

THE MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND STATES (DR. K. N. KATJU):

|  | 1953 | 1954 |
|--|------|------|
| (i) No. of suicides                      | 53   | 25   |
| (ii) No. of men                          | 31   | 14   |
| (iii) No. of persons more than 35 years. | 14   | 7    |

#### PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

FINAL ORDERS NOS. 11, 12 AND 13 MADE BY THE DELIMITATION COMMISSION

THE MINISTER FOR LAW AND MINORITY AFFAIRS (SHRI C. C. BISWAS): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of each of the following orders made by the Delimitation Commission under section 8 of the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952:—

- (i) Final Order No. 11, dated the 16th June, 1954, in respect of the distribution of seats to, and the delimitation of, parliamentary constituencies in the State of Manipur.
- (ii) Final Order No. 12, dated the 16th June, 1954, in respect of the distribution of seats to, and the delimitation of, Parliamentary constituency in the State of Tripura.
- (iii) Final Order No. 13, dated the 2nd August, 1954, in respect of the distribution of seats to, and the delimitation of, Assembly constituencies in the State of Coorg. *[Placed in Library, see Nos. S-254/54, S-255/54 and S-256/54 for Nos. (i) to (iii).]*

#### MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

MR. CHAIRMAN: Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, I beg to move:

“That the present international situation and the policy of the Gov-

ernment of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

Since this House discussed this matter, over three months have passed and during these three months many important changes and developments have taken place. Many attempts have been made to grapple with the various problems which affect the world and which might altogether be referred to as the crisis of our times. Now, this crisis of our times may be viewed in many ways and from many angles. If you stand in the American continent, inevitably you have a certain angle of vision on the crisis of our times. If you stand in the middle of Europe, you have another angle of vision and if you stand in the middle of Asia, you have a third angle of vision. It may be that the crisis is one and the same in its totality with different facets but it is obvious that the viewpoint makes a difference—difference in perhaps what you say and certainly a difference in the emphasis you give to certain aspects of that problem. Anyhow, whatever these different problems may be—the major ones—normally they have become parts of one major problem, or at any rate one reacts on the other. The House will remember that a conference was held in Berlin many months ago and at that conference, though not much was decided, it was decided to hold another conference at Geneva and then that Geneva Conference was held and that Geneva Conference considered two major problems—the Korean problem and the Indo-China problem. In so far as the Korean problem was concerned, there was no settlement, or no definite advance, although some little advance might be said to have been made in so far as people considered it, and I hope, will go on considering it till they find a way out.

Then the Indo-China problem was considered. There, everyone concerned had to face a new situation because much had happened in Indo-China meanwhile and had brought matters to a crisis and some decision had to be made this way or that way. In

fact not coming to a decision itself was a decision which would have led to certain consequences which were considered grave. Therefore, this Indo-China problem dominated the scene at Geneva and in a sense became the epitome of this crisis of our time, if you like to call it so, or for all the problems of the day. The Geneva Conference was important, therefore, in many ways. It was important as indicating how things have been done in this world, are being done, and are not likely to be done in the future, I hope. That is, the Geneva Conference was a conference, it is said, on Asia and a conference on Asian problems in Europe chiefly dominated by European and Americans and the like. Now, we honour these great countries of Europe and America but all the honour and respect in the world for them does not make the slightest difference to our decision that we must have a say in our destiny and in Asia's destiny. (Cheers.) And so here was this conference in Geneva talking and discussing about Asian problems but they realized there the importance of the Asian outlook, they realized that they could not ignore what Asia felt in this matter. First of all, there was, of course, one country which is intimately involved, i.e., the People's Republic of China, which was represented there, but another important factor was that a number of Asian countries, which were not represented, nevertheless were constantly referred to and talked about, i.e., the so-called Colombo Conference countries. That is to say, the Colombo Conference which was held immediately before the Geneva Conference and which considered many of these problems, the Indo-China problem specially, and passed certain resolutions or made recommendations with regard to it, attracted a great deal of attention at Geneva. That was because it was supposed, and rightly supposed, to represent the viewpoint of a very large part of Asia, in fact the part of Asia very intimately connected geographically and otherwise, by virtue of proximity, with the Indo-China problem.

So, we saw in Geneva this impact of reality on an unreal way of dealing with things, and the unreal way of dealing with this problem was to forget Asia, generally speaking. But that fact that Asia was there and that Asia had a certain definite viewpoint in regard to it could not be ignored and so Asia was continually impinging on them although it was not present at the conference table.

Now, Sir, I have said this not with any desire to criticise the work at Geneva, but rather the way the countries of the West have got into when considering problems of Asia. No problem whether it is of Asia or Europe can be isolated. I can very well understand that Asian problems are of the deepest interest to Europe or America. I can also understand that European problems are of considerable interest to India or Asia, for the simple reason that they act and react on each other. And when a problem or a decision might lead to war or peace, a war which may extend all over the world, it ceases to be a local or even a continental problem: it becomes a world problem. But what I would venture to suggest as completely out of place and out of date today is for problems to be considered by certain European or American powers, forgetting or ignoring Asia, specially when those problems are Asian. That was realised, I think, at Geneva and, therefore, although the Asian countries were not formally represented there, to some extent, their voice was heard, and I believe that voice had a great deal of effect on those decisions there.

I have already in various places paid tribute to the leading statesmen in Geneva who tried hard to come to an agreement and who ultimately succeeded. That tribute really applies to almost everyone there. But behind that was not merely the vague desire to come to a settlement, but the compelling necessity of coming to a settlement or having a disastrous world war. That was the final pressure on the people there. They came to a

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] settlement. It is not a final settlement in the sense that it solves the world problem. But it did indicate how the peoples of the world reacted when they faced realities, the reality of war or peace. They reacted in favour of peace. That is the healthiest sign in so far as Geneva is concerned.

Sir, as the House knows, step by step, we have been drawn into this picture and we have assumed a heavy burden of responsibility in Geneva. We struggled, if I may say so, hard, not to be entangled; we refused to commit ourselves. We never offered to take up any burden. In fact, even when we were asked to do so, we did not give a definite answer. It was difficult for us to say "No" straight off, because we were afraid that our refusal might itself affect the settlement there, or come in the way of it. And it was equally difficult for us to say "Yes" because it was a heavy burden. Ultimately, when decisions were arrived at at Geneva, India appeared in every proposal that was made and this decision to form commissions in Indo-China consisting of the three countries—Canada, Poland and India, and India to be the Chairman—was an integral part of the agreement arrived at. So, for us to say "No" or for somebody else to be chosen might upset the agreement in Geneva in regard to Indo-China. That would have been a tremendous responsibility and a far-reaching step to take. We could not do that. It would have been the way of escapism from doing one's duty. So we accepted that and immediately on acceptance we took steps to give effect to that decision. We held a conference here within almost a week of the Geneva decisions, a conference to which we invited the representatives of Canada and Poland, that is, the other members of the Commission; and, also, the parties in Indo-China, that is, France, Viet-Nam, Viet-Minh, Laos and Cambodia. We discussed all the preliminaries to our work there, for the formation of the Commissions, and also

decided to send an advance party under one of our Secretaries to Government in the External Affairs Ministry. Now, throughout that conference here and throughout the work of that advance party and the early days of the Commissions in Indo-China, I am very happy to say that everything that we have done, every step that we have taken, has had behind it the unanimous approval of all the members of the Commission. (*Hear, hear.*) This indicates the co-operative approach of those members; even though they might be divided in their other view-points, in their approaches or ideologies, in this matter there is a great deal of the spirit of working together. And above all, even the countries in Indo-China, which have been warring against each other, have been very helpful to these Commissions thus far. Well, in our conference here they showed a friendliness even to each other, which was rather surprising and very pleasing, considering the last six or seven years of the background of war between them. So that we have started off this work in Indo-China, in a sense, under good auspices. There has been a good beginning, but the work is full of difficulty. Not merely the fact that so far as we are concerned we have had to send about a hundred and fifty officers from here, civil, military and others, which is a heavy strain upon our resources—not that—but the whole position is full of difficulty—as it is bound to be after seven years of intense warfare—and all kinds of problems are likely to arise from day to day. You may consider the Indo-China problem by itself. Of course, it is intimately allied to what happens next door to it, in the China seas, in Korea and round about, because anything happening round about affects Indo-China. And ultimately it becomes one, we might say, integrated problem of the Far East, of Asia, and South-East Asia; and so you may consider that a problem of the larger world.

In regard to Korea, as I have said, some little progress was made, but

not much, at Geneva. The situation is not at all a happy one and all I can hope is that the little advance made will be pursued and efforts at further advance towards a peaceful settlement will continue to be made.

Now, while this Geneva Conference was going on, the Prime Minister of China visited India for a few days. That visit of Mr. Chou-En-Lai was, I need hardly say, important in many respects. After all, China and India are the two biggest countries of Asia. China and India are not only big but have, both of them, a very long past, and a very long past which has often touched each other in the course of history. Apart from this past history, in the present, it is obvious that we have to play an important role in Asia, if not in a wider sphere, and we have thought it of the highest importance that India and China should understand each other and should, so far as it is possible, co-operate with each other. We were neighbours with nearly 2,000 miles of frontier and anyhow, we were big, dynamic, vital, growing and progressive nations and we were bound to come in touch with each other in many places. Now, that coming in touch could either be a friendly touch or one in conflict. If one is coming in touch with the other, our desire and, I believe, the desire of the Chinese Government, is that the contact should be friendly and that we should co-operate in as large a measure as possible. As a result of that came the agreement on Tibet wherein the agreement itself, if I may say so, was rather a minor document but certain principles contained in it were very important. Those five principles—they are known to hon. Members—non-interference, recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, etc.—were important and, since then, they have become, well, the basis of a new approach to these matters certainly in South-East Asia and, to some extent, elsewhere, too.

So, the visit of Mr. Chou En-Lai was important for us to talk to each other, to discuss matters frankly and

fully. At that time, the Geneva Conference was going on and no one knew what the final result would be. We had occasion to discuss those matters at Geneva, as well as many other matters pertaining to Asia specially, and other matters. We discussed quite frankly the fact of China and India having different political and economic systems, how they were going to come into conflict with each other, how far each country would tolerate and not interfere with the other. Those talks, therefore, led us to a large number of common approaches to these problems in spite of such differences which we might have in our own individual countries as to how to solve our own respective problems. It was to me not only a pleasure but I think I profited considerably by this meeting and I believe it was of some advantage to the Prime Minister of China also to have spent a few days in India, to have had frank talks with us, to have had a fleeting glimpse of India as it is and to have grasped something of the mind of the other countries in Asia, not only India but Burma and other South-East Asian countries. I think, therefore, that both of us profited considerably by this meeting and widened our respective horizons.

After that he went to Burma and the House knows that the Prime Minister of Burma and the Prime Minister of China issued a joint statement there more or less on the lines of the joint statement that had been issued in Delhi, embodying those five principles again. I have little doubt that some other countries in South-East Asia are also entirely agreeable to those five principles and to the approach of those joint statements. Now, this is an important thing, this gradual growth of an area of peace in South-East Asia. It is true that by some of the countries agreeing to follow this peaceful course we do not guarantee peace in Asia or anywhere else because that is beyond our capacity, but we do throw our weight on the side of peace. Now, it was after Mr. Chou En-Lai came here that he went back

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to Geneva and those agreements were arrived at. I do not wish to say much more about these international developments except that while on the one side we have to congratulate ourselves on this progress made in regard to the situation in Indo-China, I do wish the House to appreciate that the world is all the time sitting on the edge of some kind of a precipice and nobody quite knows what new development or what new happening might upset this balance.

We have to be clear about some basic matters. The word 'co-existence' has been used and thrown about a good deal in the past few months and it has come to mean something; and yet, so far as we in India are concerned, our whole policy has been based, right from the beginning, since we started functioning in the international sphere, on the conception of co-existence. That word or that idea or conception is not new to us naturally. It had to be so because on the one hand we do not wish to interfere with others in any way and, on the other hand, we will not like to be interfered with by others. So the natural consequence of this approach is co-existence; it can be no other. It is only when you want to interfere or when you are afraid of being interfered with, that naturally co-existence is upset; nobody in the world today can be certain but you can form your own guess as to whether the forces aiming at interference with each other can be checked, controlled or not. If they cannot be checked, then of course there can be no co-existence and conflicts arise. And we have arrived at a stage in the world when a conflict, a small conflict, is likely to become immediately a big conflict and a big conflict is likely to become immediately a big world war. There are no small stages left now although this problem of understanding whether co-existence is possible or not is a very important one. But one thing is quite clear. If it is not possible, the only alternative is world war—co-destruction, I do not know what you

would call it—so that whether one likes the present state of affairs in the world or not, one has in effect to choose between a policy which is likely to lead to war on the bigger scale and the acceptance of the general approach meant by the word 'co-existence' that is, countries existing where they are, not interfering with others. The first real grip with this subject came at the Geneva Conference, I mean as between the various countries, and they realised that excepting some idea of co-existence the alternative was war, which they were naturally not prepared to face. The House will remember perhaps that in the decisions at Geneva in regard to the Indo-China countries—Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam—it has been specifically laid down that they should be independent, of course, and they should not have military alliances with other countries. That is to say, they should be more or less unaligned, and should more or less belong to what we call the area of peace. Now, there is some argument about the interpretation of words, but the general idea underlying the Geneva decisions in regard to Indo-China countries is quite clear. If any of the Indo-China countries aligns itself so definitely with one powerful group of nations, it becomes a threat to the other. And, therefore, instead of affirming peace, they become a cause of conflict. On the one side, it was feared that they might be a spring-board for the action of communist countries; on the other, it was feared that they might be bases for action against those countries, so that unless you could, in a sense, isolate them, in a military sense I mean, and a sense of bases and others, from the two types of countries, you make them a cause of conflict. Therefore, this important principle or decision was laid down that these Indo-China countries should, as far as possible, keep out of these military alliances, and, in a sense, therefore, form part of an area of peace. How that idea develops there, of course, will depend on other circumstances.

Now, soon after this Geneva Conference, proposals were made to hold a meeting to consider the idea of a South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, and I believe in about a fortnight's time a meeting is being held in the Philippines to consider these proposals. Our country was also invited to that meeting. We expressed our inability to attend, and we gave some reasons, not as a reaction not to attend, but after deep thought, full thought, we came to this decision and explained our position, because some of the countries going there are countries with whom normally we co-operate, and we propose to co-operate. There is no question of our keeping away from any conference where those countries are represented, unless we feel that it would be wrong for us to participate. We came to the conclusion, with all deference to the other powers that will be present there, that this particular move, more especially at this particular juncture, was unfortunate. It somehow was likely to change the whole trend towards peace that the Geneva Conference had created by its decisions in Indo-China. This Conference, therefore, in the Philippines was likely to give a new direction, and a wrong direction, to their efforts for peace. I am quite sure that the people who are going to meet in the Philippines do not wish, of course, anything which might make the prospects of peace less. They want peace, and they are aiming at peace and security. That is so, I have no doubt, but the fact remains—and I am convinced of it—that the result of the Geneva Conference and the ending of the Indo-China War was to bring about a great sense of relief in Asia and all over the world, also a greater feeling, if you will, of security, or—I put it the other way—a lesser feeling of insecurity. One was moving towards less fear, less suspicion of each other and gradually towards settlement. Now, immediately after that, to approach this question in the way which is probably likely to be adopted at the Baguio Conference seems to me very likely to raise those very fears and

suspensions again and thereby, instead of assuring security, encourage a feeling of insecurity and suspicion. We think, therefore, that the immediate result of this Conference would certainly be unfortunate, possibly also the ultimate result. In any event, so far as we were concerned, our attending that Conference would have obviously meant our giving up, to a large extent, the policy of non-alignment that we have followed, giving up the basic policy that we have been pursuing. And thirdly, having accepted the membership and the Chairmanship of the three Commissions in Indo-China, it seemed totally inappropriate and unbecoming for us to join a Conference of this type which really would have come in the way of our functioning with that impartiality with which we are expected to function in these Commissions. So, for these reasons we were unable to accept that invitation and we gave our reasons quite clearly.

Now, I should like to refer to some nearer matters in which the House is no doubt greatly interested, that is to say, the Portuguese and French Settlements in India. May I say that, in so far as the French Settlements are concerned, we are at present engaged in a series of what might be called technical talks or talks on technical subjects, as between the representatives of the Government of France and our representatives? I hope that out of these talks and negotiations something more precise and definite will come and as soon as that happens, I shall of course come to this House and inform it. For the present, it would not be advisable, when these delicate talks are taking place, for me to discuss them publicly.

The question of Goa has proved more difficult and has produced much more excitement, some excitement in India, and apparently, unfortunately, more excitement in the mind of the Portuguese Government. It has been very extraordinary how in the last month or so, the Portuguese Government has suddenly started organising campaigns in all the capitals of the

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world against India in regard to Goa, and it is very extraordinary what they have said in the course of those campaigns. They made out that some major military invasion was going to take place—either definite military invasion or our soldiers disguising themselves as fisher-folk with guns under their clothes and invading Goa or in some other way, and there has been a considerable addition to their normal military forces in Goa. There has been a good deal of correspondence with the Portuguese Government which has been published and laid on the Table of the House. Hon. Members who have read that correspondence will perhaps experience a feeling of some slight bewilderment as I have done when dealing with it because I have found it very difficult somehow to come to grips.

The Portuguese Government suggested at one stage that there should be some international observers. They particularly suggested it for August 15 but the suggestion was made about 3 or 4 days earlier. It was quite impossible for these international observers to appear suddenly out of nothing, but we decided to accept that because we were not afraid of any observers and we made it perfectly clear that these observations should be, well, on the fullest scale. We don't mind observers on the Indian side or on the other side. It must be a free observation in regard to conditions in the Portuguese territory and certainly that observation can take place on the Indian side of the border, and nobody said 'no' to it and we suggested the normal thing: "let us meet together; let your representatives and ours meet to consider as to how this observation should take place and who should be invited to observe." It is obvious because unless we meet together and discuss this problem, the observers won't appear out of nothing. They have to be chosen or picked by us and there must be some agreement between us. Now, for the last two weeks, we have exchanged note after note and yet that

meeting has not taken place. We have nominated our representatives and the Portuguese have nominated theirs and yet we cannot meet somehow or other and some excuse or other has been found by the Portuguese Government and apparently they want us to commit ourselves in regard to various matters. We are not prepared to commit ourselves about anything nor do we ask them to commit themselves. Naturally these observers or these talks that might take place between their representatives and ours over this question of observation are not going to solve the Goan problem. They are not going to discuss the basic problem of the transfer of *de facto* and *de jure* sovereignty of Goa or the problems which are between us and the Portuguese Government. The present discussions, if they take place, cannot discuss them and they have to be left over for, I hope, a future discussion. The present stage, when the representatives of the two Governments meet, is a limited stage—for them to discuss what is happening there now and what is the position there now. In regard to that, no commitment is necessary or can be made. If the Portuguese Government wants us to make any commitment giving up immediately our ideas in regard to Goa, they are obviously mistaken and we are not going to do that nor do we ask them at this stage to make any such commitment on their part. Our object has been to proceed step by step peacefully and thus gradually arrive at some settlement.

Now, I don't know if the Portuguese Government have agreed to this last letter of ours—I don't know what they will answer. Anyhow, we are ready for it. One thing that surprises me very much is the reaction of some foreign countries to this Goa issue. Some of them, I think, are probably not fully aware of the facts because when we have placed the real facts before them they have admitted that they did not know them wholly. Others, knowing the facts, nevertheless have acted in a way that surprises me.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA (Andhra): Is the United Kingdom one such country?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Pardon?

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: I ask whether one of the countries active in this manner is the United Kingdom.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am sorry I could not hear.

MR. CHAIRMAN: He asks whether the United Kingdom is not one of those countries.

SHRI B. GUPTA (West Bengal): Please name the countries.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is a practice which hon. Members there may indulge in, but it is not a right one.

I feel, looking at this question of Goa and reading some of the speeches and documents which are coming out from Portugal, I am transported into some other world. I remember, and the House may remember, that story, how some five hundred years ago first a very significant event took place, when Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut—I believe it was in the month of May, 1498. And it was a very significant event because that was the first intrusion of an expansionist Europe into Asia. Much followed that. But, before Vasco da Gama also, much had happened. He did not suddenly emerge out of nothing. For years before that, Portugal, and to some extent other countries also, had prepared for this visit to India. There was that great heroic figure in Portugal's annals—Prince Henry, the Navigator—who had dreamt of coming to India or sending somebody to India. They had gradually spread and gradually gained knowledge of the coast of Africa, of western Africa, because they wanted to come round Africa, as they ultimately did. And some time after Prince Henry's time, Vasco da Gama came and then other people came too. Then Albuquerque came—whose name we still have in

one of our roads in New Delhi. That shows how little animus we have in these matters. And I think—I am not quite sure—it was Albuquerque who first established himself at Goa. If you look at the background of Indian history then there was the conflict in South India and Western India, between the Kingdom of Bijapur and the Empire of Vizianagram and Albuquerque took advantage of that conflict, supporting one against the other, or one side being foolish enough to ask for his support or conniving at his coming. Whatever it was, Albuquerque came and they established themselves at Goa. And it is no good our getting excited about it, or the Portuguese getting excited about it; it is too old for that. I am prepared to pay my tribute to the adventurous spirit of some of the great Portuguese of that era. Though they were not, well very mild mannered and gentle nevertheless they were of a heroic mould, some of them undoubtedly who risked their lives coming across unknown oceans. And they came here and they established themselves here under certain circumstances. And I think within about fifty years of their coming to Goa there was something else which was not very nice and that was the starting of the inquisition at Goa. Well, the inquisition functioned and many things have happened in the past two hundred years which are just history. We do not feel much about them except that we read them as we read about other matters in history. But the point is that Goa, for a variety of reasons, has remained as a kind of congealed piece of history, a kind of a painted picture which does not change while life is changing, due to a variety of factors, just as in an infinitely lesser degree those States which used to be called Indian States previously and which were not parts of the other Indian scene—politically or otherwise—remained for about a hundred years, or 130 or 140 years, cut off, by and large, from the changes that were taking place in the rest of India. Some States were fairly well off; others were pretty bad, but most of them were cut



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off. Powerful movements took place in India, or in British India, as it was called then. They only had a very slight effect on the Indian States. To say that the movement, whether it was for independence or anything, was meant for just that area that was called British India, is manifestly absurd. The movement for independence in India was meant for the whole of India (*Hear, hear*) obviously including the Indian States, including Goa, including Pondicherry, including every place. It makes no difference to us that in the course of our history, colonial powers had come and colonial powers had, if you like, divided India between them. It may be that the division was not a fair division between them—some got very small parts and some got very big parts. In the early nineteenth century there was a struggle between the big colonial powers which ultimately resulted in the triumph of the British power in India. And if Goa continued after that, it was perfectly clear that it continued, well, under the shadow of the British power and with the connivance and goodwill and protection of the British power. It could not possibly have continued otherwise—just as the Indian States continued with the goodwill and the connivance of the British suzerain power; otherwise they would not have continued. All kinds of changes have taken place in the last hundred years. So Goa continued. It is not for me to describe the conditions in Goa or conditions in Portugal during this long period.

What I wish to lay stress on is that this continuation of Goa as a separate entity was due to certain adventitious and other causes. The moment the British power—the protecting power, if I may say so, in India—went from here, the whole *raison d'être* for Goa remaining separate ceased and no doubt it would have been in the nature of things if, at that time, this question had been solved immediately. It may interest this House to know, if it does not know already, that in the year 1947—I am not sure of the

exact month and date but I think it was in 1947—that is to say, just about the time when the transfer of power was going to take place in India, a little before and then a little after—when the Hyderabad Government was adopting—the Hyderabad Government of the day—a rather non-co-operative line with the Government of India, it (the Hyderabad Government of the day) started negotiations with the Portuguese Government about Goa. It is not a secret and it is known. I do not mean to say that Goa was going to be transferred to Hyderabad completely, but some proposals were discussed about some kind of common control of Goa between the Governments. On the one hand the Hyderabad Government wanted an outlet on the sea. The Government of that day, of 1947, felt surrounded by the territory of what was going to be the Union of India and—perhaps the House knows—they had various ideas. The Government of the day was rather an ambitious Government and it thought on the one hand of spreading out towards the Bay of Bengal and, on the other, it tried to spread out towards the Arabian Sea via Goa.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: And yet the Nizam continues to be there.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I hope he will live long and healthy.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: I do not mind his living long but I do not want him to continue as the Raj Pramukh.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is no good blaming any single individual for this. The persons who were the moving spirits behind all these negotiations have long been spread out and have left Hyderabad. They are not even there and some of them have, well, suffered adequately.

So, the idea was to spread out towards the Sea and, presumably, the Portuguese thought that Hyderabad might be used as the bulwark against the Indian Union to come—just as well

to go hand in hand. Of course, those talks came to nothing ultimately because other changes took place with some rapidity, but it is interesting to see how the Portuguese Government of the day, not long ago, was discussing this problem of Goa with the Hyderabad Government when now they adopt the line that this subject is too sacred to be talked about, to be discussed, that it is a bit of Portugal transplanted into India and that they cannot discuss this matter at all. I am merely referring to that to show how at one stage, when they felt no doubt that because this great British power—their protecting power—was going away their future might be uncertain in Goa, they wanted to do something, while ever since then—we stated even right at the beginning—we have been stating that Goa must become part of India for a variety of reasons which are manifest to anybody.

The whole historical or other necessity of Goa being separate has vanished. Nothing can keep Goa separate. It is not a question of my opinion or, if I may say so, the opinion of this hon. House. There are certain factors which must have full play, apart from this factor of Goa being in this great country, the past of it, the future, and the fundamental fact of the Goanese themselves wanting it.

Apart from all these, the major fact is that what is called 'colonialism' is in its retreat and has to be so. We talk about the crisis of our time and many people do it in different ways. Probably, in the United States of America, the crisis of the time is supposed to be communism *versus* anti-communism. May be so to some extent. Well, the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism *versus* anti-colonialism. But let me say, of course, all these things overlap.

Now, take the case of Indo-China and look back at the history of Indo-China, the tragic history of seven-and-a-half years of war, of terrible destruction. Was not that due to an attempt to prolong the colonial era

there when it had ceased to have any real strength or significance? The result has come or will come, has almost come, that is, those countries will be independent and free from colonial control. But if a wise decision had been taken seven years ago, that would have avoided the horrors of this war and all kinds of other developments and consequences that have taken place. That wise decision was taken in Burma, in India. In Indonesia there was trouble, you remember, repeated trouble, but, however, it was solved to some extent. One can see the difference. Where this has been recognised, the trend of modern history, of modern events in Asia has been recognised, there has been a peaceful change-over and friendship between those countries that dominated and those that were dominated. Where it was not—whether in Asia, whether in Africa—there is continuous trouble, the trouble of fighting a war and all that is going on and it is patent that that cannot end until the freedom of those countries is recognised.

Now, it is in this larger context of freedom of countries, individual countries, that we should also see this problem of little Goa. I can understand the Portuguese having a soft corner in their hearts and minds for the days of Portugal's grandeur. Each country has its periods and we do not grudge them that, but that does not justify in any sense, logically or otherwise, for them to adopt a policy today of holding on to Goa against the wishes of the people of Goa—it could not be justified at any time. One thing I deeply regret, that is, the way the Portuguese Government has brought the Christian Church into the picture, especially the Catholic Church, and thereby tried to make this a religious issue, which of course it is not, as has been pointed out to me by the Catholics in India, by the topmost Catholic leaders in India, who have, I am glad to say, expressed themselves quite clearly on this issue not only of religion and Catholicism in India but of Goa itself

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and have supported the freedom movement in Goa.

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But so far as Christianity and Catholicism are concerned, Christianity came to India long before it went to Portugal, hundreds of years before it went to Portugal. It came in the first century, before it went to any part of Europe, in fact. And it has been established as such. I should like hon. Members here and the country to remember that, because people happen to think that Christianity, or that religion, is an alien or a foreign religion. Christianity is as much a religion of India as any other religion. It has been here for the last 1900 years, especially in the South, of course. There are five million Roman Catholics in India, I believe, and there may be, in regard to minor matters, arguments with them, or differences of opinion, but in regard to any matter concerning their religion, freedom of conscience, etc., they themselves have declared that they have full freedom and full opportunity.

So, it is a matter of deep regret to me that this religious bias is being given to this purely political question of Goa. As a matter of fact, if I may put it in another way, by giving it this religious bias, the Portuguese Government or the Portuguese Prime Minister is doing no service to Roman Catholicism in India, because he is associating Roman Catholicism with colonialism, which is a bad thing for Roman Catholicism. Naturally, religion should stand on its merits as a religion, not as a part of the political doctrine or as an umbrella of a colonial power. Therefore, let us keep religion out of the picture and look at this question from the point of view of politics, economics and the rest, and from the point of view of what has happened in India, what is happening in Asia. And it is manifest that looking at it from this point of view, all one can say about Goa is to express surprise that it still continues to be a Portuguese possession,

to express surprise that it has lasted so long in this isolated way during this long period of history. It lasted, of course, because of various other factors, various other protections given to it, and the like. If the British power had to withdraw from India, and come to a friendly settlement, as it did, it is **extraordinary** for any one to imagine that any small footholds on the coast of India here and there, under colonial control, can continue as such. It is manifestly a proposition which, on the face of it, is absurd. But, apart from these broader arguments, which indicate that the whole sweep of things today is against this colonialism, wherever it has been sought to be continued, there has been grief and disaster, as we have seen. And so, people are realising that it must go. And now, the argument that Goa is a part of Portugal and the argument that Goanese are passionately fond of Portuguese Administration, could very easily be tested. I have never heard of the Portuguese Government referring to self-determination. But I know that the Portuguese Government have had to bring large numbers of African troops to Goa to carry on their administration. This is not a sign of the Goanese in Goa rejoicing in the Portuguese Government there. As a matter of fact, the last seven years or so show that the Goanese there have supported this movement—of course, the Goanese there, the Goanese in Bombay and elsewhere. And of course, we are in full sympathy with them naturally, but we have strictly, perhaps too strictly, avoided any direct interference in this matter because we felt that now that the British power had gone, the rest would follow, but we wanted that to happen peacefully and co-operatively. We do not want a quarrel with Portugal. Why should we? It is true that the state of affairs in Portugal is different from the state of affairs in India—I mean to say, politically and economically. The Prime Minister of Portugal has, I believe, in one of his speeches made some reference to democracy. Well, with all respect to

him, I was not aware that this word was understood or acted upon in Portugal. It is none of my concern what the Portuguese have in their own country, as it should be none of their concern what we have in this country. I am interested in Goa naturally and I feel for it also. We are both interested and therefore the only way is to talk to each other. Powerful historical forces are working. It is not a question of the Indian Army marching there; we do not want to do it, but powerful historical forces are working there and bringing about these changes. A powerful, indigenous Goan movement is working there, with which we wholly sympathise. Now, the House knows that in Goa such a thing as civil liberty, of course, is completely absent. Newspapers cannot be published; nothing can be published in any newspaper. A very eminent surgeon of Goa the other day happened to say something at a dinner party. Somebody said that Goa was part of Portugal and he said that Goa was not part of Portugal. The next day he was arrested and deported to Portugal—a very famous surgeon of Goa and a very able man—and he is now in Lisbon or somewhere. This has been the background in Goa. The people there are not allowed to say anything, to express themselves, and are coerced into living in a state of non-expression of anything. And then we are told that the Goans are very happy under the Portuguese. Now, the only way to deal with such questions obviously is for people to talk to each other. The other way is war, and we do not wish to have that, because it may be a small thing but it leads to all kinds of consequences, national and international, and in the world today it is a bad thing to start off this kind of thing. It has its effects, actions and reactions, and it comes in the way of the other work we want to do. We want to settle this peacefully and we hope to settle this peacefully but that can only be done if the other party is prepared to discuss these matters. Now, in the last five years

we have been trying to get across to them. We opened a Legation at Lisbon to be in closer touch with them. We presented notes to them on the subject, but they refused to accept our notes officially, formally. So, it has been for us a rather frustrating experience as to how to get on with this business. I am not surprised at all that the Goanese or other non-Goanese are, round about Goa or in the northern area of Daman or Diu and all that, taking the law into their own hands, if I may say so. I can quite understand and sympathise with their feelings in regard to this matter. Nevertheless, we have advised them strongly throughout not to do so, because, if they did so, all kinds of complications would arise. We cannot stop the Goans, nor do we wish to stop them. It is their business. Others can express their sympathy, but we have first of all deliberately prevented any person—Goan or non-Goan—from going there with arms; secondly, non-Goans from going there in organized bands, because we thought that that would confuse the issue and may set in motion a certain chain of events which might lead us into difficult situations.

SHRI S. N. DWIVEDY (Orissa):  
Even if they are peaceful bands?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, even if they are peaceful. Of course, it is difficult for anyone to guarantee in such circumstances how one will behave when these conflicts come because on the other side the people are not peaceful. I am quite sure in my mind—I have no doubt—that owing to the various forces at work in India, and outside India—and I have no doubt what the fate of Goa is going to be—it must become a part of India, part of the Union of India principally because the Goans themselves desire it. Now the point is whether we should do something in this matter to expedite it which might involve us into difficult situations which we would rather not face—conflicts and the rest of that type—and that is why we have done this. I am quite clear in my mind that, that

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is the right policy to adopt. I cannot of course, say what will happen next but whatever may happen, I do hope that the general policy that we will pursue, not only the Government but also the people, will be a peaceful and non-violent policy in this matter. We are too big, if I may put it in another way to adopt any other method, apart from any other thing. So, I would beg this House and the country to some extent also to exercise some patience in this matter.

SHRI B. GUPTA: But the Americans are sending arms and how can we be patient when they do it?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member is not right in the statement he has made about the Americans sending arms. I don't think they have sent arms, I don't think they will send arms, and I don't very much care if anybody sends arms. (Cheers).

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Only the last statement is correct. Even if they send we don't care.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member will perhaps realize that I am in a better position to know than he is or they are.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Not always.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I say definitely.

SHRI B. GUPTA: Will you allow us to go and seize the arms and see who has manufactured them?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is not a question of my allowing you. It is for the Portuguese Government.

SHRI B. GUPTA: You are coming in the way.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It does not make much difference whether there are a few more Portuguese or other regiments there or a few more arms or a few less arms. The whole situation, but for the slightly tragic aspect, has a comic opera aspect behind it and we must not lose our sense of perspective in looking

at it. It is the people of Goa that count ultimately, not other people who want to go in and put them in difficulty. Sir, I have ventured to place these considerations before the House in moving this motion. I thank you, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion moved:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

There are four amendments. I hope hon. Members who have tabled them will just say that they formally move them, without making any speech.

SHRI S. MAHANTY (Orissa): Sir, I move:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same the House regrets—

(a) that the policy pursued by the Government in regard to the elimination of foreign pockets from India, particularly the Portuguese territories, has been belated, halting and unplanned; and

(b) that Parliament has not been taken into confidence in shaping and directing the foreign policy of India'."

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Sir, I move:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, the House regrets that Government have let down the Indian people in their struggle against the continued Portuguese occupation of Goa, Daman and Diu'."

SHRI B. C. GHOSE (West Bengal): Sir, I move:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

‘and having considered the same, the House regrets the action of the Government in preventing peaceful satyagrahis from entering Goa with a view to take part in its liberation movement’.”

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN (Madras):  
Sir, I move:

“That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

‘and having considered the same, the House approves of the policy’.”

MR. CHAIRMAN: The motion and the amendments are now open for discussion.

SHRI P. C. BHANJ DEO (Orissa):  
Mr. Chairman, from the earliest times, India has been wedded to the cause of peace and the preservation of goodwill in the international sphere. As early as the Fourth Century B.C. the Greek Ambassador to the then Government of India spoke thus:

“Truth and virtue the Indian people hold alike in esteem. The people of India have never sent an expedition abroad; nor was their country ever invaded and conquered.”

This quotation is given from “The Indika” of Megasthenes. Few facts reveal the continuity of Indian tradition and culture more clearly than the continuation of this policy in the acts and the pronouncements of our present Government and of our President of Independent India. In 1950, the President said:

“My Government has not sought to interfere with other countries, just as it does not invite any interference from others in our own country.”

I am glad the Prime Minister has repeated those words in his speech today and said that the intention of our foreign policy and our earnest desire is to preserve international

harmony and goodwill. But how far this principle of our foreign policy has been carried out by the Government, in view of the confession by the Prime Minister in another place that “Portuguese concentration of ship movements may well be a violation of our national and international rights. We shall examine and consider this and take such legitimate measures as may be necessary” is perhaps a debatable point and largely depends upon the effectiveness and timeliness of those legitimate measures. Sir, I had intended to touch extensively upon the Portuguese question and its present situation in the light of my recent interviews with Dr. Cunha and other Goan leaders in Bombay. But seeing the number of amendments on this subject and the paucity of time at my disposal, I will leave this matter to be tackled at length by other speakers. I will quote only one of my friends there in Bombay and that one statement. I think, will suffice, as far as the opinion of Goanese leaders in this respect is concerned. My friend in Bombay said:

“The ‘*namak-haram jagirs*’ of colonial occupation left to Independent India by the British power, which have thrived on smuggling and illicit speculation on currency, could have been eliminated much earlier by the Union Government through prompt steps to check this illegal traffic in due time and nip it in the bud.”

I am glad that in this connection, the Prime Minister has mentioned the integration of the Indian States. I only hope that the Government will not hesitate to take prompt action for the integration of the Portuguese pockets similar to that taken in the case of certain Indian States. Sir, I come from a part of India which was formerly a State. There, for much less provocation than the Portuguese people have given to our people so far, the Government decided on the integration by the firm step of letting Gurkha troops.....

SHRI S. N. DWIVEDY: Quite rightly.

SHRI P. C. BHANJ DEO: ..... by letting them loose among the Adibasis, the innocent Adibasis.

SHRI H. P. SAKSENA (Uttar Pradesh): It was integration by consent.

SHRI P. C. BHANJ DEO: You see, I am not opposing that point of view or that action of the Government. I am rather supporting it and I say that in the ultimate circumstance, if it comes to the point when we have to resort to force—God forbid that and we do not wish to resort to force and we are doing everything in our power to.....

SHRI GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore): But you are quoting a bad example for a good argument.

SHRI P. C. BHANJ DEO: We are doing everything in our power to settle the differences peacefully, but if Portugal understands no other language except the language of the sword, then I can only say that the Government should be prepared to prove to them to the hilt that those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword. In the light of the present international situation, it may not be out of place here perhaps to say that on the whole we approve of India's stand and the foreign policy of this country very ably handled by the Prime Minister. India's name for traditional championship of peace and goodwill among nations stands high today in the estimation of alien powers, under the guidance of the External Affairs Minister and its qualified leader.

We cannot, however, help feeling in all these achievements, that the Prime Minister could have satisfied our desire to know realities better in consonance with our traditional partiality for truth and given us more facts about our relations with governments nearer home. Charity begins at

home, even in the international sphere. But even in the distant theatre of international affairs, we cannot help feeling that he has not taken us into confidence fully by eliminating so many items in which we feel vitally interested.

As an instance of this I would cite Russia. Our diplomatic relationship with Soviet Russia, for instance, has not been touched upon by the Prime Minister. We are both busy sending mutual delegations and spending a lot of money, but are still in blissful ignorance about the state of our country's relationship with Soviet Russia, and *vice versa*. Members of the Russian Embassy here are free to move about wherever they like, but there are restrictions on the movement of foreign embassies in Russia in which category the Indian Embassy is included. What are the reasons for these restrictions? Have our Government carried out negotiations with Russia about these matters? How can there be true friendship between two powers without the right of free movement in their mutual territories? Churchill's "History of the Second World War" shows clearly that America and her President have contributed much towards the achievement of Indian freedom. While Churchill himself was resisting such an occurrence, it must not be forgotten that America insisted upon Indian independence all the time. It must not also be forgotten that the United States of America helped India during the great famine of 1943-44.

SHRI B. GUPTA: How?

SHRI P. C. BHANJ DEO: America was the first to recognize our independence and allowed us to open our Embassy even before the 15th August 1947. She gave us citizenship rights in the United States of America and has been helping us with money and technicians. We have, therefore, every right to know the present state of our relationship with that country. According to Reuter's report in the

newspapers, Mr. Allen says that there are differences in the foreign policies of America and India. We would like to know what these differences are and what the Government is doing to smoothen out these differences.

SHRI B. GUPTA: Why don't you ask Dulles?

SHRI P. C. BHANJ DEO: It is my earnest request to the Prime Minister that he should take the representatives of the people of this country into his confidence as far as foreign policy and international relationships are concerned. I understand that there are many matters which cannot be discussed publicly, but for that I would like to request him that he should hold a secret session of Parliament, if necessary, and inform us all and make us full partners in the policy of the Government and all that he is doing to enhance India's prestige in the international field.

Coming nearer home, our relations with Pakistan are singular by their absence in the Prime Minister's speech. Many of us would like to know the true reasons for the prevalent war cry in Pakistan today. What influences are at the back of this strange phenomenon? How far has the canal water dispute proceeded towards a solution? Apart from other matters, we cannot forget the fact that in our present financial difficulties, Pakistan owes us over 250 crores of rupees. Although seven years have elapsed since partition, we have heard nothing about the re-payment of these sums which formed Pakistan's share of railways, of currency, of disposals, etc., although these should have been replenished to us immediately after partition.

Then, again, tens of thousands of our people are about to be liquidated in Ceylon. We would like to know the reasons why the Finance Minister of India has gone out of his way to declare publicly that India is ready to

receive all refugees from Ceylon. It is well known that India has no extra-territorial ambitions, but the truth is that Ceylon has been built up by the hard labour of Indian workers. Her tea and rubber plantations are still worked by Indians. We would like to know if the Prime Minister is also a party to this unasked for offer for repatriation of our nationals. Details about the reception arrangements for these people, if such is the case, would be a very welcome event.

In South Africa, too, the question of our nationals is far from satisfactory.

Last but not least, I come to Burma, and there I am personally interested because I come from Orissa. In Burma the fate of hundreds of thousands of our nationals is concerned in the problem of land nationalization that is taking place there; all these nationals of ours own lands and housing properties there. Of these Indians about fifty thousand come from my part of the country. Therefore, I should like to know from the Foreign Minister, from the Prime Minister, the policy of the Government and what he is doing to secure compensation for these people who are going to be very hard hit by this policy of Burma.

May I end up my observations, Sir, by saying that many of our neighbours that I mentioned in my speech are Commonwealth countries? We have become a partner of the British Commonwealth in spite of the Independence pledge of 1930. We were assured at that time by the Prime Minister that it was to our advantage to become a party in this alliance. But in view of the fact that our relations with Pakistan, with Ceylon, with South Africa, are such, and, also, in view of the fact that Mr. Eden has been cautioning our Government not to resort to arms—which betrays the attitude of the Churchillian Government towards India—I have my grave doubts whether it is worth our while to continue as members of the Commonwealth any further.



[Shri P. C. Bhanj Deo.]

With these words, Sir, may I wind up by mentioning my appreciation of the success of our Prime Minister in the creditable achievement of peace in Korea and Indo-China? By this act both he and Mr. Krishna Menon have done service not only to this nation, but to humanity generally, which both will remember gratefully for many years. The cementing of our good relationship with China also is an achievement of no mean proportions. I hope, Sir, in this connection that an early conference of the Colombo Powers will be held, to which China and Indo-China will also be invited; all matters relating to Asia should be discussed thoroughly here, so that a common formula can be evolved to ensure strength, unity, understanding and co-operation.

Thank you, Sir.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR (Bombay): Mr. Chairman, in this debate on foreign policy what one can do, at the most, is to discuss the principles on which the foreign policy of the Government is based. There is hardly time for doing anything more. Principles are undoubtedly very valuable, but I take it politicians have a great dislike for principles, particularly politicians who are dealing with foreign policy. They like to deal with things *ad hoc*, each transaction by itself, without any underlying principle.

I remember that when after the first World War, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau met in a hotel in Paris before the Versailles Treaty in order to settle, among themselves, where to draw the line of partition between certain territories belonging to Germany in order to hand them over to France for satisfying the strategic fears of France, they had a long map spread in a room which covered the whole of the room and Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau had fallen on their tummy to examine exactly where the line should be drawn. After a long search they drew the line which was, of course, most suitable to France. After-

wards Mr. Lloyd George called Mr. Nicholson, who had accompanied him as the expert from his Foreign Office and asked him to express his opinion about the line which they had drawn. Mr. Nicholson explained in horror saying, "Oh! this is too bad, too bad. Morally quite indefensible". Both these statesmen immediately turned on their back and raised their legs in the air and said, "Well, Mr. Nicholson, can't you give us a better reason?"

I remember also about 1924 or so, Mr. Low, the great cartoonist, having drawn a cartoon in the *Evening Standard* in London showing the various Foreign Ministers of the different countries of Europe then searching for the settlement of European problems with their top hats, tail coats and striped trousers holding each other's hands, dancing round and saying, "Oh! give us peace without principles, give us peace without principles". Of course, the world laughed at that.

I am glad that that cannot be said of our Prime Minister. He has certain principles on which he is proceeding. It is for the House to decide whether the principles on which he is proceeding are principles which can furnish us a safe guide and whether they are valid principles on which the destiny of this country could be staked. That is the only question that we can discuss and it is to these principles that I am going to confine myself.

The principles on which the Prime Minister is proceeding—and he has said so himself—are mainly three. One is peace; the second is co-existence between communism and free democracy; and the third is opposition to SEATO. These are the three main props on which his foreign policy is based. Now, Sir, in order that one may be able to assess the validity and the adequacy of these principles, I think, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the background of the present day problems with which we are concerned and for which these principles are enunciated.

Now the background, to my mind is nothing else but the expansion of communism in the world. It is quite impossible to follow the principle or to understand the validity and the nature of the principle unless one bears in mind the problem that the world has to face today—that part of the world which believes in parliamentary and free democracy, viz., the expansion of communism in the world. I propose to give some figures to the House which I have collected in this matter. I am not going back into the long past but I am going to start from May 1945 when the War came to an end. By May 1945, Russia had consumed ten European States.

SHRI B GUPTA It is an utter falsehood.

MR CHAIRMAN Mr Gupta, you will have your chance to reply.

SHRI B GUPTA He cannot say such things. An older man like him cannot say such things.

MR CHAIRMAN Mr Sundarayya, tell him that he will have an opportunity of answering and he need not get excited.

DR B R AMBEDKAR You will have time to answer. Don't be impatient. The person who is often uneasy is the Prime Minister but he is not today. He is quite calm. Why are you so excited?

If you want to have a look at the authority, I will give it to you—I have got it here—provided I am assured that you will return it to me.

SHRI B GUPTA You have your document from McCarthy and Dulles.

DR B R AMBEDKAR Now, Sir, I was saying that if we take stock of the situation from May 1945, and find out what has happened, this is the situation. Russia has consumed, as I said, ten European States: one is Finland, two, Estonia, three, Latvia, four,

Lithuania, five, Poland, six, Czechoslovakia, seven, Hungary, eight, Rumania, nine, Bulgaria, and ten Albania.

SHRI B GUPTA and eleven is Dr Ambedkar!

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DR B R AMBEDKAR I am glad you add to my list. You are more up-to-date than the book.

In addition, Russia has taken possession of parts of Germany, Austria, Norway and the Danish Island of Bornholm. Of these ten European States, three have been straightaway annexed by Russia and made part of her country. The rest seven are kept under Russian influence. This European conquest of Russia amounts to an absorption of a total of 85,000 square miles and 23 millions of people subjugated.

In the Far East, Russia has annexed the Chinese territory of China (Tannu Tuva), Manchuria, and Korea, north of the 38th parallel, and Southern Sakhalin. This territory in the Far East represents against a total area of 20,000 square miles and 500,000 inhabitants.

SHRI P SUNDARAYYA What about the People's Republic of China? Why did you omit it?

SHRI GOVINDA REDDY He said that.

SHRI B. GUPTA A great demonstration of history is going on, a great historian has devolved!

DR B R AMBEDKAR They have increased the number by further aggression in South Korea and Indo-China.

Well, Sir, this is the background, I say against which the adequacy of the principles on which the foreign policy of this Government is based must be considered. I will take first the principle of peace. We want peace, nobody wants war. The only question is, what the price of this peace is going to be. At what price are we purchasing this peace? Now, it is quite obvious

[Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.]

that peace is being purchased by what might be called partitioning and dismembering of countries. I can quite understand the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary where different nationalities with different languages, different cultures, different races, were kept together under one sovereign autocracy of the Austrian Empire. The first World War brought about the end of the Austrian Empire on the well-known principle of self-determination. But here what you are doing is this. There are countries which are culturally one, which are socially homogeneous, which have one language, one race, one destiny, desiring to live together. You go there, cut them up and divide the carcass, and hand over a part of the carcass to what? to countries who are interested in spreading communism. From the figures which I have given there can be no doubt about it that communist countries today are as big as a giant—nobody has seen a giant—I have not seen anyhow.....

SHRI B. GUPTA: Except yourself.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR:..... and he is supposed to be one of the biggest individuals or persons that can be imagined. Here you have a vast country endlessly occupied in destroying other people, absorbing them within its fold on the theory that it is liberating them. The Russian liberation, so far as I can understand, is liberation followed by servitude; it is not liberation followed by freedom. But the point is this—and it worries me considerably. You are, by this kind of a peace, doing nothing more but feeding the giant every time the giant opens his jaw and wants something to eat. When you are feeding the giant regularly and constantly, the question that I should ask myself is this. Is it not conceivable that this giant may one day turn to us and say: "I have now consumed everything that there was to be consumed; you are the only person that remains, and I want to consume you."

SHRI H. P. SAKSENA: Then we will consume the giant.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: Let us not boost ourselves too much. We have not been tried as yet in an international bout and when we are tried in an international bout I think it will be found out whether we can face the situation ourselves. But the point that I was making is this. This principle of feeding the giant seems to me a most obnoxious principle and how, for instance, as I said, can we expect to be relieved? Will the Russians show any gratitude because the Indian Prime Minister and the Indian Parliament have supported the partition of Indo-China or supported the partition of Korea, and will they not turn to us? I think this is a question which the Indians should bear in mind and not forget or overlook.

Now the other question, namely, co-existence. This co-existence to my mind is an astounding principle unless it is very strictly limited. The question is: Can communism and free democracy work together? Can they live together? Is it possible to hope that there will not be a conflict between them? The theory, at any rate, seems to me utterly absurd, for communism is like a forest fire; it goes on burning and consuming anything and everything that comes in its way. It is quite possible that countries which are far distant from the centre of communism may feel safe that the forest fire may be extinguished before it reaches them or it may be that the fire may never reach them. But what about the countries which are living in the vicinity of this forest fire? Can you expect that human habitation and this forest fire can long live together? I have seen comments from Canadian statesmen and from European statesmen congratulating the policy of co-existence. Their praises and their encomiums do not move me in the least. I attach no value to their view and to their opinion. The statesmen of Canada can very easily say that co-existence is possible because Canada is

separated from China and Russia by thousands and thousands of miles. Similarly, England after having pulled itself out from the great conflagration, now thinks that she is too exhausted to do anything and therefore likes to enunciate and support the principle of co-existence. But there again it is a matter of distance. One must not forget that in the foreign policy of a country the geographical factor is one of the most important factors. Each country's foreign policy must vary with its geographical location in relation to the factor with which it is dealing. What is good for Canada may not be good for us. What is good for England may not be good for us. Therefore, this co-existence seems to me a principle which has been adopted without much thought on the part of the Prime Minister.

Then, Sir, I will say a few words with regard to the SEATO. I was very carefully listening to the Prime Minister's observations with regard to the SEATO, and I was glad to find that he had not made up his mind about the SEATO. If I heard him correctly, he said that in view of the fact that this country has accepted the chairmanship of some commission in accordance with the Geneva decisions it may not be compatible for him and for this country to join the SEATO at the same time. The two things would undoubtedly be incompatible. But apart from that I think the merits of the SEATO must be considered.

The repugnance to SEATO appears to me to arise from two sources. I think I am not letting out any secret nor am I accusing the Prime Minister of anything of which he does not know, that the Prime Minister had a certain amount of hostility, or if he does not like that word, estrangement between himself and the United States. Somehow he and the USA do not see eye to eye together. That is one reason why I think he always had a certain amount of repugnance to anything that comes from the United States.

SHRI B. GUPTA: Are you speaking for match-making?

MR. CHAIRMAN: The Prime Minister is quiet and you are talking.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: And secondly from the fear of what Russia will think if India joins the SEATO. Here again, I think, it is necessary to give the House some background against which the merits of the SEATO may be assessed. Now, Sir, what is the background of all this? The background is this.

I have given a list of countries which have gone under the Russian regime. I think it is well known that this happened largely because, if I may say so, of the foolishness of the Americans during the last Great War. The Russians got possession of these territories with the consent of Mr. Roosevelt and with the reluctant willingness of Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill expressed, when the war ended that they had done a great mistake, and a great wrong, in sacrificing the liberty of so many nations for the sake of winning victory against Hitler. And the same feeling, I think, is expressed by him in his last volume which he called "Triumph and Tragedy". It is because of this that he named his last volume "Triumph and Tragedy". Now, Sir, what the Americans are doing, if I understand their policy correctly, is this. Their point of view is that Russia should be satisfied with what she has got during the war, the ten countries. As a matter of fact, I should have thought that it should have been the duty of the Americans and the Britishers to extricate these countries, to liberate them, to make them free. But neither country has the will, nor the moral stamina, nor the desire to engage itself in such a stupendous task. They are therefore following, what may be called a second line of defence, and that second line of defence is that Russia should not be allowed, or China should not

[Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.]

be allowed, to occupy any further part of the free world. I think that is the principle to which all freedom-loving people would agree. There could be no objection to it. And it is to prevent Russia from making further aggression that they are planning the SEATO. The SEATO is not an organisation for committing aggression on any country. The SEATO is an organisation for the purpose of preventing aggression on free countries. I wonder whether the Prime Minister will not be prepared to accept this principle, that, at any rate, such part of the free world as has, by accident, remained free should be allowed to remain free and not to be subjugated. Is India not exposed to aggression? I should have thought that it is very much exposed to aggression. I have no time. Otherwise, I was going to point out to the House how this country has been completely encircled on one side by Pakistan and the other Muslim countries. I do not know what is going to happen, but now that the barrier between Egypt and England has been removed by the handing over of the Suez Canal. I think, there may be very little difficulty in the Muslim countries joining with Pakistan and forming a bloc on that side. On this side by allowing the Chinese to take possession of Laha, the Prime Minister has practically helped the Chinese to bring their border down to the Indian border. Looking at all these things, it seems to me that it would be an act of levity not to believe that India, if it is not exposed to aggression right now, is exposed to aggression and that aggression might well be committed by people who always are in the habit of committing aggression.

Now, I come to the other question. What will Russia say if we join SEATO? And the question that I like to ask is this. What is the key-note of Russian foreign policy? What is it? The key note of our foreign policy is to solve the problems of the other countries,

and not to solve the problems of our own. We have here the problem of Kashmir. We have never succeeded in solving it. Everybody seems to have forgotten that it is a problem. But I suppose, some day, we may wake up and find that the ghost is there. And I find that the Prime Minister has launched upon the project of digging a tunnel connecting Kashmir to India. Sir, I think, it is one of the most dangerous things that a Prime Minister could do. We have been hearing of a tunnel under the English Channel to connect France with England. We have been hearing of it for 50 years, I think. Someone has been proposing, and yet the English have never done anything to carry out the project, because it is a double-edged weapon. The enemy, if he conquers France, can use the tunnel and rush troops into England and conquer England. That might also happen. The Prime Minister, in digging the tunnel, thinks that he alone would be able to use it. He does not realise that it can always be a two-way traffic, and that a conqueror who comes on the other side and captures Kashmir, can come away straight to Pathankot, and probably come into the Prime Minister's House—I do not know.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Getting time.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: Now, one or two small observations.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: One or two small observations to wind up.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: Yes. The Prime Minister has been depending upon what may be called the *Panch-sheel* taken by Mr. Mao and recorded in the Tibet treaty of non-aggression. Well, I am somewhat surprised that the Prime Minister should take this *Panchsheel* seriously. The *Panchsheel*, as you, Sir, know it well, is the essential part of the Buddhist religion, and if Mr. Mao had any faith in the *Panchsheel*, he certainly would treat the Buddhists in his own country in

a very different way There is no room for *Panchsheel* in politics and secondly, not in the politics of a communist country The communist countries have two well-known principles on which they always act One is that morality is always in a flux There is no morality Today's morality is not tomorrow's morality

You can keep your word in accordance with the morality of today and you can break your word with equal justification tomorrow because tomorrow's morality will be different The second thing is that when the Russian Communist State is dealing with the other States, each transaction is a unit by itself When we deal with somebody, we begin with goodwill and end with gratitude. When the Russians deal with somebody, they do not begin with goodwill nor do they end with any gratitude Each transaction begins and ends by itself, and this is what I am sure the Prime Minister will find at the end when the situation ripens The Prime Minister has always been saying that there is such a thing as the principle, "Asia for Asiatics". Yes, in so far as colonialism is concerned, that principle is perfectly true Asia must be for Asiatics, but are we dealing with a situation like this? Is Asia one today? In what sense? Asia is divided now, it is a divided house now More than half of Asia is communist It has adopted a different principle of life and a different principle of Government The rest of Asia follows a different life and a different principle of Government What unity can there be among Asiatics? What is the use of talking about Asia for Asiatics? There can be no such thing at all Asia is already becoming the cockpit of war and strife among Asians themselves Therefore it is better to align ourselves with what we call free nations if we believe in freedom

One word about Goa There can be no doubt that the Prime Minister in pursuing the policy of getting Goa

evacuated is quite right It is a very sound policy and everybody must lend his support to him I do But there is one observation that I would like to make This question about the evacuation of Goa by the Portuguese and handing it over to India was, if I rememoer aright, brought to his notice very early when we got our independence I possess with me some notes which were submitted to him by a delegation—I have forgotten their names. but I have got them with me—but the Prime Minister took no active interest in it I am very sorry to say that, because I feel that if the Prime Minister had in the very beginning taken an active interest in the matter I am sure about it that a small police action on the part of the Government of India would have been quite sufficient to enable us to get possession of Goa, but he has always been only shouting against them, only shouting and doing nothing The result has been that the Portuguese have been able so far as we know, to garrison Goa Of course, the Prime Minister's information must be correct and must be accepted by us that Goa is still defenseless, that there is no garrison there no army there, brought by the Portuguese

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU I said no such thing

DR B R AMBEDKAR I thought he said so but whatever it is, the point now is this Personally I myself think that this discussion over observers has no value and no consequence Supposing the Portuguese give the best treatment to the Goanese, are we going to give up our claim over Goa? Maybe that they give dominion status to them so far as we know, and make them full-fledged citizens but we are not going to give up our claim to Goa No doubt about it It is part of India. Therefore all this talk about observers seems to me to be beside the point We must deal with the Portuguese people over this question. Are they prepared to surrender their

[Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.] sovereignty in the same way as the British did? This is the only issue that I think need be discussed. Sir, it seems very unfortunate that some of the enlightened nations are siding with the Portuguese. I am sorry to see Mr. Churchill in a clandestine manner siding with the Portuguese saying to us, 'Do not use force.' Why? Are they going to go away with a kiss from the Prime Minister? And without a shot being fired? Similarly Brazil, and I do not know what the attitude of the U.S.A. is, which has not been publicly proclaimed. Possibly, they may also have a soft corner for Portugal. I have been wondering why all these things have happened, why England, which voluntarily surrendered sovereignty to the people of this country, should ask another country similarly situated to act in a contrary way. It is impossible to understand it. It seems to me—the Prime Minister may accept my suggestion or may not accept it but it seems to me that they are trying to teach our Prime Minister that neutrality has a price.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: The Prime Minister must take note of it.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: I am going to make one suggestion to the Prime Minister. I do not think that we should have an armed conflict with the Portuguese if the Portuguese are going to be supported by other United Nations members, but less than that, there are two proposals that I want to make. You remember perhaps that there was the case in America which concerned the State of Louisiana, which was a French possession in the midst of American possessions and the Americans were very anxious to get rid of the French and to have Louisiana transferred to the United States. The measure that they adopted was to get it for a price. The price given was—I have got the figures with me..

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: A few pieces of silver.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: A very small price indeed for a huge territory. Goa is really nothing compared with it. Goa is just one of the towns of Louisiana. If the Prime Minister wishes to adopt it.....

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What is it?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Purchase it from Portugal.....

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: Initiate discussion on that. I am suggesting alternative methods.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That is one suggestion. What is the other?

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: The other suggestion that I would like to put before the Prime Minister is that we can take Goa on lease. We all remember in our own country of the lease of Berar. Berar was the property of the Nizam. He had sovereignty over it, but the British Government in the year 1853 or so got Berar on a permanent lease. I do not know what amount of money they gave the Nizam. It might have been very small.

SHRI B. GUPTA: If we do that, we will have to mortgage India's honour.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: I am sorry I can't follow him. It is very difficult for me to follow him.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is difficult to follow him.

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: What I say is this. We are not interested very much as to who is the nominal sovereign in this matter. What we are interested in is getting possession of Goa, and in establishing our own administration there. We have here a case where in our own country a territory belonging to another sovereign, was leased over, made permanently part of India with certain embellishments to indicate that there was a sovereign. I think his son was made Prince of Berar. That is an-

other method which the Prime Minister may try. I don't see any reason why he should not succeed with the Portuguese in persuading them to adopt either of the two methods.

There is only one more observation I will make and I will sit down. I was reading the other day a volume published by the Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, giving a survey of things that led to the Second World War, and the author, undoubtedly one of the best and most erudite, drew two conclusions as to why the war came and why it was not avoided. One was that Mr. Chamberlain, on account of the policy of disarmament which was then being agitated upon by the Labour Party could not preserve what is called the balance of power in Europe and allowed Hitler to grow and grow until it was difficult to control him. The second thing, he said, was that Chamberlain made the greatest mistake in believing in the word of Hitler. There was no greater liar than Hitler. He was given all that he wanted when the Sudetan Germans were separated from Czechoslovakia and he said he had nothing more to ask. The whole House will remember that after that treaty was signed, the very next day he marched into Czechoslovakia. I hope our Prime Minister will not make these blunders. Sir, I have done.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Dr. Subbarayan.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Try to answer Dr. Ambedkar.

MR. CHAIRMAN: That is for you.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN: Sir, I want to tell my hon. friends on the opposite side that I don't want to pull their chest-nuts out of the fire. It is their job though I don't agree with all that Dr. Ambedkar has said.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: You agree with something.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN: When I see that other countries are just beginning to understand and appreciate the foreign policy that has been pursued by our Prime Minister, it surprises me that there is one in our own country who seems to doubt the wisdom of the policy he has followed during the last 7 years. One object has been, as he has himself stated time and again, that he stands for peace and every problem that faces this world can be solved by peaceful means and if such means are to be adopted, it cannot be by joining one bloc or the other because we cannot forget that the world is divided into two portions today which fact I think my friend Dr. Ambedkar does accept but at the same time he seems to feel that we ought to throw in our lot with the United States. I am sorry I differ from him in this respect as I feel that the policy that the Prime Minister has pursued with such determination during the last 3 or 4 years has paid us rich dividends. The world has been on the brink of war on many occasions during this period and I am sure Dr. Ambedkar himself will recognize that however small a part we played in this, we have succeeded in preventing a catastrophe occurring.

For instance, in Korea, the cease-fire came after a good deal of discussion and I don't think I will be wrong in stating that we had our own share in bringing it about and undertook a very difficult task when we became the custodian force for the prisoners of war in Korea. We may not have succeeded in doing all that we wanted but at the same time we proved to the world that even an armed force can undertake a peaceful mission and I think there were occasions when our soldiers might have been provoked but let it be said to their credit that they kept their heads and followed the policy we wanted with great credit. We hear today of the cease-fire agreement having come to an end but I am glad the President of the United States has reaffirmed that



[Dr. P. Subbarayan.] ,  
 cease-fire still does remain though he has expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the Neutral Nations' Commission remaining in Korea. But I hope he will see that in the interest of international peace something has to be done to keep the warring elements away from each other. I hope, as the Prime Minister said, there will be peace in Korea brought about by agreement and negotiation and not by the arbitrament of war. Dr. Ambedkar talked of our being a party to division in Korea. I think that is the last thing we have thought of. We want union in Korea but union under what conditions? We want union not by war, not by devastating the country as it has happened during the years that the war has gone on but by mutual consent and by the will of the people of Korea and if that can be brought about, nobody would be more glad than the Prime Minister himself who has stood for union of various peoples right through these years that he has been in charge of our foreign affairs. But unfortunately the parties to the dispute are not in a position to come to an agreement. There are certain differences which perhaps may be solved by peaceful means if time is given.

Dr. Ambedkar talked of the division of Indo-China. There has been no such thing if I may venture to say so. What has been done is the stopping of the conflict between the two elements. They have agreed to cease fighting and to bring about a situation which in two years' time, so far as Viet Nam is concerned, might lead to elections and the representatives who would come through that election will decide the type of government Viet Nam should have. As far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned, in a year's time there will be elections but their independence has been guaranteed by the Geneva powers.

Dr. Ambedkar talked of the swallowing up of various countries. I don't know what he means by that. He talked also of the giant who, having eaten up all that was given to

him, might wish to swallow us as well and he thinks that like Chamberlain, our Prime Minister has followed the policy of appeasement by the five principles on which he came to an agreement with the Prime Minister of China. I do not think he is very correct in his appraisal of the situation because what has been done is to continue the friendship of thousands of years between China and India and a step has been taken in the right direction to see that even though we may differ in our ideologies, still we can live as friends, and I think that is a great achievement, an achievement which other people might easily follow. For instance, our neighbour Burma, having seen what has happened, has also agreed to abide by the principles that were set out in that agreement.

The Indo-China agreement was not brought about without difficulties being encountered in the way. Here I would like to pay my tribute to my hon. friend, Shri Krishna Menon, for all the work which he did in connection with Indo-China. No doubt he followed what was laid down by our Prime Minister as long ago as February of this year, when he mentioned about a cease-fire in Indo-China. But there were times when someone intimately connected with the Prime Minister had to be on the spot to see that things worked in such a manner as to bring about what the Prime Minister had in view. This Mr. Krishna Menon has done and I think that is a great service that he has rendered to this country and to humanity at large. I am sure most people will recognise this fact and appreciate the great work which he has done in connection with the Indo-China agreement.

As the Prime Minister has explained, we have again undertaken a very difficult task. But it was not for us to say 'No', when the whole of that agreement was based on India undertaking this mission and the chairmanship of these three commissions. And as he has explained, things have begun well at the conferences that were held between the representatives of Canada,

Poland and India and also the representatives of those people who were concerned intimately with the problem in Indo-China. This has been in many ways a better beginning than what had happened with regard to Korea and I do earnestly hope that things will go on in such a manner as to enlarge the area of peace which our Prime Minister has been talking of so often. I say this because, if this question of Indo-China can be settled in the manner we hope it will be, it will certainly lead to an enlargement of the area of peace.

With regard to Goa I do not want to say very much because the Prime Minister has said that it is not by force that we want to achieve any results. Dr. Ambedkar talked of the leasing of Goa or the purchase of Goa. I do not think this is a matter for a barter of this kind. It is a matter which must be settled by the will of the people of Goa and the people of Goa have, I think, shown that they are very anxious to form part of India, because they are Indian nationals in every way. It is unfortunate that the Portuguese Government have raised the question of religion in connection with Goa. I am, however, glad that persons in high position in the Catholic Church have repudiated this and even gone further and said that the position of Christians in this country is now better than it was at any time in the history of this country, because, as the Prime Minister has explained, Christians have been part and parcel of this country almost from the very inception of Christianity and it was to the West Coast of India that they came soon after Christ's message had gone out and I think they have lived in happiness and peace in this country all these nineteen hundred years and more and will continue to do so. I think it is very wrong for the Portuguese Government to raise this question of religion. But you know, it is generally the case that one catches hold of even a slender reed when one feels one is to be drowned and that seems to be the position of the Portuguese Government today.

I do not want to say much about the French possessions because the Prime Minister has announced that this is a problem which may be settled to the satisfaction of both India and France in a very short time and I do hope that the results will be such that they would be acceptable to the people at large.

In spite of what the Prime Minister has said, I feel that the method of securing world peace by peaceful methods rather than by the application of force is beginning to be understood all over the world, including the countries to which my hon. friend Shri Sundarayya owes allegiance.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Absurd nonsense.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI B. GUPTA: We all owe allegiance to this, our country only, if you will care to know that. And this cannot be put into their heads however long they may be here.

MR. CHAIRMAN: You should not make such irrelevant statements.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN: I am sorry and I withdraw if you think I should not have made that statement.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Thank you.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN: I am sure I am not exaggerating when I say that the whole country supports the foreign policy of the Prime Minister and his Government and appreciates with gratitude all the efforts he has made in the cause of our ideal—world peace.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to answer all the ravings of a frustrated man.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: No, don't start like that.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: The present Government of India's foreign policy is dependent essentially on British imperialism, and as if that was not enough to produce difficulties for

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the country, Dr. Ambedkar wants the Government of India to follow a policy of abject surrender to the policy of America also. Well, Sir, this will not appeal to anybody in this country or outside and I do not want to say anything further on them, especially because there are urgent matters to be dealt with here.

[MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair.]

Sir, the foreign policy of India has continued to follow the influence of British imperialism. We see this today in the debacle of India's policy at Goa. When India follows a policy which goes to preserve and strengthen our independence and to help the people enslaved by imperialists in Asia and Africa in their struggle for liberation and when that policy tries to preserve world peace, especially peace in Asia, on the basis of the five principles which have been enunciated and agreed to by the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Chou En-lai, when it follows the anti-imperialist traditions of the Indian people and the traditions of our freedom struggle then it meets the wishes of our people and gets their support. We follow the five principles already enunciated and it is in that spirit that we play our role in Indo-China and we have accepted the chairmanship of those commissions, those commissions which are to bring peace and ultimate unification and establishment of people's government in the countries of Indo-China. But I would like to warn the Government not to repeat the same weak-kneed policy which they exhibited in Korea when our representatives, the officers there instead of breaking up the terrorist gangs of the American forces allowed them free scope in the prisoners-of-war camp and the whole thing has been brought to nought and the deadlock continues there. Here again there is American imperialism aided by their British partners—the British imperialists with whom unfortunately we are still linked by the so-called British Commonwealth—and they are trying to disrupt and sabotage

the Indo-China Agreement. They will bring all kinds of pressure on the Government of India and our officers. They are already obstructing the Geneva Agreement so that Laos, Cambodia and Southern Viet Nam can be dragged into the so-called SEATO pact. I want the Government of India to take a very firm stand and see that the Geneva Agreement is not going to be sabotaged by the American imperialists, aided by their British allies. Sir, it is good our Prime Minister has said that the SEATO that is being contemplated by the Americans and their junior partners, the British imperialists, is not going to preserve world peace. It is not going to keep peace even in Asia. It will do nothing but bring war nearer, on Asian soil, once again to unleash war in Asian soil. Therefore, he categorically rejected the idea of India joining any such SEATO pact.

So far, so good. But we want the Prime Minister also to be categorically clear that he is not going to commit our country to any kind of economic SEATO, because the British imperialists are now trying to drag in India by subtle methods, by promising, by putting forward this economic SEATO. They say, after all for the development of the economic situation in South-East Asia, what harm is there if India joins it? This is how they started in Western Europe. I mean they started with the so-called Marshall Aid and ended in NATO, which, as everybody knows, the Prime Minister himself knows, is a pact which is not going to bring peace in the world. It is a pact of aggression. So I want the Government of India to be equally categorical about the British imperialists' subtle manoeuvres to economic SEATO.

Sir, I want the Government to take the initiative to counteract the British and American imperialists' manoeuvres in South East Asia; to call an Asian conference, consisting in the first instance—because the problem is urgent—of Asian countries in South-East Asia and the Far East, including the

People's Republic of China, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, and even the Philippines. Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan have entered into military agreements, have lent their countries' military bases to the American imperialists, but they are all Asian countries. Let the Asian countries meet and discuss and in those discussions, let our Government try its best to persuade the Japanese Government, the Thailand Government, the Philippine Government, and the Pakistan Government to see how dangerous it is to lend their bases to American imperialists. It is nothing but once again enslaving themselves. Not only enslaving themselves but it will lead to the enslavement of the rest of South-East Asia also by the American imperialists and their junior partners, the British imperialists. In this conference, let the Prime Minister make it clear that no imperialist will be allowed to have a plan. The British imperialists, who still go on hanging on to Malaya, Hong Kong—to whom, unfortunately, our Government has leased the Nicobar Islands for an R.A.F. aerodrome—shall have no place in this conference. The French imperialists shall have no place in this conference. The American imperialists, who are trying to launch a third world war, shall have no place in this conference. That conference shall be confined only to the Asian nations. And let us build peace in Asia as a prelude to the preservation of peace in the whole world and frustrate the doings of the American imperialists and their partners, the British imperialists.

AN HON. MEMBER: What about Russian imperialism?

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: As I have been pointing out, the biggest weakness of our foreign policy is the dependence on the British imperialists. Why should our Government keep silent on Malaya? Why should our Government allow Gurkha soldiers to be recruited on the boundaries—earlier in our own country but later now in Nepal—and allow them transit facilities? Of course, they are garbed as

civilians and they go there. In Malaya and in Hong Kong the British fight their imperialist battles with Gurkha soldiers, with Nepali soldiers. Why does the Government of India allow this butchery to go on against our own Asian people? The Prime Minister, whenever he speaks, speaks of the solidarity of the Asian people. Naturally every Indian's heart goes forth in support of him. But then we should like to ask the Prime Minister how long he intends to allow the Gurkha soldiers, the Nepali soldiers, to be recruited and trained on the Nepali soil, and allowed transit facilities through our country, to continue the British butchery in Malaya, etc. Why should our Government keep silent and not take strong steps?

I am not bothered by merely verbal protests on the Kenya butcheries and what the British imperialists continue to do in Africa. Let us see what the British have done to us. The Britishers have sided with Pakistan on the Kashmir question. They sided with their own racial imperialists in Africa. They supported the United States—Pakistan pact. And now they have got the temerity to give an ultimatum—it is more or less an ultimatum—to the Government of India not to resort to arms, as if the Government of India was on the point of resorting to arms in connection with Goa. What does all this show? The Prime Minister again and again in the House and outside has pointed out that NATO does not apply to India, to Portuguese territory. Whatever the Prime Minister might say, NATO is actually in action. Under the NATO pact itself Portugal has brought that question in the NATO Council. Even though the NATO powers have not passed a formal resolution under the NATO pact to intervene, you can see Spain, Portugal and on top of it, their old ally, the British imperialists—they all have intervened and accused India. What has happened to the British? If they really want to help, they must have sent an ultimatum to Portugal and said that just as they had left India the Portuguese should also quit India. But instead they have got the

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temerity to address the Government of India as to how they should behave towards the enslaver of a part of India, the Portuguese imperialists.

The most amazing thing is the moment this note from the British Government is delivered to the Government of India, overnight, there is a change in the attitude of the Government of India towards the liberation struggle in Goa. I will, take point after point, their arguments. Their first point is, that it is only the people living in those three areas who could participate in the liberation struggle and that the rest of the people in India should not go there. When the people in the neighbouring areas wanted to march in satyagraha, it is not the bullets and rifles of the Portuguese that stopped them but—it is a shame to say—it is the Indian police that stood between the Indian people and the Portuguese-occupied territories. It is the Indian police that stopped the patriots going to the succour of our people in Goa, Daman and Diu. When has the Prime Minister started thinking that the Goans are separate nationals and that Indians should not go to Goa to participate in the freedom struggle there? The Goans are Indians, for Goa is a part of India and there is no question about it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I just mention that this has been our policy for the last six and-a-half years, repeatedly declared both in regard to Pondicherry and in regard to Goa?

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: If that has been our policy, then why with regard to Pondicherry, Yanam and Mahe did not the Indian police intervene when the Indian patriots went to liberate those territories? Why is it that this policy has been put into practice in regard to Goa, Daman and Diu only when the Prime Minister says it has been our policy for the last seven years? Is it because the British did not send a note in regard to the other territories but have sent a note only

in regard to Goa? Even though this policy has been there for the last seven years, it has not been implemented in regard to the other territories but is being implemented now?

The second argument that is put forward for its indefensible attitude by the Government of India is that the Goans must fight their own freedom struggle. It is a most amazing argument. The liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu is not the concern only of the people resident there but that of every Indian and as such, it is the job of every Indian to do whatever he can to see that the Portuguese are driven out of these three areas and our Indian compatriots living there are liberated from the fascist military dictatorship that has been ruling there for the last 400 and odd years. If for the last seven years we had not been able to help them to the extent that we would have liked in liberating those territories, that is no reason why we should not stop the Indian citizens from going to the succour of our own compatriots. As our own Counsellor pointed out, in those small areas, occupied by the Portuguese military and police, they have increased their army three-fold from 1,500 to 5,000; they are building aerodromes and bringing in air-ships; they have got two or three cruisers and destroyers. Against all these military and armed fortifications, it is callousness to say that only the people living in the particular areas should participate in the freedom struggle and that the Indian people will have to be onlookers only and send all their sympathies and their congratulations to the martyrs.

This is not the way in which Indian freedom could be defended and strengthened; it is not only the question of liberating these three pockets from Portuguese imperialism and it is also not merely a question of the interests of the people living there. Let us understand it clearly that, whatever the Prime Minister may say to deny it, this is part of NATO and part of American strategy to surround

India with its bases and cow her down so as to destroy our foreign policy which the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, is following. They do not want even this kind of independent policy in certain aspects to be followed by the Government. They want the Government of India to follow a policy of abject surrender as is being done in Pakistan. That is why they have got their own bases in Pakistan; the British and Americans both have got bases. The British have got their own base in Trincomalee in Ceylon and the Americans now try to keep Goa also as a base by strengthening it as a military base. If the Prime Minister of India changes his policy and surrenders to them well and good. If he does not and if he carries out an anti-imperialist policy in the tradition of the Indian people, they want to bamboozle us and they want to threaten the Government of India with these bases. As such, it is not a question of mere coming to the succour of the five lakhs of people living in Goa, Daman and Diu. Even to preserve our own independence and strengthen it, it is necessary that we liquidate these pockets as early as possible.

There is another strange thing which the Prime Minister has accepted in his reply to the Portuguese note. The Portuguese are not prepared to negotiate with us for seven years but just on the eve of a big struggle for the liberation of these territories launched by the Indian people, they want India to accept to the sending of some neutral observers to find out what is happening. The Prime Minister does not find anything wrong in it. He says "Let the neutral observers come and see what the Portuguese imperialists are doing in Goa, Daman and Diu. Of course, they can also see what the Indian people are doing on the other side. After all, Goa is a part of India and it is our internal affair. Where is the question of any foreign Government coming into this? Do you allow any foreign Government to send observers, so-called neutral observers....."

SHRI A. S. RAJU (Andhra). The country has not forgotten about your role in 1942.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: You always remember 1942. I know the persons who sell their conscience and join the Congress and become renegades and are always the worst haters of communism. I do not.....(Interruptions) ... bother about such people.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: I would certainly ask the Prime Minister whether it is his policy to allow foreigners to intervene by allowing all kinds of observers in our own internal affairs. Is the experience of Kashmir not enough for us? We have made a mistake in taking this question to the U.N.O. and in allowing the so-called neutral observers to come here. After a few years of these U.N. observers we had to say that the American observers were no longer neutral. I do not know when that good time is going to come when the Prime Minister will one day wake up and say that not only the Americans but their junior partners, the British, are also not neutrals and that, therefore, they should also be asked to quit the country.

SHRI B. GUPTA: Very soon I hope.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Sir, let us not forget the experience of Kashmir where the so-called U.N. observers did so much of damage to the integrity and independence of our country. Why should we allow the observers to come and poke their nose round about Goa, Diu and Daman? It is an internal affair.

Coming to the other aspects of the question, the other day the Prime Minister said in the other House that we have been wedded to the policy of non-violence; we have won our struggle and freedom and we have driven away the British Governors, Viceroys and the British Army from

[Shri P. Sundaraya:]  
 the country by our non-violent struggle and that, therefore, we will still continue to follow the policy of non-violence with regard to the liberation of Goa, Diu and Daman. I am not going into the controversy as to how far the non-violent struggle brought about Independence. I also do not want to go into the question whether it was only the non-violent struggle that contributed to this or that the I.N.A. struggle and the R.I.N. and the Army revolts had anything to do with the achievement of our freedom. We do not underestimate the fact that the non-violent struggle helped the people rise against imperialism but let us not forget the realities by attributing the success of the movement only to the non-violent approach. I do not want now to enter into that controversy by saying more than what I have said. But when the Portuguese deny the least bit of civil liberties, when they do not deal with the satyagrahis in the way in which the Prime Minister expects them to behave and when they reply the non-violent satyagrahis with bullets and arms and artillery fire—as they have done in Terekhol, then what are the people to do? Are they to be silent victims of this murderous fire from their guns and artillery or have they to expect something better than that? Sir, it is also a strange thing to see. Just before the British note had come into existence, we read in the Press that the Government of India warned the Portuguese Government of the grave consequences that would follow if the peaceful satyagrahis were dealt with violently. Then what happened to that bold declaration? The moment the British note came into existence all that thing had been silently kept in the old archives of the secretariat, and then a new thing, the philosophy of non-violence took its place. I would certainly ask the Prime Minister to tell us whether this change in their approach came because of the British note. Then I would like to ask this. When Pakistan invaded our territory in Kashmir, did the Prime Minister stick to non-violence? Did

not he send our army to defend our country? Sir, when the Portuguese armies, supported by their NATO partners, come from 5,000 miles away with ships carrying artillery and reinforcements and air force, then it is time that the Government of India does not go on advising the people to continue to take the path of non-violence. What is our army for? When the foreign aggressor is coming from 5,000 miles away with further materials for reinforcing his battalions and armed forces, what is our army for? Is our army only to be a non-violent army meant for demonstration purposes? If this army is not to defend our country, if this army is not to liberate the pockets from the foreign aggressor who continues to remain there by putting down by violent means the peaceful independence struggle that is going on there, what is our army for? It is better that we do not have such an army. In spite of all our peaceful efforts, in spite of the efforts of the people in Goa, Daman and Diu to liberate themselves, if the Portuguese Government does not see the writing on the wall and sticks to its guns and tries to suppress the movement as it has done in Portugal itself by military force, then the time will come when our Indian army to safeguard our own independence, will have to march forward and liberate those pockets. If the circumstances are not propitious for it just now I can understand it. I can understand the Prime Minister saying "Today Portugal is backed by American armies and by British armies. Therefore our army marching into those pockets just at the moment is not as easy as marching in, o Hyderabad—which we had rightly done at that time. So we have to wait, to choose our own time." I can understand it. We can all understand it. But let our people understand, let our countrymen understand that we cannot march our army to liberate our own soil in the hands of the foreigner, the Portuguese, because Portugal is backed by Britain, Portugal is backed by Americans, and as such marching our army just now

means great danger to us. Then we should wait to take our own time. Let the Prime Minister say that at least. We can understand it. We may take our own time. When we get strengthened then we will attack those imperialists and drive them out. But that is not what has been said. We give hopes to our own people living in Goa, Daman and Diu that the liberation of those places is nearby and the moment they reinforce their agitation we say: "Be non-violent". This kind of giving false hopes does not go to the strengthening of our own independence, nor to the smashing of the foreign imperialists' plan being hatched in our own country.

12 NOON

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It is time, Mr. Sundarayya.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: I am finishing, Sir. Why is it that all this bungling has taken place in Goa? We see it has taken place because in essential matters, whenever the British Government does not agree and brings pressure then we unfortunately succumb to it. We unfortunately continue to bind ourselves with golden chains with the British imperialists and with the British imperialist Commonwealth. Unfortunately we still depend and our whole foreign trade depends upon the British market and our whole defence requirements still depend on the British industry. For industrialisation also we always look to either Britain or America as if there is no other country, no other source that can help us and it is also because you have no confidence in your own resources. This dependence on the British not only in regard to many of the internal things but even in respect of our foreign affairs, it is this that again and again brings us automatically into this difficult position. I want the Prime Minister—if we want to follow a real policy of independence, to preserve our independence and peace then it is time, and especially after the experience of Goa—to have nothing more to do with the

so-called British Commonwealth. Let us break our bonds, the so-called bonds which we ourselves are forging and keeping ourselves in enslavement. Break these bonds with the British Commonwealth and let us assert our own independence and take every step to preserve and strengthen our independence. Further, let us strive for and give every help to all the people who want to liquidate the imperialist domination, both the American domination that is threatening as well as the actual existing domination of the British imperialists both in Asia as well as in Africa. It is this policy that will ultimately have the approbation and support of the people as well as preserve our own independence and not the policy of kowtowing, not the policy of succumbing to the British imperialists. Any further continuance within the British Commonwealth will be a black day as has been in Goa and it will be a calamity for us and for the people who are waging their struggle for independence and even for Asian peace and world peace.

SHRI J. N. KAUSHAL (PEPSU): Mr. Deputy Chairman, I rise to support the policy which the Government of India is following in international affairs. We are all agreed that the only policy which can be followed in the international sphere is the policy which promotes peace. On that matter there is no doubt. The only question which is debatable is whether the policy which our Government is following is certainly in the direction of peace or it is not contributing anything towards bringing peace to mankind. Well, my submission is that situated as the world today is, there are two power blocs and there is much tension prevailing in the world. Any action on the part of any country in the world which brings more tension or which gives more power to one bloc is bound not to lead to peace but bring war nearer. We have seen two occasions where India played a very significant role, and those two occasions are the occasions of Korea and



[Shri J. N. Kaushal.]

Indo-China. Everybody today is convinced that India's good offices affected those decisions substantially, if not vitally. The part which India played in the deliberations of Indo-China although she was not an active participant, is known to everybody, and that part was that the countries which were not willing to sit on one table, which were not willing to talk with a free heart, expressed full confidence in India, and they found that India was the one country which had a genuine desire for peace, and the only way to settle the differences of the world, which can bring peace, is to sit round a table, to negotiate and to settle all differences by means of negotiations rather than by means of a sword. We all know that the war, God forbid it, will mean the total destruction of what civilisation stands for. And it is this horror of war which actually, at Geneva, gave that sense to the different parties, and was responsible for bringing the truly negotiated peace in Indo-China. It is a matter of legitimate pride to say that the agreement reached at Geneva is more or less on the same lines as was given by the hon. the Prime Minister last February to the Houses of Parliament. The Colombo Conference also, more or less, came to the same conclusion, and the one factor was that it was the wish of Prime Minister Nehru whose voice is heard in the international councils with great respect, which was mainly responsible for bringing the Geneva Conference to a successful end. Have we ever seen any infant nation enjoying that respect in the international councils in such a small period as India has come to? It is entirely due to one man, and that is our beloved Prime Minister. The whole country stands behind him. And perhaps, the one revolutionary change which is going to stay in the annals of history is that if there is any solution to the woes of mankind, the solution is not war, but the solution is to try to understand the viewpoints of the others, and then try to evolve a formula, by

which the two nations, by which the two groups, having even different ideologies, can hope to live side by side. And this formula of co-existence is gaining ground, and the day may not be far off when all the nations of the world may come to believe that this is the only way to end the woes of mankind.

Sir, I have to say very few words regarding the policy of the Government of India with regard to the question of the Portuguese pockets here. Well, there is no doubt that those territories form a part of India and the Government of India have made a categorical declaration. They have also shown their determination that they will go on pursuing the policy of negotiation with the Portuguese Government, and will see that ultimately those territories combine with the Indian territory. The only question is: What is the policy again in that matter which is to be followed? Some friends are suggesting that the policy of negotiation which the Government have followed will not bring the desired results. Well, granted for a moment that this policy is not going to yield the result very soon. But then, what is the alternative which they propose? They have no other alternative to propose except the use of force. We all know that we are trying to create the atmosphere of peace, the area of peace, for the ills of mankind. Are we going to adopt that policy only when there is a dispute between other nations and not adopt that policy when there is a dispute between India and the Portuguese Government? Well, I feel that there can be no other policy except the one which the Government are following. The only question which my friends opposite raised very vehemently is that the Indian Government should allow satyagrahis from this part of the country also to march into Goa, Daman and Diu. The hon. the Prime Minister only this morning has stated that this will lead to further complications, and if further complications come, then still further complications will come. Therefore, this

matter is also not free from difficulties. And there cannot be one opinion on that matter. The only one opinion with which I can agree is that the Government of India is determined to see that the Portuguese territories ultimately come to India without the use of force. And I think that when we have succeeded in liberating India by the use of non-violence, there is no reason why such a small territory consisting of Goa, Daman and Diu will not follow suit.

Then, Sir, the other speaker today, Dr. Ambedkar, was trying to impress on the House somehow that this doctrine of co-existence, this doctrine of preaching peace, is impossible of achievement. And the reason which he gave was that the two ideologies—communism and free democracy—cannot exist side by side. With all respect to him, I can say that the Government of India is trying to find ways and means whereby these two warring blocs can co-exist. If once we accept the proposition that it is not possible for them to exist, then the only other proposition to which we are driven is that the one must destroy the other. We feel that ultimately moral sense will dawn on the world and wars will be vanished. India is trying to play a great role in that direction. India is a country which has a destiny, and our Prime Minister is also a man of destiny.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU (Uttar Pradesh): Mr. Deputy Chairman, as peace is indivisible, and therefore a world problem, I cannot help referring to the events that have taken place recently in Western Europe. The disagreement between France and the other members of the E.D.C. over the E.D.C. Treaty has created a very difficult situation there. Different views are held, Sir, about the proposed E.D.C. Treaty. But, in whatever light it may be looked at, it was hoped that it would enable countries, whose relations in the past had not been the happiest, to work together. The debate on the Treaty is going to take place very soon in the French National Assembly. I am not going

to prophesy what the decision of the Assembly will be, but, I think, it cannot be said that the prospect looks particularly bright. If ultimately the vote of the French National Assembly demands the rejection of the E.D.C. Treaty without anything taking its place, it is obvious that a situation will be created in which the old national rivalries and antagonisms will again raise their heads. This cannot but be a matter of serious concern to everybody. France and the other five countries that were to constitute the E.D.C. have, in spite of their disagreement, reaffirmed their determination to continue to co-operate with one another in the interest of democracy, but how far and what alternative proposals can be put forward at this stage and how far the powers concerned will be able, notwithstanding their declarations, to achieve harmony among themselves, is a matter of no little doubt and concern. If the most dangerous situation that existed before the second World War comes to exist again, it is obvious that not merely Europe but the rest of the world will be affected by it. All eyes are turning at this moment towards the French National Assembly. In the existing situation it is not possible to be too optimistic about the future. We have to keep this in mind when we consider the situation in other parts of the world.

we are all glad that peace prevails now in South-East Asia. The Prime Minister said that it was a happy augury for the future of the independence of the three countries—Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia—that it had been agreed by all the parties concerned that their integrity should be maintained. So far as Viet Nam is concerned, it is divided between two Governments, the Northern Government and the Southern Government which are of different political complexions. In about eighteen months' time or so, a plebiscite is to be held to determine the future of Indo-China. The plebiscite will decide whether Indo-China is to remain divided or is to be integrated into one country. I cannot say, not being familiar with

[Shri H. N. Kunzru.] that part of Asia, what the result of the plebiscite will be, but let us suppose that it results in what my hon. friend, Mr. Sundarayya, has called a people's Government. Then what will be the position? I assume that this Government will be anxious to act in accordance with the agreements that have been arrived at. I shall not charge it with *mala fides* or improper motives, but can the Government of unified Viet Nam set aside the logic of facts? Laos and Cambodia are weak, both politically and economically, and it is obvious that the existence of a strong neighbour will inevitably affect their future. The Prime Minister said in the course of his speech that during the British predominance in India the French and Portuguese pockets existed here by the sufferance of the British authorities and were virtually protected by them. That is perfectly true, though the reasons for the British action in each case seem to me to have been different. Now, may not the same situation, notwithstanding the best of intentions on all sides, come to exist in South-East Asia? It is true that the people of Laos and Cambodia are not of the same race or religion as the people of Viet Nam, but this cannot alter the essential nature of the position and the character of the forces that will undoubtedly be developed in this region. Therefore, while we have a right to be happy that there is peace at present in Indo-China, we should not think too much of the present and ignore the position that may arise there in the near future. I hope that India will be vigilant in this matter and that it will use its good offices to the best of its ability to see that peace continues to prevail there and that the independence and integrity of no part of the world is jeopardised by any alteration in the existing situation.

The Prime Minister has often spoken to us about the world situation, but he has generally done so from the point of view of world peace. It is undoubtedly a matter of profound in-

terest to us, but apart from our interests in matters affecting world peace, we have also a close and immediate interest in matters that affect us more nearly than events in distant countries. That is to say, we have some positive interests of our own. He has unfortunately seldom referred to those interests. I think that it is the duty of the Government of India, and particularly of the Prime Minister, to make our nation aware of its vital interests. An understanding of these problems by the people at large cannot but be productive of good. Every country has such interests and it speaks of them without fear of giving offence to other countries. Why should we, then, in our desire for world peace, keep quiet about those matters which are of greater moment to us than other matters. There is no time, Sir, to deal at any length with this matter but I have referred to it in order to ask the Prime Minister whether in his opinion and that of his Government the geographical position of India in South-East Asia is such as to give India a real interest in the state of things that may prevail there. My question is not merely in reference to South Asia generally but with reference to Laos and Cambodia particularly. I should like to know whether India has any special interest, whether the Government of India thinks that it has any special interest in the maintenance of the sovereignty and independence of these territories. If it has, then why has it not so far taken any steps to express its opinion and to apprise the people of the close connection that there may, in its opinion, be between the sovereignty of these territories and the vital interests of India. For aught I know, he may have expressed this opinion diplomatically and India's interest in these countries may have helped to bring about a change in the outlook of the other countries but it is necessary to know what the Government of India is thinking on this subject.

While dealing with this matter, I should like to refer to the visit of Mr. Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of

China, to this country. It was an event of great significance which, I trust, has led and will in future also lead to a better understanding between these two countries. I further trust that it will not end there but also create a new atmosphere for the settlement of questions relating to South-East Asia generally.

Now I shall say a word about the South East Asian Collective Peace Organization that has been proposed recently. In order to make up our minds on this question, we have to consider what the intervention of foreign powers in Indo-China and South-East Asia in the past has led to. The predecessor of the present Government of China was given help on a very large scale for years by the United States but as the United States failed to persuade the Government whom it was helping to win the confidence and support of the people, the help that it gave in men and materials, failed of the expected result. The instance of Indo-China also makes us feel similarly. America gave a great deal of help to France. There is no doubt that the present Government of China helped the Viet-Minh but what we have to remember is that notwithstanding the help given to France, it lost progressively during the war that lasted for about seven years. It was clear that whatever military support it may have obtained, it did not have the support of the people of Viet Nam and consequently all the help given by the United States was as good as if it had thrown its money into the sea. Now, I don't know whether the United States Government tried to persuade France to introduce constitutional reforms in Viet Nam and make the people feel that they were masters of their own country. It may have tried to bring pressure on France but may have failed. Whatever it may or may not have done, it is clear that military action by itself does not lead to final victory. The support of the people is the main thing. If that is obtained then as the victorious struggle of Dr.

Ho Chi Minh shows, many obstacles can be overcome but their antagonism is aroused or if distrust is created amongst them, then it is clear that material power alone cannot lead to victory. Now it seems to me that the powers who are in favour of establishing a collective peace organisation which has, for brevity, come to be known as SEATO are still ignoring this vital fact. If they had any intention of using their friendly offices to bring about the establishment of democracy and good Government and economic progress in Cambodia and Laos and Siam, they will undoubtedly help in the establishment of stability in South-East Asia. But if the situation there continued to be as it is our past experience I think makes it clear that the future will be of the same character as the past has been. My chief objection, therefore, to the SEATO is not that it will upset any country or that it will worsen the present peaceful atmosphere which has been created, but that it seems to be proceeding on entirely wrong lines. If it could succeed in the establishment of efficient and democratic governments in the countries that I have mentioned, if it could help in bringing about economic progress there, then it could render a great service not merely to South-East Asia, but to the world. But the ideas that seem to be animating the sponsors or the supporters of the SEATO, seem to be very different from those that I can approve of.

Before sitting down, I should like to ask the Prime Minister for enlightenment on one point. The Prime Minister of Ceylon said some time ago that the Prime Minister of India had an alternative to the SEATO. What he said created the impression that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had made a proposal of his own which, in his opinion, should be a substitute for the SEATO. I do not know whether this impression is correct or not; but if it is, I think there will be no harm in view of the fact that the SEATO Conference is going to be held soon,

[Shri H. N. Kunzru.]

that he should tell us what his proposal was. Again, Sir, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Casey, suggested some time ago that two conferences might be held, one of the conferences concerning itself solely with the question of the maintenance of peace in South-East Asia. It should limit itself to making a declaration of its views on this most important question. The other conference might be of the same character as the proposed SEATO. I do not know what the Prime Minister's reaction to it has been. I suppose no objection will be raised if the other Asian powers also joined a conference of the first kind and made a unanimous declaration with regard to their determination to maintain peace in South-East Asia.

The question of a collective guarantee of peace in South-East Asia seems to have been discussed privately while the Geneva Conference was going on. It seemed from what appeared in the newspapers that what was desired was a participation of India in this collective guarantee. Now, if the other powers join with India in this matter, including Asian powers, what harm will there be if a pact collectively guaranteeing peace was agreed to? Sir, I have spoken on this important subject without having full knowledge of the facts; but I have referred to them in order to persuade the Prime Minister to take us more into his confidence on this subject than he has so far done. Indeed, I feel that we have a right to complain of his silence on these matters. In the past there may have been good justification for it, but in view of the nearness of the Baguio Conference, I feel, and I feel strongly, that the time has come when he should lift the veil and tell us what India's position is and how far it can act not merely as a neutral, but as a participator with others in a collective guarantee of peace ensuring harmony and progress not merely in any one part of the world, but in the whole world.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. If I may just clear up one possible misunderstanding the hon. Member, Dr. Kunzru, referred to what the Prime Minister of Ceylon has said about an alternative which I was supposed to produce. Well, there is no alternative as such and the Prime Minister of Ceylon perhaps himself misunderstood what the position was. I merely stated in the course of my letters to him that we should consider this question in a more constructive way, from the point of view of peace, rather than in the way that had been suggested for the SEATO Conference. He perhaps thought that my reference to a more constructive approach meant an alternative. I can assure Dr. Kunzru and the House that there is nothing hidden or secret about anything that we have said about this matter. It is true that we have sometimes argued it at great length, but what we have said is exactly what we have said here.

As to the other point raised by Dr. Kunzru, that is a matter I shall try to deal with at a later stage.

DR. A. R. MUDALIAR (Madras): Mr. Deputy Chairman, I rise to take part in this very important foreign affairs debate and I shall confine myself only to two issues that were mainly referred to by the Prime Minister—the issue relating to Indo-China and our participation in the various commissions, and the issue relating to Goa. I must express my congratulations and admiration also of the part which our esteemed friend Mr. Krishna Menon played in the negotiations at Geneva. It has been *sub rosa*, under the ground, not published, not even by himself. But those of us who have had some access to the information there at Geneva know very well the very important part that he played in bringing about an understanding between various groups of people, between the representatives of the different governments that were concerned at the Geneva Conference, and I am sure the House will want to extend its warm congratulations to him

for the part that he has played. I do not think I shall be detracting from the congratulations that I have expressed so far as his work is concerned, if I were to state that any success that has attended his efforts has been largely due, almost exclusively due, to the fact which the whole world knew, the fact of the massive support that was behind him in the work that he undertook at Geneva and elsewhere. It is that impression, that knowledge that helped India and its representative to play its proper part unofficially and informally at these negotiations. When one remembers the position in which the French found themselves in Viet Nam, when one realises the advances that were being made by the forces of Viet-Minh and the most desperate situation in which the defending forces of that country were, even during the stages of the negotiations at Geneva, one cannot help congratulating the conference that after all, there was some advance in the negotiations made at Geneva and that the armed conflict had been called off and that truce had been established.

It is not a reflection on the French Government or on its military power when one says that they were in a very bad situation, notwithstanding any help that they got by way of armaments from the United States or others. It is a matter of some satisfaction that the negotiations were successfully ended. The basis on which the truce has been founded and the conditions that attach to these negotiations are such that we can congratulate ourselves—not merely India but the entire peace-loving world—on the progress that has been made.

We have taken up a responsibility, and, as the Prime Minister said, we could not have helped taking up that responsibility. We are aware of the difficult position in which we found ourselves in relation to Korea. We were attacked by both sides. We were the bridge, but, as my friend Mr. Jan Masaryk once said, a bridge is meant to be trodden over by both parties, from either side. And so it was our

fate when we took up that responsibility in Korea. I hope that we shall not have the same grim experience here, but I should not be surprised if occasionally we come across snags and difficulties which make us suspect by one side or another. Our integrity, our impartiality, our desire to keep within that neutral zone of ours which we have delimited to ourselves according to our foreign policy, will ultimately triumph and will be established.

Now, I come to one aspect of this treaty which has been referred to by the Prime Minister and by various other speakers. Some have advocated that we should have joined what is proposed to be the SEATO; others have advocated that we should not have any part or share in it. It seems to me that the position which the Prime Minister has taken—if I may say so with all respect—is the correct, moral and realistic position. What happened at Geneva? Everybody was happy that after all a truce was made. Everybody was happy that some sort of a way was found out of the very difficult situation in which the countries were placed. There was great rejoicing when ultimately this truce was made. England, France, China and the countries concerned directly in Indo-China were all happy. There were toasts; there were handshakes; and flash photographs were taken. Everybody was happy about this. And what sort of happiness will it be, what sort of mental rapprochement there was between nation and nation, between government and government, when almost before the ink was dry on the truce that was signed, some nations, parties to this truce agreement, were preparing for the SEATO, which essentially means a defensive alliance against somebody in that area? Against whom? That is the moral issue that one has to face when one considers the question of SEATO. There is no use of saying that it is merely a peace organisation. Like NATO it is a defensive organisation and a defensive organisation

[Dr. A. R. Mudaliar.] essentially implies that there is a person or a country against whom a defence has to be built up. All this is completed within a few minutes of signing this treaty and after these toasts of each other. It seems to me that neither the time nor the opportunity was ripe for the consideration of a subject matter like SEATO and I am only surprised that this aspect of the question has not struck those great nations which are moving in this matter and trying to have a SEATO. The position of India is perfectly clear. It is not merely because it has accepted the chairmanship of the Commission. It is because it wants to carry out the further stages of this negotiation in the spirit in which it was done at Geneva and it hopes to complete the transaction finally and favourably. It cannot take up an attitude that there is a hidden enemy now against whom preparations have to be immediately started. That is the way of breaking down the peace and not of building up the peace. A time may come when that may be necessary—against whom I shall not say. But this is not the time, this is not the opportunity. This is entirely a wrong way of proceeding with the matter and it means breaking up any possibility of real independence either for Viet Nam, or Laos or Cambodia. Therefore, I am whole heartedly in favour of the position that has been adopted by our country in this matter of not aligning itself with any proposal for a SEATO convention.

Now, Sir, let me turn to the next important subject which has been dealt with, i.e., Goa. Here I may at once say that I am entirely in agreement with the Prime Minister that we should not take up a policy of active aggression of any kind. That the strength of our country, that the greatness of our country, that the moral principles which we are preaching day after day to ourselves and to the world at large will not permit us to take any action except one of peace, a peaceful action, seems to be

clearly, almost axiomatically, indicated. It will be absurd for us to think of an invasion of Goa, however justified it may be, after all the protestations we have made of peace. But there are certain aspects of Goa which have to be considered. It is not merely a question of colonialism with reference to Goa. It is not merely a question of getting rid of a colonial power from our home territory. It is more than that and past experience has shown that there is much more danger than even mere colonial occupation. I make a difference, to some extent, between the French occupation in Pondicherry and the Portuguese occupation in Goa. Both have to be got rid of; both have to merge ultimately with India. There is no question about it. But the difference is based on the attitude which the two Governments have adopted in the past, on their past history, on their past performance and on all that they have stood for in the past.

Now, Sir, during the last War I had some little responsibility in regard to both these possessions. France was, of course, on the side of the allies and they readily handed over the control of Pondicherry to the Government of India. The cordon was sundered, the Government of India virtually administered all the French possessions in this country. It was not so with reference to Goa. Portugal happened to be neutral and I shall come to that question of neutrality.

What is the value of this treaty with the United Kingdom which Portugal has and which is blazoned in the columns of the "Times"? The greatest headache of the Government of India at that time was how to deal with Goa. Three enemy ships had come into the harbour of Mormugao; a radio station was established on the land of Goa. Messages were being sent out regarding Indian preparations. We could monitor those messages, but we had no control. I wish to say this categorically that the then Viceroy of India had written more than one letter to the then Prime

Minister of England and the Secretary of State complaining of the situation, pointing out the danger to which we were subjected and hoping that some remedy would be found for that situation. When Portugal recently suggested to the Government of India the idea that Portugal would observe neutrality, even if it retained possession of Goa, I just laughed at the whole idea of the neutrality of Portugal, because experience had shown what that neutrality meant.

Now, Sir, great objection was taken to the communication which the U.K. sent to our Government with reference to this matter. I share, to a certain extent, that objection but I venture to think that it was a hastily written document, hastily thought out and hastily despatched without a full realisation of the facts and that nobody is regretting it more than the Foreign Minister of England himself at the present time. If I know anything.....

*(Interruption.)*

What do you know except about Russian politics?

**SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA:** We agree that you are more competent to speak on behalf of the British Imperialists.

**SHRI B. GUPTA:** You know more of their policy, have served the British all your life.

**DR. A. R. MUDALIAR:** I agree I may have been a stooge of the British and, therefore, I claim to know the better the British mind than my friends who as stooges of other Governments have better knowledge of those other Governments and other politicians.

It seems to me that, in spite of the fact that the Government of Great Britain may not be very happy about the note which they had sent, there are certain aspects of criticism in the British press which are offensive and which should be taken note of. I am not here to excuse anything that any

of the British have done; several papers have indulged in criticism of the Prime Minister. The words "humbug" and "hypocrisy" are some of the common words that have been freely used with reference to him in this matter. He has said today and he also stated some time back that he stands by the principle of non-violence in the matter, that he will not allow any Indian to go over to Goa, that it is a liberation movement which should be spontaneous and, as he believes rightly, run by the Goans themselves and that the time has not come for adopting other methods whereby Goa will be part of the Union of India. But that does not excuse those in England, who do not understand matters here, from indulging in criticism of a gravely violent and seriously offensive nature. 'The Times', a great paper, remarked through its Diplomatic Correspondent that the treaty with Portugal existed since 1336, that it was over 600 years old, that it had been repeatedly confirmed and affirmed, that when Charles II married a Portuguese princess, it was further affirmed, and that, therefore, Portugal has ties with Great Britain which are unbreakable. I want to examine it in the light of these words 'hypocrisy' and 'humbug' and all that sort of epithets which have been freely used by some British journals. That treaty said that if England was attacked, Portugal would immediately come to its aid with sloops, with ships, with all kinds of weapons which it had at that time, and that, therefore, it was a binding treaty between these two Governments, of mutual assistance in case of aggression, in case of derogation of the respect of either of these countries. That is what the treaty says. What has been the experience in the first World War and what has been the experience in the second World War? Has Portugal gone to the help of Great Britain? I remember landing in that Capital Lisbon during the course of the second World War—I was on my way to London. In the airport on either side, there were glass cases as we see in such ports and there were the words,



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BOAC, French Aviation on one side, and on the other side, Luftwaffe, German Aviation and Italian Aviation, like animals glaring at each other. The men in charge were sitting behind those glasses and staring at each other. That was the kind of neutrality that Portugal provided in those days. Therefore, to rely on this 600-year-old treaty and to say that those things bind them, as the newspapers of England—not the British Government—say, is to indulge in what they charge our Prime Minister with.

The hon. Prime Minister, in the course of his speech, referred to Vasco da Gama and the past history of Portugal. I think we can bring Portuguese history up a little nearer today. We can examine a little of the colonisation of Portugal and the things that have been done in the name of the superior power towards colonies. I think we can then come to the conclusion, as I shall shortly show, that there is no worse colonising power in the world than Portugal.

Sir, let me narrate a short story. We all know chocolates, the delicious things for which Cadbury's are the most famous and which are the essential accompaniments of ladies whenever they go to cinema show, or to see plays. Now, the firm of Cadbury Brothers had established themselves, way back in 1890 at Bournville. Cadbury's were known to be one of the best managed firms. In fact, in one of their advertisements they had said that the girls who were employed in the Cadbury plant at Bournville—the Cadbury Brothers were Quakers and highly moral people—were as if in paradise. Now, Cadbury's

1 P.M. had a small possession in Trinidad from which they got their cocoa but that was not enough and the two places where cocoa was most grown were in the two Portuguese colonial possessions of Principe and San Thome, two islands off the western coast of Africa. Cadbury Brothers used to get their cocoa from there.

There were various rumours that the African workers were not properly treated there, that there was slavery there. Now, Cadbury went to these islands and visited the places and then came back and reported to Sir Edward Grey, the then Foreign Secretary, that there was slavery in an acute form and asked him whether they could continue to buy this raw material. Sir Edward Grey said, "Do not publish the report that you have brought to me. This is a matter for diplomatic intervention and I shall take up the matter diplomatically with the Portuguese Government". Probably, he relied on the treaty of 1336 and more especially on Charles II marrying a Portuguese girl. The diplomatic intervention of Sir Edward Grey came to nothing after five or six years. Meanwhile, there were people interested in the fate of these people in these two islands. One of them found the money whereby a great patriot, a great humane being, a person who was known for his catholic ideas, went out and made an investigation. I hope many of my colleagues know this gentleman; he is Mr. H. W. Nevinson who has written books on India which we have greatly admired. Mr. Nevinson produced a report which showed the shocking conditions that prevailed in these two islands. The *Evening Standard* a Conservative paper, which was opposed to the Cadburys who were Liberals and had their own paper the *Evening News*, published this extract and accused the Cadburys of encouraging slavery and of living on the wages of slaves. The Cadburys could not brook this criticism; they brought an action for defamation. On the prosecution side, the Cadburys had two advocates whose names we in India are very familiar with. They were Mr. Rufus Isaacs, as he then was, and Mr. John Simon, as he then was, and on the opposition side Sir Edward Carson led the defence. Mr. Cadbury was in the witness stand and I should like to read only a few questions which were put to Mr. Cadbury and his answers and the House will then have some idea

of what was happening in the islands of Principe and San Thome:

"Sir Edward Carson: Isn't it a fact that San Thome cocoa has been slave-grown for eight years?

Witness (Mr. Cadbury Senior): As far as the report from Angola and the island of San Thome is concerned, I am quite satisfied that slave-grown cocoa described the conditions, generally speaking.

Sir Edward Carson: Was it slavery of a very atrocious character?

Witness: In Angola itself the reports that have come to my knowledge give me every reason to suppose that in many cases, at least, it was exceedingly bad.

Sir Edward Carson: Would you say it was slavery of an atrocious character?

Witness: Generally speaking, as far as the collection of labour in Angola goes, that is true.

Sir Edward Carson: The cocoa you were buying was procured by atrocious methods of slavery?

Witness: Yes.

Sir Edward Carson: Men, women and children taken forcibly away from their homes against the will?

Witness: Yes.

Sir Edward Carson: Were they marched on the road like cattle?

Witness: I cannot answer that question. They were marched in forced marches down to the coast.

Sir Edward Carson: Were they labelled when they went on board ship?

Witness: Yes.

Sir Edward Carson: How far had they to march?

Witness: Various distances. Some came from more than a thousand miles, some from quite near to the coast.

Sir Edward Carson: Never to return again?

Witness: Never to return.

Sir Edward Carson: From the information which you procured, did they go down in shackles?

Witness: It is the usual custom, I believe, to shackle them at night on the march.

Sir, Edward Carson: Those who could not—mark this question—keep up with the march were murdered?

Witness: I have seen statements to that effect.

Sir Edward Carson: You do not doubt it?

Witness: I do not doubt that it has been so in some cases.

Sir Edward Carson: The men, women and children are freely bought and sold.....".

It goes on in a disgusting way and this was in 1909, not in 1498 when Vasco da Gama used these methods which are still remembered on the Arabian Coast. Sir, conditions have not changed very much. In a book published by Lord Hailey called the "African Survey" similar statements are repeated but in a very polished way as Lord Hailey is a polished Englishman. And in a recent publication to which this House has not paid much attention and with which I,

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in my individual capacity, was unfortunately associated—I refer to the Report on Forced Labour—a whole chapter deals with Portugal and the allegations that are made are that these very islands of Principe and San Thome never return the men and women that were sent there and the conditions—I might assure you after the most careful investigation that that committee entered into—are not very dissimilar from the conditions which Sir Edward Carson brought to light in his brilliant cross-examination. This is the very nation with which we are asked to be associated by Dr. Ambedkar! This is the Democratic Government, the Free Nation, for which the sympathies of so many nations have gone out. I can understand Brazil protesting because there is a tie between Brazil and Portugal; it was once a colony of Portugal. To this day Portuguese is the language in Brazil. I can make allowance for it. But to speak of other countries associating themselves with a nation of this type, of this description, of this history and of this achievement, if I might say so, of murdering men and women planting a little cocoa in their estates and living on it, is something unthinkable. It is the same story with Portuguese East Africa from where every year a hundred thousand labourers are offered to South Africa and the Portuguese Government gets £1 per head as its reward. There they go and suffer and there is nobody to look after them. It is the same campaign everywhere. I was not therefore surprised when the Prime Minister said that there is no freedom of the press in Goa. There are all sorts of methods that are adopted in Goa. If worse methods are not adopted, if the history of San Thome and Principe is not repeated in Goa, it is only because there is a big brother or neighbour standing behind and ready to take action if such methods were to be adopted. That is the only reason why Portugal is not showing itself in its true colours with reference to Goa. Therefore, Sir, there seems

to be no alternative but for Goa to come into the Union of India and it will come. I am only afraid that the methods which my friends have adopted or advocated are not the methods by which that desirable result can be brought about. I may be called a pacifist, but it is not in the sense of a pacifist I am talking. You will be going against your whole programme, against your whole policy, against all that you have stood for, against the reputation that you have built up in the international world when you have stood by those statements, if you were to adopt any other method but that which the Prime Minister has advocated I am certain that in course of time—it may take a little time but it may not be long—like a ripe fruit Goa is going to fall into our hands. What is lacking is certain propaganda on our part. The Prime Minister referred to the great propaganda which Portugal has made. What propaganda have we made in return about Portugal, about these enormities, everywhere? If I may say so, some of us are prepared to shoot our quills like a porcupine in all directions and at all sorts of countries, but the one country which has not been referred to in any of the Trusteeship Council meetings is the country of Portugal whose shocking record is blacker than any blackness can be, and I trust that in course of time our propaganda will be better. I have had a feeling throughout all my international contacts that our propaganda is not as good as it should be—I do not lay the blame on anybody. Our information officers are not able to put forward the information, or if they put it forward, it is in tabloid form which nobody can understand or digest. There is a different method of propaganda that can be undertaken on our behalf and I venture to suggest to the Prime Minister that he should, as a part and parcel of his foreign policy, try to see whether our propaganda methods, our propaganda organisation, the individuals who carry on the propaganda, are such that that propaganda can be useful.

I was very glad to hear that the Chairman of this House, the Vice-President, will shortly be going to Latin-American countries. I believe that it will be a great help to us in making them understand our policies and points of view. I personally believe that the Latin-American countries are longing to have better contacts with India. I have been twice to these Latin-American countries, the last time only in March or April, and the House will perhaps be interested to know that I spent a day in Guatemala also—I won't say more about that. But it seems to me, from what I know, that these Latin-American countries are only too anxious to make contacts. In Chile, in Peru, in Mexico, the name of India stands high; they have so much in common with India; an Indian is welcome in those places, and I am sorry that we have not got any embassies in those areas. Mexico is a visiting embassy. For Chile we started with an embassy. Then we went down to a *charge d'affaires* and now we have from Buenos Aires a *charge d'affaires* occasionally visiting Santiago. All this is partly because this House always complains of the expenditure on foreign missions, partly because perhaps the other House is even more emphatic about pruning the expenditure in these matters. Let me tell you that expenditure of that kind on proper embassies, on proper *charge d'affaires* is an expenditure which will pay you a thousandfold. Other countries have realised it. We are parsimonious and niggardly and always criticise this and that as extravagant expenditure. We should know what foreign affairs mean and how they should be conducted and what scope they should have. Then I am sure we will ask the Prime Minister why he does not spend more on his foreign policy and his embassies abroad and why he has kept it to this low level. I hope, Sir—I do not want to detain the House—that the policy which the Prime Minister has laid down will be accepted.

There is only one observation that I should like to make incidentally

with regard to satyagraha and all that. Sir, the foreign policy of a country can only be respected, can only be seriously regarded if there is unity at home and if there is economic strength. These are the two legs on which any foreign policy can stand. If, on the other hand, there is satyagraha on the slightest provocation, if there is lawlessness, to that extent the foreign policy will be weakened. Have we forgotten that we are a democratic Government? What have we done? The other day we went to the polls. Hundreds of millions voted. We congratulated ourselves. Other people congratulated us. Legislatures were formed; Assemblies were formed; Ministries were formed by the will of the people. And now, if something is done in some corner which is not acceptable to the minority, you start a satyagraha. What kind of democracy is this where you do not believe in your own legislatures and you do not believe in the process by which the electorate can be converted and made to have a new government, a new legislature, if they feel so strongly against the measures that have been taken? You cannot speak of democracy so long as there is a single attempt at satyagraha by people, by responsible people too, by people who will be alternative leaders, alternative Prime Ministers or at least hope and claim at some time to occupy that place. Now, Sir, if we mean democracy, if we have faith in democracy, let us with one voice see that these methods, hunger-strike, fast unto death, satyagraha, are tabooed and avoided and the strongest measures taken to put down such things. There is a corollary, of course, which I am not ignorant of, having dabbled in politics for many years. There is a corollary of course that a majority should not use its overwhelming strength to crush a minority's opinion, to ignore a minority's opinion. There is the corollary and there is the obligation on the part of the majority also to take some notice of the minority, but the minority cannot always be right even as the majority cannot always be right. Therefore, with that

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mutual obligation, let us hope that  
this test of democracy which we are  
facing will be successfully faced.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mrs.  
Alva, you want to speak?

SHRIMATI VIOLET ALVA (Bombay):  
Yes, Sir.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Then  
you begin tomorrow.

The House adjourned at a  
quarter past one of the clock  
till a quarter past eight of the  
clock on Friday, the 27th  
August 1954.