

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Let us take up the clause by clause consideration of the Bill. There are no amendments to clauses 2 and 3.

Clauses 2 and 3 were added to the Bill.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Clause 4. Mr. Gupte.

SHRI B. M. GUPTE: Sir, I do not move my amendment.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: So there is no amendment. I will put clauses 4, 5 and 6 together.

Clauses 4, 5 and 6 were added to the Bill.

Clause 1, the Title and the Enacting Formula were added to the Bill.

SHRI K. C. REDDY: Sir, I beg to move that the Bill be returned.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That the Bill be returned."

The motion was adopted.

[MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair.]

MOTION RE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, I move:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

The House knows that certain developments have taken place recently, in the last few months, which have brought matters to a head in some respects in the international situation. This situation has been always, if I

may say so, on the verge of some kind of a crisis or the other for some considerable time past. I do not mean to say that anything has happened recently which has brought a grave crisis and the possibility of war suddenly nearer. I do not wish to strike an alarmist note, but certain developments have taken place in the ordinary course which have put a great burden upon us and certain other things have happened which are matters of great concern to us.

I should like to refer only to 4 P M two principal matters in the course of my speech this afternoon. One is the Korean situation and the other is the proposed military aid that the United States might give to Pakistan, about which there has been much talk.

Of course, the motion that I have moved is a very wide one and includes every subject that might come under the head 'Foreign Affairs and the International Situation'. But I would respectfully suggest to the House that it would be desirable to limit the discussion to these two principal topics instead of referring to many other matters which have often been discussed in this House before.

Now, in Korea, the House knows the past history and so I need not repeat it—how after very long discussions, arguments and debates, a certain resolution was passed by the United Nations. That resolution was largely based on the resolution put forward by India last year. In that sense, we had a certain responsibility for it. Subsequently the two Commands in Korea came to an agreement; certain terms were agreed to, terms of agreement with regard to cease-fire, etc. Those terms included the various steps to be taken in regard to the prisoners of war. There had actually been more or less agreement in regard to these terms about a year ago. But the one subject on which there had been no agreement was the prisoners of war issue. On the one side, it was said that the prisoners

of war should automatically return to their homeland, and on the other side, it was said one could not compel them, force people, to go against their will. There was this conflict. Ultimately it was resolved, as I said, more or less on the lines of India's resolution, and a way out was found which did not do violence to other contentions. As a result, these terms of armistice were agreed to. Now, apart from these terms we might see easily the position that India occupied. There was to be a Repatriation Commission for these prisoners of war and in that Repatriation Commission, India was to be not only a member but Chairman. Further, India was to supply a Custodian Force for these prisoners of war. I mention this to indicate that we had had a particular responsibility in this matter. We had been interested in the Korean affair right from the beginning because it was a matter on which hung issues of peace and war in the Far East. War there was till three or four months ago, and there was always the danger of that war being extended. So, India came into the picture now in a special way, first of all as Chairman of this Repatriation Commission, and, if I may say so, it is not a question of somebody from India being chosen as Chairman, but in effect India being Chairman and putting some representative there to represent its viewpoint; and, secondly, the Custodian Force to look after the prisoners of war. Now, one very great thing happened, and that was the stoppage of that war—the cease-fire. People are apt to forget these things and they take them for granted. But, having regard to the horrible nature of that war, the terrible destruction that it had caused, that by itself was a great gain. And sometimes when people say that India should not have gone there, should not have undertaken this responsibility, they forget perhaps that if we had not gone there, there would have been a great many difficulties, and very probably the whole scheme of things might have collapsed. In other words, possibly,

this cease-fire might not have taken place; it might have taken place some time later, although one never knows what happens. Therefore, one great gain was obtained right at the beginning. India could not have refused to go there and take this responsibility particularly because, as I said, India had been in the picture right from the beginning, since we put forward that resolutions in the United Nations, and later also when both parties to the dispute asked India to come in and take this responsibility. It would have been not only difficult but wrong for India to have declined that responsibility and to have shown that it was interested more in keeping away from trouble than trying to help solve one of the biggest world problems. So we went there and we have been there now for three and a half months. Now, in the terms of that agreement a procedure was laid down for all those prisoners of war to have explanations given to them, so that they could decide then whether they would go back or not go back. That was the middle way found between the two contentions. Now, unfortunately right from the beginning difficulties arose. First of all, the date fixed for the explanations was not adhered to; the normal preparation had not advanced sufficiently, the huts or the cottages or the houses, whatever they were, where explanations could take place were not ready. And so actually explanations did not start as fixed. They started nearly three weeks later. Now, the period of explanations was a fixed one in the terms of the agreement. It was 90 days. Now, there are two ways of interpreting this. One is that the number of days was categorically put down at 90 days from a certain date; from 24th, I think, of September for explanations, 30 days after that for the Political Conference to consider the matter, 30 days after that also for the Custodian Force to remain there to finish up things more or less. And from one point of view there is no escape from that; there it is. On the other hand, if you look at it in

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another way, it was decided that 90 days should be given for explanations. Now, if you cut off a large number of days from that, what remains? Three weeks were reduced right at the beginning, because they did not start explaining then. When they started subsequently, there was trouble. As a matter of fact, out of these 90 days—I forget now—certainly not more than 11 days; maybe, including yesterday or so, 12 days have been used for explanations. Now, therefore, an essential part of the agreement has not been given effect to i.e., giving a chance of explanations to those prisoners of war. Nor has the full period allotted for it been used. That is one difficulty, and as I said, that gives rise to other difficulties. Now, the 90 days expired yesterday, and we are now in the second period of 30 days when, according to one viewpoint, no further explanations can take place.

According to another, they should continue till all the prisoners of war had exhausted the process of listening to explanations. Now, it is said that the second period ends on the 23rd January, and according to the terms of the agreement, on the 23rd January the custody of these prisoners of war will end. According to the categorical statement, that date is the last limit. Again, the question arises if the procedure laid down previous to this has been gone through. Has the agreement been given effect to? In a sense, 'No' of course. These difficulties have arisen. I do not wish to go into details on this matter, but what I wish to point out is that one can approach this matter from a rather strictly legalistic point of view. Of course, when there are terms of agreements, they have got to be strictly examined, and we just cannot interpret them in any way. At the same time one has to see the spirit of the whole thing. Obviously, the whole object of this agreement was to decide this prisoners of war issue in a particular way, satisfactory to both parties and, above all, satisfactory to the prisoners concerned.

Now, it is clear that what has been done in the last 90 days has not been very satisfactory. Whose fault it was, it is another matter. It may be the fault of either party or of the prisoners themselves. The whole thing is that what was intended has not taken place. A report, I believe, is going to be circulated by the Commission to the two Commands. Please remember that the agreement was between the two Commands. It was by agreement between the two Commands that the Repatriation Commission and the Custodian Force were appointed. So, the matter has to be referred to them. The United Nations come into the picture of course, but not directly in that way. In a sense, the United Nations represent one party. It is the United Nations' Command which functions in Korea. In another sense, the United Nations has to perform other functions; it is a much bigger body; it is not merely a party to the dispute, and in any event it is the only organisation which has world significance and which can deal with this matter. So, if the terms of the agreement are not acted upon, something has got to be done. But what is to be done? Normally, one would think that the Commission should report the matter to the parties that made the agreement, i.e., the two Commands. That is, I believe, what they are going to do. They can report it to them, they can ask them about it, ask for their advice and suggest to them to vary their previous agreement or enter into a new agreement or at any rate ask them what is to be done now. If the two Commands agree, that is all right. Then the Commission or the Custodian Force can easily act according to that agreement which, to that extent, varies the previous agreement. If they do not agree, what then? The matter is thrown back to the Commission, and the responsibility is then cast on the Commission. Now, the Commission, as it is constituted, also does not always come to unanimous agreements, and sometimes it so happens that in regard to even important matters the final decision

may well lie with the Chairman of the Commission, i.e., with India. Therefore, the responsibility for its decisions lies with India. It is not merely a theoretical interest that we have in world problems but a personal interest because on our decision will depend the Commission's decision and on their decision will depend other matters.

Now, many of us who had to do with these terms of agreement, etc., have thought and pondered over them again and again in order to try and find out whether they can be fitted into the existing situation. As I have said, there are two possible interpretations, but it seems to us that the real interpretation should be, within the limits of the possibilities, one which gives effect to the spirit of the agreement and which, if I may say so, helps towards taking a step towards peace.

That is the problem before us and I don't know if it will serve any purpose by going deeply into it in this House because, at the moment, the Commission is considering it there, and possibly in the course of a few days their report may be out which will give the facts as to how all this delay occurred and on whom was the chief responsibility—maybe on all of them—because very peculiar things have happened and even a reader of newspapers could see that extraordinary happenings took place there in regard to these explanations. People would not go and, if people went, there were much shoutings and jeers at the explainers, and all kinds of things happened. Now, that is one part of it.

Now, the House will know that this matter was referred to in the United Nations Assembly only recently before its recess and the question arose whether this matter should be raised there or not. We were of the opinion that in view of this deadlock there, the only course was for the United Nations Assembly to consider it. The U. N. Assembly cannot finalise it in any way because it does not represent the other party.

That is true. Nevertheless, they could consider it, make suggestions, deal with the other party, talk with the other party, and try to find some way out, because it would be obviously a disaster that all these efforts of years should fail on a relatively small matter of interpretation of an agreement in regard to explanations and the whole thing again sent back to the crucible of war. So we decided and we put forward before the Assembly that this matter should, at the appropriate time come up before them. What is the appropriate time—that is a difficult thing to say. It was difficult to say then and it is not particularly easy to say now. Anyhow, it was decided, I believe at our instance and the other nations joining, that the U. N. Assembly should be called back whenever necessary and the President of the Assembly was given authority for calling it back with the concurrence of the majority of the Member States. That is the position. It seems to me that in all likelihood it will have to be called back. When, I cannot say. It is a difficult situation and it has been an exasperating situation in Korea because having overcome—you might say—grave difficulties, suddenly to be stopped by hillocks after climbing the Himalayas, like hillocks to stop progress it makes one frustrated and one wants to seek some remedy out of it.

Now, the second problem is, as I mentioned, this talk of military aid to Pakistan by the United States. The United States is a very great country and Pakistan is our neighbour and an independent country. Why is it that we express our opinions rather strongly about this matter? They are independent countries. They can do what they like. It is perfectly true that we cannot come in their way. But it is equally true that what they do in this matter, in this respect, affects us; not only affects us, but affects many countries in Asia, Western Asia and Southern Asia. In fact, it is a very grave development from this point of

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view. Therefore, it became incumbent on us to express our viewpoint to Pakistan itself, to the United States of America, as well as to other countries concerned.

The House knows, more or less, what our policy has been. We have sought the friendship of all countries. We have not agreed with what many other countries may have said or done, but we have tried to proceed on a basis of friendly relations with all countries, and certainly with a great country like the United States of America. And we have thought that it was highly desirable for India and the United States to have friendly and co-operative relations. We have received a certain measure of help from America for some of our schemes. We welcome it, although we have made it always clear that we cannot accept any help to which any string is tied or any conditions are attached.

So far as Pakistan is concerned, we have lived through, in these last six years, a very abnormal period. Well, the beginning was abnormal. beginning meaning not so much the partition. It was abnormal enough in a sense, of course—breaking up India—but, however, we agreed to it. There the matter might have ended. But what happened immediately after Independence and partition? Those huge eruptions and migrations, all the killings and the like, which nobody who witnessed them can ever forget. Now, these things vitiated the entire atmosphere between India and Pakistan. I believe in many ways we have outlived them. We can see things, both here and in Pakistan, more calmly, and there is, I am quite sure, on both sides, a great desire for friendly relations. Anybody who goes to Pakistan can see that the people of Pakistan desire them and any one here can see that the people of India desire them—small groups apart. So it is all to the good. But, nevertheless, various important and serious problems have faced us and thus far

there has been no solution of them. One problem is that of Kashmir, and the others the evacuee property and the canal waters. These are the principal problems, and there are some others also. But I do not think any of these problems is incapable of solution. But many of them—Kashmir is notably one—have become more difficult, even more difficult than it was previously, because of happenings during the last few years, if I may say so, because of outside efforts which, however well-meant, actually created more difficulties. Now, it is in the context of these things that we have to see the present development and the possible military aid, as well as in the context of the larger policy that we pursue, that is to say, of non-entanglement, of non-alignment with those power blocs. We have sought to keep away from them and yet be friendly with them. One result of that policy was, as we have seen, in a moment of crisis, we could be trusted by both parties, as it happened in Korea. Obviously, if we had been aligned with either group, we could not have been so trusted. Obviously, if there is no country in the world which was not aligned with either group, then there would be no country which could perform that particular function when need arose. It is obvious. And if need has arisen in Korea in this way, need may arise in future in many ways. We find that militarily weak as we are, and otherwise weak too—financially and economically—we can perform a very useful function in the furtherance of peace. We can sometimes be a link. Therefore, in this and in many other important fields, we have followed this policy of non-alignment.

We have declared that we should be parties to no war even if unhappily a war breaks out. We had hoped that other countries, more especially the countries of Asia which were situated more or less like us, would also follow that policy because it was to their advantage as well as to the larger advantage of Asia. There was no intention on our part and no effort on

our part to impose any policy of ours on other countries of Asia but inevitably because of our past background, common experience and the like in this matter, there was common thinking. It did not require many arguments from us to make a country, let us say, like Burma or any other of our neighbouring countries, to think like us. They themselves, by their own process of reasoning and experience, arrived at the same conclusion. Indeed, I should imagine that most countries would arrive at that conclusion unless pressure of circumstances forced them not to. So, as a matter of fact, a number of countries of Asia were more or less following that line of policy. Also, in the United Nations, there grew up gradually an Arab-Asian or African-Asian group of nations, conferring together and even co-operating together. There was no binding link between them; sometimes they did not co-operate too. Nevertheless this habit of consulting together grew. It was a good thing. It was an encouragement. We, in our own quiet way, worked for and looked forward to this area, if I may say so, as the "No-war area" in Asia. Naturally we hoped that Pakistan which was, in a sense, similarly circumstanced as we are, would belong to that area also. Now, if any military aid comes to Pakistan from the United States it is obvious that Pakistan drops out of that area. Whatever else may happen, Pakistan lines up with a major group of powers. Previously she might have felt inclined that way but it now becomes an actual fact because one does not receive free military aid without that particular consequence following. That itself is a serious thing. It means that the cold war, as it is called, comes to Pakistan and, therefore, comes to India's borders on the West and the East—on both sides. It meant that if a hot shooting war developed it also comes right up to the borders of India.

It affected not only us; it no doubt affected Pakistan and it affected other countries in the Middle East as well as some in South-East Asia. Because

of this, most of these countries in South-East Asia and Western Asia and the Middle East have reacted to these proposals more or less on the lines of our own reaction—not quite, perhaps, but they do not like it. They have seen that it makes a difference to them. In fact, instead of being a harbinger of peace and security, they have looked upon it as something hampering peace and endangering security. That is the reason put in our arguments on this matter.

Now I know very well that the United States of America—I am quite sure—have not done this, have not offered this because of any feeling against India. I know and the Prime Minister of Pakistan has told me that there is no talk about bases, that there is no talk about a military alliance. I accept his statement but he himself has said and one other has said that there is talk of free military aid being given, and if free military aid is given, that is a major thing. Bases can come within a few days if the necessity arises. All other events can take place, and so, accepting the *bona fides* of the two nations, the United States and Pakistan, well, one cannot help thinking that this particular step is a step which affects us very much and which endangers security and peace in Western and South Asia. In particular it concerns us, of course, and we have got to give thought to it. To imagine as some people have done that some great peril has suddenly come upon us and we should act rather panicky—that would be a completely wrong reaction, but nevertheless it is matter of great importance that has happened and from this serious consequences will flow one after another unless people realise it. It was with this object that we drew the attention of other countries and of our own people to this, that if they might think it as an object of exciting them in any sense or frightening them, that would be completely wrong and it would indeed be wrong if, because of this people in our country became, if I may say so, rather excited or warmed up against the people of

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Pakistan or against the Government of Pakistan. That will not be a correct reaction, if I may say so. I know very well it is rather difficult to limit one's reactions and say exactly how far you can go and how far you should not go. Anyhow the hon. Members here are not the crowd and if they give a lead to other people who have got excited over this, we should be completely conscious of the harmful consequences of any such step. We should not allow ourselves to be swept away into saying or doing anything which will lead to various tensions and excitements as between India and Pakistan.

Now, it is obvious that any such development in the shape of aid from the United States of America to Pakistan affects all the problems we have to deal with Pakistan because the new context, the new environments and the new background change all those problems. Whatever they may be, one has to treat them afresh with that new background. That is one consequence as well as others. So, in this matter, I cannot definitely say what steps we may have to take because I do not definitely know yet what the United States or Pakistan may do in regard to that military aid or other matters. We are told that thus far only some informal talks have taken place. They might have been formal or informal, but the Press of the United States of America more especially has been so full of them during the last two months or more that one would imagine that they had gone pretty far. Anyhow we have to wait and see what happens and then naturally we have to take such steps on our side to strengthen our position, to make our people vigilant and aware of what it is and generally to be prepared for any consequences that might come. I do not myself—I want to make it perfectly clear—I do not myself look forward to any race in armaments between Pakistan and India. Obviously, I am not going to have a race with the United States of America or with any other great country. Is it possible? Nor is it

our mood or our practice, and if some people think in terms of that, it is completely wrong. We propose to continue to be friendly to these countries but at the same time to continue to carry out the policy of our choice and not any other people's choice. In this matter it would naturally be a great thing that the country knows that their representatives in Parliament are solidly or more or less solidly of one opinion, that they realise the importance of this without getting alarmed or flurried but want to go ahead calmly and deliberately to face any development or contingency that might arise. It is in that hope that I put forward this motion.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion moved:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

There are five amendments to this motion

SHRI H. C. MATHUR (Rajasthan):
Sir, I move:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, the Council is of opinion that the policy in regard to Kashmir and foreign pockets in India be changed and the will of the entire nation be mobilised against the military pact between the United States of America and Pakistan'

SHRI K. S. HEGDE (Madras). Sir,
I move:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, the Council approves of this policy'."

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY (Mysore):
Sir, I move:

"That at the end of the Motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this Council regrets that the policy pursued by the Govern-

ment of India, while claiming to bring peace to distant lands, has brought war near to our frontiers'."

SHRI GOVINDA REDDY (Mysore)
Sir, I do not move my amendment

SHRI O SOBHANI (Hyderabad)
Sir, I do not move my amendment

MR CHAIRMAN So there are three amendments moved by Mr Mathur, Mr Hegde and Mr Reddy. The original motion and the amendments are before the House. In discussing this topic, I hope you will bear in mind what the Prime Minister has said—that the discussion be limited to Korea and possible United States military aid to Pakistan.

SHRI H N KUNZRU (Uttar Pradesh) Mr Chairman, the questions with which the hon the Prime Minister has dealt and which are of great importance to us are obviously a picture of the tension that prevails between the big democratic and totalitarian powers. It is natural, therefore, for us to find out whether there are any indications that the maintenance of the peace of the world will be easier in future than it has been hitherto. It seems to me, Sir, that the Four-Power Conference that has been agreed to is a ray of light in the surrounding darkness. It will deal with a limited aspect of the tension that I have referred to. It will, I believe, be concerned with only one question, namely, the future of Germany. Besides, even on this question, one cannot, and one should not, hope for too much. This Conference may be faced with a stalemate as the Pan Mun Jon Conference has been. But all persons interested in world peace will hope for the success of this Conference so that the attitude of the Big Powers, to whom I have referred, towards one another might soon undergo a change for the better. Sir, in this connection, I should like to say that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr Churchill, deserves a word of praise for having persuaded America to follow its policy, though in an attenuated form. He wished that the

heads of the Powers concerned should meet in Conference, but he has not had his way. But I hope that he will have greater success in the near future and will be able to contribute materially to the easing of the tension that unfortunately exists at the present time.

Now, Sir, coming to the questions that have been dealt with by the hon the Prime Minister, I naturally want to deal first with the question of military aid to Pakistan. Pakistan is undoubtedly a free country and is free to follow a line of her own just as we are free to follow policies that commend themselves to us. But, if Pakistan wants to be stronger, I think that a better course for her will be to develop herself economically. Ultimately, Sir, the ideological conflict that exists in the world will be determined more by the regard that we show for the interests of those who have not had a fair deal for generations and indeed for centuries than by any increase in armaments. But if Pakistan goes in for an increase in her military strength, though it might get the equipment required by her free from the United States of America, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the maintenance of this equipment will increase the military charges that she will have to bear. Apart from this, one may fear that the supply of American equipment may create a desire in Pakistan to increase the man-power of the various branches of her Defence Forces. Apart from this, we have to consider the psychological effect of American military aid both on the people of Pakistan and on the people of India. Sir, as the hon the Prime Minister has said, I shall not be surprised if very soon the people of Pakistan, thinking that they can rely on American military aid, ask their Government to follow policies which it would ultimately be in the highest degree unwise for them to follow both in their own interests and in the interests of the development of Southern Asia. In India, though the hon the Prime Minister has said that no steps would be

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taken to add to our military strength, I am not certain, Sir, that public opinion will not compel the Government to take steps to assure it that an increase in the military power of a neighbouring country will not affect its own security. Whatever the intentions of the hon. the Prime Minister may be, I think we must bear in mind the inevitable demand that will arise for increased military expenditure in this country and if this happens, it is obvious, Sir, that the economic development of India will be retarded. Now, a retardation of the development of such important countries in Southern Asia as India and Pakistan will surely not strengthen the forces making for world peace. The United States is desirous of having bases in different countries in order to make democracy safe for the world, but I venture to think that by following an unwise policy like that which we are discussing, it will increase tension, create unrest among those whose interest lies in peace and security and thus make the world more unsafe for democracy than it is today. Even though American aid to Pakistan may not bring war nearer to Asia, such a step, considered from the point of view of the future of democracy, will be most unfortunate.

The United States Government might have offered military aid to Pakistan as a part of its policy to have allies committed to follow its policy on certain main points, but I fear, Sir, that it has not been unwelcome to it to take a step that will show to India that if India follows policies that are unacceptable to the United States, the United States is also free to make herself inconvenient to India. This was not desirable in the larger interests of the world and certainly India has not taken any steps merely with the object of criticising America or coming in its way. But we have to take human beings as they are and Governments are only human. We have, therefore, while exploring the step that America proposes to take, also to consider what should be done in order to remove the

feeling that at present prevents India and America which have the same purpose in view from working together wholeheartedly.

Sir, before I turn to Korea, I should like to refer to one other subject, though it has not been referred to by the hon. the Prime Minister. Before the last debate on foreign affairs took place in this House, events had taken place in certain parts of Asia that could not but be followed with keen interest by us. I refer to Tibet and Nepal. Now, I do not want to dwell at length on this subject but I should like the hon. the Prime Minister to tell us a word, to say something to us about the position in Nepal which is our next door neighbour. I should also like him to tell us to what extent the creation of air bases near the southern border of Tibet has been taken note of by the Government of India and also to what extent it affects both Nepal and India. We are going to have a conference with China. But among the matters that will be discussed in the conference, this will not be one. The Government of India may have much more information on this subject than any of us have and they perhaps feel that, in the light of the information that they have, the matter to which I have referred does not call for any special attention on their part. If it is so, I hope the hon. the Prime Minister will be able to assure us that India is vigilantly following such developments that are taking place in those parts of the world that are very near here.

Lastly, Sir, I should like to say a word about Korea. I must first say a word of praise for the manner in which the Chairman of the N.N.R.C. and the Indian forces in Korea have performed their delicate and difficult task. We know from the papers that they have been faced with no uncommon difficulties. But their impartiality, patience and good-will have enabled them to establish their prestige and to make all parties feel, even parties that were suspicious about their attitude in the beginning, that they are genuine friends of all the

parties concerned and are anxious to help them to come to a settlement that will bring peace to Asia, and ultimately to the rest of the world.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is time, Dr. Kunzru.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: Sir, there is just one thing more that I should like to say. The hon. the Prime Minister has referred to the termination of the period allowed for giving explanations to the prisoners of war. He has also drawn our attention to the delay in the commencement of the giving of explanations to these prisoners. But I should like to know what part India proposes to play, if there is no agreement between the parties concerned regarding the interpretation of the agreement between the U.N. Command and the Korean and Chinese Commands, and regarding the extension of the time allowed for offering explanations. I hope India will take no responsibility upon herself in this connection. Let India act as a mediator; let her act in the best sense of the word as a neutral. But I should be very sorry if the Chairman of the N.N.R.C. were instructed to take a line of his own. Sir, if the parties concerned do not agree to the decision of the N.N.R.C., who can compel the dissident party to meet the prisoners of war? The opportunity that will be offered, therefore, of giving explanations to the prisoners of war will be one-sided. The hon. the Prime Minister may not be able to give us a clear reply on this subject, but I hope that what I have said on this topic will receive his attention and that of his advisers.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: Mr. Chairman, we had the discussion on foreign affairs in the last session only three months back. But some crucial developments have taken place during these three months that have necessitated this discussion today. Sir, the occasion calls for some restraint and greater unity among ourselves. But the situation also demands that we should be very clear in our minds about the implication of these de-

velopments, and it further demands of us that we should give expression to our views in a forthright manner for the benefit of ourselves and for the benefit of the countries concerned. Sir, what has happened in Korea is very important. What may happen in Korea during the course of another few days will certainly be very important and will have wide repercussions, repercussions such as might determine the future course of events in the whole of the world. But I should like to confine myself to the developments that have taken place near our home and in a country which is nearest to us, nearest in every respect. In mentioning Korea I would only submit that I cannot do without mentioning with pardonable pride that our achievement there especially has been a real and a substantial contribution, a contribution to the extent that at least it was responsible for the cease-fire, and if our efforts are continuing in that spirit and if the countries—the two power blocs—who had an occasion to meet the Indian people on the soil of Korea and to know that we really stand for neutrality and we are friends to America as equally as we are friends to the Soviet bloc, if that spirit works and if we are able to make any further contribution, we shall feel happy and the world shall be happy.

But, as I submitted, Sir, I should confine my remarks and observations to the developments that have taken place near our home. In Pakistan there have been two developments, Sir. The first was that Pakistan declared herself an Islamic country. This cannot but have some repercussions. This announcement by Pakistan is likely to arouse feelings of apprehension and insecurity among the minorities there. And it is also likely to have some repercussions across the border. But we here can congratulate ourselves on the very calm and dispassionate manner in which we have received this development and we hope we will keep our balance.

[Shri H. C. Mathur.]

The other development, Sir, is about this military aid flowing from America. As has been mentioned by the hon. the Prime Minister and the speaker before me, this pact as between America and Pakistan is in the offing. It may come in any day. It is between America and Pakistan. They are both of them independent countries and they are absolutely free to have any such alliance. And we do not speak out of any fear psychosis. As a matter of fact, Sir, a man of my own means and understanding had envisaged such a thing coming. Sir, events have been taking such a shape. We cannot of course deny that these independent countries can take their own decisions, but we certainly feel deeply concerned about what is happening next door to us.

It is not only we who feel deeply concerned: even Burma has expressed herself and Ceylon has expressed herself; they have expressed in stronger terms than we have expressed. We have kept a lot of restraint in this matter. Our Prime Minister, when speaking on this matter, has been extremely judicious and he has spoken in the most friendly terms. Sir, not only Burma and Ceylon, but Egypt also has spoken on this matter because it is not, after all, a matter which concerns Pakistan alone.

It disturbs the whole equilibrium in Asia. We are particularly interested because this affects us immediately and because it affects the burning question of Kashmir which is hanging over our head. I must submit here that we do not feel very happy about the way in which this problem has been tackled. I am fully aware and I am fully conscious of the fact that our relationship with Kashmir cannot be on the same lines as with any other B Class State. There are special circumstances, there is a special situation there. I recognise all that, but even after recognising the special situation and special circumstances there, I submit we have wavered, we have faltered and we have been

very weak in dealing with this particular matter. Of course, when the Maharaja of Kashmir made a request for accession, legally speaking, technically speaking, that should have been enough to make the accession complete and irrevocable, but, as I said, there were special circumstances there. If I am correctly informed, even the Governor-General at that time, Lord Mountbatten, felt that if that request of the Maharaja was supported by an expression of opinion by the people in certain meetings, that was quite enough for the full and irrevocable accession of Kashmir to India. There is absolutely no reason, when the largest—in fact the only—political party, supported by the other party which was there, wholeheartedly supported the full accession of Kashmir to India, why that should not have been taken as the full and irrevocable accession of Kashmir to India. I wish to submit that this is one of the most pressing problems which has given rise to this trouble. We should have settled this matter then and there. We were strong enough to do that. I feel that we should not have stopped anywhere but should have driven the invaders, the intruders, out of our territory. We were then militarily strong enough to do so, and in doing that we would have been only just and generous to our neighbours, the Pakistanis, who did not behave themselves. We have let down our Kashmir friends, who asked for full and irrevocable accession to India, and we have not also taken note of the very strong feeling in this country which demands full and irrevocable accession of that State to India. We have seen of late that there is some trouble going on there. Foreigners are fishing in troubled waters. Now comes the news that Pakistan has declared herself an Islamic State, and on the top of that comes this military aid proposal. Is it possible now in this strange background to have any plebiscite there? Are we going to have same sort of fantastic religious slogans being thrown there, and are we again going to stage that drama of murder and devastation which was played there at the time of the partition of the coun-

try? I submit that we should no more be halting in our foreign policy, and I particularly wish that there should be a definite change, a change for strength, in dealing with this matter.

Sir, I do not wish that we should complicate matters, but another point which I have referred to in my amendment is about the foreign pockets here. My feeling is that if in the first flush of our independence we had taken a strong line, surely we could have cleared these foreign pockets from here. We were strong enough for that then. As a matter of fact, the other nations were looking to us. They wanted to be very friendly with us. We could help Indonesia in attaining independence. We could help Indonesia in securing a seat in the United Nations. If we had acted then with strength and promptitude, I see no reason why we should have been unable to clear these foreign pockets. But now the situation has undergone a great change. Their attitude has hardened and behind the scene, there are big powers who have vested interests in continuing these foreign pockets here. I know that it is a very delicate matter and it is difficult to deal with it now, but I do wish that we bring political and diplomatic pressure over this question, and I submit that, if necessary, we should not hesitate to take police action.

SHRI K. S. HEGDE: Mr. Chairman, I have moved an amendment:

"That at the end of the motion the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, the Council approves of this policy'."

There is hardly any doubt that there is the greatest measure of common agreement as regards our foreign policy. I dare say that it can be said that it is a truly national policy. One has got to take into consideration the conditions in which we are living. I am not exaggerating anything when I say that the world is rather crazy today. Every one is desirous of hav-

ing peace. Genuinely, everybody is desirous of peace, but people do not know where to look for it and how to find it. There are countries which feel that peace can be had on their own terms and they also believe that there could be no peace unless there is a common type of political institutions in the whole of the world. We in this country have always thought that the existence of different types of political institutions is no bar to have peace in the world. I have every reason to think that we are on the right lines and the countries which differ from us may have to review their policy in this respect. It is gratifying to note that many of the countries which differed from us at the initial stage are now veering round in their point of view and are now more or less accepting our point of view. I am glad to note that Great Britain which at one time more or less subscribed to the viewpoint of America, has now substantially changed her viewpoint and is today willing to believe that *de jure* recognition of a *de facto* reality must be given. When I refer to this, I mean that there must be proper *de jure* recognition of *de facto* China which is a reality. Voices are now heard even in America which contribute to this idea, and I am sure that within a very short time we are likely to have world opinion more or less on our side on this issue.

Another thing that has been before the world, where we have been, to a large extent, misunderstood by our friends is our policy of non-alliance. Somehow there is a feeling in certain quarters that those who are not with them are against them. It may not be always correct and oftentimes in the past it was found to be incorrect. There is no gainsaying the fact that we firmly believe in the fundamental principles of democracy. We have it written in our Constitution, we have enshrined it in our hearts, our whole way of life is one based on democratic principles but we mean by this democracy and as a necessary consequence of it, peace in the world and prosperity in the land. We may remind our American friends at this juncture that

[Shri K. S. Hegde.]

if today any one is practising the high principles enunciated by Lincoln and others, it is this country whereas in the country in which these great principles were propagated, these have been lost sight of by the exigencies of circumstances or probably by the strain of events. I have no quarrel with anybody for differing from our point of view. But all that I would beg of the world is to try to understand the other man's point of view, try to see from a different angle altogether. As the hon. the Prime Minister has correctly said, the more and more countries join one or the other power bloc, less and less is the chance of a permanent peace in this world. If today there is some simmering hope of peace in the world, the credit, to a large extent, goes to countries like India, Burma and others. It is not a vain boast when I say that had it not been for the policy of India, possibly the conflagration would have been there a long time back. We have, in no small measure, contributed to the stability in the world. I do know that peace hangs by a slender thread. That is all the more reason why we have to nourish it, why we have to cherish it and to do everything to sustain peace in this land. In a search for allies and their probably incorrect approach to defend democracy some of the countries have been forced, possibly by circumstances, by separate individuals and countries which probably may not properly represent the democratic forces. Chiang Kai Shek and Syngman Rhee may be good objects in a political museum but to hold them up as true representatives of democracy is to do damage to democracy. All that I am requesting is, let us be properly understood and we on our part certainly believe in the high democratic principles and we are sure if only the parties understand us properly, there will be no difference from our point of view.

The only other point that I would like to place before you is the question of the proposed military aid by America to Pakistan. I am not sure

whether the last word has been said on the subject. From the multitude of the confusing and contradictory statements, all that we can make out is that the powers that we are not quite anxious to place all their cards before the world. Even assuming that what the Prime Minister of Pakistan said was the last word on the subject, it is of grave implications. It has been said in certain quarters that the alliance between America and Pakistan is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. I do not dispute that. All that I say is, domestic jurisdictions have their own limitations. Would our friends in America for a moment recollect to themselves the Munroe Doctrine that they enunciated a century ago? Would they kindly recollect what was being said during the last war—that the frontiers of England were more or less in the Rhineland and they subscribed to the idea of re-alignment so far as Korea was concerned? I am not, and this country is not, speaking in jingoistic terms but what we want our friends to do is to face the realities. Here is a country, a neighbour of ours, certainly a friend of ours, which has got a large number of differences with us; they have invaded a portion of our country, their forces are in a portion of India, they have a number of disputes with us, oftentimes the cry of Jihad has been raised in that country. If America comes out and says "Here you are, we are going to help you", I for one fail to believe that it could be anything but an act of hostility. I am assured by important authorities that those armaments will not be used against India. I must take it as an obvious platitude. Is it ever possible, having equipped a big army, to say that those armaments will not be used against us? Unless the whole of the Pakistan army is taken over by America, it might be well-nigh impossible. Cynics have expressed the opinion that America has timed her help to Pakistan in such a way to see that Pakistan does not come to agreement with India. I don't believe the validity of this inference. I don't think a great nation like America would ever behave in the manner that is suggested. It is also suggested that

America is trying to bring in a certain amount of pressure on India by these indirect processes and to persuade India to fall in line. Knowing the great democratic idealism of America the very idealism which attracted us in the past and to which we are to some extent being attracted even today, I don't think anything like that will be done through a back-door process. But I do feel that there is something in the mind of America. She is obsessed with the fear of certain countries. She thinks in terms of adding to her military power. She thinks that she can usefully have another million soldiers. Whether the move is, militarily speaking, right or wrong, I for one would think it is politically speaking, probably a wrong decision. If America's desire is to fight Communism certainly they are not doing it for the simple reason that, as was very aptly said by my hon friend Pandit Kunzru, the circumstances and the situation that will be created will lead to a deterioration in the standard of living both in America and in India.

MR CHAIRMAN It is time, Mr Hegde

SHRI K S HEGDE In one minute I am finishing, Sir. If that is the case how the object will be achieved it is difficult to conceive. I do know that papers have been announcing both in America and in India that the countries beyond the Ural Mountains are within bombing range of Pakistan. Sir bombing is not a one-way traffic. It is certainly bound to be a two-way traffic and I am sure the brave men of Pakistan don't want their army to be in the front-line of battle and Pakistan being converted into a cock-pit of war. We apprehend this danger. That is why we politely, respectfully but firmly make known our opinions to the countries that they shall not disturb the powers that are working for peace in South-East Asia.

MR CHAIRMAN Mr Reddy You must be brief.

SHRI C G K REDDY Sir, I will be as brief as possible. Before I go into the merits of the motion before us I

would like to be permitted to refer to what I think to be a rather improper reference made to my party during the last session.

MR CHAIRMAN During the last session?

SHRI C G K REDDY During the debate on foreign affairs when the hon the Prime Minister was replying.

MR CHAIRMAN That session is over.

SHRI C G K REDDY That thing goes on. When he was replying, the hon the Prime Minister tried to make out that I did not represent my party and I did not represent my party's policy. I should like to say, first of all, that this is not true. Secondly, I should like to say that dividing an Opposition party may be a fascinating and fruitful game but I may say "It isn't cricket!"

Sir last time I had also pleaded for a national foreign policy. In fact I have been doing this ever since I have had an opportunity to express myself on this subject. I have said this because I feel that the Opposition parties should not be put in an embarrassing situation the country should not be put in an embarrassing situation, for a policy pursued on the sole responsibility of the party in power. I am aware that today in the other House, the hon the Prime Minister has asked for chapter and verse as to where and when the party in power has not consulted or has not tried to create a national policy. I would not like to quote, but all that I would like to say is this, that unless you have a national policy you have no right to ask for unity under any circumstance whatever. If a certain situation has been created by a certain policy—and I do claim and I shall presently explain that the situation in which we find ourselves today is the direct result of the policy that has been followed by the Government of India—in that case neither the hon the Prime Minister, nor the Government have any authority or any claim to ask for unity behind that policy.

[Shri C. G. K. Reddy.]

Sir, presently, the Congress Party, led by our Prime Minister, is trying to rouse the people on the crest of a wave of hysteria. They have tried to organise meetings against this, they have also, I believe, asked the people to rally round against an imaginary crisis.....

AN HON. MEMBER: Imaginary?

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: Yes, imaginary crisis.

SHRI GOVINDA REDDY: I thought it was.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: When the same kind of movement, almost a similar movement, was launched by the Jan Sangh last year, it was dubbed as communal. But, by some kind of Congress logic, the same thing happening today under the auspices and active guidance of the Congress Party, somehow becomes sanctified. I should like to say that this hysteria, if it is continued, is only going to land this country into a terrible situation. I listened to what the hon. the Prime Minister had to say today. He tried to tell us to have some restraint. I should like to tell him to restrain himself and his party first, and if he can, to cancel the circular which has been sent out, asking Congress units to organise meetings and processions protesting against this act.

Sir, as the House is aware, I have an amendment to the effect that this Council regrets that the policy pursued by the Government of India, while claiming to bring peace to distant lands, has brought war near to our frontiers.

AN HON. MEMBER: Shame.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: Sir, I have no difficulty whatever regarding this amendment, because during his introductory speech, I heard the hon. the Prime Minister himself agreed that the policy of the Government of India has taken peace to distant lands, and he has also said that war has been

brought nearer our frontiers. So I hope he will decide to give a whip to his party to support this amendment of mine.

AN HON. MEMBER: Not at all.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: So far as the U.S.A.—Pakistan pact is concerned, I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that so far as this particular pact that is in the offing—and for aught we know, it may have been already concluded—I feel that this is a direct interference by the United States of America in this particular belt which is trying to keep out of the cold war in its own ways—maybe, in contradictory ways, sometimes. But in its own way, this particular belt of countries has tried to keep out of the cold war and this particular act should be condemned as a direct interference by the U.S.A. All that I wish to say is that.....

SHRI T. PANDE (Uttar Pradesh): Is there any other.....

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: If the hon. Member wants to say something, he can have his chance afterwards. Or, if he wants to ask me anything, I shall give way.

SHRI T. PANDE: What else are we Congressmen doing?

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: But this is part and parcel of the policy followed by the United States of America. She has tried to interfere in each and every country. She has tried to buy bases. She has tried otherwise to negotiate bases so that she can pursue this policy. It is, I think, utter stupidity on the part of the U.S.A. But I should like to ask, "Why match this stupidity with some of our own?"

During the last two years, I should like to know what it is that our foreign policy has achieved. Take, for instance, Kashmir.

AN HON. MEMBER: Take Korea.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: I am coming to Korea also. Since August this year, I feel that this situation has taken an insidious turn. Whenever we hear of

the statements given by the Prime Minister of Kashmir, I sometimes wonder whether Kashmir has acceded to India on foreign policy or not. I sometimes wonder whether Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad is speaking or some of our friends here in this House are speaking, not the representatives of Kashmir though inside the House and also outside the House. We should like to know whether it is the Prime Minister of Kashmir who is speaking or somebody else, or he is unwittingly becoming the mouthpiece of such forces which have as much aggressive designs on this country as any one else.

Sir, I am grateful to my hon. friend—my venerable friend at that—who has raised the question of Tibet. You may remember, Sir, and the House will also recall that during the last session our hon. Prime Minister talked about geographical compulsion. He told us that when looking into this case, we should remember certain geographical compulsions. He also tried to deride those who believe that a wrong had been perpetrated in Tibet. Initially the hon. the Prime Minister himself was the person who condemned the Chinese aggression in Tibet.

I should like to ask, if you want to recognise compulsion, if you want to say that geographical compulsions are such that we have to take account of them, whether the massing of troops across the border is a geographical compulsion or not. Is not the expulsion of our diplomatic representative from Sinkiang a geographical compulsion I should like to know also whether the planned infiltration on our frontier areas is not a geographical compulsion. I want to ask the hon. the Prime Minister whether all these also constitute geographical compulsion.

I feel there is a bias in our foreign policy. We have had a bias one way or the other during the last five years. It alternates and changes and I am sure this present bias also will change in course of time. But before that change comes along, much damage would have been done. This is a

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situation which is being thrust upon you by particular parties to make capital out of it.

I should like to remind the House that so far as the world in general is concerned, whoever is anti-American is immediately said to be pro-Russian and it is no secret to us here that even members of the Congress Party are unfortunately thinking in the same manner that since Pakistan is taking aid from America, we should take it from Russia.

SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: No, no.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: No, certainly no. I also say, no. And I am glad that my hon. friends on the Congress side say "No" and I hope they will say no and die, if necessary, for saying "No."

(Time bell rings.)

Sir, I have not taken the time that you have given me.

MR. CHAIRMAN: What I am worried about is.....

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: I will finish in two or three minutes. Because you gave me fifteen minutes I was adjusting myself to that time.

MR. CHAIRMAN: But the situation is changing.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: Yes, Sir. The situation is changing and the time is also running out, not only against me but against our country also. I am glad that today the hon. the Prime Minister has come to realise that we should strengthen this belt of countries which do not want to be involved in a war. I feel that opportunities have been lost. If the Asian Conference of 1946 had been followed up with several other conferences, its strength could have been developed and I dare say, Pakistan would never have thought of going in for any pact at all. But I do hope that no more time will be wasted and we will not have to say, "Too late."

(Time bell rings.)

Sir, I will finish in another two sentences.

[Shri C. G. K. Reddy.]

In conclusion, I should like to say that I feel that we are being slowly pushed towards war and we should see to it that those hands that are trying to push this country towards war are stayed.

But, let it be understood, Sir, and I can tell all the countries who may have fanciful ideas about this country, be it America or Pakistan, be it China or Russia, whoever it is, that we may have differences in foreign policy, differences we may have on any other policy, but we will stand together as we have stood together before to see that our country is defended. On that we shall rise as one man. If anybody attempts to exploit the situation because of certain differences, I am sure that he will be sadly mistaken and we will show him that he is sadly mistaken.

SHRI BARKATULLAH KHAN (Rajasthan) Mr. Chairman, the policy of dynamic neutrality has created a strong impression in most of the countries. They know now that instead of aligning with the warring groups and being dominated by one of those groups, there is a third way out. There is already a feeling in some countries that either we join with one bloc or with the other and that there is no other alternative except to follow either of these two. When India came out with this policy, the result has been that those countries which wanted to save themselves in case of war have started accepting our policy. The countries that want peace look to us for guidance. This is not liked by these who wish to dictate to the smaller nations. They, therefore, wanted to give a shock treatment to India. They wanted to create a feeling in India that "if you are not to come with us, we are going to create such a situation wherein you will be forced either to stay with us or to go against us", India's neutrality is proving very dangerous to the blocs. They want to prove that India was never neutral. Therefore, this shock was given and I am glad to say that the hon. the Prime

Minister of India has taken the lead in assuring the House and most of the hon. Members have assured—and the hon. Mr. C. G. K. Reddy also—that this country and its different political parties are not going to fall like a ripe fruit into the lap of the other group, any other country for that matter.

Now, coming to Pakistan, I could understand Pakistan asking for aid because Pakistan, with all the tall talk about Islam, all talk about the brotherhood of Muslims, has come to realise that her position in Kashmir is not as strong as she thought it to be with the result that on one pretext or the other she has been trying not to come to terms so far as the plebiscite issue is concerned. So, it was thought by them that they should get arms at any cost so that they could create a situation in Kashmir where, if possible, they could threaten us with the arms so got from other countries. Therefore, I was very much keen to hear the hon. the Prime Minister explain the circumstances which forced America to come to the aid of Pakistan. With whatever little information that I have with me, I feel that Pakistan with all her efforts is going towards war. We might like it or we might not like it and we might not say it in so many words but a situation has arisen today wherein the country has to take stock of its position. It is no use saying that there is no such situation because there is one. The time has come when the balance of power has changed and a dangerous situation has been created. The Members of this House and the country at large should be taken into confidence by the hon. the Prime Minister and if there is danger to the country then we should be told that there is danger so that we may be united. We might put our shoulders to the wheel and reach a position where other countries, whichever they may be, however strong they may be, may think a while before they put a finger on India. With all our efforts to create good-will with Pakistan, we have failed. Perhaps that is the result of the sentimental policy which was followed by the Government of

India because most of our leaders have been suffering from that elder brother complex wherein the younger brother's mistakes are condoned. Having done that there was little left but to continue that policy, to show a little more of sentimentalism and whenever the Prime Minister or any other leader of Pakistan came and shouted that India is like an elder brother we accepted that and we went out of our way to placate her. I think the time has now come when India should be a little more careful, a little more strong and if necessary, a little more stiff. Unless that is done there would be no logic in our policy. As my hon. friend, Mr. Reddy, has suggested, the Asian countries have so far backed India, the Middle Eastern countries have so far backed India, because they know where their interests lie. If we mobilise these people, those countries which want peace, I am sure Pakistan, with all the appeal to the Muslim brotherhood or Islam is not going to succeed. If we create that public feeling in the Middle East and in the various countries, whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim, Pakistan may feel that whatever she has done was wrong and that she has become an outcast in the eyes of the nations of Asia and then, I am sure, the time will come when we may be in a position to stand on our own.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Be brief. Mr. Gupta.

SHRI B. GUPTA (West Bengal): Sir, we have heard a very interesting speech on this side of the House and it is understandable that such a gentleman should speak in such accents because except when it becomes necessary for them to talk favourably in regard to the policies of the Government of India in order to facilitate the transition into a coalition they use all kinds of language to criticise.

Now, Sir, I would not bother much about their talk because they had been talking loud for any length of time and history has so ordered that these gen-

tlemen are getting silenced day by day.

Now, Sir, I deal with the mightier person, namely, the hon. the Prime Minister of India, who can deliver the goods if he wishes and, therefore, Sir, it is better to address my few points in that direction. We are not alarmists, the people are not panicky. Had it been so, the Americans would have drowned the entire world in blood and tears. It is the people who have criticised the American warmongers, who have stood up to them, who have stopped the march of America in Asia. We know, Sir, that the people have a desire to strengthen the struggle for peace, to fight more effectively than they have fought against the warmongers. During the past 12 months or so, there has been an undoubted accession of strength to the forces of peace. Peace-loving people all over the world have grown in dimension, in strength, and if India has played her part under the leadership of the hon. the Prime Minister of India it is undoubtedly a welcome thing and has been very rightly appreciated in all parts of the world. But we cannot rest on our laurels nor can we be complacent. After all, if the Americans have suffered rebuffs during the last 12 months or so they have become all the more frenzied and desperate. This is why they are trying, on the one hand, to sabotage the Korean Armistice in order to re-start the war by sabotaging the Political Conference, while, on the other, they are trying to acquire military bases in Pakistan. That is what we find. These are signs of despair, manifestations of despair and frenzy. Therefore, one has to take note of that.

So far as the Korean question is concerned, we understand the hon. the Prime Minister's sentiments. We only hope that these sentiments will be translated into bolder actions against those people who are responsible for continued attempts at violating the Korean agreement, at sabotaging the Political Conference. It is only reasonable. After all, the path to peace is not a prim-rose path; it is a path of

[Shri B. Gupta.]

disorder and it has got to be traversed with full forces mobilised. The people know how to fight for peace.

Sir, we find that right from the beginning—it is not from today, but from the beginning—the Americans had been at the game. They had let out 20,000 persons and then when the explanations started they created all sorts of difficulties to prevent the explanations for the greater part of the period. Explanations could not take place, as the hon. the Prime Minister has said, for about eleven days. Now, there is a provision in International Law that pacts are to be kept, but the Americans have violated the pact not only in spirit but also in letter, if it was intended at all that this period should be utilised for carrying out explanation work without interference by any of the parties. The Americans have violated this. We know that Syngman Rhee—that clever politician who often jumps—has behind his back the Americans instigating and inspiring him all the time. The hon. the Prime Minister should not much be concerned with that little man. He should see behind him those gentlemen who are instigating him all the time. The Americans have two lines of approach. On the one hand, inside the United Nations Organization and in its debates, they conduct themselves in a manner as though they are going by law. On the other hand, they use the black method—what in their country is known as the gangster method—of provocation and all that. Both methods are going on side by side with them.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Strong feelings don't mean violent language or aggressive gestures.

SHRI B. GUPTA: When I talk about Americans I cannot spare them. They are the champions of atom bombs. However, Sir, these are their two lines of approach. We know that at the bottom of their hearts it is their desire to start war in Asia. That is why we find they are also trying to start bases in Pakistan.

Now, Sir, the struggle against these policies with regard to Pakistan, of course, will be carried on by the people of Pakistan in the first instance. When Mian Iftikharuddin spoke in Dacca condemning the proposed military aid to Pakistan by America, he was well received by the audience and his speech was reported in the Pakistan Press and we are seeing the signs of the times. It is not Mohammed Ali who has the last word in Pakistan. We know that the people are rising in Pakistan against this kind of thing. The hon. the Prime Minister is quite right in saying that our policy should be such that we do not have any tension between the two countries and tension between the two peoples. Americans are the culprits. We must go at them. After all, it is they who are trying to bring Pakistan into the orbit of war and thereby trying also to bring India within firing range. It is our duty, it is our task and it is the duty of statesmanship to rise to the occasions and see that Pakistan and India with one voice stand up against the American aggression which is about to be started there. Defence, of course, is important.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Your time is up.

SHRI B. GUPTA: Only five minutes more, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: No, no.

SHRI B. GUPTA: I shall just now finish, Sir.

Defence, of course, is important but the most important duty is to redouble our efforts for peace. The hon. the Prime Minister is quite right when he says that he is not going to start an armaments race. We welcome the hon. the Prime Minister's statement. We would only add that the hon. the Prime Minister should redouble his efforts for peace. There cannot be any question of being neutral between peace and war. He should be a full fledged partisan of peace. That is what we demand of him. After all, the forces of peace could stop the American aggression in various parts of the

world and if we and the people of Pakistan unite together in a common struggle for peace, the American plans can be thwarted and their bases thrown back into the sea. There is the possibility of doing so.

MR CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Krishna Menon.

SHRI V. K. KRISHNA MENON (Madras). Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the warm expression of feeling towards me when I rise in my seat and I feel as a newcomer I can look forward to the indulgence of the House in what I have got to say.

The hon. the Minister for External Affairs has submitted to the House a motion asking it to take into consideration the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in regard to it.

I feel, coming back as I do with my colleagues of the Indian Delegation to the U.N.O., that the House will expect me to make a brief reference to the conduct of affairs by our delegation. In respect of the report that we had to make to the Government the Government is responsible to the House. But in the working out of the policy or in how our policies affected the general problem of world politics in making our submissions in the general debate in the U.N.O. our delegation referred to the central problem of world politics, namely, the relaxation of world tension. In doing that we brought into the forefront of consideration the view that there should be a meeting of the heads of the great nations in whose hands, whether we like it or not, lies in the immediate proximity of time the determination of the issues of peace and war. Political circumstances, as they developed, were not favourable to forcing this issue by way of a resolution, but the attitude taken up by the Indian Delegation was favoured not only by the countries of Asia but by the countries of Western Europe, of the Commonwealth and others and that was, Sir, to create opinion in favour of this move—in

what is internationally known as drifting towards the idea—that the relaxation of tension requires more than a conference on specific issues, whether they be in Germany or in Korea or Austria, that the clouds of suspicion and the complexities of relationship which were developing in the post-war period can only be cleared away, as the Prime Minister of the U.K. pointed out, by those men who are responsible for the conduct of affairs in the great States at a meeting between them. I will not go into further detailed reference on this matter, Mr. Chairman, and take up the time of the House.

The other principal question to which we addressed ourselves and to which we are bound to address ourselves—because the basic point in our foreign policy, as far as we understand it, is not merely what is pointed out as neutral or independent, it is the implementing of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, world peace—was our attempt to lessen the friction between the conflicting parties even inside the U.N.O. and if not bring about unanimity, at least bring about a state of non-opposition to the aim of peace. So, in addressing ourselves to the problem, we have mainly concerned ourselves with what is usually called 'disarmament'. Disarmament, of course, as you know, Mr. Chairman, is not actual disarmament but merely limitation of armaments. On the 16th of July 1945 there was the first atomic explosion. Since then the world is under the terror of those bombs. The bomb that was dropped in Hiroshima is estimated to have a potency of 20,000 tons of T.N.T. The modern atom bomb is supposed to have twelve times that potency. The hydrogen bomb is supposed to have at its centre a temperature which is higher than the temperature at the centre of the Sun. So we are driven to the position: 'Either disarm or perish'. Of course in the resolutions that came before the United Nations General Assembly, the contribution of our delegation was not feasible in the formulation of resolutions because our function there was to move those who had greater influence and greater position in this

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field to adopt our ideas without seeking special privileges for ourselves. So the U.K. which was responsible for the sponsoring of the resolution on armament control—it may be the feeling of some hon. Members of the House also—was not so amenable to our suggestions, but is responsive to the suggestions that India makes always. I don't say for a moment that they accept our views anything more than we accept theirs, but they were responsive to the suggestions we made and after a great deal of debate or conversations and the pressures that took place in that place, we were able for the first time to bring into the operative part of the decisions of the United Nations, phraseology which committed the United Nations to the affirmation of the desire of the world to eliminate and prohibit atomic and other weapons of warfare. I confess that it is not going to be actual prohibition or destruction of atom bomb piles or all stocks of other high-power projectiles and weapons, but for the first time the United Nations has proclaimed to the world in the operative part of its resolution that it affirms the general desire of the peoples and calls upon the nations to take effective steps towards the elimination and the prohibition of atomic and all other highly explosive weapons of war. I admit it is not as far as we would like it to have gone, but, Mr. Chairman, we in this country recognise that it is not always too easy even in a federation of 28 to 30 States to obtain a decision that suits everybody. It is still more difficult in a community of 60 nations which are all independent sovereign nations and which have formed themselves into different camps, not united by the phraseology of peace, but bent on accumulating armaments across the lines that run across the world. Therefore, in bringing about that situation, it was the independent position of India, her refusal to be bullied, badgered or steam-rollered, but at the same time, to use a language that may not be suitable to some people, that is, her restraint, that paid very good dividends. We were able to persuade the Assembly to accept

this point of view. We were also able to persuade the Assembly that the armament race, to change the phraseology of armament race into "competitive position in regard to armaments", was something economically unsound, and inimical to world peace. This is the first time that the United Nations has been persuaded to pronounce itself on the competitive position in regard to armaments firmly on the part of disarmament. We were able to persuade the United Kingdom and her colleagues to accept that there should be private discussions by the four or five Powers that are, I suppose, called the Atomic Powers. We were able to persuade them to go into private discussions so that they could not merely think but speak and be able to come to some agreement with regard to the formula that must be put forward before the Disarmament Commission. The House very well knows that during the last two years of its work the Disarmament Commission has been riddled by the juxtaposition of formulae as to what should come before and what after, with the result that there has been no progress. The only report that came before us was that there was no progress. The Disarmament Commission met only once last year.

The Delegation also addressed itself to the more specific problems that have greater proximity to our thinking and feeling, namely, the problem of racial discrimination, the results of colonial rule and the progress or otherwise in that direction and also the request for admission of the properly accredited delegate of the Chinese Government and the people into the Assembly of the United Nations. There were other matters to which I shall not refer, but I think it is important when making observations on the work of our Delegation in the United Nations that we should not merely confine ourselves to political issues but also to the economic ones. The House remembers that in the earlier part of the year the Economic and Social Council had made what, if it is worked out, would become a revolutionary proposal, that is, that aid to under-developed countries should be organised by the United

Nations on a reciprocal and co-operative basis and not as an offering from one country to another. It was not a proposal to prohibit any country from doing what is wanted but it was the first attempt towards co-operation for economic purposes so that the rich and the poor could equally contribute their mite in order that those who deserve and those who need might enjoy the results. For the first time, therefore, though the fund has not been established, the principle has been accepted and the President of the Economic and Social Council—a man who enjoys a high reputation—has now been charged with the task of working out the project, to discuss it with the Governments and to report to the next session of the Assembly. It is called the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, otherwise known as SUNFED. It is called Special otherwise it will be pronounced UNFED. This is a special fund for economic aid. Side by side with it, the Assembly also passed a resolution asking the World Bank to consider the problem of setting up an International Finance Corporation. That again has been established so far as the principle behind it is concerned. So, in the field of economic development, two great decisions have been taken and in this, behind the scenes and in committees and negotiations, our Delegation under the leadership of our Ambassador in the Argentine, Nawab Ali Yar Jung, and our distinguished Consul-General in New York put in a quantity of work without which the very great difficulties between the various camps inside the United Nations could not have been resolved and to the amazement of everybody the Resolution went through without opposition.

There were other matters to which we addressed ourselves, but this is not the time to deal with them. But I am sure the House will want me to say a word about Burma, this neighbour of ours whose territory of some 50,000 square miles has been the victim of possession by the KMT troops, disowned sometimes, owned sometimes, by the authorities in Formosa. Around the

countryside this army of depredation has been feeding upon the land, indulging in smuggling, rapine and plunder, armed with modern weapons, not made in Burma but coming from somewhere, flying out the troops and reinforcements over all the territory that lies between Formosa and Burma. The army has been ravaging the countryside and embarrassing the Burmese Government over a period of three years. When the depredation started, they were only about 3,000 but now they are a body of 12,000 adding to the harassment of the Burmese Government until last year they brought it before the United Nations. They presented their case with great moderation and restraint and so convinced the Assembly. While the Assembly could not for purposes of political strategy obtain unanimity, they charged the KMT foreign troops in the territory and demanded their withdrawal or disarmament. In the 12 months that followed the Government of Thailand and the United States and for some time the Government of Burma entered into various arrangements and the result of all this was that a very small proportion of them, some 2,000 or so, have begun to be evacuated. Unfortunately, though these have been evacuated, there have been no weapons surrendered. Only nine weapons have been surrendered, out of which one was a pistol made in 1903. So this matter came up before the United Nations. India, with the Commonwealth countries and others, put forward resolutions reaffirming the position of last year and we have stood side by side in solidarity with the Burmese people and proclaimed to the world that their afflictions are our afflictions.

Before I refer to the problem of Korea, since I was living in New York all this time, it would be very unrealistic if one did not refer to a problem that seems to engage the minds of Members of this House more than anything else, namely, the relations between Pakistan and the United States in the field of armament. There has been considerable talk about this. It

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is not for me to refer to those aspects on which the hon. the Prime Minister has already made a statement on behalf of the Government, but may I, Sir, refer to another side of this? Not only is it the quantitative aid that is relevant. It is irrelevant to consider whether tomorrow or this year or next year this aid would begin. The developments that have taken place in the last few months make it quite clear that it is part of the plans of world politics that we have got to take into account. The question that is relevant is—one side or the other it can take place, but when it takes place—what would be our answer to it. It is not for me to say that. It is a matter of Government policy and the Government can pronounce itself on that. But as a humble citizen of this country and as a student of world politics I would say that in the context of the economics of the modern world, in the context of the military powers of the world, our strength lies in the discipline and unity of our people. The greatest empire of modern times, that of the British, was not displaced from this country by force of arms. Whenever a foreign invader has set foot in this country, he has been able to conquer because of our weakness and if unfortunately, we were to find ourselves in a difficult situation, it would be our own fault. The basis of it is not merely moral pronouncements, but the economic strength that this country can put forward. After all, in this world, nobody gives anything for nothing, least of all, those who have money. Therefore, it is on the strength of our economy that we can build up our own strength. It is the economic strength of our country that will count, our ability to formulate our policy in independence, because our next day's sustenance is not dependent upon anybody's whimsical goodwill. But, at the same time, it is frightfully important that we do not play the game of such adversaries as we have—I don't suggest we have any.

It is a very great mistake to brand

good people as our enemies. The American people are simple, friendly people, like our own people, as also the people in Pakistan or the Soviet Union or anywhere else. It will do us no good, and what is more, it will be a negation of our policy if we were to think that the problem can be solved by the cultivation of bitterness or hatred. One of the few points that were put forward in the United Nations was that war cannot be eliminated by the methods of war. For, to be right in war, I will have to be a man of peace. The present crisis is not the way to peace. Even our policy is that it would be very wrong for us to allow these occasions, to allow these circumstances, to exploit us, but we should exploit the circumstances. Any kind of hysteria in this matter is not likely to help us and, as the hon. the Prime Minister has rightly said, any idea of entering into the armament race is not only morally reprehensible but economically chimerical.

So, the question does not arise. If aid to Pakistan should materialise in action hostile to India in the context of the next two years, it would be in the context of a world war; and on that we can make no decisions here. But, if it is in the context of a long period of war, if in that context any country is poised against us, then, our resistance will largely depend on the shoulders of our own people.

Before I come to Korea, I would like to take this opportunity of saying that I was happy, as the senior member of our Delegation, to have with me a number of hon. Members of the two Houses of Parliament, a very good team, who gave an example of co-operative work, (Hear, hear) not only with each other but with the other delegations. No leader of a delegation could expect or hope to have a better and more loyal band of workers. We had the advantage of the presence with us, of the hon. the Deputy Minister for External Affairs; we had with us an hon. lady

who is a Member of this House, a very, very hard-working, very competent delegate our Ambassador in the Argentine assisted by our Consul—General in the United States who was our permanent representative, whose machinery itself was available; and two other Members of the other House who, though they were newcomers, distinguished themselves by their capacity and by their moderation; and, of course, I was there.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I come to the problem of Korea. There is, not only here but in other places too, a tendency to think that Korea is the hon. the Prime Minister's special hobby.....

KHWAJA INAIT ULLAH: It is his hobby.

SHRI V. K. KRISHNA MENON: If it is, there it is.

Our association in this matter, politically goes back some years. The war in Korea began in the June of 1950; in the October of that year, the United Nations' armies managed to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, thereby attracting the Chinese volunteers in North Korea who entered the battlefield on the 1st of February. In the latter part of that year, our delegation, led very ably by that distinguished patriot of ours who is no longer with us—I refer to Shri B. N. Rau—in association with others, put forward proposals to bring about peace. So, our association with Korea is as old as the war in Korea itself. These, unfortunately, did not lead to any results until June 1951, until the Soviet representative in New York in a broadcast said that the time had come to usher in cease-fire. Then, in July of that year, the armistice talks began and agreement was arrived at in a very short time. But, at first, it declined to become an agreement. It had not become an agreement because there was obstruction arising from difference of opinion on the problem of the prisoners of war. I have no time, Mr. Chairman, to go into the reasons why this prisoners of war problem has become

very important in the modern context of development of war. There is no provision in any International Law where this case can be treated on all fours with anything that we know. It has all arisen from the idea that the people can be taken from one side to the other, from the political ideologies that prevail in that place. But, the armistice agreement which had been completed by the end of that year did not come to anything; and, from April onwards there was a deadlock. And, following from the diplomatic pressures which were put by all concerned, the problem came before the United Nations Assembly in the autumn of 1952. At that time, the resolution which the hon. the Prime Minister referred to a while ago, which was submitted by our delegation from India was, after a great many vicissitudes, and in the first instance opposition from all sides, adopted by the Assembly by 55 to 5. Unfortunately, it has not been unanimously accepted, but circumstances in the world developed in such a way that in the spring of next year the wounded soldiers in Korea were arranged to be repatriated through the medium of the Red Cross, and advantage was taken of the circumstance and further peace was negotiated, and finally, on the 2nd of June there was agreement on the prisoners of war mainly on the basis of a resolution submitted by India and accepted by the Assembly with such modifications as are now embodied, and on the 21st of July the armistice was signed.

Now, it is important to remember this date, because questions have been raised in this House and elsewhere as to the necessity of sending our troops to Korea for the purpose of acting as ambassadors of peace. This is the first time in history when the armed forces have gone out definitely for the functions of peace. (*Hear, hear*).

Sir, in those ninety days between the signing of the armistice and the actual cease-fire, war raged with the greatest ferocity, a ferocity unknown

[Shri V. K. Krishna Menon.] even in the war of 1914-18. It was only because, without having to wait for mere formalities which would have taken three or four months, the hon. the Prime Minister of India took the bold step of immediately agreeing to send troops for the custody of the prisoners, we have been able to save in Korea a large number of lives on both sides, North Korean and South Korean, Turkish and Chinese, English and American. Whoever they were, they were all human lives. It was therefore a calculated risk, but it was worth taking in the name of humanity. It is true that it has landed us in some troubles, in difficulties; but what are Governments for if they cannot face difficulties? Our Custodian Forces went there, and the position today is that under the Chairmanship of India, a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, consisting of the Czechs and the Poles, the Swedes and the Swiss, has been set up. As the hon. the Prime Minister pointed out, if the Chairman of that Committee had been like the Chairman of any other committee, our responsibility would not have been so great. But it so happened that the Chairman in the original plan was like an umpire; and the composition of the Committee is of such a character that the Chairman has always got to make the most important decision or the interpretation of the agreement: and the final decision is in our hands. Therefore, whether we like it or not, the interpretation of the agreement is in our hands. Since the Custodian Force was to be from a country to which the two parties would agree, and as India was chosen to send the Force, this also places us in a position of additional responsibility. On the 10th of September, the unwilling prisoners of war were released from the control and custody of the detaining sides and were handed over to the Custodian Force of India. From that period onwards, this process of delivery went on and was completed by the 24th of September. From the 24th September, the entire unwilling

prisoners came into our custody and for ninety days thereafter, we had the obligation to arrange for explanation to prisoners of war. "Explanation" is a popular newspaper term. The spirit of the agreement is that the period of explanation should be ninety days, but the letter of the agreement provides for ninety days from the time we took over the prisoners. This explanation is a process of education; the prisoners were indoctrinated. This was the process of re-education. That was a natural process. Mr. Chairman, the spirit of the agreement was that the period of explanations should be 90 days. But the letter of the agreement provided for 90 days from the day when we took over. So there was no way out of it. In fact, the Repatriation Commission unanimously asked at the beginning that there should be an extension of the explanation period, which the U.N. Command refused, and they refused according to the law. And therefore that period came to an end. Then came the next period of 30 days. During that period of 30 days our army has the right and the duty to maintain guard over these prisoners. These prisoners are not ordinary prisoners or civil prisoners. They are prisoners of war. They are recalcitrant prisoners and there is no secret of that fact, because we had in a preliminary way submitted to the Assembly our difficulties with regard to the behaviour of these persons and also various other factors that stood in the way of the performance of our duty. Mr. Chairman, I think it is necessary to say that we as a Government are not concerned about the way in which these prisoners behave because that is their choice. But we have an obligation to see that we do our best. And that is what we are trying to do. So at the end of 90 days our custody will cease. The number of explained prisoners is about 3,000 or so and the net days of explanations have been ten or eleven. Now the repatriation agreement provides that those who are not disposed of in this manner should be

referred to a Political Conference. That means all but those who have returned home. The Political Conference has not taken place. And I wish, Mr. Chairman, to refrain from making any comment on the Political Conference because that might be improper while the negotiations are taking place. But, at any rate, they were to be referred to the Political Conference. This Political Conference has not taken place. Therefore, the integral part, the basic part, of the agreement goes out. If the Political Conference had taken place, we could have said that we had finished all the stages of the agreement. But the Repatriation Agreement makes the other stages categorical, with the result that our Army and the Repatriation Commission have to clear out of the neutral territory in 150 days at the very outset. We are faced with this situation: On the one hand, part of the agreement is broken; on the other, the other part cannot be disregarded. The main issue now is the question of the safety of our forces. The Repatriation Agreement is part of the Armistice, Agreement, and if anybody is so inclined, the failure of that agreement can be interpreted as the failure of the Armistice Agreement as a whole.

The question was asked: What would happen to these people after these 90 days? These are matters, at the present moment, of diplomatic representations, and unless conversations take place between the two Commands and, if necessary, with the respective Governments, it will be impossible for us to go any further in this matter. In these circumstances, the Government considered and instructed the Delegation that at the proper time the matter be placed before the United Nations. We were immediately empowered to do so. I would like to say here—it was mentioned in another place—that the Resolution that was passed by the United Nations was a Resolution which was very largely of our submission. It placed in the hands of the President of the United Nations

the initiative of calling that Conference, should circumstances warrant it. It is true that it contains the words "with the concurrence of the majority". That is the law of the United Nations, and in practice if we cannot get the concurrence of the majority, there will be very little achieved by going there. Therefore, the initiative rests with her, and if circumstances warrant and in the wisdom of the Government and of the Commission, we would have to ask for an appropriate date. At that time, as circumstances exist, the disposal of the prisoners would either have taken place or it might take place afterwards. The disposal of these 25,000 people is a great problem. There are several factors of violence involved. On the one hand, there is President Rhee, with his 17 Divisions—which is probably the largest army in the whole of South-East Asia—who has threatened all sorts of consequences to everybody concerned, even though he has lately been rather moderate. On the other hand, there are the prisoners themselves who are hostile to custody. Also there are possibilities of intervention from the other side. All sorts of consequences of such character might arise, but with the courage of our troops and the nature of our diplomacy, we may be trusted to deal with those problems as they arise. In a delicate matter of this kind, it would be unwise to go into greater detail than to look into the record of the Repatriation Commission with its able Chairman and his colleagues, who have surmounted so many difficulties in the past and also the wisdom and the patience of our Government in negotiating the necessary agreements.

This is the position, Mr. Chairman, with regard to Korea. The time is running against me, and with your permission, I will conclude now.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Mr. Chairman, I shall only endeavour to say a few words in regard to some of the points raised in the course of the debate. An hon. Member, Mr. C. G. K. Reddy, said many things

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

which to some extent answer themselves, because he has the habit, in the course of a few sentences, of contradicting himself many times. It is not really necessary for me to add anything in reply to that bundle of contradictions, but I do wish to understand what is meant by the phrase "national foreign policy" which is being bandied about. I am all for a national foreign policy. I would gladly consult as many people and as many groups as possible and also the leaders of groups, whenever an opportunity arises. But first of all a national foreign policy must necessarily mean some measure of agreement on that policy, on the broad principles of that policy. Of course, consultations there may be. I find in the hon. Mr. Reddy's speech a very great gap between his way of thinking and mine on this question. Now, does a nation lie somewhere in between the hon. Mr. Reddy and myself, and where does it lie? Do we go half way or if I give up something.....

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: I did not ask him to consult me and I don't think he will condescend to do so.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I wish to understand, because here, from the very speech that the hon. Mr. Reddy made, probably there is not much agreement on the national foreign policy. How does one get it? There are certain matters and certain emergencies when there is a large measure of agreement, because the smaller points are out of the way. That is true. I suppose personally, if I may say so, that the policy that the Government have been following by and large—I am not referring to details—is what I would call very much a national foreign policy, which, I do submit, has received a measure of support from the people of this country which hardly any country can show in regard to its foreign policy. However, we should remain in touch with others in regard to the leaders of other groups. I certainly welcome that and to some extent I will try to give effect to that.

Then the hon. Mr. Reddy talked a great deal about something, about a wave of hysteria encouraged by me and my colleagues. In particular, he referred to some circular issued by—presumably he referred to—the All-India Congress Committee. Now, I should have thought that the hon. Mr. Reddy perhaps is more excited about this matter than I am. Certainly I am not and let there be no mistake about it. Far from hysteria, I deprecate hysteria at any time, but it is true that the All-India Congress Committee issued some kind of a circular. I might confess here that I have not seen that circular as yet. But, leaving that aside, the position is—not the wording of it—the idea of it was at my instance, I admit that. So far as I know, that circular contained some advice about holding meetings to consider this problem, not processions and the like—I am not a believer in processions—the whole point being that public opinion should be informed so that it may not merely go astray by listening to rumours and other things and it may be positively informed about the very important developments. That is the function of every intelligent party, to inform public opinion according to its own way of looking at things about these developments. It depends how that is done—it may do it the wrong way or the right way. We happen to be a very live and dynamic party and we approach the public and don't sit at home.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: May I ask the hon. the Prime Minister if the meeting that was held in Delhi was in line with the advice that he has given us here?

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is a different question.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I hope so. I was not present at that meeting. I am told that it was a very good meeting and very good speeches were delivered. I was not present to hear every word but my colleagues were there and they reported to me that it was one of the best meetings that Delhi had where

speeches were moderate and very good.

Now he also said—I mean the hon. Mr. Reddy, I did not quite get his words—something about our Consul in Sinkiang being withdrawn.

AN HON. MEMBER: Expelled.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Pushed out. I don't quite know if the hon. Mr. Reddy knows anything about recent history. In fact some changes have taken place in the last two years.

AN HON. MEMBER: He does not know.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: He is not fully informed. Some major changes have taken place there. As a result of those changes, which have nothing to do with India at the moment—leaving that out—internally there many things have happened. It is perfectly true our Consul went there—I speak from memory—probably in 1948, may be even later, in 1949. But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there, it is perfectly true that the Chinese Government, when they came to Tibet, told us that they intended, that they wanted to treat Sinkiang as a closed area. They told other State Governments, too. Well, nothing happened. Our Consul remained there. But because of those changes, because of many factors—among them being what happened in Kashmir—the trade ceased. Sinkiang was important to us, or rather Kashgar. Let us use the word Kashgar and not Sinkiang. Kashgar is important to us as a trade route. The trade went over the Karakoram, passed through Ladakh and Leh on to Kashmir. Well, various factors, including developments in Kashmir led to the stoppage of that trade. While on the one hand the Chinese Government said that they wanted to treat that area as a closed area and did not wish to encourage foreign missions there, on the other hand, this trade stopped. The result was, our Consul remained there for some time, till recently.

But the Indian merchants there, the trade having stopped, gradually disappeared, and so far as I know there is hardly a single Indian merchant left there—maybe there are one or two. And so our Consul said, “I am doing no work at all. There is now no work to be done.” So we advised him to come away and he did come away. There is some property, but that is not the point. But it is a fact that the Consul, if I may say so, ceased to function, particularly, if you like, because of certain developments in Tibet and—again if you like—because of the Chinese State absorbing Tibet practically, not merely theoretically. This question of Tibet was referred to, I believe by the hon. Dr. Kunzru also. Well, I do not know what was expected or what is expected of us to be done in Tibet. I would say with a certain acquaintance with the position of Tibet during the last, let us say, 50 or 60 years or so, that at no stage in Tibet's history, to my knowledge—and I have studied it fairly carefully—was the suzerainty of China denied. Sometimes some Tibetan groups denied it. But no foreign country at any time ever denied the suzerainty of China over Tibet over the last many, many generations. That is the position. There is no doubt about it. Now, some people want us to go out on a kind of crusade for the independence of Tibet or for proclaiming something which in International Law, or in the position then existing, had not been put forward by anybody.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH (West Bengal): If I may interrupt for a moment, did not the Government of India send a note to the Chinese Government when the over-running of Tibet was about to begin?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What note?

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: Did not the Government of India then send a note of protest?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We sent many notes—not one. We are

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.] constantly sending notes. What is the protest about? I don't know what he means by protest. We are sending many notes, but at no time did we in any way challenge the suzerainty of China there. We have not, because, for the last so many years, when the British Government was here, they had recognised the suzerainty of China over Tibet. As long ago as 50 or 60 years back, when the British were rather dominant in Tibet, even in those days, and subsequently in 1911 or thereabout, when talks took place between the representatives of China, Tibet and India, even then the suzerainty of China was recognised. At every stage it was recognised. But the British Government in those days, and we subsequently for a short time, recognised the autonomy of Tibet under the suzerainty of China. That was a recognised position, the autonomy of Tibet under China. Now, if that was so, if it is the practical aspect of the question, it is not clear to me how we can go about intervening in Tibet either constitutionally or in any other way. I just do not understand.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: May I interrupt for a minute? I did not ask him to intervene. All that I asked him was about the existence of air bases in Tibet.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not replying to you. It is the argument which was advanced by the hon. Mr. Reddy.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: I did not ask him either. I did not ask him to interfere. I only said this. I said the hon. the Prime Minister himself had protested against the complete subjugation of Tibet and that some people had been talking about it. I only mentioned Tibet regarding the massing of troops across the border and I asked him whether it was not a geographical compulsion.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not aware of the massing of troops across the border. Perhaps

the hon. Mr. Reddy has greater sources of knowledge. I really do not know. We have no such sources. I do not pretend to have complete knowledge of what is happening in every part of Tibet. It is difficult. We have not got our own representative nor do the newspapers report these things, so that it is difficult to know all about these things. Much of the news that is published in the papers comes from Kalimpong and Kalimpong contains many people who send news which is of a most unreliable variety. It is very frequently, I think, completely unreliable and such news should not be accepted at all. I cannot give any exact figures but I am quite sure in my mind that there is no massing of troops anywhere—North, South, West or East—anywhere. In fact, my own information is that such troops as were there have been lessened for the simple reason that it is very difficult to feed them. Tibet is a most inhospitable country and is a most difficult country to live in, to cross over, to travel over—for anything.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: Is not Tibet still under effective Chinese military occupation?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Tibet is part of the Chinese State and the Chinese State can send its troops anywhere it likes within its boundaries. The hon. Member seems to live in a world which has no relation to reality of today. I just do not understand this question. People talk about foreign policy. Let us know something, the A, B, C, about these things.

SHRI B. GUPTA: This is meant to provoke some gentleman there.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not understand this. The hon. Member asks if China has got troops in Tibet. Of course, China has kept troops there. Certainly they have troops there. I was telling you that actually, so far as my knowledge

goes—it is not absolutely accurate as far as the numbers are concerned—the number of troops they had there originally had to be lessened; troops had to be withdrawn because of difficulties of feeding them there. The troops had to be fed and they could not be fed from the soil. Partly the food had to come from China and it is very difficult to send food across the Gobi desert and through a good bit of China.

I have no doubt—again I cannot give exact information, but I have no doubt—that airfields are being constructed in other parts of Tibet. It is a very natural thing to construct airfields. You may not like it; you may be slighted as far as that is concerned—it is another matter—but the only way of getting across to Tibet, as is the only way of getting across to many of our North Eastern Frontier areas, is by air. Air traffic has got to be developed. We are building airfields in most of our North-Eastern Frontier areas wherever we can and we are getting helicopters to go there. That is the only way. Now, the airfields can be used naturally for offensive purposes as well as for defensive purposes and also for trade and for normal traffic. All these things may happen. I am no prophet and I cannot see into the future as to how airfields can be used but if there is any suspicion that there are some preparations being made in Tibet for some kind of invasion of India, some kind of attack on India, I think that is completely mistaken and I think there is no basis for it. I cannot say what the distant future may hold, but I do not hold from my own point of view, and practically I am voicing the opinion of many others, that there is the least chance of even an attempt at such an invasion of India, and I think, apart from any uncertain factors, the mere factors of geography and various other factors make that exceedingly difficult, and then, in the final analysis, if any such thing takes place, we shall resist it. Why shout about it and why get afraid of it? I do not understand this

outlook. But, whatever may happen in the rest of the world, war or no war, this question of our Himalayan border being crossed is exceedingly unlikely. If something happens and an aeroplane comes and throws an atomic weapon on us, well, that depends on our policy rather than on anything else, on our friendship or hostility to other countries, not other factors. Nobody can gamble with the future. But our relations with the Chinese State at the present moment are friendly. We do not agree with them in many matters and they do not agree with us on many matters, but our relations are friendly, and in the course of the next few days, possibly within the next week, talks will begin in Peking. These talks relate chiefly to certain special rights that we have developed in the way of trade, etc., the pilgrimage that we have developed and some things relating to posts and telegraphs. Not one of them really is of vital importance.

I think the hon. Dr. Kunzru mentioned the question of the frontier. So far as we are concerned no question about our frontier arises and we have nothing to do with it. We have got a frontier which we know well, which is marked there and there the matter ends. We are not going to discuss it with anybody and we do not propose to admit anybody's right to come across that frontier except in a friendly way.

SHRI H. N. KUNZRU: I asked for information about Nepal and not about the North-Eastern frontier.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Nepal, the hon. Member knows, is an independent country and I cannot supply information about it except to say that we have an Ambassador there and some other people there helping the Nepal Government. Some officers are lent. We have got at present a small number of our troops to train their air force, about a couple of a hundred, I think. I cannot give you exact information, but, broadly speaking, politically, Nepal has been,

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]
in the last few months, in a somewhat fluid state, not in a very satisfactory state, and we have always had difficulties to face. We do not wish to intervene in the affairs, at the same time we are very much concerned of course with the stability and peaceful progress of Nepal and we have given advice from time to time when asked for. We have offered our help in the shape of experienced officers, though not many. A few have gone. The King of Nepal meanwhile fell seriously ill and the King was advised to go to Switzerland for treatment. He went there. He is much better now. He is convalescing and it is possible that he may be back within the next ten days or may be a fortnight. I hope that on his return we will see some further developments there towards stability. But the point of the hon. Dr. Kunzru was probably in reference to the stories about infiltration from Tibet, etc. I cannot give any precise answer to that. All I can say is that if there is any, it can be only on a small scale. It is nothing. It is not on a big scale. Obviously I cannot say whether a few persons have come across—what they do in more or less unknown territory across the border—but it is not, to my knowledge on any substantial scale.

That is all I have to say. I do not wish to take up more of the time of the House except to express my gratification at the general way hon. Members have expressed themselves and especially the hope they have expressed that if new difficulties come to us we shall face them with unity and courage.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mathur, do you press your amendment?

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: There is nothing wrong about it.

MR. CHAIRMAN: But would you like to press it?

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: I press it, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely,—

'and having considered the same, the Council is of opinion that the policy in regard to Kashmir and foreign pockets in India be changed and the will of the entire nation be mobilised against the military pact between the the United States of America and Pakistan'."

The motion was negatived.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: I press my amendment, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The question is:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, this Council regrets that the policy pursued by the Government of India, while claiming to bring peace to distant lands, has brought war near to our frontiers'."

The motion was negatived.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now comes Mr. Hegde's amendment.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: I think he is not here.

MR. CHAIRMAN: But he has moved it.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY: He may want to withdraw it, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Since he is not here, no withdrawal is possible.

The question is:

"That at the end of the motion, the following be added, namely:—

'and having considered the same, the Council approves of this policy'."

The motion was adopted.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now I put the motion, as amended. The question is:

"That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration, and having considered the same, the Council approves of this policy."

The motion was adopted.

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

I. NOMINATION OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

II. THE PREVENTION OF DISQUALIFICA- TION (PARLIAMENT AND PART C STATES LEGISLATURES) BILL, 1953

SECRETARY: Sir, I have to report to the Council the following Messages received from the House of the People, signed by the Secretary to the House:

I

"I am directed to inform the Council of States that the following motion has been passed in the House of the People at its sitting held on Thursday, the 24th Decem-

ber, 1953, and to request the concurrence of the Council of States in the said motion and further that the names of the Members of the Council of States so nominated be communicated to this House:—

"That this House recommends to the Council of States that they do agree to nominate seven Members from the Council to associate with the Public Accounts Committee of this House for the year 1953-54 and to communicate to this House the names of the Members so nominated by the Council."

II

"In accordance with the provisions of Rule 148 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the House of the People, I am directed to inform you that the House of the People has, at its sitting held on the 24th December 1953 agreed without any amendment to the Prevention of Disqualification (Parliament and Part C States Legislatures) Bill, 1953, which was passed by the Council of States at its sitting held on the 16th December 1953."

MR. CHAIRMAN: The Council stands adjourned *sine die*.

The Council then adjourned
sine die.

Editor of Debates,
Baiya Sadana Secretariat,