

Lastly, Sir, I am again grateful to the hon. Members for the very valuable and constructive suggestions that they have made today. They will receive the fullest consideration of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities as also the Government of India and the Governments of the various States.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: (West Bengal): Only one question, Sir. The hon. Minister has not said anything about the long-standing demand of the Nepali-speaking people of Darjeeling in West Bengal for recognition of their Nepali language as a medium of instruction and also for its acceptance as one of the official languages in that area. This has been pending before the Government for a long time, I understand, and I think that the West Bengal Legislative Assembly also passed a resolution in this connection. What is the position of the Central Government on this question?

SHRI B. N. DATAR: So far as the Nepali language is concerned, Sir, the Nepali-speaking population in Darjeeling District is, I believe, about 36 per cent.

[MR. CHAIRMAN in the chair.]

It is not 90 per cent. as one hon. Member either here or in the other House wanted us to believe. All the same, full attention will be given to the question of developing the Nepali language. So far as the primary schools are concerned, naturally we have got an article of the Constitution according to which primary schools will have to be established in the various areas wherever there are minority communities and where there is an adequate number of people forthcoming.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: My question was very simple—the recognition or the acceptance of it as the medium of instruction.

SHRI B. N. DATAR: I shall have it considered also.

SHRIMATI MAYA DEVI CHETTRY (West Bengal): Regarding the figures, so far as I know, the Nepali-speaking population in Darjeeling is about 80 or 85 per cent.

SHRI B. N. DATAR: I am afraid this figure is not correct, Sir.

MOTION RE THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now, we take up the discussion about the relations between India and China. It is a difficult and delicate subject. The Prime Minister on the floor of this House indicated the dual approach—to take every step necessary for protecting the integrity of the country and to seek every means for a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. Angry words do not help; they only add to the trouble. Members, I hope, will discuss the problem with their usual dignity and restraint.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, I move:

“That the present relations between India and China be taken into consideration.”

Sir, we have to consider a question of serious importance to India today. It is difficult to speak in a measured language on such a question, but I shall certainly bear in mind what you and the Prime Minister have said with regard to the importance of maintaining the integrity of India and friendship between India and China, and I hope that not a single word will fall from me which will in any way accentuate the tension that may exist on any point between India and China.

[Dr. H. N. Kunzru.]

Sir, differences regarding certain border areas between India and China along the India-Tibet border have existed for some time, and the White Paper that has been supplied to us shows that these differences have existed for at least seven years. They are along the frontier from Ladakh to NEFA. It is not my purpose to exaggerate these differences or to say that there are border areas in dispute all along our frontier with Tibet. But there are certain regions where our views have differed from those of the Chinese. The House will surely like to know the extent of the areas in regard to which there is a controversy between India and China. I shall not refer to these areas in detail, but draw the attention of the House to what is stated on page 46 of the White Paper. The map of China published in the China Pictorial magazine of July, 1958 shows as Chinese areas four of the five Divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency. I need not name these Divisions, but the House will realise the importance of this matter when it considers what Mr. Chou En-lai has said with regard to their area. The area of these four Divisions amounts to 90,000 square kilometers or about 35,000 square miles. Then, Sir, some areas in the north of the State of U.P. probably in the Garhwal District, have been shown in the China Pictorial as belonging to China. Large areas in Eastern Ladakh which form part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir have also been shown as belonging to China. It also appears from this magazine that the entire Tashigang area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in North West Bhutan have also been included as Chinese territory. The House will see, therefore, that the questions that are at issue between India and China do not concern a square mile here or a square mile there, but fairly large chunks of territory both in the central and eastern parts of our frontier with China. The Government of India have made numerous repre-

sentations to the Government of China with regard to the settlement of the questions I have already referred to, but as the Chinese Government always replied to our complaint by bringing forward a countercharge of aggression, against us, it was found impossible by the Government of India to settle the question in the normal diplomatic manner with the Chinese Government. Whenever the Government of India complained of Chinese intrusion into Indian territory, the Chinese Government claimed that the territory in question was Chinese and that it was the Indians that were, therefore, intruders and should be asked to leave the territory.

Now, Sir, the Prime Minister of India in this situation wrote a personal letter to the Prime Minister of China. He drew the attention of the Prime Minister of China to the conversation that he had with him with regard to the Sino-Burmese and the Sino-Indian borders. It seems that Mr. Chou En-lai himself referred to these matters and said that it was his intention to settle the question peacefully with Burma by accepting the McMahon Line and that he desired that a friendly settlement should be arrived at with India also. Our Prime Minister while drawing the attention of Mr. Chou En-lai to this conversation said—this conversation took place, I believe, in 1954; I hope I am right there—

“You told me then that you had accepted this McMahon Line border with Burma, and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which exist between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so.”

Now what is Mr. Chou En-lai's reply in January, on the 23rd January, 1959, to our Prime Minister's letter which was sent in December, 1958, on the

14th December? He observed that the McMahon Line was never recognised by the Chinese Government. He then referred to the various difficulties that he had to consider and then said:

"In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. ***However, we believe that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the boundary line."

I do not know, Sir, what Mr. Chou En-lai meant by the words, 'realistic attitude', but I thought that these words implied that he would take existing facts into account and not try to have a settlement brought about on the basis of Chinese maps the accuracy of which has been denied by the Government of India. Well, if the Prime Minister of China does not wish to hark back to the Simla Conference of 1913-1914 but wishes to take the present circumstances into account, his reply, I must say, was exceedingly disappointing. He has suggested in the letter that I have referred to, provisional maintenance of the *status quo*, each side keeping to the border areas at present under its control and carry on negotiations for the settlement of the questions at issue.

The Indian Prime Minister's second letter which dealt with Mr. Chou En-lai's reply to his first letter pointed out, with regard to the McMahon Line, that the Tibetan Plenipotentiary stated that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appended to the Convention of 1913-1914. The Indian Prime Minister also pointed

out that the Chinese Plenipotentiary who attended the Simla Conference, while he objected to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet and to the boundary between Tibet and China raised no objection to the boundary fixed on the map between India and Tibet. The Prime Minister of India agreed with the Prime Minister of China that negotiations should be carried on to settle the disputes with regard to certain areas between India and China but said that the position should be restored to what it was before the recent disputes arose and that negotiations should be carried on then. Here apparently the two Prime Ministers agreed, but there was an important difference between them on one point. While Mr. Chou En-lai proposed that India should recognise the existing situation, that is, the possession acquired by China of certain Indian territories, our Prime Minister suggested that the position should be restored to what it was before the disputes began.

The Indian Prime Minister's second letter was sent on the 22nd March, 1959, but no reply was received from Mr. Chou En-lai except a day or two ago. Now what does he say? I shall not deal in detail with this letter, but only point out that Mr. Chou En-lai has again said emphatically that China never recognised the McMahon Line and pointed out certain difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this Line by China. He referred to the British attitude, what he called the British imperialist attitude in the old days and so on, and said that it was clear that there was a fundamental difference—these are the words used by him—that there was a fundamental difference between the points of view between the Indian and Chinese Government in this matter. I shall have something to say about this later on, but I should like to ask the Prime Minister to throw some light on that portion of Mr. Chou En-lai's latest letter, which deals with the China-Sikkim border. He says that China is willing to live together

[Dr. H. N. Kunzru.]

in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan without committing aggression against each other. How Sikkim and Bhutan can commit aggression against China is beyond my comprehension. But let that pass, and let us try to understand what follows. Then he goes on to say that China has always respected proper relations between them and India. It can be seen from the above that the way the Sino-Indian boundary has always been drawn in maps published in China is not without grounds, and that, at first, the British and Indian maps also drew the Sino-Indian boundary roughly in the same way as the Chinese maps. I cannot say anything, Sir, about the assertions of Mr. Chou En-lai because, if he took about six months to reply to the letter sent to him by the Prime Minister of India in March, 1959, surely the Government of India must get some time to examine the claims of the Chinese Prime Minister. I should like to know from the Prime Minister what the significance of the word "proper" in the phrase "proper relations between them and India" is? Does this word mean that the Chinese Prime Minister thinks that the present relations between India on the one hand and Sikkim and Bhutan on the other are not proper? Does this further mean, when taken in conjunction with the words of the last sentence that I read out, that China claims that the relations between India and these territories will be proper only when Bhutan parts with those territories which the Chinese maps show as belonging to China?

Now, Sir, I should like to say a word about the Chinese maps. The question of difference between the Chinese and the Indian maps has not figured for the first time in the correspondence between the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of China. The question was brought to the notice of Mr. Chou En-lai when he came to India, I think, in 1954 and his reply was that the Chinese maps were old and that the

Government of China have had no time to correct them. He said that he would look into the matter, out would have no consult the Tibet region which was primarily concerned with the boundary. Sir, now five years have elapsed since then. Or, ten years or a little more than ten years since the present Government of China came into power have passed, but these maps remain as they were. The latest communication of the Chinese Prime Minister does not show that any steps have been taken or are likely to be taken at least in the near future to rectify these maps. In every letter received from the Chinese Government it speaks of its belief in the principle of co-existence and the five principles of *Panchsheel* and of the high value that it sets on its friendship with India. But, notwithstanding the expression of these friendly sentiments, no concrete measure has yet been taken to lessen the disagreement between India and China with regard to certain border areas to which I have already referred. I do not think, therefore, that it is fair in these circumstances for the Chinese Government to go on referring to the Chinese maps. The question should be settled as early as possible. And, if Mr. Chou En-lai's attitude is as realistic as he claims it to be, I have no doubt that the disputes, whatever they may be, will be speedily settled.

Sir, I should like to refer to Mr. Chou En-lai's letter. I do not want to be an alarmist, Sir, but in his latest letter he has emphatically re-asserted the position claimed as correct by the Chinese Government in its earlier communication. His letter of the 8th September is more firm and, if I may say so, more aggressive in its tone than his reply to the Indian Prime Minister's first letter. In this position we have to consider how we are situated.

The first point that I wish to make is that the Chinese intrusion into our territory has been going on since

1954, but why information has been given to Parliament about this small area or that small area, in respect of which questions were put either in this House or in the other House, and no full and comprehensive account of the situation has ever been vouchsafed to Parliament either by the Government of India or by the Prime Minister? Sir, debates have taken place in this House on several occasions in the course of which the Prime Minister could have made the position clear. But he has observed, what he calls, 'discreet silence' in one of his letters on these questions. I think that he carried his discretion a little too far.

The House will remember that the Tibetan situation was discussed here in May last, and even on that occasion, with the pretty full knowledge of the situation, the Prime Minister did not say anything which would enable us to have even the slightest idea of the situation as it then existed. I think we can have a just grievance on this subject. It is true that there was correspondence going on between the Government of China and the Government of India, but considering the long period over which the correspondence had lasted, I do not think that the matter could be treated as an ordinary matter which had been under discussion only for a short time. Sir, I venture to say that had the position been made clearer to us some time ago, we would not have found ourselves suddenly faced with a situation that was unexpected by the country.

Sir, before leaving this subject I should like to refer . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: You have just two minutes.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: I shall request you to give me three or four minutes

MR. CHAIRMAN: Just two minutes.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: Two minutes I have and I request you to give me three minutes more. Even before the discussion began I told you that it might not be possible for me to finish the whole thing in thirty minutes. I would crave your indulgence, in view of the importance of the subject, to give me three or four minutes more.

Sir, the road, known as the Sinkiang-Tibet Road, the construction of which was completed in 1957, passes through a territory belonging to Ladakh. I ask the Prime Minister whether he brought at least this important fact to our notice. If he did not, why it was that he maintained silence on so important an affair?

Now, Sir, I come to Mr. Chou En-lai's letter. As I have already said, I regard its tone as showing that the position is more difficult than we had thought it to be. Indeed, if I may speak plainly, it has virtually thrown our foreign policy into the melting pot. It is clear that the Chinese aggression into N.E.F.A., which is the last case of the intrusion of Chinese troops into Indian territory, is due to the irritation of the Chinese Government over the attitude of the Government and the people of India with regard to the measures taken by the Chinese Government to enforce its will recently in Tibet. I do not think that 3 P.M. his will deter us from doing our duty but what Mr. Chou En-lai has said on this point makes it clear that it is not the question of rightness or wrongness that is at dispute. What he wants is that India should never differ on any question of serious importance from China. This position can never be realized and if so, I would like to know what steps the Government of India takes, so that it may not find itself confronted with a situation like that which exists at present. The Prime Minister has undertaken, and you have repeated what he said, that the integrity of India must be maintained, which is quite consistent with the maintenance

[Dr. H. N. Kunzru.]

of friendship between India and China. How is this going to be brought about? Have any steps been taken to adopt measures which would bring about a speedy settlement of the questions at issue? We have always believed in non-alignment but I am afraid that *Panchsheel* has been used as a slogan in recent years. I may almost say that it is used as an opiate to lull both the Government and the people of India into a sense of security. While repeating this formula, we took no account of the hard realities of life. Sir, the Government must work single-mindedly and whole-heartedly to repair the mistakes made in the past. Perhaps if the Government of India had been more alert in the past, something might have been done by now to bring about a better recognition of India's claims to the territory which it occupies in the N.E.F.A. than is the case at present. If, however, instead of single-minded and whole-hearted action, there is either vacillation or want of unanimity, it will be dangerous both for the Government and for the country.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That will do, Dr. Kunzru.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: One word, Sir. We must realize how much is at stake. Failure on our part to maintain the integrity of our country will gravely disappoint and distress not only the people of India but our friends and neighbours and I hope that this will be kept in mind by the Government of India at least in the future, if it has not been kept in mind by it so far.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion moved:

"That the present relations between India and China be taken into consideration."

Mr. Sinha.

Fifteen minutes for every speaker except the Prime Minister. Under no circumstances, should it be exceeded.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA (Bihar): Sir, we are discussing today an issue of grave consequence, grave consequence not only for India and China but for the world at large. The peace and friendship between India and China that has continued for more than twenty centuries and was consolidated in the post Independence period has been a great stabilising factor in this disturbed world. Unfortunately a situation has arisen in which that peace and friendship seems to be in danger. Any disturbance of this friendship is likely to lead to consequences which would be grave for the two countries concerned and grave for the world at large. For, once these two great and powerful countries give up their policy of friendship and start something like a military race, the peace of the world shall be gravely imperilled. Peace is good but what is the basis on which peace can be maintained in the modern world? India and China had been at peace for at least twenty centuries of history or more. But then some of the great factors that made for peace and friendship between the two countries were the great natural barriers of the Himalayas and the desert. The two countries, as it were, never came into intimate contact with each other but in the modern world—as the Prime Minister very often reminds us—in the atomic age, space has lost its meaning. Time has been shortened and physical barriers are not of consequence. The result has been that the two countries have come very close to each other on their respective borders. They are today, as it were, in the embrace of each other. It is for the two countries to decide whether that embrace shall be one of love and friendship or an embrace of two duellists, two fighters, who are anxious and eager to overthrow each other. In this atomic age, when physical barriers have lost their meaning, friendship must be based on different elements. Friendship must be based on tolerance, friendship must be based on respect and there

is no respect where the power position of the two countries that are face to face with each other is different. Therefore, for the continuance of peace, it is extremely essential that we establish a situation where it becomes obligatory for China to respect us and therefore to have a desire for continuance of this peace and friendship. The two Prime Ministers advocate the policy of *Panchsheel* and rightly so. I feel that we should profess great ideals, I feel that we should act up to those great ideals but I also feel that we must be prepared for any situation and guard against a situation in which those ideals may be given a go-by by the other party. When I look into the whole situation, as appears from the White Paper, I find that we have been caught napping at the boundaries by China. While China developed her communications to the boundaries, while she made her boundaries accessible from the mainland of China, we, in the faith based on our past friendship, in the faith based on the professions of *Panchsheel* by the great Chinese people and their Prime Minister, neglected to build up our communications on that strategic frontier. The result has been that if we scan the White Paper, we find that we have always appeared as complainants and seldom as defendants. I, therefore, feel that the Government of India should retrieve this situation by rapidly building up their defence potential on the boundaries which we had with China for the last 50 years or more. I agree with the two Prime Ministers that every effort should be made to find a peaceful solution but that peaceful solution can only be based on the *status quo*. This is the desire of our Prime Minister, this is the desire of the Prime Minister of China but I was amused to read the letter of the Prime Minister of China published in the newspapers to-day. His conception of the *status quo* seems to be rather queer. In his letter, while mentioning the Ari area of China's Tibet and India, he says:

"The area of Sang and Tsungsha, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, which had always belonged to China was thirty to forty years back gradually invaded and occupied by the British."

Therefore, for the last 40 years it has been in the possession of India, in the possession of Kashmir. But then, he wants that the hands of history should be moved back and this territory should revert back to China. That, in my opinion, is a queer conception of establishing peace on the basis of the *status quo*.

Then again I find that while referring to the McMahon Line, the letter says that after 1947 Tibet made claims over 90,000 sq. kilometers of the territory which had fallen within the McMahon Line and had been in India for the last forty years and more. So he admits that this territory has been part of India for forty years and more; but he wants the return of this territory. I do not know if this is adherence to the principle of *status quo*. If we start going back into history, we do not know where we would stand. There have been so many changes, historical changes on this undemarcated border in the course of several centuries and if they claim to go back forty years or more, there are other parties concerned who may like to go back a hundred or two hundred or three hundred years or more. That will create a situation which will not be conducive to the continuance of peace and friendship between these two countries. Therefore, I feel that while we should establish our friendship on the basis of *status quo*, it should be the *status quo* that obtains today, not the one that harks back to fifty years or half a century.

Sir, I hope the Prime Minister of China and the great Chinese people realise the implications of the repudiation of the line in Ladakh and the

[Shri B. K. P. Sinha.]

McMahon Line. If these lines have been a reality, then that reality has to be respected. If they ignore that reality, then we shall equally ignore that reality. Repudiation of these lines does not mean that they shall be free to come to the south of these lines while we shall be tied up by these lines at those places. If that repudiation gives them the freedom to come to the south, into territories which have long been ours, that will equally give us the freedom to march into territories which had long been theirs. This is a situation which nobody can contemplate with equanimity. That is a situation which will lead to grave disturbance of peace. The two countries then will be placed in the position in which the Great Powers were placed in the nineteenth century when there were many unknown and unexplored areas and the national of one country could go and plant its flag on a territory and that territory would belong to the nation to which he belonged. If these lines are repudiated, then the situation on the frontier will be similar to that. Then on these frontiers, while our desire is to see that peace and friendship are established and continued, we will be having a sort of permanent minor war, with one country trying to intrude into one side and the other trying to intrude on the other side of the border. This is a situation which, I feel, should be guarded against.

Lastly, I have to submit that I have read the correspondence with some care. But I do not find what alternative principles the Chinese people or the Chinese Government want on which the boundaries of the two countries should be based. If these lines are to be repudiated, they must make it clear as to what are the principles on which the boundaries should be based. They have to make that clear. Race in modern times is only one of the factors on which to rest the solution of such questions. There are many other factors to be considered.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That will do.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: Only one more sentence, Sir. I agree with the policy of our Prime Minister that we should explore every avenue for a peaceful settlement. At the same time, we should take steps, and energetic steps, to guard these frontiers which have been ours for fifty years or more.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD (Uttar Pradesh): Sir, I rise to speak on this question with feelings of deep regret and sorrow due to the fact that a certain amount of estrangement has come about in the relations between India and China. I cannot but feel sad at the fact that these two great and proud countries, whose strength and unity are a guarantee for the freedom, prosperity and progress of other Asian countries, are unable today, to agree on the question of boundaries. Unfortunately, Sir, certain incidents have taken place which are making these two countries drift gradually and despite themselves, into a state of what may be called cold-war. I am sure every patriot and every person who loves peace in this world will share with me these feelings of sorrow. I call these incidents that have taken place during the last one year or so, border incidents.

(Interruptions.)

AN. HON. MEMBER: It is a continuous process.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: Listen to me. Allow me to speak. I call them deliberately border incidents and I repeat it. I would not like to call them—whether anybody likes to call them or not, I would not like it—acts of war or acts of aggression. After all, we must understand that there is a huge border and it is a fact that that border has not been properly delimited, that there are certain disputes and different points of view about certain areas and . . .

(Interruptions.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Dr. Z. A. AHMAD: In these circumstances, if tension arises about this point or that, I would call that border disputes and I do not consider it very surprising that such tension should develop. We in our country know that even in the demarcation of linguistic States, the question of borders has come up.

(Interruptions.)

You will listen to me fully. Let me have my full say.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Look here, let him go on. You don't like to be interrupted.

Dr. Z. A. AHMAD: We know that feelings have been roused about a few villages here or a few villages there. I don't say that both these circumstances are equal. What I maintain is this—when there is such a big border, when the border covers some 2,000 miles, when there are hilly areas and uninhabited areas, if such incidents develop, we should not rush and declare that these are incidents leading to a war situation. But there are some people in our country—I would not name those parties but there are some people here and there—who would straightaway take up this question and start shouting from housetops that invasion is going to come about, that a war is imminent and so get ready to fight the Chinese. One responsible leader of a responsible party said—I was surprised to hear that—that it was not possible to co-exist with the Chinese in a peaceful manner, that the whole principle of *Panchsheel* was born in sin. If such slogans are raised and if passions are worked up, then I would say clearly and categorically that friends who are doing that sort of thing are not helping the Indian people and they are not helping the cause of peace. They are not helping the cause.

(Laughter.)

Let them laugh, Sir.

SHRI M. BASAVAPUNNAIAH (Andhra Pradesh): Is this helping the cause?

Dr. Z. A. AHMAD: Let them laugh, Sir. I will have my say and I need your protection for having my say. I will not be deflected from saying what is true by people laughing. I say, Sir, that by raising sentiments of that nature, they are not helping the cause of world peace, they are not helping the cause of India. I know that some people say that the Prime Minister is doing nothing when an invasion is going on in the country, that he is sitting quietly and is going round here and there. All sort of panicky stories are there. I do not under-rate the importance of the issue. I think it is a very important issue. When two big countries begin to differ on such vital matters as the question of boundary, I do not, in the least, under-rate the importance of it but I also do not under-rate the dangerous potentialities that exist in this situation if matters are not set right immediately or as soon as possible. I do not under-rate this and yet I deprecate the sentiments, the war-like sentiments or the war psychosis expressed in the country. I want to say this frankly, Sir, that sometimes when I hear some of these things, my national dignity is hurt. (Interruption.) I do not think my country is so weak that a few border incidents will create a crisis in this country. I think we are strong enough to defend it and we shall.

AN HON. MEMBER: Not with your help.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order. You will have your chance.

Dr. Z. A. AHMAD: I consider it historically and politically wrong to hold that there are conditions of war, or there is an objective basis for war between the two countries. On the other hand, I hold that the objective basis is all in favour of growing peace

[Dr. Z. A. Ahmad.]

between these two countries. There is that common background of struggle for freedom. There is the urge for reconstructing our economies; there is that urge to have peace in order to grow in our respective countries. This being the objective basis, I hold, Sir, that these two countries have existed in a state of peaceful co-existence for such a long time, they will exist in that state and they are going to exist in that state. No propaganda of a warlike character anywhere in the world is going to weaken that bond of friendship which has existed in the past.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: What about the occupation of Indian territories?

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: I have very little time. I will go on with my speech and if they want to ask any questions, they can do so later on.

MR. CHAIRMAN: They cannot restrain themselves. That is the trouble.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: That is all right, Sir.

Behind the emotions, Sir, is the ideological, political opposition and that is changing the course of the foreign policy of the Government of India. That ideological opposition is there. Otherwise, why should there be this bitterness in the case of China, all of a sudden? Little incidents happen and they rush into the position of saying that something very grave has happened, something dangerous has come into existence.

The question has naturally now come to that level where efforts have to be made by both sides to come together. Obviously, certain backgrounds have arisen which complicate matters, the background of Tibet, for example. I think the Communist Party has made its point of view quite clear on the question of Tibet and I do not want to say anything which might confuse the issue. We have taken this point of view right from the very beginning that since you have recognised Tibet as a part of

China, the revolt in Tibet should not have been given the moral support that was given to it by certain elements.

SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: I would like to put this question, and I hope I will get an answer to this question from somebody, and that is this: If Phizo and Abdullah had run out of this country into a neighbouring country and suppose those persons had been given ovations and had been received as heroes, how would we have felt about it?

THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOUR (SHRI ABID ALI): Kashmir and Tibet are the same?

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: I can understand your sympathy because of our cultural connections with Tibet but here is the Dalai Lama. He is supposed to be a pious man. (*Interruption*). The Dalai Lama is a pious person but he is a politician. He is here. Our Government told the Dalai Lama that he should not do anything which would cause any embarrassment to the Government. He has been given refuge; he is a refugee who has been given asylum but the Dalai Lama is here in Delhi today meeting diplomats of different countries. He is pressing his point of view in the Press and before the public directly in public meetings. (*Interruption*.) We sit quiet and we have nothing to say. He is going round propagating his point of view, mobilising public opinion and saying that he is the head of the Government. (*Interruption*.) This is causing irritation; this is creating a background and I say that if that backward were not there. . . . (*Interruption*.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Sit down.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: I have got only one or two minutes, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: So, wind up.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA: May I ask a question, Sir?

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: No. I will answer no question because I have only three minutes more.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA (Bihar): What is the attitude of the Communist Party of India?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Sit down, you are disturbing.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): You come to the Lobby. I shall tell you.

SHRI RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: I do not want it in the Lobby. I want it said in the House.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The trouble is that they cannot restrain themselves. You should have some control over yourselves.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Even looking at you, they cannot control themselves, Sir.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: May I continue, Sir? The question of boundaries is there. It is a very difficult question and it has been made more difficult by the position taken by the two sides. While the Government of India takes the position that we abide by the McMahon Line, the Chinese say that they do not accept the McMahon Line and that is very complicated.

SHRI ABID ALI: What do you say?

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: I will say whatever I have got to say.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Why are you getting up like this? In the beginning itself, I warned you that you should not get into a temper.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: My submission, Sir, is this that despite these two divergent positions that exist now, negotiations should be started. We should come together. After all, the

McMahon Line has not been properly demarcated still and that has been accepted by the Prime Minister. . . .

SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: After all, it is a fact that there are areas which have got to be demarcated properly. Now, how can that be done? That can be done not by your shouting or my shouting. It can be done by the two heads of the two States or their representatives coming together and setting up an arrangement or a mechanism to find out what is right and what is wrong, what claims are correct and what claims are incorrect. I would, therefore, urge most humbly on the Prime Minister, who is a great peace-maker, to take the initiative. Let him take the initiative in this matter. As an Indian, I have got the right to appeal to the Prime Minister of my country to take the initiative in this matter. He is a great peace-maker and if he takes the initiative in this matter, he will go down in history as the greatest architect of peace.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: What initiative? Initiative in what? (*Interruption.*)

DR. Z. A. AHMAD: Now, Sir, I will wind up by saying one thing. There is a basis for settlement; there is a basis for coming together and the Prime Minister has stated categorically that India has no aggressive designs and that we are prepared, on the basis of the principles of *Panch-sheel* to settle the boundaries and the Chinese Prime Minister almost says the same thing. He says in his letter that the Chinese Government has consistently held that an over-all settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides taking into account the historical background and the existing realities adhering to the five principles through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That will do, Dr. Ahmad. Yes; Diwan Chaman Lall.

SHRI P. N. RAJABHOJ (Bombay): Do you adhere to Panchsheel?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Sit down, Mr. Rajabhoj; you adhere to it, I know.

SHRI BISWANATH DAS (Orissa): Sir, I want just a word of clarification from the hon. Member who spoke on behalf of the Communist Party. I have heard with patience the entire speech made by him but I must confess that I am in the position of one who after hearing the seven *Kandas* of Ramayana wanted to know whether Sita belongs to the male or the female sex. That is my position. Sir, I want to know the clear attitude of the Communist Party to the McMahon Line, whether they stand by that Line as the boundary between China and India? That is point No. 1. Secondly I want to know whether they consider the present Chinese aggression as a bargain-counter—India, for good or for bad, having given shelter to Dalai Lama. On these two issues I want to know their clear stand.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Consult us in the Lobby.

SHRI M. BASAVAPUNNAIAH: If you will give me 10 minutes, I shall answer it.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL (Punjab): Sir, your wise injunction has, by and large, been very well discharged by the speakers who preceded me.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I do not think so.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL: I said, by and large. Sir, my hon. friend who spoke last posed a question to the Prime Minister, posed a question to all of us. He said, "Let the Prime Minister take the initiative". Initiative about what? Has the Prime Minister not been taking initiative all

these years? Does not this White Paper show the initiative that the Prime Minister has been taking? What other initiative do you want him to take? It is for the hon. Members sitting there to take the necessary initiative.

SHRI M. BASAVAPUNNAIAH: We are not the Government. We can ask the Government to take the initiative. I object to that sort of thing.

(Interruptions.)

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL: I am prepared to give way to him or to anybody provided he puts a question to me which is intelligible to everybody but to go on in a blubbing way is no good. I cannot deal with them.

Now, when my hon. friend was speaking, I was really surprised because I think it is very necessary that in dealing with this important subject we should really know whether we are speaking a common language or not, whether those who are across the McMahon Line and those who are on this side of the McMahon Line are speaking the common language and I say this advisedly. You will recall—the Prime Minister referred to it the other day—that when El Salvador raised the question of Tibet in the United Nations some years ago, our representative there said that we had received an assurance from the Chinese Government that they wanted to settle the matter peacefully and by negotiation. India's suggestion was then supported and the matter was postponed. But what happened later? Although the Chinese armies had halted at that time when they gave us that assurance, they immediately started marching into Tibet again and the result was a settlement between the Dalai Lama and his representatives and China which may be under the compulsion of events according to the Prime Minister.

Well, in his letter which was released last night, Mr. Chou En-lai is reported to have said that the two sides should seek an over-all settlement by friendly negotiations and in

the meantime maintain the long-existing *status quo*. What was said about Tibet was a settlement by negotiation, and peacefully, and what is said about our border is a settlement by friendly negotiations. I do want my hon. friends to remember that after stating that, the Chinese army started marching into Tibet and conquered the whole of Tibet. I would like to know exactly what language is it that they are speaking and what language is it that they understand us as speaking.

Sir, I think it is necessary to remind everyone concerned that India is not Tibet, that Indians are united to a man, and I hope there is no one in this House who will be foolhardy enough to oppose or reject this statement that Indians are united to a man in resisting any encroachment on what we firmly believe to be Indian soil.

Mr. Chou En-lai in his letter published this morning has raised several points. Firstly, he challenges the McMahon Line. Dr. Kunzru has dealt with this particular matter by referring to the statement, on page 49, of the Prime Minister who had made a note of the conversation that he had with Mr. Chou En-lai when he visited Delhi. Mr. Chou En-lai has also raised the question of the Ladakh border. In regard to Ladakh border, he claims that when the then Chinese Government said that the boundary was clear, they meant in 1847 exactly what Mr. Chou En-lai means in 1959. If they thought it was clear, we also thought that the Boundary was clear. But that does not mean giving authority to anybody to march into the country and start building a road many miles inside the line that has been accepted to be clear.

In regard to McMahon Line, the Chinese Government absolutely does not recognise it. Mr. Chou En-lai says that they do not absolutely recognise the so-called McMahon Line

but the Chinese troops have never crossed it. My answer to my friend, Dr. Ahmad, is this. If the Chinese have never crossed the McMahon Line, they obviously know where the McMahon Line is. It is not a question of a few villages here or a few villages there. He must have read carefully the statement that was issued in which the claim is not for a few villages here or a few villages there. The claim is for 35,000 square miles.

SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: No, no; it is for 45,000 square miles.

DIWAN CHAMAN LALL: Well, they are better mathematicians than I am who say it is 45,000.

Now, what does Mr. Chou En-lai suggest? He says, withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long-existing state of the boundary between the two countries. But it is precisely the long-standing boundary that we call the McMahon Line.

Now, Mr. Chou En-lai has referred to the map published in the 1929 Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. In fact there are three maps published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Map 68 does not show Sikkim at all. Map 66 gives the boundaries dividing Bhutan, Nepal and N.E.F.A. areas from Tibet. Map 64 marks on the northern side what must be the McMahon Line. I do not know what sustenance, what support Mr. Chou En-lai can derive from a reference to these three maps or any one of them published in 1929 in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. You will recall that we had a dispute regarding this border in 1914 and at the Convention it was decided that a certain border should be drawn and the agreement was initialled by the Chinese, the Tibetans and by the British representing India. But it was not later accepted by the Chinese. That was not accepted, not because of the border between India and Tibet—that was accepted by all—but because of the border between Tibet and China, but because of the

[Diwan Chaman Lall.]

decision that there should be two Tibets—Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet, the Outer Tibet being Shigatse and Chamdo, nearer India, where it was decided that no troops should be stationed by the Chinese under any circumstances. Not only no troops should be stationed, but there should be no interference with the administration of the Dalai Lama in Tibet in this particular area. I do not know why, for what reason, my hon. friend dragged in the question of Tibet. I am merely mentioning it in regard to the 1914 Convention.

Now, Sir, I am glad that the Prime Minister has stressed, in spite of all this, the fact that *Panchsheel* is a doctrine not depending upon the vicissitudes of Sino-Indian relations alone. The essence of live and let live is to be able to see the world not through the eyes of Peking alone. The essence is to recognise that the other fellow may also have a point of view. It may not be your point of view. It may not be the right point of view from your angle, but then you do not proceed to correct it by brandishing a sword or speaking the language of war, of abuse and of military action. I hope, therefore, that Peking will no longer continue to live in a frozen igloo of isolation and by ill-considered action alienate the friendship of the greatest friend of humanity and, of course, of China.

Mr. Chou En-lai on the 23rd January 1959 said in his letter to the Prime Minister:—

"In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude . . ."

—referred to by Dr. Kunzru—

" . . . towards the McMahon Line, and on the other hand cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter."

It is correct that not an Indian soldier nor an Indian post is to be

found across the McMahon Line. I think I am absolutely correct when I say: "Was it, then, proper to cross it at Longju within 1½ miles of the McMahon Line, push our men back and next day arrest them, resulting in the death of one soldier, although the whereabouts of eight who escaped are still I believe, unknown?" Mr. Chou En-lai further goes on to say: "Precisely because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally delimited and some differences exist. . . he says 'some differences exist,' Mr. Chairman—" it is unavoidable that there should be discrepancies between the boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the two countries." Referring to Chinese maps, he said: "We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient grounds." There is, therefore, no justification for any advance across the line. Mr. Chou En-lai suggested further: "In order to avoid such incidents—border incidents—as far as possible before the boundary is formally delimited our Government would like to propose to the Indian Government that, as a provisional measure, the two sides temporarily maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, each side keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them." This is what I believe we have done. I do not think the Chinese have followed this precept. If they do, the matter is at an end, but it means withdrawals from occupied areas. By *status quo* is meant *status quo ante*, as far as we are concerned. If they do not, what is it that they gain? They gain nothing, but they certainly lose something that is more precious than a strip of mountainous land,—the confidence of the world in their peaceful intentions, and in their belief in the great principle of peaceful co-existence. I have said it before and I say it again: The Chinese had no greater friend than Nehru. Nehru is not only the voice of India. He is the voice of multi-millions throughout the world, who believe in the power of truth and justice and fair-

play and tolerance and friendship between the nation. Some misguided people think this is appeasement. This is the bedrock of India's foreign policy, born out of the strength which drove the greatest empire from our shores. And they are men of little faith who think that the vicissitudes of passing events can shake the grim determination of the leader of this nation to secure the honour and safety of India and still pursue the paths of peace and friendship.

This is what the Prime Minister said:

"I need hardly add that independent India would be the last country to make any encroachments beyond its well-established frontiers . . . I agree that the position as it was before the recent dispute arose should be respected by both sides and neither side should try to take unilateral action in exercise of what it conceives to be its right."

It does not advance the cause of friendship, nearly ten years after attaining power, for anyone to advance a fantastic claim for 30,000 or 35,000 or 40,000 square miles against us based on no ground that has any validity.

But having dealt with and declared a border dispute, what is the way to settle it? The way is shown by the Prime Minister of India and I hope and I believe it will be accepted by the Prime Minister of China, the way of negotiation and the acceptance of the status quo ante before the dispute took on this aspect. I cannot think of India as a land ruled by Sancho Panzas or politicians riding to battle, inciting their countrymen to wild and irresponsible action. And if there are such men in authority on the other side of the border, the sooner they are disowned the better for the cause of friendship and peace. What is at stake is not merely the test of a solemn and binding agreement, but a

whole concept of life and conduct between man and man and nation and nation. I say to our Chinese friends that we must sit down and settle this serious dispute in a responsible and civilized manner and show to the world that the doctrine of *Panchsheel* is not an empty phrase but a living reality which has brought a new factor and a new hope into the conduct of the affairs of men and nations.

श्री गंगाशरण सिंह (बिहार) :

माननीय सभापति महोदय, आज हमारे सामने जो मामला पेश है, उस मामले के सम्बन्ध में छटपुट खबरें अखबारों में पढ़ने भी निकलती रही हैं और उसके चलते देश में जो बेचैनी की चिनगारी फूटती रही है, उस चिनगारी का इजहार, उस बेचैनी का इजहार पालियामेंट के दोनों सदनों में भी जब तब होता रहा है। लेकिन व्हाइट पेपर के प्रकाशन के बाद जो बातें हमारे

सामने आईं उनसे ऐसा लगता है कि मामला काफी अहम, संगीन और दर्दनाक है। दर्दनाक इसलिये भी अधिक हो जाता है कि यह मामला ऐसे दो मुल्कों के बीच में है जिनका ताल्लुक बहुत करीब का रहा है, जो दुनिया के दो बड़े मुल्कों में रहे हैं, जो सभ्यता और संस्कृति के श्रोत रहे हैं, जिनका आदिकाल से सम्बन्ध बहुत ही मधुर और निकट का रहा है, जिन्होंने संस्कृति, धर्म और दूसरे मामलों में एक दूसरे के साथ आदान प्रदान किया है। ऐसे दो मुल्कों के बीच जब इस तरह की बात आती है तो और ज्यादा दर्दनाक बात हो जाती है। आज जो व्हाइट पेपर हम लोगों के सामने है उसको पढ़ने से ऐसा पता चलता है कि हमें यह नहीं मालूम है कि हम किस जगह पर खड़े हैं, कौन सी आखिरी लाइन होगी, किस बात का भरोसा किया जाय। अगर हम व्हाइट पेपर पढ़ें तो उसके पेज ४८ पर जो तीसरा पैराग्राफ है, उससे यह

[श्री गंगाशरण सिंह]

पता चलता है कि तिब्बत के सम्बन्ध में जब बातें हो रही थीं और उस वक्त जो ऐग्रीमेंट हुआ था, उसमें बोर्डर का—सीमा का—कोई प्रश्न नहीं उठाया गया था। आगे जब हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने, चीन के प्राइम मिनिस्टर के साथ जो उन्की बातचीत हुई थी, उसकी जो रिपोर्ट उनके पास भेजी, जो कि इस ह्वाइट पेपर के ४६वें और ५०वें पेज पर है, उससे यह पता चलता है कि चीन के प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने यह कबूल किया था कि मैकमाहोन लाइन के बारे में उन्हें बहुत कुछ पता नहीं था, लेकिन जो हालत है उसमें वे मैकमाहोन लाइन को कबूल करेंगे। इतना ही नहीं है बल्कि इस ह्वाइट पेपर के जरिये यह पता चलता है कि चीन की सरकार ने यह भी आश्वासन दिया था कि अगर कोई इस तरह का सवाल उठेगा, तो वे कोई यूनिट्रल ऐक्शन नहीं लेंगे, सिर्फ अपनी तरफ से कोई कार्यवाही नहीं करेंगे। जो भी मामला होगा उसको वे सुलह समझौते से, आपसी बातचीत से तय करेंगे। ये बातें शुरू में हुई हैं और इन बातों के आधार पर हमारी सरकार की नीति बोर्डर के सम्बन्ध में, चीन के सम्बन्ध में रही है। लेकिन पीछे जो घटनायें हुई उन्होंने यह प्रमाणित कर दिया कि इन बातों के सम्बन्ध में हमारी जो धारणा थी वह गलत थी। तिब्बत की बातचीत के सम्बन्ध में बोर्डर का कोई सवाल नहीं उठाया गया था, इसलिये हमने यह समझा था कि मैकमाहोन लाइन के बारे में उनको कोई एतराज नहीं है, लेकिन हुआ यह कि उस वक्त उन लोगों ने यह बात साफ नहीं होने दी और बाद में उन्होंने उसके खिलाफ कदम उठाया। फिर जो यह विश्वास दिलाया गया था कि हम अपनी तरफ से कोई कदम नहीं उठाएंगे, हम सलाह मशिवरा से सब मामले तय करेंगे, आगे जो घटनायें हुईं और जिनका जिक्र इस व्हाइट पेपर में है, उससे पता चला है कि इस

वाद को भी पूरा नहीं किया गया। अब हमारे और आपके तथा देश के सामने सवाल यह उठता है कि आज जो बातें वहां हुई हैं उनको किस श्रेणी में, किस कैटेगरी में रखें। कहां वे चीजें हम रखते हैं? हमारी मित्रता कायम है। हम चाहते हैं कि मित्रता कायम रहे, लेकिन सवाल यह है कि इन एक्स्पेरिमेंसेज के बावजूद, इन आश्वासनों के बावजूद, इन वायदों के बावजूद जब अपनी तरफ से हमारी जगहों पर कब्जा किया गया, हमारी जगहों पर सड़कें बनाई गईं, हमारी जगहों पर सड़कें ही नहीं बनाई गईं, बल्कि लड़ाख में हमारे किले पर कब्जा किया गया, खुरनाक फोर्ट पर कब्जा किया गया जिससे बारे में कि १९४४ में तय हो चुका था—जहां तक मुझे याद है, १९२४ में यह तय हो चुका था कि उस पर चीनी या बाहरी लोगों का कोई हक नहीं है, ऐसी कोई खाली जगह हो, जहां कि आदमी नहीं बसते हों, ऐसी कोई खाली जगह हो, जो कि पहाड़ की जगह हो, ऐसे १ गज, १० गज या ५० गज के इधर उधर होने की बात हो सकती है, लेकिन जहां आदमी बसे हुये हैं, जहां किला बना हुआ है और जिसके बारे में फैसला हो चुका है और जिसके बारे में यह सवाल पहले नहीं उठाया गया, वहां उनके आदमी आते हैं, फौज आती है और उस पर दखल करने की कोशिश की जाती है, तो यह किस तरह की मैत्री है, दोस्ती है, यह हमारी समझ में नहीं आता है। इतना ही नहीं हुआ कि किला पर चले आये बल्कि दूसरी जगह हमारे आदमियों को, जो आउट-पोस्ट के लोग थे, उनको कैद किया गया और उसकी कोई सूचना हमें पहले से नहीं दी गई, कोई खबर नहीं दी गई। अगर वह समझते थे, जैसा कि उन्होंने पहले कहा था कि अगर कोई इस तरह का डिस्पूट होगा, कोई मतभेद होगा, कोई झंझट होगा तो आपस में समझौते से फैसला करेंगे तो उन्होंने हमारी जगह पर इस तरह से कब्जा न किया होता, हमारा किला न लिया

होता और हमारे आदमियों को इस तरह से पकड़ कर नहीं ले गये होते कि उसकी हमको कोई सूचना ही नहीं मिली। इतना ही नहीं हुआ। हमारे जो आदमी पकड़ कर छोड़े गये वे जाड़े के दिनों में छोड़े गये जब कि उस ऊँचे पास (Pass) को, उस ऊँची घाटी को पार करना सम्भव नहीं था। जैनेवा का प्रिजनर्स आफ वार के लिये जो कंवेनशन है, उसकी जो शर्तें हैं और उसके मुताबिक जो सहूलियतें ऐसे लोगों—प्रिजनर्स आफ वार—को मिलनी चाहिये, वह भी हमारे लोगों को नहीं मिली। प्रिजनर्स से भी बुरी तरह उनसे सलूक किया गया और जैसा कि खुद हमारी सराकार का कहना है, जैसा कि स्पष्ट है, जैसा कि प्रकट है, कि वे लोग जिन्दा हमारे देश में पहुँच गये यह उनका सौभाग्य था, संयोग था। उन जाड़ों के दिनों में उनको छोड़ा गया था जब कि घाटी को पार करके अपने देश में पहुँचना सम्भव नहीं था। यह बातें उस तरफ से होती जा रही हैं और इनके लिये हमने काफी सहनशीलता दिखलाई, हमने काफी बर्दाश्त किया लेकिन जब हम देखते हैं कि हम ज़रा सी आवाज़ उठाते हैं, हम पर जो जुल्म होते हैं उनके लिये हम ज़रा सी आवाज़ उठाते हैं, तो दूसरे लोग उस पर उज़्र करने लगते हैं, तब मुझे तो याद आता है, जैसा कि किसी ने कहा है :

“हम आह भी भरते हैं,
तो हो जाते हैं बदनाम।

वह कत्ल भी करते हैं,
तो चर्चा नहीं होता ॥”

यही हालत हमारी हो रही है। हम जब अपने हक के लिये लड़ते हैं, जब हम अपने हक के लिये बात कहते हैं तो उस पर आवाज़ें उठाई जाती हैं, उस पर दूसरी बातें कही जाती हैं और दूसरे लोग जो कि इतनी ज्यादातियां कर रहे हैं, उस पर कुछ चर्चा भी नहीं होती है। यह ठीक है कि आज की परिस्थिति में—आज की परिस्थिति

में क्या किसी भी परिस्थिति में—कोई भी समझदार आदमी यह नहीं चाहेगा कि दो देशों में युद्ध हो, दो देशों के सम्बन्ध बुरे हों और इसलिये आज अगर कोई अपने हक के लिये लड़ता है, आज अपनी जगह के लिये लड़ता है, आज अपनी सीमा के लिये लड़ता है, तो यह कहना कि वह वार मांगरिंग करता है, वह युद्ध का नारा बुलन्द करता है, मैं समझता हूँ कि ऐसा कहना मुल्क के साथ गद्दारी है।

अच्छा होता कि तिब्बत की चर्चा इस सिलसिले में नहीं चलाई गई होती। मैं चाहता था और मैं समझता हूँ कि प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब भी चाहेंगे और हाउस भी चाहेगा कि इस बॉर्डर इशू के सम्बन्ध में तिब्बत की चर्चा न चलाई जाय। खास कर के इस सिलसिले में दलाई लामा की चर्चा न चलाई गई होती, तो अच्छा था। मैं समझता हूँ कि दलाई लामा से इस बॉर्डर इशू का कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं है। दलाई लामा का प्रश्न तो ६ महीने के पहले नहीं था, वह तो मार्च में उठा है और यह बॉर्डर का प्रश्न आज से ४ या ५ साल पहले ही उठ चुका है। मैं समझता हूँ कि एक धुंध पैदा करने के लिये, चीज़ को नज़र से ओझल करने के लिये ही दलाई लामा का प्रश्न उठाया जाता है। यह बिल्कुल गलत प्रश्न है। मैं समझ सकता हूँ कि आज हमारे कुछ दोस्त क्यों धुन्ध पैदा करने की कोशिश करते हैं, उनकी बात मैं समझता हूँ, बहुत से लोगों को समझ में नहीं आती हो, लेकिन मैं उसको समझता हूँ और उसका कारण है। उसका कारण यह है कि कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी को दूसरी कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी जहां पावर में हैं उन देशों के साथ कैसा सम्बन्ध रखना चाहिये, इसके सम्बन्ध में “न्यू एज” के अप्रैल महीने के इशू में कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी के जेनरल सेक्रेटरी श्री अजय घोष का एक लेख निकला है, जो कि इस सम्बन्ध में स्पष्ट है, जो कि कम्युनिस्ट

[श्री गंगाशरण सिंह]

पार्टी की नीति का स्पष्ट प्रतिपादन करता है। मैं आपकी आज्ञा से उसकी ५, ६, ७, लाइनें पढ़ देना चाहता हूँ। जो लोग राष्ट्रीयता के हामी हैं, जो लोग यह चाहते हैं कि अपने देश की या किसी देश की कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी राष्ट्रीयता की हामी बने और दूसरे देश की जो कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी है, उसकी आलोचना की जाय, उस विषय में ये निम्न-लिखित वाक्य हैं, ज़रा सुनिये :

"They shriek that in order 'to prove to our own people that we are independent', Party units and individual members of the Party should have the right and the freedom to criticise openly those acts of other Communist Parties, especially of the parties which are in power, with which they do not agree. They do not pause to think as to what would happen if each Communist Party gave 'freedom' to its units and members to exercise a similar right in relation to all other Communist Parties, including our own. They do not seem to realise that such a thing would disrupt the fraternal relation between Communist Parties, help the enemies of Communism, destroy the very unity of the world Communist movement—the unity which has given it such cohesion, power and sweep. All such ideas must, therefore, be sharply combated. To tolerate them, to acquiesce in them is contrary to the spirit of proletarian internationalism."

तो आज जहाँ राष्ट्रीयता का प्रश्न उठेगा, जहाँ कहीं देश का प्रश्न उठेगा वहाँ कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी की क्या नीति होगी, इसको मैं समझता हूँ कि उन्हें उसे साफ करना चाहिये, नहीं तो उनकी इस नीति से, उनके सेक्रेटरी के इस आदेश से, इस लेख से, जो प्रकट होता है वह स्पष्ट है कि जहाँ राष्ट्रीयता और कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी में क्लेश होगा, वहाँ राष्ट्रीयता को तिलांजलि दे कर

दूसरे देश की कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी का समर्थन करना और उसके गुनाहों को माफ करना उनकी नीति में शामिल है।

इसके साथ ही साथ अब सवाल यह उठता है कि जब इतनी बातें उस तरफ से हुईं तब उस समय हम क्या कर रहे थे। कहा जाता है कि जाड़ों के जमाने में हम वापस आ जाते थे, हम इधर चले आते थे और उसी जाड़े में चीनी कम्युनिस्ट लोग अपने आदमी और अपनी फौज वहाँ रख देते थे। मेरी समझ में यह बात नहीं आती है। एक साल हम चले आये और हमारे गायबाने में उन्होंने अपने आदमी रख लिये, अपना कब्जा कर लिया, लेकिन दूसरे साल हमने क्या किया? जाड़ों में चीनी कम्युनिस्ट लोग जब वहाँ रह सकते हैं तो मेरा खयाल है कि हिन्दुस्तान के लोग भी रह सकते हैं। क्यों वहाँ हमारे आदमियों को रखने की कोशिश नहीं की गई? दूसरे, यह सवाल आज का नहीं ४, ५ साल का सवाल है और इन ४, ५ सालों में अपनी सप्लाई लाइन बनाने की कोशिश क्यों नहीं की गई? उस दिन प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने कहा कि वह जगह ऐसी है कि वहाँ जाने में एक महीना लग जायेगा और वह जगह ऐसी है कि वहाँ एक्सप्लोरेशन किट में जाना पड़ेगा और माउंट-नियरिंग करनी होगी। तो क्या इस वजह से हम देश के एक हिस्से को छोड़ देंगे? क्या भारतवर्ष में जहाँ हम बसे हुये हैं वही भारतवर्ष है और दूसरा हिस्सा भारतवर्ष नहीं है? मैं समझता हूँ कि हिन्दुस्तान के एक छोर से दूसरे छोर तक, कन्या-कुमारी से ले कर हिमालय तक जहाँ तक हिन्दुस्तान की सीमा है, वह सारा हिन्दुस्तान है और हिन्दुस्तान का हर आदमी बराबर है।

हमारे कुछ आदमियों को पकड़ा गया और जेल में रखा गया। वे केवल कुछ व्यक्ति नहीं थे, वे हमारे प्रतीक थे, वे हमारे सिम्बल थे, वे हमारे प्रतिनिधि थे। हमारे

कुछ आदमियों को पकड़ा गया, जेल में रखा गया, गोली से मारा गया, मैं चाहता हूँ—और मैं प्राइम मिनिस्टर को यह जाहिर करना चाहता हूँ—कि उनको सिर्फ एक, दो व्यक्तियों की तरह ट्रीट न करे, फिर वे कोई इधर उधर के एक, दो आदमी नहीं थे, वे ऐसे गैरे नत्थू खैरे नहीं थे, वे हमारे सिपाही थे, हमारे देश के प्रतिनिधि थे, हमारे देश के सिम्बल थे, हमारे देश के गौरव के सिम्बल थे और अगर उनके गौरव के हानि होती है तो मैं समझता हूँ कि देश के गौरव की हानि होती है। इसलिये मैं अपने प्राइम मिनिस्टर से कहना चाहता हूँ, और सरकार से कहना चाहता हूँ कि मैं आतंकवादी नहीं हूँ, जिन्दगी भर मैं कभी आतंकवादी नहीं रहा और यह भी मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि जिस दल से मैं सम्बन्ध रखता हूँ उसका भी आतंक फैलाने और आतंकवाद में विश्वास नहीं रहा है और इसलिये हम आतंक फैलाना नहीं चाहते हैं, हम पैनीकी होना नहीं चाहते हैं, लेकिन इसके साथ ही साथ दो बातें जरूर कहना चाहता हूँ। पहली चीज यह है, जैसा कि हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने अपने पत्र में लिखा है, जो इस ह्वाइट पेपर के ४९वें पेज पर है, कि जहां तक हिन्दुस्तान की बाउंडरी का सवाल है, भारतवर्ष का मामला बिल्कुल साफ है, उनके शब्द ये हैं :

“So far as India was concerned we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument.”

4 P.M.

मैं समझता हूँ, हमारे प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने जैसा अपने पत्र में लिखा है, उनके साथ सारे देश की सहानुभूति है और सारे देश का यही विश्वास है। मुझे उम्मीद है कि उन्होंने इस पत्र में जो कुछ लिखा है उस पर वे साबित कदम रहेंगे और दूसरी बात यह कि अगर कोई मुलह की चर्चा हो तो मैं नहीं चाहता

हूँ कि हम एक ऐसी शुकती हुई पोजीशन से, डरते हुये, पीछे हटती हुई पोजीशन से, उस बारे में बातचीत करे। अभी अखबारों में मुलह की चर्चा के बारे में खबर निकली है। मैं प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब से कहना चाहता हूँ कि अगर स्टेट्स को—(Status quo) य. स्थिति कायम रखने—के बारे में मुलह की चर्चा हो, तो वहां से होनी चाहिये, जहां से यह झगड़ा शुरू हुआ। पहले हमारी जो जगहें उनके कब्जे में जा चुकी हैं उन पर हमारा दखल होने दो, तब स्टेट्स को (Status quo) की बात हम कर सकते हैं, उससे पहले यह बात नहीं होनी चाहिये।

अभी “तास” की खबर निकली है अखबारों में। पढ़ कर मुझे ताज्जुब हुआ। वे हमारे भी दोस्त हैं और चीन के भी दोस्त हैं। मुझे और भी ताज्जुब हुआ, उन्होंने जो अपना मैप निकाला, उसको देख कर। उन्होंने हमारी नकल नहीं की, चीन की नकल की। इससे मालूम होता है कि दोस्ती में थोड़ी डिग्रीज़ का फर्क है। दो दोस्तों के बीच अगर मतभेद था तो कम से कम नकल करने से पहले हम से भी सलाह लेनी चाहिये थी। रूस में जो मैप निकाला गया है वह चीन के मैप की नकल है। मैं अभी उस मैप को देख नहीं सका हूँ, उसकी कापी मिली है, कोशिश करूंगा गौर से देखने की। और जब वे कहते हैं मुलह समझाते की बातें करने को, तो उससे किसी को इंकार नहीं हो सकता है। लेकिन वह होना चाहिये गरिमा के साथ, इज्जत के साथ, देश के गौरव के अनुकूल। आज जो हमें बहुत उपदेश देना चाहते हैं, उन्हें मैं अन्त में यही कहना चाहता हूँ कि :

“मुझी से सब यह कहते हैं

कि रख नीची नज़र अपनी,

कोई उनसे नहीं कहता,

न निकली यों अभां हो कर।”

SHRI P. N. SAPRU (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, Sir, this is a sad occasion for this House. I do not like this controversy between two great neighbours. I have tried to attach importance to Indo-Chinese friendship and I hope that it may still survive the shock. But I must say that I attach greater importance to certain fundamental principles than even to friendship itself. I do not think that by pursuing a policy of what might look like appeasement we can solve any problem in a permanent manner. It is not as though it is a question of this border or that border, of this frontier or that frontier, but it is a question of one's faith being shaken in the word of the other person. As I went through this White Paper, I was amazed at our moderation; I was also proud of our moderation. But I felt that the tone of the letters of the Chinese Government was truculent, and I say—and I say it with some responsibility—that the letters disclose that Mr. Chou En-lai has gone back upon the word that he gave to our Prime Minister. You have to read the letter of our Prime Minister on page 49 to Mr. Chou En-lai to find that the Prime Minister categorically states that in the course of a conversation, the McMahon Line was discussed and the position which was taken by Mr. Chou En-lai was that he was prepared to accept this Line realistically. This morning's paper shows that Mr. Chou En-lai has completely gone back upon that plighted word. He does not even recognise it. You will find in other parts of this correspondence—because my time is limited, I cannot quote those passages—that statements made by our Prime Minister are directly or indirectly disputed. Anyone who knows our great Prime Minister knows how truthful he is; no Indian can accept the word of any foreigner howsoever great he might be, against the word of our Prime Minister. If you go through this correspondence, you will find that in the name of *Panchsheel*—*Panchsheel* which we value very dearly and we also understand very well—what they are doing is to go

back upon that plighted word. It is a question of 40,000 square miles of our frontier. "The whole frontier must be re-drawn and the McMahon Line must be discarded because it was an imperialist imposition. The Chinese occupation of Tibet when Tibet was weak was not, at any time of Tibet's or Chinese history, an imperialist affair." Well, Sir, I have a feeling that what has perhaps accentuated the present crisis is our attitude towards Tibet. We could not deny to the Dalai Lama shelter, refuge and asylum. It would have been contrary to all principles of international law and international morality had we done any such thing. We could not tell our people, "Do not have any sympathy because of your spiritual or your religious bonds with the people of Tibet." Tibet for many people in this country posed a human problem, and while we recognise that Tibet is the internal affair, of China, we are entitled to talk about what is being done in Tibet just as we talk about Nyasaland or about the Hola Camp Massacres or about Algeria. The French and the British do not get into a terrible rage when we talk about these affairs. But I suggest in all earnestness that the trouble with the Government of China is that it does not understand the democratic process because I was amazed to find responsibility being attached to Government for certain foolish things done by some foolish men before the Bombay Chinese Embassy. I was in New York in 1954 when the Queen Mother visited it and I have seen with my own eyes Irishmen staging demonstrations before the British Embassy where the Queen Mother was staying. The British did not protest; they did not take any notice of it, because they had attained a certain maturity in dealing with these delicate issues. Now, the tragedy is the failure of the West to recognise the fact of the Chinese revolution. I think that failure has had disastrous consequences for this part of South-East Asia. The Chinese feel that they are not in the United Nations, that they are nowhere, and that, therefore,

they can talk or do anything they like. That I think is a feeling which has been generated by the policies—the mistaken policies—pursued by the West. But may I say, Mr. Chairman, that while I appreciate that we must talk over matters, if an opportunity occurs, with Mr. Chou En-lai, it will be imperative for us to be firm and clear in the line that we are going to take. We cannot accept the *status quo* as visualised by Mr. Chou En-lai, because to accept the *status quo*, even temporarily, would be to recognise the gains, shall I say, I shall not say of aggression, but I cannot find a better word in the English language. . . .

AN. HON. MEMBER: Of encroachment.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: I thank you very much, 'of encroachment'. It will be to recognise the encroachment. We are not wedded rigidly to the McMahon Line. But the McMahon Line does exist. I read a controversy about the McMahon Line between Sir Olaf Caroe and Sir Henry Twynam the other day, that the McMahon Line does exist and that the McMahon Line was accepted by the legal Government of China at that time. But more serious than this controversy about the McMahon Line is their claim over parts of Ladakh. They show in their maps parts of Bhutan, parts of Sikkim, parts of Assam. . .

AN HON MEMBER: And parts of U.P.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: Yes, U.P. I forgot U.P.; I am sorry. Now they show all these maps for us to accept the position as dictated by them. Well, as I understand it, co-existence means capacity for mutual adjustment, for compromise. Co-existence involves consideration for the other man's point of view and I have to say, to my sorrow and regret, that I find that that consideration is lacking in the correspondence that has been

placed before us. From 1954 this controversy has been going on. In recent months it has become increasingly acrimonious and it is obvious believing as we do in certain vital principles, there can be no question of any change in our foreign policy. We are, as a matter of principle, as a matter of belief, wedded to the doctrine of non-alignment. But this does not mean that we shall make a present of our frontier to our Chinese friends. If I may say so as one who has oftentimes expressed his views before the House that he has no prejudices against Communism as an economic theory, I would say that in this matter our Communist friends, if they are wise and if they are patriotic—these are two very requisite qualifications—can play a useful part. They ought to go and tell their friends of China, Mr. Ajoy Ghosh and Mr. Dange may go and tell. . .

AN. HON. MEMBER: Also Mr. Bhupesh Gupta.

SHRI P. N. SAPRU: I think he is here. If so, he may also go. Mr. Ajoy Ghosh and Mr. Dange tried to go to Moscow immediately after what had happened in Kerala, But I would ask our Communist friends, Dr Ahmad and Mr. Bhupesh Gupta and others to tell their friends of the Cominform or Comintern, whatever it be, their friends of China, Mr. Mao Tse-tung and Mr. Chou En-lai, to be realistic, not to break up the solidarity which the Asian countries were building up and to realise that in India they had a good friend and that they should settle this matter or this controversy in a manner which befits a big people. Sir, we cannot be expected to go to the Chinese people in sack cloth and ashes; we cannot go and tell Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Mao Tse-tung, "Oh, Sir, we are very bad boys; we quite realise that. Your letters have convinced us that we pursuing a wicked policy and that our policy was being dictated to by the West." We cannot do that, but we claim to be good friends of theirs. We have worked for the recognition

[Shri P. N. Saprū.]

of their revolution. We have supported them in the United Nations and we gave a good welcome to Mr. Chou En-lai and we are making other Asian countries see Mr. Chou En-lai as a great liberator of a great country. Well, Sir, they should have some regard for what we have done for them. The 'give' cannot be on our side and the 'take' on their side.

May I say, Mr. Chairman, just one or two words about our defence. We should not be panicky about these matters. But we should be careful. We should do everything without imposing an intolerable burden upon our country to strengthen our defences so that we might speak with strength.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SHRI ANAND CHAND (Himachal Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, Sir, the matter is a delicate one and I am no expert in foreign affairs. I would, therefore, crave the indulgence of the House and the Prime Minister in what I am about to say.

Sir, India and China have been the cradles of ancient civilization. We have had a history of peaceful co-existence, now twenty centuries old or more, and both countries between themselves, I believe, have more than one half of the human race. It is therefore, a matter of some regret that our mutual relations should have been strained on account of certain border questions.

Now, Sir, as far as I have been able to see the White Paper as well as the statements made by the hon. the Prime Minister in the other House and in this House, it is not possible for me to completely isolate matters about the recent happenings on India's N.E.F.A. frontier from the happenings in Tibet during the last 6 to 8 months. I hope, my friends of the P.S.P. will pardon me when I say that I do not subscribe to the view that Tibet is a question which has entirely nothing to do with the border incidents that we

have seen in recent months. As a matter of fact, if we read the letter of the Chinese Premier which has been published in today's newspapers, there occurs a paragraph in it which says: I am quoting from it, Sir:

"I can assure Your Excellency that it is merely for the purpose of preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border back and forth to carry on harassing activities that the Chinese Government has in recent months despatched guard units to be stationed in the south-eastern part of the Tibet region of China."

Now that paragraph, to my mind, is very significant. It gives the background to the troop movements made by the Chinese authorities in recent months in the N.E.F.A. area, and I submit that we cannot therefore completely isolate these border incidents especially in the N.E.F.A. area from what has happened in Tibet.

Now, Sir, I know that so far as the Tibetan question is concerned, the Prime Minister was pleased to state the other day that our attitude is one of sympathy to the Tibetans and also acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. These are contradictory things, he will admit. But at the same time it is a basic fact, there is no doubt, that a very large opinion in this country has sympathy with the Tibetan people for all that has happened there, for all the sufferings they have undergone.

Sir, so far as the constitutional position is concerned, the White Paper makes it clear that the suzerainty of China over Tibet has been acknowledged. Not only that. Whatever armed personnel we had there, or the telegraph or telephone or other amenities which were there, were withdrawn and we accepted the Chinese suzerainty completely. Now, the question is that when the Dalai Lama came to India, the Government of India were at pains to tell the Chinese Government that asylum had been given to him. At the same time, the

Indian Government hoped that the Dalai Lama would not engage in political activities. This is contained in one of the notes given by our External Affairs Ministry to the Chinese Ambassador. It is contained in the White Paper. But have subsequent events lived up to our assurances?

AN HON. MEMBER: Yes.

SHRI ANAND CHAND: I do not know. I am not quite certain whether they have; especially in view of the happenings in recent weeks. The Dalai Lama's coming to India, his making statements about taking the Tibet case to the U.N., although I know that the Prime Minister has categorically said that there is no question of the Government of India supporting them or taking the issue to the U.N. because we do not recognise the suzerainty of Tibet or the entity of Tibet as a separate country. But at the same time, our stand gives rise to certain feelings in the minds of the Chinese Government that perhaps we are not quite fair to their sovereignty, that we are not fair to what we profess. A kind of feeling has perhaps entered into their mind that the N.E.F.A. border, through which Tibetans have entered this country, is the one which is being used for purposes other than normal and therefore, this extra activity. I am not saying that it is absolutely so, but as one goes through the columns of the newspaper this morning, one draws that conclusion. Whatever we might say, I for one, have not been able to dissociate my mind from that conclusion entirely.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA (Bihar): Sir, is it not a fact that the White Paper makes it clear that the Chinese incursions into Indian territory started from 1954 and the Tibetan issue arose in 1959?

SHRI ANAND CHAND: I was going to refer to that. If my hon. friend will read the White Paper very carefully, he will find that the incursions

started with the Hoti area in the years 1954, 1955 and 1956. The Hoti area is an area which, I believe, lies to the north of the Garhwal district of U.P. It is not the N.E.F.A. area. Of course, subsequently in the N.E.F.A. as well incursions have been taking place and there have been exchanges of fire and so on. As I was going through the White Paper, I could not completely dissociate myself from the feeling that there has been a gradual stiffening of the Chinese attitude in the N.E.F.A. area.

Now, Sir, the position is this. The White Paper reveals quite clearly that there are three areas at the present moment where these clashes are taking place. One is the Hoti area, the other is the Ladakh area and the third is the N.E.F.A. area. Now, Sir, so far as the Ladakh area is concerned, I regret to say that we have not been very vigilant. Reading through the White Paper I have come to the conclusion—might be erroneous—that we took note of the road when the Chinese had actually finished building it in 1957. We did not send anybody to go into that matter and make reconnaissance till after the road had been built. It was some time in early 1956 when it was reported to us that the road was being built. Now, it may be that the conditions of that part of the country are very difficult, that it is difficult to approach an altitude of 17,000 ft. But at the same time, we should have been a little more vigilant especially when we knew that the Chinese forces had entered Tibet and that they were opening up Tibet for communications with the outside world through Ladakh area. As I see the White Paper, I do not think the Prime Minister has really been very firm that the line has been—what I might call—impinged upon by the Chinese. They have been taken as undefined but those areas were definitely in the possession of India, which at the present moment are assumed to be Chinese. My impression on reading the White Paper about Ladakh is that we are not quite definite about that line.

[Shri Anand Chand.]

About Hoti area, I believe, there have been exchanges of notes. I think there was some sort of sitting together with the Chinese, moving for some sort of settlement which never came about.

Now, Sir, it is in the N.E.F.A. area—the McMahon Line—that the real tension started. Reading through the Chinese Prime Minister's letter which has been published yesterday, I for one am not agreeable to all that he has said. After reading our Prime Minister's letter to the Chinese Premier, which he sent after his friendly discussions when the Chinese Premier was in India in 1956, it is quite clear that Mr. Chou En-lai was of the view that although the McMahon Line was a line arbitrarily laid down by the British, still on account of the friendly relations between the two countries he did not see any reason why he should object to that as being the boundary. As mentioned by the Chinese Premier, about consulting the Tibet region in the matter, it was really a secondary one because Tibet was an autonomous area and therefore he had also to consult them. But I do not think that there was any question of his saying that he did not accept it. But now in his latest letter he has repudiated his previous position. Though it is a very serious question, to my mind, it might have been repudiated because conditions have changed, because repeatedly he finds that there is pressure from the Chinese side that they cannot give large chunks of territory to India. But the fact remains that the Line is there. It is a line which was drawn in 1914. It is a line to which the Chinese representatives subscribed, although, it is quite true, in the later stages the Chinese Government disowned acceptance of that. But that is a secondary matter. The fact remains that it is a line which has been there all these years. Therefore, I do not see how a claim could be made for the areas this side of the McMahon line especially when the existence of the thing is not denied.

Now, Sir, the question is. How are these things to be ended? After all, it is all very well to say that we do this or we do that. But some concrete steps have to be taken to ease this tension and come to a sort of understanding with our neighbour in the north. Well, Sir, I would like to make, with your permission, three or four suggestions in this regard for being considered by this august House.

Firstly, I would like to say that the mind of the Chinese Government must be disabused so far as India's stand on Tibet is concerned. There might be some contradiction in our having sympathy for the people of Tibet and at the same time recognising the sovereignty of China. I think we must be quite clear in our minds that Tibet is an integral part of China. And when we have accepted it as an integral part of China, we must also accept the fact that the Chinese authority there must be supreme within their own Constitution. If that authority is not liked by a majority of Tibetans, I am sure, their representatives in the Chinese Legislature or the Chinese Assembly or whatever they have in the form of Parliament will see that the voice of the people is felt.

Secondly, I would like to say that we should not try to rush into military alliances like the S.E.A.T.O. for example. I was rather unhappy to read about some talk, when the President of Pakistan was visiting India, about some suggestions of India and Pakistan entering into a common Defence Pact for the sub-continent. Well these suggestions appeared in the papers from certain sources which my hon. friend can read if he likes. Well, Sir, there might be some who may subscribe to that view. I think we must adhere to the policy of keeping away from power blocs. Pakistan is already a member of the S.E.A.T.O. and I do not think any common defence policy of the sub-continent, especially in view of our difficulties with the Chinese at the

present moment, should lead to our having a kind of mutual defence pact because, I am sure, that will not lead to happier relations with China.

The third point that I would like to make is that we must be vigilant. I might respectfully point out that. Of course, there is nothing that I can give by way of advice to this august House. We have elderly and much more wiser people here than I am. But I would say eternal vigilance is the price of liberty and we have to be vigilant on our borders. It is true that these borders extend to over fifteen hundred miles—right from Ladakh on the one side up to N.E.F.A. or up to the Brahmaputra on the other side—but we have to be vigilant. I think that vigilance is to be exercised not only by periodically visiting these areas but that vigilance should be a kind of a permanent process whereby we must have our people on our borders. Of course, we must be sure where those borders are, and if we are sure where our borders lie, we must be firm to defend India's soil. There can be no question of going back, there can be no question of yielding even an inch of legitimate Indian territory. That is positive. But if there are differences—I find in today's Annexure to the White Paper which is before me that the Government have accepted in two or three places in the N.E.F.A. areas, what I might call, grounds for certain readjustments in the McMahon Line itself—I think the earlier they are settled the better. But by and large we must stand by that Line which has been the border between the two countries of India and China for decades and we must be firm and we must be friendly. I am sure, with the Prime Minister at the helm of affairs, we will have a settlement with China on this issue before long which would be satisfactory not only to this country and China but also to the peoples of Asia.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am grateful to the speakers who have preceded me, even though I do not agree with everything they have said. When we decided to have this debate today, it was because the House considered that a serious situation had arisen on our borders and in regard to the relations between India and China. Since that time, two days ago, something else has happened which has added to the gravity of the situation and highlighted certain aspects which were perhaps under a shadow then. Therefore, in a sense, this debate becomes all the more important, although perhaps it is being held a little too soon after these developments to permit all of us to consider this new aspect carefully and fully. Speaking for myself, as Foreign Minister, it is my business not merely to read the new reply from Premier Chou En-lai once, but many times, carefully, trying to understand what exactly it might mean. Therefore, it would not be proper for me at present to deal with that reply at all fully or to refer to many of the points raised in it. It will no doubt have to be dealt with. As we have now taken Parliament and indeed the public into our confidence by publishing this White Paper whenever our reply goes, that also would be published. As a matter of fact, only yesterday morning we sent a message to the Chinese Government in continuation of this correspondence and a copy of that message, I believe, has been placed on the Table of the House today. I do not know if hon. Members have read it or seen it. Yes, it is there. It was soon after we had sent this message that we began getting bits of Premier Chou En-lai's reply. It took a considerable time to come through. Therefore, I shall venture only to deal with certain aspects of it referred to by hon. Members which I consider important and not deal with Premier Chou En-lai's reply. One thing, however, I would like to say is, I often wonder if we, meaning the Government of India and the Government of China, speak quite the same language, if using the words

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or similar words we mean the same thing. Because often enough I do not follow the course or line of thought. I hope I could follow a line of thought that is opposite to mine but I just do not follow; whether the basic way of thinking is different, I do not know. Secondly, and I know this from experience, the problem of translating Chinese into any other language is a terrific problem. I remember when Premier Chou En-lai came here for the first time five years ago and we sat down to draft a simple joint communique, it was originally drafted at his instance, on his suggestion, by me. He looked at it and he approved of it. He knows some English and then his translator told him. Then it was translated into Chinese and then I was asked by him to change some of the words in the English draft because in the Chinese he did not like them, in the Chinese translation. I told him that I had no objection to changing them because they had no significance but I did not like what he told me in the Chinese draft. The matter was of no great principle or significance but it struck me then how immensely difficult it was to translate an idea from English or any such language into Chinese or *vice versa*. It struck me also then, and I have never been able to find a complete answer to this question which is troubling my mind, how Marx appeared in the Chinese language. I am quite sure that Marx or others must be different in Chinese from what it was in the original German or their translations in English or any other language.

So there are these difficulties that one grapples with. One grapples with another difficulty. It is all very well for Members here or for me to criticise something that has happened in China as we do and rightly do but I have not forgotten—and I hope nobody will forget—that before I understand what is happening in China or in relation to China, a big fact stares me in the face and that is a tremendous human upheaval in China which was going on there, the Chinese Revolution. My friend Mr. Sapru said

something about the failure of the West to recognise the Chinese Revolution. It is not a question of your liking the Chinese Revolution or not liking it. It is a fact, a fact of tremendous significance to the world, by the size of it and by the content of it. Part of it may be good, part of it may be bad according to your thinking or way of thinking. It is neither here nor there but unless one recognizes these major facts of history, your appraisal of the situation may be wrong, utterly wrong. So it has been that many of the troubles we have had in the international sphere have been due to the fact of a deliberate attempt not to recognize one of the major things in human history. That is so.

Having said that, I would venture to say that there appears to me to be a lack of understanding or recognition in China of the revolution in India and to that perhaps are due not only some of their misunderstandings but many of their approaches to India and to matters connected with India. It is true that we have been brought up—I am talking about recent history, not the long past—in a different tradition. We have been conditioned by different factors, we in India and they in China. True. Nevertheless, we ought to be wise enough to understand what has happened there, if not agree with it. And they ought to be wise enough to understand what is happening and what has happened here in India even though they do not agree with it. I find this lack of understanding and appreciation. We have tried, I hope, to understand them and to understand what has happened there. Maybe, we have not fully succeeded but I believe we have to a large extent; at any rate there was this great attempt. I am not at all sure that there was even any attempt on the other side and I feel that just like certain Western nations, not now but throughout the 19th and half of the 20th century, in their pride and arrogance, ignored the rest of the world—they thought they were the leaders of the world and the rest of the world should

follow them—so also there is a tendency in some of these Far Eastern countries to forget that there are other parts of the world which count. They forget that India is not a country which can be ignored even though she may speak in gentler language, as she has been accustomed to do not only recently but even in the past ages. The other day, some time back—I forget when—in one of our notes to the Chinese Government we said this. It is included in the White Paper and I shall read it out. It is on page 77 here, in the note embodying the conversation with our Foreign Secretary. It was amazing to get the note from China to which this is the answer: The Statement says:

(1) "The Government of India have learned of this statement with regret and surprise. It is not only not in consonance with certain facts, but is also wholly out of keeping with diplomatic usage and the courtesies due to friendly countries. It is a matter of particular surprise and disappointment to them that a Government and people noted for their high culture and politeness should have committed this serious lapse and should have addressed the Government of India in a language which is discourteous and unbecoming even if it were addressed to a hostile country. Since it is addressed to a country which is referred to as friendly, this can only be considered as an act of forgetfulness.

(2) "We have no desire to enter into a lengthy argument about facts or opinions, much less about the discourteous language used in the statement made on behalf of the Chinese Government. It has been the consistent practice of the Government of India to treat other countries with courtesy and friendliness, even though any country might express opinions opposed to theirs. With China they have endeavoured to maintain and develop friendly relations, and they propose to continue to do so in spite of the discourtesy shown to them

by the Chinese Government. This is in consonance with India's past culture and background and Mahatma Gandhi's teachings."

And this is because of what seems to us a complete failure of the Chinese Government to appreciate that we have what are called certain civil and democratic liberties here. This is in relation to Tibet and what has happened here, as if we could go and throttle everybody who disagreed with us or disagreed with the Chinese Government. Then the note says:

(4) "The Government of India realise that the system of Government in China is different from that prevailing in India. It is the right of the Chinese people to have a Government of their choice, and no one else has a right to interfere; it is also the right of the Indian people to have a Government of their choice, and no one else has a right to interfere. In India, unlike China, the law recognises many parties, and gives protection to the expression of differing opinions. That is a right guaranteed by our Constitution and, contrary to the practice prevailing in China, the Government of India is often criticised and opposed by some sections of the Indian people. It is evident that this freedom of expression, free press and civil liberties in India are not fully appreciated by the Government of China, and hence misunderstandings arise."

Then again, on another matter it says:

(5) "From the statement made on behalf of the People's Government of China, it appears that, according to them, the Panchsheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence may or may not be applied according to convenience or circumstances. This is an approach with which the Government of India are not in agreement. They have proclaimed and adhered to these Principles as matters of basic policy and not of opportunism. They will continue to hold to these

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Principles and endeavour to apply them according to their own thinking."

I have read out extracts from that Paper. So there is this difficulty.

Dr. Kunzru said that our foreign policy was in the melting pot. He also referred to our non-alignment and to Panchsheel being a slogan and an opiate and so on. I am sorry that Dr. Kunzru has failed to appreciate—he may disagree, but he has failed to appreciate—the basic reasons for our foreign policy. They were not based merely on being friendly to China or some other country—although we wanted to be friendly with other countries—but they were also based on a certain mental or other approach to this question. It is a basic thing. These principles are right—and I do claim that they are right and I should like any hon. Member here to tell me wherein they are not right. I have yet to find any one, not only here but elsewhere as well, who can say that they are not right, but only they say it is not right to say this to China or some other country. But a principle is a principle. It does not become unright or wrong because somebody whom you suspect to be not quite truthful, says it. Therefore, I do not understand what the present situation which has developed, serious as it is, has got to do with putting our foreign policy in what is called a melting pot. So far as I am concerned and so far as our Government is concerned, our foreign policy is as firm as a rock and it will remain so. It will be some other Government that may change it. The present Government will not and the present Government will hold to non-alignment, because it is a matter of principle, not of opportunism or the convenience of the day. That surely does not mean that we should not be vigilant, that we should not protect India's interests or India's border or whatever it is. Surely that would be a foolish inference to draw from it.

Dr. Kunzru referred to various mistakes of the past. He particularly referred to our keeping things back from Parliament. Well, Sir, what did we do? He said the other day when there was a debate here about Korea. . . .

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: Tibet

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am sorry, I meant Tibet. He said that then we did not make a full report or a full and comprehensive report to Parliament. Well, Sir, let us go back to that time, a few months ago. That was the time when the message from which I just now read out was sent. I don't quite know what more report we could make at that stage. We could, of course, have said something more. But so far as the border problems were concerned, the position then was as it had been for several years previously, because remember that the recent development, the very recent development, of the last few weeks, is a new development about the frontier problem. It is true that the Government of China had gone on producing maps which were incorrect maps to which we had taken exception. And they assured us that they would look into the matter and correct them where necessary later, these old maps. That was not an adequate or satisfactory explanation to give. Yet it was some kind of explanation and those maps continuing were an irritating feature in the landscape. Still there it was. We are not going to change maps by shouting about them. After all, in dealing with countries, we deal with them diplomatically or by methods of coercion and war. Where we rule out war and where these methods of coercion are silly in the case of such countries, we have to proceed diplomatically.

Right from the first few months of independence, in the first year or two, repeatedly I stated in Parliament that the McMahon Line—I use that word for short; really I do not know why it should not be called the McMahon line; it simply means the defined fron-

tier—was our frontier. When I say something in Parliament, it is meant for the outside world and it was meant, if I may say so, for the Government of China. We said this to the Chinese Government in Communication orally and otherwise too. Their answer was vague. I am talking about the maps. I saw no reason at that time—I am talking of a time about six, seven or eight years ago—to discuss the question of the frontier with the Chinese Government because, foolishly if you like, I thought that there was nothing to discuss. I think in the last letter Mr. Chou En-lai refers to this that I would not even discuss this I always recognised that they were minor matters, territories which had been considered disputable even before the Chinese came to Tibet. Those areas were there even in the British period. There were minor disputes and the Chinese inherited them and went on with them. We are prepared to settle those matters.

You may say that all the frontier matters might be divided into three parts. One is broadly speaking what is called the McMahon Line from the Burmese border to the Bhutan border. Then comes Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Lahaul, Spiti and then you go on to Ladakh. You must treat these separately. When I talk about the McMahon Line, obviously it is only that area, not of the Ladakh area which is quite different. I am not going into the long history because I do not want to take the time of the House. It is a complicated thing but we have always looked upon the Ladakh area as a different area as, if I may say so, some vaguer area so far as the frontier is concerned because the exact line of the frontier is not at all clear as in the case of the McMahon Line. When we discovered in 1958, more than a year ago, that a road had been built across Yehchong in the north-east corner of Ladakh, we were worried. We did not know where it was. Hon. Members asked, why did you not know before? It is a relevant question but the fact of the matter is that

we just are not within hundred miles of that area. It is an uninhabitable area and it has not been under any kind of administration. Nobody has been present there. It is a territory where not even a blade of grass grows, about 17,000 feet high. It adjoins Sinkiang. We sent a party, practically of explorers, small group of six or seven or eight or ten, mountaineers and others, to find out about this. One of the groups of this party was apprehended by the Chinese Government and there was correspondence on this. The men belonging to that group were released later on. Now, possibly it was an error or a mistake or wrong on my part not to have brought that fact before the House. I am myself not clear, thinking back on that, what I should have done but our difficulty then was that we were corresponding with the Chinese Government and we were waiting for those people, that little party, to come here and tell us as to what happened to them. It took two or three months for them to come. The group which was apprehended by the Chinese was released later and the men came back after some time. We thought at that time that it might be easier for us to deal with the Chinese Government without too much publicity of this incident. We might have been wrong but it was not a crisis or anything like that. However, I am prepared to admit that it was my error not to have brought this matter to the notice of Parliament when it occurred. For the rest, there has been no keeping back really of any information and we have kept Parliament fully informed. There have been plenty of questions.

Dr. Ahmad said that there are no objective reasons for war. Of course, there are no objective reasons, no practical reasons, no sensible reasons or no reason whatsoever of any kind. Whichever way you approach it, it would be folly of an extreme type for us to fight over such matters. We may get excited about the sacredness of the Indian soil and the Chinese people may get excited about something they

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hold sacred if they hold anything sacred. That is a different matter but the fact of the matter is that nothing can be a more amazing folly than for two great countries like India and China to go into a major conflict and war for the possession of a few mountain peaks, however beautiful the mountain peaks might be, or some area which is more or less uninhabited. It is not that, as every Member of this House knows. When such conflicts occur, something happens which stirs our innermost convictions, something which hurts our pride, our national pride, our self-respect and all that. So, it is not a question of a mile or two or ten or even a hundred miles. It is something more precious than a hundred or a thousand miles and it is that which brings up peoples' passions to a high level and it is that which, to some extent, is happening in India today. It is not because of a patch of territory but because they feel that they have not got a fair treatment in this matter, they have been treated rather casually by the Chinese Government and an attempt is made, if I may use the word, to bully them.

Now, the only time that firing took place was in Longju, a few days ago. In his last letter, Mr. Chou En-lai gives a list of places where India has committed aggression. We have committed aggression on air and we have committed aggression on land. There is no sea; otherwise, we would have been accused of committing aggression on sea also. I might inform the House that we have received a protest about one of our ships having gone into the territorial waters of China. That ship, I think, was going from Hongkong to somewhere. That is another matter. So, sea is also not left out. Now, what is aggression and what is not aggression depends, of course, on where you put the line of demarcation. Obviously, we may go on saying that they have committed aggression and they may go on saying that we have committed aggression because their line is different from ours and

so long as you do not agree to a line, you can always go on saying this according to our own interpretation and our own methods. There can be no limit to that but Mr. Chou En-lai says in his letter that although they totally deny and repudiate the so-called McMahon Line, nevertheless, they had not crossed the Line. That is his argument and he says that they won't cross it till this matter is settled by agreement. I won't go into the long argument but take this particular place where actually firing took place. We got one version from our people and they have no doubt got a version from their own people. The two versions do not meet and they conflict with each other but there is just one simple matter I should like to bring to your notice and to the Chinese Government's notice. Over this there has been a protest. There has been a post belonging to the Indian Government at Longju. It so happened that towards the second half of July, we got news that the officer-in-charge of the check post at Longju was seriously ill.

He was supposed to have got 5 P.M. appendicitis and nobody was available there to deal with him. So we sent a message to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 23rd July, that is, slightly more than a month before this small fighting took place and this was the message to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"The Officer-in-charge of the Indian check post at Longju near the international border in the Subansiri Frontier Division of NEFA is seriously ill. It is essential to send immediate medical relief to save his life. The location of the post is

Then the exact longitude, latitude etc. were given.

"The Government of India propose to paradrop a doctor at the post. Depending on weather, the paradropping operation may take place on the 24th afternoon or on

one of subsequent days. The aircraft has been instructed to take all care not to cross into Chinese territory but the Chinese Government are being informed should there be any error of judgment. The Government of India will appreciate if immediate warning is issued to the neighbouring Chinese posts of this operation."

This was a normal message sent to a friendly Government but the mere normality of it shows that we had no doubt about our post. We gave them the longitude, latitude and we said we were sending a doctor and when they say that this is aggression on our part at Longju, I do submit that that argument does not convince. We can, of course, go into that; I need not convince the House because the House is convinced about these matters.

Now, I should like to go back to one thing to which attention has been drawn, I think, by Diwan Chaman Lall; that is about my talks with Premier Chou En-lai. It is no pleasure to me to contradict Premier Chou. My memory may be wrong; his memory may be wrong. Whatever it is, but it happens I did not trust my memory but a record of the talks I made in an official note within 24 hours of our talk. There is a small quotation given of that. How did this talk arise? How did it take place? It was Premier Chou who started it and the reason for it was that some months previously I had sent him a message, not about the Indian frontier, but about the Burmese frontier. I had no business to interfere on the question of the Burmese frontier but the Prime Minister of Burma who had been here about that time said that he was having this trouble about the frontier and we discussed it and he asked if I could help in any way. I said, it is very difficult to interfere with two other countries of the status they had but still presuming rather our friendly relations with China and with Burma I sent a message to Premier Chou saying that I was sorry

that this small matter of the Burma-China frontier was continuing and was not being settled and I hoped that it would be settled soon. Then I used—I remember very well—a phrase. In it I said Burma is relatively a small country; on either side of Burma are these big countries China and India and Burma naturally feels a little apprehensive of both these countries—I included both India and China—and it is up to us to function in a way to remove all apprehension from the mind of Burma which is a friendly country. We are friends with it. Why do anything carelessly which might increase their fear or apprehension? I included India and I put it in the same level as China in that letter. Then I suggested in that letter—it is not for me to suggest what the frontiers should be—that perhaps he might be good enough to invite U Nu who was not at that time Prime Minister and discuss this with him. Premier Chou agreed to my suggestion and invited U Nu. Later U Nu went and they had talks and I believe he came back fairly satisfied with those talks but I regret to say that although this occurred some time ago, 3½ years ago, those talks have not borne fruit in Burma yet. It is still there; there is a feeling in Burma that the assurances given to U Nu about the frontier are not fulfilled by China. So when Premier Chou was discussing this matter over the message we sent about Burma—I had invited U Nu and we had talked in that connection—he said, although we do not recognise this McMahon Line—it was of British Imperialism and all that—nevertheless we are friendly countries, these things should not go on in this way and therefore, he said,—we have agreed to recognise the McMahon Line in so far as the Burmese frontier is concerned—we were discussing Burma, remember—and the other few matters will also be settled soon. In that connection he went on to say, also because of our friendly relations we shall accept the McMahon Line so far as the China-India frontier is concerned. That was the whole of the McMahon Line. Then one or two

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things he added. One was that the did not think that it was a valid line. Certainly he said that; that the British had gone on extending. Nevertheless, we shall recognise it because of long usage and because we are friendly countries. Now, when I heard this I wanted to be quite sure that I had not misunderstood him. So I think three times in various ways I came back to this subject and made him repeat this. So there was no doubt about it. Because the matter was of some importance to me, when I came away a little later I put it down in writing and there it is. Now, it is a matter of sorrow to me that this thing is now, if not denied—it is anyhow practically denied—ignored and another line is adopted. Of course, it may be that things have happened in China compelling a change in policy; I do not know. That may happen in any country but however that may be, there it is. And this changeover, it seems to me, has been a progressive changeover; it is not sudden. Even in this White Paper those who read it will see that the answer about this McMahon Line etc. is not quite so strong, so positive, as in premier Chou's letter of yesterday. Gradually, step by step, the policy of China in regard to this matter has become more rigid. Why, I cannot say.

Now, this is a matter, Sir, undoubtedly of concern to us, not only because of its consequences but because such developments produce a feeling of lack of confidence in each other's words and assurances. That is a more important thing, as some hon. Members said, than a few yards of territory. If there is that lack of faith, lack of confidence, where are we?

Take another thing. On the one hand we have these maps where large areas of India are marked as if they were China and on the other they say, well, the maps are not precise and accurate. We can change them if necessary but we do not recognise the McMahon Line. Nobody knows exactly what they may have in mind as to where the Line is. It is an

extraordinary position for a great State to take up. Even if we subscribed to that, it means leaving the matter vague and the possibility of trouble is always there. So far as we are concerned, administratively we have been there. It is true that there is not much of administration in the high Himalayas but still what there is there. We have our post; we have our officers. We function; we have functioned for years there and to be told that this is aggression or this may be aggression is an extraordinary thing. If we have two sets of opinions about this, the right thing to do for the two countries was and is for them to sit down and talk about it and argue about it and come to a settlement. Now, I have made our position clear on this border issue by statements in Parliament and later by letters, etc. for ten years now. There is no doubt that the Chinese Government knew about it. They remained silent. They did not accept my position, except as I said that we had a talk here in India when Premier Chou came here three years ago, when he accepted the McMahon Line. But apart from that we have been talking about it, acting upon it. Take even the Sino-Indian Treaty about Tibet, five years ago, I think—in 1954. Now, we were dealing with Tibet and we were dealing with such matters as affected Tibet. We were dealing with the various extra-territorial rights we had in Tibet, withdrawing them, some soldiering we had, post office, telegraph office, roads, pilgrim routes, trade, commerce and everything, and what were the passes we should go through. Now, normally one would think that, if there was a problem of a bit of Tibet being in India or *vice versa* when we were dealing with India-Tibet questions, those matters should have come up for discussion. They did not. I saw no reason why I should push them, because I had nothing to say about them. I accepted the boundary as it was. Nothing was mentioned. And the whole context of those discussions was that we were dealing with all the remaining problems as between Tibet and India in

that treaty with China. And to have it at the back of your mind that you were going to change the whole frontier between Tibet and India and later bring it up, does not seem to be quite straight or fairplay. Now, a very favourite word, we often use it too and they use it frequently, but a very favourite word with the Chinese authorities is 'imperialism'. Well, there is imperialism in the world. We have known enough of it to dislike it very greatly. We have struggled against it. But it seems to me that sometimes this word is used to cover every sin and everything as if that was an explanation of every argument. Just say 'imperialism', it answers everything. British imperialism spread, they say. Undoubtedly British imperialism was here. Undoubtedly in the old days, half a century ago, it exercised pressure on Tibet. Those were the days, the House may remember, when China was not strong, but British imperialism was afraid of Czarist Russia. It was really Czarist Russia and British Empire pushing, being afraid of each other. However, they did do that and various things came. Various settlements were made from time to time and, as Diwan Chaman Lall pointed out, also the tripartite treaty of 1919 or 1914. Although China did not sign it, the real Chinese objection was to the border between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet, and not to this border at all. We were not concerned with that. However, whatever that may be, that was about more than 45 years ago. That is, after that treaty, before that too, there was a vague kind of occupation. Now, to raise these matters now on the ground that many, many long years ago British imperialism functioned there, it does seem to me, is some strange argument. How do countries grow? The Chinese State today is a great, very big, colossal State. Was this Chinese State born as such from the head of 'Brahma'? How did it grow so big and great? Surely, in past ages by the ability of its people and the conquests of its warriors, in other words, by Chinese imperialism. There is no doubt about it and I am sure they would not deny it. I am not talking

of the present more enlightened days of China, but of the old days surely—and I have the greatest admiration for Chinese history and culture. Not that the world functioned in that way, but the point is that the Chinese State grew in that way, where it came to Tibet. Tibet now is a point at issue, very much so. But where do you draw the line, from which a kind of certainly comes—there is no imperialism after and only before? At times, if one discusses the history of Tibet, well, there were periods when Tibetan armies occupied the Chinese capital. There were periods when the Nepalese Armies occupied the Tibetan capital. You go far enough. We had even in India, peaceful as we are, empires going right over to a large part of Central Asia, in Asoka's time, Chandragupta's time, the Kushan period, and all that. Now, where do you draw the line in history? History is full of changes, full of ups and downs, full of all kinds of things and full of mixtures of people and countries. And if one does go back that way, there is no country in the wide world which may not be shaken to its foundations and split up and certainly the great Chinese State will not survive if that argument is applied. We do not apply that argument. So, it is strange that these simple human factors, apart from constitutional and other factors, do not seem to be appreciated by the Chinese State and they have valued India's friendship only to a very low extent, in the final analysis.

I think we were right in working for their friendship and, may I repeat and say, we shall continue to work for it. Any person who has the least responsibility for India's present and India's future cannot allow himself to be frightened and angered and behave in fright and anger. No country should do that, more especially in a crisis. People who are frightened and angry can never act wisely. We have to think of the present, of course, but we have to think of the future of these two great countries. To imagin

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that India can sort of push China about is silly. To imagine that China can push India about is, if I may venture to say so, equally silly. Now, therefore, this idea of settling things by this kind of compulsion and force or by threats and bullying is all wrong and we must accept things as they are. Now, if you will read the letter, the message we sent to the Chinese Government yesterday morning, that yellow paper or pink paper or whatever it is, you will find that we made a suggestion to them there. You need not read it just now. But you will find that we have suggested to them—there can be no other way—that we must accept the *status quo* and let us discuss these individual points. I do not know, and I do not see how we can discuss this kind of broad areas. We can discuss individual points where there might be some dispute and there might be complaint. It is one thing to accept or to adhere to the McMahon Line but quite another to see the exact alignment here and there. A village may be here and a village may be there. It is not of great importance provided it is done in a friendly way. We are prepared to discuss, we have discussed once or twice. But we say that it is the *status quo*, as somebody said it is the *status quo* prior to any recent incursion.

Take Longju. We made a very fair offer. We said: "You say that we committed aggression. We don't agree that we did. But we are prepared to agree to neither your forces nor our forces being at Longju. Let us discuss that matter. Let your forces withdraw and let our forces remain where they are or two or three miles away. We are not prepared to take them back." That is, we want to approach this matter in as peaceful and co-operative a way as possible. Of course, it is fantastic to talk about war etc. in this way and to rush about in a panic. Nevertheless the matter is serious enough. Frankly it is serious because I just do not know how the Chinese mind may think. I just do not know, and I have been surprised at recent developments. So I do not

know. I have great admiration for the Chinese mind, logical and reasonable and relatively calm. But sometimes I wonder if all those old qualities have not perhaps been partly overwhelmed. So we have to be careful. We have naturally to be vigilant, and we have to take such measures as we can to protect our integrity.

One word more, Sir. Very probably these Tibetan developments have angered and soured the mind of the Government of China, very likely. They have been in trouble there undoubtedly, and the Tibetan people have been in much greater trouble of course. And perhaps they have reacted strongly to what we have done. I mean, to the asylum we have given to the Dalai Lama and to certain other factors. We have tried to steer a middle way. We respect the Dalai Lama. Large numbers of people respect him. That does not mean we agree with him in everything. In some ways he is acting wrongly today. In so far as our advice was taken we have strongly told him that he is acting wrongly and no good can come if he goes to the United Nations on Tibet. I have told him personally, I have said so in public, and I hold to that opinion. It will do no good to him or Tibet. There it is. Some others have advised him differently. We have contradicted some statements that he has recently made which were very unwise and incorrect, if I may say so. The other day in a speech he delivered, I think somewhere in Delhi, he talked of the McMahon Line and the status of Tibet being at the same level which was quite incorrect. So we do not agree with him. We have warned him and I must say in a large measure he has accepted our advice, that is to say, in regard to not indulging in political controversy. But sometimes he has not, and it has been a difficult question for us to decide. We do not want to come in his way. We want to give him freedom of action within limitations. But no doubt all this must have affected and is affecting the Chinese mind, and perhaps it is due to that and not to

the logic or the reasonableness of the Chinese position in regard to India, in regard to our frontiers that they are taking up this rigid attitude. Well, we have to be firm, we have to hold to our position. I shall try to do that. But I shall try always to find a way for peaceful settlements because I try to look into the future, and the future is dark if it is to be covered by continuing hostility between India and China.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Dr. Kunzru, we have just five minutes.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: I do not want to take advantage of the five minutes.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Do you want to say anything more?

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: If it is your wish, Sir, that the discussion should continue, I am agreeable to that.

MR. CHAIRMAN: No. I want to know how long you will take if you want to say anything.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: Please give me fifteen minutes. I will see if I can finish within that. I will not take more than fifteen minutes. It may be something less. But I respectfully feel that if you think it is not desirable to continue the discussion any more—and your wish is a command—I shall not say anything more.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The House stands adjourned till 11 A.M. tomorrow.

The House then adjourned at twentyfive minutes past five of the clock till eleven of the clock on Friday, the 11th September, 1959.