

COUNCIL OF STATES

Tuesday, 18th May 1954

The Council met at a quarter past eight of the clock, MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair.

ELECTION TO THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

MR. CHAIRMAN: Shri J. V. K. Vallabharao, Shri Mohammed Valiul-lah, Shrimati Violet Alva, Shri K. S. Hegde, Shri Ram Prasad Tamta, Diwan Chaman Lall and Shri P. S. Rajagopal Naidu are the only candidates nominated for election to the Public Accounts Committee. As the number of candidates nominated is equal to the number to be elected, I declare the said Members to be duly elected to the said Committee.

PAPER LAID ON THE TABLE

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR SCHEDULED CASTES AND SCHEDULED TRIBES FOR 1953

THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR IRRIGATION AND POWER (SHRI J. S. L. HATHI): Sir, on behalf of Shri B. N. Datar, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of *the* Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the year 1953, under clause (2) of article 338 of the Constitution. I Placed to the Library. *See* No. S—177/54.]

MOTION ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, I beg to move:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the
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Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

It has almost become a convention with us, Sir, to discuss in some form or other the subject of foreign affairs and international happenings almost in every session. If I may say so, it is a good convention, because it enables us to look at our own problems in proper perspective. But to discuss foreign affairs means in effect to discuss the world, and that is a big undertaking, because the problems all over the world, even in our own country, even the problems which intimately affect our own country, are numerous, and from time to time questions are put or other discussions take place in regard to those problems.

There is at the present moment the problem of intense interest to us relating to the French establishments in India. Obviously, from every point of view that is of importance to us. At the present moment talks are going on in Paris, and perhaps it is not desirable for me to say much about it, because our position is very well-known. All I would say is this, that this whole movement in these French establishments is rather a remarkable and an entirely spontaneous movement which has developed in the course of the last two or three months, and the time has obviously come for a very quick settlement of it, if this movement is to develop properly and not go into wrong directions. I hope, therefore, that this quick settlement will come. That settlement will not just now be a final settlement of all the various matters connected with it, but in regard to the major decisions it has *to come soon*. So far as we are concerned, as perhaps the House knows, we have done everything in our power to create a climate of proper discussion even by relaxing some of the measures we have taken, and I hope that the French Government will act in a like manner. This is only one subject I have mentioned.

There are others which also interest Members greatly, for example, the

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] position of the people of Indian descent in Ceylon. There, again, we have come to grips with this problem and to create an atmosphere of friendly discussion and conciliation.

There was an Indo-Ceylonese Agreement, as it was called, between the two countries, but unfortunately the promise of that agreement has not been fulfilled yet, and all kinds of difficulties and suspicion have arisen. There are other problems. There is the problem of Pakistan or our relations with Pakistan, of Kashmir, of Nepal and so many others, and a recent development which is of great importance to us is the agreement between China and India in regard to Tibet. That is of great importance in itself, this agreement between these two great countries, and it is of even greater importance because of the principles which have governed that agreement and which are laid down in the preamble to that agreement.

So, I could mention other problems too, but everyone knows that the most important thing happening today at the present moment is the Conference being held in Geneva over the last three or four weeks. A great deal depends on the outcome of that Conference. That Conference is considering problems relating to Asia—Korea and Indo-China—and naturally in regard to problems relating to Asia, it may be imagined, and rightly so, that the countries of Asia are more concerned than other countries. I would not labour that point at the present moment, but because I am anxious and eager that steps towards the establishment of peace there should be taken—it does not matter who takes them—I shall be happy if through the initiative of others some kind of cease-fire and further steps towards a settlement are arrived at there in regard to Indo-China or a further move towards a *settlement* in Korea is taken.

When I refer to Asia in this connection, it is no sense of rivalry, but

because I do feel—and everyone must feel—that today it is totally unrealistic, to try to solve any problem of Asia by distant countries whose relations with Asia, well, may be either colonial or may be some economic relations or some other relations because they are great powers. I do not deny their interests—they are interested of course—and it is essential, if we take a realistic view of any situation, that great countries and the great powers should come into the picture and should come to an agreement. It is no good saying that we should ignore them, because that would be totally unrealistic, but I do submit that in considering these countries of Asia, it is essential and realistic to take into consideration what the other countries of Asia think, and perhaps one of the difficulties in the past has been the tendency not to take the opinion of Asia into consideration. In the last few years great changes have taken place in Asia, and probably one of the biggest things in recent history is this fact of Asia changing, this fact of all kinds of currents, movements, urges, upheavals taking place in Asia after a long period of colonial rule. It may be that subsequently, when the history of these times is written, this fact of Asia coming up in this way will assume even greater prominence than today before our eyes.

But I shall not labour that point but rather draw the attention of the House to these very important discussions, deliberations and conferences that are taking place in Geneva. Every day the newspapers are full of various accounts, and, on a superficial view, one might think that it is almost impossible to bridge the vast gulf between the two or three differing viewpoints or standpoints. There are differences, considerable differences, yet I think that, on closer scrutiny, one will see that although the differences are great, there are many points in common, and that gradually, those differences are being narrowed. At any rate, every attempt is being made to narrow them. It is clear that some of the great statesmen there are dealing with this

problem with their minds bent on achieving, if it is at all possible, some settlement, some way out.

Now, when all these efforts are being made there towards a settlement, it would not be right or becoming of me to say anything which might perhaps embarrass or come in the way of those talks. We want results. There is no question of our taking up some kind of a high moral attitude blaming this and that—that is a very easy line to take up. We want results—in the shape of a settlement in Korea, in the shape first of all of a cease-fire in Indo-China and, subsequently, leading to some kind of a settlement. If so, we should be helpful whenever we can and we should not merely, for the sake of saying it, say things which might embarrass or come in the way. I might say straight off, to remove any possible misapprehension in the people's minds, that we, *i.e.*, the Government of India, have no set proposals on these matters. People seem to think that we are throwing proposals in season and out of season at the parties concerned from time to time. We have made no proposals and it is not our intention to make any set proposals. If we have any idea occasionally, well, we may discuss it. We may privately put it but we are more or less groping to find some way out. It is easier, as I said, to lay down some logical formulae which may be correct and may even be justified in arguments but the point is not some kind of victory in arguments but the achievement of a settlement or peace or cease-fire, etc., and when we consider that matter, we come up against all kinds of prejudices, passions, fears and suspicions. So one has to go cautiously.

First of all, I should like to lay stress on this point that earnest attempts are being made in Geneva at the present moment and to wish them success. Secondly, in considering these problems, let us take Korea for instance, much was gained by the cease-fire; and without meaning to go back and indicate, "well, we were right and others were wrong"—I don't mean that—the fact remains that if that

cease-fire had come to Korea much earlier, the position would have been much better..... (*Cheers*) not merely from the point of view of the killing that took place—certainly of course that was a great gain and a great deal of killing and suffering would have been avoided on all sides—but essentially the problem would have been easier of solution because the longer this process goes on, the more difficult the problem becomes. Korea is a good example. There was war for three years there—terrible war, terrible for the Koreans, terrible for the other parties fighting and at the end of the three years, where are we? We have put an end, or they have put an end to the fighting, certainly, and that is a great gain but it is essentially a deadlock, a stalemate, whether from the military point of view or from the political point of view. That is to say, neither party has gained a victory. They may talk about it, each one of them, but the fact is, the reality of the situation is, that neither party has gained a victory, *i.e.*, neither party, in military terms or in like terms, is in a position to impose its will on the other side.

That is the position that has arisen. That position would have arisen two or two and a half years earlier in Korea and perhaps in a much better way, because subsequent developments or subsequent happenings have embittered the people on either side, made them harder, more rigid, more difficult of yielding a thing.

But this is all past history. What do we do now? Well, as I said, I am not presumptuous enough to offer solutions for these terrible problems which the world has to face. But certain considerations have to be borne in mind. The first which I have just said is that you cannot deal with Korea, neither side can deal with Korea as if that side had won a great victory, because it is a stalemate, it is not a victory for either side. Therefore, what we have not won in the field of battle we cannot somehow translate into a settlement. That is an imposed settlement. 'If there is

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] to be a settlement it has to be on the basis of a recognition of the facts, of the realities of the situation. And the realities are that neither side can impose itself on the other. And what is more, neither side is prepared to be imposed upon by the other. Therefore, the only way is for this fact to be recognized.

Now, all of us, I hope, want this long-suffering country, Korea, to be united. And I am quite sure that if it is not united, the present disunity will remain, may be conflicts will continue, small or big, and there will be no ultimate stability or security for either side. We want it to be united. How are we to get that unity? I am not going to discuss any proposals. There are various proposals being considered in Geneva. I am only putting before the House certain considerations which should govern our thinking in this matter. We want unity in Korea. We want similarly, you may say, unity in Indo-China. Well and good. But with the position as it is, you cannot have unity. And if you cannot have unity, without imposition on one side or the other, what are we to do? You are not in a position to impose yourself, neither side is in a position to impose itself on the other. Then how do you get unity? That is the problem. That is the difficulty. Therefore, one should try to explore other avenues. It may be, in fact it is always so, that you cannot solve these intricate and difficult problems which rouse so much passion, suddenly by some formula or other. Where this is so, it is part of wisdom to go towards the solution, just as it was part of wisdom to have a cease-fire, even though you do not come to a decision about the next step. This cease-fire itself was a great step. So it may be wise to take some step towards that solution, even though you cannot reach the objective aimed at. Of course, if you could reach the objective, well and good. But I am merely pointing out that this desire of either side to have it all one's own way, is obviously opposed to the facts of the situation and is not likely to succeed.

It may be that you may not have a united Korea yet, for a while, North and South Korea may function separately, democratically and independently, but build up some kind of a common structure as a temporary feature at the top so that they can consider their problems and so that, instead of thinking in terms of conflict they can discuss those problems and gradually the common matters of discussion may grow and when the passion of the present day has passed they may come together and unify in a closer way. I am merely putting ideas before the House because the most important consideration is that neither side is in a position to impose its terms on the other and neither side is agreeable to be imposed upon. That is the reality of the situation. How does one get out of it? Either some way of gradually getting together, realising those facts, has to be found out, or the other way is, not getting out of it, but getting into a worse mess by war. These are the two alternatives.

/ Now, apply these to Indo-China, the same basic principles with such variations as may be necessary on account of the different situation. Here we have this war which has gone on for six or seven years. With all respect to those who might have been responsible for it, I think few wars anywhere have been so unfortunate as this Indo-China war. During the last few years, repeated opportunities have come, repeated opportunities have been suggested for some kind of arrangement, agreement or settlement. They have not been accepted and the position has grown progressively worse from the military point of view; and now, at last, something that should have been done years ago is being done. These people are meeting and discussing this question. Of course, by way of meeting, it does not mean that they will arrive at a settlement; nevertheless, facts are such that they have compelled these people who were reluctant even to discuss this matter to meet and consider the problem now. The unfortunate part of it is that a little foresight and a little understanding,

especially, of course, of the Indo-China situation, and to some extent, of the Asian situation, ought to have led the people to adopt this course of discussion to come to an agreement long long ago.

Well, again, it is not good looking back and regretting what was done or what was not done in the past but it is right that we should draw a lesson from it and not make the same mistake again. In Indo-China also there are certain hard realities to be faced. Some of them are beginning to be faced. It has been stated, for instance, that the countries there can have and will have complete independence. What exactly that formula means—although the meaning of the words is dear, nevertheless, what it means fully—is not so clear, because the same words have been used often. Anyhow, whatever they might mean, my point is that it is something which, if it had been recognised two or three years back, would have eased the situation tremendously and paved the way for a settlement, and that is the recognition of the independence of the countries, that is the recognition of the necessity of the withdrawal of colonial control. It would have made all the difference. It was not done. Well, now, when facts have gone ahead, it is done. Facts have gone ahead in other ways also and those facts have to be realised and kept in mind. I am not, for the moment discussing, shall I say, the merits of the situation; I am not even discussing what we believe in, that is the removal of colonialism and all that; of course, we believe in that. But rather I am trying to put before the House the present situation, the realities of the situation. Now, again, looking at it I have a feeling that these realities are beginning to affect the course of discussions in Geneva, that they are realised, to what extent by everybody naturally I cannot say, nor can anyone else, but there is a feeling that they are trying to come to grips. There are difficulties. There are some people unfortunately who still refuse to understand realities

and who try to find some way out without even thinking whether that so called way out is not unfortunately worse than anything we have had thus far, but in spite of these difficulties there is this attempt being made, and I would hesitate to say or do anything which might cause any embarrassment to those who are doing their utmost to find some way out. In this attempt to find some way, Members must have noticed that people on both sides of this dispute, if I may say so, to some extent have gone some way to meet the other viewpoint. Some are rigid and sometimes it may be that the speeches that one reads in the newspapers will sound somewhat rigid. Public speeches sometimes have to be rigid. But behind those public speeches, one does see that earnest attempt and that gradual relaxation, the gradual coming nearer on both sides. Only one fact I would like to mention because it is an interesting fact, that after the five or six years of this terrible war and all that it has involved in suffering and passion, after the recent military successes which the Viet Minh parties have achieved, the troops, etc. have achieved because from that point of view they have achieved some successes, nevertheless, in the proposals they have made—I am not analysing the other proposals—they made one suggestion which struck me as remarkable, as showing their approach to this question. The suggestion they have made is that they are prepared to consider a union with France of independent countries, that is to say, they want of course complete independence, but they have not ruled out, in fact they have specifically stated that they are prepared to talk over and consider a free union with France. Now I think that itself shows the type of approach, the spirit behind, because one would have thought that after all that has happened, the reaction would be very much against this, and no doubt that reaction must be there among many, yet this proposal has been thrown out for consideration. So I think, without being unduly optimistic, and fully realizing all the dangers that surround us and surround the

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] people in Geneva; nevertheless I think that there is some ground for hope, that step by step they may go towards a settlement and they may go towards a cease-fire first of all. As in the case of Korea, a cease-fire need not necessarily mean a settlement of the political issues. It just first of all stops this continuous strain in killing, the strain on the mind of both sides, but apart from that it is easier to discuss political issues once you have done with the killing.

Therefore it is—I speak with diffidence—not necessary to tie them with political issues. The question of cease-fire—I feel it should be possible for a cease-fire—should be separate by itself and obviously a cease-fire can only take place if both parties play fair, do not take advantage of that cease-fire to consolidate their strength or to add to their position at the expense of the other. That would be unfair. I feel that both parties are in a mood for it. There was a time four months ago when we ventured to suggest that there should be a cease-fire in Indo-China. The idea was welcomed in some quarters, criticised in others and it was suggested that that idea of course was good but how are we to do it? There are difficulties in the way. Of course, there were difficulties in the way. Nobody imagined that it was so easy but after four months I have no doubt everybody realises that the difficulties in the way of not doing it have been far greater and they go on increasing day by day. So it is a choice of difficulties—a choice of evils if you like. It is no good trying to keep away from what is an obvious course because there is some difficulty and going backwards and backwards and falling into a bog from which there is hardly any way to extricate yourself. Therefore this question of cease-fire is of primary importance, of course in the context of other matters too.

The House will remember the Colombo Conference where this question

of Indo-China was discussed at greater length than any other question, naturally because every country represented there—and two or three countries more especially—they are right near Indo-China, like Burma, Indonesia. We are not very far from Indo-China, nor is Ceylon. So it is of intense interest to us what happens in Indo-China. It is of interest to us by itself as the problem of Indo-China; it is of interest to all of us because it might well affect the whole of Asia—a big conflagration or whatever it is. Therefore we discussed it at great length and finally we issued a statement which hon. Members must have seen. I am not going to read that out. That statement was essentially based on some of the proposals I had ventured to put forward here which we, the Government of India, had communicated to the other Governments concerned. In the main, they were a cease-fire, direct negotiations, non-intervention and reference to the United Nations, that is, the United Nations must be seized of the problem—not directly, but should be referred to it as the Colombo Conference considered these matters. In their statement there was no mention of non-intervention or non-aid. I confess that I attach the greatest importance to this from the point of view of preventing this conflict which was bad enough from becoming an international conflagration. It was important that aid from other countries, whether it is aid from China to the Viet Minn or whether it is aid from other countries to the Viet Nam, should stop by agreement. If there is such an agreement, immediately you limit the conflict and immediately it becomes easier to consider it without the prestige of the Great Powers being involved. When the prestige of the Great Powers is involved, then it becomes more and more difficult. It should be the function of the Great Powers to advise others on peaceful courses and not to incite them to other courses. If you agree to prevent aid and intervention coming from outside to both sides—it is essential that it should be on both sides, because it is obvious that if it is on one side, on the other side also it is bound

to come in—then you change the whole atmosphere of the conflict. You make it clear and you bring tremendous pressure of the facts to bear on the solution of it. But if aid continues, then it is not an Indo-China conflict at all. It is a conflict on a wider international plane and the body of Indo-China just suffers because of it.

Therefore we are keen on this policy of non-intervention. Now these words do not appear in the Colombo Statement, but what appears in the Colombo Statement is, if I may say so, a happier way of expressing it, that is to say, there will be an agreement between the countries concerned principally. China, the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., there will be an agreement to take every step to prevent a recurrence or resumption of hostilities. Naturally this would come about at the time of following the cease-fire. Now if there is a cease-fire and there is an agreement between these principal and great powers concerned to take every possible step to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, what does that mean? You will realise that it means something much more. It includes nonintervention and it means something more. Non-intervention is a negative thing—a good thing but a negative thing. This is a positive thing including the negative thing—non-intervention. Now obviously no country is going to prevent hostilities by sending equipment for war, troops, etc. That is the reversal of it. Non-intervention comes in no doubt, but something more comes in. That is an attempt, and an attempt by agreement, because all these attempts have to be by agreement on both sides. If one side does it, the other is bound to follow. So, in effect, the Colombo Statement was wise enough to go further, in this particular matter, than I had ventured to say here.

Now, there is one thing and that is this. The House knows that all along we have been anxious that the People's

KepuoJic ot unina snouia De recognised as the representative of China in the United Nations. That has absolutely nothing to do with the question whether we like it or dislike it. But we do firmly believe that if the United Nations is to be representative in any real way, it has to have every solidly functioning Government in it. Otherwise, it ceases to be representative to that degree. Now, if I may mention one thing, there is a Disarmament Conference, or a Committee of it, sitting in London at the present moment. Now let us presume, although it will be too optimistic to presume that, that the countries represented there come to some kind of agreement in favour of disarmament, and the U.N. agrees. Why should the countries left outside the U.N. which do not come into the picture of that disarmament game agree? They are not there. Why should they agree? It does not matter much, of course, if some small country agrees or does not agree, but it will make a mighty lot of difference if the great country of China is left out of that agreement, not only now but later too. So obviously any plan of disarmament which leaves out a military power, either actual or potential whatever the case may be—is a defective plan. It leaves a loophole for that power to go ahead apart from the terms of that agreement so that from any point of view it seems to me so extraordinary that the present Government of China should be ignored or not accepted into the United Nations or otherwise. I say this because I believe that many of the troubles of the world during the last four years have almost directly resulted from this fact. It is patently absurd—if I may say so—it is amazing for anyone to say in the United Nations that the learned representative of Formosa is the representative of China. He has nothing to do with China; he has no authority in China, and to call him the representative of China is to delude oneself, and to delude oneself in such matters leads to very dangerous consequences. It is my belief that the Korean war would not have taken place otherwise; this was one of the major reasons. It is my belief that

,Shri Jawharlal Nehru.] some other things would not have taken place also. I have mentioned about China because at the Colombo Conference great stress was laid on this, and without letting out any great secrets, if I may say so, it was not I who brought this thing forward in the Colombo Conference about China being recognised in the United Nations. Of course I believed in it all the time, but personally and deliberately I did not wish to confuse the issue of Indo-China at the present moment by talking about the recognition of the People's Government of China in the United Nations, but there were others who said, "No, this is of basic importance in relation to Indo-China apart from anything else." I agreed of course. There was no question of disagreement with it. I wholeheartedly agreed. It is probable that if the other Prime Ministers had not been very keen. I might not have put it in there at that moment, but they were keen and I think there was justification for the attitude they adopted, because all these are connected matters, and so long as the People's Government of China is not properly fitted into the picture of the United Nations and given her rightful place, there will always be trouble in Asia and elsewhere. In this connection it may interest, hon. Members if I read out something that Mr. Dulles said not very recently but not too long ago either, *i.e.*, before he became Secretary of State of the present administration in the United States. He wrote a book. It is dangerous for politicians to write books. He called it "War or Peace", 'this Has about four or five years ago. He says:

"I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace if that assembly is representative of what the world actually is without at tempting to appraise closely those nations which are 'good' and those which are 'bad'

"Some of the present member nations.....have Governments that are not representative of the peo-

ple. But if in fact they 'govern', they have a power which should be represented in any organisation that purports to mirror world reality. If the Communist Government of China in case proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations."

Now, I don't mean to imply or say that Mr. Dulles is not entitled to change his mind or that other circumstances may not have arisen which may have made him change his mind. It is not that. But what Mr. Dulles said in his book four years ago seems to me so very much to the point and such a right approach to this problem because you cannot have really a World Assembly like U.N. If you begin to sit down and say 'well, I don't like that country and I like this country'. Who is to decide? You must face the facts as they are. Therefore on this question of China's—I will not say admission; it is not right, it is not correct to say that, because China is in the United Nations—representation the question is, who will represent China? It is not a new country seeking admission but a country which is in the U.N. and it should be found out who is the right representative of it. It is a matter of extreme importance and it affects all these problems that are arising from day to day. Now in this connection, one of the major happenings so far as we are concerned has been the conclusion of the agreement with China with regard to Tibet. Personally I am very happy about this agreement not only because it settles various pending matters but much more so because in its preamble it lays down certain principles of abiding importance. Those principles if applied to other Asian countries or in fact elsewhere, would immediately produce a new atmosphere. What are those principles? First, recognition of each other's territorial integrity, and sovereignty. Second is —I forget the order—it was something

like non-aggression. Third is non-interference with each other internally or otherwise. It is mutual. Observe these principles. Recognition of each other's territorial sovereignty and integrity, non-aggression and non-interference—if these principles are recognised and acted upon, we know that 90 per cent, of the fear today in the world would disappear. You see that the fear is this. Everyone thinks that he is going to be invaded or that aggression is going to take place. The great power blocs, the more powerful they grow, the more afraid they grow. It is an extraordinary position in the world today. You go on becoming stronger and stronger and bigger and bigger and because you become bigger and bigger, you become more exposed in the sense of possible attack. Therefore you want to be bigger still. Each is afraid of aggression of the other or attack from the other. I am not going into the merits at all of the question. Now if once you recognise the reality as it is in the world today and accept it and lay down that there should be no aggression, no attack on another's sovereignty, no internal interference because internal interference is important apart from war—there is the question of intrigue by the other; if this is not going to take place, immediately you remove this fear and then it becomes far easier to deal with every problem—at least you make peace more or less secure for this generation. Therefore, this treaty, this agreement with China, between India* and China, is important. I do not mean to say it is in the nature of a non-aggression pact: that is not it, but it is something very near it.

Then there are a number of other matters which I shall refer to briefly. There is Kashmir—Pakistan and Kashmir. Two or three days ago, there was published a President's Order in regard to Kashmir and there have been many comments on that. Many of the comments expressing satisfaction on that Order are completely justified; but some of the com-

ments seem to me to put an interpretation on that Order which was not justified. Now, what was this President's Order? What is it all about? Ever since the accession of Kashmir in 1947, in the end of October, that accession was complete, as complete an accession as of any other State, the accession on three subjects—Defence, Communication and Foreign Affairs. There was no difference between the accession of Kashmir and any other State in India. Subsequently * other developments took place with regard to other States, as we all know, before our Constitution was finalised, and other States were more closely absorbed, if I may say so, into the Union of India. That development could not take place in regard to Kashmir for a variety of reasons. First, for some time there were actual military operations. Secondly, because it had become an international problem. Thirdly, because it was an international problem in which we were tied up in all kinds of ways. Fourthly, because any such decision in regard to any State can only take place with the agreement of State Government or the representatives of the people of the State. So the matter rested there, for about two years, three years, or four years. Thus, a number of matters of daily concern to us remained in an unsettled state, as between Kashmir and India—financial matters, other matters—and we carried on from day to day, without coming to a settlement about them. Now we had to come to a settlement about them, quite regardless of our international assurances of commitments. Those international commitments and assurances remained, of course. But we had to work out the results- of that accession on three subjects. But when we say three subjects, each subject means a category of subjects. It is not one precise subject. It is a category. One has to work out the category and one has also to work out all the inevitable consequences, apart from the main subjects. There-fore, two years back there were talks and negotiations between the

[Shri Jawharlal Nehru.] representatives of the Kashmir Government and the Government of India and we arrived ultimately at some kind of a settlement which was referred to as the Kashmir settlement or the Indo-Kashmir settlement or whatever it was.

That was plated before Parliament and approved of by Parliament. That agreement, which is sometimes referred to as the Delhi Agreement, was, in a very small way, given effect to in Kashmir and by us. We could not give effect to that unilaterally; it was not given effect to by the other side—that is, the rest of the agreement. This was a matter of a good deal of disappointment. People did not feel happy that an agreement was arrived at but that it was not given effect to. That has been pending ever since and, what has happened is, during the last two or three months we have considered that old settlement of two years ago and tried to work out details of it, because the details had not been worked out, that is, to dot the i's and cross the t's of it, and now by a Presidential Order it has been given effect to. Of course, I need hardly say that we have done this after agreement not only of the Kashmir Government but of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly so that this is really continuing something which had to be done, which was, in a sense, largely done two years ago and which has no relation to any external commitment or assurance of the Government of India. Naturally every assurance that we have given and every international commitment that we have made in regard to Kashmir holds and stands. Difficulties have come and may come in the way of fulfilment, that is a different matter, difficulties not of our seeking but of others; but I want to make it perfectly clear that so far as the Government of India are concerned, every assurance and commitment of ours internationally made in regard to Kashmir stands.

Now, coming nearer, I should like just to make a brief mention—brief not because it is unimportant—about the South East Asian countries, and the Middle Eastern countries, to the west of India, because our contacts with them have been and are close. In fact, they go back to thousands of years of history. It has always been our endeavour to develop these contacts and our relations with all of them are very friendly. We continue exploring new avenues, trade, cultural and political, for closer contacts.

Finally, I would just like to repeat this:

There is a phrase or a sentence and there is a great deal of talk of collective security. The idea is that for collective security you want a collective force. I submit that this is a wrong approach for collective security. In the present context when forces are more or less matched, collective force means continued insecurity; it does not lead to security. It is completely wrong because both sides go on collecting forces and both sides become more and more insecure. The approach to collective security is only through collective peace and that is why we have ventured to suggest that countries should not align themselves with any of these collective forces but that they should try and maintain an area of present peace and peace even if by misfortune some tragedy might occur elsewhere.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion moved:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

DR. WAN CHAMAN LALL (Punjab)-Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, the Council approves of the policy'."

SHRI B. C. GHOSE (West Bengal): Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, the Council regrets that no effective steps have so far been taken to form and enlarge an area of peace and pursue a policy of strict non-alignment'."

Prof. N. R. MALKANI (Nominated): Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, the Council fully approves of the policy of the Government'."

SHRI S. MAHANTY (Orissa): Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, the Council is of the opinion that more effective steps should be taken—

(a) to eliminate foreign pockets from India;

(b) for a speedy solution of the Kashmir dispute; and

(c) for settlement of the outstanding items of Indo-Pakistan dispute'."

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA (Andhra): Sir, I beg to move:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:

'and having considered the same, the Council is of the opinion that Government should give more active support to the freedom struggle of the peoples of Malaya, Kenya and British Guiana'."

MR. CHAKRAVARTY: The motion and the amendments are now before the House for discussion.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Mr. Chairman, we have heard the Prime Minister with great attention. In his speech on our foreign policy he has referred to the Indo-China situation which may become a source of danger for world peace. It is true that the Government of India have made certain proposals which have been more or less endorsed at the Colombo Conference attended by some of the Asian countries. We have to look to the crucial problem that is facing them in Indo-China. The crucial problem is the foreign aggression: French imperialism is trying to hold on to its position in Indo-China and the American imperialists are trying to egg on the French imperialists to stick on there. In this connection, the formula suggested by the Prime Minister earlier and also put out in the latest Colombo Conference is not complete. Non-intervention is all right; even agreement between the Big Powers who are closely connected with Indo-China to see that hostilities do not break up is also correct. But why does not our Prime Minister, why does not our Government of India, make it clear that one of the parties, the French imperialists essentially, must withdraw their armies? Without that there cannot be any real independence for the Indo-China people. Sir, this is what we consider one of the weak spots in the whole proposal. It is true that the Government of India has said that independence of the Indo-Chinese people must be recognised and it is only on the recognition of their complete independence that any settlement could be achieved. But now-a-days independence is being again and again tom-tommed. Even Ceylon is called independent though the British bases continue there. That is why we would have liked our Prime Minister exactly to stress that the French imperialists have no business to stay there, that they must quit and that naturally only after that a real settlement could be arrived at.

iShri P. Sundarayya.]

In this connection the proposal by the Viet Minh People's Democratic Republic is to let both the Governments, the Governments of Viet Minh People's Democratic Republic as well as the Bao Dai Government, have joint commissions to settle all the matters, either of cease-fire or of future elections, and they are even prepared to let a neutral nations' commission supervise this arrangement. The essential condition is that the French imperialists must quit. Sir, the same thing happens in Korea also. It is heartening today to hear the Prime Minister saying that for North Korea and South Korea, because they are equally balanced, the first step to ultimate solution would be some kind of joint commission between these two Governments to find out on what issues and on what matters they can cooperate so that ultimately the unification can come. But in all these proposals who are opposing this reasonable proposal? It is not the People's Democratic Governments either of North Korea or of Viet Minh, but the South Korean Government and the Bao Dai Government backed by the American Imperialists. In fact the American imperialists tried to by-pass the Geneva Conference itself. They are today carrying on negotiations, secret negotiations, with the French imperialists in Paris to unleash direct intervention, to send even their armed forces, ground and air forces as well to Indo-China, and thus unleash a war, a war on Asian soil, a war to suppress Asian people.

Sir, in this connection we would like the Government of India to categorically warn the British Government, with whom we are still maintaining Commonwealth relations, that if the American imperialists and the French imperialists, in spite of the warning of the Asian people, in spite of the warning by our Prime

Minister and the Government of India, try to unleash this war, and if the British imperialists directly or indirectly support it, then we will have to give notice to them that we will not only not be a party to it but we will use all our moral and material strength to oppose any such move even on the part of the British Government. Sir, in this connection I particularly lay stress on this. The British Government under the pressure of Asian people's opinion and especially under the pressure of the Government of India can certainly take up an attitude which may avert a great world catastrophe and it is in this regard that I want the Government of India to be very unequivocal not only in using their own influence directly but also in bringing as much pressure as they are capable of on the British Government so that it will not even indirectly agree to have anything to do with this war in Indo-China. In this connection may I draw the attention of our Prime Minister, as we have again and again been doing to the killings that are going on, the continued war that is going on in Kenya and Malaya, and ask how long the Government of India will take a lenient attitude towards this? A war has been going on in Indo-China for 7 years. The Prime Minister has rightly pointed out that this kind of dragging on of local wars to suppress the Asian people will ultimately lead to a world catastrophe. Is not a similar war going on in Malaya where the British imperialists have been using bombers, naval craft and divisions of armies for the last seven years? And not only that; the most unfortunate thing is that a good chunk of the British imperialist army in Malaya unfortunately is composed of the Gurkha soldiers, Nepalese soldiers, recruited in Nepal—and partly in India also—to whom unfortunately the Government of India allows transit facilities. Of course, they go in civilian clothes, but they are recruited here, they are trained here and they are given all transit facilities and it is this chunk of the army that is doing the dirty work in Malaya.

Is it enough for our Government only to go on verbally protesting? (Time bell rings.) Sir.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: You may wind up. We have got about a dozen speakers. At about 12, I would ask Mr. Krishna Menon, who was in the Colombo Conference, and the U. N. to speak, and after that the Prime Minister will wind up in a few words.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: Is there a time limit for the speakers?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes; say, about 1.) minutes.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: 20 minutes, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: All right. 20 minutes for those who have moved amendments and 15 minutes for others.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: 25 minutes and 15 minutes, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: No, no.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Sir, in Malaya this has been going on for all these years. The Government should at least stop this flow of Gurkha soldiers to Malaya. Again and again arguments are brought forth saying that if you stop them from proceeding, then unemployment would increase and they would find themselves in difficulty, Sir, we have recently written off a debt of more than Rs. 60 crores to Burma. We are doing everything to help the Nepa-lese Government to rehabilitate their own economy and to develop their economy'. Is it difficult to give employment for these eight battalions with approximately 8,000 Gurkha soldiers instead of allowing them to go to Malaya to butcher the masses struggling for their freedom?

In Kenya a mass butchery is being carried by the British imperialists. It is a well known fact that some say that more than one lakh of Kikuyu tribe people have already been massacred. Even the Government of India must be knowing it. If it thinks that one lakh is an exaggerated figure, I know that it

will not be less than 30,000, even by the most conservative estimate, though the British Government says that it has killed only 3,000 up till now. How long are we to allow the British imperialists to go on butchering the people in Asia and in Africa? If the British imperialists continue to do it, why should we give them our moral support by continuing to be in this so-called British Commonwealth? Why should we not say, 'if you continue to do this sort of thing, we cannot be a part of the British Commonwealth, whatever the benefits we may derive from it' and tell them that we will have nothing to do with them and we as an independent sovereign Republic will have dealings with the British Government without being a member of the Commonwealth if they continued this butchery?

Similarly in British Guiana, they have let loose tremendous repression. We have protested again and again. Is it all that we are capable of? I would request the Government of India to seriously consider why it is that it is so hesitant with all these doings of the British imperialists? Is it because we are tied up in the Commonwealth? Then, it is better that we get out of the Commonwealth so that the voice of Asia and the voice of the Indian people can equally condemn these atrocities as vigorously as we are condemning the atrocities of the French imperialists in Viet-Nam, in Tunisia, in Morocco, and as vigorously as our Prime Minister condemns the American doings, the American imperialists who are trying to make the whole world and the whole of Asia the battle-ground for the third world war.

Sir, in this connection I would like to refer also to the French and Portuguese pockets in our country. It is true that the Government of India are not allowing the French forces to traverse our Indian territory to reach their so-called enclaves. It is not enough. The Government of India are now carrying on negotiations in Paris: these negotiations are likely to be prolonged. We do not want these negotiations to be prolong-

[Shri P. Sundaraya.] ed. Find out what they are up to and give them notice that if they are to prolong these negotiations, we will give our moral and material support to the people in these French and Portuguese pockets. I should like them to give every measure of support within their capacity to drive away the French and Portuguese imperialists from the soil of our country. The Government of India must give their serious attention to this.

I would like to refer to the question of Indian-origin Ceylonese people, or Indians in Ceylon. Sir, there has been agreement between the Government of India and the Ceylonese Government. Even when that agreement was concluded, we on the floor of this House had pointed out again and again that this was giving away the rights of the Indian people, creating a kind of untouchable caste there, as they did not get the full citizenship rights which was a dangerous thing. Ultimately, day after day, the consequences of our giving moral support by our signing the treaty is coming up. Today, the Ceylonese Government, controlled by the planters there, the British planters there and the Ceylon Government run by their own Ceylon monopolists, the Ceylonese landlords backed by the British planters, are creating this feeling, this division between the Ceylonese people of Ceylonese origin and the people of Indian origin so that they can continue to dominate them. I would like the Government of India to look into what the British imperialists are trying to do in this connection to divide the Ceylonese people themselves so that they can keep on ruling by keeping their own bases in Trincomalee and other places. The whole issue cannot be solved unless and until the Indian people join with the Ceylonese people and fight the reactionary Britishers. I do not want our Government to be a party to this agreement. As, unfortunately, they have signed this agreement with the Ceylonese Government. Sir, I would like to ask our Government, and especially

our Prime Minister who has been taking steps, although probably halting, to take such steps which will support the struggle for peace, which will preserve peace and which will help the Asian people who are suffering under colonial rule to stand up and fight their own struggle for independence. But it is not enough if the Prime Minister himself enunciates this policy. I want the Government of India and the Prime Minister to see whether his foreign policy—even to the extent that it goes—is not being sabotaged in India itself" by arch-reactionaries That is the point I want him to see.

Sir, again and again, the American aid, the arch-reactionaries, the big monopolists, the big landlords, the Princes, these people are trying to sabotage the foreign policy of this country. Today, they are creating an internal situation which becomes difficult and brings pressure on the Prime Minister and the Government of India not to pursue their foreign policy even to the extent that they are pursuing. There is a concerted move on the part of the reactionaries to frustrate the Government of India's foreign policy. Therefore, Sir, the Government of India's foreign policy will not succeed unless the Prime Minister takes certain steps to see that agrarian reforms are immediately implemented—not the halting agrarian reforms. In the whole of the country there are lakhs of tenants being evicted; we must stop all these evictions and land must be assured to the peasants. Similarly, Sir, India must be industrialised.' Now for the industrialisation of India who is the biggest obstacle? The Government pleads lack of finance, lack of capital and for that it naturally asks for a national Five Year Plan Loan. But this loan alone is not going to bring enough money for our various schemes. The most essential thing to do is to mop up the huge profits of the foreign imperialists and of the Indian monopolists; and, without doing it, no amount of loans, no amount of plans will ever succeed.

The third point, Sir, I would like to refer to is that if our foreign policy is

to succeed, the Government must take steps to see that our people are assured of full employment and people have contented life. With regard to these matters if the Government of India continues its present internal policies as they have been doing, then the situation in the country instead of improving may even get worse; and with internal conditions worsening, no amount of good words, no amount of good policies or connections abroad can ever be enforced; not only enforced, but ultimately the internal forces will overwhelm even the liberal policies to the extent they are pursued by the Government of India; they will also get sabotaged and pressure will be brought on the Government of India even with regard to the foreign policy to line up behind the American and British imperialists. In this connection—I am just concluding, Sir,—I would like to point out one thing. Some of the critics of our party say that we want the Government of India to join and become a stooge of the so-called other bloc—the Soviet-Chinese bloc. We do not want our country to become a stooge of any country; we do not want our country to align with any other bloc. We want our country to follow an independent foreign policy and independent foreign policy which preserves peace, which I would request our Prime Minister to follow as an urgent, emergent necessity for all people in Asia.

SHRI GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore): Are they * not doing so?

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: I have explained it. Not only should our independent foreign policy preserve the peace but at the same time it should be such that we should give our moral and, if necessary, material help also to all the people in Africa and Asia who are struggling for their complete independence. Let our Government judge every act in the international situation whether it is British imperialists or American imperialists or the Government of the Soviet Union or that of China. Let their acts be judged, and 'U we feel that the step taken by any Gov-

ernment goes towards the preservation of peace, goes to the liberation of colonial people, goes to the happiness and development of the so-called backward countries of Asia and Africa, let us go to support that people. We do not want our Government to have any other policy except an independent policy. In this connection we are afraid that though that may be the ideal which Mr. Nehru, our Prime Minister, put before us, the way in which it is being pursued is, in many respects, halting and sometimes even negates it. We only want to point out this and we hope the Government of India, while furthering its policies, will also see that these are put alongside equally progressive internal policies.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU (Uttar Pradesh) : Mr. Chairman, the big issues on which war and peace depend are in a state of flux at the present time. It is hardly possible, therefore, to say anything definite on any of those issues that we have been thinking of for weeks and months. All eyes are turned at present towards Geneva, and everyone earnestly hopes that the spirit that has so far manifested itself will continue to develop so that fighting may come to an end and steps may quickly be taken to bring about a lasting settlement in Indo-China and also in Korea.

Notwithstanding, Sir, the points on which agreement has been arrived at, there remain questions of great importance to settle. The unification of Korea and Indo-China are the main problems before the Geneva Conference. The Government of India is for the unification of both these countries because it believes that unless they are unified, unrest will continue to prevail in these territories, which will threaten and which will be a source of danger to world peace. But as realists we must recognise that it is far from easy to unite the various portions of these countries that are under different controls. Both the democratic and the communist blocs are deeply interested in the future of these territories, and though both want that they should

[Shri H. N. Kunzru I unite, it is hardly possible that any agreement on the method of bringing about the unification can be quickly arrived at. Take the case of Korea. The question of finding out the views of the people on both sides of the 38th Parallel was discussed by America and Russia for five long years and no agreement has yet been arrived at; and although a war there has convinced both the sides that neither can win by force, does it seem more probable now than it did before that the protagonists on both the sides will be able to And some way of agreeing on the machinery required for ascertaining the views of the people? We should hope, Sir, for everything, but it would be a mistake to be too optimistic. That would be no m, Sir. for pessimism. It is quite possible that full ageement may not be arrived at on this point either in regard to Korea or in regard to Indo-China. nevertheless, it is possible that if the attempts were renewed some time later, we might be able to see more day-light than we can now. However. Sir. we shall be very glad indeed if. notwithstanding the difficulties that seem to lie in the path of the negotiators, a satisfactory agreement is arrived at. I wonder however whether even an agreement in these territories will bring to an end all those difficulties that have continued to embitter the relations between the democratic and communist protagonists.

Sir. it has been said that the Government of India should have suggested that the French armies should be withdrawn from Indo-China. I understand . the importance of that question. And had this suggestion been made three or four years ago. I should have viewed it with the greatest sympathy, and would have been prepared to support it. But when I remember that fighting in Korea began after the American armies had been withdrawn from South Korea, it seems to me unrealistic for anybody to suggest now that the Government of India should have insisted on the complete withdrawal of the French forces from Indo-China. Sir, if we take account of past conditions and |

want to work for peace in a mood of realism, we must recognise that it is not for us to suggest the conditions— all the conditions in detail—on which peace can be brought about. It is for the parties principally concerned themselves to agree on something that would bring fighting to an end, so that the other questions may be considered in a better atmosphere.

Sir, another point on which the Government of India has been criticised is its attitude towards Kenya. Now I should have thought, Sir, that if there was one question more than another on which the views of the Indian Government were well known, that was the question of Kenya.

The fact that Dr. Malan who regards the whole of Africa, particularly Africa south of the Sahara, as his special preserve, has fallen foul more than once of our Prime Minister is proof clear of the fact that India's views with regard to Kenya and¹ the future development of Africa are well known. India's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations has not prevented her from expressing her own opinions on the relations between the colonial powers and the subject peoples in a clear and forcible manner more than once. I have not been able to see eye to eye with the Indian Government on all questions of foreign policy, but it has been a matter of sincere pleasure to me that on the African question the Indian Government has made it clear that it is not something that concerns only the colonial powers or South Africa, which unfortunately does not see even now which way the world is moving and that this is a question of the greatest importance to the whole world.

I should now like to say a word about the Colombo Conference. Whatever the results of the Conference might have been, I think that everyone will agree with the Prime Minister that the assembling of the Prime Minis-i ters of five Asian countries in order

to discuss questions of common interest for the first time was an event of the greatest significance. I am glad to know that it is proposed that such Conferences should be held from time to time and that it has been left to the Prime Minister of Indonesia who suggested that African countries should be invited to participate in the Conference, to find some way of bringing this about. I do not know what the Indonesian Prime Minister had¹ in mind. I do not know whether he was thinking of North Africa only or the whole of Africa. It may not be possible for the representatives of any African country south of the Sahara to attend such Conferences, but I think that the desirability of inviting the representatives of such of them as have sufficient constitutional powers should be borne in mind in this connection. I hope also that some of the other Asian countries which were not invited for understandable reasons to participate in the Colombo Conference; for instance Japan and Thailand, will be invited to the future sessions. Now, our efforts should be not merely to bring a few countries which, we think, are of our own view but also other countries which, though they do not entirely agree with us, may on the whole have the same point of view with regard to questions affecting South East Asia and the Far East as we have. The Philippines too could be one of the countries to be invited. We should not think that, as the Americans have considerable influence in Japan and the Philippines, those countries should therefore for the present be left out of the Conference.

There is only one more word that I should like to say before I sit down. The position of Nepal is one which constantly demands the attention of the Government of India. It is not my intention to suggest that the Government of India should interfere in its internal affairs or should thrust its assistance on the Nepal Government, but I want to draw the attention of our Government to the anti-Indian intrigues that are going on there, the in-

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trigues that are being carried on by the representatives of foreign countries. We are all well aware of them, and the Government of India must be even better aware of them than we are, but I do not know what steps have been taken by us to counteract the mischievous propaganda that is being carried on against us there for no better purpose than to create trouble between the Nepalese and the Indians. I am sure that the leaders of the Nepalese will not allow themselves to be misled by this propaganda but it is also our duty to see that such explanations are given from time to time of our policies and actions as would effectively dispel the possibility of the success of the propaganda to which I have drawn the attention of the House. The most important question in which Nepal is interested and in which we are interested is the economic development and prosperity of Nepal for in its development and prosperity lies the strength and security of India also. I do not know whether the Nepal Government has asked us for financial assistance but I hope that it will not be denied if it asks for such assistance. So far as I can see, the Government of Nepal looks upon the Government of India as its real friend and I should not be surprised, therefore, if it expected from the Government of India more help than it has received so far. We are poor but not so poor as to be unable to give something even out of our own poverty to a country that is in a far more difficult position than India. We have helped Burma in a spirit that I venture to call generous. Let us in the same spirit think of the problems of Nepal and make it clear that we shall be ready to give the utmost assistance that we can to Nepal even in our straightened circumstances.

PROF. N. R. MALKANI: Sir, I have moved the amendment which stands in my name. Seven years have passed since our independence and now we are in a position to find out the salient features of our foreign policy and to approve of them. I do find that our policy today is a realistic policy.

[Prof. N. R. Malkani.] There was a time a few years ago when we here in India had doubts and suspicions whether the policy was not unreal and fantastic. Today we feel that it is a realistic policy and that it is based on the present conditions of Asia and the world. It is a policy which wants to abolish all colonialism all over the world, specially in Asia, and it has to some extent succeeded and shown tangible results.

We had colonialism abolished in Indonesia and we are now trying our best to do so in Indo-China. There are a few pockets here in India itself. It is a matter of time, it is a matter of patience and then the result is inevitable. They are bound to be merged into India; only we are wise enough not to precipitate matters, wise enough to see that the people of those pockets themselves wake up and fight for their freedom. It will be time for us then to pocket them. That is our wisdom, and I wish this wisdom is realized in other places of the world and understood and then there would be no pockets and no colonialism in the world. This is a policy which we most welcome. More than that, our policy has achieved a great thing in the way that it has put Asia not only on the map but put Asia before the Councils of the world. Formerly Asia was not considered as important but today Asia stands very high in the Councils of the world and if it is so, it is mainly due to our efforts and the Asiatic people recognise that. It is so because after the second Great War a very great event, a very significant event has taken place which we were likely to forget—the significant event is that today, rather after the war, Europe occupies a secondary place but Asia if it does not occupy a primary place, occupies a very important place. Asia is resurgent, China is resurgent, India is independent. Pakistan is independent and we have a number of Asiatic countries independent or waiting for independence, Asia is not the same as before the last war and this fact was being forgotten

even by us in India. It is because of our foreign policy, because of our great Foreign Minister who had the vision to know how things would be happening. Now eight years before—in 1946—in a Conference in Delhi over which Sir, you presided, in the Asian Relations Conference—the Prime Minister even visualized then what was coming and today we have a Conference in Colombo—a very unique thing which cannot be ignored. Today we may not be in Geneva but Geneva, without taking into consideration what is happening in Colombo, is bound to fail. I have listened very carefully and attentively to the two important speeches made by our Foreign Minister in both the Houses and if there was a dominant note in that, it was that we knew and anticipated what was going to happen. We also knew why European powers were failing. They did not take our advice in time. They were not prudent enough but it is never too late. Even today it is not too late. They may red;em their own position provided they awake to the realities that Asiatic problems can be solved mainly by Asiatic countries and India is one of the most important Asian countries and so is China. Today I was surprised and very much pleased that the Prime Minister in a very forthright manner—he has never spoken before so plainly—said that China ought to occupy a place not only in Asia but in the Councils of the world. He has never spoken in a more forthright manner than he did today and very rightly too. Sir, we have been talking of a peace area. We should talk a little more quietly about it. Our peace area is a very small peace area. It is growing very slowly but that is the test of our *bono fides*. Round about us are small powers and we have ourselves been ignoring them till recently because we were slaves ourselves—now we are looking around and making friends with Tibet, and as the Prime Minister said, the conditions of agreement with Tibet are very significant—they are typical. If those were adopted by bigger countries, more powerful countries, then there will be a much larger peace area all

over the world, the Tibet agreement has shown us the way, in a small way. Tibet was not known much to the world but today it comes into the centre of the picture. It shows the way for agreement on a bigger scale, in a bigger way with bigger nations in the world and so enlarges the peace area. So also with Burma, and Ceylon; and so also we have tried our best with Pakistan—though we have not always succeeded—but so far as we are concerned, we have tried our best to enlarge this peace area whenever and wherever possible. More than that, we have given to our policy a dynamic approach. After all this was a land of non-violence of Buddha and of Gandhi and after all we remember what Gandhiji preached and we in every way try to give shape to their ideals in meeting our problems. We have said that what we want is a larger peace area—we want peaceful existence. What we want is peaceful pacts, not collective security pacts which are in reality collective military pacts. This is, Sir, a great and a noble thing—and yet for the imagination of even Indians it is too big a thing which we are not able to grasp. But it is a significant thing, it is a powerful thing and it is again a thing which is intended to bring peace to the world because the world is realizing that war means no victory. War means no defeat, war means not even devastation, war means destruction of mankind. But the fear of war is an attitude of hopelessness and helplessness but this attitude of peace is something positive. Let there be goodwill among human beings, let there be mutual understandings among big nations and more than that, let there be tolerance between individuals, tolerance between communities, tolerance between great States and that is the great virtue that we do require today in the modern world. It was years ago, centuries ago that we were talking in India of moral codes and individual behaviour. Today, to my mind, by putting it in the forefront—because co-existence is nothing but mutual tolerance—we have done a distinct service to humanity. To my mind that will show the culture of

India, that will show Gandhiji's nonviolence on the international plan and that is what we need most. It is a very dynamic idea. This is our foreign policy and it has succeeded within certain limits. It is to my mind something significant. It is full of potentialities and possibilities. But what are the Americans thinking? What does the American policy lead to? When we think of it, we feel extremely sad. The American policy has helped Communism to my mind—I may be wrong, I hope I am. It is the one power which has helped the spread of Communism most. It has made China Communist.

China was the most tolerant, most patient, most peaceful nation of the world and by temperament, by tradition, by culture the most peaceful nation of the world. It is to my mind, a great crime and disaster that China today is one of the most militant nations of the world. We are comparing our five year plans and 10 year plans with China. It is not correct. Let us compare our military strengths and we will find today China is the most important, the most powerful militant nation of Asia and¹ may be of the world given 10 years' breathing time. And who is responsible for it? Not India, not U.K. but if I may say so, America the most. America is responsible for converting a friend that it had in the matter of foreign relations into a foe. In five years China has become the most Communist minded and most hostile and has become the central place for breeding Communism and even today I may say that it is because of the wrong headed policy of America that Communism has spread and is spreading towards South East Asia till it challenges us. I am afraid¹ that if America does not rectify her own policy, we ourselves in India with all our efforts, with all our sincerity, with all our traditions, beliefs and convictions in Gandhiji's preachings and his way of life, will become Communists because of the wrong policy of America. Communism is spreading and coming nearer and nearer towards India. Why cannot America look at us, and see

[Prof. N. R. Malkani.] how we are dealing with the Communists round about us here co-existing? They are our friends, even comrades— not co-workers. We listen to them when they give us good advice and we even allow them to sit in Opposition and criticise us, sometimes even to condemn us. We listen to them when their advice is good, and there is a deal of good in them. We absorb the good things but we don't want to absorb the bad points. We live and let live and we co-exist. We are friendly with each other, in the lobby and outside in the country. Why **an't America look at us and read a chapter on the way we are dealing with Communism? Communism was a challenge to us a few years ago. But today Communism is not a challenge, because of our Prime Minister, because of Vinobaji, because of the general atmosphere which is one of live and let live, one of co-existence, one of friendliness. But because of the challenge from America, because of her attitude, it is not only South East Asia that is rapidly becoming Communist, but even India, Sir, is in danger.

And today, what is worse still is that they are going to give military aid to Pakistan. Do they understand the implications and the perils of that? Do they understand that if and when that military aid becomes effective, and a peril to India, will India sit and go on listening to lectures in this House? Will India sit quijfel deliberating whether India will resist or not? India will resist it and fight, tooth and nail; she will fight with any weapons available and with any allies available, and then it may be that Communism spreads over the whole of Asia, not only India but the whole of Asia. In the event of a great war, there will not be Americanism, but Communism over the whole of Asia. That is a challenge which America should take note of. We are already in difficulty today when we try to checkmate or resist Communism. We try to meet them halfway, we try to take away the strength from them. We are trying to fight Communism in our own way. America is trying

to do it in a way that is not the right way. I will go a step further even and say that in our foreign policy and in the U.N. if there is a handicap against that foreign policy, it is created by America and its unrealistic policy. They think that France is a great power that France should have a place in the deliberations of international affairs. They want France to be re-established in Indo-China. But France cannot even stand up, cannot sit down in Indo-China. She is like a person who cannot sit or stand, but they go on dragging it and want it to stand up in Indo-China. It is a very very unrealistic policy. And to see China represented by Formosa, is almost an insult. India's policy is the dynamic policy for resisting Communism in the right way and in the most effective manner. But ours is called an obstinate policy, a policy of non-cooperation. Today America hesitates to give us an aid of 104 million dollars, but she pours out billions and billions of dollars into the Pacific all of which goes to waste, not only to waste, but also towards spreading war all over the world'. It is a terrible waste. We do not want arms or armaments. What we want is food, the wheat that they give to their pigs and swine. We want their barley, their wheat; we do not want their arms. This giving of military aid is a most unreaistic and dangerous policy which may lead to war.

(Time bell rings.)

It has led to stalemate in Korea, *viz.*, no victory, and no defeat. It has led to defeat in Indo-China, to trouble and hostility in Asiatic countries.

Sir, what are the achievements of our foreign policy? The achievements of our peaceful foreign policy in comparison with those of other nations, with the most powerful nations in the world, are something of which we may be proud. We can be proud of those results, proud of our Prime Minister and proud of our policy. It has shown great achievements and I do feel, Sir, that if we were better understood by-America, *as* we are better understood by the United Kingdom, as we are-

better understood by China, then I do think it will be possible for us to help them to restore peace, not only in Asia but also in Europe.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Mr. Chairman, today more than ever before, the Prime Minister is in a happy and enviable position, for there are very few critics or opponents of his foreign policy in this country today. I do concede, Sir, never before has the foreign policy dictated by a single individual, namely, the Prime Minister, received so large a measure of unstinted and spontaneous support from all sections of this country. Never before did the country stand so solidly behind the Prime Minister in his foreign policy. Critics have said that the foreign policy of India is the policy dictated by a single individual. I also subscribe to that view, Sir. All the same I can take the House into confidence and say that that particular individual is the highest amongst us, the noblest amongst us, the tallest among us. Therefore, in no better hands could India have entrusted the shaping of her foreign policy. But as I have stated earlier, the policy of India by the very fact of its emanation from a single individual also suffers from the relative strength and weaknesses of that individual. Let us not close our eyes to that.

Coming now to the relative strength of our foreign policy, I do admit that in the midst of much sabre-rattling and preparedness for war, whether it be in the name of democracy or collective security or nationalism or the redemption from colonial serfdom, it is ennobling and not only ennobling but it is also refreshing to listen to the message of the Prime Minister, The message of live and let live, of toleration and respect for the other man's point of view. In fact, India's record of peaceful intention far outdistances the record of professions! protagonists of peace.

Sir, India's peace mission in Korea, the impartial discharge of the onerous responsibility that devolved on her as

the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, India's anxiety for a cease-fire in Indochina, are all records of which any country can be genuinely proud. India's insistence on admission of China into the U.N. even though India differs from the very principle which China represents is another instance of that ancient spirit of India's toleration and her spirit of live and let live. Again our refusal to allow American globemasters to touch at any airport here on their flight carrying replenishment to the battlefields of Indo-China is another instance to show that India is not going to be bamboozled, she is not going to be blackmailed into acting in any particular manner, to allow herself to be allied to one or the other side. It is a great record indeed. But having said that much I would also say that the lessons of recent history should not have been lost on us.

We should not have taken on ourselves the Messiahatic role of a redeemer and harbinger of peace. Instead, we should have addressed ourselves to more immediate tasks that await solution. We are talking of peace but peace today is synonymous with war. Peace is merely an interval between two wars. Let us turn the pages of history. What do we find? More blood has flown in the name of God and peace than by actual warmongers. The prophets have proved more blood-thirsty than all the murderous hordes of Chengiz Khan. Therefore, we should not have taken up the role of a Messiah to bring peace and redeem this world from threat of war. That is a most unrealistic attitude. The thousands and millions of words that we have said about peace, the space that has been consumed in the newspapers, the man-hours which have been lost in this country in reading them and listening to them on the Radio, I say, Sir, is a calamitous waste of a nation's time. Sir, war is inevitable so long as human nature continues to remain as it is. What are the lessons of the League of Nations? They were there

[Shri S. Mahanty.] for any peace-loving man to learn. The sovereignty of nation States should have given way to the sovereignty of man, the municipal law should have been scrapped to give place to international law.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA (Bihar): Sir, may I know if a Messiah is delivering his sermon?

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Yes, unless you are a sinner. But those valuable lessons were ignored; human nature being as it is, war must continue as an unhappy aspect of human life on this most unhappy planet. Then, Sir, we might satisfy our own ego by attending the Colombo Conference. What did we do there? The most important resolution that was discussed related to the cease-fire in Indo-China. Sir, we enunciated the conditions for a cease-fire in Indo-China. What were they? We said that there should be immediate withdrawal of both the pro-Communist and anti-Communist forces from Indo-China. We proposed foreign non-intervention but what did we get in the bargain? The Colombo Conference was followed by the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the fall of Dien Bien Phu was followed by a determined attack on Hanoi. I ask the House to consider how, an inadequately equipped guerrilla army can force through the entire garrison at Dien Bien Phu or be responsible for its fall unless it is also supported or patronised by another Power? We might talk loudly about peace; we might enunciate principles but who is going to listen to us? That is what I am submitting. Sir, instead of taking up that role of trying to bring peace in this world, I would have been very happy if we had addressed ourselves to the more immediate problems of our foreign policy.

As you will find, Sir, from my amendment, I have indicated the three main problems of our foreign policy that await settlement. The Prime Minister has taken us from I

liorea to Indo-China but we have not touched on these three important problems which await a settlement. If I may be permitted to say so, Sir, our approach towards the solution of these problems has been vacillating, halting, escapist and unrealistic. We have gone on beating our wings ineffectually in an uncertain void of darkness. These may be very lofty sentiments for a poet but certainly not for a Foreign Minister who is expected to be hard-headed and realistic.

Now, Sir, I come to the foreign pockets. The Prime Minister said that our position is very well known about these foreign pockets but I have a doubt. I wish that some clarification had been made. Let me take Pondicherry first. It is a French possession and a fight has been going on now for its redemption in the year 1954, but, Sir, in June 1948 the Government of the Republic of France, in agreement with the Government of India, decided that it will leave the French establishments in India and that it will allow the people there the right to pronounce their future rights and future status. In pursuance of this declaration, a referendum was held in June 1949 about Chandernagore and, as a result of that referendum, Chandernagore became part of West Bengal. Steps were not taken either in 1949 or in 1952 for the elimination of the other French pockets in India like Pondicherry. In fact, we have been pressing for a very long time that effective steps should be taken for the elimination of all foreign pockets in India but nothing was done. Today the situation has changed. Whether in Pondicherry or in Goa the situation has become increasingly difficult which really baffles a solution. Therefore, if you permit my saying so, Sir, our approach towards the settlement of this particular question has never been effective, has never been firm; if anything, it has been vacillating, halting and ineffective.

I now come to the question of the settlement of the outstanding items of the Indo-Pakistan dispute. If I have understood the trend of the speeches made this morning, there is a feeling that India should emerge as a great power in Asia. As an Indian I do concur in it; I also join my aspirations with that aspiration but remember, Sir, unless we settle our outstanding items of dispute with Pakistan, we are never going to attain that position. It pains me to say so, Sir, but though we have made our best attempts since 1950 or earlier to resolve these outstanding items of dispute between India and Pakistan, they have remained unresolved; if anything, whenever we have gone in for a settlement, it has always been in favour of Pakistan and against the interests of India. In this context, Sir, I have to draw your attention to the Canal Water Dispute that has been going on between India and Pakistan. I have tried to raise that subject on the floor of this House and I take strong exception to the fact that a third party, the World Bank, should have been invited to arbitrate in the dispute between India and Pakistan. The Prime Minister himself referred to an article written by Mr. Lilienthal of the World Bank; he has said—it is there in the proceedings—that it was not "a correct article", but at the same time, it appears that *on* the basis of that article the Canal Water Dispute was referred to the World Bank. Let us see what awards have been given. Now, I take strong exception to the fact that the Government of India should think it proper to keep this Parliament in the dark about this matter though the Press is carrying the award, the Press both in India and in Pakistan. It appears that the World Bank has given the award of 20 per cent, of the water for India and Rs. 60 crores as compensation for Pakistan. If reports which are published in the responsible sections of the Press are correct, it seems that the Government of India is thinking

sympathetically of abiding by that award. This is another instance.

Then, Sir, I come to the Kashmir question. This might appear to be an aberration with me but I cannot help it. I ask you one question, Sir, and it is this. How, as a people, will you like to live in a political vacuum? I welcome the President's announcement that has been made in this context; I welcome it and I have welcomed it but the very fact to be mentioned is this: The Prime Minister himself has said that there are international commitments. Most humbly I beg to submit, Sir, that there is nothing sacrosanct about these commitments. Commitments are not immutable concepts. Certain commitments are made according to certain circumstances which prevail at a given point of time. Now that those circumstances have changed, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly has ratified its merger with India, the President's announcement has come, therefore why keep this on the agenda of the Security Council? The other day the hon. Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in her most frank and inimitable manner, for which I always admire her, said that this Kashmir dispute is going to remain on the agenda of the Security Council until the very day of its dissolution. But certainly this is not a very humanistic approach of which our Prime Minister seems to be so enamoured of. I should ask him a straight question as to how long this political vacuum will continue in Kashmir?

Before I take my seat, Sir, I would once again urge the Government of India to disabuse their mind of those commitments—because there is nothing sacrosanct about them—withdraw the case from the Security Council and freeze the cease-fire line in Kashmir so that *de jure* merger of Kashmir with India will be an accomplished fact.

Thank you, Sir.

DR. A. K. MUDALIAR (Madras): Mr. Chairman, I feel I owe an apology to you and to the House for my infrequent appearance here. I can assure you, Sir, that this is neither due to any lack of respect for the House nor lack of interest in its proceedings, but to circumstances sometimes far beyond my control. I am, therefore, all the more grateful to you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to take part in this very important discussion.

I listened this morning to the hon. the Prime Minister with the greatest attention and with the greatest interest. The foreign policy of the Government of India extends to countries all over the world and covers a variety of subjects. The Prime Minister has confined himself only to a few items today and I propose to follow his good example.

Sir, the first item that he referred to was the Asian countries' conference at Colombo at which, as he rightly said, the most important and vital question that was discussed was the question of Indo-China and its present position. I am glad that this conference was arranged and that it was attended by the countries mainly concerned. I would have liked, as indeed my friend Pandit Kunzru has stated, that some other countries in eastern Asia like Japan, the Philippines and Thailand in particular had been present at this conference, but it was not for us obviously to arrange a larger conference than that which was held. It pointed out to the world one significant fact that the fortunes of any Asian country cannot be settled by European nations any longer. It must have struck the world as highly unrealistic that the fortunes of Indonesia should be settled at Geneva, by countries which were not representative of the Asian hemisphere, and in spite of the military strength that some of them may have, it seems to me that the Colombo Conference was a right reminder to

them that the voice that should be mainly heard or the viewpoint that should be taken into consideration in a sense in the settlement of this question was the viewpoint of the Asian countries in and roundabout that area. The days are far gone by when some of the Western European powers or, as it stands today, even the American power could dispose of the fortunes of countries in Asia and Far East Asia or, for the matter of that, in the Middle-East. That is not going to be allowed; that is not going to end in success; that is not going to be tolerated. And if the Colombo Conference pointed out to one lesson more than another, it is the viewpoint of the countries in this area and in the neighbourhood; that must really count and should be taken into consideration. It is serving a most useful purpose.

Hon. Members, one or two of them, have said: What good has the Asian Conference done? Sir, these international conferences are of a very peculiar nature. Their essence is not that they emerge with readymade solutions acceptable to everybody at the same time. It is a long-drawn-out process which is to be fulfilled through these international conferences and anybody attending these international conferences knows that patience and patience alone will ultimately pay at these deliberations. I am wholeheartedly in agreement with the resolutions that have emerged from the Colombo Conference and I fully trust that at Geneva these resolutions will have their own weight, as I understand they are having even today, and that the powers that be will take into consideration the resolutions that have been adopted at Colombo.

Sir, the Prime Minister referred to the position of China in the United Nations and I think that he has done a service by drawing once more attention to the fact that if China had been admitted as a Member of the

United Nations four or five years ago, the real China, that is the Government which is not only *de facto* in power there and, as we must admit, *de jure* also, many of the horrible consequences that have ensued either in Korea or in Indo-China may not have ensued.

Sir, I have always felt that the United Nations has lost in prestige, has lost in utility, has lost in its purposefulness by keeping the present Government of China out of its politics. It is not a question whether we agree with the Chinese Government and its policies. It is not a question of what sort of Government is there and what policies it adopts. It is a question of its playing its part in the deliberations of the United Nations throwing its weight there, making its views known and making its contribution always realizing what its position is. In the various conferences that I have attended, at the various sessions since 1948, I have come across this curious fact that Formosa, Taiwan as it is called, is supposed to represent the Government of China. Nothing can be more unrealistic, nothing can be so deliberately a case of shutting one's eyes to the fact than that the representative of Formosa should speak in the name of the great mainland of China. Sir, in these matters I for my part try to look at the position from the point of view of those who are opposing it. There was a time, as one of the speakers has said, when the United States had a special responsibility for China when after the Boxer rebellion, in spite of other foreign countries taking what they could by way of compensation from China, it put back the whole of that money into the mainland. It encouraged Chinese students to go over to the United States and learn at their great universities. It poured money into China and it is no wonder if the United States' people gradually came to think of China as their special responsibility and of China as their

special protege. I can understand, on the part of some at least of the Americans, the anguish that they might feel when suddenly they find that the Chinese whom they have educated, the Chinese whom they have made a little prosperous, turn into people whom they consider as their opponents. I can understand that. It is one thing to be sentimental about these things; it is quite a different matter to recognise facts, and to conduct oneself on the basis of recognised facts and the recognised fact is that somehow or other owing to policies that have been pursued, the mainland of China, the Government of China at present on that mainland is the only Government that can speak in the name of the great mainland, and to keep the Government which represents 500 million people away from the Councils of the United Nations is to act as one who does not realise what the world is drifting to and how it can be saved. We are all anxious that the United Nations should function properly and, therefore, it seems to me that unless this policy is revised and unless China is admitted to the Councils of the United Nations, nowhere can peace be really established. As I said, the American people have a special liking for Formosa, for those people who are on that island. I do not know whether Formosa can ever become a part of the mainland of China, but it seems to me—and I am throwing it out purely as a personal suggestion—that if they do have that fondness for Formosa and do not want to abandon it, there is no reason why Formosa should not be recognised as a separate sovereign State and representation be given to Formosa on that basis, while China proper, the mainland, is recognised as one of the five Big Powers according to the Charter of the United Nations. To continue to recognise the Formosa Government, which is not in a position to pay even the dues that are due from them and which are written off from time to

[Dr. A. R. Mudaliar.] time, which is not able to carry out one single resolution that has been adopted by the Economic and Social Council or by the General Assembly is to continue to ignore a position that is pressing on everybody else for attention except our American colleagues. Sir, the Prime Minister also referred to the pacts that are being made. I entirely agree that these pacts are not promoting peace. On the other hand, it seems to me they are mounting up to a climax till the armageddon comes, till once more the world is divided into two hostile forces and the chances of war become nearer and nearer. And after all, let us be quite frank. These attempts at building up collective security pacts have not been successful. The NATO has not been successful. The question of bringing West Germany into the NATO Pact has brought about more diversity in Europe and more differences between some of the countries of Western Europe than ever before. Similarly any attempt at trying to build up a collective security pact in South East Asia is going to be a worse failure than even the NATO. Therefore it seems to me that the idea is not to build up these collective security pacts in various regions and think that this force or that force can be hemmed in or that an equal amount of military might can be created in one part of the bloc as against another part of the bloc. The idea is rather to see that peace and the lessons of peace are understood better, that countries come to realise that co-existence of different kinds of Government is possible. There is one statement which the Prime Minister made with reference to the recent treaty that has been concluded between India and China, that must be emphasized, and that I was glad to read about and to hear from the Prime Minister. China and India agree that there shall be no interference in their internal affairs by each country of the affairs of the

other country. It is the subterranean influences on internal affairs that are the greatest danger today in many parts of the world. It is that that has to be checked; it is that that has to be guaranteed against and if that interference is not there, if the undertaking is kept in the manner in which that has been agreed to in the treaty, then it does not matter what form of Government any other country has. After all, the people choose their way of life. We have chosen our way of life, the way of democracy, the way of democratic government, free speech as far as possible—without offending certain fundamental rules of decency and Parliamentary life, listening to all kinds of views fairly and squarely and tolerantly though not always agreeing with them. That is the way that we have chosen and India is said to be a great democracy. I am sure without desiring to become the leader of Asia—we have no desire to be that, and the Prime Minister has repeatedly disclaimed any such idea—the example of India, the example of this Parliament, the example of debates in these two Houses, the example of our Press, the example of our way of life will tell in all countries in Asia and that is the best way by which we can promote peace, progress and security in this part of the world. That is the example that we should like to be copied. Any subterranean influence obviously is dangerous and that must be resisted.

Sir, if I can go just for a moment—my time is short—out of the scope or what the Prime Minister has said and refer to what some of our friends have stated, I should like specially to refer to Africa. Now, Sir, in the first place I am of the view that while India makes its position quite clear, the foreign policy of India cannot be like that of a porcupine who chooses to shoot its quills on all sides and at all persons, there must be a *raison d'être* for the position that India takes. There must be a way of deal-

ing with that position, even a way of expressing ourselves, a way of intimating to those who are concerned where they go wrong, and I believe that our Foreign Minister has eminently succeeded in that. He has made innumerable speeches on foreign policy—no other Foreign Minister of any other country has made so many speeches—he has made so many speeches *extempore*. I have always wondered how a Foreign Minister speaking on behalf of a great nation whose every word is weighed by other countries could afford to make so many *extempore* speeches, but I must say this—and I should not be understood as paying merely a tribute to him—that in all those speeches while the position of India is made plain and clear, while he has made his own foreign policy clear, there has not been one word which can be understood by any country to be an offensive word against the people of that country or the Government of that country. That is a great thing. That is why while differences exist, while people and Governments may not agree with what he says, there is a fundamental core of respect for what the Prime Minister says. (Time bell rings.) Sir, I will finish if you desire.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please wind up as soon as possible.

DR. A. R. MUDALIAR: I was only referring to the problem of South Africa which has been referred to. It so happens that the memorandum that was submitted to the United Nations against the treatment by the South African Government of Indians was submitted by me in the year 1946. Ever since that time I have held the view that the phrase "dark continent" does not refer to the colour of the people but it refers to the dark policies of the South African Government and I have held the view that these dark policies are going to hurt irretrievably and irremediably not the Indians, not the Africans, but

the White people of the whole of the African continent and if we could only make the other White nations realise that the South African policy is going to oust them out of the whole of the continent—it is only a question of time when they would assert themselves more strongly and more vigorously against the wholly diabolical policy of the South African Government—we would have done something towards preserving peace in that part of the country. I trust that our attitude towards South Africa, whatever Dr. Malan might say, will be understood as one which leads to the possibility of co-existence of the White and the dark races in Africa and the policy of India with reference to South Africa would not mean the wiping out of the White population from the whole of the African continent. But if our advice is not accepted I feel in course of time, it may be five years, but may be ten years, but inevitably in course of time, it would lead to the establishment of an empire there free from White races.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN (Madras): Mr. Chairman, I should like to come out that the European Powers still appear to believe in their old policy of balance of power. The balance of power policy was intended to avoid war but it led to the war of 1914. Later the League of Nations arose also to avoid war but not by balance of power, but by getting the nations across a table to settle their problems by means of negotiations. That organisation also failed because first Japan and then Germany went out and the old balance of power policy, revived again and led to the second world war. We seem to be still living in the belief of balance of power because today Mr. Dulles speaks of talking to the other people by the strength he can produce which really means going back to the old idea of balance of power and fearing the opponent's strength. I feel our Prime Minister has made a new contribution

LDr. P. Subbarayan.] to peace as he says, that when you talk of collective security, you really talk of collective strength which eventually means the strength of one side as against the other. Instead of doing so, if we talked of collective peace and got together and tried to work for peace it might be possible for the nations to come together and settle problems in spite of the difference in the outlook and the way of life of people of different countries. My hon. friend, Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar, referred *in extenso* to the problem of China and her rightful place in the United Nations and said that the American people refuse to recognise facts as they exist today. It cannot be denied that the present People's Government of China represents the Chinese people and its writ runs through the whole country. But I was surprised at another proposal he made, to recognise Formosa as a separate country. Many problems will arise if that is done, such as, as to who is to be the real representative of China on the Security Council.

DR. A. R. MUDALIAR: China, of course.

DR. P. SUBBARAYAN: Obviously, China, but legal difficulties will arise which you cannot deny because the present representative will still claim: "We are there, and we are actually there and we will continue to be there." These are the difficulties which have got to be thought of. China should be represented on the Security Council and if you recognise China, naturally the place on the Security* Council must go to the People's Government of China.

The Prime Minister referred to the recent treaty that has been made between ourselves and China; and I think it is a great achievement which the world will come to recognise as important by and by, as these two great nations, forming nearly one-third of the population of the world, have decided to live in peace as

friends following their own policies in their internal administration but not disturbing each other's way of life. Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar, once again, referred to the subterranean forces that may be at work. I hope the Government of China will see that these subterranean forces are not active in our land because friendship can only grow through each recognising the other's way of life.

I am afraid I cannot help the impression that the United Nations is going the same way as the League of Nations, for, as I said at the beginning, the question of balance of power has come in, and, as the previous speaker mentioned, N.A.T.O.—as we call it—is a sign of it. People are now talking of a similar alliance in the Far East. The cumulative effect of associations like these will again be a revival of the balance of power. This really comes out of fear. I think the Prime Minister has mentioned more than once how the fear complex leads to each nation being suspicious of the other and preparing itself for the final eventuality. I hope this rivalry will cease and the nations will live more on trust than on fear. If trust becomes the basic principle of association of nations, then, I am sure it will lead to what the Prime Minister called at the end of his speech, collective peace rather than collective security.

The previous speaker referred to the Colombo Conference and called it an achievement. I entirely agree with him, but what effect it is going to have on the nations that are meeting in Geneva is the real crux of the problem. If the great powers recognise that there is the problem of Asia, and that it must be left to be solved by the Asians themselves, then will begin an opportunity for all the peoples of the world coming together and living in unity. The same may be said of the problem of Africa.

As both Dr. Kunzru and Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar said, the White people in South Africa seem to have

made up their minds that they are there and it is their land which they have developed; therefore nobody should interfere with their administration. This idea of segregation comes because they feel that the same rights are allowed to the dark people as to the white men, the dark people being larger in number will eventually overwhelm them. But, they must realise that whatever may be the position today, things are developing in such a manner, whether they like it or not, this overwhelming will come because they cannot keep down a whole lot of people in a continent which was theirs originally though it was then in a state of semi-civilization if I may put it that way. That is what Dr. Malan, I am sure, does not understand. He (the previous speaker) referred to 1946 when the position of Indians was put before the United Nations and he said that in spite of all that was done, the same thing goes on after eight years now. It cannot be helped as, I feel, the other great powers do not make themselves *iii* whatever may be their feeling with regard to the question of Africa and the Africans on the continent. They are still afraid to offend, what I may call, the powers in South Africa. They feel that South Africa is a strong-hold against a particular way of life and they want South Africa's help when this particular way of life might become more resurgent, and therefore they want to support the Government in South Africa, though they may not approve of all the things that are being done in South Africa; they still have the feeling that they should not in any way let down the South African Government. I hope they will realise that in the interests of what they themselves hold to be the correct policy they should pull up the South African Government so that it does not stand as an obstacle towards the achievement of the object of justice and fairplay which, the great nations in the West have in view.

Lastly, Sir, I would like to refer to the problems of Indians in Ceylon, or

to put it in the way our Prime Minister puts it, Ceylon nationals of Indian origin. It must not be forgotten that there are nearly eight lakhs of people of Indian origin in Ceylon today. An agreement was nearly arrived at in London with the former Prime Minister of Ceylon by which if slightly four-and-a-half lakhs of Indian nationals of Ceylon, but which were not carried through; and the present agreement does not talk in terms of numbers. All that it refers to is that the citizenship applications which are before the Ceylon Government will be quickly dealt with and as many as are eligible for Ceylon citizenship under their Citizenship Act would become Ceylon nationals. But, in the meanwhile, I am afraid the Ceylon Government are adopting an attitude which might help to squeeze out the Indians in Ceylon; by their policy of non-employment of non-Ceylonese and by refusal of food permits they are making a large number of people or citizens stateless people who really have no nationality. But by this method you are forcing them to become Indian nationals. They must become the subjects of one country or the other. And naturally, being of Indian origin, they would revert back to their Indian citizenship. I do not think this is quite playing the game. Our Prime Minister has very often said that he has been placed in a very difficult position, because no country can dictate in respect of the internal policies of any other State. But at the same time we have got to do something to safeguard the interests of these stateless people, and I hope that in course of time something will be done by the Government of India which will protect the interests of these nationals of Indian origin.

BEGAM AIZAZ RASUL (Uttar Pradesh) :
Mr. Chairman, I rise to give my wholehearted support to the foreign policy that is being nursed by our

[Begam Aizaz Rasul.] Prime Minister. We have often had discussion on the floor of this House regarding this policy, and I am very glad to say that again today the Prime Minister came out with very outspoken sentiments regarding the line of action that he is following today.

Sir, India's foreign policy is based on certain fundamental principles and it has worked in the best interests of peace. By judging the international issues on their merits and by keeping aloof from power politics, India has greatly contributed towards the promotion of peace in the world. Today, Sir, we are proud that our Prime Minister's policy of promoting the interests of peace has earned for him a very high place in the world. And different nations of the world, although they may be motivated by their own interests, certainly realise the great power and the great strength that he commands in world politics. In our own country, Sir, although there are basic differences regarding the solution of economic problems and internal problems, I am glad to see that there is no serious difference on the foreign policy that is being pursued by our Prime Minister. Imperialism, capitalism and racial discrimination have created conflicting ideologies in the world, Sir. But in spite of this race for domination of ideologies throughout, India stands firmly with her model maxim of international justice. India thinks that every nation, big or small, has the right of self-determination, and that international problems can be solved by discussion and compromise, and that the salvation of the world lies in the call for world peace.

Sir, our Prime Minister dwelt at length on the Colombo Conference and the outcome of that Conference, and the Geneva Conference which is holding a very important session in respect of these problems. As has been rightly pointed out, Sir, it is certainly a very strange and amazing thing that the Asian countries that are today the subject of these discussions have no right of full participation, and that the Asian nations that are concerned more with

these problems are not asked to take part in these discussions. As has been rightly pointed out by so many hon. speakers, this is certainly closing our eyes to facts, and *none that time will come when the European powers will see that Asian countries cannot be ignored in the way they are being ignored. As Dr. Subbarayan has rightly said, they are still living in an old world atmosphere when the European powers felt that they could decide and settle the fate of the Asian countries. Sir, today that context has entirely disappeared.

Sir, I would just like to say a few words about the military aid to Pakistan. So much has been said about it, and I do not want to repeat all those points. But I do feel that it has been a most unfortunate event. This pact is not only harmful to the people of Asia and the world, but I think it is harmful to Pakistan itself. A number of countries have protested against it, and nearly all the countries of Asia have expressed themselves very strongly against it. Newspapers' comments have also been very outspoken. It is not right, I think, for the United States of America to throw a spanner in the harmonious working of Asian and African countries, and to create a sort of bitterness amongst themselves, because the very objective of preserving peace, which, they say, impels them to have this alliance, is imperilled and frustrated by this very alliance. Sir, I was very surprised to read the statement of the Pakistan Prime Minister on this pact when he said that it opened a new and a glorious era in the history of the Muslim world. I am afraid, Sir, that his knowledge of the Muslim history must be very inadequate when he says that this will add a glorious chapter to the Islamic history. By this pact it is obvious that the sovereignty of Pakistan and its capacity to guide independently is seriously jeopardized, because in whichever country the Muslims have ruled, they have not been guided by other countries at all. And therefore, now that Pakistan is to be a sort of a stooge of the United States or America, it is hardly right for that

country to say that it will add to the glory of the Islamic countries. Anyhow, Sir, as far as we are concerned, our Prime Minister and the people of this country are certainly very anxious and disturbed about it, because it is a step which brings this country very near to the orbit of war. Of course, America was trying for a long time to get India or Indonesia or Ceylon or Pakistan to accept such aid. It has been more or less an accepted fact that Europe does not want to be the base of a third World War, and therefore it was necessary for America and other European powers to find some other base where a third world war could be fought. And what better place could they have found than the soil of Asia? And it is unfortunate that Pakistan should have been a pawn in that game. But, Sir, as far as India is concerned, we are certainly concerned on that account. It has also given rise to fear and to an impediment in the way of the solution of all the outstanding Indo-Pakistan problems in a friendly manner in which our Prime Minister has, for the last few years, been trying his very best, in spite of the great opposition in his own country, to come to an amicable settlement in respect of all the outstanding problems between these two countries in as friendly a spirit as possible. Anyhow, I hope that these efforts which have been made by him and also by the people of this country to create closer ties between the two countries will be crowned with success, although as I said, it is certainly unfortunate that something should have happened which has created a sort of bitterness and bad taste in the mouths of the people.

Sir, the Colombo Conference has been a great success and I am glad to see that the policy that had been put forward by our Prime Minister was more or less the basis of the resolutions that were passed there. We hope that this Conference of Asian Prime Ministers will become more and more frequent so that they may get together not only the Prime Ministers but also the peoples of those countries should get more and more close together and try to under-

stand each other's problems. So far on account of the British rule here in India and other forms of colonialism in the other countries, we in the past had no opportunities of doing so, but now that our countries are free or are feeling the great advantages of independence we should get together and try to understand each other's problems, and try to be as friendly with each other as possible. I am very glad to see that in the United Nations India has had the support of the entire Arab bloc and also of most of the Asian countries, and we are very proud of the fact that our representative there, Mr. Krishna Menon, was a great deal responsible for bringing about this accord between India and all these countries and also of the great part that he has played in many international conferences. I hope that all these good relationships that have been created will continue and that India will continue this policy of creating peaceful conditions in the whole world. Thank you.

DR. RAGHU VIRA (Madhya Pradesh) :

डाक्टर रघुवीर (मध्य प्रदेश) : सभापति महोदय, मैं इस प्रस्ताव का जो कि प्रधानमंत्री जी ने रक्खा है, समर्थन करता हूँ। प्रधानमंत्री जी ने जो कुछ बातें कहीं, उनका लगभग सभी सदस्यों ने पोषण किया है। मैं यहाँ किसी बात को दोहराना नहीं चाहता, केवल एक दो बातों के ऊपर ही प्रकाश डालूँगा। ऐतिहासिक आधार पर हमको इस प्रश्न की ओर दृष्टि डालनी चाहिये। संसार में कोई भी वस्तु एक साथ जन्म नहीं लेती, वह तो ऐतिहासिक देन है। एक दूसरे के विरुद्ध भावनाएँ और प्रवृत्तियाँ भी आरम्भ इकट्ठी होती हैं। एक ओर भारत वर्ष में अंग्रेजों का पूर्ण साम्राज्य था और दूसरी ओर महात्मा गान्धी का जन्म हुआ।

आज एक ओर भयंकर से भयंकर अस्त्र और अस्त्र बनाये जा रहे हैं तो दूसरी ओर संसार

[Dr. Raghu Vira.]

शान्ति सम्मेलन किये जा रहे हैं। उन सब में शान्ति स्थापना का यत्न हो रहा है। इस शान्ति स्थापना करने में कई कठिनाइयाँ आगे आने वाली हैं। हमारे भारत का शासन भी इस बात का यत्न कर रहा है कि जो भी जातियाँ अच्छे उपायों अथवा बुरे उपायों से जिस स्थिति पर पहुँची हुई हैं, वे वहाँ पर ही ठहर जायें। किन्तु वे उस स्थिति में किस प्रकार पहुँची? आज चीन की जो स्थिति है, चीन ने अपनी शक्ति को किस प्रकार संग्रह किया, जो रूस की शक्ति है, वह रूस ने किस प्रकार समन्वय की, इस प्रकार यूरोप और अमेरिका की जो शक्ति है, जो विद्यमान शक्ति है, जो संसार को डरा रही है, वह शक्ति किस प्रकार से उत्पन्न की, किस प्रकार से बनाई, इसकी ओर ध्यान देना चाहिये। हम लोगों को तो शान्ति को आगे लाना है और यह बड़ा आवश्यक है किन्तु इस समय भारतवर्ष की चिन्ता यह नहीं कि इस आगे बढ़ती हुई शक्ति को किस प्रकार रोका जाय, उनकी शक्ति को सीमित किया जाय। हमारा यत्न केवल मात्र यह है कि संसार में जो लड़ाई होने का भय है, वह भय दूर हो जाय।

एक दो मिनट के लिये यदि हम इतिहास की ओर दृष्टि डालें तो हम देखेंगे कि संसार की जो पूर्व शान्ति थी, उसको यूरोप के लोगों ने आरम्भ में भंग किया। पन्द्रहवीं शताब्दी में पहले पहल वास्को दा गामा १४९८ में कालिकट में पहुँचा। उस समय कालिकट के व्यापारियों की दुकानें कैरो, फ्रेज आदि अफ्रीका के नगरों में विद्यमान थीं। यूरोपीय लोग बड़े शक्तिशाली थे और उनकी उभरती हुई शक्ति अपने लिये क्षेत्र बनाना चाहती थी। उस क्षेत्र का प्रसार करने के लिये उन्होंने सारे संसार में फैलना आरम्भ किया। उस फैलाव के युग में उन्होंने ने व्यापार ही नहीं किन्तु व्यापार के साथ वे जहाजों में तापें भी ले गये। यह प्रथा

बाद में अंग्रेज, डच, फ्रेंच ने अपने व्यापार के साथ जारी रखी। अंग्रेजों ने पौडजन ट्रेड (poison trade) अथवा ओपियम (opium) की लड़ाई चीन के साथ की। उन्होंने पिग ट्रेड (pig trade) भी किया। वे लोगों को बलात्कार, जबरदस्ती उठा कर ले जाते थे। इस प्रकार वे जिन लोगों को वे उठा ले जाते थे, जहाजों में उनमें से ४७ प्रतिशत मर जाते थे। उनके साथ इस प्रकार व्यवहार किया जाता था जैसे वह मनुष्य ही न हों। उन्नीसवीं शताब्दी तक यूरोपीय जातियों का व्यवहार एशिया वालों के प्रति इस प्रकार था मन्तो कि वे लोग नीचे दवाने के लिये ही बनाये गये हों।

दूसरी ओर हम एक दृष्टि रूस की ओर भी डालें और चीन की ओर भी डालें। १४४० में ग्रेड जिस इवान तृतीय ने निश्चय किया कि मंगोलियन सेनाएं जिनका नाम गोरडन होई, मुवर्ण सेना था, उनको कोई रूपया न दिया जाय और लोग उनके नीचे न दबें। १४४३ में रूस की शक्ति साइबेरिया में फैलनी आरम्भ हुई। १५५५ में सिविर के खान का अधःपतन हुआ और सौ वर्ष के अन्दर अंदर रूस पैसिफिक अर्थात् प्रशांत महासागर तक फैल गया। १८४७ में रूस के जार निकोलस ने अपने एक बड़े बुद्धिमान सैनिक जिसका नाम मुरावीव था, को पूर्वी सायबेरिया का गवर्नर जनरल बना दिया। १८५० में उसने आमूर नदी पर रूसी झंडा गाड़ा। रूस की नीति सदा भूमि पर चलने की थी, समुद्र पर चलने की नहीं थी। अपने साथ के जो देश थे उनको वह आत्मसात् करता गया। इसी प्रकार से उसका राज्य धीरे धीरे चारों ओर बढ़ता गया। आज उसके अधिकार में मंगोल है, मध्य एशिया है और पूर्वी यूरोप के देश हैं।

अब चीन की ओर दृष्टिपात करें। चीन की नीति भी दूसरे देशों को आत्मसात् करने की

रही है। आसपास के देशों को धीरे-धीरे वह अपने में मिलाता गया और उनको लेना गया। चीन का इतिहास दो हजार वर्ष का इतिहास है। इन दो हजार वर्षों में चीन ने किस प्रकार दूसरे देशों को अपने में मिलाया, यह इतिहास का एक बड़ा ही आवश्यक अंग है।

पन्द्रहवीं शताब्दी में जबकि यूरोपियन लोग यूरोप से बाहर जा रहे थे उसी शताब्दी में मिंग वंश के राजाओं ने अपने प्रतिनिधि दूसरे देशों में भेजे। उनका एक सिद्धान्त था और वह सिद्धान्त आदि काल से चीन में चला आ रहा है—जिसको अंग्रेजी में थूनिवर्सल मोनार्ची (universal monarchy) कहा गया है—कि चीन का राज्य सारे संसार का राज्य है। इसी सिद्धांत को मान कर युग छोटे महाराज ने अपने एक मंत्री तुंग हो के अधिकार में बड़ी भारी समुद्री सेना सुमात्रा, जावा, स्याम, कम्बोज और मलाया आदि देशों में भेजी और अपना आधिपत्य स्वीकार करवाया। जब अलबुकर्क ने मलाया पर आक्रमण किया तब मलाया के सुलतान ने चीन से प्रार्थना की कि तुम हमारे अधिपति हो, हमारी रक्षा करो। मिंग के पश्चात् ही मंचु वंश का राज्य आरम्भ हुआ। उस समय चीन के पास तिब्बत और सिनकियांग न थे। भारतवर्ष ने चीन के साथ जो संधि की है उसमें इस बात को स्वीकार किया है कि हम तिब्बत को तुम्हारा अंग मानते हैं।

अब यह बड़ा भारी प्रश्न है कि हम ने उसको स्वीकार करके अच्छा किया या बुरा किया। आज की दृष्टि से कि इस समय तो शान्ति हो, इस समय तो लड़ाई न हो, यह हम ने अच्छा ही किया किन्तु भविष्य में इसका क्या परिणाम होगा, यह कहना कठिन है। चीन के प्राचीन इतिहास के अनुसार कम्बोडिया भी चीन साम्राज्य का भाग है, बर्मा भी चीन साम्राज्य का भाग रहा है, मलाया

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भा चीन साम्राज्य का भाग रहा है। जावा और सुमात्रा भी चीनी इतिहास में चीन साम्राज्य के अंग कहे जाते हैं। तो उस भावना को लेकर यदि चीन अपनी नीति का अनुसरण करता जायेगा तो उस समय यह बड़ा कठिन होगा कि संसार में शान्ति स्थापित हो, किन्तु हमारे शासन ने जो यह नीति अपनाई है कि आज संसार में चीन की चाहे जो भी स्थिति हो, तिब्बत का चीन में मिलना हमारे अनुकूल हो या न हो, वह डेमोक्रेसी, लोकतंत्र, सेल्फ टिटिडरमिनेशन या स्वाधीनता के विचारों के अनुकूल हो या न हो, परन्तु यह आवश्यक है कि चीन में जिस प्रकार का भी शासन है उसको हम स्वीकार करे ताकि आगे लड़ाई बन्द हो। इस विचार को लेकर हमारे शासन ने जो संधि की है उससे अच्छा काम, मैं समझता हूँ, कि हम नहीं कर सकते। किन्तु, फिर भी हमें यह ध्यान में रखना है कि भविष्य में, जो चीन की विचारधारा है जिसको कि अंग्रेजी में "Pax Sinica" कहते हैं वह विचारधारा समाप्त हो। रूस की भी विचारधारा ऐसी ही है और इसी प्रकार अमेरिका की भी दूसरे देशों को अपने आधिपत्य में लाने की विचारधारा है। इस विचारधारा को रोकना है।

जनेवा सम्मेलन में भारत का न बुलाया जाना भारतवर्ष के साथ अत्याचार है। यह ठीक है कि इस सम्बंध में हम स्वयं कुछ नहीं कर सकते किन्तु इसे यह तो पता लगता ही है कि दूसरे देश हमारे प्रति क्या भावनाएँ रखते हैं और संसार की राजनीति में शान्ति फैलाने के मार्ग में किस प्रकार रोड़े डाल सकते हैं। इसी प्रकार से जापानी युद्धबन्दियों को छोड़ दिया जाय अथवा उन पर कृपादृष्टि की जाय इस बात पर विचार करने के लिये जो बैठक होगी उसमें भी भारतवर्ष को सम्मिलित नहीं किया गया। इसका भी हम लोगों को खेद है परन्तु इसमें हमारे शासन का और हमारे देश का क्या कर्तव्य है यह समझ में नहीं

[Dr. Raghu Vira.]

جاتا । किन्तु इतना हम समझते हैं कि अब संसार इस प्रकार से बन रहा है कि भविष्य में ऐसी बातों का होना कठिन होगा ।

अंत में मैं प्रधान मंत्री जी को बधाई देता हूँ कि उन्होंने ने इन ६ वर्षों में संसार की राजनीति में अपने देश को एक बड़ा ऊंचा स्थान दिलाया है ।

[For English translation, see Appendix VII, Annexure No. 321.]

MOULANA M. FARUQI (Uttar Pradesh):

مولانا ایم - فاروقی (اتر پردیش)

جناب صدر صاحب اور میرے معزز ممبران ! اس اہم مضمون پر بولنے کی اجازت دیکر آپ نے جو مجھے شرف بخشا ہے اس کا میں شکریہ ادا ہوں - خارجہ پالیسی کے سلسلے میں ہماری گورنمنٹ نے غور کر کے جو چند بنیادی چیزیں رکھی ہیں وہ ہمارا خیال ہے کہ بالکل ہمارے اصول کے مطابق ہیں - جن معمولی الفاظ میں اس خارجہ پالیسی کو سراہا گیا ہے میرے نزدیک اس سے زیادہ کی ضرورت ہے - آپ جانتے ہیں کہ ہماری کچھ بنیادی چیزیں ہیں اور ہماری جو سب سے بڑی بنیادی چیز ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ دنیا میں جتنی قومیں ہیں ان سب کو یہی نہیں کہ ان کو اولی ریاستی میں یا اپنے اختیارات میں لینے کی اور ان پر قبضہ کرنے کی کوشش نہ کریں بلکہ یہ بھی ہے کہ اگر وہ مصیبت میں ہیں

تو انکی مدد کریں اور ان کو چھٹکارا دلائیں - اس کے بعد یہ چیز ہمارے سامنے آئی ہے کہ اس چیز کو کس طریقے پر انجام دیں - تو ہماری ایک بنیاد ہے جو کہ آزادی کی تحریک سے ہمارے سامنے ہے یعنی ہم اہلسا کے راستے پر عدم تشدد کے راستے پر چلیں - گفتگو سے صلح سے جس طریقے سے بھی ممکن ہو بلا کسی کو تکلیف دینے ہوئے کام کو انجام دیں - مہانتا جی نے ہمیں اسی جانب ہدایت کی تھی اور یہی راستہ دکھلایا تھا - ہمیں مسرت ہے کہ سنہ ۱۹۴۷ع سے ہماری فارن پالیسی (foreign policy) اسی بنیاد کے اوپر رہی ہے - جس وقت ہمیں آزادی ملی اسوقت آپ نے دیکھا کہ ہندوستان کی کیا حالت تھی - ہندوستان ہی کی نہیں پورے ایشیا کی کیا حالت تھی - ہمارے پاس نہ روپیہ تھا نہ پیسہ تھا اور نہ ڈیفنس (defence) کا سامان تھا اور طرح طرح کی مصیبتوں میں گرفتار تھے - لیکن آپ کے سامنے یہ حقیقت ہے کہ ہمارے آریبل پرائم منسٹر (hon. Prime Minister) نے کیا قدم بڑھایا وہ قدم یہ تھا کہ تمام گروپس (groups) جو ایک دوسرے کے ساتھ لڑ رہے تھے ان سے علیحدہ ہو کر اپنا ایک راستہ لیا - جو ان کا اصول تھا اس کی بنا پر کسی گروپ میں شامل نہیں ہو سکتے تھے - سب سے بڑی یہ چیز

تھی کہ وہ نان وائلنٹ (non-violent) تھے۔ عدم تشدد کے قائل تھے اور اس چیز کے قائل تھے کہ دنیا میں جو جو قومیں بستی ہیں ان کے پیچھے میں انٹرفیر (interfere) نہ کریں۔ مداخلت نہ کریں۔ ان کو زندہ رکھنے دیں اور ان کی مدد کریں۔ یہی نہیں کہ ان کو چھوڑ دیں کہ وہ زندہ رہیں بلکہ ان کی پورے طور پر مدد کریں تاکہ ان کو زندہ رکھنے میں آسانیاں مہیا ہوں۔ ایسی صورت میں ہم امریکن ڈیموکریٹک گروپ (American democratic group)

کا ساتھ نہیں دے سکتے تھے کیونکہ اس کی پالیسی تشدد کے اوپر مبنی تھی۔ اور اڈا میں یہ کہوں تو ہمارے کمیونسٹ دوست گپرائیڈ نہیں کہ اسی طریقے پر ہم کمیونسٹ بلاک (Communist bloc) کا بھی ساتھ نہیں دے سکتے تھے کیونکہ ان کا طریقہ بھی تشدد کا ہے۔ یہ دوسری بات ہے کہ انہوں نے دوسرے ملکوں کو غلام نہ بنایا ہو یا وہاں اٹم بم (atom bomb) نہ گرایا ہو لیکن جو اندرونی اٹم بم ہے وہ بھی کم خطرناک نہیں ہے۔ ان کی جو تشدد کی پالیسی ہے وہ ایسی ہے کہ وہ جہاں بھی جاتے ہیں وہاں بلاوا کرتے ہیں۔ انقلاب کراتے ہیں اور تشدد کے بعد جب ان کا قبضہ ہوتا ہے تو اس کا اثر بھی بہت کچھ اٹم بم سا ہوتا ہے۔ تو ہماری گورنمنٹ نے ہمیشہ

ہمیشہ قدم اٹھایا ہے کہ ہندوستان ان دو گروپوں میں نہ پھنسنے اور الگ رہے۔ تو ہماری یہ بنیادی چیز ہے۔ بیسک (basic) چیز ہے کہ ہم نے کسی کے ساتھ شرکت پسند نہیں کی۔ اس کے علاوہ دنیا کی کچھ عملی چیزیں بھی تھیں جنکی وجہ سے ہم مجبور تھے کہ ہم علیحدہ رہیں اور نیوٹرلیٹی (neutrality) کی عدم تعلق کی پالیسی اختیار کریں۔ یہ پالیسی کتنی کامیاب ہوئی ہے اسکو آپ دیکھ سکتے ہیں۔

کچھ تھوڑے ہی دن ہوئے کہ جب ہم آزاد ہوئے لیکن آج ایشیا کی سیاست خارجہ میں ہمارا کتنا اثر ہے۔ یہ اثر کیوں ہے؟ اس لئے کہ ہم نیوٹرل (neutral) رہے۔ حالانکہ نیوٹرل رکھنے کے خلاف بہت سی باتیں کہی گئیں کہ اگر ہم نیوٹرل رہیں گے تو ہمارا کون سا دینا دینا - اگر لڑائی نہ ہو تو نہ تو امریکن ڈیموکریٹک گروپ ہمارا ساتھ دینا اور نہ کمیونسٹ گروپ ہمارا ساتھ دینا۔ یہ تو اس وقت کا طریقہ ہے جبکہ لڑائی ہو اور اسوقت اگر ہم یہ اعلان کریں کہ ہم صرف صلح چاہتے ہیں اور کسی کے ساتھ نہیں ہیں تو ظاہر بات ہے کہ باظابطہ نصاب کی رو سے اخلاق کے اعتبار سے لوگ مجبور ہوں گے کہ ہمارے ملک پر گولہ باری نہ کریں اور ہم برہادی سے بچیں اور اپنی آبادی کو برہادی

[Moulana M. Faruqi.]

سے بچائیں - اسوقت جب ہم نیوٹرل رہیں گے تو ہماری ایک قوت ہوگی اور ہم آواز بلند کر سکیں گے - لیکن میں کہنا چاہتا ہوں کہ آج جو لوگ کسی گروپ میں شامل ہو چکے ہیں خواہ وہ پاکستان ہو یا کوئی دوسرا ملک ہو ان کے منہ نہیں ہیں کہ وہ کہتے ہو کہ اس طرح کا کوئی اعلان کر سکیں جس طریقے پر کہ اس ہاؤس (House) میں اعلان کیا جاتا ہے کہ دنیا میں امن ہونا چاہیئے - انڈوچین میں فوراً لڑائی بند ہونی چاہیئے - کوریا میں جو قدم ہم نے بڑھایا اور جس کی آپکی سیاسی پارٹی نے پوری اجازت دی وہ آپکے سامنے ہے - وہ اس بات کی دلیل ہے کہ ہماری پالیسی پوری طرح سے کامیاب ہوئی ہے -

تو جس وقت آپ کو آزادی ملی اسوقت آپ نے سب سے پہلے اپنی آزادی کو سنبھالا اور اسکے بعد جو سب سے پہلا قدم بڑھایا وہ ایشیا کے ملکوں کو آزاد کرانے کے لئے بڑھایا - ایشیا کا ایک بڑا حصہ غلام تھا - یورپ کے ملکوں نے اسکو غلام بنا لیا تھا - کسی کو غلام بنایا تھا کسی کو اپنا دوست بنایا تھا اور کسی کو اور طریقے پر ڈومینیٹ (dominate) کیا تھا - تو آپ نے دیکھا کہ انڈونیشیا آزاد ہوا

MR. CHAIRMAN: The electricity has failed, Mr. Faruqi. It is all right, but you may wind up.

MOULANA M. FARUQI:

مولانا ایم - فاروقی : میں صرف دو تین باتیں کہہ کر ختم کرتا ہوں - تو آپ نے دیکھا کہ آپ نے جو کچھ مدد کی اس کا نتیجہ کیا ہوا۔ اس کا نتیجہ یہ ہوا کہ اسوقت پورے ایشیا میں آپکی حکومت ہے - حکومت کا مطالبہ یہ نہیں ہے کہ طاقت کی حکومت ہے بلکہ وہ محبت کی حکومت ہے پریم کی حکومت ہے -

میں آپکی توجہ اس بات کی جانب دلانا چاہتا ہوں کہ جسوقت ہندوستان تقسیم ہوا تھا اسوقت ساری دنیا میں آپکے خلاف کئی کمیونل (communal) چیزیں پھیلانی گئی تھیں اور جو مڈل ایسٹ (Middle East countries) ہیں جو کہ اسلامک کونٹریز (Islamic countries) کہہ جاتے ہیں ان میں کوئی بھی آپکا نام لینے کے لئے تیار نہیں تھا - اسوقت جب میں گیا تھا تو آپکی آواز سنائی نہیں پڑتی تھی - لیکن اب جب میں جاتا ہوں تو میں آپکو یقین دلاتا ہوں کہ آپکے پرائم منسٹر کی وہی قدر کی جاتی ہے جو وہاں کے بڑے سے بڑے لیڈر کی جاتی ہے - یہ بہترین دلیل آپکی فارن پالیسی کی کامیابی کی ہے اور ہمارے پرائم منسٹر نے اسی جذبہ کے ساتھ جو کہ تمام ایشیا میں محبت کا جذبہ ہے اعلان کیا کہ یہ بالکل

غلط چیز ہے - یہ کیوں غلط چیز ہے
اس لئے غلط چیز ہے کہ تمام یورپ
ایشیا کو جس طرح پہلے ختم کرنا چاہتا
تھا اسی طرح آج بھی ختم کرنا
چاہتا ہے اور یہاں پورا قبضہ کرنا چاہتا
ہے - اس سے کوئی انکار نہیں کر
سکتا ہے - جب ایسا ہے تو ہر ایشیا
والے کو حق ہے کہ اگر اس کے گھر میں
کسی فارن کنٹری (foreign country)
کا (base) بنے تو وہ اس پر پوری
آواز اٹھائے -

MR. CHAIRMAN: No more, Mr. Faruqi.

MOULANA M. FARUQI:

[For English translation, see Appendix VII, Annexure No. 322.]

MR. CHAIRMAN: No more. Mr. Akbar Ali.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN (Hyderabad): Mr. Chairman

MR. CHAIRMAN: Just five minutes.

SHRI AKBAR ALI KHAN: Sir, in order to assess the foreign policy and to pass judgment on it, I think the -criterion as well as the objective that the country has placed before us and Parliament is more or less unanimous and it is this—how far have we kept aside from the two warring blocs? Secondly, how far have we helped in creating a peace atmosphere by our dynamic neutrality for the good of the world. Having that standard before me, I intended, Sir, to deal with five things, namely, the Indo-China affair, the Colombo affair, the question of the foreign possessions in our

country and then the China-India agreement and finally the Pakistan affair. But as the time has been limited, I have to forgo some of these things. Putting the Colombo affair and the Indo-China affair together, I would say it was at the appropriate time that we raised the voice that the Asian countries cannot tolerate the Westerners or the Americans or the Europeans, to decide matters one way or the other and against furthering the cause of colonialism in one form or the other. Regarding that Sir, we not only gave a note of warning but we gave specific proposals. I do hope that Geneva will take note of it, not only in the interest of Indo-China and Korea, but also in the interest of the world at large. I say this because, if these things are not settled amicably and mostly on the lines indicated by our Prime Minister, I feel you cannot stop the third world war for a long time.

Another good aspect of the Colombo Conference is that a suggestion has been made that in future there might be a conference of the Asian and African countries. There, I am sure, the questions and problems that our Communist friends have referred to, the African and colour questions to which my learned friend Shri Rama-swami Mudaliar also referred, will be discussed. And certainly the voice of India will be raised against the colour prejudice. All the people in Africa and other peoples are also concerned and if there is no satisfactory solution of this problem, the consequences will be very serious.

The Agreement between India and China is a great constructive step towards the creation of a peace area. I would not go into the details but would only say that it is a great achievement and I am sure the House will join me in paying homage to our Prime Minister.

Coming to Pakistan, Sir, I am sorry to say that while at the request of the Prime Minister of Pakistan—our Prime Minister and the country responded to his call—we were holding

[Shri Akbar Ali Khan.] discussions on issue after issue in a friendly atmosphere, Pakistan without informing us went and made a military alliance with one of the Big Powers of the world. To say the least, Sir, it does not behove responsible people to do like this when negotiations were proceeding and to get the negotiating power in this awkward way or to say, in other words, that India should be bullied into a compromise by virtue of this Pact. I declare, Sir, that the attitude our Government has adopted in this respect of not continuing the talks as they have not behaved properly in the sense that while negotiations were going on they entered into a military pact, is a perfectly correct one. It is derogatory to the dignity and prestige of our country that we should be coerced by undue influence. You do anything in a friendly and in a brotherly atmosphere, we agree; but we refuse to do anything and perfectly correctly when we are faced with a threat and that also by a veiled threat. The matter does not end there. We were engaged, very seriously, in our humble way, to create a peace bloc, to see that the Asian countries, as far as possible, did not join one bloc or the other. We have nothing to say against any of them but we certainly think that in the greater interest of our own country and in the greater interest of the whole of Asia and of the world at large it is necessary that we keep aside of these two warring blocs with whom we may agree in certain things and may not agree in others. What has Pakistan done? Pakistan has given a great blow and it has shattered that effort of ours to establish a peace area by practically joining the American bloc. In order to create the atmosphere of the world conducive to peace on sound lines and to divert the attention of the people from armament and securities to peace and understanding of friendliness to all the people irrespective of the conflicting ideologies, as it has been said in the other House, by our Prime Minister—the policy to live and let live we were persuading Asian

countries and explaining the ideology. At this stage when we were championing this noble cause, Pakistan, not taking a lesson from the historical fact of a century before 1875, not taking a lesson from the political history of a century after 1875, not taking a lesson from what happened as a result of the Anglo-American bloc's activities in Morocco, Tunisia and other countries, has surrendered her sovereignty to America because the letter that has been addressed to the Prime Minister of India clearly shows that the decision to decide as to who is the aggressor will be not in the hands of Pakistan but in the hands of America. This does not require comments. The very same letter also contained America's readiness to help us. Anyone, if the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi were not our guide, if our Prime Minister had been only a politician and not a statesman of whom any country could be proud of, would have jumped at that offer and would have paid Pakistan in the same coin but we have got an idea and an ideal for which we are working. It is said by the Anglo-American bloc 'if you are not with us, in security alignment you are against us'. Sir, the same thing was said in the year 1940 after the declaration of the Second World War by the British authorities. When Mahatma Gandhi decided not to support the war effort, we were told, 'If you are not with us, you are against us'. We kept up to that ideal and we went through that ordeal. We won freedom for our country and I am sure, Sir, that in the international atmosphere also if we treasure the teachings and the practical lesson that the Father of the Nation gave us—and he has given us everything and at last he has given his life for us—With this ideal and with firmness in our heart we will proceed arid do some service to the world at large. I am sure, Sir, we will divert the currents of world thought. I fully support the foreign policy of our Government.

Thank you.

SARDAR BUDH SINGH (Jammu and Kashmir):

سردار بدھ سنگھ (جموں و کشمیر):
جناب صدر! میں اسوقت اس فارن
افئرس کمیٹی (foreign affairs
debate) کے سلسلہ میں کشمیر کے
سوال پر کچھ عرض کرنا چاہتا ہوں۔
کشمیر کی ریاست کا بچہ بچہ ہمارے
محترم جواہر لال جی پر ٹیم منسٹر کی
پالیسی کو درست سمجھتا ہے اور ان
پر مکمل اطمینان کرتا ہے۔ آج سے نہیں
بلکہ آزادی سے پہلے بھی جب ہمارے
لوگ مشکلات میں تھے۔ قید و بند
میں مبتلا تھے تو ہماری مدد کی اور
آزادی کے بعد کشمیر پر جو حملہ کیا
کیا جنگ میں ہمیں انتہائی تکلیفوں
برداشت کرنی پڑیں۔ ایسے وقت میں
کانگریس کے نمائندوں نے اور پھر گورنمنٹ
آف انڈیا (Government of India)
نے ہمیں مالی، اخلاقی، فوجی ہر طرح
کی امداد دیکر ہمیں اٹھایا اور پھر سے
برہان شدہ تباہ شدہ ملک کو آباد کرنے
کی کوشش کی۔ اسکے لئے ہم احسان مند
ہیں۔ میں اس بارے میں صرف
اتنا کہنا چاہتا ہوں کہ بیشک یہ ایک
شاندار ملک ہے ہندوستان کا اور اس
کے پرائم منسٹر بھی اتنے ہی شاندار
ہیں۔ بیشک کسی شاندار ملک اور
شاندار قوم کے لئے کسی لوائی جھگڑے
کے مسئلہ پر کوئی معاہدہ یا کمنٹ
(commitment) پر قائم رہنا ایک
فرض ہوتا ہے۔ پاکستان کے ساتھ یا
یو۔ این۔ او۔ (U.N.O.) کے ساتھ آپ

نے جو کمنٹ کیا اس کا کیا نتیجہ
نکلا ہمیں اس پر غور کرنا چاہیئے۔ کیا
شرائط پوری کی گئی ہیں۔ سوال یہ ہے
کہ آپ نے، جموں اور کشمیر کے لوگوں نے؟
نیشنل کانفرنس نے جس حد تک
ہندوستان کی گورنمنٹ کے ساتھ معاہدے
کئے قول قرار کئے وہ سیات پر سہمت
(cent per cent.) پورے کر دئے گئے ہیں۔
ہمارے آنریبل پرائم منسٹر آف انڈیا
(hon. Prime Minister of India)
محترم جواہر لال جی نے
پاکستان سے یو۔ این۔ او۔ سے جو
کمنٹ کئے وہ ٹھیک ہیں مگر مشروط
وہ ایسا کہنے کا حق رکھتے ہیں۔ مگر
ہمیں جو بھروسہ دلایا گیا، یقین دلایا
گیا کہ وہ ہماری ۲۸ ہزار مربع میل
رقبہ زمین جو پاکستان نے خواہ مخواہ
زبردستی دبا لی ہے واپس لیں گے
جہاں نہ تو باقاعدہ حکومت ہے اور نہ
پاکستان یا کسی اور ملک نے وہاں
کی حکومت کو ریکگنائز (recognise)
کیا ہے اور دنیا جانتی ہے کہ
پاکستان نے وہاں جبراً قبضہ کیا ہے
تو اس کا چہہ چہہ واپس دلانے کیلئے
جو ہمیں یقین دلایا گیا ہے اور
اس کے لئے کمنٹ کئے گئے وہ بھی
تو ٹھیک اور پختہ ہیں اس کو کب
پورا کیا جائیگا۔ اور اس کے بارے میں
ہم کو امداد ہے کہ ہماری زمین ہم کو
واپس مل جائیگی۔ گورنمنٹ آف
انڈیا مہاتما گاندھی کے جس اصول
ہنسا امن و شائستگی پر چل رہی ہے

[Sardar Budh Singh.]

عمیں یقین ہے کہ اس میں پوری کامیابی حاصل ہوگی۔

یہاں میں ایک بات عرض کرنا چاہتا ہوں۔ پہلے بھی بجٹ سیشن (Budget Session) میں عرض کر چکا ہوں اور وہ اسپیکر (speech) نے آپ نے ہی ہوئی۔ کشمیر کا نمائندہ ہونے کی حیثیت سے میں عرض کرنا چاہتا ہوں کہ آپ اہنسا کے اصول پر بھائی چارہ اور آپس میں صلح اور امن کے پھول نظر جو ہمارا اصول ہے بات کرتے جائیے۔ لیکن آخر اس بات کی بھی کوئی مہعاد ہونی چاہیئے۔ ہلوگوں کو یو۔ این۔ او۔ کی طرف سے مایوس ہوتے ہوئے کئی سال گزر چکے۔ میں آپ سے عرض کرنا چاہتا ہوں کہ ہمارے ملک میں آج لاکھوں ریفوجیز (refugees) ہیں۔ یہاں کے ریفوجیز کے اوپر آپ کروڑوں بلکہ اربوں پانہ روپیہ خرچ کر رہے ہیں۔ معاوضہ بھی دے رہے ہیں۔ گھر، بستیاں اور مکان بھی بنا رہے ہیں۔ ان کو قرضہ بھی دے رہے ہیں۔ مگر ہم نے کونسا ایسا قصور کیا ہے کہ ہم کو ایک پیسہ بھی معاوضہ نہیں دیا گیا۔ مہرا بھی اپنا کوئی مکان نہیں دیا۔ میری طرح سے اور بھی لاکھوں بھائی ہیں جنکے کوئی مکان نہیں ہے جو بھینچے شریف خوددار کمپوں میں داخل نہیں ہوئے وہ زیادہ تکلیف و پریشانی میں ہیں۔

چھ سال گزر گئے لیکن ہماری حالت ویسے ہی ویسے ہی ہے۔ چھ سال کے بعد اب کچھ توجہ ہو رہی ہے اور جن صاحب جموں گئے تھے نہ معلوم کب مکان بلوں گے۔ (Time bell rings.) میں یہ کہنا چاہتا ہوں کہ پاکستان کے ساتھ فیصلہ کا معاملہ لمبا ہوتا جا رہا ہے۔ ایسی صورت میں ہمارے سامنے ایک یہی راستہ ہے کہ ہم پاکستان کو نوٹس دیں کہ اتنے عرصہ تک ہماری یہ ۲۸ ہزار مربع میل زمین ہمکو واپس ملنی چاہیئے بس اسی میں ہم سمجھیں گے کہ ہماری نجات ہے اور ہمارے ساتھ انصاف ہوا۔ ہماری جو تشویش اور مشکلات ہیں آپ کے سامنے ہیں اسوقت کافی مصیبتیں ہیں اور جو ہمارا نقصان ہوا ہے اس کے لئے کم سے کم ہمیں زندہ رہنے کے لئے معاوضہ دیا جائے۔ ہمارے لئے مکان بنا دئے جائیں تاکہ ہم صبر اور اطمینان کے ساتھ نہ معلوم کب فیصلہ ہوتا ہے انتظار کر سکیں آخر ہمارے اطمینان اور سہارے کے لئے بھی کچھ کیا جا رہا ہے اور وہ کیا ہے۔ ہلوگوں میں اس بات کی بے چینی ہے کہ جب ہمارے لئے راستہ کی آرڈر (Order) ہو گیا ہے۔ اور کشمیر اسمبلی بھی الحاق کی تصدیق و معاہدہ دہلی کو پاس کر دیتی ہے۔ پھر بھی ہمیں آخری فیصلہ کا انتظار کرنا پوتا ہے۔ جتنی دیر ہوگی اتنا پاکستان کو فائدہ ہے۔ البتہ ہمارا

بڑا نقصان ہے۔ اب جواہر لال جی پرانم منسٹر نے جو یہاں فرمایا ہے کہ وہ وعدہ پر قائم ہیں وہ بجا ہے حالانکہ حالات بالکل بدل چکے ہیں اسے ہائی پولیٹکس (high politics) کے آدمی سیاست دان آدمی جان سکتے ہیں عام آدمی کے لئے سمجھنا مشکل ہے۔ کم سے کم آپ ہم کو یہ سہارا دیں کہ کچھ فکر کی بات نہیں جو فیصلہ ہمارے لئے ہوگا۔ تھیک و باطمینان ہوگا اور جلدی ہوگا۔ آپ ہمیں روپیہ دیں معاوضہ دیں اور رہنے کے لئے جگہ دیں جس سے ہم آرام کی زندگی بسر کر سکیں۔ مہربانی کر کے ہمارے رفیوجیز کی سیوا دل کھول کر کھیلتے تو پھر اس کے بعد ہر طرح سے ہم آپ کی حکومت کے مشکور ہوں گے اور جموں و کشمیر کا بچہ بچہ آپکا احسان مند ہوگا۔ اس لئے آپکو وہاں کے لوگوں کو معاوضہ ضرور دینا چاہیئے۔ اور رفیوجیز (refugees) کے گھر بنا دینے چاہیئے۔ انکا کاروبار چلا دینا چاہیئے۔

[For English translation, see Appendix VII, Annexure No. 323.]

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: Although, Sir, the eyes of the world are turned on the Geneva Conference which is discussing vital problems affecting war and peace in Asia and the world and whose successful outcome we devoutly hope for, yet it is not the deliberations in Geneva important as they are and which, I believe we can influence only slightly and indirectly, but certain aspects of our foreign policy on which I should like to focus your attention. As you are aware, Sir, and as the

Prime Minister also knows fully, our Party is in general agreement with the basic objectives of our Government's foreign policy. This general agreement notwithstanding, we are greatly dissatisfied with the manner in which Government have set about and conducted its foreign policy for the realisation of those objectives. The main strands in our foreign policy, as far as I understand them and with which, as I said, we are in agreement, are promotion of peace, friendliness towards all nations, non-alignment with any bloc, sympathy with freedom struggles and opposition to racialism everywhere. The most important of these is the promotion of peace and non-alignment. How far have we progressed in that direction? I believe, Sir, at least until the recent Colombo Conference, there has been some going backward rather than going forward. For the promotion of peace, a cardinal *desideratum* is that we should develop an area of peace which should be continually expanding. South-East Asia was marked out as such an area. But instead of developing that area as an area of peace, cold war has been brought within this zone. We blame rightly America and Pakistan for this development and probably we have certain other countries also in mind. For, America has not only proposed aid to Pakistan but she has also sponsored the idea of an organisation for the defence of South-East Asia. I do not know at what stage negotiations in connection with this defence organisation rest today and I should like to have information on that point from Government. Now, Sir, whatever it may be and while we fully agree with the stand that the Prime Minister has taken in these matters, the question arises, did we do anything in the past to avert this development? I am sorry to say that we did not do enough. You are probably aware, Sir, that our Party— and in this House my hon. friend whom I miss here today and who would have much more effectively taken part in the discussions, I refer to Mr. C. G. K. Reddy— had elaborated the idea of a third force over a number of years. The Prime Minister had at first scoffed

[Shri B. C. Ghose.] at the idea; then it appeared to me that he started playing with it and Anally he became a convert without admitting it. For to me it appears there is no fundamental difference between the concept of a third area and a third force; whether you call it a third area or a third force, it does not matter. If we had taken action to develop it, many of the things that have happened might have been averted. And because we did not do that, the inevitable has been happening. For in a world which is divided into two powerful power blocs, one way to avoid conflict and war and assure co-existence between the two blocs is to recognise each other's spheres of influence. This postulates, of course, a feverish attempt by either party to extend its own sphere of influence. If therefore those countries which like us desire peace and cherish non-alignment do not come together but pursue instead, let us say, the same policy, but independently, the possibilities are that they would be gradually sucked in, one by one, into the orbit of influence of one or the other power bloc. And that is actually, Sir, what has been happening.

Judged by result, I should therefore, say that the Government policy has not been a success. It may be asked what could the Government have done. I say, Sir, the Government could have done a lot as the Colombo Conference has shown. The Prime Minister himself has recognised the value of this conference. If he had begun at a much earlier period not only with the countries which met at Colombo but also tried to expand the area, I believe we could have assured peace in a much better form than we have been able to do today.

Then, Sir, there is the second point that I should like to bring to your notice and that is about non-alignment. I believe, Sir, that although the Government of India's policy is primarily tilted in favour of the Western bloc *via* Great Britain, yet the policy actually

pursued has given the impression that it inclines towards one or the other power bloc at particular times. Although I do not agree with what who stated at one time, yet the Government of India was accused of being stooges of the Anglo-American bloc. Recently the pendulum is supposed to be swinging in the other direction. I realise, Sir, that we are in a difficult position even ideologically. Because while in political and constitutional matters I feel that most of us are akin to Great Britain and America, on socio-economic problems we have great admiration for Russian achievements. Sir, whatever that may be, there have been certain developments in recent times which give cause for anxiety. One is the agitation in regard to U.S. aid to Pakistan. I have already said, Sir, that we are in full agreement with the Government's stand in this regard. What I feel unhappy about is the form of the agitation which has been launched in this country under Congress aegis. I feel unhappy because it is merely negative in character and has not sought to give any positive direction. I do not think, Sir, that you can rouse public passion and hold it so to say in suspense in thin air because if you do not give it any positive direction, it is likely that other people will take advantage of the circumstance in pursuing a particular policy which they favour. And I have heard even serious and sober-minded people say that we should form an alliance with the Russian bloc on the specious plea that our enemy's enemy is our friend. That is a very serious situation which should be carefully looked into.

The next problem to which I should like to refer is Tibet. I do not intend to find fault with or criticise the Government for coming to the agreement that it has come to with China over Tibet. I am prepared to concede that circumstances and basic facts being what they were, that was the best bargain that we could have made. But what I feel I cannot exonerate the Government is of the absence of any forthright expression of dissatisfaction

with, it not conaemnation of Chinese expansionism in Tibet. Sir, our abhorrence for colonial rule is well known. Government standpoint or the policy of the Government, as pursued in Indonesia, in Indo-China and in various similar cases has always evoked our support and admiration. But we feel that in this matter Government has not done the right thing, for even technically the Chinese position was not without ambiguity because, if I may recall to you, Sir, at the Simla Convention which was held in 1910 or 1914, I do not exactly remember when it was, certain conclusions were arrived at. (1) Tibet participated on equal terms with India and China. (2) Although the Convention recognized the suzerainty of China over the whole of Tibet, it also recognized the autonomy of outer Tibet and it was also agreed that China would not be permitted to send troops or administrators to this area. The fact that China did not subsequently ratify this Convention does not alter the basic facts of the case. (3) Further, when Tibet had originally appealed to the U.N. direct against Chinese invasion of Tibet, it was understood that our Government had agreed to support the case at least to the extent of censuring China for using force against Tibet. In view of these circumstances, silence over, if I may say so, the occupation of or the resumption of suzerainty over Tibet without any protest from us is not probably morally justified. And I may remind you, Sir that the Prime Minister had himself stated in the other House, I believe, some months ago that those who condemn British and American imperialism should understand that there are other imperialisms that are growing.

Sir, in regard to the conduct of foreign affairs I should like to make one or two suggestions. First, what I should like to suggest is that instead of dissipating and diffusing our efforts, we might concentrate more on our neighbours. The second suggestion is that we should give more attention to matters at home. Sir, when I speak of our neighbours, I have in mind the countries in South-East Asia and the

Himalayan region. I think there are various ways available to us by which we can cement our friendship with these countries and then try to expand that region. One such method is periodical conferences like the Colombo Conference. I think we should have periodical conferences of that nature and the beginning that was made at Colombo should be persevered with. Secondly we might have conferences, educational, social, economic and cultural of representatives of these different countries. I am aware, Sir, that we have sent out cultural missions. They have done some good but I believe they can do only limited good. If we can have representatives of the different countries to meet together periodically I think we could get a lot of good out of these conferences because these informal conferences do cement the bonds of friendship and good understanding. Thirdly, Sir, a right move initiated by Government, I believe, is the institution of a course of African studies in the Delhi University and the offering of scholarships to African students. I should like that to be extended to students of all these areas so that they can come here and we can develop friendly relationship with them. Fourthly I should like to draw the Government's attention particularly to the countries in the Himalayan region. Their importance has lately very much increased and I am aware that Government is also conscious of that. But what I should like to underline is that we should try to secure the support of the peoples of those countries. We should not forget the fate that has befallen the Americans, namely, that many countries whose governments they had liberally assisted, had turned against them. Sir. I do not want to say anything more on this subject.

One other point on which I should like to have some information is about our diplomatic personnel. There has been lately a lot of criticism in this country about our diplomatic personnel. I am aware that we have some of the most eminent people in our diplomatic service. But since there has-

[Shri B. C. Ghose.] been some dissatisfaction expressed in the Press on this matter I should like to have some information from the Government. There is one other point in this connection on which also I should like to have information. I mean the political appointments in diplomatic service. I am quite prepared to concede that at the highest level there may be political appointments. But what I would like the Prime Minister to consider is whether there should be political appointments also at the lower levels. My own feeling is that political appointments should not be made at lower levels.

Then I should like to know something about external publicity about which the Prime Minister spoke some time ago and said that he was not quite satisfied with the present position.

The second point relates to affairs at home because I believe that it is upon our internal strength that we have largely to depend for the part that we may be enabled to play in the world outside. The Prime Minister himself had said: "A foreign policy is not just a declaration of fine principles. It is conditioned and controlled by a country's own strength. If the policy does not take the capacity of the country into account, it cannot be followed up. If a country talks bigger than it is, it brings little credit to itself." I entirely agree and that is why I am apprehensive of the fact that if our Five Year Plan is not going to be fulfilled, and with so much distress and misery in the country what effective role can be played in the international field? I do not know if moral force alone without sufficient backing of industrial and economic strength can lead the country forward, nor whether moral force alone is a sufficient antidote to the forces, let us say, of Communism which in the form in which it is practised in certain countries, we would not like to see established in this country and for reasons very cogently stated, if I may say so, by you, Sir, in a paper that you contributed to a volume called 'What I

Believe'—you had said: "In Communism there is little of the pursuit of truth, no passion for individual integrity and spiritual perfection, no faith in the inwardness of life. It is a flight from individual responsibility, it is the assertion of the herd instinct, the urge to huddle into a safe warm crowd. It provides security only so long as our minds are closed to other influences." It is for all these reasons, Sir, that I urge upon the Prime Minister to concentrate all his energy and attention primarily on the countries in South East Asia and the Himalayan region and on conditions at home.

Finally I would like you and the Prime Minister to consider this that high eminence attained by an individual statesman may secure for his country a position in international affairs which is not always commensurate with the internal strength of the country. But this cannot continue for all time. Statesmanship lies, I think, in increasing the country's strength, economic and otherwise, and laying its foundations for friendly relationship with other particularly like-minded nations on a firm basis which alone can raise the country's status in the world and make its voice heard with respect in international councils.

SHRI B. GUPTA (West Bengal): May I draw the attention of the Prime Minister to a report which has appeared in a Calcutta newspaper?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Is it Swadhinata?

SHRI B. GUPTA: The report says that on the 12th May a Skymaster belonging to the French touched down at Calcutta and 36 French soldiers lived for a few hours in the Grand Hotel in Rooms Nos. 315, 320, 466 and 490 and at about 3-30 A.M. in the early hours of the morning they left. On the same day a Reuter's news item also appeared in the Press from the French source that a group of French airmen had left for Indo-China. Now that was Reuter's news. Then another report appeared in the *Hindusthan Standard* which mentioned a similar fact, taut not

in such details. I only wished to draw the attention of the Prime Minister to this matter, even though I know it will not be possible for him to say anything definite here now.

Before I sit down I would only like to say one thing. I was very sorry to hear my friend Mr. Ghose refer to the Indo-China agreement on Tibet. We welcome the agreement, the whole country welcomes it. It seems the Socialist leaders have developed a frame of mind that if a burglar entered into their house, they would raise the telephone receiver to tell the police not to come to their homes but to go to Indo-Tibetan border.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes. that will do.

SHRI V. K. KRISHNA MENON (Madras): Mr. Chairman, the House has heard from the Prime Minister a fairly full statement on the main problems of international affairs that affect the world and ourselves today. The debate that has followed has covered this wide field and also other aspects which were probably not dealt with in his speech. It is not my intention, within the time the House has, to traverse the whole of this ground. But I will only refer to some of the main issues that have been dealt with.

May I say, Mr. Chairman, that this House is part of a sovereign Parliament which is the organ of our sovereign State and therefore no question can arise as to our right to say what we like, but at the same time I would like to remind myself that we are dealing with external affairs, with the affairs of other countries and our relations with other people and therefore we have an audience which is larger than this chamber and larger than this country. What we say may have a certain bearing on the development of events and therefore one is not always free to do what has been suggested in some of the speeches—that we should go about on a crusading mission and set the world right.

Among the matters referred to, first of all is what is now called the problem j

ot "persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. I confess I know very little about the details of the problem, the agreements and the developments that have taken place, but it is useful to remind ourselves that the relationship between our country and Ceylon extends in remembered history to some 25 centuries and there are not between our two countries those kinds of problems that need embitter good relations. For example, there are no racial conflicts; there are no problems of security concerning the two countries; there are no problems which need be regarded as arising from economies that are in conflict. To a very considerable extent our economies are, or can be rendered, complimentary. The present problem has largely arisen as a result of circumstances of more recent history and also because of the internal economic position in that country itself. It may well be that when we approach this problem in future, we will have to refer to those economic matters and seek an economic solution whereby the large labour force in Ceylon which is the bone of contention in this matter would find itself rehabilitated in that country under the policies of the Ceylon Government and with the assistance that we may be able to give. Immediately, however, it is very important that with all the difficulties and frictions that are in the world—although one does not subscribe to Dr. Malan's view that wherever we go there is trouble—it should be our concern, and I am sure it is our concern to find a peaceful solution. We need not go merely by what is reported in the papers or by matters of hearsay in such matters. So far as one is aware, no developments which have not officially been communicated to the Government have taken place in this matter. We all know that the expressed desires of the people of Ceylon, both of Indian origin and others, their general powers of organisation and the desire of the Ceylon Government itself as expressed in the Colombo Conference are to deal harmoniously as far as possible. They are ready to tell us things and to listen to us and work against the tendencies that make foe-conflict

[Shri V. K. Krishna Menon.] If the result even after all that is that still problems remain unresolved, then we will have to consider at that stage whether and what further remedies can be sought.

Reference has been made to the Colombo Conference, Mr. Chairman, I think it is worthwhile for us to fully appreciate the nature of this conference. The conference was first convened without any definite purpose in "the sense of a political item on the agenda. Now this fact is of very great importance because it proclaims the desire of the parties to the conference to cultivate friendship, even though there was nothing to be specifically discussed, that is to say, the Colombo Conference was in essence a conference of fraternity, a conference of international co-operation between nations and States in the same area. It was not convened in the context of any crises or in order to overcome some difficulties or in order to find some solution for a particular problem. It so happened that owing to the developments in the world, some very stark problems, some very pressing problems and grave crises developed, and the conference was therefore able to give its attention to them. Now these matters must be kept separately in our minds if we are to appreciate the fact that we made a new beginning or took a new step forward in our attempts to co-ordinate our ideas and to discover the nature of differences and also find out an agreement in respect of them. This is important in our relations with other countries. Mr. Chairman, in the countries having a parliamentary system of Government, exploration of the degree of divergence has also to be pursued as a degree of agreement. And that was what was done in the Colombo Conference. I will not go at this stage into an examination of the final communique of the Conference. I would however like to say at this stage that this House would go wrong in relation to facts and the background of the conference if it paid too much attention to the various reports that come through

usual sources all over the world with regard to conferences of this kind where there are no specific items on the agenda, there are no resolutions and there are no amendments of any kind. Colombo was a conference which proclaimed to the world the like-mindedness of the people that live in this area and the fact that the respective Prime Ministers can speak for their countries and come to an informal understanding. It is a great thing in itself. In fact it is the essential nature of what may be called a conference. It was not a gathering of delegates who were instructed to act in certain ways according to certain predetermined propositions. The Prime Ministers were people who were captains of their teams and who could play the game according to the rules and the deployment forces prevailing in the field. These matters which are of vital importance, would develop in the future in a wholesome way.

While I am on this subject, I might also deal with the references made by one or two hon. Members to what was mentioned by the Prime Minister as a future Asian-African conference. There might be some scope for misunderstanding on this point. It was not the idea and it was not suggested anywhere that in a future Colombo Conference other people should be invited. That seems to be the impression that appears to have been formed in some quarters. That is not the position. The Colombo Conference did say, as mentioned in the communique, that these five Prime Ministers should meet again as convenience permits. It also made a specific decision, which is quite separate, that is to say that it was the view of these five Prime Ministers that a larger conference of Asian-African countries should be convened. In fact it could not do anything else. It has been left to the hon. the Prime Minister of Indonesia to make the necessary explorations. I do not know whether it would be possible for us at the present moment to say anything or be able to know anything in our own minds as to the character and composition of the confer-

ence. The Indonesian Prime Minister is himself aware of the problems that were raised as to the position of the countries of Asia and Africa, their representation and so on. Now, all these matters could not be discussed in a conference of the kind that was held in Colombo. These things were left to this distinguished Prime Minister of Indonesia about whose ability and statesmanship all of us at Colombo formed a good impression. It was left to him to explore the avenues of holding a conference—the site and the purposes of the conference and various other matters. So there it rests.

The two other matters to which reference has been made in the course of the discussion, Mr. Chairman, are those affecting the problem of colonialism. A very definite attack seems to have been made on the Government's policy in regard to its approach to the problem of colonialism. As a private Member of Parliament, Mr. Chairman, and as a citizen of this country, I make bold to say that neither our people, nor our country or our Government should have any vestige of a guilty conscience, so far as colonial affairs are concerned. We have often, to the prejudice of our immediate interests, in spite of the difficulties in the context of informal discussions, maintained our position: But we have not thought it necessary always, and I am sure the House will agree with me in this, to 'go about this matter like a bull in a China shop. Here in this House it is well-known that the policies of Government in these matters stand proclaimed over the last two or three years even at the international gatherings. Whether it be in the Assembly of United Nations or it be an economic or other organisation, our delegations have put forward our position as reasonably as possible, based upon our policy that the independence of colonial peoples has been and is our great concern, and we stand in solidarity with them. We are a democratic community and I suppose, it is the business of a democratic community to remind itself that it cannot export revolutions even if its Minister for Commerce and

Industry issues an export licence. My distinguished colleague, the hon. lady, who is Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has spent considerable time at the various committees at that secretariat with great distinction in maintaining our position, in regard to colonial matters. We, either in regard to Malaya or in regard to Kenya or French Cameroons, have steadfastly adhered to this policy of proclaiming to the world that we stand in solidarity with the people who seek their liberation. We like to see them pursue that path along the lines of nonviolence and constitutional agitation which does not bring about cruelty and which does not create greater problems. In relation to other sovereign Governments we have observed the necessary proprieties and carried out our responsibilities. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful for us to remind ourselves as to what would be our attitude if other sovereign Governments decide to take certain action in regard to what they do not like in this country. Do we not have to take this into account in our dealings with other people and their national policies? It has been suggested that our relations with the Commonwealth have been responsible for soft-peddalling in respect of colonialism. I think the expression itself "the relations with the Commonwealth" is a misnomer. It looks as though there is a hard and fast solid bloc. This is one of the several organisations in which this country is interested. We are members of the United Nations, and there are so many other organisations with which we are connected. In the United Nations there are other Governments also represented with whom we have disagreements. Is it therefore necessary that we should walk out of it because there may be people there who disapprove of our attitude or we disapprove of theirs? Or, are we to walk out of the United Nations because the Union of South Africa is present there?

India has expressed her views about the treatment of Indians there and she

[Shri V. K. Krishna Menon.] is entitled to express her views. That is the position in these matters. I am not aware of any Commonwealth statesman trying to impose his will upon us. In any association we are bound to exert some influence and it is a concomitant of the exercise of any influence that we should be open to influences. It is the function of a parliamentary democracy, of any Government which is responsible to an elected legislature to use its own instructed judgment and discretion in respect of its decisions in its attitude to such influences. In the whole contribution that this country has made to peace, our associations, whether they be with some of the Members of the Commonwealth or some other States outside it, *e.g.*, Burma, with whom we are closely connected, so far as my experience goes, these associations have not in any way injured us, and it is not the reason why colonialism still persist over parts of North Africa or in any part of South East Asia or in Indo-China itself.

Now, I turn to other problems connected with the Colombo Conference. At Colombo the Prime Ministers met and made a full statement with regard to colonial problems. There was no difference between them. They said that they wanted to see the end of colonialism. There were two countries—Tunisia and Morocco—which were separately mentioned, because they are not colonies in the accepted sense of the term. They are countries which are sovereign States but whose sovereignties stand deprived by the action of the protecting power. This kind of protection is just like the poisonous embrace. Therefore, they are countries which are in a different category, and the Prime Ministers unanimously appeared to agree that their position should be separately treated.

Now, Sir, the Colombo Conference also dealt with the main questions of Indo-China. But before I come to Indo-China, I should like to say a word about the position of Asia about which a great deal has been said in this House. I think it would be incorrect to say—I stand subject to correction—

that the problems that are discussed in Geneva are exclusively Asian problems, for the simple reason for example that the French Army is in Indo-China, for the simple reason that members of non-Asian nations have their armies standing in Korea; it is not a question of moral or racial rights. The configuration of the situation is such that you cannot treat this as an exclusively Asian problem. The facts of the situation are there. Whatever may be one's feeling, this is a world problem, a problem in which a large number of powers have intervened or are likely to intervene. They have become concerned or are likely to become concerned in this matter, which stands between the present and the day when peace will come to Korea and Indo-China. Therefore as the Prime Minister said this morning, we should not be concerned as to who brings about a settlement so long as there is a settlement. We are concerned only with a settlement, because first of all we are concerned with world peace and what is more, we are so close by to them that the fires there may be wafted in our direction. For all these reasons we are interested, but that does not mean that we have some exclusive monopoly in non-Asian settlements or that we should be jealous of anybody trying to remedy the situation. That was also the attitude that the Colombo Conference took. I believe our Prime Minister and the other Prime Ministers said that Colombo was in no sense a rival of the Geneva Conference. It was not at all a rival to the Geneva Conference but when it met certain events had developed, and the non-Asian and Asian powers assembled at Geneva, whether they expressed it or not, were looking to the Colombo Conference and they were keeping their ears on the ground to listen to what was happening in Colombo. It was not the desire, so far as I am aware of the Prime Ministers assembled in Colombo to associate themselves collectively with this group or the other. This takes us to the decisions reached at Colombo in regard to the Indo-China situation itself. The Prime Minister referred this morning to the

five main points on which the views on Indo-China were expressed at this conference. I put it that way because the conference did not make any proposals, did not say that these were the irreducible minimum of things. They simply showed their approach, that they thought that certain things should be done and that if they were not done certain things were likely to follow. The first of these is a cease-fire. All these proposals that were made at Colombo, shall we say, bear a very close family resemblance to the items in the statement made by the Prime Minister some time ago in another place. The first proposal was that there should be a cease-fire. It is a good occasion to deal here with the opposition that has been raised to the Prime Minister's stand in regard to the recall of French troops. Now, our whole purpose with regard to Indo-China and a settlement there is based on the termination of imperialism, that is to say, to get the French off Indo-China. The first thing to do, whether in Korea or Indo-China, is to have a cease-fire and then to take action to find a settlement. Any other course is not practical or possible. The withdrawal of any troops from Indo-China, whether French or anybody else's if they are there, would depend upon the cessation of hostilities. That is to say, unless there is a stop to the fighting, it is not normally possible to bring this about, and no party is going to agree to the withdrawal of any of their really combatant troops from anywhere in the world, Indo-China or elsewhere, unless there is some agreement reached with regard to the stoppage of hostilities. Therefore, while it may be a piece of agreeable rhetoric to talk about the withdrawal of French troops from Indo-China first, it is not practical politics. So far as our Prime Minister is concerned, so far as I know, so far as the people of our country are concerned, they are opposed to the continuance of the French colonial power in Indo-China, and that is positively set out in the Colombo decision. What do they say? They say that the Government of France must make an irrevocable declaration. To whom? Not to any of the Govern-34 C.S.P

ments of their associated States, not to us. The decision is that France must make an international commitment, i.e., to China, to the Soviet Union, to the United Kingdom and to the United States; that France should make it to these four States and others assembled in this conference. That is certainly a stronger statement than any statement this country can make, or any individual country can make. The proposal put forward by the Prime Ministers was that there should be a termination of French sovereignty in Indo-China, and not merely that, there should be a withdrawal of French troops. Withdrawal of troops alone is not adequate. There must be an international commitment about the termination of French sovereignty. This is a far more effective and practical step; that goes to the root of the matter.

Then, I will come to the more controversial question of a cease-fire and the maintenance of that cease-fire. Our Government made a proposal about this some time ago. At that time the objection raised was that there was no fixed line of fire in Indo-China, there was no front, it was all fluid and that it was impossible to establish a front. There is no harm in saying now that various proposals had been made and suggestions had been made to the appropriate quarters at that time and while there was no visible opposition to it, the general desire of not having immediate cease-fire was sought to be buttressed by these arguments but anyway, now it is common ground that there should be a cease-fire and so far as I can say for myself, that any cease-fire in a place of this kind must be one without any prejudice to political pressure of other decisions in the future. Otherwise it means that, as I said before, we decide the issue before taking the first step for the decision. We must get cessation of hostilities before we can have cessation of political hostility and therefore without prejudice to these matters, it should be possible to establish a cease-fire at this time. It is interesting to note in this connection that the proposals made

[Shri V. K. Krishna Menon.] by the two contending parties in Indo-China particularly when they are both Indo-Chinese are not so far away from each other—they may so appear but one sees in international discussions that the propositions that appear so far removed from each other definitely on closer examination, have been found and can be demonstrated to have points of affinity in order to find a solution. It is a healthy sign, it is a wholesome feature and a hopeful feature that the two proposals that have been put forward, are not totally mutually exclusive. There are points of agreement and the mediatory efforts that are made at Geneva can lead to a settlement. The original suggestion made by the Government of India about the creation of a cease-fire group for this purpose with the necessary mediatory influence would still appear to be the most practical one but it is not for us sitting at a distance, to go into these details. The second aspect of the Colombo proposals which are a re-endorsement of the proposals made in Parliament here is that there should be direct negotiations between the parties in conflict, i.e., those who are fighting should get together,—not necessarily at front for making peace—but merely for establishment of the technique in this difficult front because there are isolated pockets and not merely one army is advancing from the north and the other from the south.

If it was possible for the commanders or others to get together and establish what may be called a mechanism of stoppage of fighting, then part of the battle for cease-fire would be won. We believe that a cease-fire group in this way, with mediatory influence, if necessary, would probably achieve this result.

I take the other part, i.e. with regard to the non-intervention proposals. There would be very little hope of the maintenance of peace in the war-torn area at present without non-intervention. Though the war might have originated as a civil war, as a war in which only one part of the world was

concerned, it has become more a peripheral expression of the general world conflict. If it is not possible to prevent the flow of personnel or supplies to those areas, i.e., to a certain extent sterilise the conflict after having stopped it, peace is less possible. Therefore the stoppage of supply of further aid of intervention of any kind becomes vital to the solution of this problem. The proposals made in Colombo are of a character in which the four countries some of whom are ideologically opposed to some of the others and are taken to be on the two sides of the battle in Indo-China, must come to an agreement on the prevention of resumption of hostilities. An agreement between them on any matter whatsoever would by itself be a good thing. If they are brought into this position—and so far as one can see from press reports from Geneva, it does not seem altogether inconsistent, that is a possibility of getting them together somehow or the other does not seem altogether to be inconsistent with the state of relations that now exist there,—if China and the United States and the Soviet Union and the U.K. with anybody else, would agree not to augment supplies, not to add fuel to the fire of war, then we have a greater prospect of both the cease-fire, its maintenance and the ultimate solution because first of all, it limits the issues to the parties in Indo-China to Indo-Chinese themselves. It limits the extent of conflict and the duration of the war and makes the finding of a solution without pressure from either side more possible. We have heard a good deal about self-determination. Self-determination in those circumstances would be more real and easier without the pressure that will come from either side or the hopes and fears that there may be in this matter—hopes on one side that there may be reinforcements or the fear on the other side that a cessation of hostilities would lead to augmentation of supplies to the enemy. There has been much discussion in the press and elsewhere about the services that other countries might render and also about collective maintenance of these arrangements.

The United Nations makes provision in its charter for the maintenance of collective security both by methods of force and by conciliation. In the present state of the world, there is not one force that can command willing obedience of all. You cannot have a police force in the world today when the world is divided in two by contending parties in the present manner. Therefore the use of collective force which could be of service only to one side or the other would be inconsistent with our policy. But at the same time there are various other services which various countries can render and it is to be hoped that the maintenance and bringing about of a cease-fire would not be halted or would not be prevented by the failure of others to comply with such circumstances. Reference has been made also to the position of China in regard to this and it is, true that—whether it is the right moment to say it or not—no solution of the Asian or Far Eastern affairs in the world as at present is possible without the participation of China. With a standing army of 5 million in the front line and probably as many behind, with a considerable industry in Manchuria, with all the experience gained in the Korean war, with the power of reinforcement behind, with a strong centralised Government, a great power in Asia with 500 million people behind it, it would be illusory to think that a world settlement can take place with them outside the borders of settlement. Mr. Chairman, speaking for myself, I much regret that the question of Formosa has figured in this debate. It is only a popular expression to say that Formosa is in the U.N. There is no such thing as Formosa in international law. You know that China is represented at the present moment as a Government by an authority which calls itself a Government but we don't recognize it as a Government. Therefore in popular usage we call them Formosan authorities meaning thereby the actual authority and the question now is when China comes in, what will happen to these people. That is something which we can think of at that time. If I

may say so, we are not discussing the report of the States Reorganization Committee. As to where that place should go and any attempt to create a new State which does not exist without the consent of all concerned would add another problem to the present difficulties. The position of Formosa is governed by provisions agreed to and, leading to the conclusion of the last war. Even the contending parties have thought it wise not to raise this problem at the moment but the important thing is whether the real Government of China should take its place at the U.N. or not.

Just a while ago, reference was made to the deficiency of our Government's policy with regard to foreign affairs at an earlier period, by not subscribing to what is called a third force and we are informed now that the Government has undergone a conversion. I suppose if we are really converted, we would have all the zeal of a convert. Mr. Chairman, I confess I fail to understand how a third force can be part of our peace policy because the whole idea of our peace policy is that we are against these rival blocs standing or one against the other and trying to settle problems by the use of threat or use of the organized forces of war. We don't get rid of blocs by making another bloc and what is more, what effectiveness can a third bloc have unless that bloc has the military, economic and other power which will be more than the other two blocs put together? Or, is it prepared to be in the market place and sell out either to the one or the other? So the whole conception of the third bloc is something, in my judgment, that will not stand examination. In the context of the realities of events, and certainly so far as one supports the policy of peace in the sense of non-alignment or non-commitment, non-alignment does not mean that one may not conclude a treaty of trade based on exports and imports. Non-alignment means, non-commitment in terms of policy and that is the position we have adopted. I was sur

[Shri V. K. Krishna Menon.] prised to hear that it was part of our policy to create a peace area. It appears that we are all, to some extent, consciously influenced by our background of colonial rule in reverse—the balance of power in the reverse. Are we going to create a balance of power by some sort of a thing that has a peace atmosphere? That comes to the same thing in another way. I have heard the Prime Minister say in this House and I have heard him on repeated occasions, that this is our view, that is to say, that we should not put our resources, not allow our people to be made use of in the battle field, that we should not commit ourselves beforehand; and we hope that this will appeal to other peoples also. He has not even said that this appeal is only to Asia. To think of it in geographically expansionist terms is to take a Curzonian view of it. It is no* even that we are trying to create a peace area, a sort of cordon sanitaire, in a divided world. That will be misunderstanding the whole of our policy. We are just trying to express our views to the world as far as I understand it. We say there is no real solution to the problems of the world—either through war or war preparedness. Therefore, try something else. What does not mean that we are trying to convert somebody by force, that will be like the great French philosopher who spoke about toleration and then said, "Those who do not believe in toleration should all be hanged." So this idea of a third force which is constantly cropping up has no relation; so far as my humble judgment goes, to anything that we may have to do.

Now, we come to a consideration of the problem of Korea. On account of the critical developments that have taken place in Indo-China, the fact that it is near us and so on, this problem of Korea at Geneva has somewhat taken, not a second place in importance, but has just receded a little in our thinking at the moment. 1

It will be useful for us to remember that these are the two places—Korea and Indo-China—where we have a pronounced expression, in active war or preparedness for war, of the world conflict. At these two places it has erupted. In Korea by patient endeavour for about three years, beginning with the proposal for a cease-fire in January 1951 initiated by this country, at last a state of standstill in the war, cessation of hostilities, took place. I hope I am not saying anything that I should not when I say that the present is at best an uneasy truce, a truce where behind the truce-line there are powerful forces, powerful armies, not controlled by any neutrals but by members of each of the contesting parties. So it is an uneasy truce and the least that we can expect from Geneva is that this uneasy truce would not be disturbed, that there would be no statements, no repetition of threats by one side or the other and as the Prime Minister said this morning, no attempt to bring about decisions by so-called methods of conference, which are sought to be imposed on one side by the other. There can be no easy solution in Korea considering that for over three years a terrible war was raging, some 3 million people have been killed—great many of them women and children—their homes and factories and everything destroyed and the greater part of the country in shambles. Therefore, when you have all this bitterness of war, particularly a civil war, when there are powerful people on either side, where the issues are not confined to Korea only and where the honour and prestige of nations are involved, where ideological controversies are in issue, it is not to be expected that there will be an easy solution. But it is important that we should move towards the road to the solution, that we are not put back, and it is to this that we must look. This matter at the present moment is within the purview of the Geneva Conference, but in reality it is a U.N. problem and whether the talks at Geneva succeed completely or to some degree, it has to go back for consi-

deration by that world comity. We are not in a position to know what developments are likely to take place in this direction.

Mr. Chairman, reference was made to the lack of influence that this country exercises by the enunciation of its foreign policy, that it has not found acceptance in any part of the world. I think, first of all, if we were inclined to be cynical, one may ask, which policy or whose policy has found acceptance in the world. Peace has not succeeded, they say. But war too has not succeeded. So we cannot judge these things in that way. Let us take a few immediate matters. I think the position in Korea itself is an evidence of the degree of success that our endeavours have met with in the past. When we try to be impartial, we receive attacks from both sides. We know that in Korea both in regard to our function as the Custodian Force and as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Commission and in the diplomatic field. The history of this goes back to the early part of 1951. But in spite of repeated rebuffs and failures, we have tried to make 2 contribution consistent with the policy of this country. History will pronounce on the results.

Secondly, take the most recent instance with regard to the proposal made about the high explosive weapons, the weapons of mass destruction. Some time in October, when on behalf of the Government of India, proposals were made that this difficult question of disarmament where people were trying to match their wits or appeared to do so to remove the deadlock, should be discussed by some five or six States who were mainly concerned with it, in private discussions. There was violent opposition. But finally, by degrees, by persuasion and the general course of debate, that problem was allowed to be discussed in that manner and now it is regarded as one of the greater achievements of the General Assembly of last year. Today in England the sub-committee is meeting with the Russians, Americans.

British, French and Canadian representatives, discussing the problem of atomic weapons in private. I speak with my little experience when I say we shall never get agreement between the main representatives of these two sides so long as they have only public discussions. There was a wholesome proposition of President Wilson's "open diplomacy". It is now caricatured as "public diplomacy" and now a new chapter is added— "sudden diplomacy". Well, it is only by private discussions that they can agree. In private discussions they may say many things. There are in New York men who would not shake hands in public for fear that some camera men should catch the picture and send it to their constituencies. But people may talk in private. This is not running them down; it is an objective fact in the world with all its background of prejudice and all that. So when we get into private discussions, we may get somewhere. We also suggested that this committee must be free to meet in any part of the world. It is not because we have any prejudice about New York or any other place, but sometimes the venues of the meeting have a great influence upon the general tempo of the discussions.

These are one or two matters which one could cite as examples where the influence of our foreign policy has been successful and where it has made a successful contribution.

It is necessary for us, therefore, to remember that in the context of external affairs we are dealing with sovereign nations with their own Parliaments, Legislatures or Dictators whoever it may be. In this, however wise we may think our policy is, other people also have notions of their own and, therefore, it is only by a long process of influence and persuasion that we can hope to persuade others. With a degree of reluctance and intrepidity, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that there is danger in countries like ours

[Shri V. K. Krishna Menon.]

for our nascent nationalism—I am speaking for myself in this matter—to claim for our policy a degree of virtue which is sometimes not very different from self-egoism. The worst form of egoism that we can project into the international field is the national egoism which is born out of a feeling of subjective virtue. Other people resent it so much especially as the world measures power in terms of guns. Perhaps the Minister of Defence will tell us some time how many guns we have, but whatever we have, they are not equal to some of other people's and even if we had we are not seeking to measure our strength in those terms. So, while the Prime Minister's speech referred to a large number of matters that must cause concern, it also referred to those that aroused a degree of hope and certainly some which cause a degree of satisfaction but the broad fact remains that in international affairs our own position is conditioned by a world where opinions are predetermined and there is this division in the powers into those to whom they are antagonistic and those to whom they are antagonistic. It reminds me of a part of the farewell address of George Washington. The Prime Minister this morning quoted a modern American. May I, Sir, quote an old one? George Washington on the 19th February in his farewell address to the United States Congress said, "Nothing is more essential than that the permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded". It is a simple phrase but I think that is what we are living under non-permanent attachments and permanent antipathies. A more cynical Foreign Secretary of England once said, "England has neither permanent enemies nor permanent friends, she has only permanent interests." The contribution that our country is making is to detach ourselves from these permanent antipathies and permanent attachments, and not saying that because one nation says so therefore,

we must be right; again not right because it is done by us; so far as I understand and I have tried, we are trying to keep away from predetermined alignment, and the statements that we have heard and the events that have happened in the last few years are outstanding events which demonstrate this. So far as we can make out, we are trying to follow a policy consistent with our new freedom, with our economic position, our anxiety for survival as an independent nation and not as a battleground for the other people and for our strength and our security.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Mr. Chairman, I have not much to say in conclusion on this debate, but I should like to refer to some relatively minor matters which have been touched upon by some previous speakers.

Dr. Kunzru mentioned Nepal and the fact that violent anti-Indian activities had increased there. Well, it is true that in a place like Nepal and in any place like Nepal, there is always the chance and the opportunity for outside interference and intrigue. In fact, all these border countries and border areas always attract that kind of thing and we have been concerned about this matter. Not that we are not aware of it. Rather for some time past—I forget now when we had our last treaty with Nepal about four or five years ago and that was before the change took place in Nepal, even then we had that treaty—we had a treaty and it was stated in that treaty, I think in the letters attached to that treaty, that the foreign policy of Nepal would be coordinated with that of India. Now, since these changes have taken place in Nepal we have been brought in fairly close touch with developments there and with those who are in charge of the Government there. We have often discussed these things and it has been very clearly agreed to between us and only the other day—about less than a few weeks ago when His Majesty the King of Nepal and some Ministers of the Nepal Government were here—it was again reiterated

that the foreign policy of the Nepa-lese Government should be co-ordinated with the foreign policy of India. That is so: there is a general agreement and there is even consultation with each other. But conditions in Nepal in the past, as the House probably knows, have been rather fluid, changing Governments, but recently there has entered an element of stability in the present Government. I am glad to say; but because of these changing Governments opportunities came to people, whether living within Nepal or coming from outside, to create some mischief. All I can say is that we have very little to do with this. Nepal is an independent country and we have no desire to interfere but Nepal's future is of great interest to us not only because we want Nepal to progress as an independent country but also because what happens in Nepal directly affects us.

Dr. Kunzru, I believe, suggested that we should give adequate aid to Nepal, financial and economic. We are giving quite substantially to Nepal and I have no doubt that we shall continue to do so to the best of our ability.

Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar, I am told, said that he would have liked the Colombo Conference to have included other countries like Japan, the Philippines and others. Now, we must remember that the idea of having such a Conference was started by the Prime Minister of Ceylon. It was he who started it by inviting some countries. I am not quite sure at the moment but I think that at first he invited India, Pakistan and Burma and then, a little later, Indonesia. As soon as this idea of these five Prime Ministers meeting in Colombo was mooted, it received instant attention all over the world. The very idea was a unique idea and quite apart from what we did achieve there or not, the fact that we were meeting itself struck the imagination of the world, perhaps especially of the Western World more than that of the Eastern World. The Eastern

countries tried to come together, some people might have thought—or may not have liked it—to form some kind of ganging up, if I may use that term, against the West. Of course, it was not so but the mere fact of our coming together was a notable event of I history. So some Eastern countries, I those that had not been invited were I also naturally interested and they i suggested that it would be a good thing to have a larger conference. That was entirely for the Prime Minister of Ceylon to decide. Person ally I think that at that stage it would probably not have been a good thing to have a much larger meeting because the larger the meeting the mere diffused it gets and the common factors become slightly less pronounced and the uncommon factors more. *It* was as well that we met as we did. but as the House must know at the instance of the Prime Minister of Indonesia we decided—or, rather we accepted his suggestion—that some kind of a larger gathering including not only people from Asia but from Africa too should be thought of and organised. In fact, the Prime Minister of Indonesia himself was put in charge of this. There are obvious difficulties in this way of that larger gathering, but I hope such difficulties will be surmounted.

Then some hon. Member made reference to the canal water issue between India and Pakistan and asked why this should have been sent to the World Bank. Now the answer is *not* difficult. In this issue we had—and I am not going into the question as to whose fault it was—reached a dead-lock. We got bogged up. For both parties, that is, India and Pakistan it was important to get going. It was a vital matter. Long ago, I think in May 1948, a meeting was held between the representatives of Pakistan and India—those representatives being both of the Central Governments—and of the two Punjabs, and at that time an agreement was arrived at between the two, which we signed, and it so happened that I was one of the signatories

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] to that, at any rate who initialled it at that time. Now, unfortunately, that agreement which was arrived at in a very good spirit by those parties was not subsequently acted upon fully. Otherwise all these difficulties would not have arisen. After two or three years of that agreement, although it was not fully acted upon, still it was there and it laid down certain principles. After two or three years, suddenly we were informed by Pakistan that they repudiated that agreement unilaterally. And, what is more, they suggested that it had been made under some kind of pressure or coercion, which was a very astonishing remark to make because, as I just mentioned, I happened to be a party to that and, therefore, I could bear personal witness as to what happened. Not only I but, if I remember rightly, the present Governor-General of Pakistan, was also a signatory, and there were a number of others, Ministers of our Government, Ministers of the Pakistan Government, of West Punjab and East Punjab. However, it is a bit past history. So we got bogged up in this matter. Meanwhile, the time is coming, has come almost when the final decision has got to be made—anyhow it has to be made—partly because of the gradual completion of the Bhakra Nangal scheme which requires certain waters for the vast construction of canals, etc., that had to be made. Now, as to when the proposal was made, the story, I think, is this. An eminent American, Mr. Lilienthal, who was intimately connected with the Tennessee Valley Authority—Chairman, I think—came to India three years ago, and he visited India and he visited Pakistan, and he visited some of our great river valley schemes also, and he naturally discussed with us— with Pakistan probably—what this canal water dispute was. We explained to him. He went back. Then he wrote an article in an American periodical about his visit to India and Pakistan, and especially about this canal water dispute. Well, his facts in that article were

not wholly correct, but that was a minor matter; perhaps he had forgotten them, got them the wrong way, and in his own way he represented what either country thought and he made, I believe, some rather vague suggestions. Anyhow that article was read by his friend—or his attention might have been drawn to it—and the President of the World Bank, Mr. Black, came to India. He discussed the matter with us and when he went back he wrote to me and he wrote to the then Prime Minister of Pakistan suggesting that they were prepared to help, that is, if it was a technical matter chiefly apart from the political side, and we wanted to be dealt with on the technical level, if our engineers met the Pakistan engineers and if the engineers of the World Bank could also be there, it might be helpful because otherwise we simply talk to each other and do not get down to things. He said he would be glad to give whatever help he could and I welcomed it. I said we would be glad and we would want to meet Pakistan engineers, but they did not come forward. Then the Pakistan Government also agreed and so these talks began with the World Bank. There was no commitment about it, of any kind, but it was only they who liked to play their part and help with their own engineers, etc. At the back was also, I suppose, this idea that if any decision was arrived at, that would require some construction of canals and dams, which means some considerable sums of money, and that probably the World Bank would lend it, because the whole point was how best to use these waters. Our case has been that there is enough water in the Indus valley basin to satisfy all the needs of Pakistan and all the needs of India provided we use all the water. At the present moment I should imagine that about 80 to 85 per cent, of that water runs into the sea; it is wasted. But in order to use all that water, it may be necessary to have some canals, connecting links, etc., and that is where the money part comes in. Now, we wanted to put this whole question

on "a wider basis of all the water supply in that area. Pakistan wanted to deal with a particular basis of the Sutlej river or one other river right here, and anyhow we agreed to the International Bank. The only condition that we made was that while we were talking to them we would not make any unilateral change without reference to them about the use of water. Well, this thing, we thought when we met the World Bank, would probably take six months. But everything takes years. It is only some months back, three months back, that the World Bank made certain proposals to each party. They could not act as arbitrators, they could not lay down anything, they can only make suggestions and they made certain suggestions after long discussion with the parties. Those suggestions came to us. We considered them and, broadly speaking, we accepted that approach, apart from minor things, something we did not like, etc. Anyhow, I may say this because although I believe it is publicized, we have not notified this publicly, it is known that broadly speaking, in order to settle this problem once and for all we accepted the good in it and the bad in it. But the answer from Pakistan did not come at all, was not coming, and I am not yet sure whether it has come. Vaguely the newspapers say that the Pakistan Government has not accepted or agreed to these proposals but, as I said, these are suggestions made by the World Bank for anyone to accept or not to accept or to do what it likes. They are not binding in any way unless we accept them. That is the present position. Meanwhile I might add here that the Bhakra Nangal scheme of canals is nearing completion and although we are not going to use a large quantity of water soon, yet we want to use some water more for trial than for other purposes next month, in June. So the amount of water that we are going to use in fact does not make much difference to Pakistan. Meanwhile it is our information that Pakistan has built certain canals, certain 34 C.S.D.

connecting links, intermediaries, etc., so that they can get more water from other sources, from some of the other Punjab rivers and we have sent intimation of this to the parties concerned.

I have gone perhaps more deeply into it because I think the House would be interested in this matter.

I am not quite clear—I think Mr. Ghose referred to our diplomatic personnel and to certain dissatisfaction in the Press. Well, I do not know; if he wants me to please all the members of the Press always in regard to our appointments, it is a little difficult matter. He especially referred to what he called political appointments and said that they should not be made at lower levels. I do not know quite what he means by political appointments unless he means non-service appointments.

SHRI B. C. GHOSE: Yes.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, non-service appointment is not a political appointment. It may or it may not be, but very few appointments are made, and when they are made, they are made for very special reasons because a person is supposed to be particularly fit. The whole Foreign Service began from scratch six years ago. There was nobody in the Foreign Service as such. There were a few persons in the old Political Service. The old Political Service had a number of Englishmen and they left and a few Indians were transferred—three or four. Some went to the other Administrative Services. We then built up our Foreign Service from three sources. Firstly, there were those who were in the old Political Service—just a few; then there was the normal Administrative Service, that is, the Civil Service and then, thirdly, some were taken from other Services, like the Army, the Police Service, etc. We examined a large number of retired officers from the Army—hundreds of them—and we took some of them.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] And then some were directly recruited,—not politically, but directly recruited in the normal way from non-Service men. They were invited usually from universities: some were professors and a few of them were lawyers and the like. They applied ! and they went through the normal course—Boards, etc.—and they were recruited in that way. Then, gradually, all outside recruitment stopped and recruitment was done only in the normal way through annual examinations, Public Service Commission, etc. Very rarely somebody is taken directly. What happens sometimes is this. A person who has been serving actually is there. We find him very good. He has not been serving as a regular member of the Foreign Service but in some other capacity. But when we have found him good, we have taken him later into the Foreign Service. I cannot for the moment think of a single case which might be called a political appointment as such.

I do not wish to say much. But criticism has been made that we are not strong, not loud enough and not aggressive enough in regard to these foreign pockets—French and Portuguese possessions in India. It is rather difficult to say what degree of pressure one should exercise and how loud one's voice should be on a particular occasion, but it must be remembered—let us consider the question of the French possessions here—that it is not a question of our taking possession of them by force. It is easy enough; nobody can stop us for long, but it is a matter involving a large number of problems of international relations and at the moment when in the world there are so many conflicts, to add to them has not appeared to us to be a wise thing to do. Now, I hope so far as the French possessions are concerned,— talks are taking place—I hope they will end in a satisfactory way and I think our patience has been rewarded. If we had jumped in and done something unilaterally, this would

have led to ill-will which would have pursued—we might have solved that problem—but that would have meant ill-will with a great country like France. We do not want to add to ill-will. We were quite convinced and quite certain that these foreign possessions cannot go anywhere. They have to come into the Union of India. We have made that perfectly clear and having done that, well, we were waiting for a suitable opportunity.

I must say, as I said in the other House, that the question of Goa in some ways is more difficult. It is more difficult because Goa is an example of a head-on collision between the 16th century and the 20th century. And I can say with some confidence that in such a collision, 20th century will win apart from anything else, but the fact remains that it is difficult even to talk to the 16th century. Well, there are other factors but I have no doubt that those questions will be solved.

Reference was made to Ceylon. Again, we are very anxious for a variety of reasons to deal with any problem relating to Ceylon in as friendly a way as possible. The House must remember that the main problem with Ceylon, so far as we are concerned, relates to the population, to the large labour force. They are the descendants of Indians who have gone there. You must remember that they are not Indian nationals. We mix up the word 'Indian'. It is confusing. A person of Indian descent need not be an Indian national. A person of European descent may be an Indian national. So they are not Indian nationals. We are interested in them for a number of historical and other reasons, because of a number of agreements with Ceylon, etc., and because of human interest. But they are not our nationals and we cannot claim the right for them which we would claim for our nationals. On the other hand, the Ceylon Government does not choose to consider them its nationals except those which it selects after some type of an enquiry. That is the problem in

the main. In the main it is a labour problem, with certain political aspects. We hoped that this agreement would, if it did not solve the problem, ease the situation and lead to a solution. I must confess with some regret that the situation is not ~ easier and that the agreement has not r led to that happy result which I had hoped for. Apparently, conditions there are not improving.

I have not said anything about a [group of countries with which we are intimately concerned, that is, the Middle Eastern group from Egypt right up to the other countries in Western Asia. It has always been our endeavour to be friendly with them, even though many of them because of pressure and other reasons have sometimes adopted policies with which we do not wholly agree; even though one or two of them, under some pressure or other, are to join one of these blocs and others, nevertheless we continue with our friendly approach and we get a friendly response from them all the time.

Finally, I would just say one or two words, although this subject has been dealt with by Mr. Krishna Menon who spoke just before me. We are accused of taking up a soft line in regard to British colonies, Malaya and the rest, because I do not condemn them all the time. Now, I want to make it quite clear what our approach to this question is. So far as the whole colonial question is concerned, our viewpoint is clear; we go on repeating it. Deliberately, I say, we do not specify them all the time. We do not enumerate them or list them because that merely adds to the bitterness at the present moment. In private we deal with them specifically if necessary but this public condemnation of each country with which we are dealing, with which we are going to deal, does not help. Many things are happening in the world, many things have happened in Africa today which I think are horrible and we have been deeply concerned and pained. Naturally we have

naa our say aabout them too but nevertheless we do not go about shouting about them. Many things are happening in the world today apart from colonies with which we do not agree. Many things are said, let us say, by members of the group of nations attached to the Soviet Union. We do not agree with many of their policies. We do not agree with many policies of the United States of America. But we do not go out of our way to condemn those policies. When the matter comes up before us, we deal with it, we express our opinion. We say that we do not agree with that policy, but we do not condemn any country. Not that we are more virtuous than others. And I entirely agree with what Mr. Krishna Menon said, that this attitude of superior virtue is exceedingly irritating. We are not more virtuous than others. But after a good deal of calm and cool thinking we have seen that from any point of view, and even from the narrowest opportunist point of view in r&. gard to our country, it is better for us to be detached from these quarrels. It is better for us not to take sides, not to be allied. It is better, not only politically but even in our mental approaches, to cultivate a little detachment. That does not mean having strong opinions. We should above all avoid using strong language against this country or that. There is far too much of the strong language we use which confuses and covers up the issues. Whether it is the colonial question or other questions, we should deal with broad principles and should try to avoid running down countries.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, the Council regrets that no effective steps have so far been taken to form and enlarge an area of peace and pursue a policy of strict non-alignment.' "

The motion was negatived.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, the Council is of the opinion that more effective steps should be taken—

(a) to eliminate foreign pockets from India;

(b) for a speedy solution of the Kashmir dispute; and

(c) for settlement of the outstanding items of Indo-Pakistan dispute.' "

The motion was negatived.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, the Council is of the opinion that Government should give more active support to the freedom struggle of the peoples of Malaya, Kenya and British Guiana.' "

The motion was negatived.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Then, Diwan Chaman Lal's amendment and Shri Malkani's amendment are more or less the same. The question is:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely: —

'and having considered the same, the Council approves of the policy.' "

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now I will pul the motion as amended. The question is:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto

be taken into consideration ana na«B ing considered the same, the Council approves of the policy."

The motion was adopted.

MESSAGE FROM THE LOK SABH^P

THE DISPLACED PERSONS (COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION) BILL, 1954

SECRETARY: Sir, I have to repof to the Council the following message received from the Lok Sabha, signed by the Secretary of the Lok Sabha:

"I am directed to inform the Council of States that the annexed motion in regard to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Bill, 1954, has been passed in the Lok Sabha, at its sitting held on Tuesday, the 18th May, 1954 and to request that the concurrence of the Council of States in the said motion and further that the names of the members of the Council of States to be appointed to the Joint Committee be communicated to this House.

Motion

That the Bill to provide for the payment of compensation and rehabilitation grants to displaced persons and for matters connected therewith, be referred to a Joint Committee of the Houses consisting of 51 members, 34 members from this House, namely: —

1. Shrimati Subhadra Joshi
2. Shri Gurmukh Singh Musafir
3. Lala Achint Ram
4. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava
5. Shri Hira Singh Chinaria
6. Shri Naval Prabhakar
7. Shri Bibhuti Mishra
8. Shri Ramchandra Majhi
9. Dr. Pashupati Mandal
10. Shri Daulat Mai Bhandari