

RAJYA SABHA

Friday, 13th December 1957

The House met at eleven of the clock, MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair.

PAPER LAID ON THE TABLE

**NOTIFICATION PUBLISHING AMENDMENTS IN
THE CENTRAL SALES TAX (REGISTRATION
AND TURNOVER) RULES, 1957**

THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE (SHRI B. R. BHAGAT): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table, under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, a copy of the Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs) Notification S.R.O. No. 3613, dated the 6th November 1957, publishing certain amendments in the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, [Placed in Library. See No. LT-437/57.]

**MOTION RE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION—continued**

SHRI B. SHIVA RAO (Mysore): Mr. Chairman, at the end of the long debate we had yesterday, so many points were covered by the different speakers that it would not be easy to avoid a reference to some of them. But in the time at my disposal I will try to invite the attention of the House to certain considerations which seem to be relevant in discussing our foreign policy.

I will first take the question of Kashmir. In the speeches that were made yesterday I do not think there was any substantial difference of opinion amongst those who referred to that topic. Possibly there was some difference in emphasis. But I would invite the attention of the House to a remark which has been made not for the first time in this House and outside, a remark which

■ RSD—1.

was made more than once in the course of the speeches which have been delivered in this country by Sardar Dilip Singh Saund who is the only Indian representative in the American Congress at the present moment. So far as Kashmir and Goa are concerned, his complaint is that the Indian point of view on both these topics has not been placed before the American public in a way that they could appreciate and understand. This complaint, Sir, about a certain defect in our technique of propaganda has been brought to the notice of the External Affairs Ministry.

I have gone into the figures that we spend on propaganda abroad. I think at the present moment we spend something like Rs. 75 lakhs on foreign propaganda. It sounds an impressive figure, but it is spread over more than 40 countries. That is not the only defect. I have sometimes wondered, knowing something about propaganda myself in my capacity of a journalist, whether in existing circumstances, with the terms and conditions of service being what they are, the Propaganda Section of the External Affairs Ministry can do better than it is doing today. I will not go into the details of that question, but I think it is time that the senior officials of that Ministry went into that problem to see how far they could remove some of the handicaps which prevent the Publicity Section of the External Affairs Ministry from doing better than it is doing at the moment.

Sir, I would also like to invite the attention of the House and of the External Affairs Ministry to another aspect of propaganda. Kashmir is not the only dispute we have with Pakistan. So far as Kashmir is concerned, the Security Council has been dealing with it for so many years that I doubt whether today in the Security Council there is any one who was a member of that Council when we first took that complaint of aggression against Pakistan. There is also the Canal Waters dispute which is being dealt with by representatives of the World

[Shri B. Shiva Rao] Bank. There is the question of evacuee property in regard to which we carry on direct negotiations with the representatives of Pakistan. Then there are other disputes, some relating to trade and so on. It seems to me, Sir, that the time has come when our Government should attempt a clear and integrated picture of all the problems which make up the differences between ourselves and Pakistan. That picture should be drawn simply and clearly without the use of any technical or legal jargon, because I am convinced, having gone into all these matters in detail, that we have a story to tell to the outside world which has not yet been told, and I think if that story could be told in the manner I have suggested, we could carry conviction to many people who today are confused and baffled because of the complexities of the various problems which we have placed before them.

So far as Goa is concerned, I would like to make one suggestion which I have already made to the External Affairs Ministry, and possibly action is being taken on those lines, though I have not seen any indication of it in newspaper reports of the proceedings of the current session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Goa, as we see it, and the other Portuguese possessions in India are non-self-governing territories coming within the terms of Article 73 of the Charter. Sir, it was my privilege for five years to represent the Government of India on a Special Committee of the United Nations which deals with all such non-self-governing territories. It is open to any member of that Committee to ask the metropolitan power— and Portugal as a member of the United Nations has to be a member of that Committee—to fulfil all its obligations under Article 73 of the Charter. What does it mean? It means that every year the metropolitan power must furnish in full detail a report on the economic, the social, the cultural and the educational conditions in the territories in its charge, and if it is not **done**, **we have the right to bring**

such information as we possess both to that Committee and to the General Assembly. In that way it seems to me that we can keep world opinion fully informed as to what is happening in the various Portuguese possessions in India.

Another suggestion, Sir, which I would like the External Affairs Ministry to consider in regard to foreign policy is to think afresh on a suggestion which I ventured to make to the Prime Minister two or three years ago. As a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations some years ago I found that our influence and our capacity for helping in the solution of international problems was greatly increased by our membership of such bodies as the Economic and Social Council and of the Security Council. For reasons which I have not been able to understand we have kept out of the elections to these bodies.

Yesterday the Prime Minister made a reference to Algeria and later in the debate Pandit Kunzru also made a detailed reference to the same problem. My mind went back to the meetings of the Security Council at a time when India was a member of that Council and of the General Assembly Session of that year, when the Indian delegation played a great part in bringing about a solution of a problem which had baffled the General Assembly for some years. That was the problem of the independence of Algeria and the future of the colonies that were formerly known as Italian Somaliland. It seems to me that we can play a bigger part in world affairs at the present moment without being open to misunderstanding if we take our seats in these councils, and I have no doubt that if we sought election there would be little difficulty in being elected.

Sir, Anally I would like to come to a point to which the Prime Minister referred in the concluding passages of his speech yesterday. He referred to

the appeal he had made to the United States and to the U.S.S.R. a few weeks ago, and to which Mr. Bulganin has already made a sympathetic reply. We do not know, at least I do not know, what reaction there has been in Washington to this appeal. President Eisenhower is being persuaded by some of his advisers to go to the next meeting of the NATO Council in Paris. It is a meeting of exceptional importance in view of recent developments, for which Russia has been responsible. There is no doubt, Sir, that all over the world, especially in Europe and in America, Russia's spectacular achievements in the conquest of space, have made the most profound impression, and even without the Sputniks and the international continental missiles, American opinion has been increasingly sceptical as to the results that could be achieved through military alliances and the expenditure of colossal sums of money in strengthening bases all over the world.

The Prime Minister referred yesterday in the course of his speech to a view expressed by a well-known American, Mr. George Kennan, or the desirability of withdrawing all foreign troops from European soil. Mr. George Kennan is a man of great significance in American foreign policy at the moment. He was probably the chief policy-shaper in the Truman administration. Later he went to Russia as American Ambassador. But, more than the positions that he occupied, he was the author of two phrases, which have practically governed American foreign policy during the last few years. It was Mr. Kennan who evolved the phrase "of containing Russia." It was he who spoke of the need of speaking from strength to the Soviet Union. Now both these phrases which have governed American foreign policy are being questioned by an increasing number of Americans and people in Europe. I looked into a pamphlet which was sent to me a few weeks ago by the American Embassy's Information Ser-

vice in Delhi about NATO, its development and significance, and from this pamphlet I have taken out a few very significant figures. Since NATO was first formed in 1949, the United States has contributed over 22 billion dollars worth of equipment and other items to support the defence efforts of its European NATO allies, guns, tanks, aeroplanes, motor vehicles and other military items, and apart from military materials there has also been economic support to countries whose budgets and general economies could not afford defence efforts of that magnitude, and again according to this pamphlet the ground forces available to NATO in Europe were 12 divisions in 1949, and now, probably a year ago, there were nearly a hundred divisions either on active duty or in reserve. NATO aircraft had increased from approximately 400 in 1949 to more than 6,000 in 1955, and there are more than a 160 jointly financed air bases constructed in various NATO countries. Similarly, with regard to naval power, since 1951 the increase in naval strength has been roughly of the order of 30 per cent. Many people are asking, many thoughtful Americans themselves are asking, chief amongst whom I would like to mention a former American Ambassador in India, Mr. Chester Bowles, what is to be the future of NATO and that question is not only being asked by outsiders but by members of the NATO countries themselves. Last year a sub-committee was appointed by the Council of NATO consisting of three men, at least two of whom are well known all over the world for their progressive outlook, Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada, Mr. Lange of Norway, and Mr. Martino of Italy about whom personally I do not know anything. It was a long and interesting report which they submitted, dealing with the different aims of NATO and the value of those aims in the modern world. And this committee observed,—I am quoting from their conclusions—"there is a wrong feeling abroad, that it (the ! NATO) is tending now to become an I agency for the pooling of the strength

[Shri B. Shiva Rao] and resources of the 'colonial' powers in defence of imperial privileges, and racial superiority, under the leadership of the United States."

There is, as I have ventured to point out, a growing and sharp disillusionment all over the world, and perhaps nowhere more than in Europe and America, as to the efficacy of these military pacts and alliances because the plain fact which stands out is that in spite of all these colossal efforts by NATO and other pacts, Russia has not been contained as is evident from recent events in western Asia. And as to speaking from strength, Sir, I do not know who is speaking from strength, whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union at the moment. There are unfortunately a few diehards, some of them in key positions, who still cling to the old grooves of thought, but opinion, as I have said, is rapidly changing all over the world, and it is changing in a direction which invests our Prime Minister's recent efforts to bring about a suspension of nuclear tests and the beginnings of disarmament with a great deal of hope, and these efforts may well prove the beginnings of a total abandonment of war. I am therefore sure that all sections of the House, whether those sitting here, or on the opposite side some of whom have moved amendments to the motion that was moved yesterday, all sections of the House will most wholeheartedly support the Prime Minister in his great efforts to establish the foundations of an enduring world peace.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, this debate has shown, as such a debate has previously shown also, how little basic difference there is in this matter of foreign policy between the Governmental side and the Opposition. The basic factor is accepted, the basic approach is accepted, broadly speaking, and not referring to every individual Member, and then a search is made to find something to criticise

or more emphasis is placed on some matter. It is a question of emphasis. But I must exclude from this the remark that was made by one hon. Member who boldly and gallantly said that the foreign policy pursued by the Government of India is cowardly and effeminate. I do not know whom, what group or what ideology that hon. Member represents. Evidently he lives in some age wh'ch has nothing to do with the present. There are some organisations which still live in some age which was about a thousand or two thousand or three thousand years ago, and who try to apply their thinking of this past age to modern conditions. It is a very interesting subject to study, this reaction of a person living in the middle of the twentieth century, but whose mind has not moved from the tenth or eleventh century and who tries to judge of conditions today on that basis. It is difficult to answer that. I suppose he might find Ms opposite numbers in this matter in Portugal, who also think in terms of many hundreds of years ago. They would not agree no doubt; but they will be able to understand each other's thinking. Therefore, I need not say anything about such criticisms which have no meaning and which apparently expect us to be always in shining armour and sword in hand and attack anybody who dares to criticise us or lift his little finger against what are considered our interests. I should like to make it perfectly clear that our policy is the exact opposite of that. It is not a question of variation. It is the exact opposite of that, both basically and as it works out. It is the opposite of that because we do not think that policy would anyhow be right. But in the present state of affairs of the world that would be grievously wrong and wholly and absolutely impractical. If some people think that we are— and some Members have apparently said that—too idealistic, I would beg

to tell them it is they who live in the realm of imagination divorced from facts. Our policy is strictly practical,

the only practical policy that would be pursued which might bring results. The results may be delayed occasionally, but certainly it avoids ill results and that is something certainly to our advantage. In the broader sense of the word, of the subjects, I would venture to say that other countries, great countries and small, are bound to come to a closest policy of non-alignment, because the only alternative to that policy is, well, what is being done today, the cold war. But the real alternative is deliberately expecting war and having it. If you once rule that out, then you come back to this policy either of non-alignment or putting an end to cold war. I suppose the lion Member who referred to our policy as cowardly was probably thinking and was obsessed by the ideas, of Pakistan and thinks that we are weak, appeasing—these are the words sometimes used towards Pakistan. Well, let me make it perfectly clear to him and to everybody that holding to our principles and to our vital interests, we want to appease everybody. I am not afraid of the word appeasement, provided appeasement does not involve any loss of any principle or any vital interests of our country. I do want to appease because I want to win over their people. I want to make friends with them, I want to make friends with Pakistan. Why should I be afraid of people who are with us? Always subject to this I am not going to give in on any vital principle or vital interest of our country, of our people. Subject to that, let there be full appeasement. It is a big exception, I admit, that I have made, but even so it does, I hope, indicate the mental approach to the problem because the mental approach to the problem even of Pakistsji—with whom unfortunately our relations are none too good—our mental approach is a friendly approach and it will continue to be a friendly approach even though we do not agree to many things that they say, even though we hold to some things that we consider most important in

spite of Pakistan's pressure and sometimes threats. Nevertheless, the mental approach of the Government of India and, I believe, of the people of India is a friendly approach to the people of Pakistan, because we realise that in the nature of things Pakistan and India both—because of geography, and nobody can change that geography, nor can anybody change past history, past culture, past traditions, past so many things which have joined India and Pakistan, nobody can change those in spite of political differences and tensions—should be friendly countries. We do believe that in such circumstances it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should be friendly countries, co-operate with each other. It is unfortunate that partly or largely as a result of the partition and subsequently what happened, we have not yet got over those difficulties and a trail of suspicion and bitterness pursues us, not so much, I believe, in India, but a little more in Pakistan, where it is so frequently said that India, or the Government of India, are conspiring or intriguing to put an end to Pakistan or to do injury to Pakistan because we have not reconciled ourselves to the partition and we want to annul it—and these things are frequently said. And I wish to repeat that nothing could be farther from the truth and this is not a matter of sentiment, it is just a matter of hard fact, that any such going back on that decision would be extraordinarily harmful for us. It is a purely opportunist way of looking at it nothing idealistic. There is, of course, the idealistic point of view, but purely from the point of view of opportunism, it would be almost fatal for us to try to go back or to be pushed back into that position, we do not want it. Far from trying for it, we shall try stoutly against it. Yes, we want friendly relations with Pakistan, co-operative relations. It is absurd as things are—leave out the major problems—that even in regard to trade Pakistan should get something from ten thousand miles away at a higher price which it can get at a cheaper price from India. It is patently ab-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru] surd. It is not good for Pakistan; it is not good for ourselves; it is not good in so many other things. Even today as hon. Members will know that if one puts aside for the moment the political conflict, the political controversies between us and Pakistan, if Pakistanis and Indians meet together, they meet on an extraordinarily friendly level. They may argue. There are no deep barriers. There are no deep animosities. There are superficial animosities with certainly some fears and apprehensions and I do think that they can be got removed and they will be removed. They are not removed by the attitude of the sword and the shining armour being displayed everywhere. That attitude ended more or less with Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.

I do not think it is very relevant to KO about like the Spanish hero, Cervantes. Some people apparently think that it is a suitable point of view for India. The Government of India does not agree with that. There is one thing about Pakistan which I should like to say which is important and which shows the mental approach of the Pakistan Government, not the people. I am sure that in their dislike of India, in their dislike of what we do, they go and combine and even enter into unholy marriages, they go and make friends, make alliances with the Portuguese, with Goa. It is not for me, of course, to limit the choice of their friends and companions and bedfellows. They can do what they like. It is an independent nation. I merely referring to show to what extent their animosity to India carries them. No Eastern country, I say, or for the matter of that, no liberal Western country, can have today two opinions about the colonial regimes. Even the colonial countries today say and admit the fact that colonialism has gone, is going and will go. They do not justify it. The most they say is, it will take a little time; we are taking steps. The United Kingdom has made a considerable advance in

Africa and elsewhere and they are making it clear that the rest of their colonial territories will also soon be free.

Now, the whole world has rejected the idea of colonialism—well, perhaps, not the whole world, but, at any rate, a great part of the world. Of course, so far as the countries of Asia are concerned, they are wholly and absolutely opposed to this idea of colonialism. And at such a moment for the Government of Pakistan not only to be friendly—I have no objection to their being friendly—but in a sense lining up with the Portuguese colonial authority in Goa does indicate a frame of mind which is rather extraordinary which does not take into consideration what the Asian thought is on this subject or African thought or liberal European thought or liberal American thought, which I am quite certain does not take into consideration the Pakistani thought on this subject. It shows how far they have drifted away from any normal policy which an Asian country inevitably follows, simply because of their animosity to India.

Of course, I need not point out to this House that the Portuguese Government is not normally reckoned among the liberal or advanced Governments of the world today. It is not my function to criticise it. But I am merely pointing out this fact that it is an authoritarian Government. It is a Government where we had recently seen a very strange kind of election and a Government where nobody dare raise his voice against the ruling authority. That is the close friend of the Pakistan Government, not the people. It shows that the real differences between Pakistan and India—I am not talking about the people, but about Governments, the governing apparatus—are not really related to Kashmir or the canal waters or this or that. They are deeper and these things come up. They are important, of course. The question of Kashmir is important; the question of canal waters is important. But the real differences stem from something else. They are deeper

and, therefore, it becomes more difficult to solve the Kashmir problem or the canal waters problem or other problems which could otherwise have been dealt with on a different level.

Yesterday, Dr. Kunzru, asked me to place the Resolution on Algeria before this House. At that time, I thought that we must have received it. But, later, I found that we had not got it. We had got a telegram about it, not the Resolution itself. Now, I have received it. I shall read it out:

"The following Resolution on Algeria was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 10th December 1957, by 80 votes to none. South Africa was absent and France did not participate in the voting."

This is the Resolution—:

"The General Assembly, having discussed the question of Algeria and recalling its Resolution of February 15, 1957,

- (1) expresses again its concern over the situation in Algeria;
- (2) takes note of the offer of good offices made by His Majesty the King of Morocco and His Excellency the President of Tunisia;
- (3) expresses the wish that in the spirit of effective co-operation parleys will be entered into and other appropriate means utilised with a view to reaching a solution in connection with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

Probably, there is some mistake in this word 'connection'. That is the word we received by telegram. It might be a mistake.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It should be 'consistent with'.

THE MINISTER OF LAW (SHRI A. K. SEN)
: 'In consonance.'

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May be, 'in consonance' perhaps.

Now, the meaning is clear.

Well, this Resolution does not go very far, but the point is this. From the super-heated atmosphere where it has tended to become a cold-war matter, it was drawn out by this Resolution into an atmosphere which should lead to more effective approaches. That itself is a great gain and I am very glad that our delegation in the United Nations played an important part together with others, in bringing about this approach of some kind of reconciliation. I use, the word 'reconciliation' and I do feel that that should be the governing approach now, wherever possible. Certainly, so far as we are concerned, we shall always try to have that approach to world problems like those with Pakistan, with any country. But I was thinking more specially of this approach of reconciliation in contrast to the approach to the cold war generally.

I pointed out yesterday the dangers of this cold war. Even when the Governments concerned do not want war, even so, it produces risks which might lead to a war bursting out or something happens which might lead to war. Today one reads that atomic bombs are carried by aircraft on patrol duties in various parts of the world. When this is done, there is always a danger of accidents happening, quite apart from any deliberate attempt to do so. Now, when this is pointed out, it is said, "But, in the nature of things, we cannot go about without bombs because the whole purpose is to be ready, instantaneously ready, for action, if something happens. The purpose of patrolling is not served without being armed." On the other hand if you are armed for that purpose, a person armed may mistake something —may be misled—and may think that somebody is attacking him when he is not, may go off his head, may get excited and anything may happen. He may start using the bomb. Is the future

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru] of the world going to depend on the sanity and calmness and composure of every one of the hundreds of thousands of persons on the aircraft or other places who have bombs? It seems to me too risky.

Then again, leave out the individual, I speak as a lay man. I do not know but suppose there is some failure of the engine of that aircraft and it falls down with those bombs on the wrong territory. Well, I do not know what the consequences will be, they may burst and immediately, the other country might think, it is a deliberate thing and react. When I really come to think of these, the prospects of danger are so many, even apart from a Government deciding on aggressive operations. So there is no way out that way.

As I came in, I heard Mr. Shiva Rao talking about new thoughts in regard to these military alliances. I myself mentioned yesterday something to that effect, because it is being realised that these military alliances now at any rate do not serve very much useful purpose from the military point of view. From other points of view they might. Even the new type of weapons are such that they can be used over the heads of the alliances and the areas where the alliances function. Anyhow, I am not a military man to say how useful they are. But the military alliances at best can only keep the cold war going. They cannot take these countries away from the cold war. That is quite obvious. And the cold war leads nowhere today except to the possibility of a more destructive hot war. Therefore people are thinking on these lines. Yesterday, Sir, I quoted that distinguished American expert who was suggesting that foreign armies should be withdrawn both by the Western Powers and by the Soviet Union and other countries. There can be no doubt that if that is done, it would bring relief to many countries and it would ! bring relief not only to the countries '

affected but to the world. It will be such an effective way of showing that we are going away from the conception of having a war in the near future. I earnestly hope that the Great Powers will think about it. It is very presumptuous for me to go on offering advice to those Powers who have to shoulder tremendous responsibilities. It is always easy for those who have no responsibility to advise those who are responsible for something being done. It becomes very easy for one country to advise another which has to shoulder that heavy responsibility. Therefore I am reluctant to suggest any such thing. At the same time when one feels strongly about some matter, to remain quiet and silent would also be a wrong thing. Perhaps even a small and thin voice might make a difference occasionally. So we advance our small voice occasionally and make some submissions to other countries and put forward some of our ideas for their consideration.

There is one thing about these military alliances. The major one is the N.A.T.O. And for my part, quite frankly I find it a little difficult to express an opinion as to whether, when N.A.T.O. came into existence, circumstances justified it or not. There was great fear on one side, and you have to recognise that. But this was ten years ago. Much has happened since then. The point is not what should have been done in the past or what should not have been done, but what is desirable and necessary today. But take even N.A.T.O. It was started as a defence organisation for defence purposes. But it has been used not in the military sense, but used otherwise to some extent, as a defender of colonial territories. It has spread from being an Atlantic alliance to the other seas and other areas of the world. It goes on spreading. I am not criticising anybody, but I am just pointing out the inevitable tendency of such alliances. The House may well remember that the Portuguese Government invoked it even in connection with Goa. Now where does

Goa come in? It is not in the North Atlantic, nor is there any question of defending Goa against a Soviet attack, and yet it was extended. So it goes on extending because the thing is there. And as far as the S.E.A.T.O. and the Baghdad Pacts are concerned, the possible justifications which apply to N.A.T.O. do not apply there at all. The fact is that the world has changed so rapidly even since the last war that our thinking has become out-of-date just as sometimes, if I may say so with all respect, the thinking of hon. Members on the other side is quite out-of-date and it has no relevancy to *i* acts. And whoever may be right or wrong will not help in saving the world :?rom disaster. Whichever of the two big Blocs, I mean, is right or wrong, will not help in saving the world :from disaster, if we suddenly plunge into a war. Therefore the approach to all these questions cannot be merely expressing your approval of something and your denunciation of something else. That is exactly the cold war approach, because if you go on denouncing each other, then there is no way to come together no bridge. And I would submit therefore to this House, and more especially to the Members sitting opposite, that whatever their views might be on a particular subject—those views of course can be put forward with force and cogency, but it helps nobody today merely to denounce any country even though you may dislike that country or its policies. If your policy is to bring them together to have some kind of a bridge, then let us work towards that bridge and not put difficulties and obstacles in the way of that process.

Now sometimes I find in the press of foreign countries, and sometimes some reference is made here in India—in Parliament also once or twice—to the effect that India's policy towards China or towards the Soviet Union is dictated by fear; China has become a great and powerful country, and it has a long border with us, and therefore we are conditioned by this major fact in changing our policies and not doing what we might

otherwise have done. Now I think that that outlook is not an Indian outlook. It is a Western outlook which proceeds from the assumption that conditions being what they are, we ought to be afraid of China, but facts are not seen whether we are or not. But the presumption is that every country, and more especially countries bordering the Communist countries, should be afraid of the Communist countries, and therefore should line up with the anti-Communist countries. That is one presumption. And a similar presumption is there on the other side too. And that presumption is shared by some of the hon. Members opposite. That presumption is that, every other country which is not in the Communist circle of countries is in danger all the time—all kinds of dangers—from the imperialistic countries, and therefore the way to preserve its independence is to attack the so-called imperialist countries and to line up with the Communist countries. Both proceed on the assumption that the other is attacking or is on the point of attacking, and therefore defend -yourself. Both have developed a certain war mentality with which they look at all their problems, which makes them quite oblivious of the facts of life and the facts prevailing in the world today. Now take this question of Russia, China and India. I can say with complete honesty that I am convinced that there is not the remotest chance or, if I may put it even more strongly, the remotest chance of a remote chance, of India being afraid of Russia or China or India having any kind of conflict, military conflict, with Russia or China. I am not saying that on any kind of sentimental or even an idealist basis but purely on practical grounds. Even if we differ, even if we are opposed in various policies, nevertheless there will be none. First of all, there is geography. It is true that no country today can be free from risk of attack because mountains and seas do not protect a country. It is true, but apart from that we all fortunately

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru] situated geographically. It is not easy to attack us; it can be done of course but it is not particularly easy to attack us, and if any person indulges in that attack, he will have very considerable difficulties to face. It will be a hornet's nest for that country. I am not for the moment referring to the fact that India will not be a great military power. We have no intention of trying to develop as such. Nevertheless, India is such a place that, if any person wants to attack it, he will have to face enormous difficulties; let that fact other people realise. Apart from the Himalayas, apart from the seas the Indian people are not people to be played with by any aggressor, whoever he may be. The real geographical advantage of India is that India is not in the way of the great powers' conflict. That is the advantage geographically. That does not apply to so many countries of Europe; it may not apply to some of the countries of Asia, but it does apply to us. We are away from the main road of conflict. It is true that if a conflict of the great powers takes place resulting in a great war, well, the whole world is affected, but that is a different matter. Even so, India will not be in the direct line of fighting. We are thus outside it. Therefore, for these and so many other factors, it is not conceivable for me that there is any danger of attack on India from any country and none from the other great powers obviously. May be we may have our local troubles, but that is a different matter. And even if there was danger, some remote danger I think we are completely equipped to face that danger. We may weak militarily, from the war point of view as we are in a major war, but it is a completely different proposition to defend one's country against an aggressor, and we are completely strong enough for that. I have no doubt about that. I put it to the House that two major factors came up last year or one and a half years ago in Europe or Africa or both. Two major things happened

there. One was the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, as also the Israeli invasion of Egypt. The other was what happened in Hungary. Both these indicated some lessons which we should keep in mind. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt showed that it is no longer possible, normally speaking, for any attempt to be made to go back, to revert, to colonialism, even for the great powers. A great power may be stronger as it is than a small country, but there are so many factors, world opinion and all that, which prevent a country from adopting, in an open brazen way, the old style colonial methods. In an insidious way it may be done, and it is done, but the whole situation in the world has changed so much that it cannot be done. The two great powers failed for a variety of reasons.

In Hungary what apparently came up was that communism cannot be imposed by foreign forces, by a foreign authority; it may grow, but it is a different matter. After long years, ten years, of a certain regime, it was obvious that there was a very great deal of opposition to it on nationalist grounds, not against communism, against whatever it was, against certain foreign elements imposing their authority.

These two lessons came to us last year. In other words, in both cases, we say that nationalism is still a very strong force like other things too—social changes—but basically nationalism, and that it is no longer easy for the biggest powers of the world to impose their authority by force of arms for long. It may conquer territory, but it cannot win the hearts of the people. These events, in spite of the tragedies involved in these, are hopeful signs. If it is so about small countries, it is much more so about a country like India, and I may assure this House that whatever other failings we in this Government may have, no single policy of ours has been based on the slightest fear of Russia, China,

America or England or any other power. Our friendly approach to these countries is a friendly approach based on friendly feelings and not that type of friendly approach which is based on fear.

Before I end, I should like to express the hope—I am sure the House will join in it—that President Eisenhower who has been unfortunately rather unwell but who has fortunately recovered fast from his illness,—will be wholly well again. Of course, Mr. Eisenhower, everyone admits, even the opponents of America in the cold war admit has played a great part in this controversy between war and peace, because, although a very eminent man in war, he is even more important as a man of peace. He has worked for it, and it would be most unfortunate for humanity if at this stage this great force was not available for purposes of world peace.

I move this Resolution, Sir, as I said yesterday. I am unable to accept any amendment except the amendment moved by Mr. Sapru.

SHRI H. D. RAJAH (Madras): Will the Prime Minister enlighten us as to whether he has received any replies to the letters which he had sent out to other world leaders, apart from Marshal Bulganin?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: He has not received.

The question is:

2. "That at the end of the Motion the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House regrets to note that wrong handling of our foreign policy and incorrect undemanding of the international situation have resulted—

(i) in the passing of a resolution by the Security Council partially reviving the Graham Mission;

(ii) in the lowering of the prestige of India in asking for financial aid and loans from countries in the Western bloc

on the plea that it is necessary if India is to be saved from totalitarianism;

(iii) in the weakening of our 'voice in the Councils of the World for helping the cause of peace and disarmament; and

(iv) in the diverting of large sums of money which are urgently needed for the fulfilment of the Second Five Year plan to the purchase of war equipment for the defence of India'."

The motion was negatived.

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MR. CHAIRMAN: •Amendment No. 3 is barred.

The question is:

4. "That at the end of the Motion the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same this House regrets that India, though a Sovereign Democratic Republic, continues to remain a member of the Commonwealth.' "

The motion was negatived.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

5. "That at the end of the Motion the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House regrets that the Kashmir issue is still treated as part of the problem connected with foreign affairs'."

The motion was negatived.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: With regard to amendment No. 6, I would like to make my position clear. Trusting the cause of Indonesia in the Prime Minister's hands, I beg leave

•For text of amendment, *vide* col. 2354 of Debate, dated 12th December 1957.

[Shri Bhupesh Gupta.] of the House to withdraw my amendment No. 6. I would also like to withdraw amendment No. 7.

♦Amendments Nos. 6 and 7 were, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

8. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House regrets that Government does not still recognise the need for a second conference of the Asian-African Powers in order to face the aggressive action of the Western Puvvefd in the Afro-Asian region'."

The motion was negated.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

9. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House regrets that Government does not recognise the need of establishing full diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic'."

The motion was negated.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

10. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House regrets that Government does not express its disapproval of the continued existence of the British armed forces in Malaya and of the attempts to draw the Malayan Federation into the SEATO'."

The motion was negated.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

13. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

•For text of amendments, ride cols. 2354-2355 of Debate, dated 12th December 1957.

'and having considered **the** same, this House regrets that the Government does not declare that the latest resolution of the Security Council on the so-called Kashmir issue can only further complicate the situation and has no validity as far as India is concerned."

The motion was negated.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

1. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, this House approves **the** said policy'."

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I will put the amended Resolution.

The question is:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration and having considered the same, this House approves the said policy."

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The Resolution is passed unanimously.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now we pass on to the consideration of the Indian Railways (Amendment) Bill, 1957.

THE INDIAN RAILWAYS (AMENDMENT) BILL, 1957

DR. P. J. THOMAS (Kerala): Mr. Chairman, the Railways are really public utility No. 1 in the country. A public utility service is primarily intended for the benefit of the public, and of the people generally. The revenue aspect of it is important . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please **speak** through **the mike**.