

COUNCIL OF STATES

Friday, 19th February 1954

The Council met at two of the clock MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair.

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

STATEMENTS SHOWING STATE-WISE POSITION OF ELECTION PETITIONS

THE MINISTER FOR LAW AND MINORITY AFFAIRS (SHRI C. C. BISWAS): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table seven statements showing the State-wise position, as on 1st February 1954, in respect of the number of election petitions filed before the Election Commission, the number of petitions disposed of, the number of petitions withdrawn and the number of petitions pending before election tribunals or the Election Commission. [Placed in Library, *see* No. S-27/54.]

MOTION OF THANKS ON PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS—*continued.*

DR. RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI (Nominated): Sir, I wish to offer only a few observations on some of the points that arise out of the President's Address. The first point that I wish to bring to the notice of the 'House is with reference to the passage in the President's Address which reads:

"My Government's representatives are at present discussing with the I Government of the People's Republic of China various issues of common [concern in regard to Tibet."

What I wish to suggest is that we do not yet know the full terms of reference given to the representatives of the two Governments. I also hope that perhaps the attitude of China towards Tibet will not involve India in additional expenditure in order to maintain the security of our Himalayan frontiers. That is the only point on which I wish to have some details.

My second point arises out of the reference in the President's Address about Kashmir. The Address contains the following sentence:

"While some progress was made in this respect, unfortunately some other developments have at present come in the way of further progress."

Now, on this subject these new developments certainly refer to the proposed military alliance between Pakistan and the United States of America. In this connection, I think that we should be fully acquainted with the new developments and their effect on the Kashmir issue and we should have a clear and concrete idea of the real objective of this military alliance between Pakistan and America. I take my stand upon the actual words used by some of the highest authorities in the State of Pakistan, especially the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He has frankly stated:

"A military aid agreement with the U.S.A. would make a settlement with Kashmir easier."

Again, he says:

"When there is equal military strength, then I am sure there will be a better chance of a settlement of the Kashmir problem."

Now, on the top of this, the chief of the so-called Azad Kashmir territory, who had been to Dacca recently, has made a more emphatic and concrete statement to the effect that the real objective of this Pakistan-U. S. military alliance is directed towards Kashmir. This really raises some very grave questions affecting the attitude, that India should have, towards the Kashmir issue. In fact, as was stated by the Prime Minister the other day:

"the acceptance by Pakistan of American military assistance has changed the whole complexion of Indo-Pakistan relations."

Again he has repeated the same declaration by saying:

[Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji.]

"If military aid comes to Pakistan from the U.S.A., it upsets all kinds of balances, the present equilibrium..... All that context changes when one of the greatest powers of the world sponsors military aid to Pakistan."

On the top of this, Pakistan has always been maintaining the attitude that she is unwilling to sign a no-war declaration with India. In the face of these emphatic declarations of the objectives that underlie the Pakistan-US. military pact, I should think that we are really placed in a position of very great difficulty and trouble with reference to Kashmir. In this connection, we should not forget the historical background of the entire problem of Kashmir. In October, 1947, Pakistan had been for several months silently and secretly planning and financing a full-scale attack upon Kashmir, and the Indian Government was hardly aware of the real situation, that was then prevailing. It was only towards the last week of October 1947, that the Prime Minister of India first reported to the then Executive Council of the Government of India that more than 5,000 tribal troops had already advanced in military transport along the road from Rawalpindi to Srinagar taking Muzaffarabad and Domel on the way and were within a few miles of Srinagar. This was an invasion which was carried on across about 200 miles of Pakistan territory, an invasion of which the Pakistan Government at that time said it was completely innocent, an invasion by people over whom the Pakistan Government said it had no control. But later on the Pakistan Government, officially, took up the position that they were also involved in that invasion. My point is this: When this invasion took place in the year 1947, the Indian Government had hardly any information of it. On that very serious occasion when the invaders were within a few miles of Srinagar, the Kashmir Government and the Kashmiris, as a people, who

were fighting the invaders as best as they could, thought that without military aid from India, the situation could not be saved. When they, therefore, approached the Indian Government for military aid, naturally the reply of the Indian Government was that that aid could not be given unless Kashmir was prepared to accede to India and become an integral part of the Indian Union. So, the Kashmiris who carried on conversations with the Indian Government went back, but soon returned with a regular official offer that Kashmir was acceding to India in that emergency, and it was then only that the Indian Government treated Kashmir as part of Indian territory and sent all possible aid in the shortest possible time and we know the result of that aid. Now, my point is this. On that occasion in 1947 when Pakistan was indulging in a serious act of aggression against India, we should also note the kind of behaviour the Kashmiris showed. The Kashmiris fought as one man in defence of their hearths and homes against the foreign invaders who, indeed, posed as an army of liberation for Kashmir. The Kashmiris, instead of welcoming those invaders as their liberators, instead of fraternising with them, fought them tooth and nail, and, therefore, I say that, if a plebiscite were at all necessary, that plebiscite was expressed in blood and tears on that occasion, because the entire Kashmiri people were united in defence of their national independence. Therefore, I say that this question of plebiscite, which has been creating trouble for all these years, should have been disposed of by a reference to this proof and demonstration of what is meant by a plebiscite, *viz.*, the will of the Kashmiris to treat the invaders not as an army of liberators but as an army of invaders. On that occasion, we also know how Mahatmaji sent a message admiring the unity that the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were showing in their common fight against a foreign foe in the defence of their hearths and homes like the Spartans dying in the

pass of Thermopylae, as an example of their living national unity. So I think that no better plebiscite could be imagined.

Now, the situation has been completely changed. The complexion of events has undergone a radical change. The conditions under which India had agreed to a plebiscite no longer exist. They have been radically changed. In the meanwhile there are certain other facts which have happened and which must influence the policy. There is the Kashmir Constituent Assembly—the Constituent Assembly made up of elected representatives of the people and the representatives are elected on a definite issue, the issue of accession to India—and quite recently the Kashmir Constituent Assembly has passed a Resolution, solemnly affirming the accession of Kashmir to India. Now, this really also alters the situation. On this occasion, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has been pleased to say that he expects the Prime Minister of India to repudiate that Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir as regards accession to India and this request has been repeated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan also. They expect that India should repudiate the Kashmir Constituent Assembly's Resolution on this subject. Now I should only try to talk in terms of facts and figures and not in terms of speculation or theory. I should say that when a State accedes to a Federation, the accession is pure and simple, unreserved and unconditional and it cannot be subject to any kind of reservation. That is the international law on this subject. Accession can never be allowed to be succeeded by secession. In the present case, when Lord Mountbatten and his

executive Council were pleased to accept the offer of Kashmir for accession to India, that accession was accepted as complete in law and in fact. Probably in the excitement of the moment in view of an invasion pending, Lord Mountbatten was pleased to say that later on the accession would be ratified by the will of

the Kashmiri people, but eventually afterwards, probably he thought that the position that was taken up was not legally sound. There was a weak point in that position. Therefore, he thought that the will of the people of Kashmir could be ascertained in four ways, *viz.*, firstly, by referendum; secondly, by election; thirdly, by plebiscite; and fourthly, by any kind of representative public meeting. One of these four suggestions should do for the purpose and what I mean to say is that I take my stand upon one of these alternatives—the plebiscite—and, therefore, I say in that connection the Kashmir Constituent Assembly corresponds to what has been implied by Lord Mountbatten in those three alternatives, *viz.*, election or referendum or any representative public meeting.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is time for you to close, Dr. Mookerjee. The Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU) : Mr. Chairman, I must apologize to you and to the House for not having been present here in the course of the debate for the last two days. It is rather difficult to be present, simultaneously, in two Houses when a similar debate is taking place, and also there were other grounds which made me attend the other House. I have, however, tried to acquaint myself by reading reports as to what has been said in this House.

Well, many things have been said and many subjects have been touched upon. To some extent, during these debates, if I may say so with all respect, certain set speeches are delivered and set opinions are expressed and set answers are given to the questions put and it becomes a little wearisome to listen and to say the same things again and again. The House knows that we have to face, whether externally in the world or internally in the country, vast problems and however small we may

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] be—and we are small, of course, if I may say so with all respect—Members on both sides of the House—we are small when compared to the vastness of the problem and the responsibilities that we shoulder—however small we might be, I say that we have to face these problems and try to understand them and try to the best of our ability to raise ourselves to the level of understanding and action. Although individually we might not be big, we are citizens of no mean country and in our corporate capacity we are not small, and, therefore, in a way, we proceed to the extent that that corporate capacity can function as such. Where, however, we forget that and function separately, individually, forgetting the larger whole and the larger question, then we revert to our small stature. So I do not quite know if it would be worth while for me to answer some of the queries that have been put or points that have been raised not only on this occasion but on many previous occasions and which were answered by me or by my colleagues then. The questions before us and the world are much bigger than the question of say, foreign pockets in India, than the question of, let us say, India and the Commonwealth. The same questions are repeated again and again and answered. So far as I am concerned, I have stated previously that this question, let us say, of the Commonwealth and India, can only be considered from the point of view of what is right and of advantage to India. There is no other point of view and I have been convinced that it has been of advantage and is of advantage to India's interests and the interests of world peace—the larger cause of peace—for us to be associated in that vague and general way in which we are associated with the Commonwealth.

The question of foreign pockets in India and the rest are troublesome and irritating questions, and we are irritated from day to day by some developments. Yet I do not understand

what some hon. Members mean by asking us to take vigorous action. Perhaps they think that the problems of this world can be solved by armies marching and solving them. But it is my firm conviction that that is not the way to solve problems. We keep armies—the Army, Navy and the Air Force—and keeping them we indicate that we cannot do without them for the defence of our country and like purposes. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we attempt to solve every question by armed might. We have to pursue other ways even though they appear to be long, because the way of violence is ultimately the longest of all, and perhaps it does not solve the problems that we are facing.

Now, this debate has been largely concerned with a tragedy that occurred at the Kumbh Mela on the *Amavasya* day. Naturally that tragedy affected all of us, and I will not complain that hon. Members opposite made much of it here. Nevertheless, it has very little to do with the larger questions that we have to deal with. We have to see things in some perspective, and in looking at this Kumbh Mela tragedy in perspective, let us remember the extent of this Mela and what happened. It is estimated that on the *Amavasya* day, during the course of the day, about five million people went there.

N. KUNZRU (Uttar
Atrocious exaggeration.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The figure may be wrong. They did not go at one moment. I do not say they went there at one moment; but I say in the course of the day

SHRI H. about five million people
Pradesh): went there, and in the
morning specially, there was
anything approaching four
millions there. It so happened that I had a
good view of this assemblage from a high
vantage point, from a balcony. I have some
idea of crowds and I estimate this, all over the
place and round about, at nearly 4 millions. I
may be wrong by a quarter of a million, of
course, you may say. But it was

die biggest, most amazing and overpowering assemblage of human beings that I have seen.

Now, why was this matter brought up here in connection with this debate? Presumably to show that Government, whether it is the Central Government or the Uttar Pradesh Government, were guilty of unpreparedness, incompetence and—I believe the word was used—of callousness. I do not wish to take shelter under any plea that this is a State subject—which it is, of course, because the Government of India had little to do with this matter, except to render help to level the ground, prepare it, build bridges and the like through our military machine. And our army did very good work indeed—and I believe it is admitted all round. But I am not for the moment taking shelter under that plea. However, there is a difficulty that here is a matter occurring in very peculiar circumstances about which, probably, if you examine half a dozen eye witnesses, they will give half a dozen different accounts. It always happens in moments of excitement. But here is a matter which is being enquired into and presumably some kind of facts will emerge from that enquiry. Now it is difficult for me to deal with it. But I should like to place before the House certain aspects of it. and the very first is to think of this tragedy in relation to the whole thing. I want to be quite frank about it. I am very sorry for what has happened; but if 10,000 people had perished there I would not have been surprised—by some accident, I mean—because in any such crowd, when something upsets the normal movement of the crowd and people go under, then it is frightfully difficult to control that situation and when three or four million people are on the move, it is almost an impossible thing to deal with the situation without a major tragedy, and I was surprised to learn that the death roll was as limited as it was, considering the enormousness of the crowd, for the crowd became

excited or frightened, and it was a question of dealing with millions of people, frightened people, moving about,

I purposely went round about there on that day and the previous day; but I did not enter the regular *mela* section. I went round, went to the river, went to the bank on the one side, I went to the bank on the Jhusi side, but not to the *mela* section, because I did not wish to create any kind of an upset in the crowd. Fortunately or unfortunately, I attract people and I do not wish to create any kind of an upset by people crowding round me and upsetting the arrangements. I avoid it. I went to a vantage point and round about to see. This was such a matter of touch and go. When you are dealing with such crowds—I am not talking of hostile crowds, but just ordinary friendly crowds—even a little incident might upset the balance and create some difficulty.

Now, as I said, it is for the Enquiry Committee to find out who was in error, if anybody was in error. But I think you may divide the period into three. The first is the period of preparations for the *mela* for which the State Government is responsible. Secondly, there is the actual incident and what happened there and who was responsible or not responsible for it. And thirdly, after the incident, what was done. Naturally I cannot speak with any authority about the actual incident, although I have heard many, many reports, and I went there myself—not on the spot, but two hundred yards away. I did not again dare to go to the spot because I felt that my going there might upset the huge crowd moving this way or that way. It was not static. It was a dynamic position all the time, with people going and coming. I stood at a spot some two hundred yards on this side and enquired from a number of officers and a number of Pressmen and others, some eye witnesses and others. But then a proper report has to be made. I have some views of my own.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

I can speak with some knowledge of the previous part, that is to say, the preparations for the *mela*, because it was known that normally this Kumbh Mela was a big show. A very peculiar difficulty had arisen because the river Ganga had changed its course and reduced the area of the *mela* to about a third of the normal area.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: About one-seventh.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I thank my hon. friend for the correction. It was a terrific problem as to what to do. Well, the *mela* was extended to Jhusi, the other side of the river, and on this side above the Fort and above the embankment. No doubt, it was a very difficult problem and, no doubt, the work which our military did there was of great importance, of great help, and I have no doubt in my mind—and the House can take my opinion for what it is worth—that the arrangements made for this *mela* were good, they were exceedingly good, and that officers and all concerned worked terribly hard.

In making these arrangements, probably one of the most vital things, where such vast numbers of people gather together, is the question of disease, infection, etc. If an infectious disease spreads, then it is not a question of a few hundreds; it is a question of vast numbers being affected not only there but carrying the infection to their hundreds of thousands of villages all over India. It was a terrific thing. That was a major issue before us all, and I would like the House to consider that in spite of this colossal and unprecedented crowd, the sanitary arrangements were perfect. Nothing happened. It is an amazing achievement for any Government. It is a big thing. As I said, officers and others may have been erring—I cannot say—but I hardly imagine any hon. Member saying that any officer deliberately committed

an error. The most that can be said is that he lost his nerve or that he was not competent enough for the job—may be so or may not be so. Let that be enquired into.

Now, one fact which struck me and the House greatly is the fact that the news of this, although in some form it reached other people, did not actually reach people in Allahabad. Now, I should like the House to consider this carefully because it is important that in a place like the *mela* area it is difficult to know what is happening at some distance away. We do not get any telegrams there. Take the case of the Chief Minister, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant; he spent the whole of the forenoon and the afternoon in Jhusi, across the river. He was there all the time and he did not know till he reached Government House at 4 o'clock about this incident. Of course, incidents were happening all the time—petty incidents. The day before I heard of petty incidents, two or three persons falling off a sinking boat or from off a bridge that was built. Some were fished out and some were not. These incidents were being reported. The Chief Minister was on the other side of the river and it was only on his return from Jhusi at 4 o'clock that he knew that something had happened. What, he did not know. He heard that something big had happened but not quite in detail as to what happened. Within half an hour we went, he and I. I heard about it the same time. Now, it may be that somebody is at fault not to have taken the trouble to inform us; whatever the reason may be, I cannot go into it because I have not got the facts. It may be that the people who were dealing with the situation were rather overwhelmed and rather unnerved; that is quite possible—either the police or the civil authorities at that particular spot. The whole thing happened probably in ten or fifteen minutes. I was, as it happened, not in that particular spot but some distance away. In fact, when I was trying to go to the Fort, I was

stopped and I subsequently discovered that they were stopping people because that incident had occurred, and quite rightly too. Because they were stopping people, again a new situation arose. The people, who were coming there, were getting angry, "Why are we being stopped?" They had to be stopped because this happened and if they were allowed to go, there would be still more trouble. Angry people were demanding access saying that they had come all the way and that they must go forward. It was frightfully difficult and confusing to go that way.

As to the facts of what happened afterwards in that area, let the Committee decide, find out the facts and then report and then this House, if it so chooses, or any other place, may consider that matter and express its opinion. I must say that I experienced a feeling of distress at the manner in which this subject has been approached, as if the Government of Uttar Pradesh or any other person did not think this important enough or was callous enough to ignore it. I do submit, Sir, that this is a very unfair approach to this question. That Government or any government or our Government may have made inadequate arrangements, if you like. We are not wise enough, as we are all wise after the event to do something. As a matter of fact, that morning—this incident occurred that morning and I did not know about this—a large number of people who went there saw me—I am not talking about this particular incident—and praised the amazingly good management and arrangements made for the *mela*.

Now, the person, if I may say so, who deserves our greatest sympathy in this matter and probably one who has felt far more this tragedy than any of us or anybody outside, is the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant. It was, in the most personal sense, an intense personal tragedy for him. He had worked his hardest; his officers had

worked their hardest and he was happy that everything had passed off successfully, that the arrangements had withstood the tremendous trial. And just to be told that this had happened, it almost broke him. And we heard hon. Members say that he was callous or that others were callous. This, I do submit, Sir, is gffftssly unfair

Now, much is made of the fact that a party was held in Government House in Allahabad and that the President, the Prime Minister, the Governor and others were present at that party. As a matter of fact, as I said, I was going to the party and within ten minutes of reaching there I heard of this tragedy. It was after we arrived at the party that Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant and I heard of it. It may be the fault of somebody not to have informed us. I am not going into that. I am only stating facts. People were already gathering there, three hundred or four hundred people. Apart from that, I do not quite know what hon. Members think of these parties. Are these parties places of revelry? What are they? They are very formal, very troublesome and, if I may use the term, very boring. One does not go there to be amused; there is nothing amusing there. It was a crowd of people paying their respects to the President, who had gone there after a year or more; just an opportunity for the President to see their faces and shake them by the hand. There is no feasting there; they may get a cup of tea or something. They sit for half an hour or whatever it is and then go away.

SHRI H. D. RAJAH (Madras): But there was music there.

PROF. G. RANGA (Andhra): It is just these formal occasions which are stopped. If it had been informal, nobody would have raised any objection.

SHRI H. D. RAJAH: If it had been an informal thing nobody would have¹ raised objection. There was feasting

[Shri H. D. Kajah.] and music. That is the charge of the Opposition.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What does he mean? Does he refer to the regimental band as music? Of course, the band was there. The local regiment or the police force had sent a band.

I do not know how the hon. Member talks about the formal thing. It was a formal thing so far as I am concerned. I want to put forward this to the House, that whenever a tragedy occurs we must not, naturally, have anything in the nature of feasting and revelry, but all formal activity should continue exactly as it is, to show that we are not overwhelmed by the tragedy.

PROF. G. RANGA: We are not able to agree with it. It is a matter of fundamental difference.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member may be right not to agree with me, but again the question does not arise in this matter because this matter was not even known and one could not stop people from coming.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA (Andhra): One question, Sir. Is it not a fact that at 4-10 P.M. on that day, immediately after the Prime Minister heard of this, he went to the Control Room of the Press and, in the midst of the Pressmen and other officers came to know the full details of the tragedy?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I?

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Yes, at 4-10 P.M. and then a resolution was passed condoling the death.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: By whom?

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: By the Pressmen among whom the Prime Minister was also present.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member's facts are so incorrect.

SHRI GOVIND A REDDY (Mysore): Always.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I went to Government House at 4-30 P.M. and I left Government House at about 5 for the Control Room, and I was there till near about 7 P.M. For about two hours. I was in the Control Room as well as round about. It was then—I think it was round about 6 o'clock—that I met the Pressmen, the Magistrates and others, and talked with them to find out what they had to say, all the time learning from them and not saying much myself. I do not know what resolution he refers to, but I am not aware of any resolution. I was enquiring from them and then I came away at about half past seven or so from there. So I submit, Sir, that, however great this tragedy—and it was great and naturally it has distressed us all very much—we must not lose ourselves in it and we must not say things without any perspective, and I think that for them to criticise the President or myself or others for this matter is, with all respect, not fair, as if they feel for the lives of human beings there more than what others, who were there felt, who had some sense of personal tragedy, because they saw things for themselves, which makes a great difference. You and I may read about, let us say, some grievous earthquake which happens somewhere in South America taking a heavy toll of human lives or, say, ten thousand or a hundred thousand people die in Japan. We read about them and we say: 'We are sorry', but we face it. But if we see a tragedy, even if one man dies before us, we feel it; it is a personal thing. Now this Kumbh Mela tragedy came as a personal shock to us because we were there and when people hear of it differently, remaining at distant places, and accuse us, it is odd.

There is another aspect of it. It has been stated that the Government

exploited the religious sentiments of the people and encouraged them to come, which I really do not understand. How can the Government encourage them to come? We don't encourage. All the encouragement in the world will not make four million people come there. It was, rightly or wrongly," whatever it is, a powerful sentiment that impelled them to come and all the time we were struggling with the fact: 'These people are coming; how to prepare; what to do.' It may be that the Government there or we were guilty, we were not clever enough or intelligent enough to manage it better. Maybe, an abler person would have done it better, but it is the attack on one's *bona fides* that, I think, is rather unfair.

Now I shall just briefly refer to two or three important matters. I think one hon. Member referred to the Ceylon-India Agreement recently arrived at. I have said that that agreement is only a first step and rather a small step. It only recognises things, that had been previously recognised, in a better way, in a more cordial way so that we may proceed with this matter more confidently and take the next step more easily. There is nothing very new about anything that has happened.

An hon. Member—I think it was Dr. Kunzru—asked what has happened to the Stateless persons. My reply is that nothing has happened. They remain exactly where they were, Stateless, except in so far as they will be absorbed there as they were being absorbed. Therefore, this question is not solved. It remains more or less where it was, to be taken up and dealt with at the appropriate moment.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: May I ask the Prime Minister to say something about the reasons for the Government of India agreeing to the separate representation of the Indians who might be placed on the electoral register?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: This question of a separate register was

raised some time back in connection with another approach to this question and in that context it was agreed to by the representatives of the Indian organization there, the Ceylon Indian Congress. We felt also that in the circumstances—much as we disliked it—it would be worth while to leave it at that for the time being. I repeat, we don't like it, as the hon. Member does not like it, but in the circumstances it was so decided. The reasons why this was agreed to are obvious. It has no rational element in it at all. The reasons are that the political fortunes of certain parties were likely to be affected by it—and it is not for us to argue about it—and they laid stress on this and to break on that issue, not to accept that—well, one could have done that, if you like, and left the problem where it was, not merely where it was but in all probability much worse, because certain steps were being intended which would have made the problem much worse. So, as I said, the Ceylon Indian Congress, previously, some three months back in another context, accepted this and we, while not liking this, taking everything into consideration, thought we would accept this for the time being. That was the position and in view of that we felt that we should accept, that also for that period. Even so, the hon. Member might remember that this does not apply to all of them but only to certain constituencies where they were in considerable numbers. Where they were in small numbers they would be on the common roll.

Now, the major question in the world is the one in the Far East and the problems relating to Europe, ; chiefly Germany. So far as Korea is j concerned, I do not wish to say much I as I hope first of all hon. Members J are aware of the latest developments and that our forces are coming back very soon. Some of them are on their way back. I think they have performed their task well although many things had happened there, which were unfortunate, and we have not achieved what we set out to achieve. It is my intention in the

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] course of a few days to place a statement before the House *m* regard to Korea and especially in regard to the work that our forces and our representatives have done thpre.

In this morning's newspapers hon. Members might have observed an agreement arrived at between the Four Great Powers to nave a Con ference on Korea in Geneva some time in the near future, about two months from now or so, in April. Well, I hope that that Conference will yield results and that befo-e that Conference is over nothing worse will happen in the Far East. On-: of our great difficulties in Korea, as no doubt this House knows, has besn the very extraordinary attitude of the South Korean Government and the an azing statements that the South Korean authorities were making from time to time. I do not think we neei attach too much importance to thes-; irres possible statements

As regards the West, we just had this Four Power Conference. Thus far it has not been a marked success although some achievements are there. It is not much good my going into these matters in detail and expressing our viewpoint. Our viewpoint is chiefly governed by the fact of what leads to peace, and for the rest it is not for us to decide what shouM happen in Germany and so on.

Coming nearer home, one fact, which has been of great importance for us and to which reference has been made, is the proposed military assistance which the United States might render to Pakistan. Reference was made to this during the last session also. Since then a great deal has been said about it and the matter is perhaps somewhat clearer, though not wholly so. There is also the talk that there is some possibility of some kind of arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey. I do not propose to go into these matters except to repeat what I have said previously that these matters are of intimate

concern to us, not merely, as Members no doubt feel, because they might mean some danger to India, but in a larger context—quite apart from the danger to India—in the larger context of what is happening in Asia. Hon. Members talked about a Third Force, an area of non-involvement and the like. I must say I admire greatly their optimism and their idealism, but I fail to understand what relation this Third Force idea has to anything in the world today. Who are the countries of the Third Force? What force have they got? How are they going to use it? I have mentioned previously that it is desirable to have as large an area as possible which is not tied up with either of the power blocs, and which in fact stands for peace. We want that to happen. It is not for us to exercise pressure on others but to express our own viewpoint to our friends. There are many friendly countries who are interested in this and who are inclined to agree. That is the most we can do.¹

The other aspect of it, about the possible effect on India, is an important matter. There again some Members seem to think that we must immediately increase our armed forces and generally put India on a war basis. I think that, for a variety of reasons, that would be an exceedingly wrong policy and would lead us nowhere, or perhaps would lead us in the wrong direction. That does not mean that we should not be prepared as efficiently as we can be in the matter. But the way to gather national strength is different. It does not make the slightest difference, from the larger point of view, whether we have a few more regiments or not. It does make a great deal of difference what atmosphere we produce in this country, what our productive capacity is, what our industrial capacity is, and how far we are united in these matters. That does matter and that gives us real strength to face any crisis; otherwise our foundations would not be very strong even though we might create some kind of a superstructure which appears to *b»*

strong. However, these are matters in all their aspects which we should, no doubt, consider; and in this matter the Government does not think that by any means they can function by themselves without the fullest consultation with and confidence of others. This, of course, is a national matter and is not confined to any party, however big that party might be.

Some reference was made to the reactions of this in Kashmir and the recent decision of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Pakistan and others have called upon me to repudiate the decisions of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. There is no question of my repudiating those decisions, and indeed it would be completely wrong for me to repudiate the decisions of the elected Assembly of Kashmir. Right from the beginning, when the Constituent Assembly was being elected, we made our position quite clear—two or two and a half years ago that was—that the Constituent Assembly was perfectly justified to decide, to state, to declare what it chose, what the representatives of the people of Kashmir chose. They were perfectly justified in doing so as, I think, they are perfectly justified in deciding what they have done. That is one thing. But it is a different thing as to what India's commitments are—international or other—by which we have to stand and we intend standing subject to changes that may come about by other events. That is a different matter but we do not propose to renounce or change any assurance or commitments that we have made internationally. We will stand by them as we did. We have to consider them in the new context of events; that is a different matter.

That is all, Sir, that I wish to say and I earnestly hope that in view of this general situation that we have to face, we shall take the larger view. We should try to see things in their proper perspective and not exaggerate

the significance of relatively small matters.

SHRI S. MAHANTY (Orissa): Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult indeed to continue after the Prime Minister. In spite of it, I have ventured to do so and I think, I should rather begin with the Kumbh Mela. I would not have touched that subject, if only the Prime Minister had not provoked me to do so. He asked this House to believe and swallow that the parties are a very boring affair. An At Home party was being held in the Raj Bhavan of Allahabad after this tragic incident, with soft music in the background to condole it. I do not suggest that it is callousness, for callousness has its well-known meaning. I do not impute any motive, but what I intend to suggest and submit is that a comedy was being made of a national tragedy.

SHRI B. B. SHARMA (Uttar Pradesh): What is a tragedy? I am a Hindu. It is not.....

(Interruptions.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: I do not dispute that the U.P. Government did all their best but they were, certainly, doing nothing which was not expected of them. It was their bounden duty and they were discharging that duty. I do not dispute that proposition. I only take exception to the fact that the V.I.P.s of India should be so shameless as to go there and stay in a special camp. This Kumbh Mela is associated with a hallowed name in India's history. Harshavardhan used to go there. He used to go not as a V.I.P., but as an ordinary pilgrim like any other man. There he used to distribute everything away and come back as a beggar. But this secular State would dismiss it as sheer bunkum. But all the same the heads of this secular State would go there, have their dips and stay in a special camp. I only regret that the doors of Heaven, that were opened to

[Shri S. Mahanty.] hundreds of pilgrims under a stampede were closed to them.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I would ask you to stop for the time being. Though it is unusual to interrupt a discussion on the President's Address, the Budget Estimates are to be laid at 3 o'clock in the other House and we may have them here also.

3 P.M.

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

SUPPLEMENTARY DEMANDS FOR GRANTS (GENERAL) FOR 1953-54

THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FINANCE (SHRI M. C. SHAH): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table a statement of the Supplementary Demands for Grants for expenditure of the Central Government (excluding Railways) for the year 1953-54. [Placed in Library, *see* No. S-29/54.].

SUPPLEMENTARY DEMANDS FOR GRANTS (PEPSU) FOR 1953-54

I also beg to lay on the Table a statement showing Supplementary Demands for Grants for expenditure of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union for the year 1953-54. [Placed in Library, *see* No. S-28/54.]

RAILWAY BUDGET, 1954-55

THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR RAILWAYS AND TRANSPORT (SHRI O. V. ALAGESAN): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table a statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India for the year 1954-55 in respect of Railways. [Placed in Library, *see* No. IV-4 (114).]

MOTION OF THANKS ON PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS—*continued*.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mahanty.

SHRI S. MAHANTY: Then, Sir, there is another point. The Prime Minister has said that the Opposition was making capital out of this calamity. But I would like to ask this question. How is the Prime Minister or the Government of Uttar Pradesh or the Government of India going to justify the party that was held, even though the news of this calamity was on the A.I.R. and the whole of the Calcutta Press was full of this story by the evening? If it is argued that there was some lacuna, then who is responsible for it? Is the Opposition responsible for it or the gentleman sitting over there and thumping for every nonsense? Really it is a matter of great tragedy—not the incident that occurred, but the manner in which the Government have behaved. Viceroy Willingdon cancelled a tea party at the news of Quetta earthquake. Now it is being suggested that since the Congress was fighting against all those Willingdons, the symbols of British Imperialism, they should also discard that human gesture of cancelling a merry-making programme in the face of such a calamitous incident.

Having said that much, I should now come to another subject. It is very well and good that the President, in paragraph 5 of his Address, has invited the attention of this House to the formation of Andhra State. The formation of Andhra State is a matter of major importance and we had all welcomed it. But if this House would remember, in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Andhra Bill, which was presented in this House, the words "linguistic State" were very carefully omitted. At that time it was said that though Andhra State was formed on a linguistic basis, still the Government would not concede it as a linguistic State. As you know, Sir, two plus two never makes four with powers. It is either five with the Food Ministry or three with the Home Ministry. Though it was a linguistic State, the Government of India would not concede it as a linguistic State for