

श्री उपसभापति: नहीं, नाम ले सकते। The name will not go on record. Now, the discussion on atrocities on women will continue after the statement and clarification by the Commerce Minister. The Commerce Minister is to make the statement.

STATEMENTS BY MINISTERS

Outcome of the negotiations at Sixth Ministerial Conference of World Trade Organisations held in Hong Kong, China from 13th to 18th December, 2005

THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (SHRI KAMAL NATH): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, hon. Members will recall that I had made a statement in this House on 7th December, 2005 on the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference of the Commerce and Trade Ministers of 149 member countries from 13—18 December, 2005. The Ministers issued a declaration, copies of which have been placed in the Parliament Library.

During this Conference, India was proactive in articulating its position on issues of concern to us and other developing countries, especially in the 21 member G-20 alliance and 45 member G-33 alliance. India played a key role in further strengthening the developing country coalitions by bringing together G-20, G-33 and G-90 groups of countries in a Grand alliance to reinforce each other's position on issues of mutual interest. India also enabled the formation of NAMA 11 Group (countries such as India, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Philippines, Indonesia, etc.) to pursue and integrate meaningfully Special and Differential Treatment issues in Non-Agricultural Market Access matters.

As far as India is concerned, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration finally agreed upon, addresses our core concerns and interests and provides us enough negotiating space for future work leading up to modalities. The text has positive development content, which would need to be built upon and fully realized in the next stage of negotiations.

The Declaration stipulates that the negotiations must be concluded, by 2006 and establishes time-lines and targets in specific areas. Among other issues, in Agriculture and NAMA, we agreed that the modalities are to be established by 30 April 2006 and comprehensive draft schedules submitted by 31 July 2006.

The principal elements of the text represent significant gains for India. In Agriculture, in Domestic Support, developing countries like India with no AMS (Aggregate Measurement of Support) commitments will be exempt from any cuts on their *de minimis* support. Green Box criteria will be reviewed so that programmes of developing country members which have minimal trade distorting effect will be incorporated into the Green Box. All forms of Export Subsidies by developed countries and other export measures with equivalent effect (such as Export Credits, guarantees & Insurance in excess of 180 days, and to trade distorting practices of STEs and Food Aid) will be eliminated by the end of 2013, with the substantial part eliminated by the middle of the implementation period *i.e.* 2010. Developing countries like India will continue to benefit from the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture *i.e.* they shall be able to continue to provide marketing and transport subsidies for 5 years after elimination of export subsidies, *i.e.* up to 2018. Developing countries will be able to self-designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as Special Products guided by indicators based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. To safeguard our farmers against surge in imports or fall in international prices, developing countries will have recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism with both import quantity and price triggers.

Specifically, on Cotton, export subsidies by developed countries will be fully eliminated in 2006; and trade distorting domestic support by developed countries will be reduced ambitiously over a shorter period than for other agricultural products.

On Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), the Declaration calls for a Swiss Formula with coefficients. This formulations preserve the ABI formula submitted by Argentina, Brazil and India for multiple coefficients based on each country's tariff average. The Declaration reiterates that Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries be maintained through the principle of less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments and the flexibilities to exclude a certain percentage of tariff lines from tariff cuts. The Declaration also recognizes the sensitivity attached to the unbound tariff lines by providing for a non-linear mark up before applying formula reductions. It is agreed that tariff peaks, tariff escalations

and high tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries be either reduced or eliminated. It is also agreed that participation in the sectoral initiatives to reduce or eliminate tariffs will be on a non-mandatory basis.

In Services, developing countries will have adequate policy space and necessary flexibility to pursue their developmental objectives. The primacy of the Request—Offer process has been maintained. In Mode-1 and Mode-2 (including Cross Border Supply), guidance for commitments at the existing levels has been secured. Members have agreed to offer enhanced commitments in Mode-4 (Movement of Natural Persons). We agreed to removal or substantial reduction of the Economic Needs Test. This has been one of the principal barriers to export of Services from developing countries, and has been a longstanding demand of India. It was also agreed that the approaches to negotiations, which includes plurilateral negotiations, will follow the GATS Agreement and the Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures evolved in 2003. The Declaration does not introduce any compulsion on developing countries for opening up services sectors. Revised offers would be submitted by 31 July 2006, and final draft schedules would be readied by 31 October 2006.

The Declaration notes the amendment made a fortnight ago, spearheaded by the Agrican Group and supported by India, to the TRIPS Agreements to incorporate the Public Health concerns. On the Implementation Issues relating to TRIPS and the Convention on Biodiversity, and extension of the protection of Geographical Indications, the Declaration calls for intensification of consultations so that the General Council could take appropriate action by 31 July 2006.

India spoke not only for herself, but in the tradition established since the time of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and Smt. Indira Gandhi, we also lent a powerful voice to the concerns of least developed countries. Through close co-ordination with the LDC Group and the Africa Group, we were instrumental in fashioning an LDC package.

As part of Special and Differential Treatment, the Membership agreed to five LDC specific proposals, including the one relating to provision of duty-free and quota-free market access in developed countries for products originating from LDCs. We further directed that on the remaining proposals, recommendations be made by December 2006.

The contours of the Domestic Support reduction formula in Agriculture as also the tariff reduction formulae in Agriculture as well as NAMA have been given shape. The coming months will see intense negotiations, as the modalities are finalized. The Government will continue its close engagement with various stakeholders in each of the areas, so that the best result could be obtained, fully protecting our farmers, industry, as well as promoting our national interests and core concerns.

डा० मुरली मनोहर जोशी (उत्तर प्रदेश): सभापति जी, मैंने मंत्री महोदय के वक्तव्य को बहुत ध्यान-पूर्वक सुना और मुझे यह देख कर आश्चर्य हुआ कि उन्होंने कुछ चीजों के बारे में बड़े गर्व के साथ बताया है, जैसे सरकार और अपने वार्ताकारों की उपलब्धि के बारे में। मुझे लगता है कि उसके बारे में उनसे कुछ स्पष्टीकरण पूछना बहुत आवश्यक है।

पहली बात तो यह है कि आपने एक्सपोर्ट सब्सिडी के एलिमिनेशन के बारे में चर्चा की है और यह बताया है कि यह बहुत बड़ी उपलब्धि है कि एक्सपोर्ट सब्सिडी अब 2013 तक समाप्त होगी। लेकिन, उसी पैराग्राफ के अन्त में यह लिखा हुआ है कि जब आप अप्रैल 2006 में मोडैलिटीज़ डिस्कस करें, उन मोडैलिटीज़ के पूरे होने के बाद यह डेट कन्फर्म की जाए। अगर आप उसी पैराग्राफ को पढ़ेंगे तो आप देखेंगे कि अन्त में उसमें यह लिखा हुआ है कि यह 2013 की डेट तभी कन्फर्म होगी जब मोडैलिटीज़ पूरी हो जाएंगी। वर्ष 2006 की अप्रैल तक ये मोडैलिटीज़ पूरी हो जाएं तो बहुत अच्छी बात है, लेकिन डब्ल्यूटीओ में हमें यह तजुर्बा हुआ है कि अक्सर जो तारीखें रखी जाती हैं, उन तक बात पूरी नहीं होती है, क्योंकि जिन चीजों पर मोडैलिटीज़ होंगी और उनके बारे में जहां पर चर्चा होगी, वह विषय काफी व्यापक होगा।

उसी समय आपने स्वयं यह कहा है कि ट्रिप्स वाली बात पर तुरन्त ध्यान दे दिया जाएगा और इस पर भी ध्यान दिया जाएगा, लेकिन खुद एग्रीकल्चर के बारे में इतनी प्रॉब्लम्स हैं कि उन सब की मोडैलिटीज़ तय करने में बहुत समय लगेगा। इसलिए मैं यह नहीं समझ पाया कि आपने यह कैसे मान लिया कि अप्रैल 2006 तक ये सब मोडैलिटीज़ पूरी हो जाएंगी और यह डेट वर्ष 2013 तक कन्फर्म भी हो जाएगी। यूरोपियन यूनियन ने तो खासतौर पर पहले से ही कह दिया है और यह जो 2013 की बात हुई है, यह तो वही कानून है जो यूरोपियन यूनियन ने पहले से ही पास कर रखा है कि 2013 तक हम अपनी सब्सिडी नहीं घटाएंगे। तो इसलिए आपने उसी को एंडोर्स किया है। उसमें डोमेस्टिक सब्सिडी के लिए कि वह कब खत्म होंगी उसके बारे में तो कोई चर्चा है नहीं। डोमेस्टिक सब्सिडी ही हमको सबसे ज्यादा नुकसान पहुंचाती है जो वहां दी जाती है। और हमारे देश पर, हमारी एग्रीकल्चर पर जो प्रभाव पड़ता है वह उसी को सबसे ज्यादा पड़ता है। लेकिन डोमेस्टिक सब्सिडी के बारे में जैसा मैंने उस दिन भी कहा था कि एक टन पैडी से राइस बनाकर, खेत से राइस बनाकर अमेरिका के बाजार में 415 डॉलर प्रति टन दाम है और उनका एक्सपोर्ट दाम

274 डॉलर प्रति टन है। तो यह सवाल है कि जो उनकी इतनी जबर्दस्त डोमेस्टिक सपोर्ट की सब्सिडी है उसके बारे में इसमें कोई चिंता नहीं है, उसके बारे में कोई बात नहीं हुई है...।

श्री उपसभापति: डा० जोशी जी, आप संक्षिप्त में ही पूछिएगा क्योंकि बहुत से सदस्य क्लेरिफिकेशन्स पूछने वाले हैं। वक्त का ख्याल रखियेगा।

डा० मुरली मनोहर जोशी: उपसभापति जी, ये सवाल ऐसे हैं जो हिन्दुस्तान...।

श्री उपसभापति: आप सवाल पूछिये, आप क्लेरिफिकेशन्स पूछिये। मगर आप ब्रीफ में पूछिये।

डा० मुरली मनोहर जोशी: उसके बारे में क्या निर्णय हुआ है? आपने किस तरह से भारत के हितों की रक्षा की है? आपने इसी सदन में हमें यह वचन दिया था कि आप भारत के सम्पूर्ण हितों की रक्षा करेंगे और भारत के किसान और खेती के बारे में आप पूरा ध्यान देंगे। यह जो ग्रीन बॉक्स क्राइटेरिया है यह भी रिव्यू किया जाएगा in line with paragraph 16 of the Framework, और उस फ्रेमवर्क पर हमारी पहले से ही आपत्ति थी इस देश की कि यह फ्रेमवर्क आपने गलत स्वीकार किया है। पैरा-24 में यह कहा गया है कि "Balance will be established during further negotiations in market access both for agriculture and NAMA". यह आपने दोनों को जोड़ दिया, एग्रीकल्चर और नामा, दोनों को एक साथ शामिल कर दिया गया। यह तो हमारे लिए हानिकारक है। यह आपने क्यों किया है? इसका क्या इम्प्लीकेशन है? क्या यह सोचा गया कि यह जो नॉन-एग्रीकल्चर मार्केट एसेस है और एग्रीकल्चर है इन दोनों की समस्याएं अलग-अलग हैं? लेकिन आपने इन दोनों को जोड़ दिया। यह बात समझ में नहीं आती है कि इससे जो सीरियस इम्प्लीकेशन हैं क्या आपने उनको सोचा, क्या समझा और उनके बारे में आपका क्या कहना है। उसी तरह से ट्रिप्स के बारे में जो कुछ आपने कहा वह बहुत इनसफिसिएंट है। जो दोहा वर्ग प्रोग्राम का पैराग्राफ 17, 18, 19 और 37 उसमें कई बातें रखी गई थी और यह दोहा राउंड ही हो रहा है जिसमें Notification and registration of geographical indication for products other than wine and spirits; the review of article 23.3 (b) regarding patenting of micro organisms; relationship between TRIPS Agreement and the Convention of Biological Diversity and traditional knowledge; review of the TRIPS Agreement under article 71.1 and trade and transfer of technology. इनके बारे में तो कोई चर्चाएं ही नहीं हुईं जो हमारे को काफी प्रभावित करते हैं। इसके अलावा जो दवाईयों का सवाल है, वह बहुत जबर्दस्त हैल्थ प्वाइंट आफ व्यू से है, तो उसके बारे में क्या चर्चा हुई दुनिया के तमाम देशों के सामने आज यह गंभीर समस्या है और गरीब देशों के सामने तो बहुत अधिक है। खेती के

मामले में बात करते हुए आपने कॉटन का उल्लेख किया है, लेकिन कॉटन के बारे में तो कोई चर्चा सार्थक हुई नहीं थी और कॉटन हमें भी प्रभावित करती है और अफ्रीकन कंट्रीज को भी प्रभावित करती है। वहां उन्होंने क्या किया? 26 हजार किसानों ने आत्महत्या की है जिसमें बहुत बड़ी संख्या कॉटन ग्रोवर्स की है यह जो सवाल है कि कॉटन प्राइस बहुत गिरती चली जा रही है और उसके कारण से हमें कठिनाइयां पैदा हो रही हैं इसको भी देखने की जरूरत है। फिर आपने इसके लिए कहा है डि-मिनिमस सब्सिडी के संबंध में आपने बात की। लेकिन वह तो कांकलूड पैरा में पहले ही बात हो चुकी है कि अंतिम ड्राफ्ट में कि Para 7.1 had mentioned and I quote: "Developing countries shall be exempt from the requirement of reducing the Minimum Support Price." तो नई बात क्या हुई उसमें What have we achieved? यह तो ऑलरेडि पहले से ही तय हो चुका है, यह कोई नई उपलब्धि नहीं है। मेरी समझ में नहीं आया कि आपकी कुल उपलब्धियां क्या हैं इस मामले में, आपने दो बातें बताईं उनमें से एक तो ऐसी है जिसका कोई असर हम पर नहीं पड़ता। इसका प्रभाव उनको पड़ता है हम पर नहीं पड़ता। फिर रिडक्शन के बारे में जो सवाल है-ग्रीन बॉक्स, ब्लू बॉक्स और एम्बर बॉक्स के उसमें कैसे डिस्ट्रिब्यूशन होगा और उसका क्या को-फिसेंट होगा, इसके बारे में कोई चर्चा नहीं है। आपने क्या सोचा है जब वे को-फिसेंट तय होंगे तो क्या होंगे और उनका भारत के ऊपर क्या प्रभाव पड़ेगा, किसानों पर क्या प्रभाव पड़ेगा, ये सवाल हैं जिनके बारे में हमें बहुत चिंता होती है आपके इस वक्तव्य से कोई बात सार्फ-साफ नहीं मिलती, कोई स्पष्टीकरण इन चीजों का नहीं होता।

श्री उपसभापति: वे दे देंगे।

डा० मुरली मनोहर जोशी: मुझे कुल मिलाकर यह कहना पड़ता है कि आपने वही किया जो हमें संदेह था। मैंने इस हाउस में यह कहा था कि कहीं से कुछ इशारा आएगा और आप फिर दब जाएंगे। जो उरुग्वे राउंड में हुआ और जो मराकेस में हुआ वही इतिहास आज आपने यहां फिर दोहरा दिया है, आप यहां से बहुत ताल ठोक कर गए थे। वहां से आकर यह नतीजा है। तो मेरी समझ में नहीं आया कि इस वक्तव्य में मिला क्या है। मेरे आप इन सवालों पर कृपया करके स्पष्टीकरण दें।

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Shri Sitaram Yechury. Only pointed clarifications, please.

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (Andhra Pradesh): Yes, Sir. I head your warning that it is only for clarifications and not for any speech. But there are many issues on which I want the Minister to actually clarify and express to this House that in future how the Government will react to it. I have a series of questions. I will ask them very, very quickly.

The first thing is, as has already been expressed, and we have also said this earlier, that, till 2013, our basic concern regarding this and this time when we went in for this Round was, how to protect our marginal and poor farmers and in what we have been assured is that there will be a reduction of export subsidies which I do not think is a very big gain for India because export subsidies, at least, as far as the European Union is concerned, is not more than 3.5 per cent of their overall subsidies. If they continue with their domestic subsidies for their production in which case they are already distorting international trade in agriculture, and that is adversely affecting us, this in no way is a great achievement for us. But we have to work for a substantial reduction. In that, my question is: how are we going to put that pressure that they are going to reduce their domestic subsidies in their agriculture and, thereby, not distort international trade.

Secondly, Sir, the question that has come is—and this is what I want the Minister to clarify—that it says, even if this reduction by 2013 if there is no assurance that there will be no cuts in the tariff for special products, then how are we going to meet this situation? And what is what the Minister will have to tell us how are we going to think in terms of protecting the farmers.

Then, the next question I have is this. In Para 6, there is a very interesting thing which says that there will be a Safe Box for food aid. I do not need to recall the experience of this august House on what happened to PL-480 and how food aid was used as an instrument of subversion and how India, at that point of time opposed it and, finally, abandoned PL-480, when we saw the pressures that have been falling on us. So, how did we accept this aspect of the Safe Box for food aid. Then, Sir, on Para 15, this is a little disturbing to me. The flexibilities that are there in your Special and Differential Treatment are included in Para 15. It says that these will also be under review. Now, even in the flexibilities that are there for you, as defined in para 8, if they are going to be reviewed by para 15, in which case, what are we finally going to gain out of it, or, what is going to come out of this, or, what is the assurance that we have on this special and differential treatment? So, on all these things put together, Sir, what we want is that this time we did not lose out much, but what we have to gain and how we are going to proceed to gain, that is where, I think, the direction will have to go.

Sir, I just have two or three other questions in the area of services. We are very disturbed, Sir, and this is something about which we have been having this opinion for a long time. I don't blame this particular Minister alone for that reason. To begin with, we think the WTO itself is an unequal agreement. This is something we have to fight the date will be confirmed only upon the completion of modalities. I am just quoting from the Report, Sir. These modalities are expected to be complete by 30.4.2006. Any delay in completion of these modalities, which include negotiations between major agriculture exporters on some complex question such as discipline on export credits, export credit guarantees, export insurance programmes, etc. etc will delay the confirmation on the announced date. Now, our fear is that this will provide the time for both EU and the USA to work out modalities to compensate the possible losses that they will be doing it, in which case we ultimately do not stand to gain. So, how are we going to meet these modalities? That is the next question.

The third question that I have is this. We have talked in Para 24 of the Declaration that both in terms of market access for both NAMA and agricultural products, we have said, will be considerable increase. Now, my fear, and that is the question I want to be replied, is: in this background, how do we assure that we are protecting our farmers and our agricultural community? Now, the demands will come to reduce the tariff levels. Now, that is contingent on reduction of domestic subsidies in the developed countries. If they reduce their domestic subsidies, they will also put pressure on us to reduce our market access. Now, if we are going to accept that, that will be further detrimental to our agriculture. So, how are we going to protect our agriculture? The argument was that there can be a Special and Differential treatment; that has come in. That is my question: Why is this Special and Differential Treatment not been defined? The USA, for instance, has said that that, what is called, the SADT, the Special and Differential Treatment will be slightly less, not even the two-third as per the formula that has been accepted; but it will only be slightly less. So, if SADT is not defined and to protect our sovereignty. Now, my only point, Sir, in the field of services is this. We have said that access to higher education will be given. Now, that is very disturbing. We are now considering an entire constitutional amendment on the question of higher education, how the private professional institutions are treating education, commercialising education, etc. In that background, giving access to higher education in the field of services is a very disturbing

thing. We would like an assurance that we can protect our higher education. Further, Sir, the next point is about the field of health. ...*(Interruptions)*...Access to higher education. Doesn't matter, let the Minister answer. This is what I learnt, what I could gather, that in the field of higher education, opening up in the field of services is being considered.

Secondly, in health, the foreign investment that was allowed to the tune of 49 per cent, now, I think, has been extended to 74 per cent. You have increased the limit for foreign investment in the health sector. Now, this is also very disturbing. I want the hon. Minister to assure us. With regard to the TRIPs, I want the Minister to take it in the spirit that we want to strengthen India's position under the WTO so that we are able to withstand the pressures that the advanced countries are putting, and protect the interests of our farmers and our agricultural sector in May. Thank you, Sir.

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (Gujarat): Sir, the hon. Minister had made a detailed statement and answered a large number of suggestions which had been raised prior to his visit to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, we saw three important developments in terms of the developing countries alliance of G-20 staying and holding on together. Secondly, the G-20 alliance trying to leave its impact on the WTO agenda, and correcting the traditional imbalances in the functioning of the WTO which was driven predominantly by the United States and the European Union. If these are considered as developments in the on-going negotiations, which we can have a sense of satisfaction about, we also saw several statements from the hon. Minister which were also giving us a lot of comfort level during the Conference and prior to the Conference. But, when I read the draft text, there is a slight disconnect between all the oral statements and the determinations which were being shown and some of the facts which have been incorporated in the text itself. I will, therefore, seek my clarifications in terms of this question and doubt which I have developed.

Sir, the export subsidies are to be eliminated by 2013. I take it that before the eventual elimination of the export subsidies by 2013, there will be some front-loading and some slashing down of subsidies would begin prior to even 2013. Let us not forget one fact that export subsidies are only a miniscule percentage of the total subsidy budget of the European Union and the United States. The export subsidies itself are

to the tune of about four billion dollars. If we add to this various forms of export support and export credits..*(Interruptions)*...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr Jaitley, you can put direct question..*(Interruptions)*...I know.

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Sir, I won't take more than three to four minutes, if you just permit me. The export support would be a little more, and take together, the entire export support budget would be about three per cent of the entire subsidy budget of the development countries. Now, with regard to the rest, my question on this is two-fold. My first question is, with regard to the entire domestic support, I find that this Agreement incorporates in toto what was said in the Geneva July 2004 text; and in the Geneva July 2004 text, there is huge comfort level for the developed countries because the Green Box has been completely left out of the subsidy reduction. The Blue Box is first sought to be expanded, which is highly trade distorting, and then reduced to the extent of about twenty per cent in the entire life of the Doha Round. Therefore, what constitutes almost ninety seven per cent of the subsidies, of course, has not been touched upon in Hong Kong, except to the extent that it incorporates what was agreed to in the Geneva text of 2004. What steps is the Government going to take, as a part of these negotiations, to really see if we can improve our negotiating position in Geneva that these ninety seven per cent subsidies could itself be brought down. My specific question on the export subsidies is that these export subsidies were specifically agreed to be phased out completely during the Doha Round, in the Doha ministerial in 2001 itself. Therefore, phasing out or elimination was a principle which we agreed in Doha. Only the end date had to be negotiated. Now, the end date had to take place during the life of the Doha Round itself, and it is anticipated, for developed countries, the Doha Round would last till about 2013 itself. So the 'end date', which we have now been forced to negotiate and accept, is 2013 which, perhaps, is the last date possible for the real elimination of the export subsidies itself. Therefore, from a negotiating point of view, what we have gained ostensibly is that ninety seven per cent of the subsidies remained untouched, three per cent would be eliminated in terms of export subsidies, but that is a fact for which we have already paid a price when we got that concession in Doha, and that would now be eliminated only on the last possible day of the Doha Round. Therefore,

the Government could have done better in terms of having negotiated an earlier date, as far as the elimination of export subsidies is concerned.

Secondly, Sir, at a time, when we are to negotiate the elimination of the entire domestic support subsidies, must we not link or re-link, the factum of tariff reduction by developing countries along with the subsidy reduction by the developed countries? Because if the first does not take place substantially, the clear answer has to be that the second itself cannot take place substantially. Now, in the Geneva text, which has been reincorporated in the Hong Kong Declaration, this link had been slightly broken. Therefore, the need to re-establish this link also is important there.

Two more questions, Sir. One on NAMA itself, that is, the industrial goods. Now, we have agreed to a Swiss Formula to be applicable in the matter of reduction of industrial tariffs. Now, the Swiss Formula necessarily involves that those with higher tariffs reduce more. Now, India is obviously one of the countries which has higher tariffs as far as industrial tariffs are concerned. Therefore, this will be now contingent upon the co-efficient, which is finally negotiated or the multiple co-efficient which is negotiated, as to what is the exact character of the percentage of the tariffs to be brought down as far as the industrial tariffs are concerned. While we were agreeing, in principle, to the Swiss Formula which is detrimental to our interest, why should we leave it in the dark for a future negotiation that the co-efficient would be negotiated on a future date leaving us an age of uncertainty as to the extent to tariffs which we have really to bring down.

And, finally, Sir, would the Minister be kind enough to explain the rationale behind paragraph 24 of the Declaration which interlinks and states that a balance will be maintained between the agricultural negotiations and the NAMA, i.e., the industrial tariff negotiation? I ask this question, Sir, in the background, because India today can afford to have substantially more aggressive interests as far as services are concerned. India has a mixed bag as far as the manufacturing sector is concerned, because we also have some advantages of being a low-cost economy, and, therefore, we can, in some areas, afford to be more aggressive and, in some areas, we have to be defensive. So, it is a mixed bag. But in agriculture the kind of situation we are still in and the plight of 600 million people dependent on agriculture for livelihood, we

have only a defensive interest. There are hardly any offensive interests or aggressive interests that we have in agriculture. Therefore, is it a clever strategy to say that negotiation will move the same way in matters or aggressive interests that we have in agriculture. Therefore, is it a of tariff reductions and market access, both in agriculture and industrial goods, as far as India's interests are concerned?

MR DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: NAMA and agriculture have already been talked about. So, please, don't repeat the points of clarification. The points need not repeated, because in any case, the Minister is going to answer them.

DR. P.C. ALEXANDER (Maharashtra): Sir, I would like to make one comment before I ask for clarification. I thought the hon. Minister could afford to give a more detailed report on what his achievements were at Hong Kong. Already a lot of publicity has been made about agricultural subsidies. Since you have warned me that I should not repeat what has been already said by Dr. Johsi and my esteemed friend. Mr. Jaitely, I am not going to repeat them. But, I wish to seek some clarifications.

We have been demanding, since Cancun, and even from earlier stages, that the reciprocal obligations on the part of the developing countries should be, not subsidy versus subsidy, but their reduction of tariffs.

My first point is, why did you allow so much time, up to 2013 for the abolition of export subsidies? I know that multilateral negotiations involve a lot of giving and taking. But, my humble submission is, from today till 2013, may appear to be a short time but negotiations started twenty years earlier, on the same subject! Having reached this final stage, why were you compelled to give time, up to 2013?

My second point of clarification on that is, why do you link the five years' extension on subsidy on agricultural marketing and transport as the obligation on our part to their removal of agricultural export subsidy? Was it necessary that developing countries should undertake to dispense with transport subsidies and marketing subsidies after 2018?

My third point for clarification is, why haven't you informed the House about the agreement reached on the specific point about amendment to the TRIPS for which we have been expressing interest in all the

negotiations in the past, particularly piracy of biological material, and traditional knowledge? These are the two points which we have insisting at every negotiation. You have not taken us into confidence as to what has been done on these matters?

Then, on access to non-agricultural goods, what is new that has been achieved? 'Less than reciprocity' was a principle accepted at Cancun. Cancun was failure, but understanding was there. Earlier also, the developing countries had always maintained, that the principle of reciprocity should not be accepted. What have specification achieved on the issue of 'less than full reciprocity'?

SHRI RAVULA CHANDRA SEKAR REDDY (Andhra Pradesh): Thank you, Sir. I know the time constraint and the busy schedule of the hon. Minister in the other House also.

Sir, I would like to confine myself to only one point. This is in continuation of the issue raised by Dr. Alexander. Do you think that by the end of the period of eight years, by 2013, the export subsidies would be contained or controlled? What will be the impact on our Indian farmers during these eight years? Have any studies been made?

In the morning, during the Question Hour, an hon. Member had sought clarification with regard to the import duty on cotton. He replied that it is looked after by the Ministry of Agriculture. I could not follow the answer at that time. When such important negotiations are taking place, why not involve the Ministry of Agriculture in this whole process? (Ends)

SHRI MANOJ BHATTACHARYA (West Bengal): I shall do that, Sir, because many of the points of concern have already been made by other hon. Members. So, I am not going to repeat those. Our primary concern was non-tariff barriers by developed countries, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures there is not much mention about these. I would like to know from the hon. Minister whether the developed countries have agreed upon those points. I have not been able to go through the final draft. Would the hon. Minister kindly explain what has happened to those non-tariff barriers? In non-tariff barriers, the developed countries have, at will, used special safeguard measures. Majority of tariff lines are with the developed countries like Switzerland, Canada, USA and the European Union.

Whereas developing countries hardly have 72 tariff plans. Whether there has been some advance in the discussion in so far as non-tariff barriers and special safeguard measures are concerned. This is the first point. Secondly, Sir, I am very much worried because the hon. Minister would also appreciate that this Green Box, Amber Box and blue Box are all hoaxes. These are only puzzling and these are some *..(Interruptions)...* Now, there is a proposal of reviewing in 2010 virtually and we shall expose, as I understand from the statement, our market by 2008. So, two or three years will be sufficient for the developed countries to plunder our country, particularly agriculture. So, what are measures that the Ministry is contemplating to have?

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: All points are covered.

श्री मंगनी लाल मंडल (बिहार): सर, एक मिनट दे दें।

श्री उपसभापति: अब नहीं। मंत्री जी को दूसरे हाउस में जाना है।

श्री मंगनी लाल मंडल: महोदय, माननीय मंत्री जी का सार्वजनिक बयान रहा है कि वह हांगकांग से संतुष्ट होकर लौटे हैं। मेरा एक ही सवाल है कि अभी जो सब्सिडी दी जाती है, इस में करीब 360 लाख डॉलर इनवॉल्व हैं। किन्तु अभी जो समझौता हुआ है, वह सिर्फ 35 लाख डॉलर पर ही हुआ है और जिसकी अवधि 2013 तक हुआ है। इस के अतिरिक्त जो आंतरिक सब्सिडी 97 प्रतिशत घरेलू है, उस पर कुछ बात नहीं हुई है।

इन तीन बिंदुओं पर माननीय मंत्री जी जवाब दें।

THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (SHRI KAMAL NATH): Sir, I have listened very carefully to what Members have to say, and I am hoping that, at least, there will be some recognition of India's position in Hong Kong and what we have been able to achieve. It's all right. I understand that substantively there is text which affects, erodes India's position and being critical of that is one part of it. But what was Hong Kong about? Hong Kong was one of the Ministerial meetings which have been held. My predecessor, Mr. Arun Jaitley, has attended it several times. The Ministerial meetings are held in every two years. The significance of this meeting was that this was a meeting which was originally meant to finalise the full text, that is, the full modalities. Dr. Joshi, I want to tell you that modalities mean really that there is complete agreement. Modalities imply that in the WTO parlance. This was

supposed to be done in Hong Kong. That was the original plan. Before I went, I informed this august House that Hong Kong will not be able to achieve that because of very contentious issues which needed to be addressed. Most of that being agriculture. The agriculture is one of the most structurally flawed aspects of global trade and the effort will be to see how much more forward we can move from the Framework Agreement to see if an agreement of the Doha Round can be arrived at by December 2006. Hong Kong, I informed this House, was not meant to arrive at the Agreement of the Doha Round. It was only a milestone. My strategy in Hong Kong was to ensure that in the five days, which were available, we secure for India our defensive concerns. What were we to start with? should we start what were the items on which emphasis was needed to be laid in five days? There were so many issues. So, many emphasis was, let us secure for India the defensive concerns so that there is no grey areas left with those as we move on with the negotiation. So, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration is a piece of paper -- I must explain what this means—which bears in terms of specifics. It is laid down how the agreement will be arrived at. What could not be discussed or could not be settled, it lays down point-wise for further discussion. It also lays down that by June, 2006, we will try to see that the full modalities have been achieved in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. I am sure my predecessor, Mr. Arun Jaitely, will agree that this is the correct position. Okay. Now, having said that, I must specify what happened; what is in this piece of paper. What is in this Ministerial Declaration which benefits India. There are hundreds of things, at least hundred things; we take rule; we take implementation; we take non-tariff barriers; we take anti-dumping. These are not just three items. All that could not be discussed in five days. We sat overnight. We used to start at 9 in the night and talked till nine in the morning; overnight in the Green Room. The Green Room process is not very clearly understood to anybody, but at least, this is understood to my predecessor, Mr. Jaitely, because he knows this. And, in this what is contained, and let me tell you very categorically that there are many things not contained here. They are not meant to be contained. And, my strategy was, let me secure what I want to get first, pocket that what I need. What did I need most and this is what this House demanded, not only this House, Lok Sabha said. "Please, make sure that *de minimis* and AMS is what we are not required to cut." If you see, the proceedings are there. What does this

paper say very categorically? Mr. Jaitely said, "That was always there." No. There was an ambiguity in the July Framework. If you see the July Framework, there was an ambiguity in that. It used the word, "largely". There was an ambiguity; I had to secure it. So, the first thing you asked me to do was to secure that there would be no reduction in *de minimis*; there would be reductions in *de minimis* support. We would not have to deal with this at all. This is very, very securely mentioned in the Agreement and I don't think they will... ..डा. जोशी, अगर इसमें आपको और कोई क्लारिफिकेशन चाहिए... It is very clear. I can read it out to you, "The Developing country Members, with no AMS commitments will be exempt from the reductions in the *de minimis* and the overall cut in the trade distorting domestic support." What does this mean in simple language? In simple language, it means, what we are doing for our agricultural sector, we will not be required to make any reductions. This was the most important thing in this House that you had asked me; you desired, you demanded that I do it. What is the next thing you demanded? You demanded to make sure that our sensitive products were secured; our sensitive products like rice, wheat, etc., were secured from an onslaught of subsidy-laden products from the developed countries. So, taking up from what you told me, I ensured that Special Products are no more left out in the negotiations. In the Framework Agreement, we have left negotiations. What does this agreement say? "special products have been secured." What does this agreement say? "Special products have been secured." What is mentioned here categorically has been secured. And, it has not only been secured, it says what? The word, the language used here, "developing country Members have the flexibility to self-designate"-I won't negotiate. This is Agreement Now. What is here in specific terms is the Agreement. This will not come up for discussions any more. I want to clarify this for Dr. Joshi. When he says that you mean this will happen, we will again have to negotiate this."an appropriate number of tariff lines as Special Products guided" 'guided' is very crucial - " by the indicators based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development." Our agriculture is rural development; our agriculture is food security; our agriculture is not commerce; our agriculture is livelihood security. So, I had to secure this. We have secured this in its entirety. At least, here, I hope Dr. Joshi will appreciate this because this

is what this House told me. This is when I went to Lok Sabha, you told me to ensure and get so, we got it. Now, what happened on other things, in agriculture?

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: The last sentence... (*Interruptions*).

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: The Minister himself is yielding.

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: this para says that the Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism shall be an integral part of the modalities and the outcome of negotiations in agriculture. This has not been secured.

SHRI KAMAL NATH: I would only request Mr. Arun Jaitley to explain to Dr. Murl Manohar Joshi. (*Interruptions*) He will do a great service to him and to the House. (*Interruptions*)

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: I want an explanation from you. (*Interruptions*).

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: He has given his explanation. (*Interruptions*) You please proceed. (*Interruptions*)

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Are you suggesting me to interchange places?

SHRI KAMAL NATH: Arun, I don't think that time will come, but, anyway... (*Interruptions*). If you are objecting to these words, "Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism...", I am saying that this is what is needed. Without this, we were insecure. It says, "Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism shall be an integral part of the modalities and outcome of the negotiations." This is the most crucial part of this paragraph. (*Interruptions*) But modalities, Dr. Joshi, modalities, it is an agreement, and, I explained to you in the beginning (*Interruptions*)

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: I know it. Gentleman, the question is...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Now, this is too much. I cannot start a new debate. (*Interruptions*) Please.

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: Sir, what I am saying is that it is not final. That is the point.

SHRI KAMAL NATH: Let me assure Dr. Joshi that when we are saying, when we are talking that this is full and final modalities - I am afraid and

I must say - in the WTO context means it is an agreement. (Interruptions)
Let me finish. In 2006, when we enter the full and final modalities, that will be the agreement. After that what is left, the full and final modalities are converted into legal text.

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: My point is.. (Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: That is all right. No, it cannot be..(interruptions)..

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: Sir, he is trying to confuse me: My point is that when these modalities are finalized... (interruptions)

श्री उपसभापति: जोशी जी, आप देखिए, यह आग्युमेंट नहीं चल रहा है। यहां कोर्ट रूम नहीं हो सकता है ...(व्यवधान)

SHRI KAMAL NATH: With all respect, I would submit to Dr. Joshi that this paragraph, which he is taking objection to, is the most important paragraph for India's concerns, and, Mr. Arun, may be you would like to certainly enlighten us on the technicalities of this, because without this sentence, this whole thing was rubbish. But I need this sentence, and, he is saying, "why have you got it". This is the most crucial sentence, namely, "...shall be an integral part of the modalities". That is what I have been saying that I have secured it. So, that was a crucial point. Next point was a special Safeguard Mechanism. What is a special Safeguard Mechanism? Supposing, as my hon. Friend mentioned, there is a drop in the world price of cotton, and, despite duties, the prices of world cotton fall, and they are able to sell very cheap to India, what will I do? Suppose, the prices fall somewhere in Africa or somewhere in the United States, and, the United States decides to sell at 70 per cent below the market price, because the world prices have fallen, there will be bumper crop, or, some of the African countries think; those are developing countries. We by long staple cotton worth about four hundred million dollars, I give you a specific case. What will happen if the price falls? I had to fight a lot for price, because once you get a huge import, by the time we realize it and we wake up, it will be a case, as happened about five years ago in the case of soyabean, when huge amount of soyabean prices fell. But, with price trigger, we know immediately on the screen, that the price has fallen, we can immediately raise our duties. So we kept a Special Safe gurard Mechanism with a price trigger. That was

another demand during the course of the debate. I don't remember whether that happened in Rajya Sabha or Lok Sabha. And, one of the important demands was to please make sure that the special Safe guard Mechanism has a price trigger. Here, I have secured it. And, you say, nothing has happened.

Now, I come to export subsidies and domestic support. Why are export subsidies and domestic support divided into two parts? Export subsidy is directly linked to the export of those countries..

It is the most trade distorting. It is export targeted. Domestic support is not necessarily export target. So export subsidies, while it may represent four billion dollars, but it actually represents ten billion dollars, if you do take the export credits. Then, it was said that it would be done by 2013. Friends, we are at the end of 2005. In a few days, it will be 2006. There are seven years. What does the language say in this? The language says in this, "We agree to ensure to be completed by the end of 2013." This will be achieved in a progressive and parallel manner to be specified in the modalities. This will be achieved. But, how? It is to be specified in the modalities. जिस पर आप अभी परेशान हो रहे थे कि हमें अभी 2005 में मोडैलिटीज़ करनी है। It defines, "So that a substantial part is realised by the end of the first half of the implementation period." That means, the substantial part has to be reduced by 2010 Now, the export subsidies are the most of the trade distortions. What am I looking at? I must share with you what I am looking at. I am looking at our agricultural exports. We have seven billion dollars of agricultural exports. With increased production by our farmers, we will also need access to their markets. We should not and must not remain defensive. But if I have to be offensive, in the next two years, three year or four years for our farmers, I must see that the price is not distorted first by export subsidy and then the price is not distorted by the domestic support. So, my first milestone is what? My first effort is export subsidy. That is what I secured. Next question is about cotton. In cotton, you know, as I said in the morning in the House, it is not only an issue sensitive to Africa; it concerns my own constituency. And I mentioned it there. I said I would not accept it because people who have voted me for the last 26 years, if cotton is going to take a back seat here. Immediately, they agreed to export subsidy for cotton from next year. I said, "we are not going to move". Why is export subsidy

for cotton? I told them. "I don't speak mainly for India; I speak for farmers in my own district." As 3 o'clock in the morning, I gave them this lecture. and if this is going to be in cotton, I cannot justify it, forget to my country, but those who stood for me for the last 26 years. So, here it provides, export subsidies from next year, within 12 months, in cotton. That is what I want to say.

Next I come to domestic support. Domestic support was my next target. There was not enough time, but we laid the contours. What are those contours? It is very easy for me to come back to you. The United States has already put it on the table. Seventy per cent they are willing to reduce. I said that was not enough. The European Union is already offered 53 per cent on the table. Two months ago they had offered it. I had not accepted it. It is very easy for me to come back with 70 per cent and say that I take it for granted. I said nothing doing. You have to reduce more than this. This is the G-20 proposal. What is the G-20 proposal? It was 75 per cent. The European Union said that they could not do more than 53 per cent. I said nothing doing. We couldn't agree to anything. Are you suggesting that I should have agreed to this? I already have 70 per cent from the United States and 53 per cent from European Union in my pocket. I already have them in my pocket. I am looking for more. Because I am looking for more, I did not agree. so, we left it to the future. What was wrong in that? Please, thank me for doing that. At least, appreciate that I did that. I did not agree for 70 per cent. I could have agreed for that. You all know. So, in domestic support, there are contours laid out. Mr. Arun Jaitley has rightly mentioned the Blue Box and the Green Box. I completely agree with him that the discipline in the Blue Box which is a box of production limiting support which they give. Disciplines have to come in that. I completely agree with him. He says Green Box. I completely agree with him. No problem. We have to get them. They cannot put what is distorting in the Green Box. The Green Box has payments which are not supposed to be distorting. So, we have to be very careful in the next six months. And I am entirely willing to be guided by his advice in this on Blue Box and Green Box and my other friends here. We have to see to it actually. Don't make optics out of it. That is his concern. Am I right or wrong? But in real terms, we must recognise. The difference between the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round is this. Today, you know tomorrow morning what United States is exporting. You know tomorrow morning on the net. Information technology

helps us know everthing that is happening. It is not very difficult. I agree, ten years ago, it was very difficult. It took us six months or one year to even understand what they were doing. Today, we understand it. Today, our civil society and our NGOs have done some very good work. They are expert institutions and everyday, more and more are coming into the fray. This helps us to understand this. So, of course, in future, I will be guided by the caution which you have exercised that please be careful on the Blue Box and the Green Box.

6.00 P.M.

So, in agriculture, what didn't we achieve? What I did not want to because I wanted more, I left for next six months. What you asked me to get, I have come back with, in no uncertain terms, no unequivocal terms. Okay, now, I come to industrial products. I am not seeing the time. I am to go to vote in Lok Sabha. How do we see industrial products? We are aggressive. We are going to have exports of merchandise of 100 billion dollars. Is this just happening? We are looking for market access. My concern was to open up areas where I cannot get in because of tariff peaks and tariff escalations. On fibre, on yarn, duty will be five per cent; on fabric, it is ten per cent; on shirt, it is twenty per cent; on overcoat, it goes up to 90 per cent. I want to supply them the overcoat. I don't want to supply them just a yarn. I want to give my value added products. On leather, the duty is five percent. But on leather handbags my interest lies. I want to give them leather handbags. I don't want to give them raw leather. Duties go up to 90 per cent. So, I had said that I want tariff peaks and tariff escalations to go. What does the text say? I said that I don't want to accept tariff peaks and tariff escalations. What does the text say? I will read out to you. It says, reduce or as appropriated, eliminate tariffs, for the elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalations, and, in particular, on products of export interest to developing countries. I told them in the negotiations. I am not looking to export aeroplanes to you. I am looking to export my fisheries; I am looking to export my leather products. So, these tariff peaks and tariff escalations must go. I said, it must be of interest to me--what is of export interest to developing countries must be specifically provided. In fact, we had a long argument about this. What does this mean? The difference this time was, and I am happy to inform the House, we were not negotiating, as in the past, from a position of weakness. We built up coalitions and

what Mr. Pascal Lamy said at the end of the conference, I have his words, was something which I think one should know. At the conclusion of the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting, he said that balance of power in WTO has shifted for the first time to developing countries. This is why we could get this in. And what did we want here? I wanted to make sure what was on the table—and Mr. Arun Jaitley understands it—what was the proposal made by the United States of America? It was a Swiss Formula with a single co-efficient which meant we will have to reduce our tariff sharply. I said, it's going to be thrown out. My words were, "This has to be thrown out." What are words here? They said, let's have co-efficient and co-efficients. There is difference between co-efficient and co-efficients. I said co-efficients. What was India's proposal? It was co-efficients. That is my proposal all throughout. I have got it here. I have got here another point. It takes fully into account the special needs and interests of developing countries, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments. What does that mean? I want them to reduce their tariff. If they reduce ten per cent, of course, I will also reduce five per cent. I will reduce five, six or seven per cent. That is at the heart of it. I said, please reiterate it. In fact, at one point, they asked me, "Don't you trust us? Have you understood it?" I said, "No. In this room, we should not trust anybody." We will do that outside. Let us keep it here. Let us do what we have to do here. So, in industrial tariffs, in industrial products, we have preserved India's proposal, and we have thrown out their proposal of a single coefficient. Then, tariff escalation has been taken care of, full reciprocity has been taken care of, flexibilities of para 8, I got it reaffirmed. I said: "Maybe, this becomes a grey area," and the meeting was going on till 9 a.m. in the morning after having started of. I said: "That reaffirmation I want." So, the words used are: "We reaffirm your flexibility." They said: "It is already there." I said: "But please reaffirm it." They said. "We reaffirm it on this and this point." I got it reaffirmed so that there is no area of doubt because, tomorrow also, we have to negotiate. That was in respect of the industrial products.

Now, I come to the in-services. I want to assure my friend, Shri Sitaram Yechury that, in no way, have we compromised on our policy space? There is no way, there is no commitment that we have made, as you may think, in terms of the higher education sector. Of course, these

are testing. Okay, if I do this, what will you do? If I tell you like if I was to tell them, please don't jump at this. When I say I will give you 100 per cent FDI in banking, that does not mean I am giving it to them. I said, let me see what they are offering. Then I will say, okay, this I cannot do, maybe, I can do that. What was the thing which I wanted to do? There are 34-35 countries interested in the Services sector. Let us understand that. Out of the 148 countries in the WTO system, there are 34 countries which are really engaged in the Services sector. Not all of them. So, when you say that the negotiating process had to be more engaging, the services tax only makes, without changing the architecture, the negotiating process more engaging. As a country, India is aggressive in this. Why? today, we are losing so much of business because, we cannot get visas for our contracts. Today, we do a software. That chap has to go and instal it. He needs two months' visa to instal it. He cannot go because he can't get the visa. He has to go for after sale service. He does not get a visa. That is an immigration issue. He wants to go because there is a warranty clause. Since we cannot get a visa, we cannot give a warranty. There is a large part in Services which we cannot get. I have to open up that market in Services. So, to open up that market, we said—I can read out all this, but there is no time—but, I want to say that the primacy of our request of a process has been maintained, a policy space has been maintained. I can refer to paras 25, 26, 27 and para 6 of Annexure C. Please refer to these. This will give you an idea, and this is very clear, in unequivocal terms.

Sir, we have the concerns of TRIPs, biodiversity and health, Sir, prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, we engaged ourselves with the African countries because, TRIPs and health are issues where we were doing for the African countries. TRIPs affects the African countries. The African countries agreed to a text, which gives them the comfort level, whereas, we can take that under compulsory licencing. This, to the satisfaction of our African friends is very much there, and I will be happy to explain to them in their meeting. So far as biodiversity is concerned, bio-piracy, which I call, I used the word 'bio-piracy, I am not going to preside anymore on the bio-piracy. So, what was on the table before I went, and what is on the table after I came back? That is the text. Before I went, there was no question of a target date. I have got a target date fixed on July 2006. I have got the words "intensive discussion"

included in it. We have to do it intensively. I have got it. I have put more mass into it. Certainly, the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference was not the answer for a solution to this. We cannot be pre-deciding TRIPs in Hong Kong. But for a general council decision, 'intensive', and I have got a date put. For GIs, my Darjeeling tea, my basmati rice, I need this protection. Today, a large quantity of Darjeeling rice produced in Vietnam, is being sold in other countries. I have urged very strongly for the pro-active support for GIs, as you have requested for it. You have, in the discussion, said that India must be pro-active in GIs. I follow your guidelines. So, Sir, in conclusion, I only want to say this, that I do hope that with these clarifications, I have been able to throw more light which will help you to look into this in a better light.

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: More noise, and nothing like that!

SHRI KAMAL NATH: No, Sir. And you will have the reality that this is not only a big and important step for India, but we have secured, for India, leadership in the developing countries; we have built a coalition, and in the negotiations to be held in the next six to eight months, India will continue to go into this with a strong position. It is not that we are going to be pressurised or pushed by an countries. India's concerns have been fully taken care of in what has been agreed; in what is left to be discussed, the contours of it are all in our favour, and we hope that in the continuing negotiations, which are taking place, we will be able to secure that also. Thank you very much, Sir.

Status of implementation of recommendations contained in one hundred-twelfth report of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs

गृह मंत्रालय में राज्य मंत्री (श्री माणिक राव गायित) : उपसभापति महोदय, मैं विभाग-संबंधित गृह कार्य संबंधी संसदीय स्थायी समिति के 112वें प्रतिवेदन में अंतर्विष्ट सिफारिशों के कार्यान्वयन की स्थिति के संबंध में वक्तव्य सभा पटल पर रखता हूँ और इसे पढ़ा हुआ माना जाए।

Status of Implementation of recommendations contained in the Seventh Report of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Urban Development (14th Lok Sabha)

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (SHRI SURESH PACHOURI): Sir, on behalf of my esteemed