کوئی بنیاد نہیں تجویز کی گئی ہے جس پر بات چیت کی جائے اور جب تک چائنا کی طرف سے وہ بنیاد نہ مانی جائے تب تک بات کرنے کا کوئی فائدہ نہیں ہے - ہاں اپنی طرف سے ہمیں کوشش کرنی چاہیئے کہ وہ کوئی بنیاد مان لے اور اسے مان کر بات چیت چلائی جائے اور اس چھگڑے کا صلح صفائی سے فیصلہ کیا جائے - یہ اچھی بات ہوگی -

میں چائنا کی طبیعت کا ایک اور نمونہ پیش کرتا ہوں - چائنا جب تھوڑا طاقت میں آیا اس کے بعد آپ کو معلوم ہے کہ انڈوچائنا میں کیا ہوا - اس کے بعد اس نے کوریا میں کیا کیا - وہاں اس نے دیا چنہا - یہ الگ بات ہے کہ اس کی پوری پٹی یا نہیں پٹی - پھر اس کے بعد ذرا تہمت کا ملاحظہ کر لیجئے - تہمت کی جو قوم ہے وہ اس وقت بڑی مشکل میں ہے - تہمت میں وہاں کی اندرونی خود مختیاری چلی گئی اس کی تہذیب اس کا تعدن اور سارا قصہ ہی ختم ہوا - برما کے ساتھ بارڈر کے متعلق ابھی تک کوئی سمجھوتہ نہیں ہوا -

[شہری پیر محمد خاں]

اس طبیعت کی قوم کے ساتھ قلیل کرنے میں اس میں کوئی شک نہیں کہ بہت احتیاط اور عقلانندی اور دلیری برتنی ہوگی۔ اب میری یہ درخواست ہے کہ ہمیں یہ چیز کچھ واضح کر دیں چاہیئے کہ اگر اب تم آگے آئے تو پھر ہم تم کو روکیں گے۔ اس چیز کا نتیجہ بھی ہم نے دیکھ لیا۔ یہ ایک شرافت تھی ہماری طرف سے۔ لیکن ہم نے دیکھا اس کو شرافت سمجھا گیا یا ویکٹریس سمجھی گئی۔ بہر صورت اب میری یہ گزارش ہے کہ بارڈر ڈیفنس ایسا مضبوط کیا جائے ایسے آرینج کیا جائے کہ بہت اچھا انٹر کمیونیکیشن اور کمیونیکیشن کا بندوبست ہو جس سے کہ جس جگہ بھی آگے بڑھیں ان کو پورے طور پر جواب ملے۔ اور میرا اپنا خیال یہ ہے کہ ایک دفعہ اگر تھیک طریقہ کا جواب مل گیا تو وہ پھر کبھی آگے بڑھنے کا خیال نہیں کریگا۔ شاید اور کسی موقع کی تلاش نہیں کریگا۔

یہ میں نے آپ کو کافی مثالیں دی ہیں۔ بیشک ایک شریف آدمی ہو ایک کو شریف سمجھتا ہے اس پر بھروسہ کرتا ہے۔ لیکن ایک قوم کا مزاج جب ایسا ہو اور ایک خوف سامنے ہو تو اس سے آنکھیں بھی بند نہیں کر سکتے۔ اس لیے میں

یوائٹ منسٹر صاحب سے با ادب التماس کروں گا کہ وہ با عزت سمجھوتے کے لئے پیس فل طریقہ سے ضرور کوشش کریں اور اس میں ہم ان کے ساتھ رہیں۔ مگر کوئی حد بھی قائم ہونی چاہیئے۔ جب تک چائنا کو کوئی حد معلوم نہیں ہوگی یہ چیزیں نہیں رکھیں گی۔ حد کا کیا مطلب۔ وہ یہ کہ اسے صاف پتہ لگ جائے کہ اب اگر ایک پاؤں بھی آگے کیا یا ایک قدم بھی آگے کیا تو اس کا نتیجہ لڑائی ہوگی اور جس طرح سے ہم لڑائی سے بچنا چاہتے ہیں اس کی تباہ کاریوں سے بچنا چاہتے ہیں میرا اپنا خیال ہے کہ چائنا بھی اسی طرح یہ چیزیں سمجھتا ہے۔ صرف کسی کے بلف میں ہمیں زیادہ نہیں آنا ہے۔ جہاں تک چائنیز سولجرس کا سوال ہے ہمیں پتہ ہے اور میں اس کو بلا رو رعایت کہتا ہوں کہ انڈین سولجرس کے مقابلہ میں دنیا میں بہت کم شاید کوئی ہو۔

اور اس وقت ہماری فوج اپنی تیاری کے لحاظ سے اپنی ٹریننگ کے لحاظ سے اپنے ڈسپلن کے لحاظ سے بہترین فوج ہے۔ صرف ہمیں بارڈر پر یہ میری بڑی مخلصانہ التجا ہے کہ کمیونیکیشن اور انٹر کمیونیکیشن بڑی جلد قبول کرنے چاہئیں اور اس کے بعد آپ دیکھیں گے کہ حالات

کس طرح بدلتے ہیں - ایک آدمی سمجھتا ہے کہ ہم کوئی جگہ چھوڑنے کو پہنچ نہیں سکتے اس پر کتنی دلیریاں ہو جاتی ہیں - جس وقت ایک آدمی یہ سمجھے کہ یہاں میں کہسا چوری کرنے کے لئے تو آئے سے سر پر لٹے پڑے گا تو بڑا مشکل ہے وہاں دلیری کرنا -

تو ہم پرائم منسٹر کے ساتھ ہیں کہ پیس فل یلگوسی ایشن سے معاملہ طے ہونا چاہیئے - مگر ساتھ ہی یہ جو درخواستیں میں نے کی ہیں میرا خیال ہے کہ گورنمنٹ اور پرائم منسٹر صاحب ان پر زیادہ تر ضرور دھیان دیں گے اور آخر میں میں یہ کہہ کر ختم کرنا چاہتا ہوں کہ ایک قوم کا مزاج دیکھے بغیر کوئی بات نہیں کرنی چاہیئے -

† श्री पीर मुहम्मद खान (जम्मू और काश्मीर) : जनाब चैयरमैन साहब, मैं पहले मुक्तसिर तौर से लद्दाख के मुताल्लिक कहकर प्राइम मिनिस्टर चाउ-एन-लाई के खत के मुताल्लिक अपने खयालात जाहिर करूंगा। लद्दाख जम्मू और काश्मीर का एक हिस्सा है। मैं वहीं का रहने वाला हूँ। चीन, जो कि हमारे साथ बहुत दोस्ती का दम भरता रहा, उसने पहला कदम यह लिया कि वहाँ सड़क बनाई और फिर दूसरा कदम यह लिया कि हमारे एक पेट्रोल पर फायर किया जिससे कुछ आदमी मारे गये, कुछ जखमी हुये और फिर उनको कैदी बनाया और कैदी बना कर उन लोगों को जो तकलीफात दीं वह हाउस को अच्छी तरह मालूम हैं। यह कहना कि हमारे आदमी लड़ाई में मारे गये थे इसलिये हम फिज न करें तो

वह लड़ाई नहीं थी। लड़ाई वह होती है जो दोनों तरफ से डिवल्यर की जाय, और इस तरह से दोनों तरफ की फौजें आपस में लड़ें। यह है लड़ाई की इंटरनेशनल तौजीह। यह एक डाका था जो कि पेट्रोल के उन आदमियों पर मारा गया जो अपने इलाके में पेट्रोल कर रहे थे और किसी दूसरे के इलाके में पेट्रोल नहीं कर रहे थे। इसलिये इस वाक्या के बाद हम वहाँ के लोग—और हमारे जज्बात क्या हैं, उसके मुताल्लिक एक फारसी का मिसरा अर्ज किये देता हूँ—

“कि हम आतिश जरे पा हैं”

फिर अगर आप व्हाइट पेपर देखेंगे और उसके साथ जो नक्शा है उसका मुला-हिजा करेंगे तो आपको मालूम होगा कि लद्दाख में सौ मील चौड़ा और सौ मील लम्बा इलाका इस वक्त तक चीन ने अपने कब्जे में कर लिया है और किस तरह से कर लिया है ? एग्जेशन करके। खुशकिस्मती से या आप कुछ समझिये मैं उस खानदान से ताल्लुक रखता हूँ जिसके बुजुर्गों ने महाराजा गुलाबसिंह के वक्त से इन बोर्डर्स की हिफाजत करने में अपना खून बहाया है और वहाँ बहुत बड़ी जिम्मेदार पोस्टों पर रहे हैं। मैंने खुद भी बोर्डर-इयटी दी है—गिलगित की तरफ।

मैं एक और दोस्ती की मिसाल पेश करना चाहता हूँ। हमसे चीन की इतनी दोस्ती थी कि हिन्दुस्तान में यह एक आम नारा बन गया था कि “हिन्दी चीनी भाई-भाई”। गोया दोस्ती से आगे बढ़ कर भाई-भाई बन गये थे। तो अब लद्दाख पर चाहना ने एग्जेशन किया और कब्जा किया। इससे भी ज्यादा इम्पोर्टेंट इलाका हन्जा के शुमाल में है जो काशगर की तरफ है। इस पर पाकिस्तान ने हमला करके अपने कब्जे में कर लिया था। ये दो इलाके वहाँ पर हैं। हमारा तो चीन था दोस्त और “भाई-भाई” और पाकिस्तान का वह था दुश्मन, क्योंकि पाकिस्तान उसके दुश्मनों के ब्लाक के साथ

[श्री पीर मुहम्मद खान]

मिला हुआ है। वहां "भाई-भाई" छोड़ कर दोस्ती या शनासाई भी नहीं थी। तो आप यह देखिये कि "भाई-भाई" ने क्या किया। उसने दुश्मन के उस इलाके पर कुछ नहीं किया जो स्ट्रैटजिकली ज्यादा इम्पोर्टेंट था। उसने डाका मारा था या एग्रेसन किया तो "भाई" के इलाके में। यह दोस्ती और दुश्मनी की एक मिसाल है कि दुश्मन की तरफ मुंह नहीं करेंगे—उसे कोई तकलीफ नहीं पहुंचायेंगे, उससे डरते रहेंगे और दोस्त की सब चीजें हमारी हैं। हम तो दोनों दोस्त हैं, कोई बात नहीं है। विरासत इसे समझ लिया है। तो मैं यह अर्ज करूंगा कि हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने बड़े वाजिब और फैयाजाना तरीके से कुछ सजेसंस किये थे जिसमें बातचीत की बुनियाद रखी थी। उसके जवाब में प्रीमियर चाउएन-लाई की चिट्ठी अभी हाल में आई है। तो हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर के सजेसंस ऐसे थे कि जिनमें बातचीत करने की बुनियाद थी और आप सबको मालूम है कि वह बड़े फैयाजाना थे। लिहाजा, उसको दोहराने की जरूरत नहीं है। लेकिन चाउ-एन-लाई कतई नहीं माने और कह दिया कि आप २६ दिसम्बर तक मुझे मिलें—चाइना में या बर्मा में। तो अब सवाल यह है कि वह मिलें तो किस बुनियाद पर बातचीत हो। बुनियाद तो यह है कि जिस तरह से हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने एक बुनियाद अपनी इस चिट्ठी में रखी कि ये लाइन्स मान लो। इस बुनियाद पर बातचीत करो। अब मेरा अपना ख्याल है कि चाउ-एन-लाई की इस जवाबी चिट्ठी में कोई बुनियाद नहीं तजवीज की गई है, जिस पर बातचीत की जाये, और जब तक चाइना की तरफ से वह बुनियाद न मानी जाये तब तक बात करने का कोई फायदा नहीं है। हां, अपनी तरफ से हमें कोशिश करनी चाहिये कि वह कोई बुनियाद मान ले और उसे मान कर बातचीत चलाई जाये और इस जगड़े का मुल्ह सफाई से फैसला

किया जाये। यह अच्छी बात होगी।

मैं चाइना की तबीयत का एक और नमूना पेश करता हूं। चाइना जब थोड़ा ताकत में आया उसके बाद आपको मालूम है कि इंडोचायना में क्या हुआ? उसके बाद उसने कोरिया में क्या किया? वहां उसने क्या चाहा? यह अलग बात है कि उसकी पूरी पटी या नहीं पटी। फिर इसके बाद जरा तिब्बत का मुलाहजा कर लीजिये। तिब्बत की जो कौम है, वह इस वकत बड़ी मुश्किल में है। तिब्बत में वहां की अन्दरूनी खुद मुस्तारी चली गई, उसकी तहजीब, और उसका तमद्दुन और सारा किस्सा ही खत्म हुआ। बर्मा के साथ बार्डर के मुताल्लिक अभी तक कोई समझौता नहीं हुआ। इस तबीयत की कौम के साथ डील करने में इसमें कोई शक नहीं बहुत एहतियात, अक्लमन्दी और दिली बरतनी होंगी। अब मेरी यह दरखास्त है कि हमें यह चीज कुछ बांधे कर देनी चाहिये कि अगर तुम अब आगे आये तो फिर हम तुमको रोकेंगे। इस चीज का नतीजा भी हमने देख लिया। यह एक शराफत थी हमारी तरफ से। लेकिन हमने देखा, इसको शराफत समझा गया या वीकनेस समझी गई। बहरसूरत, अब मेरी यह गुजारिश है कि बोर्डर डिफेंस ऐसा सज्जुत किया जाये, ऐसे अरेंज किया जाये कि बहुत अच्छा इंटर-कम्मुनिकेशन और कम्मुनिकेशन का बन्दो-बस्त हो, जिससे कि जिस जगह भी आगे बढ़ें, उनको पूरे तौर पर जवाब मिले और मेरा अपना ख्याल यह है कि एक दफा अगर ठीक तरीके का जवाब मिला गया तो वह फिर कभी आगे बढ़ने का ख्याल नहीं करेगा। जायद और किती मौके को तलाश नहीं करेगा।

ये मैंने आपको काफी मिलावे दी हैं। बेशक, एक शरीक यादनी हर एक को शरीक समझता है उस पर भरोसा करता है। लेकिन एक कौम का मिजाज जब ऐसा हो

और एक खौफ सामने हो तो उससे आँखें भी बन्द नहीं कर सकते । इसलिये मैं प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब से वायदव इतमास करूंगा कि वे बाइजत समझौते के लिए पीसफुल तरीके से जरूर कोशिश करें और इसमें हम उनके साथ हैं । मगर कोई हद भी कायम होनी चाहिये । जब तक चायना को कोई हद मालूम नहीं होगी, ये चीजें नहीं रुकेंगी । हद का क्या मतलब ? वह यह कि उसे साफ पता लग जाये कि अब अगर एक पांव भी आगे किया या एक कदम भी आगे किया तो उसका नतीजा लड़ाई होगी और जिस तरह से हम लड़ाई से बचना चाहते हैं, उसकी तबाहकारियों से बचना चाहते हैं, मेरा अपना खयाल है कि चायना भी इसी तरह ये चीजें समझता है । सिर्फ किसी के बल्क में हमें ज्यादा नहीं आना है । जहां तक चाइनीज सोलजर्स का सवाल है, हमें पता है और मैं इसको बिला रू-रियायत कहता हूं कि इंडियन सोलजर्स के मुकाबला में दुनिया में बहुत कम—शायद कोई हो ।

और इस वक्त हमारी फौज अपनी तैयारी के लिहाज से, अपनी ट्रेनिंग के लिहाज से, अपने डिस्टिप्लिन के लिहाज से बेहतरीन फौज है । सिर्फ हमें बॉर्डर पर, ये मेरी बड़ी मुस्लिमाना इल्तजा है कि कम्युनिकेशन और इंटर-कम्युनिकेशन बड़ी जल्द डेवलप करने चाहिये और उसके बाद आप देखेंगे कि हालात किस तरह बदलते हैं । एक आदमी समझता है कि हम कोई जगह छुड़ाने को पहुंच नहीं सकते । इस पर कितनी दिलेरियां हो जाती हैं । जिस वक्त एक आदमी यह समझे कि यहां मैं घुसा चोरी करने के लिये तो आगे से सिर पर लट्ठ पड़ेगा तो बड़ा मुश्किल है वहां दिलेरी करना ।

तो हम प्राइम मिनिस्टर के साथ हैं कि पीसफुल नेगोसिएशन से मामला तय होना चाहिये । मगर साथ ही ये जो दरखास्तें

मैंने की हैं मेरा खयाल है कि गवर्नमेंट और प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब उन पर ज्यादातर जरूर ध्यान देंगे और आखिर में मैं यह कह कर खत्म करना चाहता हूं कि एक क्रॉम का मिजाज देखे बगैर कोई बात नहीं करनी चाहिये ।]

12 NOON

SHRI DAHYABHAI V. PATEL (Bombay); Mr. Chairman, Sir, the country is faced with a rather serious situation, perhaps more serious than we have imagined. After the attainment of independence and on account of the pace of development that has been going on in this country, there was coming over us a sort of self-complacency. We have received a rude shock from a friend, a neighbour, whose friendship we cherished, a neighbour whom we befriended when nobody else was prepared to befriend. Sir, we welcomed delegations from the people of China. The people of China are certainly very friendly with us, but were the intentions of the Government that sent the delegations so perfectly honest? Were the people who came in these delegations honest? And, what did they find out during their visits and their tours all over the country? Did they not find out the strategic weaknesses that existed in us and as a result, of that, have they not exploited the situation and taken courage to violate our territory so far?

I think it was at the time that we started shouting "Bhai-Bhai" in this country that the Chinese started marching across our territory. I remember quite well because it was when one of these delegations came to this country that I happened to be the Mayor of Bombay and our Government made elaborate preparations and wanted the delegations to be received properly so as to create an atmosphere of friendship between the two countries. It was at that very time, we now learn—I wish our Government had advised us earlier but we are told now—that they had been

[Shri Dahyabhai V. Patel.] in occupation of these territories, from the day that we had talks and we started shouting "Bhai-Bhai" and welcomed these delegations. I do not want to say anything unfriendly about the people of China but the regime exists there is responsible for all this and to what extent they will go and to what extent they will not go, is something that nobody can predict to-day. But looking to the ways of such administrations in the past, I think it is a serious warning to us. No doubt the whole country will stand behind the Prime Minister in the hour of crisis. I come from a part of the country which had a little quarrel with our Government; but that quarrel is settled now and the Prime Minister knows from the ovation the people had accorded him at Ahmedabad, how the people feel about the present situation and now everybody will stand behind him. But on the other hand, what does the world think of us? We, the people of India, say that we are behind our Prime Minister and the Prime Minister knows it. But what does it mean in the light of how we have acted in the matter of Goa and in the matter of Kashmir? Sir, that is a matter of serious doubt to the world and, if I may be permitted to say so, it is because of that that China has made bold to take this step. Where do we stand today? Some hon. Member referred to three pillars of non-aggression, and there were the five pillars of the Panchsheel. How many of these pillars stand today? And if these pillars are not there, then what happens to that policy? And what happens to this country? That is what is worrying everybody, even the average citizen. I was in Bombay a few days ago and I saw people were worried about it. They look at this as something very serious, a very grave and serious situation for the country. Are we prepared to meet that situation? That is the question that everybody asks. And Sir, while the whole country may be unanimous on this point, the question is, are we going to be effective? That is the question that worries everybody and I do not think

that a very satisfactory or reassuring answer is forthcoming.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU) : Mr. Chairman, I have always welcomed discussions on foreign affairs in this House and profited by them. On this occasion I was somewhat reluctant for a discussion, though I bowed to the wishes of the House and your wishes, Sir, because I felt that having regard to the present situation, nothing new, so far as discussion is concerned, had really emerged and it would be rather an odd course of events or precedent to establish that whenever I send a letter there is to be a discussion and whenever I receive a letter there is to be a discussion. As a matter of fact, such letters are normally not published. But owing to the peculiar circumstances of the case here, we have decided, and I think rightly, to place all correspondence that takes place before Parliament and the public. And yet it is obvious that diplomatic correspondence can hardly go very far, if this took place and if it is continually discussed in public. Some new method of diplomacy will have to be evolved. That was my difficulty, not of keeping back any facts from this House or the country, because when we place all our cards on the table and all our letters, then there is nothing hidden, and if we are to proceed through diplomatic means, they have to be somewhat different from the procedure often adopted in a debate. The facts may be the same, the course of events may be the same. As Mr. Dahyabhai Patel said, and no doubt, others have said or realised, the issues before us are of the highest moment and importance and require not only great effort of the mind, but if I may say so, other efforts too. It is a situation which, as was pointed out in the last debate here, is a new situation in India's history of two thousand years. It is not some mere border incident that has happened, although border incidents have happened. It is not something which can be brushed away by a little strong language as our friend

from Ladakh just used. It is a conflict between two of the biggest nations of Asia coming up face to face on a long border after thousands of years of history. Therefore, we have always to keep in mind where we are and 1 what we can do and what we will have to do. At the same time, keeping in mind all this does not mean that we should approach this question with an apprehension of not being able to do much or with weakness. I do not believe in that. But weakness or strength comes from many things and in many ways. It is not merely a question of strong resolutions that we may pass. There is the military test of weakness or strength. There is the industrial test of weakness or strength, and there is the test of the morale of the people, the discipline of the people. All these are tests and we are going to be tested in every way. And whatever may be the outcome in the next few weeks or few months or whatever the period might be of these border troubles, this testing will continue for years to come. I should like this House to realise this. Now, I do not understand when hon. Members ask: "How long are we going to put up with this kind of thing?" What exactly does this kind of thing mean? I do not understand it. I say, as long as the circumstances require it. It may be a week, a year, ten years or a hundred years, because you cannot change all these factors that go to make world changes. I use the words "hundred years" in a metaphorical sense. It may happen. But the point is, the whole outlook has to be fitted in into the enormous changes that are taking place in the world.

Here are two mighty nations of the Western world—the United States of America and the Soviet Union—opposed to each other in many ways, fearful of each other, arming against each other and yet holding their hands realising the consequences of not holding their hands realising the consequences that once they let loose the dogs of war, nobody can stop them. In strength or mili-

tary might, neither India nor China can come up anywhere near those tremendously powerful nations but we are big nations, strong nations* determined nations and each nation is having its own strong sense of self-respect and honour. If we honour, as we do, our own self-respect and are going to stand by it whatever happens, let us remember that China is not a small or a mean country. It has also a strong idea of its self-respect and honour and let us not throw words which without doing us any good do a lot of harm by attacking the self-respect of a country. This is quite apart from what they may have done or we may do. Of course, we have to talk warily as we have to act warily but with strength. Here this position has arisen due, undoubtedly, to certain activities, advances, and I think, aggression by the Chinese authorities in Ladakh chiefly and a little bit in NEFA. Now, there is a history behind it which can be traced to some extent from the White Paper that had been circulated, the correspondence, etc., and we can try to understand and find out what has happened more or less and what might take place but again, I would say, behind all this are bigger and more historical changes that are taking place in the face of history. Two revolutions come into contact, the Chinese revolution and the Indian revolution. They are of different types but nevertheless revolutions which have changed the face of these countries and which go on changing them, maybe in somewhat different ways and it is a major fact of history not only of India and China but of Asia and the world that these two revolutions come across each other on a wide field. That is the problem before us which cannot be dealt with by merely getting angry or petulant about it. Let us be angry by all means but let us think as to how we can deal with this matter. We cannot, of course, lay down every step because each step has to be conditioned by events, each step has to be conditioned by new circumstances, but broadly speaking one can lay

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] down and one can prepare for it so far as one can, because whatever step we may take can only be successful in so far as it is backed by strength and a people's will and determination to shoulder the burdens of that step. Each step involves burdens and each step involves grave difficulties for the country. When there is a conflict between two countries big or small, there are, broadly speaking, two ways of dealing with it. The normal way which every country follows till something else happens is the diplomatic way, by diplomacy of correspondence, diplomacy of personal meetings and discussion. The moment any country renounces the diplomatic way, there is no other way except war. There may be perhaps a middle way of nothing happening, just sitting at home and being angered with each other, but the moment you say that you will not have the diplomatic way, it means that you close the door of meetings, of talking and of correspondence. There it is and then the other forces come into play. It may be a way or it may be, for the moment, not doing anything if you like, but a situation which drifts towards war. I should like to know what other third way there is. That is one point to be realised when people talk about: "How long are we to wait?" I say, you will have to wait as long as you have to wait. I cannot measure that time and I cannot limit it. Do we deal with a situation like this, or does China deal with a situation like this by issuing an ultimatum to India "Do this" or "Do that"? Is India going to deal with a situation like this by issuing an ultimatum to China? Think of the meaning of these words and the consequences that lie behind those words. It means shutting the door with no other way, open except the way of war. Now, all of us want to avoid war, I presume all of us, maybe not some, but let us realise that this imagining that one can have a little scrap here and a little scrap there and then just adjust with the other party is rather infantile thing. Two great nations do not have little scraps

and then righten each other by scraps. Scraps grow. In fact, the chief difficulty at the present moment which, the House faces and the country is angered at is, as everyone knows, because scraps have occurred. It is not our fault, maybe, but it does not matter; the point is it is the scraps that rouse passions and if there are a few more scraps, the period of small scraps will end and the period of big scraps and other things will come in. One tiling leads to another. One has to look into this not only from the context of our border and of two mighty countries coming into conflict, but its consequences elsewhere, what will happen. I am being perfectly frank with this House which normally a person in my position should not be, but I think that we should be frank with each other and not lose ourselves in fine phrases. Any kind of warlike development between India and China will be an indefinite war because we will never give in and they will never give in. Realise that. It is not like what the hon. Member from Kashmir said, "Go and teach them a lesson. They will then behave". It is amazing, and this kind of approach, I am sorry to use the word, is rather infantile. It means that throughout our life we will be warring and warring because India will not give in. Are we going to allow China to conquer India, or will they allow themselves to be conquered? All these facts come up. Have you thought of them? Of course, if they try to push into India, naturally we have to fight and fight regardless of the time taken, it may be a few years or a hundred years. That is a different matter and we have to fight because there is no choice left. From our side or from their side, in bringing this decision about one thinks not once but many times before doing it. When there is no escape from it, well there is no escape from it. Therefore, one tries naturally the way of peaceful settlement. We have been talking about these things not only in our case but in the case of every quarrel in the wide world. We have talked about this in regard to big international issues and

we still go on talking about it. Was that meant for others only, this talk that we indulged in, and was not to be applied to our own case when it came? That would be a strange commentary on what we say and what we do when faced with a difficult situation. Therefore, it is inevitable that we should—call it what you like —negotiate, deal with this question diplomatically, deal with it by correspondence, by meeting when necessary, because in such a matter it is far more important to get results if results are obtainable than to allow some kind of false prestige to come in and refuse to talk. That is not becoming when major issues are at stake involving the future destiny of a country, of hundreds of millions of people, and I should say quite frankly that in this letter which we have been discussing—the letter of Premier Chou En-lai—there is, so far as facts are concerned, no giving in. It is a reiteration, repetition and reaffirmation of their claims and yet there is one thing in it which I welcome, whatever the reason for it may be, and that is, as I see it, certainly a strong desire to meet and discuss. There is that and I welcome it, although I must say I do not understand how Premier Chou En-lai expected *me* within four or five days or a week to be able to meet him in a third country. It seems rather odd to me but the fact remains that there is that and whatever the reason behind that may be—some people may say there is a special motive behind that; it does not matter. Maybe, but the point is that throughout that letter this point is brought out—so far as I am concerned, whenever the time comes, whenever it is suitable, I shall avail myself of that opportunity because the issues are too serious for any other course to be adopted. That is the broad approach to this question.

We have sent a reply to Premier Chou En-lai which has not been published but in fact I had given the substance to this House yesterday, because I wanted it to reach Premier Chou En-lai before it is published. It

will be published in a day or two, perhaps two or three days.

Now, I think in the last two or three letters that we have sent we have stated our case. I won't say in all its details but broadly they have been stated and this House should realise that merely repetition or strong repetition of certain phrases does not make a case when you are dealing with international matters, just as the Chinese Government should realise that their mere repetition of strong phrases does not make a case for them. A case is something different whether it is looked at from constitutional, legal, historical, geographical or other points of view, usage etc. We have broadly stated our case; it is a good case and I think the facts and the history behind it and all that are very much in our favour. But it has to be dealt with in that level. If I or the Chinese Government merely deal with it at a level of hurling strong speeches at each other or ultimatums, well, then there is no discretion. Then we enter into a field of conflict which from a merely verbal conflict may go on to physical conflict and from a small physical conflict to a big physical conflict and so on and so forth. All these step-by-step consequences come.

So I have ventured to place these, various considerations before the House, I am grateful to the House for their kind expressions of confidence in the policy we are pursuing and their assurance to support this policy to the hilt. Of course without that faith and confidence and assurance, I could do little; nobody could do anything. In such a grave matter we require the full direction and confidence of Parliament and of 'the people, and we have to tread the straight and narrow path of building up strength as soon as and as rapidly as we can in all ways, always also restraining ourselves from doing the wrong thing which will bring about wrong and evil results which may become irretrievable. It is now a difficult position for anyone or for any country just as the world in the

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] last few years has lived—not under a balance of strength or balance of power but it has lived—under a balance of terror. That has been the state of the world. These great mighty countries, mightier than any country the world has ever seen, have lived in a state of terror of each other—the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb and all that—and in spite of their anger and passion and disgust of each other, yet they have restrained themselves because they knew the consequences of not restraining themselves. And here now we see this great attempt being made by two of the most powerful nations in the world somehow or other to find a way out of life under this terror, a way of peace which will not come quickly. It will take time. It is not a question of a meeting, call it summit meeting or whatever you like. Even now they envisage a succession of summit meetings, but it is by far the most hopeful sign the world has been in the last ten years, this meeting of people who have been rivals and who have been opponents trying and coming together to find a way out and that way out is not merely something that will apply to them or something that will apply only to Europe. Obviously in the circumstances as they exist, it will apply to the wide world directly in some places, indirectly to others if tension goes down. Now, even in an extreme case like that, the House will see how countries have functioned even when they are full of passion and anger and strength and all that; yet they have restrained themselves realising the consequences. Are we not to show even that much restraint here and not think of the consequences of this or that action and to become impatient and say, 'we cannot wait'? Well, if we cannot wait, what do we do? I do not know what anyone has in mind when he says, 'I cannot wait; something must be done'. And I should like that aspect to be developed as to what should be done. Mere anger I can understand and I should like that anger to be translated into strength-

giving elements in the country. That I can understand. Of course we have to build up strength—that is the basis of it—in every way; as I said not only in the military way but even more so in the industrial way, and this strength has to do far more than the sword or the small gun. It is the industrial machine behind it that counts and above all it is the strength of the morale of the nation which counts, a nation which will not surrender to evil, surrender to invasion, surrender to any threat and stand up with head high whatever happens. That is the thing we build up meanwhile always trying to find a way out of the deadlock, to find a solution consonant with the integrity and self-respect of the country—because anything which goes against self-respect should be ruled out of course—at the same time remembering not to say or do things which make it difficult for the door to remain open which put the other side—not a weak side but a powerful side—concerned also angry and thinking,—wrongly you may think but rightly according to their thinking—that they are being insulted and all that. It is a very dangerous thing when the iron enters the soul of a nation. In war time it enters it and then they go ahead simply motivated by hatred and anger and a desire to destroy. It is a dangerous thing and till it works itself out in terrible destruction; well, the war proceeds—somebody is defeated or nobody is defeated—whatever may happen.

Now, I should like some difference, some distinction, to be made in India between what I would call a grim determination to preserve our freedom, our integrity, our honour and self-respect because there can be—I entirely agree with one hon. Member—no bargaining about these things, it is true, and at the same time avoiding that iron entering into our soul» and our saying something or doing something which makes the iron enter into the other party's soul. Then a situation is created out of which there is no way out, except dreadful conflict, indefinite conflict, uncertain

conflict, spreading possibly to other countries, spreading possibly all over the world. These are serious possibilities which may come about by some action of ours or China's or somebody else's. We feel wronged by China. I feel that the way they have acted has been wrong and unfair to us. I am not for the moment going—it is up to the House and hon. Members—into the question of how far we have been at fault, our Government here in the past. But we cannot go on repeatedly discussing the past. We have to discuss the present and the future. And in the future the only two courses open to us are to strengthen ourselves in all these ways that I have mentioned and at the same time to try our best by friendly approaches, dignified and friendly approaches, to find a way by settlement

Now, sometimes Mr. Dahyabhai Patel, sometimes others, talk about the "Bhai-bhai" approach. I really do not understand what this criticism means. I hope that our approach to every country will be a "Bhai-bhai" approach. I am very glad that in regard to China it was a "Bhai-bhai" approach. What does it mean? I fear the significance of the words is not realised. It is a very common thing in India, a friendly way of approach. Each country has its own way of approach. It is not a bad approach. There is nothing derogatory about it. And this "Bhai-bhai" has been used for almost every country from which people have come here. We may have used it more for some countries, because they took it more, and for some less, and it is quite a right approach. That does not mean, of course, that our eyes are closed, that we surrender anything that we value. That, of course, is wrong. More especially while Governments deal with each other, the people's approach towards another people should always be friendly, and they should not consider the people of the other country enemies, even though we are in conflict with the Govern-

ment. Surely even in the days of our national struggle, the lesson we learnt was to fight against imperialism, British imperialism, and not against the Britisher. I am merely mentioning this in passing, because I am anxious that the resentment that there is in India and which has been caused rightfully and justly should be directed into right channels of strength to build up, because it is a matter of our survival, not of phrase and of not being able to wait or not wait. It is a matter of India's survival. That is the question we have to face. It is a big question. It is not a border issue. Of course, there is the border issue. We shall deal with it to the best of our ability, but behind that border issue stretches out this future which might be and ought to be a good future for us and which might also be a dreadful future by countries fighting for survival. So, it is in this context that I would beg of this House to consider these matters and deal with them and even advise us.

Now, I am not dealing with Premier Chou-En-lai's letter. But there is one particular matter which I should like to correct. First of all, may I point out—I think it was Diwan Chaman Lall who said something about it—that the Chinese have agreed to withdraw from Longju. Yes, but they have made conditions. There are conditions attached to that. You withdraw from somewhere else. So, it is not simply a case of agreeing to withdraw. You withdraw from places in the U.P. border, Himachal Pradesh and several other things. It is not such a simple thing. Now, they have caught us in a small matter in regard to a name. They have pulled us up. They have caught us in an error. In Ladakh, in the papers you might have seen, there is this question of a place called Pulingsumdo. Now, we have got mixed up. It was an error in one of our letters between two places—Pulingsumdo and Pulamsumda. And they have caught us in that mistake in this last letter. No doubt you did

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] not know anything about it and hon. Members could not judge. They have said with great force that this place you have mentioned is in our territory. Well, it is undoubtedly. It was a misprint or error. It is a place twenty miles away. This Pulam-sumda is in our territory. So, that is true.

May I express my gratitude, again, to the hon. Members for the confidence they have reposed in the policy we are pursuing. Thank you, Sir.

DR. A. N. BOSE (West Bengal): Sir, may I ask one thing by way of clarification? The Prime Minister spoke rather strongly about the observation of the friend from Kashmir, who, as far as I understand, had said that if the Chinese made further incursions into our territory anywhere else, hit them back strongly. I think that was the purport of what the friend from Ladakh had said. May I know the attitude of the Government in this respect? Supposing there is no invasion, but there are further incursions or creeps into the frontier, then what do we do? Do we hit back or do we stand as we are now.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That surely has been stated quite clearly. We resist every kind of incursion and we build up our strength to resist these. There is no doubt about it. I am sorry if I am supposed to have used strong language against the hon. Member from Kashmir. I was not thinking of this, but some of his words were inappropriate, not to be used in regard to countries or in diplomatic parlance. It is not the idea that I objected to, but the very words which seemed to me not rightly used.

SHRI KAILASH BIHARI LALL (Bihar): May I also have one clarification from the Prime Minister? Each time when we speak here I have heard from the lips of many hon. friends emphasising that China is a mighty nation, that China is this

and that. When it comes from the Government side also, then it dampens the people. It is true that I have taken very little part here in this debate or in the other debate, but they have said it is a mighty nation. China may be mighty nation or whatever it is, but when we come into conflict with China as now, nothing in the world . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please sit down. He said also we are a mighty nation, we are a determined nation, we are a nation with honour and self-respect and dignity. We will not bargain away these. He has also said that. Do you want to say anything, Mr. Singh?

SHRI D. P. SINGH: I have nothing more to say.

THE CHILDREN BILL, 1959

THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION (DR. K. L. SHRIMAU): Sir, I beg to move for leave to introduce a Bill to provide for the care, protection, maintenance, welfare, training, education and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent children and for the trial of delinquent children in the Union territories.

The question was put and the motion was adopted.

DR. K. L. SHRIMALI: Sir, I introduce the Bill.

THE TRIPURA LAND REVENUE AND LAND REFORMS BILL, 1959— *continued*

[MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair]

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS (SHRI B. N. DATAK): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, there is very little for me to reply but only two points were raised by my hon. friend, Shri Bhupesh Gupta. One was, What was going to be done with regard to the