

**MINISTRY OF FINANCE NOTIFICATION
PUBLISHING FURTHER AMENDMENTS TO
THE CENTRAL EXCISE RULES, 1944**

THE MINISTER FOR REVENUE AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (SHRI A. C. GUHA): Sir, I lay on the Table, under section 38 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, a copy of the Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) Notification No 43, dated the 27th August, 1955, publishing further amendments to the Central Excise Rules, 1944. [Placed in the Library. See No. S—303/55.]

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS NOTIFICATION PUBLISHING THE ALL-INDIA SERVICES (DISCIPLINE AND APPEAL) RULES, 1955.

THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS (SHRI B. N. DATAR): Sir, I lay on the Table, under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the All-India Services Act, 1951, a copy of the Ministry of Home Affairs Notification, SRC No 1866, dated the 1st September 1955, publishing the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 [Placed in the Library. See No. S—305/55.]

**INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND
THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA**

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, I beg to move:

“That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

Sir, as usual, this motion is worded in a general way, taking into its scope, the entire world, if I may say so. That, of course, does not mean that the Government of India is concerned

with everything that happens in the world. It is concerned, of course, in the sense that in order to understand this larger context of things, one has to see and understand what is happening in other parts of the world.

I realise that probably many hon. Members here are more full of nearer happenings and thinking less of what is happening in distant countries. In particular, probably they are thinking a great deal about recent events in Goa. Well, I shall endeavour to deal with that aspect of the question somewhat later. I think it is desirable for us to see this larger picture first. Most hon. Members have, no doubt, followed the developments in recent months and must have noticed that there has been a progressive change and a change for the better in so far as the international situation is concerned. Perhaps it may be said that this change began last year, that is, at last year's Geneva Conference which resulted in the stoppage of the war in Indo-China and various agreements which made us, that is India, responsible to some extent in the States of Indo-China. That was the first major effort and a successful effort, at coming to an agreement at a conference round the table between the major powers involved, and it brought the end to a very disastrous war. It did not settle the problems of Indo-China, but it, at any rate, pointed out the way to their settlement. And ever since then, those States and others have been struggling to find some way towards a settlement.

Sometimes difficulties have arisen; indeed, even in the present moment, the difficulties are very considerable. Nevertheless, there was a great achievement in the Geneva Conference last year. Many things have happened after that; many things have taken place in Europe. There was the settlement of the Austrian question. At long last, Austria's independence has been recognised. There has been a fairly considerable move in the direction of the consideration of the disarmament question.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

The question bristled with difficulties but it is true, I think, that the distances separating the various viewpoints have lessened very much and there is some hope that some way out will be found. Of course, the question of disarmament is so intimately connected with what might be called the cold war that it is hardly possible to separate it and consider it in some kind of a vacuum. Probably a decision or some settlement of the disarmament question would follow the improvement in the international situation.

Now, I need not refer to the various things that have happened in the past few months but I would like to refer certainly to the Conference at Geneva between certain Heads of great nations. That Conference did not decide anything finally or precisely; nevertheless, that Conference made a great difference to nations as they were and resulted in a very great—at any rate, considerable—lessening of tension all over the world. A happy result of that Conference is that it has created an atmosphere of hope in spite of the tremendous difficulties that still pursue us in Europe and in Asia. The major problem in Europe, of course, is the problem of Germany and the major problems in Asia are the problems of the Far East, of Taiwan or Formosa, of Korea, of Indo-China, and so on. At least we have the great satisfaction of knowing that there has been this considerable improvement in the atmosphere of the international situation. There have also been more specific improvements. Hon. Members might have seen a progressive realisation all over the world, among the many people who control the destinies of great Nations, of the fact that war is not only highly undesirable and disastrous but very futile, with the result, I think, that it may be said that it is increasingly recognised that war is not in itself a solution of any problem and that, therefore, countries should try to solve their problems by means of negotiat-

ed settlements peacefully. I do not mean to say that we can rest content and imagine that war is ruled out but I think it is a major change in the atmosphere of the world in that this realisation—which is being given expression to by responsible people in various countries—that war should not be invoked to settle questions has come about. There are far too many dangers in the world for anyone to be satisfied with a mere declaration either in Europe or in Asia. Every day some little thing happens which makes one a little wary to complacency, whether it is in the East or West. Nevertheless, I think, a tremendous change has come over the thinking of the world and, if I may say so with all respect, even of Foreign Ministers and the like. Being myself a Foreign Minister, I would say, it has even affected the thinking of Foreign Ministers. That is a hopeful sign.

As the House knows, I had the opportunity of visiting a number of countries in Europe and part of Asia, three months ago. I had the opportunity of visiting Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, Rome, England and Egypt. I had a fleeting glimpse, on my way back to India, of Germany—Dusseldorf. I came back from these tours full of impressions—varied impressions. I am not going to weary this House and tell the story of my visit to these countries. The House knows from Press reports and in other ways about the very cordial welcome that was given to our party in every country that we visited, not only from the Governments but from the peoples of those countries. I think I may say that that welcome was—I have not the least doubt about it—something much deeper than what normal courtesy required. There was often enough in the crowds an element of emotional friendship, one could not miss.

Now, I felt that that welcome was obviously not something meant for me as an individual. To some extent I felt it was meant for my country

and was an appreciation of the broader policies of our country, but more especially it was meant as a demonstration of the will and the desire for peace of the countries that I visited and because they thought that India worked for peace and that I, as a representative of India, for the moment, also was working for peace and represented the idea of peace. Therefore they gave that welcome. In fact I came back with a powerful impression of the desire in every country that I visited, a strong desire, for peace and for the settlement of problems in a peaceful way. It was probably that strong desire that brought about those subsequent developments to which I have referred. Now, of course, among the various motives or urges towards peace, undoubtedly is the growing fear of a war in which modern weapons like the atom bomb or the hydrogen bomb and nuclear weapons are involved.

The House will remember that another hopeful development has been a conference in Geneva also, recently under the chairmanship of a distinguished citizen of ours on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Now, this conference has certainly opened out a wide vista to scientific approach and knowledge which had so far been hidden. A great deal still remains hidden, but enough has been announced publicly to make people realize that we have entered almost unawares on a new age, the new age of atomic energy, with enormous power resources being placed at the disposal of human beings. The real question is not about the atomic energy. I have no doubt that scientists and others will before long be able to use it to advantage. The real question somehow now has shifted to another plane, the plane of human standards and values. Human beings have got to reshape their sense of values and standards to refrain from using this mighty power in a bad and in an evil way. I do not wish to say anything about this, but I do wish to draw the attention of this House to the fact that the basic question that faces humanity

today and will face it more and more, as the mighty powers come into the hands of men, is how far man himself has developed and, in using them, how far he can restrain himself from evil courses and the like.

Now, I should, therefore, like the House to keep in mind this important fact that for the first time in about ten years—post-war years—we have arrived at a stage, when the cold war is—well, I do not know what to say—not so cold or not so warm as it has been. But it is there and there are plenty of forces in the world which probably do not approve of this change towards better relations coming over the international situation. Therefore, we have to be very wary about that and watch the situation very carefully. We are, as I have just said, engaged as Chairman of the International Commission in the States of Indo-China. Now, there are three Commissions there, in Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam. Each one of them faces difficult problems but perhaps the most difficult of all are in Viet-Nam and the chief difficulty arises there from the fact that one of the Governments does not seem to like the idea of accepting the Geneva Agreements. Now, that obviously creates difficulties for us, for them, in fact, for everybody, because the whole development in Indo-China is based on the Geneva Agreements of last year. If the Geneva Agreements had not been there, war would have continued with whatever results it might have brought. The fact that war ceased brought certain advantages to all the parties there. Various other advantages also came to various other parties. Now, surely it is bad that one should accept the advantages and then try not to accept the other aspect, the other factors in that agreement. But so far as India is concerned, our position is perfectly clear. We have gone there at the request of the parties concerned and we accepted the Chairmanship of those Commissions on the basis of the Geneva Agreements. We have

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] absolutely no other basis there. If the Geneva Agreements do not function there, then we cannot function. Indeed, the whole structure built up by Geneva collapses. Therefore it should be fully understood by everybody that it is only on the basis of the Geneva Agreements that we function there and, if that basis goes, then, we cannot function and I do not quite know what might happen, what developments might take place there, but those developments can hardly be fortunate ones.

I have referred to the change in the world atmosphere for the better. In this connection, I should like to remind the House of the Bandung Conference, although it occurred many months ago; but I think that the Bandung Conference was in its own way helpful in this. And it

12 NOON brought together a large number of countries of differing view points. and the House will remember that they passed a unanimous resolution or manifesto which was a remarkable feat for thirty countries situated in Asia and Africa, and having entirely different backgrounds and policies. Among the subjects in which there was absolute unanimity was the question of colonialism. It was obvious that that had to be so. I mention this, because events have since taken place in several parts of the world which have brought this question of colonialism very much to the forefront. Only recently there have been very grave, very unhappy and almost disastrous developments in North Africa, in Morocco and Algeria. Now, it is not my desire to say much or to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of other countries. But there can be no doubt that what has happened in Morocco and Algeria has powerfully moved not only everybody in India, but persons over the whole of Asia, I should imagine, and more. I know that the Government of the French Republic had been trying very hard to solve these problems

or to go somewhere towards solving these problems. The House will remember that in regard to Tunisia, there was some kind of a settlement between nationalist elements there and the Government of France resulting in what might be called home rule. Morocco has been in a very bad condition for a long time past, and then because of certain occurrences recently, it boiled over completely and some of the things that have happened there are extraordinarily painful and the extent of suffering that has been caused to both sides has been tremendous. All I can say is that I earnestly hope that the new efforts that are being made by the French Government and the nationalist parties there will succeed. It appears that the essence of the Moroccan problem for some time past has been the fact that the old Sultan, Moulay Ben Yusef, was removed and a new one was put in his place. Now, it seems that the old Sultan was and has continued to be the representative of Moroccan nationalism and hardly any settlement can be made without his approval. I believe efforts are being made now to find some satisfactory way to a settlement.

The position in Algeria has also been a very difficult and distressing one. The legal position there is somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, the fact remains that something will have to be done in dealing with that situation also.

Now, perhaps in the course of this debate other Members may bring forward some other aspects in the international situation, because I have dealt with this question rather briefly, important as it is. I hope that our colleague, a Member of this House, Shri Krishna Menon, may also perhaps speak on some aspects of the international situation, because he has been very intimately concerned in the activities of our Government in the various countries, notably in the United States, the United Kingdom and China. And he has been

the main representative of our Government in carrying on informal talks over these vital questions, from the days of Geneva last year onwards. Sometime back, he went after Bandung to Peking and I may say that several events that followed were partly the result of his visit there. I should like to pay a tribute on behalf of our Government to his ability in dealing with these matters, (Applause) because they are very difficult matters, and we do not wish at any time, in any place, to push ourselves in to interfere. Nevertheless, a certain responsibility comes to us occasionally and we cannot say "no" to it. Ever since we accepted the chairmanship of certain international commissions in Korea, we did not desire that difficult position. But in the circumstances, when both the parties wanted us, it was impossible for us to say 'no'. So also in Indo-China. And so, owing to a succession of events, we have occupied a position which sometimes brings very serious responsibilities for us, to which we cannot say 'no', although we have no desire to undertake those burdens. Now, in assuming those responsibilities again, we do not wish to push ourselves forward, or try to appear as if we are mediators in the settlement of any problems. We do not wish to mediate, and perhaps, it is not very—if I may use that word—courteous for us to say that we are going about mediating other people's problems. But when we can help at other people's request, and help informally, without shouting, then we consider it our duty to do so. I should like to say here that we have been very nobly served, in these delicate matters and negotiations, by our Ambassadors in these four capitals—Washington, London, Moscow and Peking, and in other places too. The situation in Indo-China, as I have said, has been extraordinarily difficult, and the Commissions there, and more especially, the Indian Chairman there, have handled the situation no doubt with great tact and ability.

Now, Sir, I come nearer home. The hon. Members are aware, and perhaps only too much aware, of what has happened recently in Goa. On the other side, in Pakistan, there have been changes. The Government there has changed. But the only thing that I should like to express my regret about, to some extent, is that there is a tendency in the Pakistan press again to attack or to write, well, in unfriendly terms, in rather aggressive terms. Now, it is difficult to have an aggressive and an unfriendly approach on the one side, and almost a friendly approach on the other side. These are the two conflicting views. It has always been our desire to settle any problems by peaceful methods, and to have friendly relations with Pakistan, and to settle every problem which we have, and any great problems, by peaceful and friendly methods. As we have seen, in Europe, the first preparation for a friendly settlement is the creation of a friendly atmosphere. And, if the friendly atmosphere is absent, it is difficult to deal with a problem with any success. Now, these repeated outbursts, and the use of strong and challenging expressions—I am deliberately using moderate language—do not in any way help in creating a favourable or a friendly atmosphere. They come in the way of the consideration of our problems.

Now, we all know that those problems are difficult and intricate. And, if they had not been difficult and intricate, they would have been solved long ago. It is not for any lack of time that we have failed to solve them. Now, in such cases, where such difficult problems occur, one of the solutions is to lose our temper and rush ahead, because we are just tired of waiting. The other is patiently going on trying to solve them, step by step, because you cannot solve these problems as a whole. You cannot solve the problems, whether it is a major international problem of Germany or the Far East, suddenly as a whole. All kinds of difficulties and national prestige and interests

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]
are involved, but one can solve them, if one goes step by step, always creating a better atmosphere. That is why I regret this renewal of the phase in Pakistan of using aggressive and strong language against India. I have just referred to the Bandung Conference. The Bandung Conference Resolution especially referred to colonial countries. It did not refer to every one of them. I think it was in this House that an hon. Member asked me: "Was Goa mentioned in the Bandung Conference Resolution?" Goa was not mentioned. You will find that any number of places were not mentioned all over the world because the Resolution was meant to cover every place where there was this colonial and foreign domination. Some places were mentioned because some of the delegates there were very anxious that they should be mentioned, but the other delegates felt that making these long lists would not be desirable. Circumstances differed and if you leave out some places, it will be considered that it will not apply to them. Anyhow, it is obvious that the Bandung Resolution applies to wherever there might be colonial domination still functioning. It certainly applies obviously to a place like Goa, just as it applies to the countries of North Africa or elsewhere. Goa has become a rather interesting test of how people and countries feel about such colonial territories. During the last two weeks or so, it has been a significant thing to watch these reactions of other countries to Goa and to what has happened in Goa. I am not for the moment going into the merits of any question, but one has seen how certain countries—very considerable numbers of them, nearly all of them practically, nearly all—not all—in Asia naturally took up the anti-colonial position, i.e., we are in favour of the freedom of Goa from Portuguese control. I regret that so far as I know, no such clear indication has been given of following the Bandung line in regard to Goa by Pakistan. In fact, there have been

some tendencies in the other direction, which we have noted with regret. But, generally speaking, all the Asian countries, many European countries, many countries in America—North and South, I am talking about newspaper press—have recognized that the continuation of Portuguese rule in Goa is a complete anachronism. Now, it is not for me to justify to this House this statement of this fact because nobody in India certainly requires any justification and I think more and more—outside too, people are beginning to realize the absurdity of the fact that Portuguese rule should continue over this little corner of India. The question that has confronted us all along, that confronts the Government of India, has been how to deal with this problem of Goa in a peaceful way. If one looks at it from a very narrow point of view—and regardless of consequences and policies—it is obviously an easy thing for some military measures to be taken to take possession of Goa. Obviously also, that would be not in keeping with our policy which we have reiterated often enough. At the present moment, it would be a remarkable thing that, when after many years, world opinion is shifting and is gradually turning to this belief that problems should be solved peacefully, not the Goa problem only, I mean all problems should be solved peacefully and without war, that we should indulge in military operations; we who were supposed to be, well, champions of this idea to some extent.

Therefore, in regard to the Goa problem, we have to be clear in our minds. And the first thing to be clear about is this: Should we consider ourselves free to use military measures or what is called police action, which is much the same thing? If there is the least doubt in our minds, that doubt will pursue us throughout our consideration of this problem. If we are clear—and I submit we ought to be very clear from every point of view, of our principles as well as, if I may say

so,—of expediency—that we should not take military measures for the removal of Portuguese rule from there, then we are limited to peaceful measures. It follows obviously. Now, what are these peaceful measures that we can take? What are the normal diplomatic steps? The House may have forgotten, and therefore, I shall remind them that from the moment India became free, in fact, if I may say so, two or three months before that, when we knew that India was becoming independent, in August, 1947, even some months earlier, Goa and Pondicherry began to impinge upon our minds. They were always there; but the question of India as a whole, that is, of British India as it was, was so much of a major issue that one thought these little enclaves would naturally follow suit. We did not, therefore, separately pay too much attention to their problems. But the moment we saw that India, that is British India as it was, was going to attain independence, we almost presumed that Pondicherry and Goa would follow suit. And we said so. Well, we were busy enough after independence; but again repeatedly we thought of this problem. We tried to get in touch with people. We were always in touch with the French Government with regard to Pondicherry. Whether we agreed or whether we disagreed; we were always in touch and we always discussed the matter. They had certain proposals and we had some; and we dealt with this problem of the French possessions in India, if I may use the word, in a decent way: Both parties dealt with it in a decent and civilised way, whether we agreed or not. Ultimately we agreed, because we both knew, this was a matter to be settled peacefully, by agreement. It was far more important that India and France should come to a peaceful agreement, not only because of Pondicherry, but because of our future relations and everything. And we gave them, as the House knows, all kinds of assurances about the future, about French culture, French language

and other thing in Pondicherry. Ultimately we came to an agreement.

We tried to follow the same course in regard to Goa and to talk to them. At first, because they had no representative here then, we tried to talk to them in London that is, our representative there and the Portuguese Ambassador there. That did not lead us very far. Then we opened a Legation in Lisbon to talk to them about this and they opened a Legation here. That did not lead to any result. We were patient enough and we did not mind even if some delay occurred. There was delay, considerable delay, in regard to the French settlements, but all the time there was effort from both sides to deal with the situation in a friendly way. But in the case of Portugal we just could not get moving even with the first step and when we presented in Lisbon our first, I think, note on this subject, apart from oral things, they would not even accept it, much less discuss it.

This went on and, later, we found that our Legation was of no particular use to us in Lisbon. We withdrew it, but we did not break off diplomatic relations. The Portuguese Legation in Delhi continued to exist. This situation went on and we tried to get some kind of talks started with the Legation here. Last year—August 1954—the House will remember, matters came to some kind of a remote crisis there in Goa. Again we suggested to the Portuguese Government. “Let us talk about these matters without commitment”; that is, we did not even ask them then to commit themselves to accepting our position, which we had asked of the French at an earlier stage and succeeded. What was the position that we had taken with the French Government? It was quite impossible to have any half-way house in regard to either the French administration leaving the place or not leaving. We could not have half and half. So, our suggestion to them then was that there should be a *de facto* transfer of the administration in the first place,

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] and then, we could consider the *de jure* part of the question later more fully. Even in the *de facto* transfer, there were a number of things to be agreed to; quite a number had been agreed. The *de facto* transfer took place but the *de jure* transfer has not yet taken place. That will involve some kind of action to be taken by Parliament here and by the Parliament in France. We would like to have it as soon as possible; nevertheless, a little delay does not make much difference. Now, we went further than this with the Portuguese last year; our general proposal was the same, that the *de jure* part will be considered later on, but that we should meet the present situation by *de facto* withdrawal of the Portuguese authority. We went further than the earlier action in the sense that we said, "Let us talk even without commitment about certain problems that had arisen last year". Even that they refused. Now, the House will see how we have repeatedly approached in various ways to get to talking with them, but we did not succeed even in that, because of the attitude of the Portuguese authorities.

The talks entered into with Goa, in various ways, were ever since 1947-48, seven years and more, and more especially in the last year or two. Now last year, something occurred. Meanwhile, may I remind the House that inside Goa something or other was all the time happening, that is, the Goanese people within Goa were often demanding changes, demanding freedom, civil liberties, etc., and quite a large number of them—a larger number than the people realized—suffered for it. A number of them were banished and punished for the most extraordinary offences. Just to give one instance, a most eminent surgeon in Goa, a person whose services were taken advantage of by the Governor-General there and his family, because he was the most eminent surgeon, went to some official or semi-official dinner and there someone said that Goa was part

of Portugal. He said: "I protest; it is not so". Almost overnight, for this statement, in refuting a patent absurdity that Goa was part of Portugal—it may be a Portuguese possession; it is still; we realize that; that is a fact, but to say that it is part of Portugal is something like saying that Goa is part of the moon—for that observation overnight, this eminent surgeon was removed and taken off to Portugal, was punished, was banished. It is a single instance. There are people who have been sentenced to enormous sentences of imprisonment, varying from 10 to 20 years, even 28 years, just for some statement against the continuance of Portuguese rule there. Now although the struggle of the Goanese people in Goa has been continuous, one cannot hear of it. Naturally, because of the total suppression of civil liberties, it does not come out in the press. There is no press there to publish such news. Nothing can gain publicity there, normal publicity, and only sometimes some fact becomes known outside.

Now, last year, something new happened and that was what is called—rightly or wrongly, I will not say—Satyagraha, that is to say, broadly speaking, that people without arms with peaceful intentions go into Portuguese territory in Goa and peacefully defy Portuguese orders passed on them not to come in, and thereby naturally offer themselves for any action that the Portuguese Government might take against them. Now, so far as the Government of India or any Government is concerned, obviously Governments do not perform Satyagraha. This simple fact is sometimes forgotten. It may be that some organization might think of it, might consider itself entitled to do it or not, but Governments do not perform Satyagraha or encourage it. At the most, they may imagine that it is not against the law and not prevent it. That is the most that the Government can do. It is a delicate matter, because I suppose, none of the books on international law has yet dealt with this question of Satya-

graha in this way. So I am not going into this philosophic aspect of it, as to how far an individual on the ground of conscience wants to do something; how far he is entitled to do it; how far a State should prevent him—it depends upon so many circumstances. But it is obvious that any mass movement of this type, whether it is called Satyagraha or something else, remains a different aspect completely, and it does raise a number of issues for a Government to consider, so that since last year, when this Satyagraha began there, it was essentially a Goan struggle, that is to say, Goans who were outside Goa wanting to go back. They had every right to and they wanted to go back and face the consequences of Portuguese anger against them. We felt, as a Government, we had no right to stop Goans as individuals, or even in small groups, going there.

Sometimes a non-Goan national or two went with them, as a matter of conscience. It was a new problem for the Government to consider in that way. So this went on in a relatively small way during these various months. There were of course Goans inside Goa who did like wise also from time to time till recently when this Satyagraha took the shape of a large-scale entry into Goa at various places. That immediately raises a new type of problem for the Government to consider and for this House to consider. I am not going into the details. We had always pointed out that any kind of mass entry or mass Satyagraha as it is called was undesirable and would bring about all kinds of complications, apart from its undesirability. To some extent this took place.

I do not wish this House to think that I am condemning all those people who went there. Among those who went there, certainly a large number came from various parts of India. They were impelled by this urge to freedom, by the old urge which had impelled them to fight for India's freedom and by a spirit of

self-sacrifice, and where there is fearlessness and a spirit of self-sacrifice, one must appreciate it and admire it. There were instances there on the 15th August, some instances of individuals, more especially of a lady whose name has become a household word in India—Subhadra Nagar—of extreme courage, in the face of bullets flying about and holding on the flag she had in her hand, regardless of anything even when she fell down. We were all emotionally roused when we considered this and the country was emotionally roused and powerfully moved on the one side by these acts of heroism and courage. And remember this that among the people who went there on the 15th August, there were a considerable number of Goans. It is true that the number of Indians was far greater, but there were many Goans who played an important part that day. The country was powerfully moved by the courage of some of these people and still more powerfully moved by what the Portuguese authorities did to them. I am not aware of a single statement by anybody to the effect that these persons who had gone in were armed or offered any hurt or injury or violence, and yet the House knows, that they were fired upon, often at close range, and otherwise very badly treated. That is to say, a number of them died and a large number were beaten—there were fractures and broken bones—and then thrown out.

I do not suppose the law makes any difference in such matters, national or international, but we consulted eminent lawyers about this position, as to what the international law is, when some parties, strangers, aliens, against the will of a State, go into that State. Obviously, the State has the right to apprehend them, to arrest them, to push them out, but according to all eminent authorities whom we consulted, the State has no right to ill-treat them, much less to behave in the manner that the Portuguese authorities behaved. What I say may be of little importance, of

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] little consequence to the Portuguese Government; but all we can say is that, nevertheless, the action of the Portuguese Government, on the 15th August there, was from any point of view—of international law, international behaviour, standards of decency or any similar consideration—a gross violation, and utterly illegal from that point of view. I say that for my satisfaction, may be for the satisfaction of the House. I know that makes perhaps little difference to those in Portugal, who have acted in this way, or those in Goa.

The question then, again, comes back to us: what exactly do we do in Goa or about Goa? What do we aim at? We have said that Goa is a part of India. Well, it does not require an argument. A map will show it. Geography has made it a part of India. But it is true that Goa is not at present part of the Indian Union. We must distinguish between the two. It is natural and I think inevitable that Goa should become part of the Indian Union, for all kinds of reasons. for obvious reasons. They are the same folk by race, by culture, by everything—whether they are Christians, Hindus or Muslims. Nevertheless, while I say that, I am not for the moment engaged in pushing Goa into the Indian Union. What I am engaged in, what I think is something much more important and that is, the removal of Portuguese sovereignty from Goa. Now, I am not making any fine distinction between the two. What I mean is this. I want to remove the idea from any person's mind—not in India very much but abroad—that we are out to grab, we are out to coerce or compel people to come into the Indian Union. I have no doubt that the Goanese want to come in. That is a different matter and they will come in, because they cannot carry on, just cut off from India or elsewhere. But the main point, for us as well as for the people of Goa, is, first of all, the general proposition that colonialism should not

continue anywhere; secondly, the nearer proposition that colonialism should not continue right on our doorstep. And as an extension of that, that a foreign power holding on to any territory lying on the mainland of India is a position which we can never tolerate. Therefore, from every point of view, the Portuguese have got to go from there. And I know of no logical approach or reason, reasoned argument, which can be raised against us on that issue. Yet, as the House knows, there are people still in other countries who have criticised India's attitude and supported Portugal's. They are a number which grows lesser and lesser. That is true. Why should this be so, I wondered. And I have found no adequate answer, because from any point of view and reason and logic, world events—what is happening in the world today and what is inevitable—there can be only one solution of this problem. That is of Goa coming to India, of Goa getting rid of Portuguese domination; and her association with India is the second step.

The House will remember the assurances we have always given. Our intention is not to grab or to coerce anybody. We have told them that we will respect their customs, literature, culture, etc. That being so, what steps should we take? We have ruled out, I take it, police steps, military steps. They have to be peaceful steps. Now, as a Government, obviously, we cannot have Satyagraha against another Government. Governments do not do that kind of thing. It is absurd. Whether private parties can do it or not is another question and a highly difficult question looked at from the national or international or legal points of view. But I am not going into them. We can, of course, take economic action in various ways. We have done that, not today, but progressively, during the last six or eight months. It takes a little time to take effect. It has taken effect, and gradually, we have arrived at a stage

now, when Goa, so far as the land frontier is concerned, is completely cut off from India. One great advantage flowing from that, of course, is that Goa, which used to be a home of smugglers, has ceased to be so. In fact, probably, the only persons who have a vested interest in the continuation of Portuguese rule in Goa are the smugglers there. So, we have cut it off except for one thing. Well, there are some Indians there in Goa, Indian miners working in the railways, and naturally, if they want to come out, we will allow them to come out, and not force them to remain there. And similarly, if any Goan in India wants to go to Goa, he can go to Goa. Apart from that, we consider the route as closed, not only for human beings, but also for goods, commodities, trade, and the like. Of course, the sea route is open, and the air route is also open, subject to certain limitations.

Now, as I said, these fine philosophical questions of satyagraha are not for Government to consider. But Government has to consider how far they come in the way of its other policy; how far they come in the way of its international considerations, and the like. I cannot give any final reply to the philosophical or theoretical aspects of this question, i.e., of individual satyagraha by a person impelled by his conscience to do it. I have at present no clear answer in my mind as to what Government should do in these circumstances, or what it ought to do. But I am quite clear in my mind that in the existing circumstances, satyagraha, not only of the mass variety, but also of the individual variety, is undesirable. All of us certainly—I am of that number—feel strongly and emotionally about this question, and tend, well, to take steps which may allow us some outlet for our emotion, and resentment at the existing things. But, after all, the policy of a great country can hardly be governed by emotional sentiment and resentment.

There are many problems in the world which have brought the world on the verge of war, and yet fortunately, people have held back, countries have held back, in spite of their strong feelings in the matter, because they have preferred waiting for a peaceful solution. Now, surely Goa, anyhow, is not a problem on which we should go to war, or we should take any war-like measures. I am not prepared naturally to prophesy or give a guarantee to this House or to the country, as to when this particular problem will be solved. I am no Prophet. But I think I can say with some confidence, that forces are at work, all kinds of forces, national, international, economic and other, which are bringing that solution nearer and which ultimately will undoubtedly solve this problem. Again, I cannot say when. I submit, therefore, that the policy pursued by the Government in regard to Goa is the correct policy and in fact is the only policy which fits in with our larger policy and even with the narrow view of the future of Goa and what will be good for Goa. Any other policy would have the widest reactions, certainly, on what we have said in the past and the present about international relations. It would be bad, I think, even for the future of Goa. It will produce conflicts internally in Goa and a trial of bitterness will follow. Therefore, it is better for us and indeed there is no choice for us except to hold on to this policy of peace in regard to Goa. The fact that a war is a little war does not make it less than a war. You may call it by any name you like. If a little war is justifiable under circumstances, a big war is also justifiable under certain other circumstances. There is no ground or principle left then in saying that war should be avoided and solutions sought on peaceful lines. If we come to peaceful lines, the normal ways open to a Government are open to us. In addition to that, a certain amount of confusion has been caused in the public mind because of what is known or called 'Satyagraha'. Now, we have

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] known Satyagraha in various forms in India as a national phenomenon internally, but as an international phenomenon—in the use of it by some people in one country against another—it is a novel weapon, and one has to watch carefully how far it is practicable, in what circumstances and when. Without going into a philosophic argument, I would say that in the present case of Goa, whatever has happened has happened, but for us to continue in this way will not help in the liberation of Goa but might well come in its way. That is all, Sir. I submit therefore this motion to this House. (Cheers.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion moved:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

I have received notice of five amendments.

SHRI S. MAHANTY (Orissa): Sir, on a point of order. Before these amendments are allowed to be moved, I have to raise a point of order. The point of order is that under Rules 138(3), 139 and 141(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Council of States, amendment No. 1 of Mr. Hegde and No. 3 of Mr. Ranga be ruled out of order. Sir, Rule 138 says.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: But, Mr. Mahanty, they apply to Resolutions and not to Motions.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Sir, I am just reading the Rules out so that.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: But what is the good of reading them? They relate to Resolutions.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: But Rule 141 (1) says:

"After a resolution has been moved, any member may, subject to the rules relating to resolutions, move an amendment to the resolution."

And Rule 138(iii) says, that if the Resolution is argumentative, it should be ruled out of order. Therefore, I submit that the amendment must conform to the admissibility of the Resolution to which it is an amendment and these amendments that I referred to, Sir, are highly argumentative. I therefore, submit that they should be ruled as being out of order.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Well, the Rules quoted apply to Resolutions and not to Motions and they have no relevancy, therefore, to this.

The amendments may be formally moved now, without any speeches.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE (Madras): Sir, I move:

1. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House extends its fullest support to the said policy as that policy has not only enhanced the prestige of this country but has helped greatly to ease international tension and has brought about better international understanding'."

DR. RAGHU VIRA (Madhya Pradesh): मैं निम्नलिखित प्रस्ताव प्रस्तुत करता हूँ।

2. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House approves the policy and its basis, the Pancha-shila'."

PROF. G. RANGA (Andhra): Sir, I move:

3. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House approves the foreign policy pursued by Gov-

ernment which has led especially to the acceptance by many countries of the principles of Panchashila and to the easing of the international tension, thus promoting the cause of world peace'."

SHRI B. C. GHOSE (West Bengal): Sir, I move:

4. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House deplores the intention of the Government to ban all satyagraha by Indians in Goa and is of opinion that more effective steps should be taken to liberate Goa and other territories from Portuguese occupation and merge the same with India at an early date'."

MR. CHAIRMAN: And now Mr. Mahanty's amendment which is a very argumentative one.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Sir, I move:

5. "That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House is of opinion that more positive and effective steps be taken for the early liberation of Goa from Portuguese colonial rule'."

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now the Motion and the amendments are before the House. I shall ask the Prime Minister to reply at five o'clock. We have, therefore, 4 hours and 10 minutes before us, and a number of Members have given their names to me. My suggestion is that with the consent of the House, each of these gentlemen here, of the P.S.P., the Communist Party, the Democratic Party and the Independents, and Mr. Krishna Menon be given half an hour each and the others 10 to 15 minutes each. Yes, Dr. Kunzru.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): Sir, I suggest that the time may kindly be extended, because the Prime Minister has raised very many important points and I think it necessary that we should at least try to meet those points. So you will please be good enough to extend the time limit so that we may not suffer from lack of time.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Actually you have twenty minutes extra from the Question Hour. The Prime Minister will start at 5 o'clock and if he goes upto six he will have it. So automatically there will be an extension of one hour.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Chairman, I must first give expression to our sense of satisfaction at the warm reception that the Prime Minister received in the countries that he visited recently. It was a matter of joy to us that a representative of the people of India should have been so warmly honoured both by the Governments and the peoples of other countries. There can be no doubt that his effort to persuade the bigger nations, or rather all the nations, to agree to a peaceful settlement of all their disputes has made him a kind of centre of hope everywhere.

While his efforts are commendable, we have, nevertheless, to consider the world situation as it is. I shall first refer to the recent Geneva Conference at which the heads of four Governments met to discuss questions of peace and disarmament. Nothing that has been published so far beyond the statements made by the participants in the Conference that it was successful, enables us to know what the discussions were or what were the lines on which they proceeded. The only element of hope for the future is that the foreign ministers of the powers concerned will meet shortly to discuss some questions, some of those questions on which no agreement was arrived at. I was glad to hear from the Prime

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Minister that the differences between the points of view of the various Governments were less than they were before. I hope, therefore, that the conference of the foreign ministers will succeed in paving the way for an agreement on substantial matters between the heads of the nations that took part in the recent Geneva Conference.

I express this hope not merely on general grounds, but because I feel that the solution of some difficult questions, including those referred to by the Prime Minister depends, whatever our own views and feelings may be, on the success of the efforts that have already been made to bring about a better understanding between the bigger nations. Whether we consider Korea or Formosa or Indo-China, we cannot consider it apart from the general world situation and their solution will be possible only when these nations have come to a friendly understanding among themselves on all the questions that seem to them to affect their vital interests.

Sir, now I would like to say a word about the Bandung Conference. The Bandung Conference, as the Prime Minister rightly claims, was an unexpected success. Twenty-nine nations belonging to this part of the world met for the first time to consider certain general questions in which they were all interested. I am sure that every Indian followed the reported proceedings of that Conference with the greatest interest. I was particularly glad to note from the reports of the discussions that the smaller nations made their opinions felt in the Conference and gave expression to views which, though not uttered by others, were silently colouring their attitude towards larger questions such as questions of neutrality and peace and concord among neighbouring nations. I should like to refer here in particular to the resolutions relating to colonialism and the freedom of nations, both big and small.

1 P.M.

It seems to me that because of the outspokenness of the smaller countries, the Resolutions on these subjects have gone beyond the principles underlying the Indo-Tibetan Agreement. It must have given genuine pleasure to everybody who read the Resolutions to find that there was a general acceptance of the view expressed by the smaller nations in regard to what was meant by colonialism, freedom, democracy and so on. I hope that the principles that were agreed to in the Statement and the Resolutions that were issued at the conclusion of the Conference would be given effect to both in the letter and in the spirit, by all the nations concerned. It is only the deeds that will convince the world that the Resolutions of the Bandung Conference should be treated as a factor of vital importance in international politics.

Now, Sir, I shall come to questions nearer home. I shall first refer to the Viet-Nameese question. The Prime Minister has told us something about this matter but the information that he gave was not as full as I should have liked it to be. I wish, therefore, to draw his attention to certain matters that have not become clear in spite of the discussions that have taken place so far and the views that have been expressed by different countries that participated in the Geneva Conference last year.

Soon after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference of 1954, the U.S. Secretary of State said that America, though no party to the agreement at which the Conference arrived, would not oppose it by force but would view the renewal of aggression with grave concern. About that time, the Government of the Southern Zone of Viet-Nam said that as it was not a signatory to the Geneva Agreement, it was not bound by its terms. This Agreement to which I have referred was entered into by France on behalf of Indo-China. Before the Bandung Conference was held, France took steps to enter into a

treaty with Southern Viet-Nam according to which it was to recognise the full independence and sovereignty of Southern Viet-Nam and Southern Viet-Nam was to accept all the international obligations incurred by France in regard to Indo-China. This treaty was not ratified presumably because of latter developments, one of them being the Geneva Conference. The question that arises is this: France is in no position now to implement the Geneva Agreement or the Final Declaration of the Conference. Did it, before transferring power to the Southern Viet-Namese Government take care to stipulate that it should honour the international commitments made by France not merely previously but also at the Geneva Conference? I suppose that if such a stipulation had been made and accepted, that fact would have become public now. Probably, no such stipulation was made or, if made, it was not agreed to by the Government of Southern Viet-Nam. It is, therefore, surprising that France should have transferred full power to Viet-Nam without taking steps to see that the Geneva Agreement was honoured by its successor. That the present Government of Southern Viet-Nam should be regarded, morally at any rate, as the successor of the French Government, seems to me to admit of no doubt. It seems to me that legally, at the present time, this Government can say that it is not bound to carry out the Geneva Agreement.

We have to consider, as the Prime Minister said, what would have happened had the Geneva Agreement not been concluded. Would there have been any Southern Viet-Namese Government at all? The fact that there is a Government in Southern Viet-Nam is probably due to the conclusion of this Agreement and this important fact should not be lost sight of. All the same, I should like to know what were the steps that France took to see that the Geneva Agreement was carried out before it transferred full power to the Southern Viet-Namese Government.

There is one other thing that I should like to refer to. The final Declaration of the Geneva Conference—not the Agreement—relates to the efforts that should be made to bring about the unification of Viet-Nam. Paragraph 7, I think, of that Declaration requires the Governments of the Northern and Southern Zones to meet by the 20th June 1955, to consider the steps that should be taken to hold elections in July 1956. The Government of Southern Viet-Nam has so far declined to enter into negotiations with the Northern side on this question and, on the 10th August, in a statement issued by it, it said: “there would be no all Viet-Namese elections unless freedom of vote and human rights were guaranteed in the North.” This statement also recalled the view earlier expressed by the Government that the Geneva Agreement was not binding on it. Soon afterwards the American Secretary of State said that the Prime Minister of Southern Viet-Nam was perfectly right in taking the position that he was **not** bound by the Geneva Agreements as his Government had not signed them.

The Government of South Viet-Nam has referred to certain essential preliminaries that should be fulfilled before the question of holding elections next year can be discussed, and they are freedom of vote and human rights. Now, the Government of Viet-Nam can refer to these things because they are referred to in paragraph 7 of the final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. The very first sentence of this paragraph says: “The Conference declares that so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot.” Now, the sentence is not very happily worded, the meaning of the different parts of the sen-

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tence is not easy to explain, but it is clear that the final Declaration said that the settlement of political problems will permit the Viet-Nameese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, etc. That is why the Government of South Viet-Nam has referred to these things. I think that if these are the objections of the Southern Viet-Nameese Government, it would have been better for its representatives to meet the representatives of Northern Viet-Nam and give expression to their doubts when they meet. Its position would then have been morally stronger, but its reiteration of these objections, while refusing to meet the representatives of the other side to discuss how free general elections may be held, lets it open obviously to criticism.

But what I should like to know is what the view of the Indian Government in this matter is. It has welcomed the Agreement and the final Declaration. Now, is it in a position to assure the Government of Southern Viet-Nam that the people of Northern Viet-Nam will have the freedom to vote, as they like, and will enjoy the human rights referred to in paragraph 7. This is a very difficult question and, I doubt, whether the Government of India can make itself answerable for anything that another Government may do; but there is the International Supervisory Commission whose business it is to see that free elections are held. Now, will it be enough to say that it will be the duty of this Commission to see that nothing is done that is inconsistent with the right of the people to vote as they like, or is it desirable—and I frankly think that it is desirable—that it should give some assurance to the doubters that the principles, that I have already referred to would be observed? I mean, we are all interested not merely in peace but in other things to which peace ought to lead, that is, human freedom and I have no doubt therefore that this matter has engaged the attention of the Indian Government.

Now, Sir, I come to the question of Goa. The Prime Minister has referred to it at length. It is not necessary for me therefore to deal with it in any detail. I was glad to note a certain change, I mean an important change, in his policy towards Goa or, if he prefers it, in the emphasis that he lays on certain aspects of that policy now. In August 1954, Sir, at the meeting of the A.I.N.E.C., he said, he was prepared in the circumstances and normally speaking to discourage Indians. He was prepared to say that he did not want non-Goans to go to Goa. "I do not want" he however said, "any interference, military or civil, but I am not going to stop Goans from functioning." Well, in pursuance of this position of his, instructions were issued to close all routes to Goa except the railway route. I may say here that the railway service too was stopped under the orders of the Government of India on the 25th of July, 1955. At a press conference held on the 31st May 1955, the Prime Minister enunciated an almost similar though not wholly similar policy, but he preceded it with words that coming from him, seemed to be very surprising. He said, referring to what was going on, I mean the participation of the Indians in the struggle for the liberation of Goa, with regard to the policy formulated by him there was no vital principle involved in this. Of course, it was not a sin for Indian nationals to go there and in fact he admired the courage of those who wanted to go there. He did not challenge the right of Indians to go there. In a subsequent speech, he said he conceded the right of Indians to go there. Now, how could the Indians go there as all routes but one were closed and this route could be used only by those holding permits granted by the Government of India?

Now, those who went there in large numbers obviously went there in violation of the Government orders. Whatever his own personal feelings on the subject might have been, how could he, as the head of the Govern-

ment of India, when he had announced a particular policy, say that he admired those people who disregarded his policy and violated the rules laid down by his Government? He has said something and used some words of the same character today too, though in a much guarded way, and it is also to be noted that he has announced a policy which goes beyond anything so far announced in clear terms by the Government of India. I do not want to go into the various stages of this question, but I should like here to state my point of view with regard to the struggle for the liberation of Goa. So long as India was a subordinate dependency of England, other foreign powers had a right to have their own possessions here, but with the departure of the British and with the achievement of freedom by India, it is obvious that these countries, which had small possessions or which had or have small territories under their control on the Indian continent, have no moral right to remain where they are. The position has changed radically with the achievement of freedom by the country. Geographically, it is quite clear that Goa is part of India. Suppose in England or in America, a part of the territory of the country was held by a foreign power, would it be viewed with equanimity by either of them? It would cause them the gravest concern. I therefore understand the concern that the present situation in respect of Goa causes to the Government of India and to the people of India. We all want that Goa should no longer remain under foreign domination, but then, our interest in Goa is not our only national interest. We have other national interests also to think of—other national interests which seem to me to require very serious consideration.

There is first of all, the question of the Prime Minister's foreign policy. He wants that he should persuade the nations of the world to settle all their disputes by peaceful means. Now, though he has enunciated this policy again and again in respect of Goa

it is well-known that doubts are being thrown on his own sincerity and that of the Government of India in this matter. I therefore say that our interests in the maintenance of the honour and prestige of the country in this matter and in maintaining our ability, our moral right to speak to the nations on the plane on which we have spoken to them should not be weakened by anything that may happen in this country.

In the second place, we can easily conceive of situations in which the words used by the Prime Minister may be found very embarrassing by the Government of India. I do not want to refer to this matter at any length but it is clear, whether we look at the question from its international or its national aspect, that.....

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Which words is the hon. Member referring to?

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: The words that I read out just now.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Where were they quoted from?

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: I have quoted them from a report of what he said at a Press Conference held on the 31st May 1955. If that report is wrong, I have nothing to say. I should be very glad to hear that it is so. But if the report is right, then what I am saying is germane to the discussion of the question of the liberation of Goa.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Half an hour is over.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: Just one word, Sir. I will finish this.

Now, a new policy has been announced by the All-India Congress Committee. What this really means is that the Prime Minister has a new point of view now, which he has got the A.I.C.C. to accept. I am very glad that the A.I.C.C. resolution is very satisfactory. I shall not read out from it at any length but I shall only draw your attention to the con-

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cluding part of the resolution. After saying that the Goan borders have been sealed by the Government of India, the A.I.C.C. says: "The A.I.C.C. is therefore of the opinion that, in the present context, even individual Satyagraha by Indian nationals should be avoided." Now, I think in view of our larger interests, this is a satisfactory policy. Not that I do not feel keenly on the Goan question. My interest in the liberation of Goa is not less keen than that of any other Indian, but I do feel that when we take up a particular line of action, we should weigh one interest against other interests that we have to protect. All that I want to know from the Prime Minister now, who made a very important speech after the conclusion of the meeting, is whether the Government of India is really going to take steps to stop Indians from entering Goa, so that those larger interests might be protected. He has himself said that a peaceful policy will really brighten the chances of the freedom of Goa and that anything that jeopardises this should be depreciated. I want to know therefore whether the Government of India is going to take steps to deal with this question in a more effective manner than it has done so far.

Sir, I am sorry that my time is up; otherwise I should have liked to refer briefly to the Ceylon question, but I suppose some hon. friends will do that.

PROF. G. RANGA: Sir, I am glad that the line taken by my hon. friend Dr. Kunzru is very much in conformity with the policy enunciated by our Prime Minister today in regard to Goa and also in regard to the present international situation. Not so long ago, India was obliged to be apologetic, to be very much on her guard when she came out with her thesis that there should be co-existence and that all nations should try to live in the friendliest possible relations with each other. There were countries in the world which tried to misunderstand India's atti-

tude, which began to say that our Prime Minister and our Foreign Office were leaning more towards the East and so on. When we tried our best to use our own diplomatic pressure or influence to help the colonial people in their struggle for freedom, to persuade the Imperialist countries to shed their imperialism and concede freedom to these colonial peoples, they would not listen to us. And because we happen to be free and we happen to come into our own independence, the earlier freedom we used to enjoy to inveigh against these imperialist nations, to openly take our side on behalf of the colonial peoples, became weakened. And some of us anyhow felt, because of India's independence, the colonial people's struggle was becoming weaker than it had been, when we were not free and when we were able to range ourselves on the side of the colonial peoples.

But actually what happened was that our Prime Minister moved in the direction of the freedom of these peoples in such a statesman-like manner that at the right moment—as fortune would have it, it turned out to be the right moment—we were able to take the lead in convening a conference of the five Prime Ministers—I speak subject to correction—in Colombo. They formulated their policy and declared their determination to call a conference at Bogor in order to concentrate the attention of the world on the struggle of the colonial peoples for freedom. That conference also paved the way for the Geneva Conference. It was during that Geneva conference that it became possible for us—Indians as well as others—to make our very powerful contribution indeed, towards the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China, and the later developments and the later growth in power and independence of those four countries within the area of Indo-China and the peoples of those four countries.

In this way, independent India, instead of being a weakness, has pro-

ved to be a source of strength to the colonial peoples. Some of the imperialist countries and their friends were rather annoyed and I dare say the House remembers how Mr. Krishna Menon, who has been complimented very deservedly today by our Prime Minister, was abused and ridiculed, at that time by some of these powers and they made haste in a very indecent fashion, as we thought at that time, to go there somewhere in the Pacific to hold a conference and then bring into existence the abortive SEADO. All of us declaimed against it. We did not want that conference to take place and yet it did take place. They wanted to bring this into existence. What for? Not necessarily for the protection of democracy as against totalitarianism; but more—as we were afraid—in order to buttress their own imperialist positions, imperialist sway in the various parts of the world, more especially in Africa and Asia. Now, what were we to do against these things? We had no arms as President Soekarno had put it so rightly. We had not the same kind of power that the western countries had. And yet we could not very well remain silent. And that is how, came to take place two great conferences, the Bogor and the Bandung.

When the Bogor Conference was held, our statesmen were ridiculed. When the Bandung Conference was held, our statesmen were not only ridiculed but were suspected, were inveighed against in a very cruel fashion. Nevertheless, a few months after the Bandung Conference was held, and all these 29 nations were able to unanimously declare themselves against the continuation of colonialism in any part of the world, and for world peace and co-existence, the Secretary of State of U.S.A., Mr. Dulles, himself, had to admit—and I am glad it stands to his credit to have admitted it—that Bandung had contributed considerably to the easing of the situation, and also to make it possible for the four great powers to

meet at Geneva. I consider that as one of the signal achievements of our Government.

Then, Sir, came the third stage. Before we come to the third stage, I would like the House to keep in view what used to be the position in 1948, 1949 and 1950—the first three or four years after we became free. We had no place in the U.N.O., although we were a member. We went there of our own accord, as our Prime Minister had put it, as a matter of faith, with our complaint. We were not treated properly. We were made a play-thing of their own politics there. We were then treated as suspects. And yet the whole position has changed during the last seven years. Today, we are in a position to say to ourselves that our Prime Minister has inaugurated a new era in the African and Asian political fortunes. For ages, for several centuries, policies came from the West; inspiration used to come from the West. Power also used to display itself from the West on to the East.

Now, for the first time, the swing has turned in such a way that our Prime Minister began to move from India first to the Bogor and Bandung Conferences; and from there, our own Prime Minister's representative was there very much in evidence in Paris and Geneva during those conferences. Thereafter, just as Mr. Kellogg had gone from country to country in Europe in order to get the signatures of the statesmen, the Foreign Secretaries or Prime Ministers of the various countries, to sign "no-more-war declaration", similarly, our Prime Minister had gone recently from country to country. It was a great risk indeed for a statesman of that stature to have begun, not to go to a conference, but to go from country to country, face their own statesmen, persuade them to accept his doctrine or our principle, or the Asian-African conference principle of the doctrine of *Panch Shila*. And then, it stands to his credit, it stands to our credit, that he has succeeded in getting the signatures of every one of the Foreign Secretaries or the Presidents or the Prime

[Prof. G. Ranga.]

Ministers, whoever was concerned, of all those countries which he has visited recently. This is an achievement of which we can be deservedly proud. This reminds me of the ancient times when Lord Buddha went with a little lamb on his back to the prince. And when the prince said: "You should not stand between me and the lamb, I am going to kill the lamb", he said: "instead of killing the lamb, you had better kill me." In that way, our Prime Minister had gone and fortunately for us he has brought us back again the lamb of peace, the pigeon of peace. That way he has brought credit to Mahatma Gandhi of whom he is a fitting disciple.

Sir, having achieved this, he comes back to our country and we are faced with this Goan situation. It is not a small one. All our emotions are exercised over it. We are certainly impatient. So is the Prime Minister, to be rid of this relic of imperialism. We want to do all that we possibly can. If there is anything in what the Prime Minister had said on various occasions during the last two years which is inconsistent with the stand that he has taken today, I can only assure my hon. friend, Dr. Kunzru, that the Prime Minister is very much a human being, like so many of us. He has been one of our fighters here for our national freedom. Therefore, naturally our emotions come first, later on our State or Congress policy. Therefore.....

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: First nationalism, then emotion!

PROF. G. RANGA: Therefore, we wanted to help our friends in Goa and we have pursued this line of policy in all our activities. We have reached this present stage and we have to take our decision. Don't we want to leave this matter to the Government, the Government as it is represented by our own Prime Minister.....

SHRI S. N. DWIVEDY (Orissa): No.

PROF. G. RANGA:.....the Government which has brought to us these laurels in this international

field? Or do we want to take the international law into our own hands? And then, because we are impatient, because we are certainly emotionally exercised over the freedom of the people of Goa and of our own country, do we want to take to Satyagraha and go there in spite of the advice, in spite of what is considered to be the best policy for our country. This is the question which faces the country. I sincerely hope that members of all parties would be willing to range themselves on the side of our Prime Minister in regard to this matter. If they do not wish, if on the other hand they want to be impatient and, therefore, only want to inveigh our own Prime Minister on this (*Time bell rings*), then I can only remind them of what we did during those days when Mahatma Gandhi was leading the struggle against the Indian States.

There was a stage when Mahatma Gandhi allowed our people to offer Satyagraha in the States in order to fight the Rajahs. But there came a stage when Mahatma Gandhi found it necessary, in the then existing circumstances, and in order to promote our own freedom struggle, to stop that struggle. And he asked the people to suspend Satyagraha. We are all patriots and I accept them to be full-fledged patriots. But then also there were these patriots who said that Mahatma Gandhi was wrong and that he was only preventing the achievement of freedom not only of the States people, but also of the whole of India by that act of his. History has proved Mahatma Gandhi to have been in the right and our impatient friends to have been in the wrong. I want my hon. friends to keep that in mind and place the leadership of this country entirely in the hands of our Prime Minister in regard to this Goa problem, in regard to international affairs, on the score that it has succeeded, on the score that it has paved the way for world peace, on the score that it has eased the international situation and on the score that those enemies of his, those friends who were not

inclined to be friends, those who laughed at our foreign policy, who scoffed at it, who suspected the *bona fides* of Mr. Krishna Menon and his chief and our chief, our Prime Minister, are today themselves converts and therefore, they have come to accept the need for a four Power Conference and then take part in the conference.

Let us remember that, and on their return, they tell their people that there is no longer tension and that tension has eased. The cold war is coming to an end. We are on the eve of a great age. As the Prime Minister has put it, here is this great giant power of the Atom with us in the possession of mankind. It is this power which is going to help the poverty-stricken masses of our country. The peaceful uses of this power are available to us today thanks to the new world situation. The whole world is to have a chance to experiment with this power. Therefore, Sir, I am extremely glad to associate myself once again with this motion. I have been consistent in my support of the foreign policy of the Government of India ever since we have become free. I am one with the Prime Minister in his Foreign Policy and I hope that my amendment will commend itself to this House.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA (West Bengal): Sir, we have heard the Prime Minister explaining the foreign policy of his Government as well as dilating upon the situation in Goa. We only wish, Sir, that it was possible for us to discuss the question of Goa independently as a domestic matter and an internal question affecting India's sovereignty and territorial integrity without mixing other matters connected with broader international affairs. Unfortunately, it has not been possible. As you know, we demanded an early discussion on the question was pressing; the question was agitating the minds of our countrymen. But the Prime Minister and his Government thought that it would require a cooler atmos-

phere for discussion. And I have no doubt in my mind that the Prime Minister of India and the Leaders of the Congress Party have utilised this time in order to prepare, I hope unsuccessfully, the ground for the resolution that has emerged from the A.I.C.C. on Sunday on Goa. This resolution, according to me, is the basis of his speech and this resolution is shocking and it amounts to a sheer betrayal of the people fighting for the liberation of Goa. I make it very clear that this resolution would be unacceptable not merely to us, but also to many Congressmen and supporters of the Congress—about whose strivings we have nothing to question—who share the sentiment, emotion and patriotism that we have in the matter of the liberation of Goa.

However, Mr. Deputy Chairman, it is necessary to touch on a few aspects of international situation. The Prime Minister has referred to some of the instances and things of international importance. I need not again touch on them. I can only say that the Geneva Conference, which has been preceded by various other developments, including the signing of the *Panch Shila* between the two Prime Ministers—the Prime Minister of our country and the Prime Minister of the Chinese People's Republic, has been a great contribution to the lessening of the international tension. At his time, we also remember the great part—the constructive part—that has been played by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic who have always been for friendship among nations, who have stood for peaceful co-existence, for helping Asian solidarity and the Asian peoples and for relaxation of international tension. But for their constructive efforts backed by their entire peoples and the might possessed by them, I doubt if the imperialists would have been isolated in the manner that they have been isolated today. Therefore, Sir, when I speak in this debate about the lessening of international tension and all that I should like to pay a tribute to those people and those countries

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who have done so much for bringing about a situation of which we are all proud today.

Now, our country too has played a part in this context of the world situation. I am proud—and I assume every Member of this House is proud—of the prestige and position that India has gained on account of the part it has played. But in the final analysis, I cannot understand all this development, but for the will and the struggle for peace loving mankind all over the world. It is the people who have fought for peace in every country and this struggle knows no frontiers or barriers. The struggle is mingled with other causes of the vast humanity striving for peace. It is this struggle which has made possible to achieve the results of which we can talk today.

Of great importance in this present world situation, of course, has been the Geneva Conference of the four Big Powers. That represents the beginning of a new stage in the international situation. We welcome this development. Many of the questions have not been discussed at all there. And, as the Prime Minister has said, it has not solved any important question. But it has made a good beginning and certainly this beginning will have a beneficial effect on the entire course of history.

Then, Sir, we are also happy to note that the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union has been successful and this growing friendship between the Soviet Union and India is a matter of vital concern for all peace-loving mankind. We also hope that this friendship will gather momentum and will extend to larger spheres in the political and cultural fields. Here, we also note with satisfaction the resumption of the relationship between the Yugoslav Republic and the Soviet Union and this has also helped the cause of world peace and has strengthened it against the imperialist warmongers. These are developments of vital importance.

I listened to the Prime Minister when he referred to so many things. He also pointed out the dangers that exist today in the world situation. But I find, he missed something.

The time has not come for resting on our laurels, because the Imperialists, even after they have suffered defeats one after another, are not resting quite. That is what we have seen in the sabotage of the "Kashmir Princess" in which Chinese and Indian nationals were killed on their way to Bandung.

But this is not the only instance. In Indo-China, as the Prime Minister told us, some people do seem to like this sort of thing. But he has not named them. I name them. They are the South Viet-Nam regime who have not accepted the Armistice Agreement. They instigate its violation. It is these people and their hirelings who attacked the personnel of the International Supervisory Commission on the 20th July and it is these people who are even today refusing mutual consultation for bringing about the general election as has been laid down in the Armistice Agreement. Behind them stands the United States of America. I would like to see the Prime Minister not merely to look at those people who are the immediate culprits, but also to look at those who instigated these culprits to attack the Commission there, and to come in the way of a solution of the problem through violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Sir, the *New York Times* in its editorial on the 4th May 1955, states as follows:

"This trend is greeted with satisfaction in Washington, which has regarded Premier Diem as the best available leader to clean up the chaos.....and to establish an honest Government which could command the loyalty of the Vietnamese people in the coming showdown with the Communist regime in the North."

Here you see an organ of the ruling class of the United States of America, not only openly provoking the Diem regime, but telling the world that this regime is meant to plunge that country Viet-Nam again into a war. And this is the declaration you get. Therefore, Mr. Deputy Chairman, it is necessary to beware of these enemies of the people, to beware of these enemies of the world peace.

It is most unfortunate, Sir, that while the Prime Minister, in his speech rightly referred to the North African possessions of French Imperialism, he did not say anything about Malaya or Kenya. I should have thought that he would be concerned with the developments in Malaya and Kenya. Sir, as you know, recently, a military communique has been issued which says, that since the beginning of the emergency, over 9,000 people have been killed in Kenya, and in the course of the current year alone, nearly two thousand people have been killed. We know that this is an official statement, and, as such, is an under-estimation. The number of persons killed is much higher than the number given to us. At the same time, Sir, we also know that 80 thousand people are still in jail. These things should have found some reference in his speech. About Malaya, our Prime Minister is silent. But I think the Bandung Declaration makes it obligatory for us to exert our pressure, exert our moral force, in order to see that the predatory war that is conducted in Malaya and in Kenya, by the Britishers, is brought to an end immediately. And, I think, it is necessary for the Prime Minister to direct his energies to achieve this result. Sir, it is most regrettable that even today, war materials and war equipments are being sent from this country to Malaya for helping the murder campaign of British imperialists. Not a month passes without some Kukris and other things being sent from the Calcutta Port to that destination, so that the butcher can use them. Not a month passes without certain planes touching

Dum Dum or Palam airport, which take such equipments to Malaya. Sir, we have a report that an increasing number of Canberra jet planes are being flown through Palam and Dum Dum airports, and their destination is clearly Singapore, where they want to build the base of SEATO. I should have thought that the Prime Minister's attention would be directed to these questions.

Sir, then, it is a matter of great importance for us to express our solidarity with the struggle of the people for freedom. And we should do so not merely in words, but by taking whatever action we can take and lies within our power. Then, I think the Prime Minister should have also mentioned something about the German rearmament. After all, under the Paris Agreements, German militarism is being revived under the former Fascist generals, and as you know, two world conflagrations started there. And we cannot be indifferent to the developments taking place there. Time has come when the Prime Minister should speak openly against the revival of German militarism under the Paris Agreements.

Then, Sir, I think, that the present conditions are favourable for working together with the Chinese People's Republic in the matter of creating what is called a collective peace for Asia and the Pacific regions. That is very important, and the situation is favourable now. At the same time, the Government should also try to take the initiative in seeing that disarmament becomes successful. Sir, already, as you know, the Soviet Union is reducing its Armed Forces by 6 lakhs and 50 thousand men. The other countries of the Socialist Camp are also doing the same thing and are reducing their Armed Forces. I think, efforts should be made to see that disarmament and prohibition of atomic weapons become a reality. At present, Sir, we know that the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the U.N. is meeting, and it will be advisable for this Parliament to send its fervent wishes for the success of

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the Disarmament Sub-Committee's efforts. Sir, you know that we have been protesting against these atomic weapons, and the conscience of the whole world has been roused against these atomic weapons. And it is a matter of great satisfaction for us that over 65 crores of people have signed the Vienna Appeal against the atomic weapons, and still more are signing that appeal. In fact, Sir, that is a great historic Appeal. Therefore, here is the occasion to raise our voice much more loudly, much more vigorously for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Now, Sir, let me come to the question of Goa. But before that, I would only like to say that if you follow this international policy, it is necessary also to strengthen its national base. There are many people in this country placed in high positions, who do not believe in such direction for the Government's international policy, who do not believe in the friendship of this country with the Soviet Union and China, and who are out to sabotage it, if they get a chance. Therefore, I say, that you should beware of such people. It is most regrettable, that when our foreign policy has taken a direction towards friendship with the Soviet Union and China, the Congress leaders, and even Ministers, go to public platforms and utter unmentionable slanders against those countries, whose friendship we are trying to seek. Sir, here I would like to read from the *Andhra Prabha*, which is a Congressite paper, and an organ which supports the Congress policies. This is a speech made by Shri Jagjivan Ram at Razole meeting in East Godavari district. He says:

"Russia is the fatherland of Communists and in that country the institution of marriage is founded first on business lines. There the women are being used as a means of trade. Will you reconcile to such a thing?"

That is given in *Andhra Prabha* dated the 12th of February 1955. Sir, I am asking: Is this the way to

develop friendship with other countries? Is this the way to talk about the great country whose greatness has demonstrated in the international sphere, and also in relations towards our country? Then, Sir, you have also other people. I can name them also. There are so many quotations here with me. We have got a Minister in West Bengal, the Minister for Irrigation, who never opens his mouth on a public platform without slandering the Soviet Union and China. Here are other names in that list. They are Shri Raghuramaiah, Prof. Ranga and others, all gentlemen of the great order, who say such things. Therefore, I say, that Government should beware of all these things. This is not the way to build friendship. We must cultivate the art of building friendship, and those voices have got to be silenced in the interest of world peace and friendship among nations.

Sir, now let me turn to the question of Goa, which is undoubtedly uppermost in our mind. One should have thought that the Prime Minister would improve upon the A.I.C.C. Resolution. He has done nothing of the kind. I only find, Sir, that the Prime Minister's speech simply contains eloquent and sonorous phrases. That is all that we have got in his speech. Goa is a part of India. It is an indisputable fact, and nobody can deny that fact. It has also been stated by the Prime Minister in his speech in the other House, on the 26th of July last, that the continuance of Portuguese rule in Goa is an interference with the political system in India. Accordingly he laid down his own doctrine. We stand by this doctrine. We accept that doctrine. Undoubtedly, it is an interference with the political system in India. It does not require the wisdom of the Prime Minister or that of the A.I.C.C. to tell us that Goa is not yet a part of the Indian Union. That we all know. Precisely because we know that, we want to alter that unwanted fact, which is a crime against the Indian people, namely, the occupation of Goa, Diu and Daman by

the Portuguese bandits. He has said that he was happy, because Goa has ceased to be a home of smugglers, but I ask him, how long must it take to see that Goa ceases to be the home of butchers who are carrying on their butchery unrestricted and in an unbridled manner. We are not at the moment fighting against smugglers and all that. That is a matter for the Prohibition Department. We are fighting for the liberation of that territory. We are fighting for the liberation of our soil, for territorial integrity of our country, for the sovereign right of our people. We are here to deal with the butchers, those colonial killers who stay there to the eternal shame of all people and who are not yet expelled and thrown into the Arabian Sea. That is how we should view this matter. We would not be satisfied with such utterances as the Prime Minister has made. The Prime Minister has raised a whole number of questions. His Goa policy particularly, if anything, is a definition of failures, is a definition of hesitations and vacillations and bunglings and now if I take the AICC Resolution it is a kind of betrayal. We are against that policy. We want him to alter that Goa policy. Let there be no mistake about it. We are.

SHRI K S HEGDE So you are not in agreement with the terms of Panch Shila, that all settlements should be peaceful? You are now withdrawing your support.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA You better sit now. I don't think the great Prime Minister is in need of protection from this gentleman. You assist him somewhere else when you speak against the Portuguese in the United Nations Assembly, if you go. I leave your oratory and forensic ability to be displayed there. Now the question is, 'Have we got any right of action?' The Bandung declaration is quite clear here. It declares against colonialism. This is how it reads:

"In affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,

domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation"

What does it mean? Here it is not a question of international dispute of that sort. Here it is a question of subject people fighting for their liberation, asserting their right of self-determination. This is how it has to be viewed and once you view it in that manner, then it is our inherent right, inalienable right and sovereign right to take whatever action we like for the liberation of Goa just as in the old days it was our sovereign right to fight against the British in whatever manner we liked for the liberation of our country. We have liberated most of our soil almost the whole of India, except those patches and spots. We want to liberate them and this liberation movement has to go forward there to achieve the unfinished task. This is how we view it. Why bring in all these international questions and complicate them? I have no doubt in my mind that the Imperialists will raise a howl. They will not like such things to be said and treated in that manner, but at the same time, I also feel that if we stand on this firm ground if we unite the people and take action, they dare not do any thing because they are isolated today. Never has a cause been so sacredly placed. And let there be no mistake about it, that if the struggle in Goa has won the admiration of mankind, it is not because of the policy of this Government, but because of the martyrdom of those satyagrahis who have laid down lives there. It is because that the Goans themselves are fighting with undiminished courage against all kinds of odds in a manner which evokes admiration from all. It is because the Indian people today are united for the cause of the Goan liberation, a fact which was demonstrated on the 16th, 17th and 18th throughout the country. It is because of the massive demonstration of the

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people, because of their self-sacrifice, because of the unity of the people out of whose ranks have come the martyrs of Goan liberation—the great lady Subhadra Bai for instance—that we won the moral standing and the administration of the whole of mankind. That has to be recognized.

Therefore the hon. Members from that side should not belittle the Satyagraha and should not try to show that Satyagraha had played no part. They are saying all kinds of things. The Prime Minister was also seen speaking on the 15th August from the ramparts of Red Fort, Delhi, and he expressed 'Mubarak' for the Satyagrahis. Today I find that he is against mass Satyagraha and does not know what kind of satyagraha it was. He may be in a split mind but the country and the people are not fighting the cause of the Goan liberation with a split mind. We find that the A.I.C.C. has given a warning against mass satyagraha. Now, we have Mr. Dhebar speaking in Madhya Pradesh telling the people to support this struggle. They always change their views and voice but the people will never do it, because, we think, we have the right to fight in whatever manner we like for the liberation of Goa. It is most disappointing to hear the Prime Minister in that strain. After all the satyagrahis have not spilt their warm blood in order to produce that inglorious A.I.C.C. Resolution or merely, to evoke some kind of sympathy and condolence or, for that matter, some tribute from them. They died, so that we would fight; they died, so that the fight for Goan liberation should go on; they died, so that the Goan people would live, and the Goans choose to die on their feet rather than bend on their knees. That is the spirit with which these men have been actuated. You are not doing justice to that martyrdom, to that glory, which will echo down the corridor of history for generations and generations—when the voice

of many of the great men on that side of the House will not be heard at all. Another question that is asked is, are we entitled to take action? I say, we are entitled to take any action against the Portuguese authorities, because it is an internal matter; it is a question of our sovereignty, territorial integrity. We want to apply the Bandung declaration according to our genius, with the powers that we have in our possession. Let there be no mistake about it. The Portuguese might say that it is war and all that. They always say such things, but let us view the situation that if we have that right, it should be recognized. I want to make it clear that we have got that right on principle—and we are absolutely certain about it. Just as we had the right to struggle against the Britishers and we fought them and expelled them from the country, so do we have our right to fight against these Portuguese bandits, in whatever manner we like and expel them from the country. It has nothing to do with—international policies and all that. The point was made that complications will arise? I can understand some suggestions about the complications. I would ask the Prime Minister to do this. Let him recognize that right and just sit with the Opposition Parties and others, discuss the question of expediency. I say that it is expedient also and the political situation is more favourable than ever before. Imperialists, thanks to the struggle of the world people, thanks to the success of the freedom-loving mankind, are isolated and cornered today. They dare not do anything. There will be much less bloodshed if we really move into action. Then the question may arise that the prestige of India will be affected. We are proud of the prestige that India has attained in the international field. We cherish it and want to preserve it. (*Time bell rings.*) This prestige has to be preserved and has to be maintained. But remember, the prestige of our country has gone up because we had that great struggle for national liberation. We have fought

against Imperialism; we have the finest anti-Imperialist tradition; we stand for peace, we greed no one's territory and we tolerate no colonial people on our territory. It is this history that has given us the great prestige today. So, if we fight for these things, if we fight for the liberation of Goa, the prestige will still rise.

The Prime Minister said that certain countries are against the liberation of Goa. He has not named them. But I tell you, it is the Leader of the Commonwealth, the British, who are against it. The British press is full of thunder against the Goan liberation struggle. The Conservative papers there, the Tory Press, are writing against it. They are against the liberation of Goa. And what is most regrettable is this. The Soviet Government and China support the struggle. An article was published in the A.I.C.C. Economic Review, saying that the U.S.S.R. supports the Goan struggle—that Goa should belong to India. When that article was published, intervened the U.S.A. Ambassador and immediately a circular was issued saying this article had been published due to inadvertence, and that the article represented the views of the Soviet writer only; although it said in the article itself that the U.S.S.R. supports the Goan struggle, that Goa belongs to India. Sir, this is the scandalous state of things that is going on. Those who support it, you suppress. Those who condemn it, those who are backing and supporting the Portuguese, to them you listen and you bow to their desire. That is the state of affairs that has developed.

Now, I would only like to say this much. Let Government give an ultimatum to the Portuguese authorities to quit Goa within a given period of time. Let the time be fixed, and if they do not quit, it shall be our right to take whatever action we like, including police action. Secondly, the treaties of Britain with Portugal, in regard to Portuguese possessions in India, should be annulled by both,

constitutionally and formally, and not by mere declarations. Thirdly, any country which supports the Portuguese authorities in Goa should be treated as unfriendly country and should be treated as such and such behaviour should be regarded as unfriendly, if not hostile, behaviour, towards India. Fourthly, there should be no ban or restriction on the Indian people helping the struggle for Goa's liberation, no matter how they choose to do it. The Congress Government has not got that right, moral or political right to impose such ban; the Government has not got that right at all. It will be for the people to decide, more especially when the Government is not doing anything, how they should help the struggle for Goa's liberation and the Government must not come in the way of the people in this matter, by sealing or closing the border for them—whatever it may mean.

Sir, these are some of the points, important demands we make, and I am confident that Congressmen, the mass of the Congress followers and other parties, indeed the entire Indian humanity, is united on these demands. This unity has developed out of the fire of struggle in the course of the last few months. And this unity we must guard as the apple of our eye. But that is the unity which you are disrupting and sabotaging by the A.I.C.C. Resolution. I hope the spirit of unity conforming to the will of the people will prevail over the disrupting forces. It is deplorable that the counsels in the highest circles should be such as these. But the people are looking forward to the future and marching forward. Let not the Government come in the way. The Government of India should give expression to the will, the sentiments, and the urges of the people of India and should not retire into quibblings in logic or international casuistry and try to do something which is not in the national interest, and not in the interest of Goan liberation. This is what I have to tell, not to the Prime Minister, because he is not here, but to his

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friend, Mr. Krishna Menon, and the other Members of this House. The Goan policy of the Government needs a radical change. And such a change is desired in the interest of the people, in the interest of peace and freedom, in the interest of the Goan people, in our own interests and for the welfare and advancement of mankind.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: Sir, I am extremely glad that there is greater appreciation of our foreign policy today than at any time before. A few months back, there were suspicions in most countries whether we were Communists or near Communists, or whether we were all political duds who do not understand the political situation in the world. When I was in America last, many people guardedly asked me, whether we were really communists or not. In fact, many people whispered into my ears whether Mr. Krishna Menon was a communist or not. I told them, "He is as much a communist as I am; if I am not one, he is not one." Every action taken by this country was suspect, sometimes genuinely and sometimes deliberately. I was addressing one of their clubs in America and when we were speaking of co-existence, some one asked me, "How can you exist with the Russian bear?" I merely told him, "You are offering me a symbol—a bear. I can tolerate the bear, if you can stand a lynching here or a lynching there. And we try to co-exist with both, with them, as well as with you." That is exactly the situation that existed till last October. I am extremely happy that many events have taken place since then, and more and more countries are seeing the useful contribution that this country has been making towards the peaceful solution of international problems. In fact, Sir, during the last General Assembly, when the question of disarmament came up for consideration and also when the question of the control of atomic energy came up for discussion, our chief delegate Mr. Krishna Menon, took a very leading part in the discussions and in helping to bring about certain amount of

understanding between the different countries. There were many divergent opinions, but he was anxious to collect together the common points of view and to consolidate them, rather than allow them to be dissipated by the different opinions that existed here and there. It is well-known in the United Nations that, for many of the useful formulae that were ultimately agreed to, he in particular and our delegation in general, played an extremely useful part and there is greater and greater realisation in the U.N. that, in all these matters, India takes a very independent attitude, not attached to any particular bloc. Each question has been examined on its own merit, and support is either offered or withdrawn solely on the basis of the merits of the questions. It is true that for a time certain countries tried to isolate us. I shall not go into that matter, because we shall not be deterred by any attempts made by any one country or made to change our foreign policy. After the Bandung Conference, an entirely different pattern has come about. Many countries now genuinely feel that this country has got a positive role to play and it has played this role in solving many of the world's difficult questions and that to a large extent we have contributed to the peaceful atmosphere that is prevailing in the world today. We may make a very modest claim that we had our own contributions to offer, directly or indirectly, in the Geneva Agreement and in the peaceful settlement of the Indo-China question. The appreciation of the part that we have played has been shown by the distressed world, when the Prime Minister went on his tour of the European countries and Russia. As he has very correctly pointed out, it is not merely an appreciation of his personality—that is my part of the comment—but also an appreciation of the foreign policy of this country. So, every Indian has got every reason to be proud of our foreign policy.

I want this House to examine our approach to the Goan problem from

this point of view. We have a position and prestige today in the international set-up; we have built up a very useful and positive role in settling international disputes. Now, in trying to solve the question of Goa, shall we forsake all the principles for which we have stood? Shall we throw to the winds the philosophy that we placed before the world? Shall we discard all those five principles that we pledged ourselves to? When my friend Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, the Leader of the Communist Party was addressing the House, I put him the simple question, "At one time you supported the policy of peaceful settlement of international disputes....."

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: We still support but this is not an international dispute. To our mind, it is a question of asserting our rights of sovereignty.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: The virtue of my hon. friend, Mr. Gupta, is that he is deaf to other suggestions and is loud in his own suggestion. When I put that simple question to him, he simply warded that question off by saying that I could use my forensic ability in other places and that I need not refer to this matter. Mr. Gupta may have a philosophy of his own, but the Government has a firm philosophy and a firm way of approach. There is no denying the fact, whether you will it or not, that our relation with the Portuguese Government is a relationship based on international law.

It is true—and there can be no doubt about it—that Goa is part of the country, but the question today is that it is in the possession of somebody who is wrongly in possession of it—let us admit it—but the point is, how shall we solve that? Shall we raise an emotion in the country? Shall we create conditions in the country of which the ultimate finale would be only military action or, shall we try to solve it in accordance with the policy that we have hitherto pursued? I shall not dilate on the subject because the Prime Minister himself has placed all the materials before the House, but I should like to

add one or two other aspects. It is for this House to take a comparative picture, so far as utility is concerned, from the point of view of this country. At this stage of the development of the country, should there be an emotional scare in regard to Goa?

What has happened to Goa is this. Everywhere, the nation's attention is now focussed not towards our development, not towards the fulfilment of our programme in the Five Year Plan, but each day we are discussing and concentrating the whole of our attention on this simple question of Goa. It is true that it raises an important issue; it is true it is a question of *fundamentals* but, at the same time, what is happening is, all our energies are being dissipated on questions which could be solved by other methods, questions which could be solved without injuring the national interest. For a time, we bent all our energies to implementing the first Five Year Plan and it is on record today that we have made an appreciable and tremendous progress. We had increased our industrial production by as much as 40 per cent. If we do not keep up the tempo, we are likely to lag behind and we may not be able to implement the programme that we have before us. In that set-up and in that light, I would like the House to examine this point. Should we raise an emotional scare about Goa? Should we all concentrate our energies in solving this question of Goa which can be otherwise, probably very easily, solved? It is within the power of this Government to solve this problem; it is being solved by methods and manners different from that advocated by my hon. friend, Mr. Gupta.

I have no doubt in my mind that many of them who took part in this movement are patriotic men and women who were impelled by a noble urge to partake in this movement, but there is also no gainsaying the fact that some of those who encouraged this movement were not impelled by the same noble cause that probably impelled most of them. There were political considerations behind it; it

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was trying to make political capital by some individuals and by some political parties also. We got a sample of it today; just now the House has heard it. There is an attempt on the part of some individuals and some of the parties to create as much confusion, both politically and economically, in this country, to exploit that condition for the benefit of that party and try to show to the world—and to Indians in particular—that salvation lies in aligning with one or the other blocs. It is that approach that we must guard ourselves against. In the name of this movement for Goan liberation, many political parties have come to the forefront and taken a lead; they have tried to bolster up their own position and tried to discredit the Government. The whole idea is not so much to liberate Goa, but to discredit the Government.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: This is most unfortunate. A slander is cast on the Goan liberation movement, the efforts of the Indian people. I hope the Prime Minister will dissociate himself from such aspersions.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: An attempt is being made to place the Government on the horns of a dilemma. It is true that every one in this country is anxious to liberate Goa.

SHRI SATYAPRIYA BANERJEE (West Bengal): Not you.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: My hon. friend challenges me. I would like him to examine his own history. Where was he when the freedom movement was going on in this country?

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: When you were in the Police Court as a Public Prosecutor, I was in Jail. You must remember that.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: I was answering somebody else. If you had been in jail, that was probably the best place for you to have been in.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I am very proud that I was in jail and I know another gentleman who was there in Alipore Jail and that was Mr. Prime Minister.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: I was trying to place before the House the fact that an attempt was being made to place the Government on the horns of a dilemma. The Government itself is anxious to liberate Goa; Government wants to liberate Goa as early as possible but Government wants to take, at the same time, an overall view of the picture, both from the national and international points of view, and to have its own solution in the matter. It is no use trying to force the hands of Government in a matter like this. One would have expected that all the political parties would have supported the Government. Normally, it is the convention in the world that in international relationship the other political parties in opposition—even if they have minor differences with the Government policies—try to go with the Government policy and support it; they try to solve the matter in the way and in the manner that the Government tries to solve it; but, unfortunately, it is not to be. I hope there will be better counsel and, ere long, the Members of the Opposition will see the merit of the Resolution passed by the A.I.C.C. That is the only Resolution that could have been passed in the present circumstances, in the light of our policies. The A.I.C.C. has taken into account every aspect of the question and the Members who passed that Resolution were as anxious as any one of the Members of the Opposition, to liberate Goa at a very early time. At the same time, they were anxious to protect the prestige of this country and to see that there is orderly advance both internally and internationally. From this point of view, I urge upon this House to accept the policy enunciated by the Prime Minister. I do not think I need dilate on the subject as, particularly, the time that has been allotted to me has expired. I again request this House to wholeheartedly support the foreign policy as enunciated by the Prime Minister.

SHRI V. K. KRISHNA MENON (Madras): Mr. Deputy Chairman, the Prime Minister, in submitting the

present Motion before the House, referred to the very many developments that had taken place in the world since this House had an opportunity to discuss foreign affairs some time ago. It is not my intention to cover the whole field of these developments, but only to draw attention to the impact of these developments on our foreign policy and also to state the contribution that our policy has made towards them. The Prime Minister referred to the Conference that took place and also to the various conversations that occurred since then in Geneva, in Washington and in Peking. This is neither the time nor the occasion to go into the details of these conversations; as a matter of fact, they refer to matters which are still subject to negotiations. In all these affairs, the Government of India has proceeded along and continued to traverse the road of reconciliation. It is not my intention to argue the issue of Goa but, in the light of our general policy, if our foreign policy is one of reconciliation, one of peaceful approach one of not using war in solving international crises, then, there is no alternative except to find ways of mobilising world opinion, using measures short of war, to ensure to the world that this country is always bound by the method of reconciliation. We could not afford to throw away the capacity that we have today, to prevent a world catastrophe, by submitting ourselves to any mood of excitement. In fact, the trouble of this world has been great in foreign affairs, and the relations between countries have, for nearly a century, been decided by the mood of excitement and by the attitude of fear. And this country has made a contribution in a modest way to improve matters, to effect a change in such attitudes.

Since we met here last, there has been an era of conferences, and some changes have come over the world. In a few weeks' time, the United Nations will meet in its tenth session, and it is worth while to recall that while its predecessor, the League of Nations, had an initial ten-year period of success, the history of the United

Nations in the first ten years has been a period comparatively of gloom. But now, in the second ten-year period, it seems to be embarking on greater capacity to implement the purposes for which it was founded and, in doing that, the United Nations, or the great powers composing the United Nations, have not renounced, but have seen the wisdom—it is rather being forced into the position by the weight of events—that there is no alternative to co-existence, that if there are differences they must be argued, and they must be resolved by peaceful negotiations. In the world today, it remains a fact that in spite of the improvements that had taken place, the situation is very grave, particularly in our continent, that we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that it is a matter of great concern, that the position in the Far East, whether it be in Indo-China or in Korea or in the China waters, is one which can at any time create a position of much greater concern and that an outbreak of conflict of some kind can spread into a larger and larger one.

Therefore, the most important event on which our eyes must be focussed are the indications or rather the talks that are now going on between one ambassador representing the United States and another representing China. Sir, it is true that United States has not recognised China and China does not recognise the United States, but their ambassadors are talking to each other and perhaps that is the beginning, and so far as we know these talks are continuing and, in a rather harassed world, their continuance of the talks is a matter of great importance; that is to say, neither party is prepared to break off and they are finding ways and means to reach a settlement. They are now arguing the question of the return of the nationals of one country to another and neither side seems to raise any objection in principle, which is a very long way from the days of Pan Mun Jon, when the main purpose of a conference was to see who could make the longer speech. In this particular matter, the two

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parties, without any difficulty, agreed that there should be no publicity during the period of negotiation with a view to reach a settlement. All this is related to the developments that took place in the Bandung Conference and afterwards the talks between this country and China, which have been communicated to both parties as was appropriate on each occasion, and the present negotiations, which are direct negotiations between China and the United States, are the one objective for which those, who were most interested in peaceful settlements, had been aiming at for a long time.

It is recognised that at conferences, the initial question of who represents whom has to be first settled and what their international position is, it is rather difficult to settle. Therefore, in the last five or six months such endeavours this country can make and others can make have been directly towards finding a method whereby these parties, who were not reconciled to each other, who ignored each other's existence, who will not recognise the reality that they are two of the great powers, without whose co-operation, settlement of any world problem is impossible. The first step had to be taken towards that and that was these direct negotiations. The Chinese came forward with an offer which was responded to by the Americans and now we had the beginning of direct negotiations. Whether it ends in all expected results or ends in more or less is not really material, because this is a break in a deadlock and no further deadlocks may follow, we hope. This is a beginning towards progress in that direction, and we should all hope that public opinion in the world, which has restrained itself in expressing criticism, will continue to do so, so that the efforts that are now being made in Geneva will extend to larger spheres.

Reference was made to the four power conference that met in Geneva sometime ago. I like to say to this House that the Prime Minister's visit to Russia and the public statements he

made there afterwards, and no doubt the private communications he must have made to others in regard to the economy, the polity and the attitude of the Russian people and their desire for peace—and indeed there is no harm in saying the fact that they were not negotiating from weakness—and equally our friendly attitude towards the United States assisted in—I do not say it was a conclusive fact—and made a contribution towards the atmosphere in Geneva itself.

In 1953, on behalf of the Government of India, we proposed to the United Nations General Assembly that the only way to bring about a break in the world deadlock was for the four powers—summit talks as it is now called—to meet. It was subjected to much ridicule. We must not congratulate ourselves, but we must feel happy that after all things have moved in the right direction. Perhaps more important than these objective events is that the foreign policy of this country was vindicated in another way, that is to say, quite honestly it was believed by both sides, that our policy had been one of sitting on the fence, of escaping the responsibility of being aligned to one or the other, or we wanted to get the best of both the worlds, that is, keeping ourselves in the good books of both sides and remaining safe without our carrying any burdens. If people wanted to use strong language, they said they were sitting on the fence and trying to be neutral.

We have moved away from that position and during the last twelve months, neither of them suspected our motives and both sides are prepared to talk with us and we to them. The most important development in our policy has gained greater acceptance than before. We are no longer looked upon as a neutral country without responsibilities. In fact, we have always denied this appellation of neutralism to ourselves so that today while we cannot say our views will be accepted or rejected, we make the approach and, as the Prime Minister has said, we

are always willing to offer our services to our limited capacity. There is no feeling in this and whatever newspapers in this country or that or the other may say, there is no feeling in responsible circles that we have either an interested motive or we are playing for one side and using the apparent confidence of the other for selfish ends.

In this connection, Mr. Deputy Chairman, I would like to say that as a representative of the Government of India, even while in an informal capacity both in China and in the United States, during these negotiations, I observed that people in responsible positions as well as the generality of the populations have shown great and warm sympathy towards this country. There is no lack of friendliness in either of these places and one great contribution we can make, is to play down any kind of exaggerated feeling of hostility that may come out in regard to either of them. One may be pro-Chinese and it is not necessary to be anti-American or *vice versa*. We lose in the strength that we may have by picking up some comment in some newspaper and trying to put it as though it is the policy of the country. Our newspapers are not free from criticising other people and there is no reason why the newspapers of other countries should not say things about us.

Reference has been made to the problem of Indo-China, which is one of the serious difficulties that confront us. The Prime Minister has already referred to the fact that our position in Indo-China is dependent upon the Geneva Agreement. In fact, the Commission is the creature of the Agreement. I would not have pursued this matter in great detail but for the fact that the legal issues in this matter have been aired in this House and we have an audience which goes further than our newspapers and the Chamber itself. This is one of the matters likely to come up and, while I have no desire to go into any very great detail, it is necessary, in view of the fact of the matter having been raised, to point out that in our mind

there should be no doubt whatsoever that the authorities of South Viet-Nam are wholly and totally bound by the Geneva Agreement. And the reasons are very simple. First of all, it is stated in article 27 of the Armistice Agreement—I do not mean the Agreement as a whole—that the signatories to the present Agreement and the successors in their functions shall be responsible so that there is no question of these people not being bound. We cannot take this Agreement in part and say that it is merely relating to military provisions, that is, an Agreement between the two Commands. But the final declaration that is part of the Geneva proceedings is an integral part of the Geneva Agreement. Therefore, the whole of this thing has the character of an international treaty; whether the authorities of the South Viet-Nam Government signed the Armistice Agreement or not is immaterial, because the State of Viet-Nam as it was called, along with nine others, is a party to the final declaration and that final declaration is binding upon the State of South Viet-Nam.

I do not want to labour the House by giving a number of provisions in detail, but if anybody is interested, he can look at paragraph 1 of this final declaration and articles 6, 7 and 13. They are all relevant to this fact that first of all the Geneva Agreement did not recognise two States. Viet-Nam was one and the French at that time had authority and forces in both areas and it is definitely laid down that the Conference recognises that the essential purpose of the Agreement is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities. The military demarcation line is only provisional and need not in any way be interpreted as constituting political or territorial boundary, so that though there are two governing authorities in these States so far as international obligations of the Geneva Agreement are concerned this territory is one and I say that the purpose of this whole Agreement is to create a situation whereby free elections will take place there according to human rights and

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things of that character. Over and above that, the South Viet-Nam territory is bound by the Geneva Agreement in so far as they have received the benefits of this Agreement and they are estopped. It is a well known doctrine in international law which has been reinforced by article 38 of the International Court of Justice that ordinary civil practices which are accepted by civilised nations are part of international law. They have accepted the benefits of this Agreement by way of repatriation of population, by way of protection against aggression and so on. All these benefits have been received by them and now they cannot repudiate the responsibility. Over and above that there are—I do not want to say the whole of the law in this connection—a large number of considerations well supported by international decisions including the recent advisory opinion on South West Africa which all go to show that South Viet-Nam can in no way escape the responsibility of the Agreement.

Now, the question usually arises as to whether the Government of India had any knowledge as to the possibility of conducting free elections. Here again, I think, we must make our position clear. The International Supervisory Commission has *ipso facto* no rights and no obligations to conduct an election. All that the Agreement provides for is that, on a fixed day in June, the two parties should enter into consultations with a view to establishing the procedure for elections and that an election should take place next year. The International Commission has an over-all responsibility to see the carrying out of the Agreement and, therefore, the International Commission has to promote agreement between the two sides to have an election. And I do not think I am saying anything improper when I say that, during the last six months, both individuals and the Commission itself have been in contact with both sides and the suggestion that we have made is that both sides should proclaim that they are willing to accept what

is implied by the Agreement and what is part of the ordinary conception of democratic elections, namely, elections by secret ballot, freedom of propaganda, freedom of speech and association and also international supervision. So far as I know, the northern territory known as the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has made it quite clear that they are not only willing to accept these conditions, but in fact, they have proposed them themselves. Whether they will carry them out? Well, there are those who say that the States of a particular character would not carry out their obligations, but then the other side also says the same thing. All that we can do is to see that the basis for election is one which will pass muster. That is to say, there should be an agreement between the two States whereby the secrecy of the ballot and the freedom of campaigning and international supervision which are the main things are agreed upon.

If that is done, a machinery would be set up. That machinery may be an international commission or may be anything else. But it is very difficult to see how there could be anything except the international supervisory commission, because, recalling the situation in Geneva, one of the main difficulties was to find a body that would be acceptable to both sides and that is how we came into this. And if it was difficult then, it would be more difficult today; but so far as we are concerned, our responsibilities would end so far as election goes with trying to bring these parties together and with enabling them to agree to a supervisory body. The only canon that makes it acceptable is that both sides must have agreed to it. There may be one country, two countries or twenty countries. No one can impose a tribunal upon them, however reputable it may be. The basis of the whole question is that the two parties must agree. So much for Viet-Nam. The place is giving us a certain amount of concern but, I think, we must take this in the perspective of things. There has been a civil war in the land for eight

years, where the contending parties were not merely, like parties in a civil war, playing with each other's life, but the war has been of a ferocious character. There are no wars more cruel than civil wars. Therefore, if there are difficulties, we must try to understand them. Under the Agreement the sovereignty of the Royal Laotian Government has been accepted by both sides but in fact, certain part of the territory has not actually come under their administration. On the other hand the Laotian Government has not provided any conditions for elections which would enable anybody to participate in them. We have some trouble there. We have also some trouble in Viet-Nam. But in all conscience, Mr. Deputy Chairman, the restless situation, with all the implications and consequences, some of which were seen on the 20th July this year, and the propaganda which is going on there, should be a warning to us. If leaders of public opinion, to whatever party they may belong, try to egg on people to violent action, they won't be able to stop them later. That was what happened in Viet-Nam. They were inciting them with the result that the population got out of control and a member-personnel of our Commission was manhandled and his personal property was violated.

Apart from that, the unification of this territory is of very great importance to South East Asia and therefore all the parties concerned, all the ten signatories to the Agreement and the various other countries, who have subsequently expressed their support to the Geneva Agreement, have both a legal and moral duty to use every means that is possible, in terms of peaceful adjustment and conversations, to bring about the functioning and implementation of the Geneva Agreement in its full terms.

In a few weeks' time, as I said, the General Assembly of the United Nations will meet and the Prime Minister referred to one of the main problems that was before them and that is the problem of disarmament. Now, as one of the previous speakers

pointed out, this country in spite of the fact that we are not one of the great Powers—and we do not express a desire to be one and what is more we have not hitherto measured the status of the nations merely by the size of their armies though it may be a very important matter—is playing a part in this. The Disarmament Committee is sitting now in New York and some public statements have been made, but it is usually forgotten that, during the last two weeks, the two parties concerned have surmounted some of the most difficult questions in principle. But it very often happens in international negotiations that it is not the principle that is difficult but it is some minute point that usually creates a deadlock and keeps the deadlock going.

So the fact that there has been an agreement in principle is important—an agreement in the sense that President Eisenhower has said that 'your planes can fly over us and our planes over you and so there will be an open book'. That is the principle and Marshal Bulganin raised no objection to that but only he has questioned the practicality of it. This idea of inspection, of looking into the other side, has been accepted. In fact, it had been accepted even before, but we are still up against the proposition how big countries, with considerable economy, considerable industrial production and considerable war secrets, and what is more, in spite of various conferences, tend to become more and more suspicious of each other. The stronger they become, the more afraid they are of each other. How will they promote the organs of their Government to wander round in other peoples' territories to find out what is going on there? I think the suggestion made by the United Kingdom Government of trying to introduce limited inspection has certain points—just as we have done in Indo-China. That may be the beginning. But at any rate this country pointed out last year that, with the best will in the world, it will take a long time before the disarmament convention can be signed by Governments. There are so many factors to be taken into account. And if a convention

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is signed, it is of no value unless it goes back to each legislature and is ratified, so that actually a disarmament act will take a considerable time, during which period atomic weapons, unless they are banned, would become not only so large—to my mind that is not the most serious part of it—but they will become so widely used that gangsters and countries outside the present group of countries would be able to possess them. Then, they would become a greater danger. That is the problem we are facing. Therefore, on behalf of the Government of India, it was proposed last year that pending this agreement, which we all hope will come and which we all should work for, there should be some truce in arming. There should be something like an armistice either on a budgetary basis or on the basis of weapons or whatever it may be, and great countries should voluntarily say, that since a disarmament treaty is round the corner or is being worked out, “we voluntarily agree not to indulge in an armaments race”

Now, last year, we were turning the corner on the deadlock between the two States and some resolution was proposed to which both the Russians and Americans agreed. We were anxious to get the unanimity maintained and, therefore, the proposal has been taken into consideration, has been referred to a Committee and it will come up again. They are hoping that if the improvement in the world situation remains, some such view would be found generally acceptable. Since the Assembly met last time, since the deadlock occurred on disarmament, there has been a change in the attitude of people. Apart from any change in the heart, there has been a realisation in the head that it is not possible to wage war with any profit, that there will be no victor and vanquished. That is becoming increasingly realised. Therefore, the disarmament problem, which would be one of the main things that will come up for discussion, is one to which this country would be able to make a contribution. I think it is important to say that no

agreement on disarmament and no discussion on disarmament has any realistic value at all so long as China is not a party to it. Here is a country with an army of five million people, probably with five millions in reserve, with an industry which is very considerable, which by 25 or 30 years of internal war has trained itself in methods of war and, what is more, has not renounced war as a weapon even in the case of legitimate positions. It has an area of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles, 600 million people—people who have no fear of any one and who cannot be cowed down. China should be brought into the ambit. Here, whether any one likes or not, it is a fact that she is a powerful nation. Now, the Government of India, I presume, will come to its own decision in its wisdom as to how far this matter can be pressed just now or not. That is purely relating that question to the possibilities and circumstances of the present situation. But we all hope that the Geneva discussions will be of a character that will assist us in promoting the Chinese position without offence to any one.

Another aspect of things is, what the Bandung Conference was widely concerned about, and about which there have been so many references in this House, regarding the representation of nations in the United Nations. While this large question is of universal concern, we are particularly concerned about our neighbours. It is only natural—countries like Ceylon, Nepal and Libya, with which we have close connections. It is our hope that some proposals that have been put forward would be accepted. There are various offers made you take 15, 12, 9, or 7. That is the offer from one side. We hope, in view of the improved relations, it will be possible to begin by the admission of Austria or some of these countries like Ceylon and Nepal who have not done anybody any harm. Our past policy has been to come out vigorously in support of the admission of these countries, especially as Asia is under-represented in the United Nations.

I do not think there is very much one should say at this stage except, once again, to point out that this country ought to feel happy that in spite of all the newspaper headlines and the attacks on individuals that may go on, we have established a position in the minds of people. Misguided as they may be, that we are not out to make mischief. Also, that we are not escaping responsibilities. I do not think that anything that we have done in the international field has been of greater consequence than the responsibilities we accepted in Korea. Being so far away and the quantum of forces sent there being so small, and what is more, having performed the task efficiently, it was a great contribution both to ourselves and to the world that the armed forces of this nation were used for the purpose of implementing the arrangements for stopping the fighting and not for promoting it. So we have to that extent been successful.

Before I sit down, I would ask, if I may, in view of the association one has with these matters of this House and this country to have a great deal of patience for people who do not understand us. After all, we do not understand other people and there is no reason why they should all understand us. The United States which has a very powerful press, and if I may say so, a very considerable press, writes what it likes about people. So did the Russian press in the old days and it may change again. I do not see any reason why people should not write or say anything. We have found it more useful, apart from ethical considerations. Let people say what they want to say and we go on to do what we want. This has been the policy—thanks to the leadership of our Prime Minister—that we carry on even when we debate in the United Nations. We have found that the best part not only of wisdom, but of national honour, lies not in hitting back; and this has been the contribution this country has made. And finally, behind that policy, irrespective of all the inevitable acrimony of debate in a Parliament, lies the entire force,

the entire moral support and the spiritual values of this country. That is our greatest strength.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Mr. Deputy Chairman, at the outset, I would like to record the sincerest appreciation of the Party which I have the honour to represent here of the unique success of the foreign policy pursued by the Prime Minister. Today, more than ever before, it can be said with a great deal of confidence that international tensions have been greatly relieved and the chances of international war of any magnitude have been greatly minimised. I am happy that this fact has received wide recognition.

[THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (DR. P. SUBBARAYAN in the Chair.)]

But having said so, I must also express my regret for being constrained to observe that coming nearer home, we find that our foreign policy has been vacillating, has been halting, has been apologetic, and has not received that degree of success that one legitimately expected. It is true—whether we look at the citizenship issue in Ceylon, whether we look at South Africa—I hope the hon. Prime Minister also agrees—that the peaceful efforts of India in these directions have not been rewarded with the success that we expected. Now, Sir, the latest instance is Goa.

3 P.M.

Sir, before I proceed with an analysis of the Government of India's policy towards Goa, I would like to remind the House of a very important statement which was made by the Prime Minister as early as 25th August 1954, in the other House. For the first time, the Prime Minister enunciated in very clear terms the Government of India's attitude towards Goa. In that speech, he stated as follows:

"The policy that we have pursued has been, even as in India under British rule, one of non-violence and we have fashioned our approach and conduct accordingly. This adherence to non-violence means that we may

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not abandon or permit any derogation of our identification with the cause of our compatriots under Portuguese rule."

Sir, I hope the hon. Prime Minister remembers it correctly.

Sir, after the A.I.C.C. Resolution, over which so much has been spoken today, and after all that we have heard from the hon. Prime Minister, the House is convinced that the policy that we are now going to pursue is going to derogate our identification with the cause of the liberation movement in Goa. Sir, the statement of the hon. Prime Minister has been negatived. He says, "we will not take recourse to police action." We are all at one with him. Then he says "we will not take recourse to satyagraha either." I am also at one with him, because satyagraha, in the international field, is something unheard of. But what is the positive line of action that he has suggested? He has suggested none. Therefore, Sir, it is no good painting the lily in red. We know that our efforts have achieved a considerable amount of success in the international sphere. But there are several problems nearer home, which still remain to be solved.

Before I proceed further, Sir, I would like to sketch here a brief resume of the nationalist movement in Goa. The fact has got to be borne in mind that while India was fighting against the British imperialism, it was not merely a fight against one kind of imperialism, or only against a particular variety of it. But it was a fight against the principle of colonialism. Maybe, for obvious reasons, our attention was focussed more on the British imperialism, which at that moment was a matter of great importance. But after we attained independence, the Prime Minister said that even before India attained independence, the issues of foreign pockets like Goa and Pondicherry were agitating the minds of the Congress leaders. And in all

humility, I ask the hon. Prime Minister to tell us even a single step that he took in that direction. No step taken in that direction. In a recent letter published by Sir Mirza Ismail, the ex-Prime Minister of Hyderabad, in the London Times, it has been stated how the Hyderabad Government was negotiating with the Portuguese authorities for the purchase of their territory in India, for a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs. Well, I do not approve the idea that we should purchase a territory at the cost of our principle, although there are instances in history; for example, Alaska was purchased from U.S.S.R. by America and Louisiana from France. But we are not going to purchase the territory even if the Portuguese authorities agree to sell it, for men cannot be purchased like chattels. But that only indicates the mood in which the Portuguese authorities were. It is an undeniable fact that Goa is a part of India, and therefore, today or tomorrow, they shall have to leave. But it is the vacillating policy of the Government of India which did not consummate that desire. I quite appreciate those difficult days. Those were the days of great concern. There was the partition and there were the other problems that followed in its wake. But let us frankly admit our own limitations. Let us not mislead the country by saying that we have been pursuing this matter with all sincerity.

And in the second place, with regard to Indo-China, I do not stint the credit that is due to the Government. But this fact has to be remembered, Sir, that if France had not to leave Indo-China, then probably the solution of the question of French possession in India would have created a very serious headache for us. But anyway, thanks to Mr. Mendes-France and the people of France, the question of French possessions has been settled very amicably, without straining our relations with that great country.

And coming to the question of Goa, I think the first spurt of nationalist movement had started in the month

of June 1954, when Dr Gaitonde was exiled, and many other nationalist leaders were put under arrest. Thereafter various things happened, and in the month of July a band of Goan volunteers occupied the enclave of Dadra in the State of Bombay. Thereafter, the other enclave Nagarhaveli, was also occupied. And I am glad to learn that the Government of India very strongly refused the Portuguese request to send troops, and police for reoccupation of those enclaves, and said that they would never be a party to such suppression of a genuine nationalist movement on the Indian soil. I am glad that they refused permission to the Portuguese troops and army to march for the reoccupation of Dadra and Nagarhaveli. I do not know, Sir, what has happened to Dadra and Nagarhaveli. Although they continue legally to be under the Portuguese possessions, we would like to be told what their political and administrative position is at the moment.

Sir, in the meantime, when the people found that the Government of India would not do anything except exchanging diplomatic notes with the Portuguese Government, they thought that it was their duty to be of some help to their compatriots, and to identify themselves effectively with their struggle against colonialism. And I am also glad to mention that such a sentiment had got its bleatings from no less a person than the Prime Minister himself. But before the independence day of 1954, when mass preparations went on for entry of satyagrahis into Goa, the Portuguese authorities were unnerved, and in a note, I think on August 8 1954, they put forward a proposal for observation of the frontiers by some neutral observers. I wonder as to why the Government of India ever gave their consent to such a proposal. However, I am glad that due to Portuguese stupidity that proposal could not be furthered. But, none-the-less, the fact remains to be said that the Portuguese got their first round of

success in their diplomatic deal. It served very well the purpose that they had in their mind namely, to seal off the frontiers so that no satyagrahis from outside could enter Goa. I think the Government owe us an answer as to why they agreed in the beginning to the Portuguese request for observation of the Goa frontier by neutral observers.

Then, Sir, in the face of these repressions, the nationalist movement went on, which reached its climax on the Independence Day this year. How non-violent satyagrahis fell under the attacks of a venal army, how a middle-aged lady did not hesitate to face the Portuguese bullets in order to save the honour of the Indian flag, well, all these things will be recorded in epics and ballads for inspiring the young generations. We need not dilate on those things. The question is, what is going to be our attitude towards Goa. I am glad, the hon Prime Minister has said that the issue should be clarified. I am also equally anxious that the issue should be clarified. Now, the first thing is satyagraha. I have never had much faith in satyagraha. If satyagraha was a valid principle, it must be valid both for home and for abroad. When the people take to satyagraha for solution of domestic issues, the Government condemns it as unethical, impolitic and unconstitutional. It should be more so when it is concerned with a foreign country. I am amazed how both the President of the Congress and the Prime Minister were sending greetings to Goa satyagrahis. Here is the report of a speech by Mr U N Dhebar made on the 21st August this year. He was delivering a speech in the Gandhi Grounds while the hon Prime Minister was delivering his speech in Sitapur in the UP Congress Committee. Mr Dhebar says (I am quoting from the report of the *Statesman*):

"Mr Dhebar expressed the hope that the movement would succeed as

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the volunteers who entered Goa had shown remarkable discipline and conducted themselves as true and non-violent satyagrahis and faced Portuguese bullets boldly".

But when it comes to the Prime Minister, he says:

"While we must admire the courage of many of those Goans and Indians who have performed satyagraha, in this connection we have to remember that many of the advocates of these satyagrahas apparently had no conception of what satyagraha means."

This kind of conflicting views and utterances resulted in not only weakening our position in Goa, in the international field, but it has also resulted in cold-blooded murder of the satyagrahis. It has to be remembered that you also have been abettors in the murder of non-violent satyagrahis in Goa. That fact cannot be eliminated. However, I would not dilate on that much. I am not an advocate of war, for war does not pay anyone. I am at one with you that such international questions should be settled peacefully through negotiations. Now, we have given a fair trial to negotiations. I don't know. Probably this Goa question will have one distinction in the history of diplomacy that, for no other issue, so many diplomatic notes were exchanged between two Governments—the Government of India and the Government of Portugal.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: Did the Government of Portugal reply?

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Yes, they were very prompt in replying. Now, the question is, let us view international opinion in regard to Goa. It pains me to observe that all our peaceful approach has been grossly misunderstood. Let us look at the Mother of Commonwealth—U.K.—whom we so much adore. On August 8 1954, the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd took an one-sided view of affairs in Goa and reported to the Portuguese

Ambassador in London that Her Majesty's Government was very much concerned over the tension that existed between an old ally like Portugal and a Member of the Commonwealth. This was enough to provoke the acting High Commissioner for U.K. in India, Mr. Middleton, to express hopes that the question of Goa would be very peacefully settled without taking recourse to violence. But the fact has to be remembered that non-violence and peace are being used as a veneer for maintaining the *status quo*. Look at Venezuela; look at Argentina; look at Brazil; look at Italy; look at Chile. All these countries have expressed unanimously the hope that the issue should be settled peacefully, but have they condemned the Portuguese vandalism in Goa? No. Therefore, from these facts, one is constrained to conclude that in certain quarters, non-violence and the peaceful method of solving international disputes is being used as a veneer for maintaining the *status quo* with Portuguese bayonets. It is not a question of police action or non-violence. It is not a question of satyagraha or exchange of diplomatic notes. It is basically a question of whether we are going to put up with it; if not, we are perfectly behind you. But tell us what do you propose. I think, the Government of India is aware of this situation but it thinks it is beyond its control to take any definite initiative in the matter.

Now, I feel there is another way of looking at this. We went to Bandung. Sometime back, I raised this question. In Bandung, where the Afro-Asian nations met, what was the emotional background of that conference? So long Asian and African countries were merely being sacrificed on the chess-board of international politics like pawns. Now, Bandung was a symbol for the new resurgence of Afro-Asian nations and in that Conference, India had a very great role to play. I asked a simple question. Was this question of Goa and other Portuguese possessions raised in the Bandung Conference? The answer was 'no'. Well, if anyone goes through

the proceedings of the Bandung Conference, he will find that it is not that the issue of colonialism was discussed there in the abstract. We expressed sympathy for Morocco, for Tunisia, for Algeria and even a specific demand was made by the Conference for rendition of West Irian in Indonesia. The Prime Minister in his speech has admitted this morning that India did not raise that issue at all. I think I have got his quotation. He said that others were very anxious to raise the question of the colonial countries in which they were interested. Then, what is the inference? India was not anxious to raise it. If India was not anxious to raise it, I should say that India has lost a golden opportunity for mobilizing Afro-Asian sympathy in favour of the liberation of the Portuguese possessions.

AN HON MEMBER That is wrong.

SHRI S MAHANTY It may be wrong, my dear Sir, according to you, but you have to advance some facts and arguments to show why I am wrong. Now, here is a non-violent way. Nobody is advocating here that you march your army or police into Goa. Nobody says here that you send your satyagrahis to Goa. It is a most non-violent, diplomatic way and I hope the Government will have to give us some explanation, why they were not anxious to raise the question of Portuguese possessions in Bandung and why they have missed that golden opportunity of mobilizing Afro-Asian opinion against Portuguese colonialism in Goa. In the second place, we have been constrained to impose economic sanctions against Goa but why we did not take to it much earlier? We already find what the economic sanctions have resulted in Goa, for which the Portuguese are now imposing taxation on Indians in Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese possessions. Why did we not take that step much earlier? The Government also owes us an answer in that regard.

In the third place the Government of India have taken no step, as yet for approaching the other Bandung powers who are signatories to that Resolution on colonialism to express their sympathy effectively, against the Portuguese colonialism in India. We did not approach Burma, Indonesia, and we thank them that they have expressed their sympathies even without our approaching them but the question is why the Government is not approaching the other Bandung powers for expressing their sympathy against colonialism in Goa in most effective terms. These are non-violent efforts, which may be continued, towards a peaceful solution of this problem.

Then, I have got two other minor points which...

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (DR. P. SUBBARAYAN) It is nearly time, because you agreed to divide the time between you and Mr. Mathur. Twenty minutes are over.

SHRI S MAHANTY Within two minutes. I will conclude. I do not want to take up his time.

Sir I have, for obvious reasons, not dealt with other important aspects of our foreign policy. I have mainly concentrated on the Goa question. But before concluding, I have to bring one or two minor points to the notice of the House. The first is that the unilateral action which the Congress has taken by issuing directives to stop not only the mass Satyagraha, but also individual Satyagraha, they have completely landed the Indian Satyagrahis who are now in jail or who have been suffering for it, in a most untenable position. Moreover, this unilateral action of the Congress has sabotaged the unity that the Opposition Parties have been trying to build up in their own way for unanimity over issues which affect international questions. It is said "Let the Opposition Parties follow our directives." We are perfectly prepared, but had you the courtesy to refer the matter to us

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before you finalised it in your A.I.C.C. meetings? You did not. I think, you yourself will concede that it is too much to be expected from the Opposition Parties. And it is also too much to attribute motives to the meanest of them, that they are trying to make capital out of the Satyagrahis who martyr themselves in the so-called foreign soil of Goa.

The second thing is—and that pains me most—that the unity, the national unity which we have been trying all along to build up and evolve on issues relating to our foreign policy, this unity your unilateral action has sabotaged and you have landed the Satyagrahis in a most untenable position. You have withdrawn your identification with the liberation struggle in Goa. Sir, these are the results, the sum and substance, of the A.I.C.C. Resolution of which this morning the Prime Minister gave a lucid exposition.

• डा० रघुवीर (मध्य प्रदेश): उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, विश्व का मानचित्र परिवर्तित हो रहा है। पिछले ४००, ५०० वर्षों में गौरी जातियों ने संसार पर अपना आधिपत्य जमाया था। किन्हीं राष्ट्रों को उन्होंने सर्वथा पददलित किया। आस्ट्रेलिया और न्यूजीलैंड में उन्होंने जीते जागते व्यक्तियों को कुत्ते और भेड़ों के समान गोलियों से उड़ाया था।

१९७८ में पश्चिमी राष्ट्रों के नेताओं ने कांग्रेस में बैठ कर अफ्रीका के मानचित्र को सामने रख कर उस पर लकीरें डाली थीं कि इतना भाग हमारा है और इतना तुम्हारा है। सारं संसार का बटवारा पश्चिमी जातियों ने अपने लाभ और विकास के लिये किया था। जब कुछ दिनों तक यह स्थिति चलती रही तो उनके आपस में द्वेष उत्पन्न हुआ। जर्मनी और जापान ने Lebensraum की घोषणा की। जर्मनी और जापान का असंतोष तथा Lebensraum का प्रयास तथा इनके प्रतिकूल शेष साम्राज्यधारी जातियों के घोर

विरोध के कारण युद्ध आरम्भ हुआ। एक युद्ध हुआ, दूसरा युद्ध हुआ। दोनों युद्धों के परिणामस्वरूप पश्चिमी राष्ट्रों की शक्ति क्षीण हुई। इंग्लैंड, फ्रांस, हालैंड, जो साम्राज्यवादी साम्राज्य करने वाले राष्ट्र थे, वे पददलित हुये, नीचे गिर गये। किन्तु, दो महान राष्ट्र आगे बढ़ गये, एक अमरीका और दूसरा रूस। संभव हो सकता था कि जिस प्रकार से युद्ध के दिनों में इनकी मंत्री थी उसी प्रकार इनकी मित्रता आगे चलती रहती। किन्तु, इनके सिद्धांत, इनकी राज्यपद्धति, इनकी विचारधारा, इनके उद्देश्य, सब भिन्न थे, एक दूसरे के विरोधी थे। इनकी मित्रता बहुत दिन तक न चल सकी। बर्लिन में, जिसको *Island in the Red Sea* रक्तवर्ण के समुद्र में बिना मार्ग का टापू, कहा जाता था, वहां पर संघर्ष आरम्भ हुआ। दिन रात, महीनों तक, अमरीका के विमान खाने पीने की सामग्री, कोयला और कपड़ा बर्लिन में गिराते रहे। इतना ही नहीं, वैज्ञानिकों का संघर्ष भी आरम्भ हुआ। कुछ जर्मन वैज्ञानिक रूस चले गये, कुछ अमरीका चले गये। राष्ट्रों की सब शक्तियां अविष्कार में लग गई, विध्वंसकारी अविष्कारों में लग गई। वैज्ञानिक वंशभोगी बन गये, संकीर्ण हृदय बन गये, उनके हृदय मानवताशून्य हो गये। अपने मस्तिष्क को उन्होंने संकीर्ण राष्ट्रियता के लिये बंध दिया और उसका परिणाम यह हुआ कि भयानक से भयानक अस्त्र और शस्त्रों का अविष्कार होने लगा। इन अविष्कारों से मानवता भयभीत हो गई। धीरे धीरे वैज्ञानिक भी भयभीत होने लगे और भय गहरा होने लगा। कोई मार्ग न दिखाई पड़ने लगा। केवल यह दिखाई पड़ने लगा कि बड़े बड़े नगर पानी के बुलबुले के समान फट जायेंगे और केवल मनुष्य ही नहीं, किन्तु, प्राणीमात्र का अन्त हो जायेगा। तब उनका विचार हुआ कि अधिक शक्ति का बढ़ना, संभव है, लाभकारी न हो। जिस आधार पर पश्चिमी दश आगे बढ़े थे, वे आधार विज्ञान और राष्ट्रियता थे। राष्ट्रियता और विज्ञान को छोड़

कर ये लोग कहां जा सकते थे। इनको कोई मार्गदर्शक चाहिये था जो इनको यह बतलाता कि राष्ट्रकृता से जो घृणा और द्वेष की अग्नि संसार में फैली हुई है उस घृणा और द्वेष को हटा कर उस विज्ञान और राष्ट्रकृता के अभिमान को हटा कर आप एक दूसरे से मिलें। पूंजीवादी साम्यवादी को भाई समझे और उसको गले लगा सकें।

संसार के वातावरण में, सांस घोटने वाले वातावरण में किसी "मंत्रय" या किसी "कृष्ण" की आवश्यकता थी जो कि संसार के नैतिक पथ का प्रदर्शक बने। चीन में, मी-लो-फो की कल्पना थी कि जब कभी संसार में अत्याचार बढ़ेगा, मनुष्य के सामने अंधकार होगा, उस समय मी-लो-फो का प्रादुर्भाव होगा और वह संसार की रक्षा करेंगे। यह भावना भारतवर्ष से, दो हजार वर्ष पहले, "मंत्रय" के रूप में जन्मी थी। यह भावना, आज फिर अंकुरित हुई। यह भावना अंकुरित हुई किनके हृदयों में ? भारतवर्ष के प्रतीक पीड़ित जवाहरलाल नेहरू के मन में, चीन के प्रतीक चाऊ एन लाई के मन में। इन दोनों ने संसार की शान्ति की ध्वजा अपने हाथों में उठाई और सहजीवन की नींव पंचशील की ध्वजा के रूप में खड़ी की। जहां पर श्मशान बनने वाला था उस स्थान पर यह ध्वजा खड़ी हुई। बर्मा ने, इंडोनेशिया ने, बाण्डूंग की कांग्रेस ने इस पंचशील का स्वागत किया।

भारतवर्ष ने अन्तराष्ट्रीय क्षेत्र में क्या किया, यह एक बड़ा विस्तृत प्रश्न है। माननीय प्रधान मंत्री ने और अन्य सज्जनों ने अभी सदन को बतलाया कि भारतवर्ष ने अन्तराष्ट्रीय राजनीति में शान्ति स्थापित करने के लिये क्या क्या यत्न किया। किन्तु, मैं समझता हूं कि यह विषय इतना बड़ा है कि दो चार व्याख्यानों में इसका पूर्ण रूप से वर्णन नहीं किया जा सकता।

[Mr DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair.]

सब से पहली बात यह है कि भारतवर्ष के स्वतन्त्रता संग्राम से केवल भारतवर्ष को ही

स्वतन्त्रता नहीं मिली, किन्तु, बर्मा को भी स्वतन्त्रता मिली, लंका को भी स्वतन्त्रता मिली, इंडोनेशिया को भी स्वतन्त्रता मिली। यह ठीक है कि इनकी स्वतन्त्रता में हमारा सीधा बहुत कुछ हाथ नहीं था, किन्तु, यदि हम प्रश्न को इस प्रकार से रखें कि यदि भारतवर्ष का स्वतन्त्रता न मिलती तो क्या इन देशों को मिलती, तो यह प्रश्न अधिक स्पष्ट हो जायेगा।

इंग्लैंड, हालैंड और फ्रांस जिनके बड़े बड़े साम्राज्य फैले हुये थे उनको यद्यपि अपने साम्राज्यों को छोड़ना पड़ा, किन्तु, फिर भी छोटे छोटे फोर्ड फ़ीसियों के समान, मानव जाति के शरीर पर इनके उपनिवेश अभी तक विद्यमान हैं। इनमें से पुर्तगाल के उपनिवेश गोआ, दमन और दीव अभी तक हमारे देश में बैठे हुये हैं। सब से पहले पुर्तगाली लोग भारतवर्ष में आये थे और अभी तक ये यहां से जानें का नाम नहीं लेते। ये अन्तिम जाति होगी, अन्तिम साम्राज्यवादी होंगे जो कि यहां से हटेंगे। यह हमारा विश्वास है, यह हमारी घोषणा है कि हमारी सहानुभूति पूर्ण रूप से गोआ की जनता के साथ है। विरोधी पक्ष के जो लोग हमारी सहानुभूति को कम बताना चाहते हैं, हमारी उत्कंठा और व्याकुलता को नहीं समझते, वे भूल कर रहे हैं। उनको यह बताना आवश्यक है कि हब्शी और पुर्तगाली सेनाएं, जो आज गोआ में बैठी हुई हैं, उन्हें अब बैठने का अधिकार नहीं रहा। किन्तु, क्या इसका अर्थ यह है कि हम अपनी सेनाओं को वहां ले जायें। यह एक बड़ा महत्व का प्रश्न है। हमने ही तो शान्ति का चक्र संसार में खड़ा किया है। क्या हमने चीन को नहीं रोका ? मैं नहीं कह सकता कि हमने रोका अथवा नहीं रोका। क्या हमने इंडोनेशिया को नहीं रोका ? मैं नहीं कह सकता कि हमने स्पष्ट शब्दों में कह कर उनको रोका। किन्तु, क्या यह स्थिति आज सत्य है कि चीन के लोग, वहां का एक एक बच्चा, वहां का एक एक मजदूर, यद्यपि अपनी फैक्टरी में बैठा हुआ गीत गाता है कि हम ताईवान् को स्वतन्त्र करेंगे, किन्तु,

[डॉ० रघुवीर]

चीन की सेनाएं आज शान्त हैं। इंडोनेशिया में कभी कोई भाषण नहीं होते जिन में यह न कहा जाए कि हमको ईरियन चाहिए, ईरियन हमारा हैं। डच लोगों का ईरियन में रहना हमको स्वीकार्य नहीं, किन्तु उनकी भी तो सेनाएं शान्त हैं। यदि हमारी सेनाएं गोआ में आगे बढ़ें तो हम चीन को क्या कहेंगे, इंडोनेशिया को क्या कहेंगे अथवा उसकी प्रतिक्रिया इंडोनेशिया में क्या होगी। ताईवान और ईरियन में उसकी क्या प्रतिक्रिया होगी, यह सोचने की बात है। गोआ एक छोटा सा स्थान है, हमारा शरीर का एक अंग है, इसलिए छोटा होते हुए भी उसका कष्ट हमारा कष्ट है। गोआ का प्रश्न तो संसार में एक छोटा सा प्रश्न है; बड़ा प्रश्न शान्ति स्थापित करने का है। पुर्तगाल का यह कहना कि गोआ पुर्तगाल का अल्दा मरीन प्राविन्स है, सर्वथा अशुद्ध है। गोआ तो भारतवर्ष का इंटर्राटोरियल प्राविन्स है, अथवा स्थान है।

यदि हम लंका की ओर आएँ, तो वहाँ भी वही प्रश्न है। मुझे प्रसन्नता है कि विरोधी दल ने लंका के बारे में बहुत अधिक नहीं कहा। मैं अभी लंका से हो कर निकला हूँ। वहाँ मैंने देखा, भारतीय दूतावास के सामने "इंडियंस क्विट, क्विट इंडियन्स", इस प्रकार के मोर्टे मोर्टे अक्षर लिखे हुए हैं। वहाँ की पार्लियामेंट में सदस्यों ने भाषण दिये हैं कि भारतीयों को लंका से भगा दो, गोलीयों से उन को मार दो, एक गोली चलाओगे तो सब भारतीय यहां से भाग जायेंगे। प्रश्न बड़ा छोटा है कि कौन व्यक्ति लंका के नागरिक जायेंगे, कौन व्यक्ति लंका में रहें, कौन भारतवर्ष में चलें जायें। इतनी छोटी बात है कि हम इस पर लड़ाई नहीं करना चाहते और न करेंगे। लंका के साथ हमारा प्राचीन काल से प्रेम चला आ रहा है। जो लंका के निवासी हैं, चाहे वे तामिल भाषी हों अथवा सिंधली भाषी हों, उनके पूर्वज हमारे पूर्वज थे, हमारा रक्त उनका रक्त है। हमारा

तो यही कर्तव्य है कि जिस प्रकार से भी हो, नागरिकता के प्रश्न का निश्चय हो, उस निश्चय के अनुसार जो लोग भारतवर्ष में आएँ, हम उनका स्वागत करें और जो लंका में रह जायें उनके भविष्य के लिए हम शुभ कामनाएँ रखें। चीन का प्रश्न बहुत दिनों से हल हो चुका, उसका कोई प्रश्न नहीं रहा।

पंचशील के सम्बन्ध में थोड़ा सा और कह दूँ। (समय की घंटी) पहली मई के दिन थियेन् अन् मन् के सामने माओ त्से तुंग वान् शुई का घोषणाद करत हुए साढ़ पांच लाख स्त्री और पुरुष वु श्यांग युवेन् त्स अर्थात् पंचशील की ध्वजाएँ लहराते हुए निकले। मंगोलिया में, मंचूरिया में, तिब्बत में, कांसु प्रान्त में, कोई भी ऐसा स्थान नहीं, जहाँ पंचशील का प्रचार एक एक चीनी बच्चे के हृदय में न घुस चुका हो। यदि हमें भारतवर्ष की विदेश नीति को अच्छी प्रकार से समझना है, उसके महत्व और परिणाम का दर्शन करना है, तो यह आवश्यक है कि हम भारत की सीमा से बाहर निकलें, देश विदेशों में, पूर्व और पश्चिम में थोड़ा सा घूमें, वहाँ के जैनओं, विश्वविद्यालयों के लोगों से, पत्रकारों और गुामीणों से मिलें। वहाँ हम देखेंगे कि भारतवर्ष का कितना आदर है, भारतवर्ष के लिए कितना प्रेम है। पं० जवाहरलाल नेहरू भारतवर्ष के प्रतीक हैं। वे केवल भारतवर्ष के ही प्रतीक नहीं किन्तु विश्व शान्ति के भी प्रतीक हैं।

मैं अंत में बैठने से पूर्व यह कहूँगा कि जिस प्रकार प्राचीन समय में अशोक ने दवानां प्रियः की उपाधि प्राप्त की थी उसी प्रकार आज पं० जवाहरलाल नेहरू ने भारतवर्ष में लोकानां प्रियः की उपाधि प्राप्त की है। किन्तु वे आज उससे भी अधिक बढ़ गए हैं वे केवल भारत के लिए ही लोकानां प्रियः नहीं किन्तु वे राष्ट्राणां प्रियः, संसार के राष्ट्रों के भी प्रिय हैं। संसार उनकी ओर देखता है। मैंने मंगोलिया और मंचूरिया के गांवों

में देखा है कि किस प्रकार से नेहरू का नाम बुद्ध और अशोक के नाम के साथ आज लिया जा रहा है। अशोक ने धर्मचक्र का प्रवर्तन किया। श्रद्धांज नेहरू ने शान्ति चक्र का प्रवर्तन किया है। मैं आशा करता हूँ कि यह शान्ति राज्याही होगी। यह ठीक है कि हमारी सारी समस्याएँ इन 5 वर्षों में पूरी नहीं हुई। किन्तु क्या आप नहीं जानते कि कोई नई समस्या हमने उत्पन्न नहीं होने दी। यदि हम युद्ध करते, यदि किसी और नीति का अनुसरण करते, तो केवल यही नहीं कि हमारी आज की समस्याएँ कभी न सध सकतीं, किन्तु नयी और समस्याएँ उत्पन्न हो जातीं। हमने नयी समस्याओं को उत्पन्न न होने दिया; पुरानी समस्याओं को हमने घटाया। संसार के दूसरे देशों को भी हमने एक दूसरे के समीप आने के लिए सहायता दी।

आशा करता हूँ कि यह सदन भी मेरा साथ

इन शब्दों के साथ, मैं भारत के शासन की विदेश नीति का समर्थन करता हूँ और पूर्ण दृढ़ता और दृढ़ विश्वास तथा पूर्ण अभिमान और गौरव के साथ इस नीति का समर्थन करूँगा।

SHRI T. J. M. WILSON (Andhra): Mr. Deputy Chairman, if the world today wears a bright look leading down from the Korean Armistice, Indo-China truce, the Bandung Conference, the recent Summit Conference of the Heads of States, it is in no small measure due to India's foreign policy, with its non-alignment with power blocs, with its unflinching faith in the United Nations Organisation, with its Panch Shila, with its contacting the Heads of States personally and thus expanding the area of peace, and a foreign policy, which is in tune with and true to the spirit of Asoka and Gandhiji. The world is aware, Sir, that Indian nationalism has delivered a vital blow to colonialism all over the world. Colonialism has died in some parts and is in the grip of death in the other parts of the world. Therefore, the existence of foreign enclaves in India

is an anachronism today and is an affront to the nationalism of India. Besides all these, there is the desire of the people of Goa for freedom from foreign yoke. Inevitably, therefore, even without the passion and the hate that is raised by political parties in this country, the people of India and the Government of India are vitally concerned with this problem of Goa. It is true that we have been served up with novel ideas and peculiar concepts by some foreign Press now and then, among them being that Goa is part of Portugal and that Goa is an entity separate and distinct from India or Indian culture. It need not be seriously considered now in the 20th century, that Goa is part of Portugal. What is this concept of culture which is separate and distinct from Indian culture?

It often pains us that both Christian religion and Christian church are invoked for this purpose. Sir, is it that the Christian church or the Christian religion is so narrow and so little as to be associated with or identified with or linked up with a Portuguese State or any other European State or Government, or is it, I ask seriously, that the people of Goa, the Christian community of Goa is afraid of any prospect of curtailment of its liberty, religious or cultural, in India, which has secularised its State which is about the greatest achievement in the modern age; the importance, the epoch-making importance of which is not realized, often, by our being far too near it and also by certain unfortunate incidents which occur in a large and ancient nation like India? Or is it indeed, Sir, that the culture of Christianity is found only in Goa or that Christianity can be reduced to or identified with any ideology or 'ism' in this material world, because Christianity essentially and centrally, is an incarnation of Christ as the King of human life, which means by implication, and which, therefore, upholds certain virtues as charity, fairness and justice and liberty, and therefore, naturally Christianity means in actual life—it upholds democracy and liberty,

[Shri T. J. M. Wilson.]

and in short, is the centralized light of freedom. Therefore, to say that Christian church or Christianity has found its reflection in Goa, is fantastic and the Christian church has had its bright pages of the early Puritanism, of piety and fraternity of the Church Fathers of those days, and also its mediæval splendour which has brought forth great saints and seers, and it has also as well its dark pages, the black pages of imposition and resistance to progress and to science. But whatever it has done in the past, I can say the Church will never stand today, in the twentieth century, either for Imperialism or Colonialism. Therefore the contention of culture or a cultural entity or cultural rights would not for a moment hold water in regard to Goa. And of course, it has been brought home by the Members of the other side that this is a very highly moral and national problem. Certainly, it is, and no argument on the part of any party is necessary to bring that home to the large masses of the people of this country or to the Government of India. But it is a fact and it remains an unfortunate fact that this issue is not only highly political and moral and national, but it is also a legal issue, because it is a matter between two sovereign States, Portugal still having legal sovereignty of the territory of Goa, and therefore, anything that is done has legal implications about it, and I am sure that the Government of India have taken very serious notice. It has been told to us by the Prime Minister that they have taken very serious notice of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese Government on Indian nationals, because these constitute, in the opinion of lawyers as well as from common sense, very serious illegal acts as understood in international law, and I have no doubt that the Government will take such action and such reprisals as are appropriate and proper.

(Time bell rings.)

Sir, I will take one minute. The blood of martyrs has flowed very

often in deliverance and progress and humanity has to get moving, healing its sores, and with the Government of India handling this problem in the way in which it is, with the policy of the Government of India which I do not say non-violent but which is peaceful, which is not only highly moral but practical and which has therefore startled many of the huge States of this world which are used to might and force with that Government and with that policy, I am sure, the problem of Goa will be solved before long and the people of Goa will be restored peace and will be enabled to take part in a life where they will find full satisfaction and realization of their dreams.

SHRIMATI VIOLET ALVA (Bombay):

Mr Deputy Chairman this afternoon's debate has been focussed on Goa. In a world where there is an easing of tensions in the international sphere, tensions, however, remain, wherever colonialism exists and the impact on us is bound to be greater, when we consider the issue of Goa, which is nearer home. There has been so much discussion on this Satyagraha and the technique of Satyagraha. It is true that our Government allowed Satyagraha to begin on the 15th of August 1954, and I want to speak here today as one who has known the Goan's mind, as one who has lived with the Goan people for the last twenty years, as one who understands their prejudices, their ignorance and their needs and their minds. It is true that Satyagraha was allowed and we were present when the first batch marched into Goa from Majali in the Karwar taluk. That was a year ago in 1954. Since then, we have seen the atrocities committed on unarmed non-violent Satyagrahis, both Goans and Indians who have gone there. I have seen the condition of these Satyagrahis in the last week of May in the Karwar civil hospital. They were battered and assaulted so badly that it would really make your blood boil. But we have pledged ourselves to non-violence. We have pledged ourselves as peace-makers, not to let

our tempers fly and indulge in violence, but we saw those youths. One of them had both his lips ripped open, one had multiple fractures on his arms, one had his chest all turned blue, one could not get up and so on. Most of them I think all of them wore blood stained clothes. They told us a sorry tale, two of them had their heads smashed and while they were there both of them had gone off their head, had become insane. These are the tales I tell, because I have seen them. I have heard from those who have suffered these atrocities and atrocities are going on in a worse fashion. We cannot expect anything more from mediæval Portugal. It is to go on, for they do not believe in any moral force of Satyagraha. And when we speak of satyagraha, we must understand how and why. It was said that once Mahatma Gandhi was sitting and two gentlemen were arguing before him about the technique of satyagraha. One of them said, 'how do you explain the success of Mahatmaji's satyagraha?' One said that it was the technique of satyagraha, while the other said that it was not the technique of satyagraha but it was the satyagraha that was taken to the masses. It was the manner in which Gandhi enlightened the masses and Gandhi later agreed that it was the satyagraha when understood by the masses, that can bring about freedom. Today, I want to say, that the different political parties are indulging in so much talk of satyagraha and rousing the emotions of people. Our Prime Minister himself has said that if the urge for freedom is there, an individual if he want, can offer satyagraha. That much freedom is given. We must however understand whether satyagraha will bring Goa into India or help the people of Goa to be free from Portuguese rule. Unless we enlighten the Goans themselves both in India and in Goa is it possible to get them out of the clutches of the Portuguese rule? Sir the satyagraha has gone on for a year and no less than Mahatma Gandhi said in 1946 that we can take Goa without firing a shot. That was

in 1946, when Ram Manohar Lohia was in Goa. He was arrested. Therefore, I want to tell those parties who are interested in carrying on the struggle that their duty is to enlighten the people of Goa in India as well as those who are in Goa itself. As I said, I know the Goan people, I know the humbler strata, what they think today. I have just come from Bombay. I know what they say—the humble, the ignorant, the illiterate. They are so superstition ridden that they say that St Francis Xavier is going to save Portugal. I also know the intelligentsia who talk in two voices. I also know the true patriots amongst Goans who want to enlighten the people but find it very hard. That is our duty. We have first of all to enlighten why Goa for Goans, and why the Portuguese power must get out of there. Unless that education is given, unless that sort of instruction is given we shall have martyrs in Goa and the jackboot policy will go on and we shall go no farther.

Now, Mr Wilson has spoken at length on religion in Goa. He forgot to emphasize one thing because he comes from down South. Portugal today is giving us hand outs to show that religion and culture is in danger. What we say here is for the Portuguese ears also. He forgot to mention that St Thomas, the direct disciple of Jesus Christ lies buried in Madras and here Portugal is saying that religion is in danger culture is in danger. Sir there are more Catholics in India than in Goa. It was an hon. Member of the Lok Sabha Mr N C Chatterji, who reported after his return from England that even some of the Members of the House of Commons are so ignorant that they say that Goa is full of Roman Catholics. We know that in Goa the Roman Catholic population is much less than the Hindu population, but this ignorance is there going about in the world. I want to say this, because our publicity is very weak. Why should our case go by default when Salazar has the courage to say that Goa Daman

[Shrimati Violet Alva]

and Diu are the metropolitan territories of Portugal, that they are not Portuguese colonies but part of Portugal itself. When he says these things, it is for us to tell the world what the position is. That is why I appeal to the Government that our publicity be strengthened. We have a good case but our case is not known. When will it be known? We talk to many foreigners, we have to enlighten them on every point about Goa. There are so many experts in our own Government. There are so many Indians who are going round the world. Why is our case not being told? Why are our friendly nations not informed about the real situation in Goa. Some friendly nations have vocally supported us recently in Asia and elsewhere. There are others who have maligned us, especially Pakistan. But the Prime Minister said that we must talk with restraint. Pakistan has even said that we have invaded Goa and that our soldiers are stationed on the borders of Goa. When we read such things in the papers, our External Affairs Ministry could take up this challenge with the world and send out true reports—not lies as do the Portuguese—but true reports, for we have a good case. We know the technique of satyagraha. We used satyagraha and got freedom for ourselves and it is for us to enlighten the Goans that they too can use this weapon of satyagraha and get themselves out of bondage. But, Sir, the Portuguese—and I am quoting from one of their hand-outs which come from time to time—say, social pattern. What is the social pattern in Goa where there are more Hindus than Christians? The impact of the West on India is much greater than the impact of the West on that little Goa and still we are Indians; but there, they want to protect their culture and religion. They say that the Portuguese Indians have no desire to merge with India. Then, why do they keep on reinforcing their army? Their brutalities are of the medieval age. Their sadistic tenden-

cies, their torture chambers all go back to hundreds of years.

Sir, there were 29 revolts in the Portuguese territories in India in the last three centuries. One of the outstanding revolts was in 1787 when the Roman Catholic priest revolted. a conspiracy of the Pintos it was called. They were sentenced to death. How can we say that they have not revolted? Even those inside the Portuguese territories in India, who are politically conscious, are mute because the suppression and repression is so much in Portuguese India. We have read in the papers that violence has grown there more and more with every batch of satyagrahis. Eye brows have been removed and the soldiers have danced on the bodies of fallen satyagrahis and what not, (*Time bell rings*). Sir, now that the diplomatic channel is closed both ways, we must clarify our policy. I do not say that what the Government have decided for the present is wrong but sooner or later, you will be answerable to the people not only in our country, but to those Goans who live in the Indian territory. There will be a psychological repercussion on them, and I have stated that quite a large section of them is ignorant and is not politically conscious. This psychological repercussion will recoil on us. That is why, while withdrawing and laying down this present policy, we shall have to clarify our stand and accelerate the process and the tempo by which we shall bring Goa its own freedom.

Now there are two liberated areas, one is Nagarhaveli and the other is Dadra. Nagarhaveli is very rich in timber and yields a good bit of revenue. They are carrying on now, but should they decide to set up their own Government—it could not be a Government—but should a group decide to govern and administer that little liberated territory, what would be our stand? Then, Sir ..

Mr DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It is time

SHRIMATI VIOLET ALVA: Sir, there was an agreement with the British that in times of emergency they could occupy Goa. During the last war, German ships were scuttled in Marmugao waters. I want to know whether that agreement operates now, and whether it can be made use of in such a strategic emergency as we find now. I remember that at the time of the British negotiations with India at a Press Conference, a question was put, I think, to Sir Stafford Cripps and it was one of them who answered that it would be for the future Government of India to decide the Goa issue. If that was so, 4 P.M. how has it worked through the years?

Another thing is that we had the pleasure of hearing St. Laurent, the Canadian Prime Minister, last year in the Central Hall, where he said that the Portuguese territories in India did not form metropolitan territories of Portugal. When he went back to Canada, he withdrew that statement. So, we want to know how the NATO powers operate, as far as Goa is concerned.

Then, Sir, I want to just mention how rich is that belt, the Portuguese territory in India. There are two hundred manganese ore mines in the vicinity of Marmugao and the remittance from 1951, from India to Portuguese territories, was Rs. 68 crores; from Portuguese India to Portugal was Rs. 11 crores, and in return, they received during these two or three years Rs. 4 crores or so. I plead here that if we must impose economic sanctions and put economic barriers, it must be done thoroughly.

Another thing is that we should not allow pro-Portuguese propaganda to be carried on in our country. I am aware of quite a lot of pro-Portuguese propaganda being carried on here. I have been asked to my face: "Are you going to get Goa?" Number one, no propaganda should be carried on for Portugal in India. Number two, the land and sea barrier should be properly sealed. Number three, economic sanctions must be so

imposed that they begin to have effect within a few weeks and external publicity strengthened.

Sir, I have many more points to make, but it is impossible to make them here with this pressure on time.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR (Rajasthan): Mr. Deputy Chairman, it is with a feeling of pleasure and sense of some pride that I congratulate the hon. Prime Minister for the enviable reception and great ovation which he received during his recent foreign tour and I wish to take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to the peoples of those countries who showered such affection and honour on all of us—because when they honoured the Prime Minister, as he has properly said, they were honouring India and its people. It is true that this was an honour to this country, but we should not mince words and we would not hesitate to say that the Prime Minister had earned this great honour for this great country. We are also not oblivious of the fact that the Prime Minister's foreign policy has helped to reduce world tensions. This point has been dealt in great detail, so I will not go into the details. We all know what happened in Korea. We all know about Indo-China. Even in regard to disarmament, it was India's suggestion that there should be a sort of informal meeting. She is responsible for bringing together the power concerned with atomic energy. We are fully conscious of it and we feel a sense of pride in having acted in a manner which has pulled us—rather which has pulled the world back from that dangerous spot, the edge of a precipice or the brink of hell, as Mr. Churchill put it.

Within the short time at my disposal, I wish to stress that we all feel and feel very strongly, that it would be much better if we paid greater attention to the problems which concern us directly. I have not the time to detail all factors, but I do wish to say that Government's foreign policy, Prime Minis-

[Shri H. C. Mathur.]

ter's foreign policy, has suited some of the foreign countries much more than it has suited India itself. It has been stated that our foreign policy is directed to have friendship with all the countries, to seek co-operation with all the countries, and to create goodwill with all the countries. I ask a straight question: have we succeeded in implementing this policy?

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: Surely.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: May I ask what is the state of relationship which is subsisting between us and our two immediate neighbours, Ceylon and Pakistan? And, may I ask what is the relationship which is subsisting even today between us and the head of the Commonwealth—I should not use that word, but that unfortunately is the present state of affairs—that is, the U.K.? Are we not aware of the fact that the U.K. has, in this particular matter of Goa, done all that could possibly be done to undermine the prestige and position of this great country? Even the hon. Prime Minister, when he was in England, recently in London, complained of the press, the manner in which the press of the United Kingdom conducted a sort of campaign against this country. I further ask why even a neighbour like Japan, for whom we have always had the friendliest of relations, goes against us. We did not sign the peace treaty in respect of Japan simply because we felt that Japan was not given full freedom. We also went to the full length in denouncing atomic tests which concerned Japan directly. And yet, is it not very surprising, even in regard to this matter of Goa, that the entire press of Japan goes all against us? There are big headlines in the entire press saying that India has gone on a war of aggression. It surprises us. There must be something very radically wrong somewhere in the implementation of our foreign policy. Either our foreign publicity is extremely bad or we are not being properly

understood. I think, Government owes an explanation to the people and to this House as to how far, in the implementation of its foreign policy, it has succeeded, particularly in respect of our neighbours? All the problems with which we are directly concerned are even now irritating us and are a source of great anxiety. The Kashmir question is there. I was simply happy that a lot of air has been cleared so far as Kashmir is concerned, by the persistent and very consistent speeches of the Prime Minister, of Kashmir, by the Speaker, by the Sadr-e-Riasat, and certainly the speech of Pandit Pant was very reassuring. But again, the same stalemate is being created. What is wrong in what Pandit Pant has said in Srinagar the other day? I do not know. It only makes me believe that at the Prime Ministers' conference, the facts have not been put squarely and our position has not been stated very clearly.

[MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair.]

Is it not a fact that in the absolutely changed context of things, in view of this U.S. military aid, and in view of the resolution by the Constituent Assembly of that State, in view of the speeches from all the leaders, are we going to force a plebiscite? It hurts us.

I will pass on immediately to Goa. In regard to the question of Goa, I am afraid, the Government cannot escape responsibility for the butchery of the satyagrahis on the 15th August. I am not a satyagrahi myself. I do not belong to any party. I do not speak here to exploit the situation against this party or that party. But I do wish to know what has happened during these days. What are the circumstances which the Congress Party or the Government could not visualise before the 15th August? Either they should have protected the satyagrahis or they should have stopped the satyagraha, whatever their policy was. It is only the weak and vacillating policy of the Congress Government, that is responsible for this great debacle.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is time, Mr. Mathur

Shri H C MATHUR: Sir, I have just started. The Government have taken a very heavy responsibility on themselves by accepting the Resolution which has been passed by the AICC. We would like to know what the Government propose to do in this matter. We certainly expected the Prime Minister to say something about the effective steps which he was going to take. There was such an expectation all over. And I am very sorry to have to say, that his speech was disappointing and depressing.

DR. ANUP SINGH (Punjab): Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the foreign policy of the Government, as I have always done, and I am fully conscious of the criticism that has been made regarding the Government of India's policy with regard to Goa.

I would like to make one or two points with respect to what has been said by the Opposition Members

Sir, my friend, Mr. Mathur, who is usually quite balanced, has made an extraordinary suggestion that simply because we have some problem with Pakistan, some problem with Ceylon, some problem with Burma, our entire foreign policy has absolutely failed. I think that is certainly an extraordinary statement. Mr. Mahanty said that we should have utilised the opportunity of putting on the agenda the problem of Goa. I completely disagree with that suggestion. Even if we could have done it, I think for a country which takes the initiative in convening a conference, and which takes a very prominent part in it, and which is trying to build a platform where a common outlook could be evolved, it would have been very indiscreet and very improper for that country to thrust upon the agenda the problem of Goa. At least that happens to be my judgment.

With regard to Goa, Sir, I would like to say that it would be very unfortunate if we treat this problem

in isolation. I fully subscribe to the view expressed by the Prime Minister that this has to be dealt with and looked upon in the proper perspective. I have recently come from Japan, and since Japan was mentioned I might say that the Japanese press there is certainly not hostile to the Indian attitude. I was unable to read the Japanese press, but I learnt about its attitude from a number of sources. Unfortunately, however, a small section of the English press, which is a hangover from General Mac Arthur's days, has been hostile. I have got here four clippings saying, "India launches attack on Goa", and so on and so forth. We should not generalise about the Japanese press. I would also add, Sir, that during my brief conversations with some Members of Parliament and with some business people, I found that they had great sympathy for what they called "The Prime Minister's dilemma and predicament". One of them said—to use the colloquial expression—"Your Prime Minister is on the spot." And as an elucidation, he said that Nehru has built up a great reputation as being perhaps one of the very great sources of easing tension, but if he takes any unwise step with regard to Goa, which some of his political adversaries would certainly like him to do, he would be playing into their hands. In fact, one of the professors on International Law—whose name I shall not mention—asked me—and I am not betraying any secret—"If you go back and if you get an opportunity to see the Prime Minister, will you please tell him that we in Japan are deeply concerned that India should not make any wrong move which will jeopardise the great reputation, not only the reputation, but the edifice of peace, that it had built up?"

And finally, Sir, because the time at my disposal is very limited, I would just like to add that India's foreign policy, as I understand it, is that three months of negotiations are infinitely preferable, three months of protracted negotiations are far better than three minutes of modern warfare.

DR RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI (Nominated). Sir, it is now universally recognised that the Prime Minister's masterly handling of India's foreign policy and his close contacts and fruitful conversations with the leaders of communist States have helped very much to ease international tensions and won him the proud position of being one of the greatest makers of World Peace. He has achieved the most difficult task of winning over the communist powers to the doctrines of Panch Shila, as the foundation of a new world order and of the structure of World Peace. It was a difficult task, because it means a radical change in communist political and international outlook, and is not quite consistent with the aims of international communism, nor with communist domestic policy, which does not admit of the principle of co-existence of different groups and parties in a totalitarian State. Panch Shila is a doctrine which has no integral place in communist philosophy or State.....

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: May I submit for his information that the Soviet State, right from its inception, has been founded on the principles of peaceful co-existence?

DR. RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI: To our Prime Minister belongs the credit of constructing a bridge uniting the communist system and the system of democracy in one international system finding place for each.

Since the Summit Conference, the problem of world peace has been the direct concern of the Big Four and their Heads and is being solved by the agencies they have set up, the Disarmament Committee of U.N., and the coming Conference of their Foreign Ministers. One of the great hurdles to world peace is the extension of communist colonialism maintained, by the communist troops of occupation, in almost nine countries of Eastern Europe, besides North Korea and North Viet-Nam. These nine countries are Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Albania and East Germany

It is to be hoped that very soon the world will settle down into a stable and synthetic system of peace for which the only conceivable foundation is to be found in the doctrine of Panch Shila, which is our Prime Minister's greatest contribution to the political thought of the world.

Coming now to our own domestic problems India has been steadily and successfully cultivating friendly relations with her neighbours like Ceylon and Burma. The problem of Goa may be left to solve itself under the compulsion of moral factors which will ultimately assert themselves. But it is a matter of regret that India's relations with Pakistan still leave room for improvement. A setback is being threatened by reviving the most controversial aspects of the Kashmir issue, and it is time that we must again consider its historical background in the light of which it may be understood aright.

What is called the Kashmir issue is an issue which has been created entirely by Pakistan. It was created by Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir, by way of unabashed aggression. Even on the eve of this invasion, Sardar Patel sent round a message that India was not at all anxious that Kashmir should accede to India, but Kashmir should hold itself absolutely free either to accede to India or to Pakistan. Now you know, Sir, the history. When the raiders invaded.....

MR CHAIRMAN: Dr. Mookerji, five minutes are over. Last sentence.

DR RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI: There is no power on earth which can, under law, compel India to go through this plebiscite in order to confirm the accession of Kashmir to India. When once accession is made, it is a transaction complete in law and in fact and it cannot be reopened by any kind of subterfuge.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: Dr. Subbarayan.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN (Madras): Mr. Chairman, I only want to say a few words with regard to Ceylon because it has not been referred to by most of the speakers, though Dr. Kunzru did refer to it and said that he had no time. Sir, will it not be possible for our Government to deal with the Government of Ceylon on the basis that the Indians in Ceylon, as it happened in Indonesia, should be allowed to say whether they would take Ceylon citizenship? I mean those people of Indian origin who are already in Ceylon—there are quite a number of them in the Estates—will it not be possible for our Government to deal with the Government of Ceylon and ask them whether it would not be possible to recognize those who have chosen Ceylon citizenship as Ceylon citizens, because for a long time applications have been considered and have been dealt with in such a manner that hardly 5,000 or 6,000 have become citizens. It is a problem which excites the South a great deal and I hope our Prime Minister also knows the problem because he has been in Ceylon and seen what our people are in Ceylon and how they have contributed to the economic advancement of Ceylon; that it should be possible for the Government to deal in a manner as to get citizenship for as large a number as desire the citizenship in Ceylon. That is all I wished to say.

SHRI M. GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mathur wanted to know if our foreign policy has succeeded. That is a question which a student of public affairs should not have put. As he knows very well, when Free India first announced its foreign policy, the world situation was bad enough. The great Nations had divided themselves into two camps and they were ranged against each other opposing each other's ideology and were about to bring the world to a conflagration of war. What did India do then? India's foreign policy has brought them nearer today.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: I said it myself, and more strongly than you say.

SHRI M. GOVINDA REDDY: India has gone to one camp, which hon. Mr. Gupta was saying, that was always living and believing in co-existence. It had styled the other countries and it gave them the name which is very difficult to pronounce—bourgeois—whereas the other camps had seen everything red in this camp. India, on the other hand, went to the one camp and asked "Why are you going so heavily veiled? You cannot expect anybody to pay courtship to you if you are so heavily veiled. Why can't you raise your veil?" The veil is lifted and what do we see? At the Summit Conference those who were not on talking terms were hugging each other, toasting each other and we see General Eisenhower making presents to the supposed wedding of the supposed daughter of a Russian General. Is this not a success? Which country in this world has striven to bring about these great Powers nearer each other today? Sir, I would like to answer 2 or 3 points. Shri Mahanty and other Members of the Opposition did not at all take the trouble to follow what the Prime Minister said. With regard to Goa, they entirely mistook him. According to me, the Prime Minister was making a distinction between the idea of Goa as belonging to India.....

SHRI S. MAHANTY: No.

SHRI M. GOVINDA REDDY: and the idea of Goa as belonging to Goans. The idea of self-determination—I believe—it was that idea which the Prime Minister was emphasising. The Goans are entitled to self-determination. Which power in this world can deny the right of Goans to self-determination? It is different if the Goans come and merge with India. It is a different question. They will do it but the primary question that we have to consider with regard to Goa is whether they have or they have not the right to self-determination.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: Is that the Prime Minister's position?

SHRI M. GOVINDA REDDY: Yes, that is the present position. That is the position of the U.N. The United Nations have acknowledged that it is the right of every people to have self-determination.

The other question that Mr. Mahanty was asking was with reference to the Bandung Conference, and there we had a golden opportunity to prosecute our case with regard to Goa and we did not do it. Therefore, we have failed. Sir, did we go to Bandung Conference in order to bargain for ourselves? We did not go to bargain with anybody there. Portugal was not a Member of the Conference and there was the whole question of colonialism discussed. The general question of colonialism was discussed and the Conference came to a unanimous decision condemning colonialism. That was not the place for the Prime Minister of India to speak of Goa.

With regard to Ceylon, I would like to say one or two things. I have been in Ceylon and, therefore, I know the situation there. They are definitely anti-Indian. It is very unfortunate that the Ceylonese who should be grateful to these Indians, should have taken an anti-Indian attitude. It is India, there, that has built up Ceylon's economy; it is the Indians, there again, who have developed the rich natural resources and if Ceylon today is a power, if Ceylon today is getting good revenues, it is on account of the Indian labour and they have not appreciated the generosity of India. When India itself was short in rice, when we were suffering under ration, we supplied rice to Ceylon. Even today, in spite of their hostile attitude we have been admitting Ceylonese students in the Indian institutions and we have been training them in the technical institutions. In every way we have been showing friendliness to Ceylon and is it not unfortunate that Ceylon, being a power of the Colombo Conference, and being a

power of the Bandung Conference, having supported the question of friendliness, living in friendliness with these powers, should it now try to bring trouble to Indians? They entered into an agreement with India and they have not implemented. I appeal to the Ceylonese authorities to see that in any case they have to be neighbours of India—God himself has placed Ceylon as a neighbour to India—and that they should cultivate neighbourly relations with India. Thank you.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: Mr. Chairman, although the Goan issue naturally fills our mind, I may be permitted to say a few words on topics which are not probably of so much immediate or intimate concern to us. The Prime Minister and most of the other speakers referred to a lessening of the international tensions and the contribution that this country and particularly the Prime Minister has made in this regard is something of which each one of us is proud, although it would probably be a fact to say that the greatest contribution has been made by the growing realization of the annihilating possibilities of what has been called His Majesty the Hydrogen Bomb. Now I would like to make two observations in this context. One, although there has been a lowering of international tensions, the basic factors of imbalance and conflict both economical and political, still continue to persist, for example, the extreme poverty of under-developed areas and the danger that constitutes or such political questions as the division of Germany, or Korea or the situation in Indo-China. International conferences held over the last one year culminating in the Summit Conference have cleared the atmosphere, but as the Prime Minister himself had indicated, nothing tangible has yet been done. Only when the Foreign Ministers will have met and deliberated, shall we know whether the basis of peace will be adequately strengthened and co-existence become not merely fashionable talk but real and realizable.

Secondly, there are many countries in the world today that do not yet believe that co-existence is possible. Doubts were expressed even at the Bandung Conference, although it must be said to the credit of the leaders assembled there that they were able to pass a unanimous resolution. On the one side, there is the fear of encirclement and on the other of subversion even from within. There are countries which feel that the talk of co-existence is not consistent with, for example, the continuance of the Cominform. It was said that the Prime Minister had taken up this point with the Soviet leaders. If that was so, I would like to know what was the result. Also whether the question of freedom of movement of people and of the free flow of ideas across the international frontiers was also taken up with the Soviet leaders and if so, with what results.

As regards Indo-China, I agree with what Mr. Krishna Menon said that the South Viet-Nam Government must be bound by the obligation which were implicit in the Geneva Agreement and declarations. I believe he said that the International Supervisory Commission had no part to play in the elections. I wonder if that is so, because, I believe, in article 7 of the Declaration, there is some reference to Members of the International Commission also forming the body which will supervise the elections, although there is no direction as to how the elections would be held. The declaration only says that mutual consultations shall be held on the matter, beginning from the 20th July. Now, that has not happened. What is the situation now? If no initiative is taken in the matter of holding discussions for having the elections in 1956, what is the position of the International Supervisory Commission? How do we continue to function if no steps are taken to implement that decision?

In the Bandung Conference, I am interested in one aspect of it, the economic resolution that was passed at

Bandung. I am aware that economics is not so exciting, nor does it rouse so much passion as politics, although it often constitutes the basis of what happens in the political field. There were certain Resolutions passed in Bandung in regard to mutual aid and co-operation. I would like to have some information on those points. For example, the Conference stressed mutual aid and co-operation among Asian and African countries in respect of the provision of experts on administration, on economical and technical subjects, provision of training facilities, exchange of know-how etc. They also recommended collective action by participating countries for stabilising prices and demands for primary commodities. They also agreed to appoint liaison officers in the participating countries for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest. I should like to know if these liaison officers have been appointed or what further action has been taken to implement these decisions of the Bandung Conference, because I feel that if we could extend the area of economic collaboration, that will have its fruitful repercussions on the political field as well.

Coming next to affairs nearer home, I agree with my hon. friend—I believe it was Mr. Mahanty—who said that there was no reason to be dissatisfied with what was happening in relation to affairs nearer home. I believe, if the foreign policy of a country has relevance to internal economic strength as manifested primarily in its industrial potential and to relations with its immediate neighbours, we have to admit that—although it may be galling to us—that our foreign policy has been far from successful. I do not want to say much about Kashmir or Ceylon, for that has been referred to, and I want to devote more time to a discussion of the Goa question. But I would like to know from the Prime Minister what the position is in regard to Kashmir now. Is there any proposal to have discussions with the Pakistan Prime Minister in the

[Shri B. C. Ghose]
 immediate future? The only good thing that has recently happened with regard to the Kashmir problem was the speech which was made by the Home Minister, which naturally drew forth protests from the Pakistan Government and the usual hedged-in statements from our Prime Minister. I believe it would be good for both the countries if they realise and recognise facts as such, because then we could establish better relations and certainly cut down our expenditure on the Defence Services so as to release valuable resources for the economic development of both the countries.

In regard to Ceylon, the Prime Minister has stated on more than one occasion that he is not satisfied with the working of the 1954 Agreement. But where do we go from there? We are dissatisfied. The people there are in a very bad situation. The register that was to have been compiled has not yet been compiled. What happens now to the people in Ceylon of Indian descent? Does the stalemate continue as probably it will continue in a worse form in regard to Goa?

Coming next to the Goa question, I would like to make two preliminary observations. First of all I should like to pay my respectful tribute of admiration to the martyrs who have fallen in the Portuguese territory. And in this context I believe the heroic conduct of the two foreign correspondents—I believe they were Americans—in bringing back the wounded from inside the Portuguese territory deserves our sincere admiration and congratulation. Secondly, I would like to submit that Goa is not a political issue. It has not been one with the Opposition parties. If it is being sought to be made out as a political issue, I am afraid it is being done by the Congress Party Congress leaders—and I do not know if I can exclude from this the Prime Minister—have stated often that political capital is being made out of this Goa issue by Oppo-

sition parties. That is completely false. Anybody who has, for example, worked in some of the committees as I have done on the Inter-Parliamentary Committee on Goa will know to what extent Opposition Members have gone for receiving or obtaining the co-operation of the Congress and what compromises they have made. If the national front is not being maintained today, or if it is being breached, the responsibility should lie squarely on the shoulders of the Congress Party.

Now, coming to the merits of the Goa question, first of all, I would say this. When we say Goa is part of India and, therefore, it should come to us, I do not think we mean that simply because it is geographically within the Indian continent, we have a claim to it. We did not lay claim to Pakistan on that ground. It is because Goa is geographically in India and the people want to be merged with India that we want Goa to come along with us. And we have always stated, and I believe the Prime Minister has also stated that Goa is part of India. The implication thereof is that they also are really Indians whatever the legal fiction may be. Therefore, Sir, I consider it very unfortunate that in this A.I.C.C. resolution a difference is being sought to be made between Goans and Indians. We are all Indians, living in the Indian Union and in Goa. Therefore, I am extremely sorry that this differentiation should have been made.

Secondly, Sir, if people in this country today are dismayed at happenings in Goa, the responsibility is also that of the Congress and of the Prime Minister because expectations had been roused that Goa will be ours, that Goa is part of India. If I may refer you to the speech which the Prime Minister made in this House in August last during the foreign affairs debate, you will find that this is what he said:

"The whole historical or other necessity of Goa being separate has vanished"—

That means, after the British had withdrawn.—

"Nothing can keep Goa separate. It is not a question of my opinion or, if I may say so, the opinion of this hon. House. There are certain factors which must have full play, apart from this factor of Goa being in this great country, the past of it, the future, and the fundamental fact of the Goanese themselves wanting it."

This is very very important.

"Apart from all these, the major fact is that what is called 'colonialism' is in its retreat and has to be so."

Sir, those words must have meant something to the people of this country. They felt that Goa was coming within India and the delay must have been very galling to them. They felt that they also had a part to play in this matter. The next question that arises is, if that was the opinion of the Prime Minister, what did he do to achieve the result? We all agree with the Prime Minister that there can be no question of force or war or police action. I am one with him on that issue. We must have peaceful means. He is not averse to using other means, *e.g.*, economic sanctions or such other things. I say, Sir, that these measures that we have been taking now have been unconscionably delayed. If they had been taken a year ago, the situation would have been different. In the meantime, the Portuguese authorities have made arrangements for getting supplies to Goa through Karachi, through Aden and probably also through Colombo. It is, therefore, unfortunate that although the problem was so urgent, nothing was done in time to press forward our advantage.

This raises the issue of what we had been doing in the diplomatic sphere. Why is it that Portugal is receiving supplies through these countries, through Karachi, through Aden and

I understand also from Colombo—I am not quite sure about this—what pressure have Government brought upon these countries, particularly so far as Karachi and Colombo are concerned, as they have an obligation in view of the resolution passed at Bandung which was agreed to by them also? What have we done in this matter in the diplomatic sphere with regard to U.K.? Have we taken it up with them? What has been the U.K. Government's reaction? Have we taken it up with the other powers such as the NATO powers and, if so, with what result?

Lastly, Sir, I should like to come to the question of this satyagraha. It reveals a very unfortunate state of affairs. There has been, I must say, a policy which has not been consistent at all. I would like the Prime Minister to recall all that he has been saying and doing since August last. In August 1954 he was opposed to any satyagraha being undertaken. I am not coming to the morals of satyagraha; I will refer to it in a minute although I do not know enough. In August 1954, the Prime Minister was opposed to any satyagraha being undertaken either on a mass scale or on an individual scale. Since then, the situation changed. Why did it change? Certainly, he owes an explanation to us. What were the factors which made him deviate from that attitude that he took up in August, 1954? I may, for your information, read out certain statements made by responsible Congress Leaders in this context. On the 25th March, 1955, the Congress President stated:

"If the Indian National Congress has been forced to accept the position to permit nationals of India to go to the help of the people of Goa, the entire responsibility is that of the Portuguese Government who have treated the people's aspirations with scant regard."

The implication is that Congress accepts the fact that Indian nationals will go into Goa. Then, on May 31.

[Shri B. C. Ghose.]

1955, at a Press conference, the Prime Minister made a statement to which my hon. friend Dr. Kunzru had referred and, therefore, I do not want to repeat it. On June 4th, at a public meeting at Poona, the Prime Minister, while he conceded the right of Indians to go to the assistance of their brethren in Goa, did not want any mass satyagraha by Indians, not because it was immoral or that we have not got a right to resort to satyagraha but because the world may get an impression that it was a satyagraha by Indians. This opposition was based on what the world reaction would be, not on the morality of the question. On the 9th June, the Portuguese Embassy in London accused our Prime Minister of reversing his declared policy of non-participation of Indians in demonstrations against the Portuguese colonies in India. There had been no denial of that statement, the implication again being that the Government of India accepted the position that Indians had a right to offer satyagraha or render active assistance to the struggle of the Goanese people. The Working Committee, in its resolution of 23rd July, 1955, stated, "It becomes the right and the duty of the people of Goa....."—and mark it, Sir—".....and of the rest of India as well as the Government of India to strive for the liberation of Goa and its integration with the Union of India". Of course, that resolution added, "The Working Committee is not in favour of mass entry into Goa from outside with a view to offering satyagraha". That position was known.

Now, Sir, the A.I.C.C. today passes a resolution which is in direct conflict with the expressions of sentiment made by the Congress President or by the Prime Minister previously. We are entitled to know what has happened in the meantime that there has been a reversal in the policy of the Government in regard to the participation by Indian satyagrahis in the Goan struggle? Is it world

opinion? Is it a question of misrepresentation of facts? If that was so, the correct approach would have been to rectify any mistake or any misrepresentation that might have been circulated about our struggle in Goa. It has been suggested in some papers that the threat of Pakistan satyagraha has something to do with it. I do not believe that. I do not think the Prime Minister would be stampeded by that sort of thing if the issue was right and moral. As it is, the question whether satyagraha can be undertaken in the international sphere is one about which I am not competent to say anything. Probably the Prime Minister and other Congress Leaders who had been in close contact with Gandhiji know better. I have not, however, come across anything to suggest that Mahatmaji would have been opposed. My hon. friend, Shri Bhupesh Gupta, says it is not an international issue. Legally it is, though morally we do not agree. That is the position and I am arguing the legal position now. Yet, I came across in the papers only today an observation made by Horace Alexander, who is supposed to have been in intimate contact with Mahatmaji and who knows something about satyagraha, and he says that satyagraha was, in Mr. Gandhi's philosophy, more or less equivalent in international affairs to the right to strike in the industrial field. The implication again being that it is not something which would not have been supported by Mahatmaji. But, as I said, I am not very competent to say much on that issue. Therefore, Sir, I do not see the consistency in Government's policy in this regard. We are entitled to know the basic factors that underlie the present policy. What has happened that the Government of India is now banning Indians to participate in the Goan struggle? Certainly when we say that Goa is part of India and Goans are also Indians just as Bengalis are Indians, we have a right and a duty and an obligation to do all that we can to liberate that foreign enclave from colonial domination. Of course if the Prime Minister

has something which is more efficacious, then we have a right to know. The Prime Minister very often posed the question. What are we going to do now? But he did not give any answer. He said: We rule out war: we rule out police action. That is agreed. But what are we going to do?

PROF. G. RANGA: It will take time.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: We take time. Surely. But time is eternal and human life is short. It is said that we should not be impatient. Was not the Congress impatient when the Indian liberals said that we should wait and did not the Congress launch the struggle for the liberation of the country? Did not the Indian liberals then say: Wait, you will get freedom from the British Government in the fullness of time? Who can say that we would not have got it in the usual course without a struggle then by merely waiting? The same counsel we are now hearing from the Congress.

Now, having examined the Government of India's policy in this regard, all that I can say is that taking it all in all it seems to me to be punctuated by confusions and contradictions which cause dismay and distress to the people both in the Indian Union and Goa and it also bears unmistakable indications of bungling in relation both to the internal and international aspects of the Goa issue.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Mr. Chairman, I am a little confused as to what particular arguments I should seek to answer. Many hon. Members have been good enough to say good things about our policy and to approve more particularly of what I said in regard to Goa. Other Members have been critical. Now it depends a great deal on how one approaches these various matters. If hon. Members on the other side point to Pakistan, to Ceylon and to Goa—may be to other things too—and say: All these problems have not been solved, I entirely agree with them. Of course, they are

not solved. But is that a test of the success of a policy? There are many problems in the world. One might even say that every policy in the wide world has failed because there are problems in the wide world. Most of the problems we have to face came to us at the time of independence, hang-overs one might say. Our difficulties with Pakistan were a result of the rather violent and sudden changes that took place then which naturally upset so many things, in India as well as in Pakistan, and not only so many things externally but much more so the minds and hearts of men; and it is not an easy thing to get back an equilibrium after such an upheaval happens. Now we seek to get back to a state of equilibrium, to a state of dispassionate consideration of problems because problems can be solved possibly in two ways—one, by the club, and the other, by dispassionate and peaceful consideration. Now the method of solving them by the club includes war—of course, that is the big club—or smaller clubs. The other methods are those of peaceful consideration which take time or appear to take time. I do venture to say that nothing takes more time than war in solving a problem because it is no solution of the problem to remove a present hurdle and create half a dozen other problems. Any person who has studied the history of the last 30 or 40 years of the world and, more particularly, of Europe will see how tremendous efforts to solve a problem through war resulted, if you like, in the solution of that problem, but in the recrudescence of far greater and more difficult problems, and here we have been struggling with these new problems ever since. Therefore, it is hardly enough to say that we have not solved this problem or that, and I say it will not be enough not only now but later to say that again. I guarantee no solution of any problem. Who am I to be a prophet? I can only try my best. We can try our best and my only care is that we should try our best and go along the right path. It is not given to me to bring about

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

solutions, but I hope for them; I work for them and I think they will come. But it would be deluding this House and this country if I promise any solution of any problem. I can certainly say as an observer, and a student of public affairs that certain things lead to certain results or are likely to lead to them. In my mind I am quite convinced that the problem of Goa must be solved, has to be solved and will be solved—I cannot fix a date.

Now, the main thing I should like this House to consider in regard to all these matters and various problems is how to approach them. Is this approach of the big club the right approach, or some other approach? All this cold war business in the world has been the approach of the big club. Now the big club, that approach may yield results, at least temporary results. Well, there are quite a number of people with big clubs and what will happen one does not know. One big club may frighten a party without a club, but with others having big clubs there it becomes a little doubtful what would be the result. Now the whole purpose of our policy in so far as it concerns external affairs has been to approach our own problems and the world's problems in a spirit of objective reality and peace. We have got excited naturally because we are very far from perfect, but we have at least tried not to get excited and tried to approach these problems in a calm and dispassionate way. We have avoided indulging in blame and denunciation of other countries even though we have thoroughly disagreed with them often enough because we found that this blame and denunciation got us nowhere. It only excited them and excited us and made a consideration of that problem more difficult, in fact impossible, except by the club which was to be avoided.

5 P.M.

Now, I point out to this House that one of the big changes that have come over the world in recent months

has been this remarkable approach towards methods of peaceful settlement. Those very persons—or nations rather—who thought some time ago that there was hardly any chance of a peaceful settlement of the world's problems today speak of them, if not with confidence, at least with a certain expectation that that method might succeed or, at any rate, that any other method is fraught with the gravest danger. Now, it is no small matter that today in Geneva an Ambassador of the United States and an Ambassador of the People's Government of China are sitting together and talking. It is true that what they are talking about are, if I may say so, relatively small matters. They are not small, but they do not, at any rate, include the major issues. But the mere act of talking between the representatives of these two great countries which have been so hostile to each other and which have not recognised each other in the normal sense of the word, itself denotes a great change in the whole atmosphere of the world. Of course, there are so many other things that have happened to denote that change. Now, I think that that should be welcomed. We should not imagine that that change has changed human nature and has prevented evil from happening or war from occurring. All these things can happen and may very well happen unfortunately, but at any rate people are thinking and looking in another direction. It is a tremendous feat. I do feel that if we proceed on these lines, that is, if the world proceeds on these lines, it may be a great turning point in world history because we have come up right to the very edge of the precipice and I imagine that even those who talk of the precipice seldom had any realisation of the depth of that precipice. Gradually, some realisation has come and I undoubtedly agree with the hon. Member opposite that perhaps that is one of the major reasons why people have turned towards thinking in terms of peace. So, some of the hon. Members opposite, I take it,

have not quite caught up to this new approach to things in the world because it takes time for some people in India to catch up even to the doctrines of their own party which move ahead of them sometimes

They talked about the "Kashmir Princess" disaster and said that the United States Government was partly or wholly—I do not know—responsible for it. That is a kind of statement which surprises me because I take it the hon. Member has not an atom of justification for it except his own passionate belief in things that he imagines have happened without an iota of truth. That kind of feeling, that mental approach is, I submit, excessively harmful. I would go a step further. Even if there was some truth—not adequate truth—even if there was some doubt about it, one should not accept that doubt until it is proved because one vitiates the whole atmosphere of dealing with public affairs by that particular approach. Now, take the "Kashmir Princess" affair. It is a very, very serious matter that was affecting India more than any country, and next affecting China. It was perhaps, as far as I know, a unique example of that kind of sabotage—a terrible thing to do for anyone. Now, after a full enquiry which was mainly conducted by the Hong Kong Government helped by both representatives from India and representatives sent by the People's Government of China, it has been found undoubtedly that there was sabotage of the "Kashmir Princess", undoubtedly also that it was committed by persons in Hong Kong—in fact the person who is supposed to have done it is named and a warrant was issued against him—and almost undoubtedly that it was committed by a member of a secret organisation functioning in Hong Kong. Now that organisation, apparently had a great deal of contact presumably with Taiwan or Formosa; but I have heard not even an atom of proof, or even for the matter of that, any real allegation about the United States having the

remotest connection with it. Why I bring in these things is because it just removes the matter from the plane of clear thinking to the plane of passionate denunciation. Therefore, I submit that we should consider all these matters in the world or anywhere else keeping in view this new change in the world and trying to help it to go forward.

Now there was some reference to Indo China. The last speaker was amazed as to what was going to happen there. I really cannot say what will happen there. What I said earlier today was this, that India is there simply because of the Geneva Agreement. So long as the Geneva Agreement continues there, India will go on functioning. If the Geneva Agreement breaks down completely well, there will be no place for India. I do not quite know for whom there will be place there.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: May I just say what I wanted to know? Under the Agreement the International Supervisory Commission has certain functions under article 13 or 27. Will there be no day when these functions will come to an end if no elections are held?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: How can I say what will happen a year hence in this very complicated situation there? All that has happened thus far is that there have been talks about elections which should have taken place on June 25th or so—I forget—but which did not take place. Now, that itself was, if you like, a non-observance of a clause of the Agreement which is unfortunate, but that does not mean that the whole Agreement is broken up. You may say that there are dangers to that Agreement. I agree that there are dangers. Things are said denouncing that Agreement. So far as we are concerned we go on pointing out to the parties concerned that they should abide by the Agreement and the time has come, I might inform this House, when we are placing our difficulties before the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Confe-

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 rence for them to consider. It is not for us to decide; we are executives. We have been told to carry out a job of work under the Geneva Agreement. We can advise the parties. We do that and as a matter of fact I believe all the members of the Commissions have done a very good piece of work there in removing difficulties and getting over all kinds of obstacles in the course of last year. They may succeed again, or they may not. If they do not, if the Geneva Agreement breaks down, you may have anything there—military activities, military conflicts and again war. You may have anything; I cannot say, but the time has come when we shall have to approach the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference—one from the United Kingdom and one from the Soviet Union—and if necessary at a later stage all the Powers represented in the Geneva Conference.

Now, an hon. Member—I think it was Mr. Bhupesh Gupta—and some other Members too seemed to think that we committed a grave error in not placing the subject of Goa before the Bandung Conference.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I did not say that. I had some other grievances, not this particular one.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I beg your pardon. Now, I do not understand this argument. The Bandung Conference was not a public meeting. It was not, if I may use that term without offence, an agitational conference. It was a conference of representatives of Governments talking about vital matters of general concern, not individual matters. It is true that some individual matters were referred to, to my regret I may say, and after that we had pointed out that it was not wholly in keeping with that conference. Why? Not because individual matters were not important. Of course, they were, out it was obvious that at a conference of this kind if we got

into a discussion of the large number of individual questions and conflicts that each one of us had to face, then there would be no end to that conference and we would lose ourselves in a jungle of disputes and arguments. Therefore, we sought to keep the conference at the level of discussion of general principles, whether it was anti-colonialism or whatever it was, and in the speeches to refer to individual cases. That was the general attitude there. Well, it was not wholly adhered to, but we sought to adhere to it. May I suggest for the consideration of this House that the names of some countries that were mentioned were colonial countries? I do not think that mention of that recommendation has saved them from disaster and catastrophe later on. There was much mention of Morocco there and others, and we have seen what is happening in Morocco. It was obvious that by mentioning names and resolutions and the rest, they do not make a major difference. They only at best satisfy you that you have said something which you have in your mind and heart—and you are the lighter for that. But when Governments function in a governmental way, they have to function somewhat differently

Then, some Member asked me, "What have you done about Goa—that is, diplomatically?" Well, I really do not know how I am expected to state here what we say to the representatives of other countries here or to other Foreign Offices. The question of Goa has been and has become still more one of the major issues and naturally we express our opinion and inform other Foreign Offices what we think about this matter. We cannot go about with a begging bowl asking for anybody's sympathy. We have some self-respect and dignity about this matter and if other countries are behaving in a way which we do not wholly approve of, still less are we going to ask for their sympathy in this matter.

Going back to the Bandung Conference, I was asked what has been done in regard to the resolution about economic co-operation. It was recognized at the Bandung Conference that this economic co-operation—apart from the laying down of general principles—could only be encouraged really on a bilateral basis. It was very, very difficult for these thirty countries or even fifteen or twenty countries to come together to discuss economic co-operation because our problems were different. We could discuss it with two or three countries, say, in South East Asia; say, between Indonesia and India; Indonesia, Burma and India or Ceylon, where there are some common features. We could not discuss it in that big way. We should lay down certain high principles; so, the resolution contained high principles. As a matter of fact, so far as India is concerned, we have gone, even previous to that resolution and since then too, some distance in steps leading us to mutual co-operation, mutual help. India has become a fairly important centre of training in all kinds of subjects—Community projects and national extension schemes, which I might inform the House, have created a very considerable stir in the whole of Asia and some parts of Africa. The community project schemes are just the type of things which fit in with conditions in other countries in Asia and efforts are being made in other countries to copy them both by asking our experts to go there and by sending their people to learn from here. Then, there are engineers and others whom we are training. We have got an international school of statistics where people from about twenty countries come. In Roorkee we have just begun an international school for engineers from all over Asia. And there are so many things which I cannot give a list of without looking into the subject.

I think it was Mr. Bhupesh Gupta who became very eloquent at the Gov-

ernment's silence in regard to what has happened in the past or may be happening now in Malaya and in Kenya and other parts of Africa. Well I might inform the hon. Member that Government is silent not about those two, but many other matters which Government dislikes. Governments are normally silent. Governments do not merely express their general views about what they like and dislike in the world all over. They take up subjects because they can do something about them. Merely expressing their views or their condemnation does not help that Government or the other Government concerned: The wide world knows what our views are about conditions in Africa, about conditions in Kenya, in East Africa, in Malaya and elsewhere. They are varying views. Naturally in regard to each part the views are different with reference to that particular part. It depends on the particular things that have happened or are likely to happen there. We are against colonialism. But at the same time we realise that merely by denouncing it, the thing does not vanish into the air, and that sometimes it is easier to take steps to phase the change-over instead of constantly wanting a complete and hundred per cent change-over. Not that we are opposed to hundred per cent change-over, but one has to take things as they are. We are not strong enough, and even if we were strong enough, we have not become the policeman of the world. We have to carry a heavy enough burden in our own country and if we can succeed in a small measure in our own country we will have done well.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: I drew the Prime Minister's attention to certain materials that are being sent through India and from India to Malaya for the use of the Gurkhas and other British forces there.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know if the hon. Member is thinking in terms of *kukris* that were being sent.....

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA 4,000¹

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU But all the 4,000 were *kukris*

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA Yes, and many other things

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU Yes they were sent, and what is more, I think, he referred to the fact that a number of British aircraft have passed through Dum Dum, and Mr Gupta keeps careful watch of Dum Dum and comes to me and tells about them. It is a fact. But so far as foreign aircraft are concerned, we have agreements with foreign countries. We have mutual agreements with England, France and various other countries. We fly over their territory, they fly over ours, subject always to their not taking armies or army materials. Those rules are followed. Now, we did allow British aircraft to go through. They carried no soldiers in uniform. They normally carried women and children, etc. They did carry on some occasions British soldiers, people who were going back. They used to go by sea, but subsequently they used to go back by air as it was simpler for them. And we thought by virtue of our agreement with them we should not come in their way. *Kukris* as all the world knows are hardly the type of weapons with which these persons fight today. They are a kind of symbols of the Gurkhas and they are manufactured in India and they wanted them.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA But we can give some non violent symbols

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU May I suggest to the hon Member opposite in regard to Malaya—as he is so anxious that the British Government or whatever administration functions there should grant self rule or independence or whatever he calls it—would it not be desirable for all the parties there to lay down arms and seek the ways of peace? At the present moment there have been elections there, and there have been changes in Malaya. There are popu-

lar Governments functioning. Now, it is not for me to judge them or to say anything about them. But I know that there have been certain changes there, and major changes. At any rate, certain big steps have been taken to bring about self-rule in Malaya and elsewhere. And they are encountering certain difficulties. The problem of Malaya is a difficult one because of the major racial groups there. It is hardly possible to do anything where the principal indigenous group is in a minority. That creates certain problems. Now, the point is that all these matters whether in Malaya or in Kenya, or elsewhere would be solved very easily. I submit, if all parties thought in terms of a peaceful approach, not one party only.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA It is the Britishers who have to do it

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU Now, Sir, a word about Ceylon. I did not say anything about Ceylon earlier today because really I did not quite know what to say. In answer to certain questions, I have expressed my regret at the developments there. Well that regret continues. Now, I am not prepared to use any strong language about Ceylon in so far as I can help it because I feel strongly that the broad policy that we pursue everywhere applies in a very, very special measure, to these neighbours of ours. And even though they have often said hard things, unconscionable things, about us, we have refrained from saying anything in reply, because I know very well that the people of Ceylon are friendly to the people of India, by and large. But unfortunately various hangovers and various fears and suspicions come in the way which make this problem difficult of solution.

I would like the House to remember that the problem is not that of the Indian citizens as one hon Member talked about it. If it were a problem of the Indian citizens, there would be no problem to be settled imme-

diately It is a problem of the people who are not Indian citizens It is a problem of the people of Indian descent, who never were citizens of India, but in whose fate for historical, cultural and other reasons, we are interested Naturally, we are interested in their fate Normally we would not be interested in them, but both Ceylon and we have inherited certain things We were both parts, a one time, of the British Empire, and we were all dubbed as British subjects And all kinds of things happened in the British Empire, and a large number of Indians were taken to Ceylon and put down there in the tea estates chiefly, and they are there, and so many of them have been living there for generations, and so many of them have been born there I think they are by now the citizens of Ceylon

Now, the hon Member, Dr Subbarayan made a very remarkable suggestion He asked 'Why not apply the Indonesian Chinese parallel to Ceylon, i.e., make them choose their nationality?' Well, of course, if he had known anything about Ceylon, he would have found that that was the same thing that had been said by us for many, many years But it is the other party that is going to apply, not we So, according to us, the difficulty is created by the Government of Ceylon I do not wish to go further into this question But the point is that there are two separate questions There are the Indian nationals there, and they should have the rights of foreign nationals, and they should be treated with the courtesy which foreign nationals get If they are not getting that much courtesy, then it is up to the Government of India to protest But in the final analysis, well we may say that they are there as guests, or they are permitted to remain there as foreign nationals and they should be treated with the same courtesy as is extended to foreign nationals here in India It does not mean that foreign nationals should be pushed out of the country Anyhow their status is different,

because we are not directly responsible for them The 8,00,000 or 9,00,000 of them—whatever that figure be—are people of Indian descent and who according to us, have ceased to be Indian nationals, or they were Indian nationals Their problem concerns us chiefly because of certain historical and other reasons Now in regard to these people, we are prepared to accept them as our nationals, if they want to become our nationals, and if they satisfy our tests of nationality, because our tests of nationality are very broad, e.g., the fathers the grandfathers, etc., can make them our nationals, provided they want to But we say at the same time that an equal opportunity should be given to them to become Ceylon's nationals, if they so choose That is exactly what Dr Subbarayan has said Now this was more or less agreed to and both the Ceylon Government and the Government of India opened registers for those people who wanted to apply for becoming nationals We have not, I believe, thus far rejected even a single application And on Ceylon's side, a very large number of people had applied and to begin with the proportion of registrations was not good, but anyhow it was appreciable That was about a year or two ago In the first year, I am told that about 46 per cent were registered But the proportion of registrations, recently, has come down to one per cent And the others are rejections And rejections for what reasons? For instance, I remember that there are estate labourers there, a very fine lot I can tell you that they are a very fine lot, because I have seen them several times and I admire them And I said once in Ceylon long long ago when I was not Prime Minister—probably in the year 1938—that a day would come when the people in Ceylon would put up a monument to the tea estate labourers who had come from India and who had done so much for Ceylon So these people apply for citizenship Now, they are summoned to answer certain questions Why has often happened

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

there is that they have never got the summons. It has been sent to the estate manager, a bundle of them possibly. And the estate manager is not at all interested in this question. The result is that nobody appears, and, therefore, a large number of applications are dismissed and rejected on the ground of non-appearance. And the poor people do not even know what has happened. And there are other reasons also for rejections, but they are only formal reasons.

So, now this question basically is between the Ceylon Government and those people. We come in as people who are interested in friendly people, because they are not our citizens in that sense—which we must remember, because there has been frequent confusion about it, as the hon. Member just now said something as if we are doing something to Indian nationals. If they had been Indian nationals, the position would have been completely different. They are not Indian nationals, and the Ceylon Government refuses to make them their nationals. So, they become Stateless people. And the Ceylon Government apparently do not like this idea, naturally, because when we say that they are not our nationals it means that we are not going to accept them here. If the Ceylon Government push them out, we are not going to accept them. It is not a question of lack of sympathy for them. We have to accept our nationals only, if they are pushed out from there. But we are not going to accept others. Therefore, the question basically is concerning the Ceylon Government and all these people in that country. Whatever the legal position about their nationality be, they are the residents and inhabitants of Ceylon, and for generations. We suggested to the Ceylon Government in our recent messages that we would be glad if they dealt with them directly—we shall help, of course, wherever we can. In fact whatever we have said, we cannot bypass their views

—the people themselves. They are the real people to count. They function through their organisations, trade unions, their associations, etc.

Now, Mr. B. C. Ghose suddenly brought the Congress into the picture—that they have made Goa into a political issue which is not a political issue. I don't think this is a suitable forum for us to discuss the Congress as such but, Sir, since he said that, I must say that I was very much surprised to hear that remark of his. In this matter the Congress was peculiarly circumstanced. It is obvious that if the Congress officially takes any step, to some extent it will be thought that it does so with the blessing of approval of Government because of the close association between the two. It cannot function, therefore, with the same degree of freedom and laxity as other organisations function. In this matter we shall leave out the Congress, but in view of what appear to be certain doubts in hon. Members' minds, I shall relate the sequence of events during the past year or so. I did refer to it earlier too today. But this question of satya graha first arose a little over a year ago. It arose in the case originally of Goan organisations—not Indians though perhaps one or two Indians might have been connected with it. It was a novel question for us. It was a question of individuals or small groups of 6, 7, 10 or 12—nothing more. As I said, it was a novel question. I am speaking on behalf of Government now—not of what the Congress did about it—and we were, I shall be quite frank, not quite clear in our minds as to how to deal with this novel issue. We said and we have said throughout at every stage—there has been no confusion—that we cannot tolerate the masses functioning in this way. There has never been the slightest doubt in any statement or anything because hon. Dr. Kunzru seemed to think that there had been. At every stage and step, we have made that clear and we have made it clear also

at that stage that Goans should take the lead and not Indians. I use the word in the technical sense. You may of course, call Goans as Indians and I agree that we may. For the moment I am using that word and I would stick to the technical sense. Now Mr. Ghose read out something from what I had said. That did not mean that there was any crime or blame attached to an Indian doing it or that he might not be justified in doing it because he was an Indian. I would go a step further. Why only an Indian, why should not a Ceylonese or a Pakistani or a Burmese or an Indonesian join in the satyagraha too? From another point of view—I am not for the moment thinking in terms of the Government's reactions to it—the Government may stop them but this type of satyagraha becomes ultimately a type of peaceful war. I may compare it, if I want to compare it, to some other type of war, let us compare it to the Civil War in Spain some 25 or 28 years ago. There was an international brigade there. All kinds of people joined it. You might have an international brigade of satyagrahis. I am just analysing the situation.

SHRI S. N. DWIVEDY: There is a move.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What the Government would do is another matter. If there is an international brigade, it may stop them, but when you bring in satyagraha in this way, you introduce a new method and I for one am not at all sure how this can function in the international field. It is a very difficult problem for anyone to answer. I would say anyhow that in individual satyagraha, if a single individual's conscience impels him to do something, I cannot stop him. I may stop him physically but if a man's conscience impels him to do something, then my attempt to stop him, except physically, fails. Now, there was a very curious idea of satyagraha—because it is a modern idea of satyagraha by people

who have never indulged in satyagraha previously or understood what it meant—that they should commit a breach of the law and should not suffer the consequences thereof. It is a very extraordinary idea. The very essence of satyagraha is that you should suffer for it; otherwise it is not satyagraha.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: They have suffered.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not talking about Goa. I am talking generally. It is very likely and, of course, in Goa they have suffered. I am saying that it often happens that people complain because of the natural consequences of some breach of the law. The natural consequence of breach of the law is punishment—whether it is fine or jail or whatever it may be. Then they complain that in this free India we are punished. But free or unfree, if a law is broken, the consequences flow from it. If the law is wrong, change the law—it is a different matter. But anyhow it is not satyagraha unless you suffer the consequences from it. In fact it becomes a joke—not satyagraha. In Goa this difficulty did not arise. There has been a great deal of suffering—tremendous. Anyhow it started. Throughout this period, as I said, we laid it down clearly that we would not encourage or permit mass satyagraha. Again, may I explain, we said "by Indians": there was no question of satyagraha by Goans, outside in India. What is going to happen inside Goa is not our concern and we are not issuing directives to Goans. They may have mass satyagraha. If so, whether it is lawful—that is a different matter. It is unlikely under the Portuguese administration. That has been clear throughout. There has been some doubt about individual satyagraha. That is from the Governmental point of view. We said that Goans should do it, not because Indians were not entitled to do it but because we did not wish to create any imposition on the people of Goa, or on the Goans or to make people think that it is easy enough

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that India has vast numbers of people just to swamp Goa by sheer weight of numbers. It is a possibility. The possibility may end in disaster—shooting, killing, etc. That is a different matter. We did not want to do so. It is not satyagraha, whatever it is, and no Government can supinely look on when large numbers of people take matters, international matters, into their own hands and cross the border into another territory. Therefore, in no event could the Government agree to any large scale entry like this. The difficulties arose in actual operation. We stopped entries in many places and closed the borders except in one place, but the border—I forget it—is a pretty long border, full of jungles and it is almost physically impossible to stop odd individuals from going in, or even little groups unless we keep watch and ward for every yard of that area. But it is perfectly true that we did not mind very much governmentally a few odd persons going in, and so they went in and we had some doubt in our own mind whether it would be legitimate for us to stop them because it did not create, so long as the numbers were small, a problem. It did not create a problem as large numbers or overwhelming bodies would. It remained in the individual stage, individuals taking the risk of suffering and even death, if you like, in protesting against the Portuguese Government there. We may have been right or wrong, as I said. It was a difficult matter and has been, both on its theoretical and philosophical side and its practical side, troubling us a great deal.

Dr Kunzru referred to something I said at a Press conference. I read it, but I really do not understand what troubles him, except that I have told him we were all the time making this distinction, rather two distinctions, between mass and individual and between Indian and Goan. It is true that gradually there was a tendency in the course of the last year for individual Indians to

join the Goans, small numbers of them. And it is true that we knew about it. It being a little difficult to have scrutiny and enquiry about a few persons, no particular step was taken. But matters came to a head only recently, from the 15th of August and a little before that. Reference was made to the speech I made on Independence Day here. I do not remember exactly my words; but what I said was that our minds and hearts were rather heavy, because of the thought of what might happen on the Goa border. In fact, we did not know what was going to happen and what happened came as a great shock to us. But that presentiment that something evil like that might happen was in my mind and I referred to it. And certainly even though governmentally I may stop people from going there, I certainly thought it very improper to condemn them wholesale on that or any other occasion.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: May I draw the Prime Minister's attention to what he said on that occasion from the report in the "Times of India" of August 16th? The report says:

"Addressing a mammoth gathering from the ramparts of the Red Fort, Mr. Nehru wished the Goa satyagrahis 'mubarak' with the injunction that as true satyagrahis, they should be completely peaceful and, if necessary, suffer bravely without expecting armed support from India."

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Excellent sentiments.

Another thing I was asked was why we did not apply economic sanctions earlier. Well, as a matter of fact we progressively have been applying them for a considerable time past. But economic sanctions take some time. We must also remember that we have been till recently in diplomatic association with Portugal and one does not have economic warfare with a country with which one is associated in various ways. So there

has been this process for the last, I should say almost a year or eight, nine or ten months. This process has been going on. Sometimes notice has been required and notice was given. But all these things stopped two or three months later or some months later. Complete severance of economic relations could only follow severance of political relations. That has taken place now and so the other has also taken place.

I did not quite understand when one hon. Member talked about our relationship with the head of the Commonwealth, meaning thereby, I think the United Kingdom. Well the United Kingdom is not the head of the Commonwealth.

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA But it is *de facto*.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU No, neither *de facto* nor anything. It is not in any sense. None of these countries is the head. Perhaps, the hon. Member thinks of the King or the Queen of England as the formal head. The U.K. is not the head of the Commonwealth or any other organisation. I do not know what the hon. Member means by relationship. Our relationship with the United Kingdom is exactly on a par with our relationship with let us say, France or with Russia except for the fact that we meet once a year or have conferences where we exchange views and discuss matters, and sometimes get reports from each other about world conditions. There is no legal relationship in these matters. But take Burma. Burma is not in the Commonwealth but we are much more intimately connected with Burma than with any country in the Commonwealth. It is a matter of mutual relationship with other countries.

There are a few other small matters but I do not think I should take up more time on them. The hon. lady Member sitting behind me said some

thing about numerous revolts and insurrections in Goa. As a matter of fact the history of Goa for the last 800 years or more is full of tragic episodes, beginning with the Inquisition there. But I do not think it is worthwhile our going back and thinking of those past tragedies. We have to deal with the situation of today. And in this situation I will again explain what our approach is to these questions. We do not say that Goa is not going to be merged with India. I think that is inevitable. But what I say is this, that stress has to be laid on the factor of the Portuguese leaving Goa. It is a question of emphasis, of stress rather than the fact of Goa immediately merging with India. That is the second step which I have no doubt, will be taken, because all the circumstances are in its favour. But we are not prepared to tolerate anyhow the presence of a foreign colonial power. I do draw a distinction—not that it is necessary—but we are not prepared to tolerate the presence of the Portuguese in Goa, even if the Goans want them to be there. So there is that distinction. I am not prepared to impose myself on the Goans. That is for them to consider, completely. But the presence of the foreign colonial power on the mainland of India is a matter in which I am also interested tremendously—not only the Goans. But these are theoretical considerations. I think in this House or in the other place I ventured to say that it must be understood by every one that no foreign power can have a foot-hold on the mainland of India now or in the future. This must be clearly understood. This is by no means a kind of reflex of the Munroe Doctrine of America. That is something much vaster and much bigger. But if you like you may compare it with some such idea in the limited Indian continental region. But a foreign power, whoever it might be, that foreign power cannot have any foot-hold here. I think it is in that context that we should look at this Goan question. There is

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no intention of grabbing Goa or of our desiring to extend the Indian Union in this way. We have no doubt that Goa, being part of India, has to become part of the Indian Union. It will, because they wish to become so, not because we push them into it.

I believe there are some amendments which refer to the "Panch Shila." Now, this word, oddly enough, has not only caught the fancy of our people in this country, but to some extent is getting known in other countries too. It is odd, but sometimes when a word or phrase is used which is in tune with the spirit of the times, it catches on. Otherwise it simply drops. The House knows that "Panch Shila" are words used in India for long ages past. I am not a scholar, as every one knows, but they meant, I take it, certain foundations of character; they were not used in the international sense. We used those words from time to time and, later, in modern times, the Indonesian Republic adopted this phrase for its own Constitutional foundations, in a somewhat different sense. I do not know who used these words here in India in this new context but, whoever may have used it, it became current coin very soon. I think it is a good thing if we can combine this present idea of "Panch Shila", which marks our international relationships also, with the old idea of raising of character. If those two are combined, I think we might well be able to deal with most of our problems and solve them satisfactorily. Now, at a moment of great change in the world—great change in many ways, political of course, big changes in regard to cold war, etc., gradually coming down, even major changes which might affect the whole life of human beings; that is, atomic energy and the new forces that have been placed at the disposal of man; we see in it the magnificent sweep of the historic forces at work—it is a little difficult to see the full picture,

or to avoid being swept off one's feet occasionally, or to avoid getting lost in smaller problems. At any rate, I think we should try, first of all, to have some anchorage on principles, etc; secondly, to try to see the full picture and then try to do one's best. What happens subsequently lies in the lap of the gods.

MR. CHAIRMAN: We shall take up the amendments now.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: I would like to withdraw my amendment.

The amendment* was, by leave, withdrawn.

डा० रघुवीर : मैं अपने संशोधन को लौटा लेता हूँ ।

The amendment* was, by leave, withdrawn.

MR CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, this House is of opinion that more positive and effective steps be taken for the early liberation of Goa from Portuguese colonial rule.'

The motion was negatived.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, this House deplores the intention of the Government to ban all satyagraha by Indians in Goa and is of opinion that more effective steps should be taken to liberate Goa and other territories from Portuguese occupation and merge the same with India at an early date.'

The motion was negatived.

*For texts of amendments, vide col. 2100 *supra*.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this House approves the foreign policy pursued by Government which has led especially to the acceptance by many countries of the principles of Pancha Shila and to the easing of the international tension, thus promoting the cause of world peace'."

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I shall put the motion, as amended, to the House.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the

Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration and having considered the same, this House approves the foreign policy pursued by Government which has led especially to the acceptance by many countries of the principles of Panch Shila and to the easing of the international tension, thus promoting the cause of world peace."

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The House stands adjourned till 11 A.M. tomorrow.

The House then adjourned at two minutes to six of the clock till eleven of the clock on Wednesday, the 7th September 1955.