

[8 August, 2005]

RAJYA SABHA

The question was put and the motion was adopted.

SHRI SRIPRAKASH JAISWAL: Sir, I introduce the Bill.

**The Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sciences and
Technology, Trivandrum (Amendment) Bill, 2005**

THE MINISTER OF STATE OF THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE MINISTER OF STATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (SHRI KAPIL SIBAL): Sir, I beg to move for leave to introduce a Bill to amend the Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sciences and Technology, Trivandrum Act, 1980.

the question was put and the motion was adopted.

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: Sir, I introduce the Bill.

DISCUSSION ON STATEMENT MADE BY MINISTER

New framework for the Us-India Defence Relationship

THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION (SHRI JASWANT SINGH):
Mr. Deputy Chairman, how much time do I have?

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have 30 minutes.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH: I will try and see whatever I can do best in this time, Sir. The US-India relationship is considered to be an important relationship, so also the strategic partnership. Therefore, on this new framework agreement, that has been concluded by the Hon. Defence Minister on which he gave a statement recently, let me say it at the very outset, that we welcome the developments. I will share with you where ' we welcome it, where our concerns are. You know very well that the present Secretary General went in 2001-02 and many such agreements were concluded in the previous NDA Government. Those were the beginnings of this defence relationship, in real sense, going back actually to 1995. Now, there is, in that sense, continuity and this continuity is to be welcomed. There is this aspect of diversification of procurement of weapon systems, which is a welcome aspect. The question of technological advancement of military weaponry is somewhat a complex

subject. I don't want to go into the complexities of it, but because it is the tentacles of the technological aspects—production, R&D, what is the nature of war that we are confronted with today, what it will be tomorrow. That is a debate in itself which is not my intention to go into in any great length here. I might touch a point or two of it. But, the fact remains that technologically and technically, particularly in terms of military equipment, • not in other sense, but certainly, in terms of military equipment, I don't think that we have had, in human history, the kind of technological advancement that we witness today in the United States of America. How much of this we will be able to absorb, how much of it will be offered is again a different question which requires a different discussion and I touch upon it very briefly. This is the context in which the statement was made and the new framework was concluded. But, there is another reality. Let me share that reality very briefly with the Hon. Minister, as also the Hon. Members of the House. We had a discussion just the other day on the hon. Prime Minister's visit to the United States of America, his making a statement to the House whereafter my distinguished colleague, Shrimati Sushma Swaraj, made, I think, a very good intervention in the House.' What she has given voice to, in essence, was the next step in strategic partnership because the United States is a specialist in confusing acronyms; and, therefore, we have the NSSP, yet another addition in the multiples of that. Let us please recognize that the NSSP is a revolution in thought, both in the United States as also in India but it is an extremely hesitant revolution. It is hesitant in India and there is a great deal of hesitation in the United States also. That is a reality and if we overlook that reality, then I think, we are not addressing this entire question because, after all, defence relationship is a consequent, it is one of the byproducts as it were of the NSSP. Let us, therefore, be very objective about it. The NSSP by itself is, at the moment a hesitant revolution. Again, I don't want to elaborate this further than what I have said that this is the essence of the difficulties that are faced, both in the United States and in India.

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The second reality is, Sir, that neither in the United States nor in India, do we have the kind of domestic unanimity or consensus about the NSSP or the result, the byproducts of the NSSP as one would ideally want. It is much better if we take on board the fact that we would need to have much greater consensus in this regard, a much better understanding of what is being done, how it is being done and the benefits of it; and, this is equally applicable equally true of the United States.

Sir, I shared with the House the other day that—it is my experience and my viewpoint—I have not seen the United States as internally divided as I find it today. Very recently, I have shared this view with my friends in the United States of America. I continue to correspond with them on this subject. The political dialogue in that country is today as invective field as regrettably ours is. It is not something that one says with the sense of , delight, but this is a reality.

The third is: let us also recognize that within the United States as within us in a different fashion, there is a great internal debate that goes on—as to how this enhancement that the United States is contributing to in raising India's power status, power capability, is good for the future of the US national interests. I have attempted to put it as best as I can. There is a debate within the United States asking as to how good is it for our national interest to raise the power capacity, power capability of India. Just as we take this on board, please understand that the United States ' also takes on board. It is a democratic country like us, and, perhaps with much greater access to public opinion and opinion makers in India that they have and we have, in the reverse fashion because we are a hesitant revolutionary as a nation. We are a hesitant revolutionary because, in our case, we only half-believe the change, the great change, that is taking place. And, we only half-believe because part of us is still a captive of the shadows of history. We are unable to break free of the experience that, as a country, as a political community, as a Parliament, we have had in the last 50 years of relationship with what today is, no doubt, world's pre-eminent political, military, somewhat fragile now, but, economic power also, and most regrettably, Sir, I say, unfortunately also, the most dominant culturally. It is a reality that the icons of the US culture are icons now. There is a very wonderful phrase 'how can anybody eat a hot dog'. But, that is now cultural icon. So also, you have 'a blue jean' and the revolution of the competitive Colas; even the music. But, the sign of the dynamism of that country, just as much, Sir, as today I find—I would have been astonished if it had been otherwise—I am really delighted when I find—I am not a great fan of it, but occasionally I stumble upon it—that so much of the U.K. is now suffering from what is called reverse imperialism. You have pop bhangra; you have the revolution of the *tandoori*. *Tandoori* otherwise is not a very edible cuisine. But what is the *chicken tikka*? Everybody wants to eat it... (*Interruptions*)... Anyway, let me proceed, Sir. The point that I am making here is we only half-believe ourselves in

what we are doing today in this regard. Why do I say this? Because, if we approach, both United States and India approach, in this kind of hesitant tentative manner on, I think, what is really the most remarkable strategic shift that has taken place and is taking place, then we will only half-achieve the benefits of it. And, there are dimensions of it which are also economic. I think, President Putin, quite unwittingly, and I must share it with the Hon. Defence Minister, perhaps gave voice, what I think is the fundamental truth of the later half of the 20th Century, the last 15 years of the 20th Century, when he said that the greatest catastrophe that seized Russia was the demise of the former Soviet Union. And, he called it a great geo-political catastrophe. We should examine this coolly, rationally and as having implications for us both diplomatically. I won't take too much time, Sir. I won't read out all the contents of the Framework Agreement. Just see the essence of it. It is for the next 10 years. It lends to continuity but those 10 years must demonstrate the result of 10 years. Otherwise, we are specially taking 10 years to find a file. That might not be the best way to approach this.

There are usual tributes to freedom, democracy, and rule of law. There is a phrase, to advance shared security interests.' In the subsequent

elaboration, some of those security interests are elaborated, and it is a matter of some advice to the Hon Defence Minister that the longer we spend, and the more time is spent with the United States of America on deliberating over 'shared security interests', the better it is for the United States of America, for us and also for this Agreement for which we have got pats. The other day, just I shared with the House that my experience informs me that in the United States of America, policy moves in a four-year cycle. And in those four years, the first two years are the years of action, and the next two years are the years of elections. In this particular case, commonly called 'Bush-II' or 'Second Presidency.' I am beginning to think that the first two years of the action-oriented policy determination period has somehow unnaturally got cut short. Please take that into account when you proceed further.

Then here is this aspect of 'maintaining security and stability.' It is a very pregnant phrase. I hope, it is not one of those phrases which appears to say a great deal but does not have to say anything very much. Otherwise, security and stability really covers almost everything that one can think of.

The next is agreement on 'defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism.' This is the carry forward of what was agreed upon in 2001, 2002, 2003, and soon. I had repeatedly shared with the United States of America — because that was my job — that they were approaching the same thing completely wrong; they were missing what was taking place, I believe, on their doorsteps; they were not taking sufficiently seriously what was happening either in our neighbourhood in Pakistan or in Afghanistan. I do not want it to happen and having said it; if it were ever to happen, I would not be surprised, if some day, the same ills that have afflicted India for the past 15 years, would arrive upon their doorsteps also. And when it did so on 9/11, it did not delight me at all. Now, on terrorism, I do wish to take a minute or two of the Hon. Defence Minister.

Sir, I see some very involved discussion and debate going on in the third row of the ruling party. (Time-bell) I would also like to be a participant or debater of that discussion.

We must note that there is a very thin line between absolute failure and total success in terrorism. Let me cite our own example of 13th December. What became a failure was that they were struck at some cost. That was a failure. What would have been a total success for them to have ingressed into the Parliament and to have done what they wanted to do. Please note that the United States does not approach the question of terrorism in the same fashion as we do. Our experience of this menace is much older. I believe and I don't say it because of any parochial reasons, but because I believe so. It was a very unfortunate incident on the World Trade Centre. It was a terrible tragedy; it shouldn't have happened to any country. But the consequences on the psyche of the United States of America, at times, greatly concerns me. As a society, they have got traumatised. Their decision-making is, now of a kind which worries me. I believe, Sir, that the militarisation that is taking place within the United States of America is also a worry. The kind of excessive zeal that the security apparatus demonstrate in the United States of America at airports and elsewhere is because the control mechanism has much to do even before the regulatory wherewithals could keep pace. Therefore, the entire control mechanism has been firmed up for those who are unable to meet this sort of course. These are consequences. And, therefore, when we want to work with them, and we must work with them, we must have a full understanding and appreciation of the pluses and minuses of it. Sir, we

must also be very clear. Is this a fight or is it just a battle or is it just a law and order matter? I think, in this case, we are more confused than is the United States of America. We seem to oscillate between our attitudes on how to contend with this threat and this menace, and our approach to this issue is not constant. I do not wish to cite instances, Sir, because then the Hon. Members would be troubled by my instances, which is not my intention. But I do wish to point out that unless you are clear in your mind as to what this fight is all about. Is it a fight or is it only a law and order matter? What is Maoism all about? Is it a deeply worrying and a serious security threat to the country as terrorism or is it not? I do not know how we will work with the United States of America just as the United States of America also has to be clear in its mind as to what it is. For the United States, it's literally at war. Let me cite only two examples. Sir, because it is at war, they are ready to have guns and armour. But we don't want to have POTA. This is a very wide gulf. And you cannot cooperate on terrorism unless, at least conceptually, you approach the issue on the same wavelength. For example, in France, it is a very astonishingly direct and simple reply to the aspects of common civil law. There is only one French Republic. But that is not the answer that we are able to give. But France says that it is a violent confrontation with those that are challenging the Republic. Is that what we are seeing? France uses every possible tool, all weapons, in the armoury of the Republic, legal or military, if necessary because the Republic is pre-eminent and is above all other challenges. For Russia, it is clearly a war. I might exceed my time. I say this only to point out that in 1984, a very distinguished Member of the Congress Party, Mr. R. Venkataraman, was the Defence Minister. Pranab Babu was also a Member of this House. I was personally very disturbed over what had happened at the Akal Takht. He was going to Amritsar, and therefore, I really pleaded with him if he would take me with him to Amritsar, and I went with him to Darbar Saheb. While returning, I happened to meet one Russian, and just as a matter of academic interest, I asked him: "How would you have addressed this challenge?" He said: "It is very simple. We would have bombed the whole thing out of existence." It is a cultural and civilization difference. What Russia can do, India will not even think of doing. Why do I cite this example? When we are agreeing to cooperate and work together on terrorism, let us, at least, be clear ourselves on the fundamentals, on the basics of the challenge because, like the Maoist threat, this challenge lies in a very real sense, in meeting

the severe threat to democracy at a certain level. Is that the concern that the United States of America has? No. We must find, if nothing else, at least, the LCM of the common approach that we have. For example, Iraq. It is such a big subject, such a vast subject that I could go on speaking. Iraq, to my mind, is now today to be a potential black hole of terrorism. That black hole of terrorism has been created on account of the policies and actions of the United States of America. Therefore, when we agree to work with them, please state the reasons behind it. In a similar fashion, I would very briefly cover one of the questions about terrorism. The Hon. Defence Minister knows that we had occasion to say this earlier. I have no desire whatsoever to pick holes in the situation. I share the concern. I shared it the other day with the Hon. Prime Minister's statement. The United States of America wants to work with us in preventing spread of weapons of mass destruction. If you have signed a memorandum on that, how do we do that? In what fashion do we actually work with the United States in preventing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the associated material? How do we do this? You can say that we have signed all the necessary international treaties with them. I think, there has to be a very carefully judged balance here of obligations and benefits. Then you also said, Sir, and please reflect on this carefully that, with the United States of America, we will protect the free flow of commerce, which of course, we should try and protect *via* land, air and sea-lane. This is a very ambitious goal. I am sure, the Hon. Defence Minister will agree that when you have agreed to work with the United States of America to protect the free flow of commerce *via* land, air and sea-lane, and I go beyond just the standard observation about the foot-steps stretching from the Strait of Malacca to Aden, etc...

[THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN) in the chair.]

Let me ask a direct question. If we are to protect the free flow of air, land sea link, would the hon. Defence Minister please clarify now as to how till today India is unable to have a free access even by a link, whether by air or by land, to Afghanistan? How we are unable to have access of commerce to Pakistan freely? I don't want to cite Bangladesh. When we have agreed to protect free flow of commerce, by implication globally, please do share with the country and the House how you intend to do it and the two examples, what is not being possible and what we are not able to achieve with Pakistan or Afghanistan. With Afghanistan, Mr. Vice-

Chairman, Sir, I had difficulties. On those trying days, India donated buses to Afghanistan. The buses could not be sent by land route from here. We had donated, if I recollect rightly, about 500 tonnes of wheat. The wheat got lying and rotting at Wagah. It could not be transported because I had good sense that the Pakistan Government would not permit it to be transported directly by land to Afghanistan. There was no direct air connection of Indian Airlines till today between Kabul and Delhi. Everything that we had to send, we sent *via* the Emirates. What free flow of commerce are you talking about? (*Interruptions*)... We sent them *via* Iran. I don't know how you proceed.

I don't have much difficulty with the combined exercises and exchanges. It would be a good experience. If the outcome of the combined exercise and exchanges are disseminated, at least, in the Service Journal so that a large service community will be able to benefit from it and learn from it, and some of us who are students of military affairs can also be benefited from it.

There is also an agreement on collaboration of multinational operations. I think, there is need to make it clear as to what multinational operations you are conceiving because what we are witnessing today is a kind of, what should I call, the United Nations fatigue on the United States. It is rather a cliché phrase that the United States actually does not believe in the acronym 'P-5'. It believes only in 'P-1'. There are no five. There is only one and that is the United States of America. Therefore, all that should have been globally in what that P-1 wants, nothing else. Therefore, that is the reality. If that is the objective reality, we have to face the situation. In that context, if you say multinational, you have deliberately skirted the issue of "UN approved", "UN sponsored", "under the aegis". These are very standard diplomatic euphemisms. It is better for their common interest. Actually, we went only when there are interests and all. We would go with the United Nations. But still it is necessary to be clear on all these things, not as fault-finding but as further clarifications on approach.

Sir, I will take a minute or two to share about the regional global peace and stability. I will give just two examples. Is it the suggestion of the agreement that we would go to Haiti? What the United States has done in Haiti, on several occasions, is very much known. Would we be

partners in maintaining peace there? Alternatively, take the case of Taiwan. If the United States of America have concluded a security agreement about Taiwan with Japan, would we then be a party to that global peace? Let me then cite an example of Afghanistan. There is great deal of lack of comprehension of what actually is taking place today in Afghanistan, particularly in the United States of America. I am beginning to fear the same situation that I have had to go through from 1999 onwards. And I have a similar apprehension about our own sense of reality of what is taking place in Afghanistan today. I would not go into much greater details about what I feel is happening in our immediate western or eastern neighbourhood. Very briefly, it is well enough known as to how the President of Afghanistan is today guarded. There is a company called Dynacorp. I have for so many years now shared with my friends in the United States of America and in Afghanistan, "Do you not see what statement you make everyday when protection to the President of a proud country like Afghanistan, an Islamic Republic, is provided by a private firm that has hired security guards from the United States of America?" That security firm is called Dynacorp. That is a very damaging statement there and it is not just for Afghanistan, it is for the United States of America, it is for India and it is, to my mind, a very hurtful comment because I also belong to this region. I went to Kabul in that fateful December to swear in President Karzai. I found it a very touchnig experience. I landed at Bagran. They very kindly provided me the same helicopter which was at one time the personal helicopter of Ahmed Shah Masood. Ahmed Shah Masood used to sit in that helicopter in a kind of an easy chair with a very beautiful Badakhshani carpet on it. But what disturbed me there was not just the debris of war and how many tanks and other things were still lying at Bagran and this wonderful Shomali plains which were now nothing but annihilation, it was disturbing much more, Sir, that Ahmed Shah's personal crew and pilots used to come and chat with me. There was a very big auxiliary fuel tank next to me which had been put into the helicopter. Ahmed Shah had to fly constantly between Tazakhstan and Badastan. My entire military training had informed me that between an auxiliary fuel tank and a cigarette there should be a distance of 300 yards to 509 yards, and there was my good host standing like this, smoking next to that auxiliary fuel tank. Why do I cite this? There is a certain spirit that exemplifies Afghanistan, not true history alone because Afghanistan is also the same Afghanistan in which up till lately mothers used to silence

their children by saying, "If you do not keep quiet, Hari Singh Nalwa would come". So, we know Afghanistan for centuries. But, if the President of Afghanistan is guarded by a private security personnel, hired by Dynacorp, something inside me feels hurt. Please address this question. Should I share some additional facts about what is happening in Afghanistan? Then, Sir, they have the International Security Assistance Force. I don't know whom they are providing assistance to. That International Security Assistance Force is under the command of NATO. Now, what has NATO got to do with Afghanistan? It is North Atlantic; I mean, even with the most imaginative stretch of re-writing geography, I cannot stretch NATO to Afghanistan. I shared this concern with my friends in the United States. Then, I asked a number of friends in Pakistan: "Are you comfortable when you have the NATO troops next door?" They told me, "Can we go into a quiet place and talk this over? Please don't say this in front of them. But we are not comfortable." But I do say it in front of them; and, I say it in Parliament. It is not in our advantage; it is not in India's benefit; it is not in Afghanistan's national interest to have the NATO troops there. They said at one time that there were Polish troops. And I asked, "What on earth are you doing?" You are sending the Polish troops to Afghanistan? What has gone wrong with your thinking? How will you address this regional question?" Sir, the Afghan National Army is to be trained by the United States of America. They have got about 21,000 personnel there. But a lot of desertions are now taking place from there; inevitably so. Now, the police there are being trained by the Germans. The Anti-Narcotics operations are in the care of the United Kingdom. And you will be astonished to note that the law, justice and judiciary in Afghanistan are now being trained by the Italians. With all my experience, I cannot understand what the Italians have got to do and who are the Italians to teach the Afghans how to be just and to have the Shariat Law implemented. We still have no access in these countries.

Sir, I must conclude now. But I have to share with the House one more thought only; there is a great deal more that I could have said. Please address yourself to the question of what was earlier called Revolution in Military Affairs. Actually, warfare has moved much faster in that arena. We continue to remain stuck in transferred values, transferred knowledge, transferred acronyms of the West. Please free yourself from that. My greatest worry and my greatest concern lies in this very great

damage that we have done to ourselves. Please bear in mind, what I term as a law of unintended consequences, in diplomacy, in warfare as also in internal affairs. I won't cite examples of the results of this law. But, one final point, Sir, which is about the Ministry of Defence. I am very deeply worried by the state of Ministry of Defence. We have brought--all of us are collectively responsible for this—the decision-making system, the decision-making apparatus in the Ministry of Defence to a total grinding stop. A lot, Sir, I am ready to admit, was actually started long years ago when the whole issue of Bofors first cropped up. I then mentioned it in public, "It is a very good weapon system but, I believe, the method of procuring it had been faulty".

My colleagues thought that I should not have commended the weapon system. I think, I was right in commending it. I think, I am still right in holding to the view that the method of procuring it was faulty. And when the then Prime Minister wanted to blacklist this firm, I pleaded with him, "Don't do it. This is not in India's interest. The agreement has long-term implications. There is no need to blacklist it". That blacklisting was wrong. We have gone down that path, increasing our speed of the decline of this Ministry at a pace, which really bewilders me. I have very serious difficulties with accepting the rationale of sending 32 cases, which are observations made by the Comptroller and Auditor General, to the Central Bureau of Investigation. The Comptroller and Auditor General's observations go to, at least, two Committees of Parliament which examine them. This need not have happened, I don't think this step was correct. I will not be able to agree to it. What it has done, Mr. Chairman, is that there is not a single officer today in the Ministry of Defence who is ready to put even a dot on a piece of paper and agree to anything. What, therefore, you, Mr. Defence Minister, have concluded, I think, is a very worthwhile agreement and that requires to have many follow-ups, consequential agreements, to continue so that the pace of its implementation is maintained. I share with you this worry that because of what we have done, having brought the Defence Ministry to a Standstill, the implementation of it will not keep pace with your intentions. That, Sir, is, I think, the fundamental part of it. Thank you

SHRI JAIRAM RAMESH (Andhra Pradesh): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, it is a rare privilege to be speaking after the Leader of the Opposition. At the end of an almost 50 minutes' 'tour de horizon' of the State of the US

economy, the State of US thinking on military matters, eating habits in the United Kingdom, private security organisations in Afghanistan and, finally, the State of India's Defence Ministry, I turned to my neighbour, the Hon. Minister of Information and Broadcasting and asked him a very simple and pointed question as to what the Leader of the Opposition actually said, to which the irrepressible Mr. Jaipal Reddy responded, "Well, his political compulsions conflict with his ideological impulses and his diplomatic predilections and, hence, the obfuscation". I think this was a bit of a tongue-twister. -

But I do want to commend him for the high moral ground that he occupied and stressed the element of continuity that is implicit in this statement of the Defence Minister on the agreement that has been signed between India and the United States. I wish the same statesmanlike approach had been adopted by his colleague who was the opening batswoman when the debate on the Prime Minister's statement took place. I think the Hon. Leader of the Opposition has made my task much easier. He has enabled me to close Mr. Strobe Talbot's book; I don't need to take any reference to it; because, I think, the tone that he has adopted, a very statesmanlike tone, recognising the element of continuity, but only pointing out that the Americans cannot be trusted, that you do not have to believe whatever the Americans tell you and that there are a lot of risks implicit in this agreement because of the nature of domestic politics in the United States, is a warning; that is a caveat, worth its weight in gold and coming from somebody who was engaged with the United States over a long period of time and who has, in effect, emerged as a major spokesman for closer engagement between India and the United States, I think, the Government would be well-advised to heed his warning Sir, the debate is, of course, not on the United States *per se*; the debate is not on the world's geo-strategic scenario, but the debate is on this relationship that has been concluded, the Framework Agreement that has been concluded between India and the United States two months' ago in Defence. Sir, the word 'Framework Agreement' itself is suggestive that we are discussing not a final agreement; we are not discussing the nuts and bolts of a defence relationship; we are discussing a Framework Agreement, an Agreement that sets the broad framework, sets the broad parameters and provides a rough and ready roadmap for closer engagement between India and the US.

4.00 P.M.

Sir, the statement that the hon. Defence Minister laid on the Table of the House draws reference to the fact that this goes back to 1995, when India and the US had a similar agreement, not so detailed agreement, but somewhat of a similar agreement on cooperation on defence, and the hon. Leader of the Opposition reminded us that there is an intervening milestone, the NSSP, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, which forms the background to this Defence Agreement. Actually, Sir, I would like to take this element of continuity much beyond 1995. It is really not as if in 1995 alone, suddenly, India and the United States discovered each other, discovered the need for each other or discovered the need for closer engagement on strategic issues between each other.

Sir, way back in 1980, the eminent civil servant, who the Leader of the Opposition often quotes when he talks about the North-East and Jammu and Kashmir, the late Shri B.K. Nehru, writes in his Memoirs, 'Nice Guys Finish Second' that he was dispatched by the then Prime Minister Shrimati Indira Gandhi long before Mr. Reagan was sworn-in as President of the United States to open a channel of dialogue with the President-elect of the United States. In fact, Mr. B.K. Nehru was only the second foreign dignitary, after Mr. Helmut Schmidt of Germany, to have been granted an audience by the President-elect, Reagan. Subsequently, Sir, under Mrs. Indira Gandhi, there were a lot of high-level summit meetings that took place, which culminated, of course, in the MoU on high-tech transfer between India and the United States, that was signed in 1984. In 1985, the then Indian Prime Minister went to the United States and one of the major purposes of that visit, in many ways, a landmark visit, was to trigger a process of cooperation in science and technology, in research and development, which incidentally forms a very important and integral element of this Agreement. Sir, it is not often recognised, the hon. Leader of the Opposition is engaged in a debate which, unfortunately, I cannot take part in that debate with which he is engaged in bilaterally.

Sir, when the hon. Leader of the Opposition spoke on the Prime Minister's statement, he talked about the paternity disputes. There are a lot of paternity disputes on the IT Industry in India, Sir, and I just want to say that in 1985, when, the then Prime Minister went to the United States, he made a special visit to Houston and the purpose of that visit to Houston

was to meet the CEO of Texas Instruments, one of the largest IT companies in the world. It was because of that trip that Texas Instruments, which was a very major IT player, both in the civilian industry and in the Defence industry, decided to open shop in Bangalore. And, that is how Bangalore really came on the IT map of the world and that is how the entire IT Revolution started. Sir, I don't want to get into paternity disputes here. The short point is, as the hon. Leader of the Opposition has himself recognised, there is a very strong element of continuity in the search for closer relations between India and the US. For variety of reasons, having to do with geo-politics, with US's own policy, with India's own pressing domestic and regional concerns, for a period of time, it did appear, as if there were divergent interests between India and the US. But, beginning 1980, Sir, over a last quarter of a century, successive Governments, Congress, Coalition, now again Coalition again, have found it prudent, have found it in the national interest to pursue a closer economic and strategic partnership with the United States on terms that are dictated by the sovereign Government of the day here in this country. So, I do believe to that extent what the Defence Minister has done, what this Government has done, has taken this continuity forward, yet another milestone in the search for this closer strategic and economic partnership and engagement. But I stress closer and enduring partnership on our terms, closer and enduring partnership as equal partners, as partners that bring an equal amount of value to the table. This is not, this cannot and this will never be a search for a partnership of a client-patron type, of a subservient State and a superpower type. It has necessarily to be a partnership founded on the national interest, based on a domestic political consensus that the Leader of the Opposition talked about. I do believe today, Sir, across the political spectrum while there may be genuine tears and concerns about US foreign policy in Afghanistan, US foreign policy in Iraq, US foreign policy in other parts of the world, I do believe there is general recognition that we have to do business with the United States. It is in our interest to build a closer economic partnership, it is in our interest to build closer a political partnership, and it is in our interest to build a closer strategic partnership. To that extent, Sir, I think there will be a fair degree of political consensus and agreement across the spectrum. In a coalition partners and allies will have their concerns which have their fears which I am sure will be aired even today and would have been aired in the media. But I do believe we must recognise the nature of this continuity. Sir, my second

point is that when you look at the agreement itself which the hon. Leader of the Opposition tried to do towards the end of his intervention; there are three or four issues that have, in fact, caused legitimate fears. First, there is an issue of joint exercises. But, Sir, joint exercises is nothing new. As we know, as all of us note, in the last three or four years we have had joint military exercises in Agra, we have had joint military exercises in Alaska, I suppose to acclimatise the American troops to heat and Indian troops to winter. We also had a joint naval exercise where Indian ships in the Indian Navy had escorted the American ships in the Straits of Malacca which has raised many eyebrows in South-East Asia. So, joint exercises is not a new invention. It is a new animal that has crept up in the framework agreement. It has been there and it has been one element of this engagement. It has enabled both the sides, both militarily establishments, to get to know each other after a long period of separation. I do believe whatever fears may have been expressed on joint exercises, are, in fact, largely exaggerated. Sir, the second point in the framework agreement is multinational operations and the hon. Leader of the Opposition drew reference to this by asking what is multinational; will we be called upon to send troops to Haiti; will we be called upon to send our troops to Somalia, to Sierra Leone to Iran or wherever, should the Americans ever decide this misadventure. Sir, I found that actually, Sir, the only partisan note that I want to introduce in this presentation is I found that question or query strange coming from a representative of a political formation that according to all reports had almost committed Indian troops to Iraq, was on the verge of sending Indian troops to Iraq. Now, for somebody who was almost talking about sending Indian troops to Iraq to turnaround and ask the Indian Defence Minister, will you send troops to Haiti, will you send troops to or to Somalia or whichever country, I thought that was somewhat misplaced. But I do believe that the concern of multinational operations is not entirely out of place. But, I think he has been selective and has not read the full phrase in the joint statement which reads that multinational operations in their common interest. Now, as I understand it, Sir, if it is not in our interest to send troops to Haiti, we will not send troops to Haiti, if it is not in our interest to send troops to Iran or North Korea or whichever country the United States feels it is interested to send its troops, we will not send troops there. So, I think this sign of a mature relationship is that we agree to disagree. There are vast areas of agreement and engagement, but there will also be areas where there are substantial disagreements.

The maturity of a relationship between India and the United States will be when India tells the US that 'no, this is in our national interest; this is what we are going to do'. I believe we are saying this in the case of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. I believe the Prime Minister said this on the issue of Iraq when he was questioned on the wisdom of American intervention there. Therefore, Sir, I think, when looked at in its entirety, this phrase 'multi-national operations in their common interest' should convince us that it is really up to the Indian Government of the day to decide whether it is in its interest to do something which the Americans feel it is in their interest and I quite agree with the hon. Leader of the Opposition that there are many areas of agreement between India and America but there are equally many areas where we cannot agree with the United States. We cannot agree on the conduct of its foreign policy both in our region and in other parts of the world. I think, the sign of maturity, the sign of our strength; the sign of our resilience will be when the Government of the day has the courage to say, 'no, we will not do this because it is not in our interest'¹. That is how I understand this phraseology in the statement that has been signed. Sir, I think there are other elements, there are other features of the agreement on technology transfer, on collaboration, on co-production, on research and development which nobody can really object to because in many ways here India stands to gain both through out-sourcing, both through its own research and development capacity and both also in terms of upgrading its own defence production capability which I will come to it a little later. So, I think, Sir, in terms of the point that the hon. Leader of the Opposition made on the basic features of this agreement, I think, on the core issue of joint exercises and multi-national operations, I do believe that there are enough, adequate safeguards in the agreement itself to ensure that if the Government feels it is not in its interest to take this agreement forward it will not do so. And, as I said, Sir, this is not a definitive; this is not a conclusive agreement. It is only Framework Agreement, which has to be negotiated, which has to be given teeth, which has to be given concrete nuts and bolts and specific milestones. Sir, let me now turn to the third issue which is really the larger issue of defence production, defence planning, defence R&D. What this agreement really does in my view, Sir, and we have a very distinguished scientist, Prof. Kasturirangan is sitting here, and I hope he speaks on this because what this agreement does is like what the Prime Minister's statement on the Indo-US collaboration on science and technology did, it

opens the window of collaboration. It opens a window of engagement for upgrading our own defence industry. Sir, the fact of the matter is, that at the end of 50 years, it is not a matter of great pride that countries like Israel have a far greater, lucrative, defence industry in India. We are still dependent on defence imports. Our main objective has to be at all costs, at all times, indigenisation. A country of India's size, a country of India's geo-strategic vision and its ambition and its own compulsions and concerns, enforces on us, the imperative need at all times to indigenise, to absorb the technology, to improve the technology, to keep the technology contemporary at all times. Now, Sir, self-reliance does not mean autarchy. Self-reliance does not mean that you close your walls and do everything on your wall irrespective of time and cost considerations. As the experience of the Indian Space Research Organisation shows self-reliance means creative engagement with the rest of the world. Self-reliance means borrowing what you don't have. Self-reliance means getting know-how from outside. Self-reliance means the ability to absorb the technology, productionise it and put products whether it is a tank, whether it is a missile, whether it is an aircraft, whether it is a Light Combat Aircraft in place. Sir, the sad fact today is, — again we have a very distinguished representative of the user here—if you talk to the users, if you talk to the Indian Army, to the Indian Navy, to the Indian Air Force, there it says, indigenous defence research and development has not made a dramatic contribution to our own indigenisation effort. If you talk of scientists, the scientists say, 'The users keep changing their requirements because there is an inbuilt propensity for imports.' I think, the truth is somewhere in between. What this Agreement does, in my view, for the first time, is, it provides an opportunity for building a vibrant Defence industry based on domestic research, based on domestic capability, but creatively engaging with the rest of the world, borrowing things like engines for LCA so that you are able to cut down the production schedules and the production time. I think, the real concern in this Agreement is how do we use this statement in order to fulfil our own objectives of creating a self-reliant, technology-based, indigenous Defence industry. That is really our objective. That was the objective that has animated all our discussions on Defence planning. It is often not recognised in this country. That one of the first things that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru did — Prof. Kasturirangan might recall — was that he personally hired, in 1948, the Nobel laureate, Prof. P.M.S.

Blackatt, to be the Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence. The first Scientific Advisor to the Minister of Defence was Prof. P.M.S. Blackatt, a very famous Nobel laureate in Physics. This was the idea that we must bring in science, we must bring in modern technology, modern research and use that as a basis for creating a vibrant domestic Defence industry. This is what the Americans have done. The hon. Leader of the Opposition ■ is right that revolution in military affairs is really the revolution in technology. This is what Israelis have done. This is what Chinese are doing. This is what the Russians have done. This, I believe, is the route for India to take. We cannot, year-after-year, be dependent on imports. Year-after-year, we cannot use our foreign exchange just to have expensive imports. I think, we should develop our own capacity in many of these areas and use opportunities like the Agreement that has been signed in order to borrow know-how, to transfer technology and, in fact, to contribute to world-wide research and development. Today, India is emerging as the biotech capital of the world. India is emerging as the IT capital of the world. There is simply no reason why the Indian scientists and Indian technologists in this vast network of research laboratories that we have cannot do contract research and development for systems abroad, aircraft abroad, for tanks abroad and for missiles abroad. I think, once you get out of this culture of secrecy that we have built up for ourselves and use this as a technological opportunity, you will see that this statement really has much more to offer than it meets.

Finally, Sir, the hon. Leader of the Opposition, was right in saying that in the last few years, there has been a paralysis in the Defence establishments. Sir, Rs.24,000 Crores earmarked for Defence modernisation was not spent between 2001 and 2004. Why was it not spent? We can debate it. One of the reasons, perhaps, is the fear of taking a decision. But the fact is Rs. 24,000 Crores earmarked for modernisation. And, only about 15 to 20 per cent of the Annual Budget of the Defence goes for modernisation and capital expenditure. And, Rs. 24,000 Crores, according to this CAG Report, was not spent! He is quite right. We need an accelerated modernisation of our Defence establishments. We need to expedite procurement in key areas. There is no point in increasing the Defence Budget year-after-year, if we are not able to put in place a fast track mechanism in order to ensure that

decisions for modernisation of system, decisions that will enhance safety, reliability and efficiency of our Defence system is not taken in time.

I do want to end with one word of caution. We are, after all, still a very poor country. I am a patriot, but I am no jingoist. I don't believe that this country cannot afford a Defence expenditure of 5 or 6 per cent of the GDP. Today, the Defence expenditure is running at roughly about 3 per cent on the GDP. It is just about right. Maybe, it can go up to three and a half per cent. But, Sir, we should be very cautious because the temptation to militarise, the temptation to create a military-industrial complex, which President, Eisenhower, himself warned in 1959, is equally strong in our country. And, if you question anything about military, your patriotic credentials are immediately doubted. So, I do want to say this that our needs in agriculture, our needs in education, our needs in health, our needs in nutrition, are enormous. So, the 'guns and butter debate may be an academic debate in other parts of the world, but it is very live debate in this country. So, let us by all means modernise, let us by all means get modern weapon systems; let us by all means give our defence, system safety, reliability and efficiency. But, at the same time, let us keep a check on Defence spending. Let us not use this opportunity for a runaway spiralling of Defence expenditure because, in this way, it is a sure recipe for domestic ruin.

Thank you, Sir.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU (West Bengal): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, actually, within a week of the debate that we had earlier in this House on the hon. Prime Minister's Statement, this debate, to me, is proving to be a little more difficult. A little more' difficult, primarily, because of the Statements and observations of the hon. Leader of the Opposition, who had opened the debate. The other day, I had the virtue of recognizing that I was not surprised by the opening remarks of the hon. Member, Shrimati Sushma Swaraj. But, today, I am really surprised because I am not very clear what the hon. Leader of the Opposition's contention is—whether the statement is good or bad. If it is bad, then, he should not create this impression that he had created the background and the hon. Defence Minister has just inked on the dotted lines. And, if it is bad, why is it bad? Because, the earlier Government did precisely carried out many of the implications that are implicit in the statement. Therefore, I am really

confused and I don't really try to conceal that element of surprise.

But, I think, my friend, Shri Jairam Ramesh, has made very interesting remarks. I don't know whether this is also to really create a smokescreen as to whether this agreement springs out from the National Common Minimum Programme. And, very, very significant last point he made was about 'guns and butter. But, Sir, our problem is that Mr. Ramesh's basic defence of the statement has been that this is a framework, not a proper agreement. Now, what does the term 'framework' suggest? A framework is definitely indicative. We agree with that. A framework is definitely indicative. But what is indicative in this framework? We had been told several times before the Defence Minister actually took his visit to the United States that that was an exploratory visit. I think, it would be in the fairness of things and the need for probity that if the hon. Defence Minister, while he replies to the debate, can really elaborate on the extent of exploration because exploration does not really commit anybody to even an indicative framework. Therefore, this nature of the exploration is really a little mystifying because, later on, when explanations were dished out we were told that they had to renew the initial agreement which was reached in 1995. If that is the case, that this kind of an agreement on arriving at some kind of a defence cooperation framework was very much on the cards, then, naturally, it follows from that kind of an argument that the visit can be everything but exploratory, and it is to have certain definitive dimensions insofar as it provides an indication.

The other point made by Shri Jairam Ramesh, which I find very difficult to digest is this. He is trying to divorce defence policy, defence strategy issues from the geo-political context. He was very appreciative of the kind of strikes that Israel has made. In all fairness, through you, can I pose this question? Was it possible for Israel to do what it has done but for the kind of strategic partnership that they have provided to the United States' interest in the Middle East? I think, Mr. Jairam Ramesh could have done well while he was trying to show the continuity of this framework document with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's policies in terms of self-reliance and having the correct vision, a modernistic vision of a modernistic India, of developing its science and technology, with also references to what Pandit Nehru thought of how Israel is doing and what kind of role it is playing. He referred to Mrs. Gandhi, Shri B.K. Nehru and

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what Mrs. Gandhi thought of this development in the Middle East, why Israel is doing what it is doing and how it is managing to have the kind of developments in defence matters. I think that would be more enlightening for all of us who do not know so much about the United States and how it has contributed to the emergence of the IT industry. I think, I have learned many of these things, ironically, from the Defence Minister himself how the strategy of locating our defence and aviation research facilities in the 60s' in Bangalore led to, actually, the creation of the capacities which could be made use of in the subsequent period when, maybe, Texas Instrument also provided some inputs in that process of development.

SHRI JAIRAM RAMESH: Just one minute. My point was, why should India be importing from Israel? That is the issue. I am not supporting Israel. I am saying, if Israel accounts for 15 per cent or 10 per cent of India's defence imports, it is not a situation that is in our national interest. We should be sending stuff to Israel; we should not be buying stuff from Israel. That is the point I am making.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: I am very happy that we have a supporter here. We think our foreign policy position on Middle East is improving regardless of Governments, while the Middle East is getting influenced by this fact that Israel defence imports to this country have risen to the tune of 3.5 billion dollars. I could not agree with you on this question. But the point is, you see, the defence cooperation framework is precisely creating those conditions. It is precisely creating those conditions. It is one question of whether we should import from Israel or not or whether we should export. But the basic issue here is how Israel has attained the capability to export to a country like India. If we go to that question, we will find that there was a willingness on the part of Israel to share a strategic partnership with the United States in the Middle East, which has facilitated the kind of development which allows Israel to make the kind of exports that they are doing today in India. Therefore. *...(Interruptions).*

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): Mr. Basu, I am sure that the House would like to hear you much longer, but the only problem is that there are 8 or 9 speakers, and I am told that we have to finish it today.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU. Sir, I have no problem. If you direct

me...(Interruptions)... I am too old now...(Interruptions)...

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): I am only looking at the time.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: I don't want to upset the Chair; but I think..*(Interruptions)...*

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): No, I am not upset.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: There was a general appreciation of this fact when others spoke before me I would, really, be a part of this.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): It is a point of allotment of time. That is all. The time allotted to your Party is 10 minutes.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: Sir, I also understand; therefore, I also looked up. I think the Leader of the Opposition spoke for an hour, he was allotted 30 minutes I know I am a very small person. I am very...

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): No, I am just asking you to carry on.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: And, I have the greatest reverence for both, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chair, but I think, some element of even-handedness on the question of time would be better appreciated.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): Certainly. I said that the House would like to hear you longer. Try to see that all the 8 or 9 speakers can speak.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: Sir, to the best of my ability, I will try to cooperate with you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): Thank you.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: Therefore, the question today is, the short point is, that we cannot divorce the question of our defence strategy, our defence relationship, that too with a very, very important country of the world with which we have, absolutely, no hesitation that We have to engage, from the overall world-view or the approach that we have, particularly, in the context of the fact that this is a country whose inspiration of the Foreign Policy objective states that America has no permanent friends, it has only permanent interests. Again, the question is: If the Americans

have been prepared to go this far with us, at what cost? Why are they interested, at this very juncture to do all these good things to us? Let me pose this question that way. The Leader of the Opposition is not around, but the other Members of the Opposition are here. We know, for example, what is very close to Mr. Jairam Ramesh's heart is our indigenous programme, the Light Combat Aircraft. I happened to have been in the Defence Standing Committee, and we had really seen the unwillingness of that partner with whom the hon. Member, the Leader of the Opposition, was saying that NSSP was signed. Then why they put such a big spoke in our indigenous programme? Therefore, the dependability of the partner is also a very big question in political terms, when you give certain indications about entering into a defence cooperation treaty. Therefore, it really surprises us why the Americans are talking about giving us the Patriot missile? Within America itself, there are a lot of questions about this missile shield, and there are a number of countries which have categorically given their refusal to become a part of the missile shield which the Americans ambitiously think that they should go ahead with. What are the reasons behind the American establishment's thinking for offering us the Patriot missile? This is a question we have to answer while we endorse or do not endorse this framework programme. The question of outsourcing business processes has created a lot of debate in the country. That country is debating hotly whether business process should be outsourced to India, because that is creating employment problems in United States. Now, that talks of outsourcing security on the Malacca Strait. Now, Sir, if you see the background of the Malacca Strait Naval Exercise, you will find that the littoral States there comprise of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. While the Singaporeans want to bring the Americans in there, the Indonesians and the Malaysians have approached the ASEAN and said that there should be a regional security initiative and no outsiders should be allowed to keep military vigilance over the Malacca Strait. Now, therefore, certain questions arise as to what extent this cooperation will lead us to, and whether that will help us in achieving the kind of foreign policy objective that the present Government really has stated in such unexceptionable terms, where it says in the CMP and I quote, "Even as it pursues closer engagement and relations with the USA, the UPA Government will maintain the independence of India's Foreign Policy positions on all regional and global issues." This is the moot question, Sir. Yes; we need cooperation, but it should be on our

terms. And, lest we should give this impression that in exchange of, in lieu of that cooperation, we are not going to take a position which will alienate us from potential allies because in the ultimate analysis, India, today, in the best interest, a rationale interest would like to have a multi-polar world, not a unipolar world. Unipolar world is not in India's interest. I was also, Sir, quite surprised really by the bluish hole theory of Iraq. I think, Jairamji also lauded the Prime Minister over what he has stated on Iraq. As far as the first part is concerned, I also feel Sir, that he has made us proud by saying that the Americans made a mistake. But the difficulty is, we have a Resolution unanimously passed by this House and the other House which does not stop at just condemning the American occupation, but also talks of withdrawal of the occupation forces as early as possible. And may I point out, Sir, through you, that almost two years have already passed, and 25,000 civilian deaths have taken place? I do agree that technology has a very important role in modern day warfare, but we should not forget that wars are not merely won through technology alone, and Iraq is the greatest example of this. Nobody thought that Vietnam, a small country, will put on the kind of resistance that it did against the huge war machine of the United States and the USA fall flat on its face. We should not see these developments in isolation, but it should be seen in the context of the political processes, global political processes. And, then when Iraq came, many of the commentators said, "Well Iraq is not Vietnam; well Saddam Hussain is not Ho Chi Mein." Correct. But you see the spirit of freedom, which impounds the majority of the Iraqi people today, has led to this situation, and it is a different thing that they may be misled by a lot of people. I am very happy that the Leader of the Opposition has admitted that what has happened in Iraq and today's development is largely the handiwork of the United States itself, of its kind of abrasive policies that they pursued *vis-a-vis* Iraq. But, here also, the bottom line is that in spite of light years of distance between the technological level of the American war machine and the British war machine and the way the Iraqi's are fighting, the war is still on.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): Mr. Basu, kindly conclude.

SHRI NILOTPAL BASU: Sir, a couple of sentences more. Therefore, I think, it is very, very important for us that as an independent country, as a country which has come to be respected by the entire world, the

developing world, in particular, the issues which I mentioned should be kept in mind. I think, I cannot say that not only this particular Framework Agreement, though it is a fact that it does not commit itself, needs to be looked into but, at the same time, non-reference to the UN auspices in sending multinational forces, the entire missile question and also the other issues that I have tried to touch upon really does not augur well for the country the manner in which it is going in securing defence cooperation relationships with other countries. We would have been happier if you tried to have some kind of a better relationship with the United States. We were equally mindful of the other concerns and other countries which are really our potential enemies because again at the end of the day Americans feel that they don't have any permanent friends, but only permanent interests and those interests cannot converge with the interest of India. Thank you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALI S. NARIMAN): Shri Siddiqui, your party has eight minutes, and there are several speakers.

श्री शाहिद सिद्दिकी (उत्तर प्रदेश) : सर, सबको जैसे आपने समय दिया, उसी रेशों से मुझे भी वक्त मिलेगा, मुझे उम्मीद है।

वाइस चेयरमैन साहब, आपका धन्यवाद मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि डिफेन्स मिनिस्टर साहब जो एग्रीमेंट करके आए हैं, मुझे यकीन है कि उन्होंने हिंदुस्तान के मसादात को हिंदुस्तान के इंटररेस्ट को सामने रखकर ही यह एग्रीमेंट किया होगा। इसीलिए मैं जब अपने कुछ सवाल यहां उठा रहा हूँ, तो किसी की जो इंटेन्शन हैं उन पर सवाल नहीं उठा रहा हूँ। बल्कि देश के हित को सामने रखकर उठा रहा हूँ। मेरे सामने एक सबसे महत्वपूर्ण सवाल यह है कि जब डिफेन्स मिनिस्टर साहब वहां गए, तो यह बड़ा साफ नहीं था कि वहां वे इस किस्म का कोई एग्रीमेंट करने जा रहे हैं। जिस तेजी से भारत और अमरीका की दोस्ती बढ़ी और जितनी अचानक दोस्ती के अंदर तेजी आई, उसने हम सबको हैरान कर दिया, अमरीकन्स को हैरान कर दिया, जो इस इश्यू पर एक्सपर्ट हैं, उनको भी हैरान कर दिया कि अचानक इतनी तेजी क्यों आई, कैसे आई। तो मैं यह जानना चाहूंगा कि क्यों इतनी तेजी आई और कैसे आई ?

सर, जब आप गए, 29 जून को आपने यह एग्रीमेंट साइन किया, फ्रेमवर्क एग्रीमेंट और फिर उसके बाद प्रधानमंत्री ने वहां जाकर 18 जुलाई को दूसरा एक एग्रीमेंट साइन किया। तो यह प्रधानमंत्री जी के एग्रीमेंट तक इंतजार क्यों नहीं हो सकता था? क्या यह एग्रीमेंट प्रधानमंत्री जी के एग्रीमेंट का प्रिडीसेसर था? क्या ऐसा था कि जब आप यह एग्रीमेंट साइन करोगे, तो फिर हम वह

एग्रीमेंट साइन करेंगे? यह सवाल मेरे मन में उठा है। हो सकता है कि मैं गलत हूँ, लेकिन यहाँ एक सवाल उठा है कि क्या यह कंडीशन थी कि आप यह एग्रीमेंट पहले हमारे साथ साइन करेंगे? क्योंकि इसकी कोई जरूरत मुझे नजर नहीं आई। आपने यह एक एग्रीमेंट साइन नहीं किया, जैसा हमारे दोस्त ने कहा, यह फ्रेमवर्क था, एग्रीमेंट नहीं था, क्योंकि अगर यह बाइंडिंग नहीं है, तो यह फ्रेमवर्क ही था। इस फ्रेमवर्क के लिए हम इंतजार क्यों नहीं कर सकते थे? इतनी हमें जल्दी क्यों हुई? मुझे लगता है कि इसके पीछे कहीं कोई कहानी है, और कई ऐसी चीजें हैं, जिनका जवाब हमें शायद इस हाऊस में मिले या न मिले, लेकिन आने वाला इतिहास इसका जवाब देगा कि इसके पीछे कुछ न कुछ बात थी। तो मेरा दूसरा सवाल यही है कि इस एग्रीमेंट की जरूरत क्या हुई? क्योंकि यह एग्रीमेंट, खासकर के जब बाइंडिंग नहीं और जब सिर्फ अभी हम ढांचा बना रहे हैं तो हम इंतजार करके, सारी चीजों पर डिसकस करके कि क्या हमारी जरूरतें हैं, उसके बाद इसके नतीजे पर आ सकते थे।

सर, इसमें जो एक दूसरी महत्वपूर्ण बात है, वह एक मल्टीनेशनल आपरेशन में कोलबोरेशन की बात है। मल्टीनेशनल आपरेशन में जो कोलबोरेशन की बात है, मुझे लगता है कि हम इतिहास के एक नए दौर में दाखिल हो रहे हैं, हम एक नई पोलिटिकल सिचुएशन क्रिएट कर रहे हैं। हमारा जो भारत का इतिहास था, जहाँ हम कुछ देशों के साथ अपनी सुरक्षा के लिए, रक्षा के लिए जुड़े हुए थे, उससे निकल कर हम एक दूसरे चेप्टर में दाखिल हो रहे हैं। यहाँ जो एक मल्टीनेशनल आपरेशन की बात है, इसमें बहुत — सी शंकाएं हमारे दिलो — दिमाग में उठ रही हैं कि क्या जैसा इराक में आपरेशन हुआ, आगे अगर और ऐसे आपरेशन होते हैं, जैसा मेरे दोस्तों ने भी कहा, उसके अपने इंटररेस्ट हैं और उन इंटररेस्टों के हिसाब से वह डिसाइड करता है कि कहां किसी आपरेशन की जरूरत है, तो उसमें हमारा रोल क्या होगा? क्या जैसी हमारी मर्जी है, जैसा रमेश जी ने कहा कि हर जगह हमारी मर्जी है कि हम जाना चाहेंगे तो जाएंगे, अगर ताइवान में मूव करना है तो हम नहीं जाएंगे, जो हमारे हित में नहीं होगा, उसे हम नहीं करेंगे। अगर यह इतना ही आसान था, इतना ही हमारे लिए खुला हुआ था, तो फिर इस एग्रीमेंट की जरूरत क्या थी? इस एग्रीमेंट की मुझे कोई जरूरत नजर नहीं आती, अगर हम मर्जी से किसी भी ऑपरेशन में जा सकते हैं, मर्जी से आ सकते हैं, यह रास्ता तो हमारे लिए पहले भी खुला हुआ था, हमें इसमें एंटर करने की जरूरत नहीं थी। इसलिए मुझे बड़ा खतरनाक लगता है यह शब्द **collaboration in multinational operations**, जिसे **pregnant with dangerous possibilities** कहते हैं। तो यह जो **pregnant with dangerous possibilities** हैं, डिफेंस मिनिस्टर साहब जरा इसको क्लीअर करेंगे कि इस प्रेगनेंसी के पीछे क्या छिपा हुआ है।

दूसरी, एक जो बड़ी खतरनाक बात है, वह है **fight against terrorism and religious extremism**. यह टेरेरिज्म से लड़ाई की जो बात है, हमारे जसवन्त सिंह जी ने भी कहा और नीलोत्पल बसु जी ने भी कहा कि इराक में तो कोई टेरेरिज्म नहीं था, अमेरिकी फौजों के जाने से पहले, वहां कोई रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म नहीं था। मैं कम से कम एक दर्जन बार इराक गया हूँ, इराक से ज्यादा सैकुलर सोसाइटी कोई नहीं थी और भारत के बाद अगर मैंने कहीं सैकुलर सोसाइटी

देखी पूरे मिडल ईस्ट में, तो इराक में देखी, जहां कर्बला जैसी जगह पर सिनेगुआज़ फीली काम करते थे, जहां चर्च बिल्कुल फ्री थी, जहां औरतें बिल्कुल आजाद थी, जहां पर लिट्रेसी तकरीबन 100 परसेंट है। वहां पर रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म था ही नहीं, लेकिन आज उस राष्ट्र के अंदर रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म है, वहां शिया एक्सट्रिमिज्म, वहां सुन्नी एक्सट्रिमिज्म है, वहां कुर्दिज़ एक्सट्रिमिज्म है, वहां टेरेरिज्म है। जो टेरेरिज्म को क्रिएट करने वाला है, जो टेरेरिज्म को जन्म देने वाला है, जो रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म को बढ़ाने वाला है, हम उसके साथ कॅलेब्रेशन करेंगे एक्सट्रिमिज्म से फाइट करने के लिए? अफगानिस्तान में रिलीजियस स एक्सट्रिमिज्म नहीं था, जब तक कि अफगानिस्तान खान अब्दुल गफ्फर खान या सरहदी गांधी का अफगानिस्तान था, वहां पर रिजेक्ट किया गया था इस्लामिक एक्सट्रिमिज्म को और महात्मा गांधी के रास्ते को अपनाया गया था, उस अफगानिस्तान में एक्सट्रिमिज्म कौन लाया ? रूस के खिलाफ लड़ाई में किसने जेहाद के खिलाफ तालीम दी ? किसने अफगानिस्तान और उसके आस – पास जाकर जेहाद का नारा दिया ? वे लोग जिन्होंने रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म को दुनिया में बढ़ावा दिया है, जिन्होंने सऊदी अरब के एक्सट्रिमिज्म को बढ़ावा दिया है, जिन्होंने टेरेरिज्म को बढ़ावा दिया है, हम उनके साथ कॅलेब्रेशन करेंगे एक्सट्रिमिज्म से फाइट करने के लिए? हम उनके साथ कॅलेबरेट करेंगे टेरेरिज्म से फाइट करने के लिए? मेरी समझ में नहीं आता कि यह कैसे संभव होगा और किस किस्म के टेरेरिज्म और रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म से हम फाइट करने वाले हैं अमेरिका के साथ मिलकर, जिसने इस्राइल में जियोनिस्ट एक्सट्रिमिज्म को पाला है, पोसा है, जन्मा है और आगे लेकर चला है। मिडल ईस्ट की मेजर प्रॉब्लम जो है, आज जो इस्लामिक सो काल्ड एक्सट्रिमिज्म है, उसका जो जन्मदाता है, वह यह जियोनिम है, जो इस्राइल के पेट से जन्मा है। उस इस्राइल के जन्मदाता से हम कॅलेब्रेशन करने वाले हैं रिलीजियस एक्सट्रिमिज्म से फाइट करने के लिए? महात्मा गांधी के देश में, महात्मा गांधी की सोच रखने वालों के लिए मेरी समझ में यह बात सही नहीं है।

फिर कहा गया कि हथियारों का हमारा कॅलेब्रेशन होगा और हम वहां से टैक्नोलॉजी लाएंगे। श्री जय राम रमेश जी को बहुत विश्वास है कि हम वहां से टैक्नोलॉजी ला सकेंगे, लेकिन मुझे डर यह है कि आज शायद दुनिया में अमरीका के पास कोई दूसरा हथियारों का बाजार नहीं है। वह अपने हथियार अरब कंट्रीज को नहीं बेच सकता, क्योंकि इस्राइल ऐसा नहीं करने देगा, चीन उनके हथियार खरीदने को तैयार नहीं है, लेटिन अमेरिकी कंट्रीज के पास पैसा नहीं है और न ही उन्हें ऐसे हथियारों की जरूरत है, आज दुनिया में ले – देकर एक ही देश बचा है जो उनको हथियार खरीद सकता है, जो टैक्सास की हथियारों की इंडस्ट्रीज है, उनको अगर अनएम्प्लॉयमेंट से बचा सकता है, बंद होने से बचा सकता है, तो वह भारत है। इसलिए भारत को वे प्रोत्साहित करेंगे कि वह उनसे ज्यादा से ज्यादा हथियार खरीदे, ज्यादा से ज्यादा हथियार ले। यह क्षेत्र हथियारों का बाजार बने, यहां हथियारों की दौड़ शुरू हो। एक तरफ भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच मित्रता की कोशिश होगी, दूसरी तरफ इस इलाके को हथियारों का बाजार बनाया जाएगा, यह बहुत खतरनाक बात है। मैं पूरी तरह से सहमत हूँ श्री जय राम रमेश जी की बात से कि हमें इस पर बहुत रेजिस्ट करना है, क्योंकि हमने जो इतने दिन से सपना देखा था – जब से देश आजाद हुआ है, तब से हमने सपना देखा था,

सर, कि हम दोस्ती करके, हालात को बदलकर, हमारा जो डिफेंस का एक्सपेंडिचर है, उसको हम अपनी गरीबी को दूर करने में, अपने हेल्थ सिस्टम को इम्प्रूव करने में, हमारी आने वाली नस्लों की जिंदगी संवारने पर खर्च करेंगे और आज जब हमें लगता था कि हमारा सपना पूरा होने वाला है, पाकिस्तान के साथ हमारे रिश्ते अच्छे हो गए हैं, चीन से हमारे रिश्ते अच्छे हो गए हैं, बंगलादेश से हमारे रिश्ते अच्छे हो गए हैं, उसी वक्त हमें इतना बढ़िया ऑफर दे दिया गया, पाकिस्तान को ऑफर दे कि तुम एफ – 16 ले लो, हमें कहा गया कि आप भी एफ – 17 या एफ – या एफ – 19, इसके अलावा भी जितने बढ़िया हथियार चाहो, आप ले लो और मिसाइल शीलड, जो हमें न्यूक्लियर के लिए दी जा रही है, इसके साथ स्टार – वार्स का जो पूरा कांसेप्ट है, वह भी आप ले लो। आज इतना बड़ा दिल क्यों हो गया है अमेरिका का ? “हम तुम दोस्त जिसके , दुश्मन उसका आसमां क्यों हो।” बड़ी खतरनाक दोस्ती है, सर। ये जब जकड़ते हैं और जब मोहब्बत से गले लगाते हैं तो बहुत जवां फैटल साबित होती है उनकी यह मोहब्बत और यह दोस्ती। यहां पर तो फ्री लंच नहीं है जैसा कि बहुत सारे उनके खुद एक्सपर्ट कर रहे हैं कि हिन्दुस्तान से जो दोस्ती है तो हिन्दुस्तान को यह नहीं समझना चाहिए कि यह दोस्ती सिर्फ उनके डवलपमेंट के लिए हो रही है। मुझे हमारे बहुत से एक्सपर्ट्स ने कहा कि भारत को अमेरिका डवलप करना चाहता है अपने हित में। अपने हित में हमें डवलप करना चाहते हैं, क्योंकि अमेरिका ने पहले भी ऐसा किया है, जापान को बिल्ड किया चीन को बेलेंस करने के लिए, कोरिया को बेलेंस करने के लिए। उन्होंने इजरायल को डवलप किया, उन्होंने जर्मनी को डवलप किया। इस तरीके से वह हमको भी डवलप करना चाहते हैं लेकिन क्यों डवलप करना चाहते हैं ?

شری شاہد صدیقی "اتر پردیش": سر، سب کو جیسے آپ نے وقت دیا، اسی ریشو سے مجھے بھی وقت ملیگا، مجھے امید ہے۔

وائس چیئر مین صاحب ، آپ کا دھنیواد - میں کہنا چاہتا ہوں کہ ڈیفینس منسٹر صاحب جو ایگریمنٹ کر کے آئے ہیں، مجھے یقین ہے کہ انہوں نے ہندستان کے مفادات کو، ہندستان کے انٹریسٹ کو سامنے رکھ کر ہی یہ ایگریمنٹ کیا ہوگا۔ اسی لئے میں جب اپنے کچھ سوال یہاں اٹھا رہا ہوں، تو کسی کی جو انٹینشنس ہیں ان پر سوال نہی اٹھا رہا ہوں بلکہ دیش کے ہت کو سامنے رکھ کر اٹھا رہا ہوں۔ میرے سامنے ایک سب سے اہم سوال یہ ہے کہ جب ڈیفینس منسٹر صاحب وہاں گئے ، تو یہ بڑا صاف نہی تھا کہ وہاں وہ اس قسم کا کوئی ایگریمنٹس کرنے جارہے ہیں۔ جس تیزی سے بھارت اور امریکہ کی دوستی بڑھی اور جتنی اچانک دوستی کے اندر تیزی آئی۔ اس نے ہم سب کو حیران کر دیا، امریکنس کو حیران کر دیا، جو اس ایشو پر

†Transliteration in Urdu Script.

ایکسپرٹ ہیں، ان کو بھی حیران کر دیا کہ اچانک اتنی تیزی کیوں آئی، کیسے آئی۔ تو میں یہ جاننا چاہوں گا کہ کیوں اتنی تیزی آئی اور کیسے آئی؟

سر، جب آپ گئے ، 29 جون کو آپ نے یہ ایگریمنٹ سائن کیا، فریم ورک ایگریمنٹ اور پھر اس کے بعد پردھان منتری جی نے وہاں جا کر 18 جولائی کو دوسرا ایک ایگریمنٹ سائن کیا۔ تو یہ پر دھان منتری جی کے ایگریمنٹ تک انتظار کیوں نہی ہو سکتا تھا؟ کیا یہ ایگریمنٹ پردھان منتری جی کے ایگریمنٹ پڑی سیسر تھا؟ کیا یہ ایسا تھا کہ جب آپ یہ ایگریمنٹ سائن کرو گے، تو پھر ہم وہ ایگریمنٹ سائن کریں گے؟ یہ سوال میرے من میں اٹھا ہے۔ ہو سکتا ہے کہ من غلط ہوں، لیکن یہاں ایک سوال اٹھتا ہے کہ کیا یہ کنٹیشن تھی کہ آپ یہ ایگریمنٹ پہلے ہمارے ساتھ سائن کرو گے؟ کیوں کہ اس کی کوئی ضرورت مجھے نظر نہی تھی، کیا یہ بائنڈنگ نہی ہے، تو یہ فریم ورک ہی تھا۔ اس فریم ورک کے لئے ہم انتظار کیوں نہی کر سکتے تھے؟ اتنی میں جلدی کیوں ہوئی؟ مجھے لگتا ہے کہ اس کے پیچھے کہیں کوئی کہانی ہے ، اور کئی ایسی چیزیں ہیں، جن کا جواب میں شاید اس ہاؤس میں ملے یا نہ ملے، لیکن آنے والا اتہاس اس کا جواب دیگا کہ اس کے پیچھے کچھ نہ کچھ بات تھی۔ تو میرا دوسرا سوال یہی ہے کہ اس ایگریمنٹ کی ضرورت کیا ہوئی؟ کیوں کہ یہ ایگریمنٹ ، خاص کر کے جب بائنڈنگ نہی اور جب صرف ابھی ہم ڈھانچا بنا رہے ہیں ہم انتظار کر کے، ساری چیزوں پر ڈسکشن کر کے کہ کیا ہماری ضرورت ہے، اس کے بعد اس کے نتیجے پر آسکتے تھے۔

سر، اس میں جو ایک دوسری اہم بات ہے، وہ ایک ملٹی نیشنل آپریشن میں کو لیبریشن کی بات ہے۔ ملٹی نیشنل آپریشن میں جو کولیبریشن کی بات ہے، مجھے لگتا ہے کہ ہم اتہاس کے ایک نئے دور میں داخل ہو رہے ہیں، ہم ایک نئی پولیٹیکل سچویشن کریٹ کر رہے ہیں۔ ہمارا جو بھارت کا اتہاس تھا، جہاں ہم کچھ دیشوں کے ساتھ اپنی سرکشا کے لئے ، رکشا کے لئے جڑے ہوئے تھے، اس سے نکل کر ہم ایک دوسرے چیپٹر میں داخل ہو رہے ہیں۔ یہاں جو ایک ملٹی نیشنل آپریشن کی بات ہے، اس میں بہت سی

† Transliteration in Urdu Script.

شکائیں ہمارے دل و دماغ میں اٹھ رہی ہیں کہ کیا جیسا عراق میں آپریشن ہوا، آگے اگر اور ایسے آپریشن ہوتے ہیں، جیسا میرے دوستوں نے بھی کہا، اس کے اپنے انٹریسٹ ہیں اور ان انٹریسٹ کے حساب سے وہ ڈسائیڈ کرتا ہے کہ کہہاں کسی آپریشن کی ضرورت ہے، تو اس میں ہمارا رول کیا ہوگا؟ کیا جیسی ہماری مرضی ہے، جیسا ہمیشہ جی نے کہا کہ ہر جگہ ہماری مرضی ہے کہ ہم جانا چاہیں گے تو جائیں گے، اگر تائیوان میں موو کرنا ہے تو ہم نہیں جائیں گے، جو ہمارے ہت میں نہیں ہوگا، اسے ہم نہیں کریں گے۔ اگر یہ اتنا ہی آسان تھا، اتنا ہی ہمارے لئے کھلا ہوا تھا، تو پھر اس ایگریمنٹ کی ضرورت کیا تھی؟ اس ایگریمنٹ کی مجھے کوئی ضرورت نظر نہیں آتی، اگر ہم مرضی سے کسی بھی آپریشن میں جاسکتے ہیں، مرضی سے آسکتے ہیں۔ یہ راستہ تو ہمارے لئے پہلے بھی کھلا ہوا تھا، ہمیں اس میں اینٹار کرنے کی pregnant with ضرورت نہیں تھی۔ اس لئے مجھے بڑا خطرناک لگتا ہے یہ شدید dangerous possibilities جو pregnant with dangerous possibilities ہے ٹینس منسٹر صاحب ذرا اس کو کلئر کریں گے کہ اس پر یگ نینسی کے پیچھے کیا چھپا ہوا ہے۔ دوسری ایک جو بڑی خطرناک بات ہے، وہ ہے fight against religious extremism terrorism and یہ ٹیررزم سے لڑائی کی جو بات ہے، ہمارے جسٹسنگ جی نے بھی کہا اور نیلوتپل بسو جی نے بھی کہا کہ عراق میں تو کوئی ٹیررزم نہیں تھا، امریکی فوجوں کے جانے سے پہلے، وہاں کوئی religious extremism نہیں تھا۔ میں کم ایک درجن بار عراق گیا ہوں، عراق سے زیادہ سیکولر سوسائٹی کوئی نہیں تھی اور بھارت کے بعد اگر میں نے کبھی سیکولر سوسائٹی دیکھی پورے مڈل ایسٹ میں، تو عراق میں دیکھی، جہاں کر بلہ جیسی جگہ پر سنیگواز فری لی کام کرتے تھے جہاں چرچیں بالکل فری تھیں، جہاں عورتیں بالکل آزاد تھیں، جہاں پر لٹریسی تقریباً 100 فیصد ہے۔ وہاں پر religious extremism تھا ہی نہیں، لیکن آج اس ریشٹر کے اندر religious extremism ہے، وہاں شعہ ایکسٹری مزم ہے، وہاں سننی ایکسٹری مزم ہے، وہاں ٹیررزم ہے، جو ٹیررزم کو کرنے والا ہے، جو ٹیررزم کو جنم دینے والا ہے، جو religious extremism کو بڑھانے والا ہے، ہم اس کے ساتھ کو لیبریشن کریں گے

ایکسٹری مزم سے فائٹ کرنے کے لئے؟ افغانستان میں religious extremism نہیں تھا، جب تک کہ افغانستان خان عبدالغفار خان یا سرحری گاندھی کا افغانستان تھا۔ وہاں پر ریجیکٹ کیا گیا تھا اسلامک ایکسٹری مزم کو اور یہاں گاندھی کے راستے کو اپنا یا گیا تھا، اس افغانستان میں ایکسٹری مزم کون لایا؟ روس کے خلاف لڑائی میں کس نے جہاد کے خلاف تعلیم دی؟ وہ لوگ جنہوں نے religious extremism کو دنیا میں بڑھاوا دیا ہے، جنہوں نے سعودی عرب کے extremism کو بڑھاوا دیا ہے، جنہوں نے ٹیرورزم کو بڑھاوا دیا ہے، ہم ان کے ساتھ کو لیبریشن کریں گے extremism سے فائٹ کرنے کے لئے؟ ہم ان کے ساتھ کالیبریٹ کریں گے ٹیرورزم سے فائٹ کرنے کے لئے؟ میری سمجھ میں نہیں آتا کہ یہ کیسے ممکن ہوگا اور کس قسم کا ٹیرورزم اور religious extremism سے ہم فائٹ کرنے والے ہیں، امریکہ کے ساتھ مل کر، جس نے اسرائیل میں زائنسٹ ایکسٹری مزم کو پالا ہے، پوسا ہے، جنما ہے اور آگے لیکر چلا ہے۔ مڈل ایسٹ کی میجر پرابلم جو ہے، آج جو اسلامک سوکالڈ ایکسٹری مزم ہے، اس کا جو جنم داتا ہے، وہ یہ زائنزم ہے، جو اسرائیل کے پیٹ سے جنما ہے۔ اس اسرائیل کے جنم داتا سے ہم کو لیبریشن کرنے والے ہے religious extremism سے فائٹ کرنے کے لئے؟ مہاتما گاندھی کے دیش میں، مہاتما گاندھی کی سوچ رکھنے والوں کے لئے میری سمجھ میں یہ بات صحیح نہیں ہے

پھر کہا گیا کہ ہتھیاروں کا ہمارا کولیبریشن ہوگا اور ہم وہاں سے ٹیکنالوجی لائیں گے۔ شری جے رام رمیش جی کو بہت وشواس ہے کہ ہم وہاں سے ٹیکنالوجی لاسکیں گے، لیکن مجھے ڈر ہے کہ آج شاید دنیا میں امریکہ کے پاس کوئی دوسرا ہتھیاروں کا بازار نہیں۔ وہ اپنے ہتھیار عرب کنٹریز کو نہیں بیچ سکتے کیوں کہ اسرائیل ایسا نہیں کرنے دیگا۔ چین ان کے ہتھیار خریدنے کو تیار نہیں ہے، لیٹن امریکی کنٹریز کے پاس پیسہ نہیں ہے اور نہ ہی انہیں ایسے ہتھیاروں کی ضرورت ہے، آج دنیا میں لے دیکر ایک ہی دیش بچا ہے جو ان کے ہتھیار خرید سکتا ہے، جو ٹیکساس کی ہتھیاروں کی انڈسٹریز ہیں، ان کو اگر ان ایمپلائمنٹ سے بچایا جا سکتا ہے، بند ہونے سے بچا یا جا سکتا ہے، تو وہ بھارت ہے، اس لئے بھارت کو وہ پروتسامت کریں گے کہ وہ زیادہ سے زیادہ ان سے ہتھیار خریدے، زیادہ سے زیادہ ہتھیار لے۔ یہ شیئر ہتھیاروں کا بازار بنے،

یہاں ہتھیاروں کی دوڑ شروع ہو۔ ایک طرف بھارت اور پاکستان کے بیچ مہترتا کی کوشش ہوگی، دوسری طرف اس علاقے کو ہتھیاروں کا بازار بنایا جائے گا، یہ بہت خطرناک بات ہے۔ میں پوری طرح سے سہمت ہوں شری جے رام رمیش جی کی بات سے کہ ہمیں بہت ریزسٹ کرنا ہے، کیونکہ ہم نے جواتنے دن سے سپنا دیکھا تھا، جب سے دیش آزاد ہوا ہے، تب سے ہم نے سپنا دیکھا تھا، سر، کہ ہم دوستی کر کے، اپنے حالات کو بدل کر، ہمارا جو ڈفینس کا ایکسپینڈ چیر ہے، اس کو ہم اپنی غریبی کو دور کرنے میں، اپنے ہیلتھ سسٹم کو امپروو کرنے میں، ہماری آنے والی نسلوں کی زندگی سنوارنے پر خرچ کریں گے اور آج جب ہمیں لگتا تھا کہ ہمارا سپنا پورا ہونے والا ہے، پاکستان کے ساتھ ہمارے رشتے اچھے ہو گئے ہیں، چین سے ہمارے رشتے اچھے ہو گئے ہیں، اسی وقت ہمیں اتنا بڑھیا آفر دے دیا گیا، پاکستان کو آفر دیدیا گیا کہ تم ایف 16 لے لو، ہمیں کہہ گیا کہ آپ بھی ایف 17- یا ایف 19، اس کے علاوہ بھی جتنے بڑھیا ہتھیار چاہو، آپ لے لو اور میزائل شیلڈ، جو ہمیں نیوکلیئر کے لئے دی جارہی ہے، اس کے ساتھ اسٹار وارکا جو پرا کانسیپٹ ہے، وہ بھی آپ لے لو، تو آج اتنا بڑا دل کیوں ہو گیا ہے امریکہ کا۔

ہوئے تم دوست جس کے، دشمن اس کا آسماں کیوں ہو" بڑی خطرناک دوستی ہے، سر۔ یہ جب جکڈ تے ہیں اور جب محبت سے گلے لگا تے ہیں تو بہت جوان فیٹل ثابت ہوتی ہے۔ ان کی یہ محبت اور یہ دوستی - یہاں پر تو فری لنچ نہی ہے جیسا کہ بہت سارے ان کے جود ایکسپرت ایکسپیکٹ کرتے ہیں کہ ہندستان سے جو دوستی ہے تو ہندستان کو یہ نہی سمجھنا چاہئے کہ یہ دوستی صرف ان کے ڈیولپمنٹ کے لئے ہو رہی ہے۔ مجھے ہمارے بہت سے ایکسپرٹس نے کہا کہ بھارت کو امریکہ ڈیولپ کرنا چاہتا ہے اپنے مفاد میں۔ اپنے مفاد میں ہمیں ڈیولپ کرنا چاہتے ہیں کیوں کہ امریکہ نے پہلے بھی ایسا کیا ہے، جاپان کو بلڈ کیا چین کو بیلنس کرنے کے لئے، کوریا کو بیلنس کرنے کے لئے۔ انہوں نے اسرائیل کو ڈیولپ کیا، انہوں نے جرمنی کو ڈیولپ کیا۔ اس طریقے سے وہ ہم کو بھی ڈیولپ کرنا چاہتے ہیں لیکن کیوں ڈیولپ کرنا چاہتے ہیں؟

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI FALIS. NARIMAN): Mr. Siddiqui please finish..

श्री शाहिद सिद्दिकी : सर, मैं खत्म कर रहा हूँ। किससे टकराने के लिए हमें डवलप करना चाहते हैं, हमारे किसी पड़ोसी के मुकाबले में हमें लाना चाहते हैं, कोई हमारे लिए दुश्मन खड़े करना चाहते हैं क्योंकि, सर, जब हम अपने दोस्त चुनते हैं तो साथ ही अपने दुश्मन भी चुन लेते हैं। आज अगर हमने एक दोस्त चुना है तो हमने उसके साथ अपने दुश्मन भी चुन लिए हैं। आज हम चीन को क्या मैसेज दे रहे हैं? जो आज अमेरिका से दूर हो रहे हैं सब यूरोपियन कंट्रीज, आज जर्मन जो है, फ्रांस जो है या स्पेन जो है, वे अपनी फौजें वापिस बुला रहे हैं, जुड़ना नहीं चाहते हैं यूनाइटेड स्टेट के साथ, दो दोस्तों को लड़ाना चाहते हैं। आज हम अपनी क्लोजनेस बना रहे हैं। यानी कि हम अपने को प्रेजेंट कर रहे हैं एक सॉफ्ट टारगेट के तौर पर कि जितनी भी एन्टी अमेरिकन फॉर्सेज हैं दुनियां में, जितना एन्टी अमेरिकन टैरोरिज्म हैं उसका निशान हम भी बन जाएं जिस तरह से ब्रिटेन बना है, जिस तरह से स्पेन बना है उस तरह से हम भी निशाने पर खड़े किए जा रहे हैं। ऐसा नहीं है कि ये फोर्सेज हमारी दोस्त हैं, फोर्सेज हमारी दुश्मन नहीं है, लेकिन हमें इस पर सोचना होगा कि हम अमेरिका के साथ कहां तक जाने के लिए तैयार हैं और अगर हम अमेरिका के इंटररेस्ट के ट्रेडिंग होर्स बन रहे हैं जाने – अनजाने, तो इसके लिए हमें बहुत गौर करना पड़ेगा और जैसा कि यह अभी एक फ्रेमवर्क एग्रीमेंट हैं यानी अभी हमारे पास बचने का रास्ता है। इसलिए इस डिबेट को पॉजिटिवली लीजिए। यह डिबेट गवर्नमेंट को क्रिटिसाइज करने के लिए नहीं है, यह उसको क्वेश्चन करने के लिए नहीं है, हमें यकीन है कि आपके इंटेंशन वे उतने ही ऑनरेबिल हैं, जितने जसवन्त सिंह जी के इंटेंशन थे, लेकिन हमारे दोस्त का हित लॉग टर्म इंटररेस्ट, हो सकता है, हमारा शॉर्ट टर्म इंटररेस्ट सर्व होता हो या सरकार का शॉर्ट टर्म इंटररेस्ट सर्व होता हो, इसको करने से, लेकिन इस देश का लॉग टर्म इंटररेस्ट मुझे सर्व होता नजर नहीं आता। बहुत – बहुत धन्यवाद।

شری شاہد صدیقی: سر، میں ختم کر رہا ہوں۔ کس سے ٹکرانے کے لئے ہمیں ٹیولپ کرنا چاہتے ہیں، ہمارے کسی پڑوسی کے مقابلے میں ہمیں لانا چاہتے ہیں۔ کوئی ہمارے لئے دشمن کھڑے کرنا چاہتے ہیں کیونکہ سر، جب ہم اپنے دوست چنتے ہیں تو ساتھ ہی اپنے دشمن بھی چن لیتے ہیں۔ آج اگر ہم نے ایک دوست چنا ہے تو ہم نے اس کے ساتھ ساتھ اپنے دشمن بھی چن لئے ہیں۔ آج ہم چین کو کیا میسج دے رہے ہیں؟ جو آج امریکہ سے دور ہو رہے ہیں سب یورپین ملک، آج جرمن جو ہے فرانس جو ہے یا اسپین جو ہے وہ اپنی فوجیں واپس بلا رہے ہیں، جڑنا نہیں چاہتے ہیں یونائیٹڈ اسٹیٹس کے ساتھ، بس دودوستوں کو لڑانا چاہتے ہیں۔ آج ہم اپنی کلوزینے بنا رہے ہیں یعنی کسے ہم اپنے کو پریزینٹ کر رہے ہیں۔ ایک

†Transliteration of Urdu Script.

سافٹ ٹارگٹ کے طور پر کہہ جتنا بھی اینٹی امریکن فوریز ہیں دنیا میں، جتنا اینٹی امریکن ٹیر رزم ہے اس کا نشانہ ہم بھی بن جائیں جس طرح سے برطانیہ بنا ہے، جس طرح سے اسپین بنا ہے، اس طرح سے ہم بھی نشانہ پر کھڑے کئے جا رہے ہیں۔ ایسا نہیں کہ یہ فورسز ہماری دوست ہیں فورسز ہماری دشمن نہیں ہیں لیکن ہمیں اس پر سوچنا ہوگا کہ ہم امریکہ کے ساتھ کہہ ا تک جانے کے لئے تیار ہیں اور اگر ہم امریکہ کے انٹریسٹ کے ٹریڈنگ ہارس بن رہے ہیں جان انجانے، تو اس کے لئے ہمیں بہت غور کرنا پڑے گا اور جیسا کہ یہ ابھی ایک فریم ورک ایگریمنٹ ہے۔ یعنی ابھی ہمارے پاس بچنے کا راستہ ہے۔ اس لئے اس ڈیوٹ کو پارٹیو لیجئے یہ ڈیوٹ گورنمنٹ کو کریٹی سائز کرنے کے لئے نہیں ہے، یہ اس کو کوشش کرنے کے لئے نہیں ہے، ہمیں یقین ہے کہ آپ کے انٹینشن اتنے ہی آریبل ہیں جتنا جسونت سنگ جی کے انٹینشن تھے، لیکن ہمارے دوست کا ہت لونگ ٹرم انٹرسٹ ہو سکتا ہے، ہمارا شارٹ ٹرم انٹرسٹ سرو ہوتا ہو، یا سرکار کا شارٹ ٹرم انٹرسٹ سرو ہوتا ہو۔ اس کو کرنے سے لیکن اس دیش کا لونگ ٹرم انٹرسٹ مجھے سرو ہوتا نظر نہیں آتا۔ بہت بہت دہینواد۔

DR. FAROOQ ABDULLAH (Jammu and Kashmir): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on this issue which is vital for our country. We do want friendship with America, with all countries, even with our neighbour who continues to have terrorist activities in my State. But I hope the Defence Minister will remember that when the Defence Committee came in, met you and told you ~ when India was thinking in big ways of buying American planes and other American things — please beware; when crunch comes, they will stop the parts that we need and all our planes will be lying on the ground. Let us not forget how closely and friendly they were with the Iranian Shah, who in the end could not even get enough space for his burial in that country. Let us also not forget — Sir, you have served under the great leader of India, Smt. Indira Gandhi — the views of Nixon, the views about India of the Foreign Secretary, at that time, Mr. Henry Kissinger. Have those opinions changed? I remember very clearly the ex-Prime Minister who kept on telling them of our terrorism and they kept on telling us that the terrorism that was taking place in India is actually the freedom fight, and, therefore, we have nothing to do about it. Has their opinion on that

changed? The great economist on the other side spoke well. I must congratulate you. I think one day will come when probably a President of America will pin a medal on you. But I have to tell you something. I visited America. Now, I hope the Defence-Minister was not put like Jesus Christ; as the ex-Defence Minister was stripped, nearly naked. And, I hope he will also remember when our Minister for Civil Aviation went, he went through the same thing. I hope, Sir, you did not go through that. I hope you also remember our RAW officer, a senior officer of Raw. Where is he today? What information did he give them if they are our friends? Friends do not spy. Beware, beware of the Trojan horse. Beware of the exercises that you are doing, for they know your strategy. The recent papers that have disappeared from the Naval Headquarters, where are they today? they know every single detail of what we are going to do, if ever some change comes in. Luckily, the ex-Army Chief is sitting here. Sir, beware, we do want friendship, But, friendship, which will make India great. Please, do not forget that today a major debate is going on in this country: Are we going to become a member of the Security Council? Are we going to have the voting rights in that Council? There is one country alone that can decide our fate, and, that is, the United States of America. Mr. Jairam, remember, till they don't want you in it, you will not be here. They want you at their will and at their decision that they can command you. They cannot trust India to that level. I remember going into a Chamber of the most important Senator of America. He asked me, "Dr. Abdullah, do you see this globe"? I said, "Yes, I do see this globe". He said, "Two-thirds of this globe is America". It shook me and I could not understand what did he mean by 'two-thirds of this globe is America'. When I came back to my hotel, I realised that they called us the satellites of Russia. And, since we did not fit into this, we were not part of that globe. Every other country is more or less dependent one way or the other on them. Therefore, my warning, to you all is, while you go through these agreements, do not forget the past, do not forget the past with which India has been coping. Our neighbour here gets every help that they want. But, when it comes to us, we are the satellites of Russia. They never defended us. When the Kashmir question was taken to the Security Council, what saved us was the Veto from Russia. America stood with them. Have they changed in that opinion of theirs? I hope you will, many times, think over it. As our friends have told you, let us beware. And, I hope, you will take the advice seriously and not go whole hog to put this country into a danger out of

which we will not come out, I hope your decision would be a careful one.
Thank you, Sir.

SHRIMATI S.G. INDIRA (Tamil Nadu): Thank you Sir. On the New Framework Agreement on the Indo-US defence relationship, I am having two-three clarifications. Sir, while referring to the New Framework, the Minister has referred to the Weapons of Mass Destructions among other things. I would like to know from the hon. Minister the scope of the reference to the WMD. Sir, we are concerned because we have not signed the NPT, but here is the document which we have signed with the US, which refers to WMD. Sir, I would like to know from you whether there are any conditions imposed on India in respect of manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. The statement also refers to cooperation with the U.S. for enhancing capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces. The U.S. is supplying arms and ammunition even to Pakistan and helping it in all aspects. Here is a press clipping with me. We are witnessing that India is well aware of the U.S. blind eyes towards Pakistan military and ISI sheltering Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders and training and financing anti-Indian movements. Even now the U.S. is supplying arms to Pakistan and helping it in all respects. We have the agreement, which says that same or similar weapons will be supplied to Pakistan as well as India. This is crucial, because here is a strange situation where two neighbours will be purchasing arms from the same country, that is, the U.S. We have to be more careful in deals like defence cooperation. In this process, we will be letting the U.S. know about our defence establishments.

Sir, it is also surprising to note that the Government has yet to think as to how to bring about a change in the attitude of the U.S., so that it can be exploited to our advantage. It has been mentioned in the Statement that we can exploit the U.S. to our advantage. We should realise that the U.S. has signed this document because they have many advantages. They are the country having the advantages, not we. They have the trustworthy partner in Asia, which is committed to democracy and peace, but we are yet to know what advantage will accrue to India. I request the hon. Minister to kindly tell the potential advantage to India. It was not mentioned clearly.

Now, I come to Indo-US ties. After the visit of our hon. Prime Minister to the U.S., much has been said about the Agreement regarding U.S. assistance for building nuclear power plants in India. It has been hailed

as a landmark Agreement because without signing the NPT, India has been able to clinch a nuclear deal for civil purposes. But nothing is being said about the overriding provisions in the Agreement. Some of the provisions could put our nuclear establishments to risk in the case of any conflict. Because, under this Agreement, an international team of experts will come to India. It will inspect our nuclear establishments and see the nuclear material. The U.S. and other countries will come to all our establishments. So, we must be very careful. Also, we do not know what kind of monitoring they are going to do. If this information will reach other countries, it will be dangerous to our country. (Time-bell). So, I would request the hon. Minister to clarify how safe is this clause for India.

We should keep it in our mind that the U.S. has to change its attitude towards India after 9th September scenario. It is also aware of the fact that China is growing. This is the fact, that China is growing stronger day by day, and that can pose a great threat to the U.S., supremacy. India is one of the countries, which is equally strong and independent, and above all, a time-tested partner on international stage. So, it is advantageous for the U.S. to have ties with India. We should not be misguided by short-sighted nuclear deal or defence ties. At all costs, we should maintain our sovereignty, we should not be a committed country to the US and we should maintain peace in our country. So, we should be very careful in dealing with the US on these nuclear aspects. Thank you very much, Sir, for having given me this opportunity to speak.

SHRIMATI N.P. DURGA(Andhra Pradesh): Thank you, Sir, for allowing me to seek some clarification on the statement made by the hon. Defence Minister on 2nd August, 2005. I have a few specific clarifications to seek from the Minister.

Sir, the first point is that it is good that India and the US have signed a ten-year New Framework for US-India Defence Relations, which, I think, paves the way for joint weapon production, cooperation on missile production, etc. I would like know from the hon. Minister how the Minister is sure of lifting of export controls on sensitive military technologies to India because there are so many restrictions which prevents India from getting those technologies.

The statement says about the establishment of new Defence Procurement and Production Group. I wish to know the composition of Defence Procurement and Production Group from India and from the US.

The statement speaks about expanding Defence trade between the two countries. I would like to know from the hon. Minister as to what are (he potential Indian Defence exports to the US, apart from outsourcing.

Sir, clause 4 (B) of the Framework says that there would be collaboration in multinational operations. This clearly says that Indian military would be deployed overseas alongside US forces in non-UN approved operations. Is it not a deviation to our committed stand that we will send our troops only under UN-approved operations? Please explain the Government's position on this.

Sir, I would like to know from the hon. Minister what efforts the Ministry is making to ease the curbs on nuclear technology transfer which were imposed in the wake of 1998 Pokhran tests. Whether any assurance has been given by Mr. Rumsfeld in this regard. If yes, the details may be given.

Sir, my last point is, if you look at clause 4 (E) of the Framework, it says about the enhancement of capabilities to combat the proliferation of Weapons of Mass-Destruction. Sir, my point is: Does the agreement by India to collaborate in multilateral operations not amount to an indirect signing up of notorious US Proliferations Security Initiative? Sir, Proliferation Security Initiative is a US-led multinational initiative involving attack on Third World countries' ships on high seas. And, majority of the Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Iran are opposing this. So, what are the reasons behind India's agreement to this proposal?

Sir, I once again request the hon. Minister to respond to these queries when he replies on the statement. Thank you, Sir.

श्री मंगनी लाल मंडल (बिहार) : माननीय उपसभापति महोदय, आज जिस विषय पर सदन में चर्चा हो रही है, यह हमारे राष्ट्रीय हित, राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा और राष्ट्र के भविष्य से जुड़ा हुआ है। विपक्ष के नेता मान्यवर श्री जसवन्त सिंह जी ने और दूसरे माननीय सदस्यों ने इस सहयोग के समझौते के मामले में जो शंकाएं व्यक्त की हैं, इन्हें आसानी से न तो खारिज किया जा सकता है और न ही निर्मूल कहा जा सकता है।

उपसभापति महोदय, इसमें दो – तीन आशंकाएं हैं, जो सदन के बाहर भी व्यक्त की जा रही हैं कि अमरीका कभी भी हमारा स्वाभाविक मित्र नहीं रहा है, हमारे राष्ट्रीय हित का उसने कभी ख्याल नहीं किया है और बराबर हमारे राष्ट्र के मुकाबले में, उसने पाकिस्तान को तहजीह दी है। यही कारण है कि जब हमने ब्रेझनेव के जमाने में, सोवियत संघ से समझौता किया था, तो सारे राष्ट्र ने उसे हृदय

से स्वीकार किया था। अभी अमरीका के साथ जो समझौता हुआ है, इस पर कई तरह की शंकाएं हैं। सरकार ने जो समझौता किया है, शंकाएं उस पर नहीं हैं, बल्कि इस समझौते में जो भावना छिपी हुई है, उस भावना पर शंकाएं हैं। अब बहुराष्ट्रीय देशों के साथ हमारा अभ्यास होगा, यह बात कही गई है और कई माननीय सदस्यों ने इस पर चर्चा की है। इस दृष्टिकोण से सदन ने यह प्रस्ताव पारित किया है कि इराक में हम सेना नहीं भेजेंगे, लेकिन इससे यह बात स्पष्ट नहीं होती है कि कल जो हमारा अमेरिका से समझौता हुआ है, तो बहुराष्ट्रीय देशों के साथ हमारा अभ्यास होगा, उसमें इराक में सेना भेजने के सवाल पर भारत कितना अपना स्व – निर्णय ले सकेगा? यह शंका है, इस मामले में सरकार को स्थिति स्पष्ट करनी चाहिए।

महोदय, कई मामलों में कहा गया है कि इससे आतंकवाद के खिलाफ लड़ाई में भी यह जो प्रारूप तैयार हुआ है, जिसके बारे में कहा गया है कि यह एक फ्रेमवर्क है और जिस हिन्दी में कहा गया कि 10 वर्षों के लिए एक रूपरेखा तैयार की गई है, इससे मदद मिलेगी। आतंकवाद से तो सबसे ज्यादा हम पाकिस्तान से पीड़ित रहे हैं। अमेरिका ने पाकिस्तान को समझौता होने से पहले हथियार दिया है, लड़ाकू विमान दिया है, लेकिन इस समझौते के बाद क्या अमेरिका ने यह वचनबद्धता दी है कि भारत के साथ 10 वर्षों का हमारा जो आपसी शोध के मामले में, रक्षा प्रतिष्ठान के मामले में अभ्यास के मामले में और इस रूपरेखा में, प्रारूप में जिन बातों के बारे में उल्लेख किया गया है, उसे ध्यान में रखते हुए पाकिस्तान में जिस काम से आतंकवाद का बढ़ावा हो और भारत की सीमा पर सुरक्षा को खतरा पैदा हो, वह काम नहीं करेंगे? यह आशंका बनी हुई है।

तीसरी बात मेरी यह है कि इसमें एक और आशंका है कि रूस हमारा परम्परागत मित्र राष्ट्र रहा है। रूस से हमारा आत्मीय सम्बन्ध रहा है। पहले के सोवियत संघ से, अब के रूस से हमारा आत्मीय सम्बन्ध रहा है उसने बराबर हमारे हितों का ख्याल किया है। रूस के साथ जो हमारा समझौता है और अमेरिका के साथ हमने जिस समझौते में प्रवेश किया है, तो रूस के रिश्तों पर इससे क्या प्रभाव पड़ेगा? यह बात अलग है कि सारे लोग आज अमेरिका से समझौता कर रहे हैं। रूस भी कर रहा है, दूसरे देश भी कर रहे हैं। लेकिन रूस हमारा एक परम्परागत और आत्मीय मित्र राष्ट्र रहा है, यह बात कहनी होगी और सरकार को बतानी होगी।

एक बात यह भी आई है कि हम हथियार खरीदते रहे हैं। 1998 में जब द्वितीय पोखरन हुआ था, तो हथियारों के मामले में जो पाबन्दी लगाई थी, इसके बावजूद भी हमारे शोध का काम नहीं रुका। शोध का काम होता रहा। लेकिन अमेरिका से हमारा जो समझौता हुआ है, उसमें एक सबसे बड़ी आशंका है, सिद्धिकी जी ने कहा है कि हम बड़े बाजार हैं, हमारा सम्बन्ध कहीं क्रेता और विक्रेता का न हो जाए। अमेरिका के साथ यह तीसरा बिन्दु है, जिसके बारे में मैं चाहूँगा कि सदन में स्थिति स्पष्ट हो। इन्हीं बातों के साथ, जो समझौता किया गया है, मैं इसका समर्थन करता हूँ,

लेकिन जो आशंकाएँ हैं, उन आशंकाओं को आसानी से खारिज नहीं किया जाना चाहिए। सरकार को स्थिति स्पष्ट करनी चाहिए। क्योंकि देश में आशंकाएँ व्याप्त हैं।

DR. K. KASTURIRANGAN (Nominated): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, a lot has been said about the various aspects of this framework agreement particularly, as we all know now that it addresses the question of defence relationships, defence acquisition, equipment acquisition, defence production, defence technology transfer and things of that kind, and, of course, there are many other dimensions to this agreement of which my colleagues here have already been elaborating. I would just focus on two or three important points to be viewed in the context of technology transfer, and technology assimilation is crucial for that particular aspect of this framework agreement when it is translated into direct action plans. The first, of course, is the experience of the space programme, and to some extent, Mr. Jairam Ramesh, my illustrious colleague, spoke about it. I would give, at least, two-three instances to show that one should not be apprehensive of a technology acquisition and assimilation in this country provided you create the right type of institutions. I would say that in the context of the very beginning of India's space programme, the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station. America did play an important role. They brought their own sounding rockets; they brought their own instruments to look at the upper atmospheric systems. This was a very interesting collaboration we started, which really ushered our country into space age. Of course, we had Soviet Union, we had France, we had Germany in this collaborative effort of establishing the rocket range which finally got dedicated to the United Nations. But what is important is that we dispensed with all these collaborations at a certain point of time and become more confident to deal with these kind of facilities. Only a few months ago, we commissioned one of the world's best launch facility coming out of all the several steps that we took subsequently. That was all in India. I should say that five important industrial consortia in this country were competent to take up this work on the complex multi-disciplinary launch pad which is today available in this country. I am not exaggerating, it is, probably, one of the world's best. So, one can see where it starts and how it ends, if we have the determination internally to deal with this kind of technology transfer.

The second one, I would say, is regarding the buying or building options related to the INSAT system which is today crucial to space

communications. If one looks at the background of this, one will find that there was no way in which India could have produced the first generation INSAT, the type of INSATs that we needed, indigenously in a time-frame of three or four years by which time we wanted to start with this. This was done during Madam Indira Gandhi's time. At that time a deliberate decision was taken that we should buy four INSATs from the United States, the then Ford Aerospace Corporation, and, at the same, took all the steps for the second generation, third generation and the fourth generation to be built in this country. I am speaking about the fourth generation to be built in this country. I am speaking about the fourth generation because currently we are in the fourth generation. What is significant is that we built a much lower level technology system what we call as "Apple". We bought these four satellites from the Ford Aerospace Corporation and ultimately built the subsequent generation. We created the right institutions in the country to understand those kinds of complex satellites, the first generation INSAT which transforms into the second generation, and finally built four sequence of INSATs. Today, we possess, I think, one of the largest domestic communication systems in the world; but all due to the efforts within India. The initial step in this case was one of a procurement strategy with the United States. We didn't have any problem in terms of technology assimilation. I just mentioned this simply because of the fact we need the right type of institutions inside. I can say this in the context of another instance, though it does not relate to the United States directly, but in some other way. It is related to the development, with precision, of the cryogenic technology. Here again, in 1985, when it was not that well known, the ISRO took the first step towards developing the technology for the cryogenic upper stage of a rocket which propels it. We made sure that we have, at least, 10 years hands-down experience. This type of engine takes, even for the most advanced countries, some 10 to 12 years to develop. We had 10 to 12 years of experience of vetting it. Finally, when the question of procurement came, we could get the technology and in seven years we developed this engine. This clearly brings out one important message that given the right type of institutional framework within the country, we will not be found wanting in terms of getting the benefit of the best of technologies from outsides. Having said this, I should say at this juncture, the US always possesses some of the best technologies in the world. There are no two opinions about it. Whether the countries are friendly with it or whether the countries are not friendly

with it, all of them look for these technologies from the United States. The United States is very well aware of this aspect and they are very selective with whom they should do this business of high technology cooperation. It is gratifying to note that the recent visits, both by the Defence Minister and the hon. Prime Minister, have produced results, one on the nuclear energy programme, and the second is in space at least, they are looking and exploring to put two their instruments into our lunar mission. I should say that this is also a significant step on the part of the United States because they had done this only for three countries so far, Europe, Japan and the then Soviet Union. Otherwise, they have never shared their equipment to be flown in any other spacecraft. Here is the fourth country with whom they are seriously trying. These are not simple instruments. These are fairly complex instruments. They want to fly these in India's first lunar mission. So, what I see in these signatures is a will and that they are serious. But what is important from our side is that if we are going to get into a version of translation from this particular Framework Agreement to actual action plans, which may be several, we should be prepared with an institutional framework internally, both within the defence organisation and outside, to deal with these incoming high technologies, hardwares and weapon systems, so that for the next generation, like exactly what we did for INSAT, we have something in place. I am really worried about this, having known the Indian scientific establishments and having seen the strategic planning within this system. I am sure, the hon. Defence Minister would give enough thought to the subsequent planning on how we are going to take advantage of this. This is going to create a new culture and a new institutional way to do these things. Probably, this could be a watershed. If this kind of thing is done and ultimately, this agreement would have served its purpose. So, I would assume that that would be done. Lastly, I would like to say one thing related to the Missile Technology Control Regime. Since we are still not a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime; we are not eligible to get any other rocket technology, not that we need it, but, may be, for the future transportation system we may still need this kind of a thing. This is a regime which India has always found discriminatory and, did not want to become a signatory. But, I trust that in the overall framework of the type of agreement now in peace we could reach on understanding with the United States, we should be able to deal with the MTCR so that it should no longer be an irritant in the free flow of technology between the two countries.

Lastly, I would also like to caution about this thing. We have traditional suppliers of defence equipments, defence technologies and so on. The hon. Defence Minister has rightly put, this agreement also facilitates a level of options, a level of leverage in the overall questions of defence procurement. I trust this would be a policy which would be kept in mind as we draw up the operational plans to translate this particular agreement. On the whole, I think, I have a lot of trust in this particular agreement. I am sure it is going to work. But central to the whole thing is, how from this point we are going to respond to this in terms of tremendous number of challenges that it is going to pose in terms of getting the best benefit out of it. I would like to compliment the Defence Minister for coming up with such an important framework. Thank you.

SHRI SHANKAR ROY CHOUDHURY (West Bengal): Sir, this US-India Defence Framework Agreement is being discussed against the background of a very uncertain, very fluid international geo-political situation. There is a lot of euphoria on the one side—perhaps, euphoria is the right word to use; words are being used like natural allies, India and . USA are natural allies—at the same time, at the other end of the spectrum; the political thought in this country, there is a lot of opposition to it. This is only natural. I think as Shri Jairam Ramesh and other hon. Members have pointed out; in the USA also, it is similar. There are many factors in the USA, there are many parties in the USA, there is writing if you see in their Press, they are also apprehensive and critical of their Government for giving too much leeway to India. So I think this is an important agreement. This lays down a framework which is, indeed, how it should be because the frame work is a skeleton and to flesh out the skeleton, the details will come later. There has been an instinctive opposition amongst many sections, of our society to a joint step forward in Indo-US military cooperation because, strangely enough for a country like India, surprisingly enough for a country like India,, the lead and the most high profile and the most visible agency in progressing defence cooperation with the USA has been the Defence Forces because this is an aspect which has been highlighted in all public perceptions which is unusual. But notwithstanding that, the fact of the matter is, there has been an instinctive opposition in many quarters; instinctive doubts have been expressed that we have a tradition of non-alignment and how can we take such a step as to align ourselves with a side from which we have been keeping a distance for a

long time in our history. Well, Sir, if you take our history, we have been non-aligned. Very right. But if you go back to 1962, we were a non-aligned country. But when we were attacked, at that time, we made the correct use, we exploited non-alignment correctly, and then we went for assistance to the West, to the USA, to Great Britain. The assistance was forthcoming but with many strings and conditions attached to the extent that, at that time, in 1962—a small example; we still had bolt-loading rifles, bolt action rifles—the first self-loading rifles came to us from the USA and the US inspectors used to come and ensure that these self-loading rifles from the USA, certain recoil-less guns which we did not have for mountain warfare were only deployed in those areas facing Tibet, China. They were always on the look out to see whether we were transferring these equipments back Westwards against Pakistan. So, these many strings were attached. Ultimately, in 1962, frankly speaking, the experience was, not very happy. They did not give very much; there were too many strings attached, and they gave a long list of sermons as to how we should conduct our foreign affairs. Anyway, the next round was in 1965 when we fought against Pakistan. We found that Pakistan exploited this very intelligently, tremendously. They joined all the mutual Defence Agreements against the then Soviet Union; they got the latest equipments and the Americans knew that they would be used against India, in 1965, when the war broke out, all the American equipments that were given to Pakistan were deployed against India, and we faced a lot of them. As a result, you may say on the re-bound, but also choosing our political option very carefully, within the principle of non-alignment, we went to Russia, and the Russia gave us the wherewithal on the basis of which most of our defence forces have been created. So, when we talk about non-alignment, I think, we have utilised all non-alignment policies very realistically and I would say, very intelligently. Now, today, what we are discussing, that is, the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship, goes back to January, 1995. The then Defence Secretary of the U.S., Dr. T.N. Perry, had come, and indeed, the 1995 Agreement was based on the earlier 1991, the Kicklighter proposal, and that also developed very slowly and the First Agreement was signed in 1995. There was, let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, Sir, and through you, the House, a great deal of uneasiness even within the Defence Forces as to what do these people want, until we made up our minds that we were a fairly strong, a fairly capable, a fairly balanced, and a mature defence service, and that we need not have too

many fears about interacting with a country whose intentions we were not clear about. Since that time, a whole series of exercises have been taken place. Now the exercises really do not count very much. They are actually very small exercises—a company, a battalion, etc. Sir, for a long time in the past, we were sending Indian officers to the U.S. They used to go to the Staff College and other courses. Their officers also have been coming here. This had been much, much before 1995 in fact, it was almost in 50s. But those were the token fixed vacancies allotted by the U.S. to India, and India-sending reciprocal officers to the U.S. Let me say one thing. Their training, technology and equipments were of the highest grade in the world. We, of course, could only look and dream of a time when such things would come to us. A major step that the U.S. proposed at one time was that while officer-to-officer interaction was there, they wanted interaction at the below-officer rank, at the level of the Jawans too, that they should also come and intermingle with them. At that time that proposal was turned down, and rightly so because the culture is totally, totally different. I think we did a very sensible thing. Later on, as my friend, Mr. Jaswant Singh, pointed out, there were series of steps, the new initiatives, the new Clinton formula, the new Vision, etc; then, came the next step, the strategic planning, and now, this New Framework. But the theme is of continuity. The major issue is that we are now actively engaging with the United States, and we are doing so in an uncertain, fluid, single-polar world, but in which many new poles are coming up. We are talking of the United States. We want India to come up. But, I think, we must also acknowledge that amongst these many poles that are coming up, a very major pole in China. We do not mention it in polite conversations, I suppose. But the fact of the matter is that one of the major poles that are coming up is China Now, as far as China is concerned, China has got its policy of four modernisations—modernisation of technology, modernisation of agriculture, modernisation of industry, and the fourth is the modernisation of its defence mechanism. We do not talk about it but it is there.

What are the shared security interests that we have with the USA? At present, these have been mentioned here: 'Maintaining Security and Stability'; a very innocuous, a very broad phrase which can be interpreted and fitted in a number of ways. And I think the Government is well aware of it. I do not think that they have shut their eyes and just signed on it;

they are well aware of it. so 'Maintaining Security and Stability'! Today, we have peace in Kashmir. Why do we have peace in Kashmir? Why is President Musharraf talking peace? Has he had a change of heart? Or, is it because after 9/11 there has been heavy pressure put on him? Whose pressure is it? The pressure of America. Has it been beneficial to us? Well, I think, it has been beneficial to us. So, when you say, 'Maintaining Security and Stability', I think, we should examine this whole thing very carefully. American interests and Indian interests in this area tend to coincide, whether you like it or not. There are other areas which do not coincide.

'Defeating Terrorism and Violent Religious Extremism'; yes, earlier, the United States, and also England, totally ignored whatever we said about religion extremism. They said, "As far as we are concerned, these people have not acted against the interests of our country. Under our laws, we cannot take any action against them". But, after 9/11, this has changed. Now, you talk of terrorism or violent religious extremism, and America fighting in Afghanistan. Iraq was a blunder. Iraq was a huge blunder and the people who acknowledge it but do not express it the most are the Americans themselves. We say it is a blunder. But we are standing out. Americans themselves want to get out, somehow or the other. They asked us to send troops. Fortunately, we did not. Fortunately, we did not, though, I do agree with the comments made by the speakers—the erstwhile Government's spokesmen are here—that we nearly did. And it is only under huge pressure from the Opposition that these troops were not sent.

'Preventing Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Associated Materials Data and Technologies. This links up with the American Proactive Strategy of Proliferation, Security Initiative whereby you can interdict a ship on the high seas and if it is carrying nuclear weapons or materials to make nuclear weapons, you should be able to interdict; it is in total violation of all conventions of the sea. But the Americans still do it. However, from time to time, we have also done it. We have interdicted LTTE ships on the high seas. We have interdicted a North Korean vessel which was carrying missiles to Pakistan. We wanted to interdict, but we could not interdict ships carrying small arms along the coastal waters to Bangladesh and then coming into the North-East. We do not have the capability. So, I think, these are applied by each nation as it suits them. If you have the capability, we do it. If you do not have the capability, well, you stand and

watch. And this kind of an agreement may give us a little leverage. Let us see in times to come.

'Conduct Joint and Combined Exercise'; As I said, in 1995, when these things first started, a lot of people had asked, "What is happening? Why are these chaps here? What do you want? Do they want to send us somewhere?" I think these are very minor-scale exercises. They have helped us to improve certain techniques of our own. Our forces have seen equipment which they use to see only in magazines; now they know how it exists and how to use it.

'Collaborate in Multinational Operations'; well, it is in the common interest. Multinational operations in the common interests need not be operations of war only. They can be operations other than war, like the Tsunami relief. Such operations are called operations other than war. But, then, war-like-operations, we don't know again. When it is in our interest, we have deployed troops abroad without asking the UN. We sent troops to Sri Lanka. We helped out the Maldives. So, it is all a question of what you can do. And, if this Treaty gives us a little more leverage in these areas, then, certainly, I think there is no need to criticize it too much. But, the biggest achievement, I will say the central point of this Treaty, is the establishment of the Defence Procurement and Production Group. That represents a big step forward because, like it or not, we do want to develop our own indigenous engineering, scientific and other research capabilities. But, in many areas, we are not capable. Let me tell you, sir, and, through you, to the House that we pride ourselves on our engineering capabilities. But, the fact of the matter is, our engineering capabilities are not very good. There are certain precision components we cannot make in our country today. We are improving. Certainly, we are improving. We have made so many things. But, at present, still we are not yet capable of making these things. Therefore, transfer of technology is an excellent way out. If you can get it, it is good. For example, the Light Combat Aircraft was delayed after the Pokhran explosions. The question which we have raised again and again in the Standing Committee on Defence is, the power plant of the Light Combat Aircraft which is flying is an American power plant, the GE-404. There is no hope of the Cauvery, at least, at the present, being put into service to power this aircraft. Here, I will urge the hon. Defence Minister to consider whether the time has not come after the experience of the LCA to

commence with as immediate effect as possible, with the given processes of the Government. Should not the Hindustan Aeronautics enter into a project to start construction of the multi-role combat aircraft, the next step, the fifth generation fighter? In collaboration with whom? We do not know. Maybe the USA; maybe you can get some help we do not know. **(Time-bell)**

Sir, there are many things that can be said about this. Only one comment I will make about increase in exchanges of intelligence. Intelligence exchanges had hitherto been very selective. We were told that we were given what was considered to be suitable for us. What we wanted, we did not get. I hope this will improve. But, since there is paucity of time, I will conclude by complimenting the Government of India and the Defence Minister, in particular, on this framework agreement they have drawn up. I think, in a fluid, uncertain world, with many poles emerging, including us as a polar power, this gives us a foothold in the future. Thank you, Sir.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, first of all, I would like to thank all the hon. Members and Leaders who have participated in this discussion which has arisen out of the statement which I made on the floor of this House.

[MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair]

Sir, to be very frank, when I went to the USA, I did not have any idea that this visit and the consequence of this visit will receive so much attention that Parliament will debate on the statement which I have made and the framework which we have entered into. The Framework of Defence Relationship with the USA-India-USA Defence Relationship in the debate, certain points have emerged, and certain points have emerged out of non-existing fears and apprehensions. Certain concerns have been expressed completely ignoring the history of the country, this great country, for the last 55 years since Independence. Certain fears have been expressed by injecting meaning, which does not exist. It is a framework. It provides a broad outline of Indo-US defence relationship. How this broad outline will actually translate into reality will depend on what we want and what the USA wants. A bilateral relationship cannot have one-way traffic. It must have an agreement between both the contracting parties. First of all, I would like to thank the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. He has widened

the scope of the discussion. Surely, Mr. Chairman, Sir, it is not possible for me to make comments on the decision-making process in the United States' system, pressures, counter-pressures etc. because in Government, he knows, I know, I am in Government for a pretty long time, we enter into arrangements with the Government of the day and the Government of the day decides in the context of their perception of the situation which prevails at that point of time. Every Government is sovereign, nothing binds. Normally, we try to respect the international commitments. But there are so many international commitments, so many international agreements, which have not been actually translated into reality because the contracting parties did not find it necessary to do so. But what is there? My colleague, Mr. Nilotpal Basu, started by using one of my words when I described my visit exploratory-what does it mean by exploratory. I think Mr. Siddiqui also asked why such arrangement, agreement has been made in such a haste. What is the haste? We had the defence relationship in the agreed minutes of 1995 and it was decided that after ten years in 2005 it would be reviewed. When I used the word 'exploratory'. I was asked by the media, "You are going, what is your shopping list, what do you want to buy- F-16, F-18, PC-3 Orion." I said that I am not going with a shopping list. This visit is an exploratory visit, exploratory in the context of procurement of weapons. If you just pick out the world, leaving the other words, it conveys different sense.' In the statement, Mr. Siddiqui, you should not have missed that point. In the Parliament itself. I said, in the Statement I have stated that it is the extension of the agreed minutes, as ten year period which were completed in 2005. But surely what happened between 1995 and 2005 should get reflected in the arrangement, which we are making. Another apprehension which has been expressed, perhaps it is because of our psychology, the United States of America are fond of using certain phrases, certain usage, certain idioms and through them they want to convey certain senses. Accepting those phrases does not mean that we accept the policies. Repeatedly, I have pointed out that when there is a question of collaboration in the multi-national operation in their common interest-their common interest means in the common interest of the contracting parties-where is the question of sending troops to Haiti or to Iraq? There is no such obligation. This agreement does not frame the overall foreign policy. This is within the context of the foreign policy. It is not true, that, for the first time we have entered into a defence relation with one country. Right now,

just at this moment, we have defence cooperation with as many as 12 countries, including Russia. And only one country with whom we have defence agreement at the ministerial level is Russia, all other country at the level of the Secretary. There is no question of compromising our national interest, of our sovereign independent decision-making. But, at the same time, can we ignore the need of the defence requirement? The Leader of the Opposition has very correctly pointed out that there has been a sea change, in the military matters. There has been a real military revolution with technological upgradation, information technology. The type of war we found in Iraq we had not seen it earlier. Therefore, if we do not upgrade our technology and explore the possibilities of having the technology which will suit us to equip us to meet our requirement, what should we do? This is our bounden duty. Whether we get it or not is a different issue. The question of having it from USA would not have arisen at all. If early this year, the United States of America decided to allow their manufacturing companies to participate in Indian Procurement. Earlier, they did not allow. When we floated request for proposals, American companies were not allowed to participate, to respond. In the month of March-April, they decided that now the American companies could do it. If they can do it, and if we have that technology, should we not explore that possibility? There maybe doubts. It may not materialise. But, surely, we shall have to try. We shall have to keep in view that there has been a sea change in world. Dr. Farooq Abdulla was reminding us as to what had happened in 1971. He is not here. I should not have responded. We did not respond in words. We responded in action. And that is the spirit of the Government of India. One need not feel that when somebody makes some irresponsible comment we shall have to respond to it by world. What the then US President or the US Secretary of State state did? We responded to it. But, it is equally true, Mr. Chairman, Sir, that it is not the USA alone or its Foreign Secretary alone, but there are stated words in the volumes of debates of the Rajya Sabha, where some political parties considered the Indian Army as the Army of occupation in Bangladesh and demanded that it should be withdrawn. In democracy it happens. Perceptions change. One does not remain at one place. The hon. Leader of the Opposition very correctly pointed out while quoting President Puttin that, perhaps, the most significant event in the post-Second World War era of the second-half of the last century, was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And we suffered. All the Defence arrangements that we have with them did not serve our

purpose to the extent it should have been served or to the extent we required them to serve. All of you are fully aware of the Procedure. Today, if I want to buy an equipment, I am to place an order on a Russian company. That Russian company will place order on the manufacturing unit in some other country. Their economic situation is not quite good. So, I shall have to advance money. And, from there, they will advance money. As per the agreement, I cannot procure equipment directly from the equipment manufacturers. Therefore, what is wrong if we try to explore the alternative sources? If the alternative source is not available, it is not available. We have lived with sanctions for so long. Mr. Kasturirangan correctly pointed out the type of problems that we have in respect of the Cryogenic technology. Till today, we have problems in having an engine for the L.C.A. It is incorrect to say that something new has been done in this Framework. A lot of talks have been made about the missile shields. Who is going to accept their missile shield? In the area of missile, whatever arrangements we are having right now are these in the frame work. Before the signing of this Framework, the arrangements we were having were the arrangements of sharing information, participating in seminars and meeting of technologists. Nothing beyond that. What is not in the framework and if somebody tries/emerges that something is there in their own perception, I cannot help. It has never happened. Sir, the history of the Indian National Congress in this matter is then questionable; whether we are in office, or, we sit here or sit there, we don't change our policy. On this matter, I would like to make it quite clear that our Foreign Policy has been evolved by this party. I know what was the approach, in respect of India's Non-Alignment Policy in the 50s; in the 60s, of many political parties, who have accepted it. Now Therefore, if they try to lecture us that we should do this, we should do that, I am afraid, it cannot be accepted. There is no question of compromise. Nothing has been done, it is an enabling provision. You may reject it, you may accept it. Soldiers can not be sent to Iraq. Well it is. If you feel that you cannot stand before the mighty Americans, that may be the complex of somebody. As the Defence Minister of the country, and as a Member of Parliament, I do not have any such complex. I can withstand it. Nobody can compel us. And, nobody will compel us. It is not an empty sound, it is the ground reality. A lot of issues have been raised. I have explained, in respect of the missiles, and I have shown it to some of the senior leaders that what type of arrangements they have, what type of phrases they used, how we have amended. Despite that, if

this disinformation is being carried out, I cannot help it. I do not carry any ideological baggage that whatever the USA does is bad. I don't subscribe to that view. In this trip itself, at the Carnegie Foundation, I had pointed out that we do not believe in a unipolar world. There are so many power points. It has been stated that as if we have come within the American strategy in Malacca straits, completely ignoring the fact that our policy in that area is to build up relations with the littoral States. And, not in words, we have arrangements with Thailand, we have arrangements with Indonesia, we have arrangements with Malaysia. So, how can one say that this framework is leading you to collaborate with the USA in some sort of fulfilling their strategy, if you feel that there is necessity in certain areas? For piracy, we are cooperating. For certain protection of the seaways, if weapons are supplied to the States inimical to us, and if we have the capacity, we shall intervene. And, that is why, we have deliberately not used the word 'interdiction' in the framework. We have used the word 'interaction, not 'interdiction' because it expresses certain other connotation. But we shall have to put up a strong defence for our own national interest. And, if there is a need for cooperation, we shall have to do that cooperation. And, exactly, what we are doing now, we are extending that type of cooperation.

6.00 P.M.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, it has been asked "What is the role of the WMD?" We are a signatory to this convention. But that does not mean that we are going to be a signatory to the NPT. We are signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Therefore, we are a party to various international conventions. And, as we are a party to the WMD, that is why Parliament passed the Act. In respect of terrorism, I myself had pointed out, and I think the leader of the Opposition will agree with me, sitting on that side, almost exactly, at the place where the Leader of the Opposition is sitting now, raised the same question—I have a copy on that day's debate—that how did they feel, how did they consider and what was their perception on how American action in Afghanistan was going to take note of our concern of terrorism? And his response was that Taliban regime is doing nothing but manufacturing terrorism, and if that manufacturing regime is destroyed we do feel our concerns are noted. Therefore, if we feel in certain areas there is necessity of having it, we should have it. Repeatedly, we have told the international community.

before 9/11, nobody took notice of it. In 1994-95, as leader of the Indian delegation in the United Nations, we moved a special resolution for international convention under the U.N. to deal with cross border terrorism. In 1995 they did not take note of it. In 1999, they did not take note of it. In 2001, if they did take note of it, should we say, 'No; no, you did not take note of it in 1995, therefore, when you are taking note of it, we are not with you'. That cannot be the approach. I do feel, cross border terrorism is the biggest menace to the world peace and tranquillity in the post-Cold War era. Surely, their perceptions and our perceptions are not equal. And our perceptions do not change about Iraq. And, most respectfully, I would like to submit, Sir, you will recollect one whole day we debated for one word, whether it will be Condemned or 'deplored'. (*Interruptions*) I think, for the word we debated for one day and, ultimately, agreed that it should be 'deplored.' (*Interruptions*) Thereafter the debate was for two days, but we were feeling very strongly. So, if we feel so strongly, surely, you can; expect us that we are not going to have an arrangement which will totally neglect us. But, at the same time, the ground reality has to be taken note of. The ground reality is that in areas of defence, we must be prepared. Somebody has suggested that it will trigger off an arms race. There is no question of that. I myself pointed out that we have no intention of entering into an arms race. The question of dependability has arisen. Why do you want to go for joint production; co-production? Why do you want technology transfer? Because we are not quite sure whether buying one equipment, for its servicing, for its overhaul, we will get the necessary support. But if we have access to technology, we have brain enough, competence enough to absorb that technology and even to improve it with the support of appropriate institutions. This is not an empty commitment, empty promise because we have shown it although it has taken time. But, at the same time, we have shown it that we can do it. But if we get that, we must have it. That is the reason why we have suggested this. Somebody wanted to know, what is the composition of this Joint Production Group. The Production Group is yet to be set up. We have decided to set up that. Both sides will exchange the composition and it will be done and when it will be done, it will be operational and it will be under the Defence Policy Group. It was set up long ago and it is regularly meeting, and this institutional arrangement we are having with a large number of countries. Coming to another point the Leader of the Opposition mentioned, it is true that there has been some problem, but to describe it that the decision-

making process in the Ministry of Defence has come to a grinding halt, I think, is not correct. First of all, I would like to make it — quite clear Mr. Jairam Ramesh also raised this issue — that last year, that 'means, the year 2004-05, I have spent every farthing which was given to the Ministry of Defence and Rs. 11,000 crore alone for the modernization.

SHRI JAIRAM RAMESH: Since when is the Ministry getting farthings?

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE: No, I am not talking at all. What I am doing is, sometimes, for some of the public sector units we are keeping some money, but that is as per their advance, their bills. But, if there are some misgivings, some questions come, which we feel... this issue was also debated on the floor of Parliament; it is not that all the comments of the CAG are being automatically sent to CBI for investigation but, if there are certain issues, which *prima facie* appear to be...*(Interruptions)*... Sir, I will complete within four, five minutes. Most of the points I have covered. Then, there is no option but to send it, because, after all, in our system I do feel sometimes it happens, if we do not take the appropriate action immediately, accusing fingers will be raised. Sometimes, it has its impact. Therefore, what we have decided is this. We have updated the defence procurement system. We have done two defence procurement systems. One for the revenue, the stores and other things which the hon. Leader of the Opposition is fully conversant with, and another is the capital procurement. We have put both these on the website. There are two areas where we have hardly any option. So many experts are sitting here and General Roy Chowdhury had even disclosed some information which I did not have any intention to do. Sometimes, in the larger national interest, in the interest of friends, there are umpteen examples, where we took unilateral action—unilateral action with the best intention and not with the sanction of the United Nations, because, it is the compulsion of the situation. By and large, we go by the United Nations. Basically, there was no question of sending any troops or participating in the military operations. Even to be extra careful, when it was suggested that our armed forces wanted to have greater interaction with both, the Pacific Command and the Central Command, we decided that, no, we will not send our people there. We will enhance our Defence Attache institutions in the Washington Embassy, and, to meet the requirements, whatever necessary will be done. But, in the case of Tsunami, in the case of natural disasters,

sometimes all these things need to be necessarily done. We have done it, actually, in the last Tsunami, because the very nature of the things do not allow you time to have some sort of UN intervention. But the question of military operation, or the question of joint operation without UN sanction, Mr. Chairman, Sir, is out of question. Surely, we are not going to do it at all.

Another point to which I think some hon. Members have referred is this. I, deliberately, did not discuss the detailed geo-political situation, because the hon. Members had the opportunity of debating and deliberating on it when they discussed, the joint statement of the Prime Minister and President both. Even taking the risk of repetition, I would like to point out that this framework has opened an opportunity. Somebody has said that 'why the US has so much interest? Nilotpal is absolutely correct that the US has only one interest, paramount interest and that paramount interest is their national interest, and so do we have. What is our Foreign Policy? Our Foreign Policy is to protect our national interest. Therefore, if I consider that my Foreign Policy has a bearing on my national interest, the core of my Foreign Policy is not to export technology, the core of my foreign policy is not to have any territorial ambition, but the core of my Foreign and Security Policy is, as I do not have any ambition, territorial ambition, similarly, I would not allow anybody to have territorial ambition at my cost. That is the core of my Foreign Policy, the core of my security policy. Why are they showing so much interest? It is for obvious reasons. They would like to sell their products. Everybody knows it. And, that is why we said—I myself told—that what is your track record, your dependability? So many organisations, including the DRDO scientists, are not provided with the visas. Therefore, with this track record, how do I believe?

Perhaps, the answer lies if you come for co-production, if you transfer technology, then, perhaps, these types of difficulties can be obliterated. So, everybody would like to protect its national interests, without compromising the national interest, without compromising the very basic policy, and, frankly speaking, Mr. Chairman, Sir, the scope of this arrangement is this. It is a very high sounding word, but, actually, it is the agreed minutes of discussion between the two Defence Ministers of India and the US. We have given some good nomenclature, but that does not mean that we have arrived at any concrete arrangements, agreements.

This is an enabling provision. To what extent this enabling provision will be advantageous to us will depend on to what extent we take this advantage and to what extent they also respond.

Once again, Sir, I assure all the hon. members of the House that I am indeed grateful to them for giving their very valuable suggestions and advice, and all those advices will be kept in mind while formulating further policies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Defence Minister, now, Shri Jaipal Reddy will make a statement regarding the status of implementation of recommendations contained in the Seventh Report of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology. You can lay the statement on the Table of the House.

STATEMENT BY MINISTER

Status of Implementation of Recommendations Contained in the Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Information Technology

THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING AND THE MINISTER OF CULTURE (SHRI S. JAIPAL REDDY): Sir, I beg to lay a copy of the statement on the floor of the House on the status of implementation of recommendations contained in the Seventh Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology pertaining to Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

श्री सभापति : सदन की कार्यवाही कल प्रातः 11.00 बजे तक के लिए स्थगित की जाती है।

The House then adjourned at fourteen minutes past six of the clock till eleven of the clock on Tuesday, the 9th August, 2005.