

(iii) Statement under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 16 of the Tariff Commission Act, 1951, explaining the reasons why a copy each of the documents referred to at (i) and (ii) above could not be laid within the period prescribed under that sub-section [Placed in Library See No IV R 11a(23) for Nos (i) to (iii)]

**REPORT OF TARIFF COMMISSION ON THE
BALL BEARINGS AND STEEL BALLS
INDUSTRY**

SHRI T T KRISHNAMACHARI
Sir, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of each of the following papers under sub-section (2) of section 16 of the Tariff Commission Act, 1951 —

(i) Tariff Commission's Report (1952) on the Ball Bearings and Steel Balls Industry,

(ii) Ministry of Commerce and Industry Resolution No 18(4)-T B / 52 dated the 10th January 1953, and

(iii) Ministry of Commerce and Industry Notification No 18(4)-T B / 52 dated the 10th January 1953 [Placed in Library See No IV R 15a (26) for Nos (i) to (iii)]

SHRI P SUNDARAYYA Are there any anti-Russian papers to be laid on the Table?

SHRI T T KRISHNAMACHARI No, Sir The papers are already on the Table

MOTION OF THANKS ON PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS—continued.

MR. CHAIRMAN We resume discussion on the President's Address

SHRI NARENDRA DEVA (Uttar Pradesh) Sir, the President's Address has made a broad survey of the progress that we have achieved in recent years and it ends with an optimistic note about the future I agree that

considerable progress has been made in jute and cotton production It is also true that multi-purpose river valley projects have made some progress But I see no reason why we should be optimistic about the future, why we should feel self-complacent We are not yet out of the wood We are still under the shadow of an overwhelming crisis The food situation still continues to give us cause for anxiety and even today there are many districts in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh which are suffering from famine conditions If we want a permanent and satisfactory solution of the food problem, which is a national problem, which, in my opinion is the major and central problem on the happy solution of which the future of the country depends, we shall need sustained efforts for many many years before we can reach the ultimate goal Therefore, Sir, it is not proper on our part to feel very happy over what little we have been able to achieve There may be some short-term improvements and they may be lost to us Therefore, this is not the time for rejoicing or mutual thanksgiving As I have suggested, the food problem is the major and central problem and as it is bound up irretrievably with the land problem, I shall have to examine the land policy of the Government as formulated and adumbrated in the Report of the Five Year Plan and if I find that there is nothing in it which can create popular enthusiasm, encourage local initiative and enthuse the people with a new faith and a new hope, I shall say that in spite of the labour that has been put in during the last two years it will be a still-born child Its success will depend mainly on the measure in which we are able to evoke popular enthusiasm And that will be possible only if we can give new hope of a better future to the landless labourer to the poor peasant whose holding is admittedly small and uneconomic It is admitted in the report that pressure on land is growing and that fragmentation of holdings, is

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proceeding apace but nothing is being done to check its progress. So far as the landless labourer is concerned, he has been left to the mercies of the well disposed and charitable men of the countryside. In these circumstances, I do not think that a proper atmosphere can be created in which we shall be able to get the willing and hearty co-operation of the peasant.

So far as the small and uneconomic holdings are concerned, the recommendation of the Planning Commission is that they should pool together their resources—their lands, their livestock and their agricultural implements—and take to co-operative farming.

3 P.M.

Co-operative farming is, therefore, the central theme of this part of the report and its success is more or less made dependent on the administrative machinery of the bureaucracy that will be set up for carrying on its activities in the countryside. The co-operative movement, in order to succeed, must have the ready allegiance and loyalty of the masses because it is well known all over the world that the poor peasant is individualistic, that he does not ordinarily take to co-operative farming with enthusiasm. It is the landless labourer that takes readily to co-operative farming; he has no alternative also. But so far as the landless labourer is concerned it is said in the report that the benefit of the redistribution of land will mainly go to the poor peasant and not to the landless labourer. It is however, said that efforts should be made to secure gifts of land for landless labourers. As you know, Sir, the landless labourer is the disinherited, the most backward and the most oppressed section of the village population. But, Sir, we find that no effort has been made and no steps have been indicated in the report which may give us satisfaction that there will be a fair deal so far as the landless

labourer is concerned. It is true that so far as the reclamation of land is concerned, he will get quite a little share; but the major part of it will go to the poor peasant. The landless labourer will have, Sir, no good reason to feel enthused over this dismal picture, and his willing co-operation will not be forthcoming.

So far as the question of small and uneconomic holdings is concerned, we all know that the draft outline of the Plan did not at all deal with the question. It had a soft heart, a kind of tenderness, for the most efficient producer and for the big farmer. The planners approached the problem from the economic rather than from the social point of view. If social conditions are not altered, if equality of status is not accorded and if lands are not divided, it is not possible to enlist the support and sympathy of poor peasants. But, we find a welcome change in the final Plan as it has emerged after discussion and they have now admitted that it would be necessary to fix an absolute limit as regards the amount of land of individual holdings. This is a welcome change and I am glad that wisdom has, after all, dawned upon the planners to extend this little concession to the poor peasant. But two years have been already spent in finalising the Plan; three more years remain to implement it; and they say in the learned Report that two or three years might be necessary to set up the machinery for land management and for the enforcement of the laws relating to the ceiling of individual holdings: that is to say, that for the next two or three years, we shall not be able to redistribute the land according to the Plan. The ceiling will differ from province to province, and it appears from the report itself that the old tenderness for the big farmer still persists. They are more eager to see that there is efficient management of land but they do not care whether social justice is rendered to the large body of peasants or not. For the rich peasants co-operative methods

are not necessary; they will manage their individual holdings and they will not enter into co-operatives. It is only owners of small uneconomic holdings that will have to enter into co-operatives. As it will take another two or three years to redistribute the surplus land, there is no hope for them to enlarge their holdings and so make it economic and profitable to them. There is no reason why the planners should expect them to lend a helping hand to the successful development of agriculture. So far as the landless labourers are concerned, I have just placed before you their position as defined in the report itself. They will have to depend mainly upon the gifts which may be made to them as a result of the Bhoodan Yagna movement, initiated and conducted by Acharya Vinoba Bhave. I do not disparage the movement; rather I consider it of some value because it would create a sense of urgency with respect to this matter. It seems, however, that no sense of urgency has been created so far as the Government is concerned. I did expect that as a result of the Bhoodan Yagna movement pressure would be brought to bear on the Government to see that justice was done to millions of people who could not earn their livelihood. They must not be left to depend on the charities of well-disposed persons, the zamindars, who have no soft heart for them. It has been amply demonstrated as a result of the movement that the poor alone have genuine sympathy for the poor, and not the rich. It shows the solidarity which can easily be established among the poor people, of whatever gradations they may be. I have stated all these facts and I leave it to you to judge. I do not know if in these circumstances a suitable atmosphere can be created in the countryside under which the co-operative movement can flourish. I am convinced that the present sense of frustration can be overcome, that the peasantry which is apathetic and indifferent today to social and economic problems can be brought into action provided suitable steps are taken to

enthuse it with a new hope. This is possible only if you take immediate steps to redefine the social relations in the countryside, put an end to all exploitation and give them a new status and a new hope.

The other question, Sir, is the delicate question of Kashmir. I am not competent to pronounce any authoritative opinion on this matter, but I will say with a full sense of responsibility that the Praja Parishad agitation is a communal agitation; that the Praja Parishad is the old R.S.S. It opposed the introduction of land reform; it supported the Maharaja in the days of old; and when the R.S.S. was banned, it overnight assumed a new name and is masquerading under the name of Praja Parishad. I say that this agitation is ill-timed, ill-conceived and is calculated to render the greatest injury to the larger interests of the country. I do not mean that a strong and repressive policy is needed to put an end to this mischievous movement. But I would like to place one aspect of the matter before you which is of some importance in my eyes. It is this that today it has assumed a mass character; it has a broad base now. It has drawn into its orbit a large number of people from different sections of the population. And when I find this phenomenon, I feel perturbed. I know it is due to the new non-communal slogans which have proved so attractive to the masses. But we have to find out the actual reasons which have led these masses to be drawn into the net of these communalists. I am anxious and I want that the communalist leaders should be isolated from the masses. But that would not be possible only by following a repressive policy. That would be possible only if we take an objective view of the situation and try to understand with sympathy the reasons—however wrong they may be—which led a large number of people to join the communal forces in the country. There must be something which aroused their enthusiasm. What is that? And when I thought over this matter, I came to

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the conclusion—I may be wrong in my conclusions I do not know—that the uncertainties of the situation due to protracted negotiations, due to prolonged controversies on the Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India and the United Nations Representative are partly responsible for the present situation and tension in Jammu. The other factor is the clash of two regional nationalisms of Kashmir and Jammu. These two factors, in my opinion, have led the masses into the trap laid by the communalists. Therefore in my opinion, we cannot ignore the movement. We cannot dismiss it on the simple plea that this movement is led by the communalists and I do hope that Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will consider this matter calmly, coolly and dispassionately and try to remove the legitimate grievances of the masses. I don't stand for vested interests; I don't stand for landlords and I know that a Commission of Inquiry has already been set up by the Government of Sheikh Abdullah to go into the economic grievances of these people. That is a minor question. The major question is that there must be something which has deeply stirred the hearts of the masses. It may be wrong and misplaced—regional nationalism is perhaps wrong. In India we have suffered too much for it. But it is necessary that something must be done to enlarge and broaden the outlook of the residents of Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammu. All suffer from this sense of regional nationalism. If they are to live and pull together, it is absolutely necessary that either you give recognition to this feeling and sentiment and concede local autonomy in some form or other or if that is not a feasible proposition, if that is not considered to be desirable, then the next best thing would be for the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and for the Government of India to take steps to see that these people do not have parochial and narrow outlook and that their outlook is broadened. I cannot indicate the steps at the

moment. Our Prime Minister is the architect of our policy towards Kashmir and Jammu and I think these facts must be placed before him. I earnestly and honestly feel about the matter. I have fought stoutly against communalism and I shall join hands with any organisation for fighting these communal forces. India can make progress only on one condition that the outlook of the various sections of the Indian community is nationalistic. What gave us independence? What is shaping our destiny? Nationalism and democracy, these are the two vital forces which have changed the complexion of Asia and we do need them in a very large measure. Unfortunately, India suffers from casteism, though we did notice after general elections that communalism met with a bad defeat. But it is not yet dead. Events take place, situations arise which give communalists a new lease of life. Therefore, we have to be cautious all the time. We cannot do a single act which may give encouragement to these forces in the country and I think that it is not a mere accident that the communal forces outside Kashmir are taking advantage of the situation and have joined hands with the communalists of Jammu and Kashmir. When all is said and done, I feel that repression is no remedy for a disease of this kind. It is deep-seated. Otherwise the masses could never have joined the movement and therefore it behoves us to be careful and to see what is the reason why these people's hearts were stirred and why they joined the movement.

I shall stop here, Sir. But I want to refer to one more matter. It is about education. In the Presidential Address only one paragraph is devoted to education, but unfortunately no mention has been made about university education. We all know that standards are going down. People generally complain of indiscipline and say that universities are seats of intrigue. That is partly true. But what is the remedy? No remedy has been suggested. Mere appointment of a Commission or a Committee will

not bring us nearer the solution of the problem. There has been a plethora of commissions and committees both in States and at the Centre. I remember, Sir, that the University Commission with which your illustrious voice is associated reported more than three years ago, but nothing has been done so far and nothing will be done for the simple reason that the financial stringency of the Government of India does not allow it to implement the recommendations made by the Commission. So many committees have already met in different States and so much material has been accumulated that it is quite enough to help the Government in taking decisions. But they are not in a position to take decisions because our resources are slender and most inadequate. A knowledge of man's limitation is the first postulate of wisdom and it is not always wise to seek progress in all possible directions irrespective of the resources at your command. Let us concentrate on two or three vital and urgent needs of the people. The projects that we have taken lately in hand have received the hearty co-operation of the masses because they tend to satisfy some of their vital and urgent needs. This is why we could enlist their support and co-operation. But where is the leadership which will provide guidance, will show them the path from day to day? The question is, Sir, to do something and do at once because time is of the essence. We cannot afford to waste time any further in ordering elaborate enquiries and investigations. The reasons why these universities are not coming up to the mark are well-known to us. We know their shortcomings. We know their defects. An elaborate enquiry is not needed for the purpose. That will be sheer waste of time when we know that we cannot do much about it for financial reasons. It will only lead to further discontent, to further dis-satisfaction.

I would say, Sir, that we should do something to change the attitude of

the masses. The co-operative movement is a new way of thinking and living. It is not merely a question of joint farming or consumers' co-operatives or producers' co-operatives. There are many types of co-operatives which can be established. It must serve every need and aspect of rural life. That is what is expected of the co-operative movement, and this will be possible only if non-official agencies are associated in a very large measure with the administrative machinery. These Departments will not be able to deliver the goods. I know them well in my own province. I can say that many of these so-called co-operatives exist only on paper. They do not function, and wherever they function, they function in a dull and feeble manner. They lack vitality, they lack life. How can you infuse life into them? Unless those people who have high ideals are in them, who want to serve the people who know the urges, hopes and fears, the needs and requirements of the villagers, this movement is bound to fail and the problem of the small uneconomic holdings will not be solved. My suggestion so far as the landless labourers are concerned is that whenever you reclaim fresh land, that land must be given to the landless labourers. They should have precedence over all other classes, because they do not have the equipment, they do not have the means and so they can be expected to join the co-operatives. When you get initial success, that initial success will create a suitable atmosphere so that poor peasants will also take to co-operative farming.

One word more and I finish my speech. Something should be done to create leadership of the right type. The Report itself has based its success on leadership at all levels. But nothing is being done to create this new leadership. We may be very proud of having acquired a high status in the councils of nations, our name may stand high in international affairs, because of the contribution that we have made in trying to establish peace, but all that will be of no avail to us if

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in domestic matters we fail and do not succeed in achieving economic progress and security.

SHRI B. K. P. SINHA (Bihar): Sir, in rising to speak on the third day of the debate on the President's Address, I am reminded of a small couplet:

तत्त्व तत्त्व सब अधरा कहिया

कठबो कहिस अनूठो ।

बाकी बचा सो जोलहा कहिया

अब जां कहे सो जूठी ॥

Whatever was of substance was said by Surdas. Tulsidas said same thing, brilliant and new and whatever remained was said by Kabirdas, and if anybody says anything now, it will be mere repetition. Anyway, it shall be my endeavour to put old wine in a new bottle.

Sir, our minds are agitated by certain incidents in the sphere of international relations. We are living in an age of tension, and the tension is rising every day. It was expected that after witnessing two world wars, and that in one generation, the statesmen of the world would have learnt their lessons, but like the Bourbons of France they seem to forget the lessons of history. Tension is rising and as a climax to this rising tension recently came the declaration of President Eisenhower of America neutralising Formosa. It is too early to judge the full material implications of this policy. The statesmen of the U.S.A. are confused, the American people seem to be confused, their Congress seems to be confused. They do not know what this declaration would lead to, but this much is certain that this declaration has produced a war psychosis. It is one more nail in the coffin of peace. It makes the task of those who want to preserve peace more difficult. It has created a psychology of hatred and fear and released forces which would be difficult to control for the people who

released them. Sir, peace cannot be preserved by extending the area of war, whether cold war or hot war. When the statesmen of the world place guns in their possession and train them against others, they have to reckon on the possibility of sometimes the guns going off by themselves and I am afraid if things continue in this way, some day the great nations of the world will unconsciously drift into war. Sir, this policy, based as it is on the hope that they will succeed in making Asians fight Asians, is bound to belie their hopes. This policy takes no account of the psychology of the Asians. Asians have had two centuries of experience of Western domination. The West in our minds is synonymous with political oppression and deprivation of human rights. The West during its domination of the East for over two centuries has created a sense of solidarity in the East, and it is too much to hope that in such a short time we shall forget those two centuries of political nightmare. I am sure that Asians will refuse to oblige the West by fighting Asians. We are asked to beware of Communism, with its intolerance and oppression. We have experience of the West. On the one side, there are reactions produced by experience and on the other side there are reactions produced by the possibility of Communist rule. I am sure that reactions produced by experience are very much stronger than those produced by possibilities. We are in no mood at present, no nation in Asia is in a mood at present, to fight another Asian nation. This policy encourages military adventurism. It is based on inadequate appreciation of the nature of crisis that overtook the Kuomintang regime in China and ultimately led to its elimination from the Chinese mainland. In China two social systems were fighting for supremacy. This was clearly manifested in military measures. The Kuomintang had ruled China for more than three decades and in these three decades the conditions of the Chinese people did not improve. The old economic system was on the verge of collapse and in the face of

the advance of a more progressive and virile economic system, the social and political system of the Kuomintang continually retreated until at some stage it became a complete rout. When the ship of the old economic system sank it produced cataclysmic whirlpools and eddies which sucked up in their vortex the Kuomintang military machine. For Kuomintang it was not a purely military defeat. To the Communists it was not a pure and simple military victory. For the Kuomintang this military defeat was part of a bigger debacle—the debacle of a socio-economic system. In the circumstances to expect that military measures will re-establish that regime on the Chinese mainland is simply futile. It is futile to hope that the hands of history can be turned back. Hitler tried that experiment—he succeeded but his success was temporary and ephemeral and when the hands of history lunged forward they did so with cataclysmic rapidity and devastating consequences.

Sir, the President's Address has rightly expressed the concern of this nation and this Government and this House towards the step that has been taken. I entirely concur with the feelings expressed in that Address. However, some of my friends on the Opposition Benches are not satisfied with this restrained expression of opinion and they want more vocal condemnation. I would tell them that the language of statesmanship is different from the jargon of agitation and political propaganda. I have nothing more to say in this behalf.

Coming next to the question of Kashmir. An agitation has been going on there for some time. Its objective seems to be rather alluring—one President, one Constitution and one law. Prof. Dinkar and Acharya Narendra Deva have rightly pointed out the communal character of this agitation and the antecedents of the originators or of the leaders of this agitation.

However, I look at this question from the point of view of consequences, the effects that it is likely to produce. For aught I know the leaders of this agitation may, like Brutus, be honourable men and their motives may be of the purest but . . . (*Interruption*) But I am certain that this agitation is calculated to defeat its professed purpose. I use the word 'professed' deliberately. I feel that they have a purpose, something entirely different from what they profess. What is the background for this agitation? The Kashmir issue has been before the U. N. for more than 4 years now. We have pledged that the ultimate fate of Kashmir shall be decided by a plebiscite. The question of plebiscite is even now being settled at Geneva. In this background to start an agitation of this character is not only puerile, not only a mistake but is criminal. There are some who would like us to treat the accession of Kashmir with India as final and irrevocable, but our pledged word is there and it is a lesson of history that those who have treated their pledged word as scraps of paper have been thrown on the scrap heap. Moreover when people stress that this question of accession should be treated as closed now, they are reckoning without the host. It is not a one-sided affair. We may on our part like to treat it as closed and final but the United Nations are there. Pakistan is there and the nations of the world are there. The plebiscite we are pledged to have, and it is bound to come some day or the other and if this agitation goes on, I am afraid, it will have very unsalutary effects on that occasion. I know that the people of Jammu are motivated by fear, and fear produces hatred but then it produces reactions in others also. It is not as if the people of Kashmir Valley are not subject to the same influences to which the people of Jammu are subject. They are also subject to the same stresses and strains, they are subject to the same religious influences. In these circumstances a religious agitation or a politico-religious agitation is bound to have unfavourable reactions in the Kashmir

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Valley The consequences of this agitation are bound to be bad and disastrous. Looking at it from the point of view of the consequences, therefore, I feel that this agitation is nothing short of treason not only against the Kashmir Government, but also against the Indian Union, treason against the people and treason against the great ideals of secularism which we have cherished. It is this agitation that is likely to tilt the balance in favour of Pakistan on the occasion of any plebiscite. It is vote in advance, in favour of Pakistan. It is not an ordinary struggle that we are carrying on in Kashmir. It is not a struggle for barren hills or lakes or valleys. It is something more than that. We are fighting in Kashmir for the torn body of India, for the lost soul of India. The soul of India has always been toleration, religious toleration, and this has been expressed in political secularism from times ancient. When Christianity was being presented in the land of its origin—Israel, a handful of Christians came to India. They were welcomed with open arms and they have flourished and are now in good numbers in Travancore and in Cochin. No distinction was made by the rulers of India between Christians and non-Christians between Hindus and Muslims in ancient times. This is a creation of the recent age—a creation of the foreigners for their own purposes. The partition of India was forced by circumstances that were created by the foreigners. India lost her soul and gave up religious toleration, and for a short period there was religious fanaticism. There were riots in Bengal and it had repercussions in Bihar and these in turn had repercussions in Punjab and North West Frontier Province. In Kashmir we are fighting to regain that lost soul and I have every hope that if we win in Kashmir, the ideas of secularism which are so dear to this country will be reestablished. If we win the plebiscite in Kashmir, I am sure forces will be generated that will some day lead

to the reunion of India, not by force but by persuasion and with the willing consent of the parts which are now torn asunder. In Kashmir it is a sort of crusade that we are fighting. Let us fight it out in that spirit. Destiny—I must say benign destiny has handed over the leadership of this crusade to Sheikh Abdullah. It is the duty of every Indian to strengthen his hands and not weaken his hands by these ill-timed and ill-conceived agitations. Pandit Kunzru referred in this connection to the detention of some Hindu Sabhaites in Amritsar and Punjab. He criticised that there was nothing said in the press conference of the Chief Minister that justified the detentions but there were two reports from one of which I find that there is mention that these people were collecting arms and inciting people to violence. I therefore think that there was adequate justification for these preventive arrests. However according to Pandit Kunzru preventive detention is only justified when the security of the State is jeopardised. I don't know what is the distinction between a movement of this character and a movement which falls short of danger to the security of the State. All big revolutions start with a small incident. Those incidents, taken individually, are mere defiance of the public order but a stage may come when the effect of these incidents taken collectively is to endanger the very security of the States. I think—and I feel that every right thinking man will be of the same opinion as myself—that this agitation has reached a stage when it has passed from the region of mere defiance of law and order to the region of endangering the very security of the State and I feel that the Punjab Government was perfectly justified in nipping this in the bud, rather than in the stage of flowering. Sir, we cannot be the victims of nineteenth century liberalism. The world has changed and ideals of liberalism have themselves undergone changes and in the present world, our democracy and our liberalism have sometimes to be partially and temporarily given up

I next come to the question of linguistic States. I have not much to say about them. I entirely agree that we should have linguistic States. In my opinion they give strength to the country, strength to the Union. Moreover, it is a natural urge. As our urge for independence could not be checked, similarly the urge of these linguistic and cultural areas have a strength of their own and some day it has to be met and satisfied. But this urge should not be carried to ridiculous lengths. One of my friends from Bihar—a representative of the Praja Socialist Party—made a plea for the establishment of a Maithili State. Now, Bihar is divided into four distinct—not linguistic, I cannot think of a word for it, rather dialectic units—Bhojpurī, Maithili, Magahi and some others. But they are mere dialects. They cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be called languages. There have been some great poets in Maithili, but that does not mean that it has become a language. Robert Burns wrote in Scotch; but that does not mean that Scotch was a separate language. Surdas and to some extent Tulsidas wrote in Braj Bhasha. That does not mean Braj Bhasha is a language. It is only a dialect. They are all dialects of one and the same Hindi language. Moreover, though the area in which Maithili is spoken is very thickly populated, it has extremely poor resources. It is most thickly populated,—as I said, one of the most thickly populated parts in the world—with more than 1,400 souls per square mile in some parts. But it is poor in resources. It is devastated by the Kosi river, and there are no mineral resources, nor any industries. In these circumstances, to claim a separate State for Maithili, in my opinion, is not a very proper thing—to put it mildly. I feel that even in Mithila itself, the people do not like to have a separate State. The demand for a separate State, in my State of Bihar at least, has become a favourite game of some frustrated politicians. I do not know why my friend who is a successful politician is indulging in this

game in this House. I hope this House and the Government will pay this suggestion the respect due to it.

I entirely support the vote of thanks so ably moved by Mr. Rama Rao and so ably seconded by Prof. Dinkar.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR (Rajasthan): Mr. Chairman, in this Address of the President, our foreign policy has occupied the front place, almost the very first place, and we were fortunate enough in having a little schooling the other day—on Saturday—by the lady Member who sits there.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Don't bother, she does not hear you.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: She is the only lady Member here. Sir, for the time being and.....

AN HON. MEMBER: No, there is another.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Go on.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: We had it from the lady Member who speaks with a little amount of authority on behalf of the Government on foreign policy. In her own words, she thought that the foreign policy of India is understood at the school-girl level. If that is the case, I believe it will take her a few years to understand the elderly statesmen of this House in respect of this subject of foreign policy.

Well, in support of the foreign policy, so much has been said about our proposal on Korea in the U.N. Let us examine the true position, the inside story of it, and the implications of our actions in this matter. I think the importance and significance of this proposal by us lay in the fact that India is supposed to have a unique position, unique in the sense that it is pursuing an independent policy, and she is friendly with both the Anglo-American bloc and Com-

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munist China. What is more important is that we are supposed to have the confidence and trust of our great neighbours and it was supposed and thought that when we were taking that proposal, when we were taking that proposal to the UN, it had the support also of the Chinese Government. It was at least believed that the original proposal had very favourable reactions from the People's Government of China. When this proposal was taken there, the original proposal was immediately rejected by the American Government. But the British diplomat, shrewd as he was, never rejected the proposal. He counselled caution. He praised our efforts in furtherance of peace and he said that the proposal must be examined in all its details, very sympathetically, and if possible some modifications may be suggested so that it may be acceptable to both the parties. Naturally, we felt inclined towards the British and, Sir, it must be noted that, with this attitude of the British, as against the clear rejection by the American people, the Press in America struck headlines saying that whether this proposal may succeed or may not succeed in bringing peace to Korea, at least it has divided the two good allies the Britishers and the Americans. These were the headlines which were struck in the American press. So, Sir, consultation started with the Britishers and our representative there thought of certain amendments. These amendments we must remember are of a very far-reaching character because Sir in the ultimate analysis these amendments placed the entire case in the hands of the United Nations where the Anglo-American bloc is definitely predominating and where Communist China is not represented. Sir, what happened was that it was the Russian Delegate who for the first time, informed the Assembly that the amendments to be moved by us had been rejected by China, at least 48 hours previously. The unfortunate part of the story is that we

never got in touch with the Chinese Government. We never knew what the reaction of the Chinese Government was towards these amendments. As a matter of fact, nobody, who is in the know of facts, will deny that the Indian Delegation was absolutely flabbergasted when the Russian Delegate for the first time, informed the Assembly that these amendments had been rejected by Communist China. Flabbergasted, they asked for a little time to consider whether actually to introduce these amendments or not. The Russian Delegate permitted this time, presumably they raised no objection because they thought that India would cry halt there, but, for reasons best known to our Delegation, after about 2 days of consultation, the amendments were introduced in the Assembly and the result was obvious, the Russian Delegate had already stated that the Communist China had refused and, as we know, the result was that we were no nearer peace, I think, Sir, in this matter, it is a perfect triumph of British diplomacy. The British have at least succeeded in doing one thing. They have succeeded in exposing to the whole world the extent of our relationship with China, a relationship which was so much boosted. Number two, Sir, it has given us a very bad taste for our relations with our big neighbour and, third it got us a kick from the Russian Delegate. It has further complicated the situation which is now much more difficult for peace efforts in this connection have been rendered complicated and made more difficult. If we had not introduced an amendment to the Resolution, certainly there was a possibility of our standing absolutely independent and making further efforts to bring better understanding and, agreement, if it is at all possible. I think, Sir, we should not get flattered and fooled by the high praises which are given to us in this matter by the subtle diplomats from outside or by the spoon-fed laymen here or elsewhere. I again repeat and emphasise that we have got to be very cautious in all these matters because we are dealing with

diplomats who are past-masters in it and as I have submitted in this particular case it has been a triumph for British diplomacy in estranging the friendliest relationship which we had been building up with China and Russia. This was the first time that we were condemned as somebody's camp followers.

In the matter of foreign policy the next important item is definitely Kashmir. I feel, in this matter we have definitely made initial mistakes and it is only because of the wrong decisions which we have initially taken that we are suffering and we have not been able to clear the debris. The hon. Member who seconded this Motion of Thanks waxed eloquent on the absolutely communal character of the agitation which is there in the State of Jammu at present. I do not stand here Sir to give any support to this Parishad agitation in Jammu. I quite understand and appreciate that such an agitation in the present circumstances cannot but be calculated to do great damage to this great country and the earlier it is stopped, the better it is. But, at the same time I feel and I feel more strongly, that, for this agitation there lies an equal responsibility on the shoulders of the Kashmir Government as well as the Government of India. I will tell you why. It is certainly a fact Sir, and anybody who has been to Kashmir recently, with his eyes and ears open, would know that it is definitely a fact, that there are genuine grievances and there has been suspicion in the minds of a vast section of people in Jammu and Kashmir—grievances which have definitely been ignored in a most callous manner and suspicion which has, as a matter of fact, been further strengthened by the recalcitrant attitude or by the procrastination of the Government of Kashmir, and by the complacency of India. We cannot deny and everybody recognises the vast force, the momentum which this agitation has gathered and this momentum is

certainly due to these two factors, the genuine grievances of the people there and the suspicion which was there and which is further being strengthened by such sort of attitude by both these Governments.

Well, Sir, I might submit further—I might warn the Government—that it is not only in Jammu that there is this sort of feeling in Kashmir valley itself there is a very strong feeling that there should be an end to this stalemate. It is true as the previous speaker has stressed and emphasised, that we gave an undertaking for a plebiscite. But we must remember one fact, that the accession of Kashmir is definitely unequivocal unqualified and complete. It was only as a matter of grace that in particular circumstances we offered to accept a plebiscite. Those circumstances have completely changed, and they have changed through the fault of the Pakistan Government and the delaying tactics of the U.N.O. And if in the changed circumstances the offer which was made only as a matter of grace is not there, nobody can accuse us of anything which can be called immoral. I very strongly feel that before the U.N.O. the question regarding Kashmir should be confined only to the driving out of the raiders from the parts occupied by them.

In this Address there is not a word about the foreign pockets in India. I think Sir, that our foreign policy in this direction has resulted in a complete stalemate. Firm and quick action in the first flush of our independence would possibly have yielded better results. I feel we have missed that psychological moment. In respect of other two matters—Ceylonese of Indian origin and Indians in South Africa—there is not the slightest doubt that the Government has done the very best that was possible.

Now, I come to home affairs. While talking about home affairs, I wish to

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lay particular stress on a subject which I consider to be of fundamental importance. I do not think there can be two opinions on the point that the very structure of our society is based on religious sanctions and moral values. I feel that a wrong type of education, with wrong notions about scientific advancement, and a very wrong conception of the essentials of a secular State, have created a big vacuum in the life of this country. By being secular we are opposed to a theocratic rule. That is true. But we certainly are not opposed to religion. The history of mankind shows that our moral values are rooted deep in religion. If we blindly attack religion, we cannot but weaken the moral fibre of the country. I definitely feel that that is the malady from which the country is suffering. I definitely feel that that is why we are not making that headway, that progress, which we should make. That is the reason why we hear of so many scandals and are yet so complacent about them. What is most essential in my view is that we should have secular and spiritual harmony in our lives. I think that was the great gift which ancient India gave to her sons and through her sons to the world at large. That is definitely a contribution which India alone can make.

Coming next to the amendment which I have tabled on education, it was not without some hesitation that I gave notice of and moved this amendment, because there is a clear confession in the President's Address itself about Government's failure in the sphere of education. But still my feelings in this matter are so strong and I feel that it is of such vital importance to the country that it is necessary that this Council expresses itself in this matter. Also I knew there were Members who would even defend the indefensible and draw comparisons where no comparisons are possible. One of the Members here in very emphatic language told the House

that there had been a vast expansion in the field of education, that there were about one million students in colleges, that about a lakh of graduates passed out every year, and so on; and he jeered at the figures in Russia. I consider it to be a great national loss, a callous waste of human energy and national wealth. We are playing with the youth of this country by giving them absolutely purposeless education. I think it needs no argument to prove it. I cannot do better than ask hon. Members to read convocation addresses which have been delivered in this country during the year 1952 by the President, the Vice-President, the Ministers and the eminent educationists of the country; they have all condemned the present system of education and have called for a complete remodelling of it. And yet, Sir, we have a friend here who is all praise for the educational expansion that has taken place during the last five years! I think it will be conceded that it is only through a revolutionary educational programme that the country could be vitalized, and this definitely was the first step which should have been taken, a step not only to change the methods but also the content of education. It is really unfortunate that we have taken no step in this direction till this day.

Next to education, there is an important point to which I wish to refer, and I consider that to be very important. I refer to the higher judiciary in this country—the treatment which is being given to the higher judiciary. Adverse service conditions have already had their effects. But my charge is of a much more serious nature. I refer to the appointment of a Judge in the High Court of Rajasthan.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I do not think it is wise to refer to individual cases.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: I am not at all referring to an individual case. I

have got the greatest respect for the individuals concerned. I am only condemning the most reprehensible conduct of the Government. Here is a gentleman who is thick in politics, with all party affiliations, prejudices and predilections that those party affiliations entail. Here is a gentleman who moves a motion of no-confidence against the Government of Rajasthan. Here is a gentleman who condemns the Government of Rajasthan in the strongest possible language. And, Sir, just before the commencement of the next session of the Assembly in that State, the gentleman is appointed as a Judge of the High Court.

SHRI C. G. K. REDDY (Mysore): That is the usual procedure.

AN. HON. MEMBER: Take it to the Prime Minister.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: Are we to take such a state of affairs lying down? Are we going to permit our High Courts to be the handmaids of political convenience? I definitely think Sir, this is a most serious charge....

AN HON. MEMBER: You support him?

CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI H. C. MATHUR: Next, I pass on to the Five Year Plan. It is absolutely impossible to deal with this vast subject in the few minutes that I am sure you are so kindly going to allow me. I would refer only to one aspect of this. Let us have a look at the Plan from cover to cover. What do you find but absolute helplessness for the middle-classes? Nothing but helplessness. There is absolutely nothing to ameliorate the condition of such people living in towns and big cities. We all know, Sir, that they are the hardest hit people in the country today. We ought to know, Sir, that they have eaten away all their reserves. I know that there are a number of families who are living absolutely on the brink of starvation

and we know that there is absolutely nothing but helplessness during the coming five years for this very important section of the population. We cannot forget the fact that they still constitute the backbone of the country. Whether they revolt or break down, in either case, it will spell disaster.

Then I pass on to Rajasthan in respect of the first Five Year Plan. I venture to submit that I have made a detailed and thorough study of this Plan for the State of Rajasthan. Through the courtesy of the Planning Commission here and the Government of Rajasthan, I have been able to obtain all the necessary details and it hurts me to have to submit that it is nothing but an empty shell. I will just give you an instance; I find in this Plan a few lakhs of rupees provided for an engineering college in Jodhpur, a college which, already exists. Whether this plan is there or is not there is absolutely immaterial because even in the routine course of the budget of the Rajasthan Government, this amount, which is now being provided in the Five Year Plan, has to be spent. If, Sir, the transfer of a particular amount from one budget head to another means something of Planning, I cannot imagine.....

(Tune bell rings.)

I gave facts and figures; I have consulted many people as also financial experts and I can definitely challenge that by no criterion could there have been a smaller allocation than fifty crores of rupees as against the 16 crores given to Rajasthan. I accuse the Government of a beggarly treatment to a princely State. It is really most unfortunate that our Government does not know the language of reason and representation that we have all along been making. They only understand the language of agitation.

SHRI A. S. KHAN (Uttar Pradesh): Sir, I rise to support the motion moved

[Shri A S Khan]

by my hon friend Mr Rama Rao the other day I think the President's address is a very dignified document a fair exposition of our foreign policy, of our economic activities and our activities in the international and other fields I notice, Sir, that in the course of the debate my hon friend the Leader of the Opposition was pleased to say that he could not understand the foreign policy of our Government that it was vague and so on Sir the policy which is being followed by the Government of India I submit, is the only natural policy for a country which won her freedom only a few years ago The policy is that we start with a clean slate extending our hand of friendship and it is for the other nations to reciprocate and respond This is the policy of our Government I do not see there is anything vague about it Even the Members of the Opposition do not say that we are doing nothing They say that we are only pretending to march that we are actually not marching They do not see our attitude of sincerity—of our impartiality, and they say that we are siding with one group—that is the Western group Very well Sir let us see in the light of the facts whether these accusations are or are not true Now I will ask my hon friend Sir 'Was it not a fact that we recognised the People's Government of China although it was not recognised by other members most of the members of the Western Bloc' Was it not India that suggested that the People's Government of China should be recognised? Still they call our policy as one of signing on the dotted line No, we were following an independent policy, a policy of fearlessness and justice I do not know the speaker who preceded me just now, he said that China was not consulted I do not know whether China was consulted or not, but my own impression is what generally happens is that informally China must have been consulted and must have given a sort of impression that there was no op-

position to the form It was rejected summarily and while rejecting the proposal the language that was used about India—to say the least—left indeed a bad taste in the mouth This is the position

Well Sir, now it has been said by our friends that India has not condemned the attitude of certain statesmen who made a statement of policy about Formosa and Korea Well in this connection I would like to quote from the Presidential Address with your permission

'My Government has viewed these developments with grave concern'

Then further it says

'My Government will continue to work to this end and will pursue a policy of friendship with all countries without any alignment with one group of nations against another'

So what can be more clear and definite than this? What else do they want us to do?

Again there was a lot of criticism about our attitude in regard to South Africa There again the Address says

'There are many people still who do not realise that racial domination and discrimination cannot be tolerated in the world today and any attempt to perpetuate them can only lead to disaster'

So what else is required of our Government? Do our friends want us to send an ultimatum to South Africa, Sir? My fear is, Sir, that our friends on the Opposition want us to do things which may break off our relations with one group or the other

Now Sir, about the Jammu and Kashmir question I will not say anything at length after the speeches made by my respected friends Mr. Budh Singh and Mr Hegde They dealt with this question thoroughly I

will only say this much that we know that the National Conference in Kashmir had their fight against autocracy as we were fighting here. The Congress was fighting here and they were fighting there. They had full sympathies with the Congress and the Congress had full sympathies with them. Their ideals were more or less the same. They have proved to Sheikh Abdullah and his party to the hilt that whatever they said about secularism was really their belief and their faith. They were facing a great danger when Kashmir was raided by tribesmen. They could have avoided this struggle only by accepting the two-nation theory. But they did not do so. They were willing to lay down their lives for the cause of civil liberty. They have stood the test of fire and sword. Now, to say that they are doing something which is not quite secular or reasonable is great injustice and, Sir, I would appeal to my friends here not to harass the ruling party. If they continue this agitation, it will weaken the position of the National Conference and therefore I think it is very wrong to have this agitation going on there.

Now, Sir, coming briefly to our economic programme, there seems to be some dissatisfaction in the minds of our friends in regard to what has been said in the Presidential Address. It is not said in that Address that the Government have created a new heaven. What they have said in that Address is a very modest claim that there have been some achievements. It is indeed an uphill task to improve and better the economic condition of the masses in a vast country like India. There are millions and millions of people. It cannot be done by a magic-wand. It must take time. It requires great personnel, technicians etc.

Now lastly I would say something about linguistic States. As regards Andhra, I can understand the feelings of the people. But as far as the general question of linguistic States is concerned, there will naturally be so

many difficulties. There will be so many Governors, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, Heads of Departments and so on and so forth. Now we have got this Five Year Plan. Now my question to them is simply this: Do they wish to give priority to those sentimental things or would they like to give priority to the Five Year Plan? At the same time, I would respectfully submit to the Government that such emotions do easily die out and they will have to do something in the matter. In my humble opinion, Sir, the best thing will be that within the State they must create zones and in those zones all the local boards should be allowed to work in the language of the zone. If they do something on these lines, I think, they will be able to satisfy the demands to some extent of those who want linguistic provinces. Thank you, Sir. I do not want to say anything more.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH (West Bengal): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am glad that at long last I have got the chance to say a few words on the President's Address, and I thank you for the same. I had originally intended to dilate on some few aspects of the President's Address, but I have thought it better since then to confine my remarks to mainly one topic which has come up rather unexpectedly for discussion and rather acrimonious discussion, and that is the topic of Kashmir. Before I come to that topic on which I want to address the House somewhat in detail, without, I hope, boring this House, I should just like to make only a few remarks on the general character of the Address.

As has been pointed out by numerous speakers—the hon. Members on this side of the House mainly—there is an air of smug complacency that pervades the entire Address. In fact it is writ large on almost every page. To tell the truth, on a reading of it, it seems that we have here a sort of blueprint of Ramrajya in action. You, Mr. Chairman, Sir, are familiar with the world-concept of

[Principal Devaprasad Ghosh.]

Leibniz (the famous German philosopher)—where all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. It seems from the Presidential Address, that we are very near the advent of a Leibnizian world. Upon the details of the progress—all-round progress—at an increasing pace—with which this smug Address concludes, I need not dilate, because this claim has been shred to tatters, if I may say so, by acute and detailed criticism from this side of the House. I should like to say only one word. In our ancient *Shastras*, self-praise, self-laudation, complacency, has been likened to *atma-hatya* (or suicide) and I think that if this Government does not want to commit national suicide, then it should give up the habit of indulging in self-praise, to this extent at any rate.

I had also intended to speak—but I am not going to speak in detail—on our famous foreign policy. In this connection, I may tell you, Sir, that I cannot hope to improve upon the very delicious description (“ding-dong policy”) given by my hon. friend Mr. Reddy, the other day, of the nature of the dynamic neutrality that we are supposed to be carrying on. I should think that our policy in foreign affairs in respect of the two gigantic blocs on either side, which are euphemistically called the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc, may be called a policy of tight rope dancing—trying to keep balance, sometimes tilting on this side and sometimes on the other side. A policy of tight rope dancing, of oscillation and vacillation, does involve dynamics of a kind because it implies some sort of motion. But this kind of dynamics does not carry us forward. It only results in wriggling and wobbling and zigzagging nothing more than that. If the advent of President Eisenhower in the White House of U.S.A. has not done anything else, it has at least done one good thing. It has given a fair warning to all the tight rope dancers of the world

to decide on which side they will tilt, whether on the side of freedom or on that of slavery. They have not to make their choice.

Now, I should like to say a few words about the question of Kashmir. Really it pained me that the President's Address, an Address presumably written with the consent of our revered President for whom we have got the greatest respect, should have gone to the length of describing the movement launched in Jammu by the Praja Parishad as a misguided, misconceived agitational movement. Any other person's statement containing adjectives like that would not have been listened to with the respect that any statement from our revered President carries. Not only that, in this House and outside, there has been a sort of persistent misrepresentation of the aims and objectives of the movement that has been launched. You, Sir, as a philosopher know what in logic is called *argumentum ad hominem*. If there is no argument which you can advance against your opponent, you question the *bona fides* of the person concerned. You exclaim, “Well, look here, you are not the man to say such and such a thing. Is it not a fact that you have had such and such antecedents? Well, it does not lie in your mouth to say all this. Your motives are suspect.” This is the tactics that the critics have adopted, not being able to meet the Parishad's arguments fair and square. This is the sum and substance of most of the remarks regarding the communalism, sectarianism and—most surprising of all—pro-Pakistanism of the Praja Parishad movement launched in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Well, if you begin looking for antecedents, if you want to indulge in this *argumentum ad hominem* to your heart's content, then that game can be played on both sides. I should think it not very safe to go into researches into ancient history. What are the antecedents of the various gentlemen who are concerned in this Kashmir story? What are the antecedents of Sheikh

Md. Abdullah? If I am not absolutely mis-informed, Sheikh Md. Abdullah in the beginning of his career, some 25 years ago, was a shining light of the Muslim Conference. He has become wiser since then a consummate careerist, with his shrewdness.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: Principal Ghosh, I do not want any personal comments.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: Very well, Sir. He joined the National Conference. So it appears that the antecedents of persons are not very delectable things. Our present Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nerhu, once in speaking of the unity of India, condemned the partition idea as fantastic nonsense. But look at his speeches since the Partition, and you will find that any criticism of the partition idea is fantastic nonsense. I only say this to show that it is not very safe to ransack past history in political controversies. Raking up of antecedents is a dangerous pastime. There are too many skeletons in the cupboard; better leave them undisturbed. Let us look at the present aspect of things. The movement is there and let us try to consider what this movement has been due to. What is its objective? What are its aims? If the aims and objectives of this movement are likely to be harmful to the best interests of the country, to the unity of the country, naturally such a movement deserves disapproval. I quite agree. But then these aims and objectives have to be dispassionately examined. I think that standing here as a representative of Bengal, I am in a somewhat advantageous position, for people from a distance have a clearer perspective of things than those nearer the spot. To me the whole picture though complicated and confusing, comes out clearly in its main features and I should like, with your permission, to touch upon the salient features of the Kashmir problem, since 1947. In 1947, when the tribals invaded Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India. Much has been said about the leaders

of the Parishad as having been the protagonists or champions of the Maharaja in those days, ten years ago or six years ago. I wonder if that also is an item in the bill of their indictment. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, I presume, was no better and no worse than the other Maharajas of the other native States, not certainly worse than Nizam Osman Ali of Hyderabad. The only difference so far as I can make out is this that Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir acceded to India unconditionally in October 1947, whereas Nizam Osman Ali of Hyderabad revolted against India in September, 1948, and military action had to be resorted to bring the Nizam and his hordes of Razakars to their senses. One is really astonished when this past history is sought to be raked up, and when it is sought to be made out that any person supporting the ruling potentate of the State at that time is, as it were, a sort of criminal. If to support the ruling potentate of any State at any particular time is sought to be made out as a crime, then I am afraid that those who are supporting the present ruling authorities in Kashmir might be dubbed as criminals at no distant date. I am sorry for this little digression.

As I was telling you, in October 1947, the Maharaja, Sir Hari Singh of Kashmir acceded to India. Then a strange thing happened to which I drew attention in my speech last August in the Kashmir debate. A quite uncalled for pledge or assurance was given to this effect on behalf of the Government of India, by the Prime Minister of India, that that accession was not regarded by them as final but that the Government would be guided by the voice of the people of Kashmir. It might have been given in a fit of exuberant enthusiasm so very characteristic of our impetuous Prime Minister. It might have been due to other causes. It might have been due to the influence of Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General. I don't know. However that may be.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: Principal Ghosh, the House knows the history of Kashmir. You may deal with the present position.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: Yes, Sir. I shall try to avoid controversial questions. Secondly another thing occurred in 1948. In the summer of 1948, Pakistan had to admit that she had participated in the invasion of Kashmir, a fact which she had persistently denied up till the time that it was actually discovered. At that time, to my mind, to my humble unsophisticated mind, it appears that the Government of India had an excellent opportunity of revising that assurance, or that pledge. It might have said, "Look here, we did give an assurance to the people of Kashmir to the effect that even the Maharaja's legally complete accession we did not regard as final but that we would be guided by your opinion; but now since that situation has changed, now that a foreign power has invaded Kashmir and is trying to make short work of your life and liberties, that assurance is not needed and we take you unconditionally and unequivocally under our protection so that there need be no uncertainty about your future." But that opportunity was lost. That statement was not made at the time. Then, Sir, you know the subsequent history—the long diversified ding-dong history of the U. N. dealing with the problem of Kashmir.

In this connection one thing to which attention has been drawn, if not in this House, at least outside, and which ought to be borne in mind by everybody who tries to deal with the Kashmir question, is this. The problem that India laid before the U.N. was not the problem of accession but that of Pakistani aggression. It was like this. India complained, "Look here, here is Pakistan or the tribals who have invaded the territory which is undoubtedly part of India since accession. You take some steps about it." It is a very clear and precise thing. The question of accession or

plebiscite was a question between the Government of India and the people of Kashmir with which the U.N. had nothing to do. With that question Pakistan had nothing to do; so that it passes one's reason and understanding to appreciate how and why and when and where this question of plebiscite got inextricably mixed up with India's representation before the U.N. Let me make it clear. India's complaint before U.N. was on the ground of aggression by Pakistan—not on the ground of plebiscite; so that from the international point of view, Pakistan has no right to insist upon plebiscite under such and such conditions with so much army on this side and so much on that side, and all that nonsense. Pakistan practically has no case on the complaint as it was originally launched before the U.N. by the Government of India. Anyway however there it is.

Now I come to the present state of things. I am not alluding so much to the movement itself as to the psychology behind the movement which has assumed such large dimensions with a considerable body of public support. It does no one any good to dub it as communal, for by fanning communal fires alone one does not enlist wide public support, as the movement has done. Then I come to the third stage. There was the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. People have attacked its *bona fides*. For the movement, I refrain from doing so. Let me assume, for the present, that that Constituent Assembly was elected properly on the basis of adult franchise, and that it is a good exponent, a reliable exponent of public opinion in Kashmir. If that be so, then there is a very easy way of ascertaining the opinion of the public in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and that is by asking the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir itself to decide by a Resolution whether they want accession to India. That would not be going back on the pledge; that will be honouring the pledge, because, as was pointed out by my very esteemed friend Dr. Radha Kumud

Mookerji and as is known to all those who are acquainted with the history of that period, the question was not of plebiscite in a particular form. The question was of ascertaining public opinion in Kashmir by plebiscite, or by holding public conferences, or even by holding public meetings. If it be a fact, as I assume it for the present to be a fact, that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is a representative body well qualified to speak on behalf of the public of Kashmir, then the easiest course would be for this Constituent Assembly to say

"We, the members of the Constituent Assembly, representing public opinion, accede unconditionally to India." It is repeated—I don't know whether the report is correct—that Mr. Abdul-lah himself has said that it was the very first step that he wanted to take when the Constituent Assembly was summoned, but the wonder of wonders was that it was the Prime Minister of India who stood in the way and said, "No, that would not look well. We are bound by the U.N.O. commitments, and that would look like a sort of shabby dealing." I wonder why. Our Prime Minister is very fond of dynamic approaches to all possible and impossible questions. Now I wonder whether this approach of sticking to that so-called pledge of a plebiscite throughout all the varied phases and changing aspects of Kashmir's history, since 1948 up to this year of grace 1953—this attitude that that pledge and nothing but that pledge will satisfy his conscience—is justified. Is it "dynamic approach"? I ask you. To me it appears to be quite a static approach if not a completely petrified and ossified approach to the dynamic problems of the day. Anyway that was one solution. Then there is one aspect to which in all humbleness and in all earnestness I want to draw your attention. What is the real psychology behind this movement? The real psychology is one not of domination (by the Dogras) but one of apprehension for their future. You may ask, apprehension of what? I shall be very brief and clear and to the point.

Well, our Prime Minister stands by the pledge of plebiscite. All right. The plebiscite—God willing—will take place tomorrow, or the day after, or one year later or five years later. Heaven knows when. But what will be the result of the plebiscite? Nobody knows. Reports say that our Prime Minister is very confident and optimistic about the plebiscite; he thinks that this plebiscite of the 40 lakhs inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir will go in favour of India. Others are not so optimistic. In Kashmir, as you know in round numbers, the population is something like 40 lakhs, of which about 30 lakhs are Muslims; and many people think that in spite of the shortcomings of Pakistan and all its bunglings in the domain of its home politics, the call of Islam possibly might be more potent than the call of enlightened self-interest and secularism in India. This might be true or might not be true. Of course, optimism is a good quality but it cannot be always relied upon. Realism is a better guide. In the case of the North-west Frontier Province there was a plebiscite. In that Province, the Muslims were under the leadership of one of the noblest figures in Indian history—Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who with his Khudai Khidmatgars really exerted an influence the like of which was seldom seen in any part of India. But even there, the plebiscite did not go according to Prime Minister Nehru's anticipations. So the future is uncertain. So I come to this point.

MR. CHAIRMAN It is already time

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: Sir, I will finish in a minute. Suppose the plebiscite takes place, and as a result of that the majority of the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir elect to go over to Pakistan. Then, mind you, the whole of the State goes to Pakistan. That State contains about 10 lakhs of non-Muslims. What would be their position? Naturally they are apprehensive. They have seen the

[Principal Devaprasad Ghosh.] state of things in Eastern Bengal, where there had been solemn assurances held forth at the time of the partition that any wrong done there to the minorities would be attempted, at least, to be corrected by the Government of India. But the fate of the East Bengal Hindus is known to all, and I need not dilate upon that now. Now no further illusion is left in anybody's mind that whatever may happen to the minorities in Pakistan, however much they may be looted and plundered and tortured and oppressed and raped and murdered, the present Government of India is going to lift its little finger for their effective succour and protection. If that be the position, can you, can anybody, deny that these non-Muslims of Kashmir have got a real reason for apprehension?

I might be asked, what is your concrete suggestion? I have a definite and concrete suggestion to make; and I dare say that if that suggestion is taken up by the hon. Prime Minister, then that will bring not merely the Praja Parishad movement to an end, but it will lead to the relief of the tension and suspense that prevails all over India, over the uncertainty of Kashmir's fate. My suggestion is this. Let the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir declare that quite apart from the quantum of accession, (*viz.*, the number of subjects in respect of which accession is made, like defence, communications, etc.)—I don't mind that for the present—let it declare in unmistakable terms that they accede finally and unconditionally to India. Such a declaration would be tantamount to the carrying out of the pledge of plebiscite. After that many things will follow. Naturally, this uncertainty will go. Then the Kashmiris will know that in any case, they are not going to be handed over to Pakistan. At least the non-Muslims will cease to have any apprehension on that score. I therefore think that if that attitude is taken up by the

Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, and it is so advised in this regard by the Prime Minister of India, then the real reason that lies at the basis of this movement will go.

One other point only I would like to.....

MR. CHAIRMAN: I think it is time.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: Just one more point, with your permission, Sir. It is this. A movement that wants union with India, that wants to live under Indian flag, that wants to be governed by the Indian Constitution, that wants to be governed by the Indian President—it is curious that such a movement is sought to be looked upon as anti-Indian, anti-national; and a movement that seeks to take Kashmir more and more away from India, with a separate flag, with a separate constitution, with a separate assembly, that is looked upon as a national movement par excellence.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It is time.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: It is a Gilbertian situation. And I hope our Prime Minister who has got the capacity, if he has the will, to tackle difficult situations, will realise the absurdity of it all, and give a lead—a clear lead—to India and Kashmir so that this most unpleasant situation might be put an end to once and for all. Thank you, Sir.

THE PRIME MINISTER (SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I must first of all apologise to you and to this House on the fact that I have not been able personally to attend to this debate by being present here. Some of us who are in the Government are placed in this difficulty that unlike most countries, we have to attend the business of two Houses at the same time, and more specially when a similar matter is before the two Houses at the same time, it adds to that difficulty. Nevertheless, I try

to acquaint myself, with the help of my colleague here, with the trend of the debate and read the reports of some of the speeches made here, thereby trying to prepare myself to say something in regard to those matters that have been raised here, because both here and in the other House it is my business and duty, as it is of my colleagues, to listen very carefully to the criticisms that are made, to the suggestions that are offered, and to learn from them, and where possible, to accept them, and where we are unable to agree, that is our misfortune

Now, the President's Address covers a large field rather briefly. The President's Address, of course, represents the policy of Government. Sometimes, may be not in this House or in the other House but the outside public and sometimes in the press, the criticism is made that the President's Address has merely repeated Government's policies—as if the President is going to launch on some new policy in the country. The President's Address is, of course, a repetition of Government's policy and it can be nothing else. It may not be a complete repetition of everything that the Government does; naturally, it gives or tries to give a broad survey of the foreign and domestic field and it does so, naturally, as is becoming of the Head of the State, in becoming language. I say so, because, some hon. Members object to the language being not quite so aggressive as they would like to be. The Head of the State speaks always with dignity, becoming the high position, and does not use the language which, perhaps, some of us may use on other occasions.

Now, when any Address deals with the world at large and with this country—with the foreign affairs and with the domestic affairs of this country—it covers a vast field. It is true that any Government should have some kind of integrated outlook which

fits in with the foreign and the domestic policy. Nevertheless, it is not particularly easy to have that integrated outlook because, we are not in charge of the world and the many other countries in the world do not carry out our dictates, or follow our wishes. We have to take things as they are, and things, as they are, are in a very difficult state. Looking at the world as it is today, one sees vast changes taking place, one sees large parts of it in a tortured state, some smaller parts in a state actually of war, but, infinitely larger parts in a state of fear of war and all that it produces. We see enormous technological changes taking place from day to day; they do not perhaps come to our notice day to day, but, the fact is that they do take place and, as everyone knows now, the whole economic and social structure of the world is changed by these technological changes. They change the structure of society; they change, therefore, man's thinking. Therefore, often enough a policy which seemed good yesterday, may not be completely in the fitness of things today. A policy which may have been good enough in the 19th century and may have been an idealistic and advanced policy may be out of date today. Because, all of us, whether we want to or not, have been hurled suddenly in the middle of the 20th century. We have been hurled, but, very often, the minds of many of us—I am not referring to hon. Members here. I am thinking in a larger sense—and the minds of many other lag behind somewhere in past centuries. They talk in those terms. They discuss problems, even economic problems or social problems, and therefore, naturally there is a lag, there is a difficulty. Here, we are taking the world as a whole, having seen these enormous political changes which are obvious enough, say, as a result of the last two great World Wars, and, we saw, at the end of the last War, two mighty giants rising up among the Nations, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The others are far behind—I am talking

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in terms of power and technological growth. Now that has created a peculiar situation in the World and all the old balances have been upset and, therefore, the theory based on those balances and the policies based on those balances have also been upset, yet I find often enough people talking in those old terms not realising or appreciating this enormous upset that has taken place and is taking place from day to day.

In the Far East again, great changes took place only two or three years ago again bringing about a completely new situation. And yet we talk in old terms. I merely mention this because all this makes it incumbent on us to be completely alert, if I may say so about these changing conditions. Of course we must have some principles, we must have some ideals and objectives. That is true. But it is not enough to have principles and ideals. The application of them, the implementation of them, the working out of them depends on other circumstances. And those other circumstances are hardly ever wholly in our control. We have to accept them as they are. Whether it is the outside world or whether it is this great country of ours—all kinds of social groups, all kinds of people living in every century, not only in the 20th century, but in the 19th, in the 18th, in the 14th in the 13th—you go back—we have to accept that.

No doubt every one here would like to build a new world according to his heart's desire. We try to go in a particular direction. But we cannot do so. We cannot ignore these factors. Nor can we ignore these factors in a democratic society. It is not possible. It may be more possible for a while in a structure of government, political and economic where absolutely supreme power is controlled by a

group, it is conceivable that they can bring about certain changes more rapidly, ignoring for the moment if necessary the wishes of considerable numbers of people. But in a democratic society that is not possible. You cannot ignore large groups. Certainly sometimes a majority has its will as it must. Therefore all these difficulties arise. And when some hon. Members accuse us or warn us of complacency, even of smugness, I feel that they have little realisation of how my mind or the mind of my colleagues functions, because even if we were so foolish as to be complacent, the very circumstances that we have to face from day to day make it impossible for any person in a responsible position to be complacent.

I cannot speak of those responsible for the governance of other countries. I do not know how they function, or how they feel. But I can speak for my colleagues and for myself, and I want to say that we approach these problems in all humility of spirit and with something which is utterly removed from complacency, from smugness because we feel that however small men we might be, the problems are big. They are tremendous problems, both in our country and in the larger world, and we can only approach them with such wisdom as we possess, with such experience as we have, taking counsel with others wherever possible, and trying to advance step by step, and always constantly alert, wherever necessary, to change our step, and in the background as I said, of a certain humility of spirit. Persons have to deal with these great responsibilities, and not we but I rather doubt if any person is fully capable of dealing with them with all the wisdom that a person should possess who has to deal with such problems.

I should like the House to remember this background and I am eager and anxious in any important matter that comes up before this House to be guided and to be helped in our thinking.

and in our action Naturally we have a background of thought, of approach to problems We have been conditioned, as every Member in this House has been conditioned by the past Most of us have been conditioned, apart from our reading of history of our country or of other countries, apart from such knowledge as we possess of the changes that have taken place in the world most of us have been conditioned by the national movement of this country, in which we grew up and in which we were privileged to take part Many of those who were conditioned in that way subsequently changed courses or took to different paths because they thought differently Subsequently they were forced to take to different paths because they thought differently They were perfectly entitled to do that It was not necessary that all of us should think alike We are not all regimented to think in that way Nevertheless, most of us have been conditioned to think so because of the background of the national movement in the last thirty or forty years We have grown up in that way and we view our problems as well as the world's problems with that background Also we have to adapt that background to the new condition that we have to face Because, having been in the nationalist movement negative functioning cannot suggest itself Negative functioning is the oppositionist's function which had its virtue and inevitability at that time Positive functioning is more difficult

Fortunately, hon Members who belong to various Opposition groups do not have to share the burden of the positive functioning They can function negatively, they are right because negative functioning is naturally correct, the positive functioning, if it goes wrong is dangerous Now with the background of this national movement we have got independence We have suddenly been hurled to face the positive problems of our country as well as those of the world Not that we wanted to interfere with the prob-

lems of the world, but there is a certain inevitability in a country like India when it becomes free to carry out that burden to some extent, it can't be helped, it can't be avoided; and so we had to face a multitude of political, economic and social problems which were hurled together, which we had to decide Large numbers of these problems were suppressed for generations past under foreign rule: and, as soon as that foreign rule was removed, suppressed and new problems came up and the country is supposed to solve the whole lot of them. It is a difficult proposition and it applies not only to our country but other countries as well But we will have to deal with our country I want you to think and remember that we cannot consider this great question in vacuum and decide as to what is right and wrong Right and wrong are important but the application of the right is never an easy matter For that, you have to have full control of the situation if not the control of the world's situation It is very well for friends to say that this and that must be done in the world It is difficult for us to manage even our own household Rival forces are at work and in this world it is difficult

Now, I propose to deal with two or three aspects of this problem I intend saying a few words about our foreign policy, and then something about the general economic background and thirdly, because that matter has been referred to in a number of speeches, I understand, about the Jammu Parishad agitation

Now, so far as our foreign policy is concerned, we have been criticised from various points of view, one is that it is not a policy at all and it is too vague Hon Members opposite have said—I was not here then—but I have no doubt they have said, that we are tied up with the so-called Anglo-American bloc because of various reasons, we expect their help or are in anticipation of their help to come Other hon Members talk frequently

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about building up a 'third force' or
'third bloc' whatever it is called.

Now the hon. Member who thinks that we are tied up with the Anglo-American bloc wants us—he says so—that we should tie ourselves up with the other bloc. He is not against tying up; he is all for tying up but with the other bloc. Well, I do not think it needs much argument for me in this House or indeed, if I may say so, anywhere in the country—barring perhaps a few people—to justify our not being tied up with any bloc. I think I can say with some confidence that the general consensus of opinion in this country is that we should follow an independent policy in this matter, because what does this business of tying up with this or that bloc mean? Obviously it means—you may have sympathy with this or that bloc; that is another matter—it means that you give up your sovereign independent right of having a policy, that you follow somebody else's policy—however good or bad that may be. Surely it is not a thing which, if I may say so with all respect, any self-respecting person would like to say about this great country, that it should just follow somebody else's dictates. That does not mean that we should not co-operate with others in so far as we can. So that we have to follow what is called an independent policy, which simply means that we consider matters in consultation with others and decide what we should do with regard to a particular question. It is perfectly true that even there no country functions in a vacuum. It has to take matters into consideration. If it has to achieve a certain result, it has to see how others are functioning, what it can do, what it cannot do. A country's foreign policy depends certainly on a certain outlook as ours is. Our foreign policy, generally speaking, is a continuation of what we thought when we were struggling for independence. It has to be varied according to circumstances but that is the origin of it.

A country's foreign policy—although we may call it a foreign policy—again is really a collection of foreign policies apart from the common outlook. It is very difficult to refer to it as one foreign policy. In dealing with America, England, Russia, Japan, China and Egypt or Indonesia—with each country—we have to deal with the peculiar circumstances that exist between us as well as in the world. We cannot lay down a broad rule that this is our relationship with the rest of the world because it varies with each country. You may put down as a rule that we want to be friendly with all countries. But we cannot ignore the realities of the situation. Therefore, the foreign policy is a broad outlook, a broad objective plus a collection of foreign policies of other countries.

Finally, a foreign policy is not just a declaration just laying down fine principles, though it is possible and feasible; it is not telling the world to behave. It is conditioned and controlled by the strength of the country. If it goes too far beyond the strength of the country, then it cannot be followed up; it is empty; it becomes tall talk which has no meaning and you lose all credit. So there are all these conditioning factors. It is easy for me or for any hon. Member here to state or to lay down beautiful maxims of what the world should do. But if that is laid down by a Government, or, let us say, resolutions are proposed in the United Nations to that effect, they fall flat. What do we achieve except to get the satisfaction of having made a fine speech?

Therefore, ultimately the foreign policy of every country is limited by the strength which that country possesses. Now, strength may be military or financial or may be also, if I may use the word, moral. Obviously India has not military or financial strength to go about interfering with other people, not that we want to. We have no desire to—and we cannot—impose our will on others. We have a strong desire to prevent catastrophes hap-

pening in the world, to prevent wars happening in the world and where possible, to help in the general progress of humanity. We express our opinion and work to that end with the limited strength that we have. If we adopt a policy much in advance of what we can actually do, that would simply ultimately discredit us in the eyes of the nations and we will become rather irresponsible. So, these are the facts which I should like hon Members to remember about our foreign policy. Now, it is rather difficult for me to defend or to say anything in praise of the foreign policy that we are pursuing. It is true that in some measure, in a large measure, I have been connected with it, and I think—forgetting the fact that it might offend my modesty—if I may say so the policy that we have pursued has indeed first of all kept us the friendship of all manner of countries. We can say with confidence today that there is no country which is really hostile to us. Some may be more friendly, some a little less friendly; some countries may be occasionally angry with us, but nevertheless their anger passes and we again become friendly. Why is that so? That perhaps may be partly due to the policy we pursue and partly to the manner of our pursuing it. That is to say, we have tried not to join in the new diplomatic game of maligning, defaming and cursing other countries. That does not mean that we agree with what they say or do; we do not agree, but merely shouting loudly against them does not help. Apart from it's being rather indecorous, we feel that it does not help at all. We have to deal today not only with material considerations, political and economic, but we have to deal today even more with a large number of imponderables, fear and the like. The way fear is gripping some of the largest and biggest countries of the world is amazing. I say with some confidence that we cannot be compared in terms of power with the great countries of the world but yet I think it is true, if I may say, that we as a people are less influenced by the fear psychosis that grips some

of the greatest countries of the world. May be, of course, some people say that it is due to our ignorance, not realising what facts are, whatever the reason may be. Therefore we have to deal with these imponderables which come in the way whether they are great world problems or the problems affecting India and Pakistan—they are facts of course—which come in the way but apart from these facts, it is these imponderable things that come in the way and in order to deal with this matter, at least the manner should be such as helps and does not hinder; that is to say, we should not go about merely running down other countries even though we may think that other countries are in the wrong. We express our opinion about it when necessity arises, that we do not agree with it or that we think this is right or this is wrong but we don't go further than that.

Now there has been mention of what is called a third force. I have not been able to understand exactly what it means. If it means something in the nature of a power bloc, military or other things, apart from the fact that I do not consider it desirable. I do not think it is possible. There is no such thing today. Even the biggest countries are small today compared to the giants—two giants—and for a number of countries of Asia to come together and call themselves a third force or third power in the military or other sense has no meaning whatsoever. But in another sense it may have a meaning. Do not call it a third force or a third bloc but a third area, an area which, let us put it negatively first, does not want war and positively, works for peace and co-operates with each other. I can understand that and I should like my country to work for that and we do. We have tried to work for that. But even working for that, if you put this idea of third bloc or third force, it hinders our work for that. It frightens people—not us—it frightens the people whom we want to approach. The odd thing is the very people whom you wish to

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 approach are frightened, circumstanced as they are. Therefore, let us by all means work to get as large an area, as many countries as possible who do not wish to encourage any tendency to war, who wish to work for peace and who do not wish to align themselves with these great blocs in that particular close way. We can keep friendly with them—that is our general policy.

SHRI C G K REDDY. If I may interrupt because I have suggested it—I meant what the Prime Minister is saying. I said in my speech actually that the third bloc or third force would not have any military potential and it would not be the desire of this third force to develop any military potential.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. I am glad that the hon. Member has clarified this point. Then there is no difference on that point.

Again even following that policy, one has to do it. If I may say so, without too much shouting about it—not because I am afraid of shouting but because I want to achieve something and I embarrass other countries whom I approach.

Then I should like to refer briefly to the Korean Resolution which we sponsored in the United Nations. In another ten days or so, the United Nations are going to meet again—a continuation of the last session—and they have before them again this Far Eastern problem and other big problems. I cannot say now what our representatives may have to do then, except that they will try to follow this broad policy we are pursuing, because so much depends on other circumstances which may develop in the course of the next two weeks or so. But coming to that Resolution ever since this Korean war started, we have been very much concerned with it not in the sense that we wanted to interfere or we thought ourselves big enough to tell others to behave—that has not been our approach to it—but

because it so happened that apart from our desire to help if possible, we were placed in a very peculiar position which enabled us, perhaps, to help more than any other country. The peculiar position was this, that we were in friendly contract with the main countries on either side while the others were not and it was difficult for them to do anything. We realised that responsibility and we also had a feeling naturally, that it is bad that this thing should continue to the utter ruination and damnation of the poor people of Korea.

Well, I need not go into past history. Several things were done by us, several steps taken, which did not then yield results but which were subsequently realised to have been the right steps. Well the very first thing we agreed in regard to the Far Eastern situation is this—the unreality of dealing with it, without dealing with the great country, China. And therefore, right from the beginning, we have ourselves recognised the Peoples Republic of China and we urged other countries to do so, in the UN or elsewhere. And that quite apart whether any of us or any of the hon. Members here liked the policies of China or not. That is another matter. But the fact of China is patent enough, the fact of this great country, and not to recognise it was and is I think, a fundamental breach—I do not know if 'breach' is the right word—but anyhow it was contrary to the whole spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations Organisation was formed with all principal countries, including countries which were diametrically opposed to each other in policies. Nobody can say the UN was supposed to have represented countries belonging to one policy. But unfortunately, gradually, this trend has come into existence there, and it has resulted in this very fact that here is a tremendous country of China, not recognised by many other countries as if it did not exist, and the small island off the coast of China is supposed to represent China. That is very extraordinary.

Now, I put it to this House that this basic fact is central to the situation that has arisen in the Far East, because the non-recognition of realities leads to artificial policies and programmes. That is happening.

Now, apart from that, many things that we suggested in the course of the last two and a half years were not accepted by others. But soon after, it was generally recognised that what we had suggested would have been the right thing to do. Well, that is poor consolation, but it was not done.

Now, in regard to this Korean Resolution, some months before this was put forward, we were in continuous touch, in frequent touch, with the Chinese Government, with the U.K. Government and sometimes with the U.S. Government, as well as some other governments. We were very anxious not to take any step which would embarrass us or any party, because that would make it difficult for us to help.

We occasionally informed one party or the other, rather generally, rather vaguely, of what the other party was thinking to do or was prepared to do. Naturally, our Heads of Missions abroad kept, usually, informal touch to find out. I am saying this because the Resolution that was proposed by us was framed by us, as we thought, to represent very largely the Chinese viewpoint. I do not say, hundred per cent, but, it was an attempt to represent that viewpoint; that was, in the main, that the Geneva Convention should be followed in this matter of exchange of prisoners.

Now, I am not saying that, because from time to time representatives of the Chinese Government said something to our representative, they were bound down and, that at a later stage, we were committed to it. I am not saying this, but now we tried to find out how they would like it to happen. Naturally, it is impossible for any party, however big, to have 100 per

cent, its own way and, that Resolution, therefore, was fashioned accordingly.

Now, another factor to be borne in mind is that this Resolution practically dealt with the single problem of the exchange of prisoners. "Why that only?", some people say, "What about cease fire?". Those who put this question rather forget the facts of the case. For a year and a half before this, truce negotiations were taking place at Pan Mun Jon; all of us know. After great difficulties, agreement was arrived at in regard to every matter, in those truce negotiations, except the exchange of prisoners. The central fact of the truce negotiations was the cease fire, obviously, and, the cease fire was the inevitable first outcome of an agreement; but, the negotiations did not come to fruition on the sole question of exchange of prisoners. Therefore, we took up this question because this had not been agreed and, as cease fire had been agreed subject to this, it was not necessary to repeat them here because, this was one part of the truce negotiations. So, to say that the cease fire was not there has no meaning; it was very much there; it was the Central factor, and it is patent that the very idea of exchange of prisoners, etc., can only take place when there is cease fire; you cannot conceive of firing going on, war continuing and prisoners being exchanged. There is a misapprehension about that which I should like to remove. So, we put forward this Resolution. Before we framed the Resolution, the principles which governed the Resolution were drawn up in great detail and, early in November last, those principles were communicated to the Peoples' Government of China and we told them that we would like to have their opinion about it. I am speaking from memory about the dates—a fortnight passed. Every time, we were told that they were giving them their careful consideration. I might say that, previous to that, on many occasions, we had been encouraged by various Governments, including the

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Chinese Government, to persevere in our endeavours. We did not wish to push ourselves in against the will of the others; we were asked to persevere and, so, we gave these broad principles. A fortnight elapsed. It is true that there was no commitment on the part of the Chinese Government, but, there was no denial either and, in fact, we felt that we might perhaps safely go ahead. We may have been wrong. But we had progressed a good deal. And things were developing. Then, only then, after a fortnight of consideration of the principles by both the parties, was the Resolution framed, based on those principles. There was no great difference between the original principles and the Resolution. Certainly there was a drafting difference, and that was sent to the parties concerned. And again a few days elapsed. I forget how many, but a few days elapsed, and only then was it actually proposed. And then, as the House will remember, the first effect of our putting in that Resolution was rather a strong rejection, and an immediate rejection, by the United States Government. We had no idea till then what the reaction of the Chinese Government would be, or what the reaction of the Soviet Government would be. Every time we had been told that they were considering it carefully. Then came information to us from them that they did not approve of it. Now, we were naturally disappointed. What were we to do then? Some people suggest that we should have withdrawn that Resolution. It is true that the passing of that Resolution, or any other Resolution, has no great meaning when a settlement is sought, because the settlement has to be an agreed settlement. We realised that. But, on the other hand, what were the alternatives? There were two or three other resolutions there. In fact, before we had put in our Resolution, there were some others also, all of which were, if I may say so, aggressive resolutions which would have worsened the situation very much. We did not approve of them. If they had come up for vot-

ing, we would have voted against them. Another resolution came up at a later stage. It was proposed by the Soviet Union or by some other country of Eastern Europe. It laid stress on Cease Fire immediately, and a number of nations, 11 or 13, were then to consider the other problems. Now, so far as we are concerned, we welcome a cease fire immediately any day, but a difficulty arose. It was absolutely clear that that Resolution could not be passed, and I will tell you the reason why. Not because we were against it. The reason was this, that if the prisoners of war issue could not be resolved after a whole year's argument, when there was the pressure of a war going on, then, if a cease fire took place without that issue being resolved, it would never be resolved. I am not giving my reason; I am saying that this was the feeling of many countries. The feeling was that it would be hung up completely because there was no pressure. In effect that is very unfortunate. The whole issue becomes so amazing. The prisoners of war issue is a simple issue. Almost one feels that these poor prisoners of war on either side come to be looked upon more and more as hostages. It is very unfortunate.

So, this feeling in the minds of some countries that if there is a cease fire now the prisoners of war issue would never be resolved for years, prevented them from separating this from the cease fire. They said, "We shall have both." That was the real difficulty, and we were put in this position here, that there was a resolution of ours which had been very largely supported, which unfortunately had not been agreed to by some of the principal parties concerned. Were we to withdraw it and leave matters to drift? As a matter of fact the Resolution was a resolution of the House, not ours. We had to adopt a realistic course. The Resolution was in the nature of a proposal. It was not a mandate. In future possibly it might help further consideration of the subject.

If you will permit, Sir, for facility of reference I would like to place the statement I made in the other House during the last session, giving some dates, etc. I thought Members would like to see it. I need not take your time about it here.

[The statement was laid on the Table. See Appendix IV, Annexure No. 9A.]

In this connection, may I say one other thing? I understand that some Members have disapproved of our having sent a medical unit to Korea.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA (Madras): Before the Prime Minister proceeds, may I interrupt for a minute? Is it not a fact that later modifications which were carried out by the Indian delegation in the original Resolution on this very question of the prisoners of war—that it was to be decided by the U.N.O. itself instead of by the political conference, as was originally suggested—was because of America, and is not that the reason which was responsible for the change in the earlier favourable reactions of the Chinese Government to the Resolution, so that later on the Chinese Government rejected the Resolution as modified?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: As far as I remember, two very minor amendments were accepted. A large number of amendments were proposed on behalf of other countries, notably, I think, the United States. Every major amendment was negatived by us. They could not be accepted. Two minor amendments were accepted. And I would beg the House to see if there is any major change.

Naturally it was our desire to amend it here and there if we could get as much support as possible. But not a single vital point was changed. What I am interested in is this charge that is sometimes made that we are connected with somebody in bringing forward this Resolution or pursuing this as an agent of somebody else or in a spirit of hostility to any one coun-

try. That idea is completely unfounded. (Hear, Hear), I do not understand why this criticism is made because we sent our medical unit to Korea, purely for medical relief work and the medical unit has done remarkably well in its own way and has gained very very fine experience too. It is one of the best units in the world today. It has not indulged in any warfare or anything; it was perfectly fair and impartial. We are prepared to give medical succour, we have nothing to do with the war as such.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Why can't the unit go to North Korea?

SHRI B. GUPTA (West Bengal): Is it not in pursuance of the original Resolution of June 1950?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know, Sir; it has no connection with the original Resolution; it was a separate resolution.

SHRI P. SUNDARAYYA: Why not send another medical mission to North Korea?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am afraid I have taken a long time over this matter. There are a few words I would like to say about the economic background. I am told that my friend, Acharya Narendra Deva, whose opinion I value very greatly, expressed himself in rather despondent tones about the economic situation in the country and said that the Five Year Plan was not likely to succeed. Now, it is not very easy for me or for any one to take an overall view and speak in a few sentences in respect of the economic situation in the country. And as I said, to begin with, nobody can take a complacent view of that. The point is how we are to face those difficulties, whether it is in regard to food or land or industry or ultimately better production and better distribution. The whole problem was considered at great length in formulating the Five Year Plan and there is an argument there which hon. Members may have read or can read. I do not say that that

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

argument is a final argument. The main virtue of that Five Year Plan is that for the first time, if I may say so, we have come to grips with the subject apart from theoretical approaches. Theoretical approaches are good; they are essential. But nevertheless, a theoretical approach has to be tempered with reality and with our own resources. We cannot go far beyond our own resources. And I think that in that Five Year Plan we have come to realistic conclusions, not forgetting our objectives. I should like the pace to be faster. I should be very glad to confer with Members here, not in the academic sense but in the practical sense, on how we can make our pace faster. The hon. Member referred to the land problem. As far as I know and from the reports I have seen there is not much difference in my personal viewpoint or even our Government's viewpoint and the hon. Member's. Maybe, it is the question of working out something—not any radical difference in our viewpoints. In dealing with the land problem, we must remember that our country is very varying. It is very difficult to regiment. There is constitutional provincial autonomy in different provinces. So one has to proceed in a very cautious way. But I do not see any vital difference in our approach to this problem.

In regard to food, I believe that it is perfectly true that the food situation has improved because of various factors among which certainly I should say Government policy is one. Now, people refer to the famine or near-famine conditions—say Rayalaseema last year or in parts of Karnataka or Bombay State this year. That is perfectly true. I would like the House to remember that though we use the word 'famine' today—I do not like using the word—we use it in an entirely different context from the old days when the British Government was here. When the British Government was here, a famine meant hundreds and thousands of millions of people dying. Today we receive complaints sometimes of some

death by hunger having taken place. May be or may not be. Please see the contrast. There is at the present moment a political consciousness. So that if one person somewhere unfortunately by hunger or otherwise dies, there is an outcry. I am glad about that. Previously tens of thousands died and we accepted it as famine. In the Bengal famine 35 lakhs of persons died in 1942 or 1943. That was a famine. And I do suggest that there is a vast change now. I mention this because a person from a foreign country, who had ideas of famine of the old British time, came here the other day and went to the very areas. He said: "You talk about famine in these areas! I do not find any people dead or dying." He said: "This is not famine". So you will appreciate that it is not a small matter.

SHRI B. GUPTA: I would draw the Prime Minister's attention to the famine code which does not say that hundreds and thousands of people must die before we declare famine

MR. CHAIRMAN: He is not saying that. He is merely contrasting the two positions.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not justifying anything. I am merely pointing out that it is no small matter that in spite of tremendous natural calamities, failure of rains, draught, etc. affecting vast areas, the State Governments with the co-operation of the Central Government have prevented—they could not prevent unfortunately misery and hunger occasionally—the situation from deteriorating and have controlled it by works, by doles, call them what you will. Take the Bombay area. The State recognises its responsibility it is not strong enough to do everything, but it recognises its responsibility of providing food either through works or otherwise in any scarcity area. Some hon. Members must have personally seen the works in Rayalaseema, in the Karnataka areas in the Bombay Presidency, etc. They will have observed how the

State is functioning in a big way. In Bihar two years ago it was administratively a very big thing undertaken there and undertaken with considerable success. Now we cannot unfortunately deal satisfactorily with failures of the monsoons and the like which have been considerable but we are building up our strength to deal with that situation. If there are great calamities—well it is difficult but normal calamities—I think we should be able to overcome in the course of the next two or three years. I think it may be possible—I dare not give any promise—that in the course of another three years we should be more or less self-sufficient in food. That I think is important.

Some people say that we are neglecting industry—we are always talking about agriculture—well I attach the greatest importance to the development of industry but I do not think that real industrial development could take place in India till we have a sound agricultural economy. Of course we have to go ahead on all fronts. We have a difficult problem in considering the nation's advance or economic growth, that is how far we can save or how far we can invest for future generations. Saving for investment means exerting a certain pressure on the present generation. It means if I may say so a certain austerity. Now it is all very well for a country if I may use the word without any offence in authoritarian country to dictate a certain policy which they consider good for the country's future. It is not so easy for a democratic country to do it because it is difficult to ask the people to suffer in the present for gain tomorrow. It is difficult. In the past other factors prevailed. If great countries grew up like the USA in 150 years or the United Kingdom they built it up. How did they do it? Those hon. Members who know history know that they built it on the extreme suffering of the working classes there. The proprietors were not men who liked luxury and all that. They were

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rather austere people but they were intent on saving and saving so as to make their industrial apparatus grow. They did it then at a terrible cost. You cannot duplicate that in a democratic set-up. It was all very well for England then. England had a Parliament then but that Parliament was controlled by a small group of propertied classes. They did it and out of the suffering of a large number of people they built up the industrial apparatus of England. Conditions in America were different. America had vast areas. We are differently situated apart from the fact that we have an enormous population which grows year by year and which requires to be sustained year by year. We have got adult suffrage and all that and we have to function under a democratic set-up which from the adult suffrage point of view is rather a novel thing in the world which is novel in the last twenty or thirty years. It

(P.M. is a fairly novel thing

because the previous Parliaments had been elected in other countries under a narrow suffrage. So the problem before us is how to save for investment. Some people may say, "Let us have a capital levy and let us get more money." That is a different matter—we will consider it. Let us change and assimilate the standard of living. But out of that you don't get very much. Psychologically it may be good—that is a different approach—but practically you don't gain much. Practically what counts is the production year by year: how can you increase that in land and in industries? Therefore the question of resources comes in. It is the most vital matter that we have to consider and I would beg this House and hon. Members of this House for the moment to forget in particular the dogmatic creed or policy—whether from the Capitalist Socialist or the Communist point of view. For the moment you forget those words because they have associations. But the main thing is how to increase our production: how to build up the production apparatus for tomorrow. For building up the production apparatus

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

tomorrow you naturally have to control the saving today. Where are they to come from? Of course you know the normal sources. By what industrial policy, financial policy or land policy is the problem and there should be some kind of rule or method. Therefore we have put up the Five Year Plan and I think that the great virtue of it is that it has made people generally plan conscious which is a very good thing. Secondly it has made all of us realise certain basic realities—the existing situation, our resources etc. They have been collected; they were not there previously. We know it is put in a certain way. That is not the final word. We can vary it when we like. We can divert it in slightly this or that direction, although of course constantly thinking of changing it is dangerous. It is bad but we can vary it here and there when we are convinced of it, when we want to make the pace faster but I do appeal to the House to look at this problem in this way and not merely to criticise the defects of something of which we may ourselves be aware but more positively how to improve it.

The House will remember that in the President's Address there is reference to a Welfare State. There is also reference to unemployment, or rather employment, that is to say, the real test of progress ultimately lies in the growth of employment or the lessening of unemployment and the final ending of unemployment. I completely accept that ideal because there can be no Welfare State if there is unemployment. Anyhow the unemployed are not parties to that Welfare State, they are just outside its pale. But having accepted that, to realise it obviously requires hard work. It is not an easy matter. It requires tremendous effort and co-operation of all of us and I do again appeal to this House and to the country to give us that co-operation, not necessarily agreeing in every odd thing that is said, but there are certain matters on which I

do submit, agreement is inevitable; and we have to go ahead.

Finally I may say a few words about this Praja Parishad agitation. I find that my hon. friend Acharya Narendra Deva referred to this in his speech and referred to it in rather strong terms and said that it was, in his opinion, a completely communal agitation, primarily started by those who had been supporters of the old Maharaja's rule and the landed gentry and others. That is perfectly true. He also said that it should be investigated why this agitation, which was primarily a class agitation, should have affected other people. I entirely agree with him. But we must always remember that some of these factors are well known, but others may not be. In fact, because of this, if I may say so, we have to separate the two aspects of this question completely. One is the economic aspect; the other is the purely political, constitutional or even international aspect of it.

Now, so far as the economic aspect is concerned, there has been, as the House knows, a commission appointed for the purpose. Sometimes it is said that this commission is an official commission. It is true it is a purely official commission, presided over by the Chief Justice of the State—a very responsible and able officer. Now, if it had been a non-official commission, immediately the criticism would have been made that the non-officials put there are not representatives. It was hardly possible, I submit to the House, for the Kashmir Government to appoint a commission of the very persons who want to upset the Kashmir Government. If they had appointed non-officials, other non-officials might have said, "They are your party men." I think they very wisely appointed a purely official commission to deal with these economic matters with regard to which the Kashmir Government has no firm opinion. They may accept the findings and give effect to them.

Then there are the other matters which are of a political nature. Many things are said about these. The hon. Member who spoke before me said something about the National Flag. Of course the Kashmir Government has repeatedly stated—their Constituent Assembly has stated—that the Union Flag is the supreme flag of the Kashmir State as of the whole of India, and from time to time they have displayed it all over the place. But it is an interesting thing to note that many of the persons who talk so much about the National Flag and respect for the National Flag in Jammu as well as in Delhi have in the past openly declared that they will replace the National Flag by their own party flag which may be some yellow flag or some other coloured flag. Some of the Communal organisations have seldom shown respect to our Flag. Now, they exploit our Flag in order to gain other peoples' goodwill in this agitation; it has nothing to do with it and that is my chief grievance and my sorrow that in this matter, how some rightful things had been exploited for bad objectives.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: May I ask the Prime Minister what are the bad objectives?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I might deal with them if I had time.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH: What objectives are bad, in concrete terms, in the Praja Parishad's agitation?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Please let me go on.

There is nobody here who obviously does not want the closest association of the Jammu and Kashmir State with India. It is obvious. There is no difference of opinion about that. Now, taking that as a right objective and putting it forward in the way it has been done and, in the manner this thing has been pursued, I will submit,

that a person of even moderate intelligence will say that this objective has been made very difficult of realisation because we want the closest union with Jammu and Kashmir State. That union can be based only on the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. We are not going to have that union at the point of the bayonet. Therefore, the policy to be pursued is to win them over to our side and not to make them frightened as to the results of this union. The policy to be pursued is not to disturb the Jammu and Kashmir State but to try to keep it as an entity and as a partner in the Union of India. Now, this policy of the Jammu agitation is this: they have talked about the whole State being closely integrated with India. I have no objection. How can I? But remember this, that first of all the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State was identical as of any other State in India: there was no difference; the three subjects and no more. At that time it was thought that there might be a variety in future integration of States with India. We wanted to but we did not think it certainly possible, that integration of all the States of India would be to the same degree. I am talking about 1947 or may be early 1948. So when the Jammu and Kashmir State came in, it came in in exactly the same way as any other State—full accession. There is no question of partial accession. Remember this because, when some people talk about the reference to the United Nations on the possibility of a plebiscite it is not lessening the accession in any way. There may be something which upsets accession, that is a different matter as any extraordinary thing but, it is not lessening accession. It is 100 per cent. accession. Accession has to be kept apart from integration. It was accession previously and later when other States integrated this State integrated in the same degree as other States. However the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wisely followed a policy of much further and fuller integration in regard to the other States. Good thing; but, in the nature of things, we

could not follow that policy in Kashmir War was going on and there were other considerations. It had become an international problem and all that. We could not do it and we have not done it.

Then last year, the question arose not in the sense of further integration but rather of other arrangements which led to some measure of further integration, and the agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Kashmir related to a number of topics which were placed before this House and to which this House agreed and which were tantamount to a further degree of integration.

Now, it is asked: Why has that agreement not been fully implemented yet? Why should one part of it be implemented? The question is justified obviously. But look at the facts. I should prefer the whole of it to be taken together. But then after all like every State Government and slightly more than others the Jammu and Kashmir Government is an autonomous Government and we have to leave it to them to judge of a particular situation which they have to face. They have to shoulder the responsibility. If something happens in Bengal in Bombay in Madras we give them advice, but they have autonomy and they have to deal with the local situation. Now in Kashmir they have to deal also with a local situation. We cannot order them about with a time-table when to do this or that. We leave it to them. We advise them. But the point to be remembered is this: that because of these various factors while accession was complete and integration of the previous kind was also complete there was no immediate rush to add to it. We wanted to wait and see it come gradually in the normal way, not just in a constitutional way.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH
May I interrupt...

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
Please let me go on. I cannot be stopped this way. I am sorry Sir, but it interrupts my train of thought.

MR CHAIRMAN Order order No interruption please.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU Now as regards that part of the agreement there can be no doubt that Kashmir in view of these facts which have made it an international question of significance where war had taken place had to be treated as a special case. It is no good our trying to talk about uniformity and regimentation. We cannot regiment. First of all we do not want to regiment people. It is for the people to decide for themselves. Now the very first day that part of this agreement was given effect to in Kashmir—the agreement between the Jammu and Kashmir Government and the Government of India—the new Head of the State *Sadar-e-Riyasat*, elected and approved by our President—the day he arrived in Jammu this Jammu Praja Parishad agitation started that very day. There is no gap period left. It starts by trying to interfere with the welcome given to the Yuvaraj *Sadar-e-Riyasat*, tearing up the triumphal arch etc. etc. And since then it has continued with its ups and downs. Now, even if the Kashmir Government was anxious to go ahead with the rest of the implementation, it has to deal with the existing situation first. Its hands were to some extent taken up by it.

Now I would like this House to consider again the background of this agitation. Acharya Narendra Deva I think talked about certain regional considerations. Now the past history of Kashmir going back a little over a hundred years shows how the State was formed in the old way—by conquest by transfer by purchase and all that—and the Jammu province of the State was the dominant province.

from many points of view political and others just as Hyderabad in the old days. In Hyderabad a certain group was the dominant group—a certain communal group. Muslim group was the dominant group in Hyderabad. It had the feeling of dominance and that was actual to some extent. Now that is completely upset and Hyderabad has changed. Naturally in Hyderabad a completely feudal order existed and that was upset. The old big *jaqirs* and others went—that was inevitable—leading, undoubtedly and unfortunately, to considerable distress among those who depended on that feudal order, those who depended on certain armed forces which were disbanded later and the like.

Now I cannot compare the two, there are very great differences. But there is a comparison too, a dominant group, a dominant clan, not liking the changes that were taking place both political and in regard to land reforms and wanting to resist them, trying to do something, and in the background were certain economic difficulties too. All these things are there.

These facts have to be recognised and dealt with undoubtedly. This agitation very soon became a rather violent agitation and I would like to tell the House that I have with me here full details and particulars of over a hundred officers of the Jammu and Kashmir Government—Deputy Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, some schoolmasters and constables who have been injured more or less.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH
How many have been shot on the other side?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU I do not know but I have heard reports.

AN HON MEMBER How many of the Praja Parishad people have been shot by the Police?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU I could not give the exact figures, probably 15 to 20. Now here is this aggressive agitation which has resulted in injury to a hundred persons in numerous school buildings being ransacked, furniture and other things destroyed and small Government offices and treasury being looted and so on. This is a curious kind of peaceful satyagraha. However there is the Kashmir Government to deal with the situation and the House will realise the reaction this will have in India and on the other side of the Kashmir Government. By this agitation the reaction is going to be contrary and very unfortunate. Their demand is

let us have the full integration of Jammu. It means the disruption of the State, Jammu having her wishes carried out and Kashmir being left out of the picture to others. This is an extraordinary position, an extraordinary attitude to take up. Here is something which can aid and comfort the enemies of India. I can understand some of the people of Jammu may be excited and be doing something. I am amused when responsible people in the rest of India should support this agitation which will have only one result and which will create injury to the rest of India and to the people of Jammu inevitably. If the agitation succeeds it will be the people of Jammu who would have to suffer. If hon. Members have had the chance to listen to the speeches sometimes made in the course of this agitation, some made recently in Delhi city—I was not present there, but I have had occasion to read the reports of these speeches—there was something said of Jammu of course but the whole attack was on the Government of India on a different basis and the whole appeal was—"subvert this Government, put an end to this so that we can have an entirely different Government and different policy." Everybody has a right to ask for his own government but the whole background becomes something very different from the Jammu Parishad.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru] agitation It merely becomes a base for something bigger, whether it is feasible is a different matter. Consultation is going on in Geneva on this subject. We are anxious naturally for this conflict to end and normality to return and for legitimate grievances to be enquired into.

So I would submit we are anxious—exceedingly anxious—naturally for this matter this conflict etc to end for normality to return for legitimate grievances to be enquired into and removed wherever possible and all that I am quite certain that the Kashmir Government is as anxious as we are—both of us are—but how are we to go about discussing not the legitimate grievances but high constitutional and international problems? Some are discussed in Geneva. It is difficult for us to discuss them with other people. We have to consult so many parties—the Kashmir Government is concerned the defence part of it is there and others—and we are supposed to discuss these problems in the marketplace with the Praja Parishad people. I just do not understand how this could be done.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH In Geneva the discussion should be on the basis of how to get rid of the aggressors and not on the question of plebiscite.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU So I discussed with the leaders of the Jan Sangh how to get rid of the aggressors. I do submit Sir, this is a fantastic proposition. Here is something involving military matters political matters constitutional and national matters. I am prepared to discuss with any Member of this House and get ideas but I don't like this compulsion being exercised and the threat of an all-India agitation. Now how to get rid of the aggressors? Well the aggressors are Pakistan. Therefore it involves the entire problem of war and peace as between India and Pakistan. Imagine the extent of the depth of the problem. Let us dis-

cuss the problem dispassionately. But this is being connected with the Jammu Parshad agitation. It is being given a communal outlook. Now I think that is a fatal outlook and that approach is fatal for the entire country. It will disrupt the country and will put an end to our freedom. There is such a gap between these two approaches that you cannot, normally speaking in these basic matters, come to an agreement.

PRINCIPAL DEVAPRASAD GHOSH Can the Prime Minister enlighten us as to what was the original complaint of India before the U.N.O.? I think that on the question of aggression and not that of plebiscite it was.

MR CHAIRMAN You have said that.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU The hon Member is perfectly right. The original complaint was that there had been an incursion into the Kashmir State territory (*Interruption*). As I said in the beginning we have been struggling against this problem. It has given us no pleasure to be caught in tangles. We must remember that the foreign policy of a country ultimately depends on its strength and not merely on declarations.

Now one thing more I am told that my hon friend Dr Kunzru expressed his grave discontent and his disapproval of the fact that certain persons have been arrested and detained in the Punjab in the course of the last week or ten days. I believe about a dozen or so persons have been arrested. Now I do not know if Dr Kunzru meant by that that under no circumstances, whatever happens should a person be so arrested and detained or whether he thought that in the peculiar circumstances now prevailing in the Punjab this should not have been done.

If it is the first proposition that he advances I would submit that it is difficult to agree to it and I cannot agree to it and no country can agree to it in any final sense. Of course, it is

a thing which should not normally be done and I hope it is not normally done, it is done in extreme stress, under special circumstances. If I may say so, then it becomes a question of the circumstances in which this is done. Now, the whole background of this Praja Parishad agitation was that when the Punjab became a source of supply of various kinds to Jammu, they adopted all kinds of techniques to excite the people and to create trouble on communal lines. These techniques are being employed even in Delhi and some of the cities of Western U.P., taking out processions and shouting all sorts of exciting slogans. Surely that will lead to a very grave situation. Some of the trouble, some of this stone-throwing and attacks occurred almost within a stone's throw of the Cease Fire Line, when there are Pakistan forces on the other side of the Line. We were concerned that our Army should keep completely out of this, but these people were deliberately doing this where our Army is, presumably to excite the Army. I know that the Punjab Government, for weeks beforehand, was gravely concerned. It did not want to do anything, but ultimately the responsibility was theirs. They wrote to us saying, "There is a very grave situation and we propose to take some such action". We said, "It is your responsibility and if you consider it right and proper, you should do it."

I am sorry I have taken so much of the time of the House, but the subjects before the House in connection with the President's Address cover not only India but the world, and the responsibility largely falls upon us, not as a Government, but upon Parliament here to deal with them with dignity, restraint, and keeping always our principles before us, and always in a spirit of humility.

SHRI B GUPTA: It has been submitted in the course of the debate that we made certain negative criticisms. But we also made certain constructive

suggestions. Now when the Prime Minister replies to the debate.

MR CHAIRMAN. It is not a reply to the debate.

SHRI B GUPTA. he must say which of the suggestions we had made are acceptable to him.

MR. CHAIRMAN. You did not hear me. It is not a reply.

SHRI B GUPTA. I withdraw it. Anyway, when the Prime Minister intervenes in the debate, hon Members expect that he would indicate which of their suggestions are acceptable to him. At least, some indication should be given. That is the usual practice followed in the Parliament of England and in various other countries. I submit, Sir, that we should not be treated in the way in which we have been treated.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Tomorrow some Member of the Government would wind up and tell you something.

MAJ.-GEN S S. SOKHEY (Nominated): Sir, I am glad that the President has told us that he trusts that the tendency towards an extension of the war which has already brought disaster in its train, will be checked and the minds of the nations and peoples will be turned towards a peaceful approach to these problems. And his assurance that Government will continue to work to that end is still more welcome. We can rely on that assurance since Government has in the past consistently stood for the advocacy of a peaceful solution of international troubles. It has gradually built up a platform to which more and more nations are giving adherence, that international differences shall be settled peacefully. This is all to the good. But as the Prime Minister himself explained, we cannot do much more than use moral pressure. Thus in spite of some good results the fact remains that war in Malaya is still going on and there are people being killed in Viet Nam and also in Korea.

[Maj.-Gen. S. S. Sokhey.]

Now there is a further threat of war what made the present situation so alarming was the declaration of policy of a great nation, U.S.A., which implies on the face of it extension of war in China, possibly in other parts of Asia and even to the whole world. In this alarming situation we have, we missed any lead from the Prime Minister. Though he has just now dealt with the foreign policy at length, he has not given any lead for some reason or other best known to him.

Peace is in a very precarious position and it is a matter of extreme importance that we, as a people, should speak with one voice and strengthen the hands of our Government in the promotion of peace in the world.

[MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN *in the Chair*.]

We are not doing so at present. We in this House have heard statements that are violently different from the statements made by Government. We should study the cause and resolve the difficulty. I am convinced that differences of opinion do not arise from mere cupidity. Differences of opinion arise from the fact that different people have different sets of facts at their disposal. In this House there are quite a large number of people who study foreign affairs quite seriously and still they express widely differing opinions. This situation can be met by placing at their disposal the facts that are at the disposal of Government. At scientific conferences universalisation of facts leads to commonly agreed views warranted by those facts. It is true that political facts cannot be given the same precise form as facts of chemistry and other sciences. But an effort should be made to place at the disposal of all of us all the facts and I am sure good results will follow. May I request the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Department to take us into confidence and tell us the facts in their possession. For the purpose a group of Members of Parliament should be created and the Prime Minister should frequently discuss foreign

affairs with them. That will help us to resolve differences of opinion to a large extent.

I would even like to go further. So far as we are concerned, we as a people have come on the scene of foreign affairs, only recently. Until a few years ago our minds were devoted entirely to the domestic problem of getting our independence. At the annual meetings of the Congress, the world was never considered except when the Prime Minister happened to be the President. He kept continuously in front of the people of India, that India was part of the world, that anything that happened in the world affected India and anything that happened in this country affected the world. In spite of that, we have not yet taken up the study of foreign affairs seriously. Therefore I think he and his External Affairs Department can and should do a great deal to help the country in this matter. It is true that today the newspapers are covering foreign views and affairs much better than before. They are even beginning to employ Indian representatives to collect foreign news from an Indian point of view. Still the coverage is not as good as it might be. But Government has extensive facilities for collecting information more reliable than those at the disposal of the newspapers. I suggest these facilities should be placed at the disposal of the people. Government should publish communiques, give platform and radio talks to put the study of this subject on a better basis. The study of foreign affairs, gathers importance when we realise that today domestic affairs and foreign affairs are one. They are so connected that if we neglect the study of one, we neglect the study of the other.

The Prime Minister himself has told us that we are not a very powerful people, that we cannot possibly control the action of others. But by the process of speaking with one voice we can still exercise a great deal of moral influence on world affairs.

I have taken the liberty of suggesting that Government should take us into confidence by placing at our disposal information that they themselves collect to enable us to form considered views on foreign affairs, and make the same information available to the public at large and thereby create better understanding of foreign affairs in the country and make the country politically mature. To this purpose a parliamentary group should be formed with which the Prime Minister should frequently discuss matters of importance as often as necessary. Therefore, Sir, I suggest that we should be taken into confidence by Government and it should also publish press reports, give radio and platform talks on matters of the moment and stimulate serious discussion of foreign affairs. This may be considered unusual; other Governments do not do it, but still it should be done as our needs are different and they must be met.

DR. ANUP SINGH (Punjab): Mr. Deputy Chairman, I rise to commend the President's Address for the approval of this House. I am fully conscious of the fact that at this late hour, it would be rather an anticlimax, speaking after the Prime Minister who has very eloquently and comprehensively covered the field; but, I would like to make just a few observations first about the domestic situation. So many items have been covered there that it is not possible for anyone to deal with anyone of them adequately within the short time limit, but, I do feel, Sir, that its broad generalisation that there has been all-round improvement is tenable. The mere fact that the Opposition and, particularly, the spokesman of the Communist Party, have not characterized the Presidential Address as a declaration of war on the people, which was said last time, is an implied recognition that at least there has been some improvement in the attitude of the President towards the people.

With regard to one or two items in the domestic field, Sir, I would like to
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make some comment. So much has been said about stirring the people, about channeling the sentiments of the people to implement the Five Year Plan, and, quite a great deal has been said about corruption. All that is very true. I have recently come from a fairly extended tour of some of the villages in Punjab. There is corruption there, and I think it is rampant, perhaps, all over the country, but, I feel, Sir, that an officer may be quite honest, very conscientious and very able, but, unless there has been some change in his attitude towards the people, unless there has been some reorientation in his outlook towards the people, he will not be of any use so far as the implementation of the Five Year Plan is concerned.

I would like to make one or two observations about officers in Punjab, without any disrespect to them; nor do I want to suggest that they are any different from, perhaps, the officers or the general run of officers in other parts of the country. But I happen to have met some of these in Punjab, and I regret to say that most of them continue to treat the people with an air of superiority and an air of arrogance. I have seen some of the people trying to approach a certain officer, and they have been pushed back by the *chaprasi*. I ventured to intervene, and of course immediately I was asked, who am I? Personally I feel that there should not have been any difference whether I was a Member of Parliament or just an individual, but the moment that the particular officer or those around realised that I belonged to Parliament, there was a very dramatic change in his attitude. But that certainly is not good enough, because all of us cannot go round and personally be responsible for the attitude of the officers towards the people. I feel, therefore, that some kind of direction from above, from the Centre to the States, from the Chief Ministers to the Deputy Commissioners and Collectors, and all the way down, will help the situation a

[Dr. Anup Singh.]

great deal. People feel embittered that they do not have access to the officers. They come with their complaints. Some of them are legitimate; some of them may not be legitimate. But if the officer is unwilling to give that person even a hearing, you can well imagine the attitude of that person towards the State Government, and by the same token towards the Central Government.

The Prime Minister recently said that one of the great virtues of the Five Year Plan was that people had become conscious of the Plan. With all due respect to the Prime Minister, I beg to differ. Those of us who read newspapers and who listen to the radio have been discussing and will continue discussing the Five Year Plan for quite some time, but I was certainly amazed at the situation in Punjab. When I was accompanying two of the Provincial Ministers, the Director of Rehabilitation and the local Deputy Commissioner, and was sitting with them as a non-official observer by their courtesy, I asked one of the Ministers if it would be proper for me to ask a question of those people who had come from so many villages. He was gracious enough to let me have the liberty. I asked those people in Punjabi: "How many of you have heard about the Five Year Plan? And what do you think about it?" And, Sir, it will come to this House as a surprise when I say that from this gathering of about 400 people, not more than half a dozen people had ever heard about the Five Year Plan. And these people represented a cross-section of the villages in Punjab. Again I submit that the situation that prevails in Punjab may not be very different from the situation in other parts of the country. Perhaps the difference may be very slight. Unless we devise some means of popularising the Plan and bringing it to the attention of the people, all this talk about so-called channeling of

all the energies and mobilising all human resources might be just empty talk.

Many things can be done, but if I were to pick out one, I would suggest that the relationship between the officials at every level with the people should be radically transformed. Then and then alone can the people feel and identify themselves with the Government. It may look a very simple proposition and a very obvious observation, but I have certainly come back from Punjab with a very deep conviction that unless that is done we will be functioning in a vacuum and not be able to utilise the co-operation of the people.

As for the field of international affairs, it will, I think, be rather presumptuous on my part to say anything after the speech of the Prime Minister, and especially when he devoted a great deal of time to the exposition and elucidation of India's foreign policy. But I may be permitted to make one or two remarks about what has been said by the Opposition. I think, Mrs. Menon, Sir, ably answered these critics. The Leader of the Communist Party repeated the familiar approach that our foreign policy was pro-American, it was pro-imperialist, and I think he went further when he said that President Eisenhower would not have gone so far in his pronouncement were it not for the encouragement given by the Korean Resolution of the Indian Delegation in the United Nations. I submit, Sir, that one may disagree about the implementation of our foreign policy; one can quite legitimately say that we are not doing enough for improving our relations with Pakistan; or about the problem of Kashmir and I think one can agree or one can disagree and have differences. But I personally feel that the whole confusion and the criticism of India's foreign policy is based largely upon our preoccupation with the two power-blocs today. We tend, almost automatically, to judge every act in terms of what effect it has on

our relations with America, or with the Soviet Union. If you vote on a certain resolution today, our stand is not judged on merits, on the intrinsic validity of our stand, but it would depend largely upon who we were bracketed with, the Soviet or the American bloc. It had happened on many occasions, I was in America at that time, when I was told by so many responsible Americans that by and large there is a tendency on the part of the Indian Government and the Indian delegation to go invariably with the Russians. I submit, Sir, that unless we can get back to certain basic approach as to what our policy is, what is its genesis, why we vote without any reference whatsoever to its bearing and effect upon the two power blocs, unless we had that, we will be going at cross purposes, moving all along on parallel lines without ever meeting. From that point of view I suggest that the Indian foreign policy of today is not something that has been improvised. As the Prime Minister observed, it has a background. It follows certain traditions; the Indian National Congress from 1927 has made certain declarations and pronouncements about India's stand *vis-a-vis* the world's problems and what is being done today by this Government, which is the Congress Government, is to a very large extent the projection of these ideas and these principles to the international scene. If one were to sum up the basic principles of the Indian foreign policy I would put it that we have always stood for the self-determination, freedom of all people and opposition

to imperialism. We have done everything we could as a country to strengthen the hands of the United Nations. Our policy has certainly not been imperialist.

The charge has been made that our policy is pro-imperialist. I beg to submit that that is a statement which will not be borne out by facts and it is an extravagant statement. We as a people fought against one of the world's greatest imperialist powers of our times and through a very remarkable and unprecedented method we achieved our freedom. The very fact that we were able to liberate ourselves from the yoke of the British has had its repercussions all over—in the French, the Dutch and all the other colonial powers. It had a trembling and shocking effect throughout Asia and so our policy certainly cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be characterised or dubbed as pro-imperialistic.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Are you likely to take more time?

DR. ANUP SINGH: I would like to speak tomorrow.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You may continue tomorrow.

The House stands adjourned till 2 o'clock tomorrow.

The Council then adjourned till two of the clock on Tuesday, the 17th February 1953.